Journal Pre-Proof: Journal of Loss Prevention in The Process Industries

Journal Pre-proof
The integration of HAZOP study with risk-matrix and the analytical-hierarchy process
for identifying critical control-points and prioritizing risks in industry – A case study
Panagiotis K. Marhavilas, Michail Filippidis, Georgios K. Koulinas, Dimitrios E.

Koulouriotis
PII: S0950-4230(19)30404-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2019.103981
Reference: JLPP 103981
To appear in: Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
Received Date: 17 May 2019

Revised Date: 20 August 2019
Accepted Date: 8 October 2019
Please cite this article as: Marhavilas, P.K., Filippidis, M., Koulinas, G.K., Koulouriotis, D.E., The
integration of HAZOP study with risk-matrix and the analytical-hierarchy process for identifying critical
control-points and prioritizing risks in industry – A case study, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2019.103981.
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THE INTEGRATION OF HAZOP STUDY WITH RISK-MATRIX AND THE ANALYTICAL-
HIERARCHY PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING CRITICAL CONTROL-POINTS AND
PRIORITIZING RISKS IN INDUSTRY – A CASE STUDY
Panagiotis K. Marhavilas1∗∗, Michail Filippidis1, Georgios K. Koulinas1, Dimitrios E. Koulouriotis1

1
Dep. of Production & Management Engineering, Democritus Univ. of Thrace, Vas. Sofias 12 St., 67132 Xanthi, Greece
Abstract
The integration of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study with the Decision-Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA) technique
and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) as well, is proposed as a new framework for identifying critical points and
potential hazards and also prioritizing risks, in industry. Therefore, the objective of this article is the development and
application of the extended HAZOP-DMRA-AHP approach (E-HAZOP) in process industries. Initially, the application of
the conventional HAZOP study is performed (as a case study) in a sour crude-oil processing-plant in order to identify
the possible fault causes of abnormal conditions (deviations) in the plant. With the results of the HAZOP study on the
one hand, and the usage of the DMRA risk assessment technique for assessing the risks, on the other side, the typical
AHP process is then introduced, in order to extend HAZOP analysis by prioritizing the risks in the worksite of the plant.
The proposed E-HAZOP framework can provide a trustworthy basis to boost process safety and improve occupational
health and safety. Moreover, it could be a useful tool for the decision makers to estimate the emergency of investing
constrained budget in actions preventing specific kind of deviations.
Key words: Sour Crude-oil; Hazard Identification; Risk analysis; HAZOP study; Operability Study; Risk-Matrix; DMRA;
Process Safety; Analytical Hierarchy Process; AHP; Multicriteria Decision Making
1. Introduction
1.1 Basics of risk, safety, hazard identification and risk ranking
Tolerable risk is succeeded by the procedures of risk assessment (consisted of risk-analysis and risk-evaluation
subprocesses) and risk reduction (ISO/IEC, 1999; 2009), while risk management can be considered as the entire
scheme that includes both qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques, and can be separated into these two
procedures. The final subphase is characterized by taking appropriate measures in order to be controled and/or
reduced the risk. A significant part of risk analysis subphase, and as a consequence of the total process of risk
management, is the hazard identification process (IEC, 1995; Suokas J., 1988; Olsson, 1999; Lee, 2006; Marhavilas et
al. 2011a, 2011b; Marhavilas and Koulouriotis, 2012; Marhavilas, 2015; Jain et al. 2018a, 2018b; Aziz et al. 2019).
The purpose of hazard identification is to identify, at least in theory, all possible hazards that may occur during
normal operations, as well as, during specific operations carried out on the installation. Such activities include start up
and shut down of the installation, or maintenance. Thus, the requirements are as follows: (i) to identify, as complete
as possible, the hazards that arise from all the activities of the facility (ii) to make the hazard identification tailored to
the equipment, systems and operations of the facility in which the operation will take place (Vinnem, 1998). Besides,
hazard identification techniques can be divided into four categories depending on the area in which they are
predominantly applied: (i) process hazards identification, (ii) hardware hazards identification, (iii) control hazards
identification and (iv) human hazards identification.
There has been a development of numerous hazard identification techniques, of which some are more
established than others, and the appropriateness of these techniques to identify hazards in specific phases of a project
is not universal. Furthermore, as it is clear from the scientific literature, there is a great choice when it comes to
hazard identification techniques, however the chemical and process industry has, in practice, adopted and used
extensively a few of them, with the remarkable example of HAZOP (Andersen and Mostue, 2012; Marhavilas et al.
2011a; Othman et al., 2016).
There are so different types of hazards existed in various installations that a HAZOP-study may definitely take into
account (for example toxic release, fire, explosion, chemical explosions, physical explosions, reactivity, etc). Some of
the possible hazards, which need to be identified especially in process installations, are associated with the
management of highly hazardous materials and are presented by CCPS with a guidelines-list (CCPS, 2001; 2008). The
HAZOP study is a structured method of identifying potential hazards and problematic operation of a process by
examining the effects of various deviations from the design conditions. Chemical processes involve a wide array of
interconnected equipment, instrumentation, utilities and other devices to achieve the installation design intent, for
example the stabilization of crude-oil. Equipment grouping into a node can be difficult because of the
interconnectivity that is inherent in the process industry.
∗ Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed: Dr Panagiotis Marhavilas, e-mail: marhavil@pme.duth.gr; Phone: +30 2541079320
HAZOP cannot be conducted at the conceptual phase of a project because of the lacking of any detailed Piping
and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) at that point. A hazard review must be performed to identify potential hazards
in the process. An evaluation of the severity of those hazards may follow. This review should be carried out as early as
possible, so that there will be an adequate time-frame to implement fundamental modifications of the design
concept, following principles of inherent safe design. HAZOP originally was considered suitable for new installations
only, but in a short period of time it came to be recognized as a useful tool for also existing facilities. This was due to
the introduction of new sets of regulations, like the SEVESO directive, that required the periodic hazard analysis of an
installation, and partly because of the increasing safety awareness of the industry. The potential hazards in an existing
plant cannot be calculated or identified at the beginning of its operations because the processed involved can change
dramatically over time. Also some of the modifications that are being made in older facilities may not have been
analyzed for the possible hazards that may entail for the process. These modifications could compromise the safety of
the original design but as process installations are a dynamic system, they are necessary. There many different kinds
of changes that take place in the course of a lifetime of an installation. There are vessels or pumps added, alterations
of the process parameters to increase productivity, reduce cost or conserve energy. It would not be cost effective to
perform a HAZOP study for each and every change that may be implemented in an installation.
To continue, risk ranking is a useful tool in HAZOP analysis which allows a prioritization of the recommendations
made at the end of the process. Establishments often develop corporate risk-ranking schemes to make sure that there
is a consistency in the results of the HAZOP studies. Risk ranking is achieved by performing qualitative estimations of
the severity and likelihoods of hazardous scenarios and combining them to create risk estimates in matrix, table or
grid form.
Furthermore, Analytic hierarchy process (AHP), introduced by Saaty (1990), is one of the most popular and
efficient multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) methods. Its hierarchical and systematic methodology gives it a
popular nature to solve MCDM problems, and so that it has been successfully incorporated in various fields, from
education, to military purposes. In safety, AHP has been applied in various circumstances, but its assimilation to
HAZOP studies is rare (Othman et al., 2016).
1.2 Objectives
This work concentrates on the expansion of the HAZOP method, which is one of the most widely used in
industry, with other two valuable techniques, the DMRA and AHP, taking into account that their simultaneous
incorporation to HAZOP, is nonexistent in the scientific literature. Consequently, the objectives of this article are the
comprehensive presentation of (i) the conventional HAZOP study, the DMRA technique, and the AHP process, and (ii)
an especial HAZOP-study, extended with Risk-Matrix (DMRA) and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), i.e. the E-
HAZOP approach. In addition, the applications of the combined HAZOP-DMRA technique and also the new proposed
E-HAZOP framework are performed as case studies, in a sour crude-oil processing plant, which is particularly very
significant because it combines many hazards, such as flammable liquids and gases and also toxic gases. Finally, our
main aim is to make public that the suggested E-HAZOP technique could be a handy tool for the decision makers to
improve occupational and process safety.
1.3 Structure of the article

The paper is organized by the following sections:
(1) introduction, which focuses on (i) elements of risk, safety, hazard identification and risk ranking, (ii) the
objectives of the work
(2) literature review
(3) technical presentation of a sour crude-oil process industry, which is used for the conventional and the
extended HAZOP-study application,
(4) presentation of the methodological framework of an extended-HAZOP study (E-HAZOP), implemented by the
combination of HAZOP, DMRA and AHP,
(5) application of the new proposed E-HAZOP method (as a case study) in a sour crude-oil processing-plant,
(6) discussion of main points, and
(7) conclusions
2. Literature review
HAZOP studies were introduced by the “Critical Examination” technique of the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the
mid-1960s. A decade later, HAZOP was formally published as a disciplined procedure to identify deviations from the
design intent (Lawley, 1974; 1976). In 1977, the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) in the UK published the first
guideline to HAZOP (CIA, 1977).
It was proposed as a technique to be used in the process industries to identify hazard and plan safety measures.
The objectives should always include the identification of hazards in the installation and the potential operating
problems. The hazards can be environmental or health and safety hazards that could originate or having an impact
both on and off site (Qureshi, 1988).
The concept of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was developed with the aim of identifying possible
hazards which are present in installations that operate using or producing highly hazardous materials. The main
concern was to eliminate any source that could possibly lead to a major accident, like a toxic release, explosions and
fires (Swann and Preston, 1995). Nonetheless, over the years, HAZOP’s application has been extended to numerous
other types of facilities because of its ability not only to identify hazards, but also operational deviations from the
desired state. So, HAZOP has been adopted for medical diagnostic systems (Chudleigh, 1994), road-safety measures
(Jagtman et al., 2005) and hazard analysis in photovoltaic facilities (Ftenakis and Trammell, 2003) among others. The
diversity of fields that HAZOP has been implemented shows that it has come to be considered a powerful technique to
improve many kinds of systems.
The process of HAZOP requires the concerted efforts of a team of people in management system and is divided
into three phases: (i) Definition and Preparation, (ii) Organization, and (iii) Execution and Documentation. The first
phase requires the definition of the purpose, scope and objectives of the study. Also a team leader and the team that
will conduct the study should be assembled, after taking into consideration the skills and knowledge required for the
specific installation and the phase in which the survey will take place. In the second phase two key commitments
should be addressed: (i) to divide the process into manageable parts for immediate reviewing, (ii) to plan the study
schedule and to arrange for the meetings. Finally the third phase will consist of the identification and documentation
of the hazardous scenarios that could materialize from the process design intent and operation. Also, the
recommendations of the HAZOP team should be documented in order to be considered (Kletz, 1997, 1999; Baladeh,
2019).
Although it has such a structured methodology, the HAZOP study can be tedious, complex and time consuming.
The way of organizing the study into manageable sections to be analyzed, is critical for the success of the endeavor.
The proper division into suitable sized nodes is a difficult task. The practice can be considered as something of an art,
because there is no assisted node management, so it is based entirely on the leader’s judgement (Dunjó et al., 2010).
An excellent literature survey for HAZOP-analysis, with the purpose of classifying the research conducted over
the years, and defining the HAZOP state-of-the-art, can be found in the study of Dunjó et al. (2010).
The person responsible for deciding why and when to conduct a HAZOP study, in both existing and new process
facilities is the project-manager. When the study will take place in a new facility, it can be considered only after the
basic engineering documentation has been produced. The configuration of the HAZOP study may need to be updated
in the case of existing facilities. It is a critical decision whether to conduct a new hazard identification analysis when a
change in the process is introduced. Whatever the case, the validation procedure will have to be performed.
Consequently, the decision on why and where to conduct a HAZOP study depends directly on the process lifetime. The
purpose, scope and objectives should be defined according to that (Herbert, 2011).
Besides, many accidents in the process industry have occurred due to the unforeseen consequences of minor
modifications. So, it is up to the management of the facility to determine whether a modification contains risks to
health, safety or the environment. Furthermore, whenever the conclusion of this process is that a hazard may be
present then the existing HAZOP study has to be updated (Baybutt, 2013).
What is more, HAZOP studies are performed for a variety of reasons. To validate good engineering practices, to
comply with regulatory requirements, to investigate accidents, to meet the recommendations of internal audits or to
guide in the creation of a safety management system (Mentzer et al., 2014). Additionally, HAZOP is considered as an
effective method for recognizing hazards, which additionally could increase the safety levels, prevent accidents and
enhance the reliability of systems via the reduction of operational problems (Alaei et al. 2014; O Herrera, 2018).
Nevertheless, conventional HAZOP has several drawbacks (Cheraghi et al., 2019) and so that, the development of
HAZOP-analysis is in progress, in such a way, that other processes are being embodied, day after day, in HAZOP. Risk-
matrix or decision-matrix risk assessment (DMRA) is a characteristic case. For instance, Alaei et al. (2014) evaluated
the level of safety in the Claus reaction furnace package/blower/heat-exchanger equipments of a sulfur recovery unit
(SRU), using a HAZOP-study joint with DMRA. Moreover, Filippidis (2014) merged the DMRA with HAZOP for achieving
hazard identification and risk analysis in the first stage separation of a crude-oil processing plant.
DMRA is a systematic and commonly used approach for estimating risks and consists of measuring and
categorizing risks on an informed judgment basis as to both probability and consequence and as to relative
importance (Reniers et al. 2005; Marhavilas et al. 2011a; 2011b; Gul et al. 2018). Once the hazards have been
identified, the question of assigning severity and probability ratings must be addressed. It is very important to note
that frequency estimates and consequence estimates are very well considered and performed by experienced risk
managers. The current consensus is that risk ranking in HAZOP studies should be used for qualitative reasons, in order
to prioritize the recommendations that would emerge. It is beyond the point of HAZOP to perform a quantification of
the risks involved in the process as there are more suitable analysis methods to that purpose (Montague, 1990). There
are some guidelines involving rink ranking. The more levels, either for severity or frequency, the more precise will the
assessment be. However in the case of risk assessment in the context of a HAZOP study the process is based on
empirical judgement and this inherently mean a lack of precision.
To proceded, the integration of multicriteria methods with HAZOP has been attracted significant research
interest. Mainly, AHP used for occupational health and safety problems, initially by Henderson & Dutta (1992) and
especially for ergonomic factors assessment. Also, Badri et al. (2012) used multicriteria analysis methods for
occupational health-safety (OHS) risks evaluation, while Aminbakhsh et al. (2013) used AHP for safety risks
prioritization in construction projects. Moreover, Gul and Guneri (2016) presented a fuzzy multi criteria risk-
assessment methodology based on a risk-matrix technique, in order to help aluminum industry stakeholders to
struggle with hazards more efficiently. Besides, Othman et al. (2016) used AHP for ranking risk factors identified by a
HAZOP study, and applied to a reactor unit and a complex system of dividing wall column pilot plant. Recently,
Cheraghi et al. (2019) used HAZOP with fuzzy AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS to determine the weight of risk factors and to
prioritize the hazards on a gas wellhead facility.
3. Presentation of the Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant
3.1 Description of the installation and its purpose

A crude stabilization unit processes sour crude-oil (i.e. crude-oil that contains hydrogen sulfide) from the oil
production platform and produces marketable crude-oil. The processes that take place are:
• Desalinization and stabilization of crude-oil. The unit has been designed to desalinate and stabilize 100 m /h
3
incoming crude-oil from the production platform. During this process sour gas is produced, approximately 70.000
Nm3/day that are treated in a different industrial unit.
• Gas compression. Sour gas that is being produced from the top of the crude stabilizer tower has to be
compressed in order to be merged with the sour gas stream originating from the three-phase separator vessel. The
sum of the two streams is cooled by air cooled heat exchangers and then is passed through a three-phase separator
where water and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) are separated.
• NGL stripping. During this process, the NGL produced during the processes mentioned above is being
stripped of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and some volatile hydrocarbons before being mixed with the stabilized crude-oil
and routed to storage.
There are one input and three outputs in the unit. The input is sour crude-oil that is being transferred to the unit
via a submerged 8” pipeline from the oil production platform. The first output is stabilized crude-oil that is driven to
storage after it is mixed with H2S-free NGL. The second output is sour gas that is produced in the unit and is driven to
another unit for further treatment. The third output is the sour water that is the sum of the water content that arrives
in the facility with the crude-oil and the injected water that has been mixed with it, before being recovered. There are
also utilities flows in the unit.
• 20.7 bar steam is being provided to heat exchanger to provide the energy required for the crude stabilization
and NGL stripping.
• Potable water is being mixed with the sour crude-oil to aid in the desalinization process.
• Compressed air is being provided for the operation of the control valves.
• Nitrogen is used occasionally for vessel or pipeline for inertion.
The input stream of the sour crude-oil arrives at the unit through an 8” pipe. It has a pressure of 20 bars and the
o o
temperature is that of the sea, so it fluctuated seasonally from 14 C in the winter to 25 C in the summer. It is a
mixture of saturated volatile hydrocarbons, various volatile compounds (Nitrogen, Hydrogen Sulfide, Carbon-dioxide),
medium volatility hydrocarbons and heavier compounds.
The untreated sour crude-oil that enters the unit also contains brine, dissolved sodium, calcium and magnesium
chlorides in small quantities of water. The brine is dispersed in the crude-oil in the form of tiny suspended droplets
and depending on the diameter of these droplets, they can be separated by gravity in calm conditions or by using
electrical methods.
The unit is designed to remove water, salts, suspended particles, hydrogen sulfide and a large part of the volatile
hydrocarbons from the sour crude-oil and transforming it into stabilized crude-oil. Stabilized crude-oil is safer for
storage, transportation and further processing in a refinery. The final stabilized crude-oil must have specific
characteristics such as:
• Vapor pressure reid must be below 12 PSI
• H2S content must be below 15 ppm
• Water content must be as close to zero as possible
• Salt content must be below 28 mg/lt
The removal of the dissolved hydrogen sulfide is necessary because it is a volatile, toxic and flammable gas that
would render storage and transportation significantly more dangerous. Although non-toxic, vapor pressure in the final
product must be kept under a maximum value by removing volatile hydrocarbons to avoid creating an explosive
environment during storage and transportation.
The amount of salts in the final product is important for all phases of its processing (from stabilization to refining),
even in small quantities. It can leave deposits in process equipment that would cause reduction of their efficiency and
shut down for maintenance. Also it can increase the corrosion in the transportation pipelines and in storage facilities.
Furthermore, it can increase the cost of moving the stabilized crude-oil to the refineries, as it is not a value product
and finally it can cause a significant damage to fraction distillation columns in the refineries. There are chloride salts
(and especially magnesium chloride) which are broken down and form the extremely corrosive hydrochloric acid.
As far as the produced sour gas is concerned, the gas produced in the unit must be separated from its liquefiable
contents before being driven to the gas treatment unit. This is pursued to avoid problematic operation in the sour gas
treatment unit. Also they contain valuable hydrocarbons that must be recovered and reinjected in the final crude-oil
product to increase its value. This has to be achieved without violating the maximum permissible value for the vapor
pressure. The NGL that is recovered from the gas produced in the unit contains H2S and so, it must be stripped before
the spiking of the crude-oil can occur.
3.2 Installation Equipment

In Table 1 we a present a concise description of the installation equipment, which is illustrated by the process
flow diagram (PFD) of Figure 1 and divided into vessels, heat exchangers, pumps and compressors. In this table, it is
also included a brief description of their functioning, not extended to all their details (more information exists in the
work of M. Filippidis, 2017).
The installation includes, on the one hand, two cooling heat exchangers using sea water and another one using
fans, and on the other side, two heating heat exchangers that use 20.7 bar steam as a source of energy. In addition,
there are existed a heat-recovery heat exchanger, three pumps and one compressor. Moreover, there are three types
of control valves in the facility, i.e. pressure, flow and level valves that control the respective element. They are
pneumatic valves that draw their power from compressed air supplied from a utilities-unit. If the air supply is lost due
to any reason the control valves will assume a predetermined position, either closed or open, to ensure the safety of
the installation. There are also several pressure relief valves and alarm switches to ensure the safe operation of the
facility.
Table 1. A concise description of the installation equipment

Nr Type of the specifications
part of
installation
equipment
1. V-101: It is a three-phase separator vessel in which sour gas is being released from the sour crude-oil due to the drop of
pressure that is controlled by PV-101. Also any water content in the sour crude-oil is being caught in the boot of the vessel and
moved to the sour water processing unit before it is released in the sea. As sour crude-oil passes through PV-101, pressure drops
Vessels to 10 bars and is maintained at that level with PV-102 that releases sour gas to E-104. At the exit of the vessel there is a demister
to trap some hydrocarbon droplets. Oil is exiting the vessel through flow control and FV-107 to V-102. The LV-103 on the vessel
triggers a low alarm if the level of the sour crude in the vessel drops below 25% and a high alarm if the level rises above 75%. It
also triggers a shut-down function if the level reaches 80%.
ME-101: It is a desalinization vessel that uses an electrical field to achieve separation of the salts in the sour crude-oil and
their dissolution in the water at the bottom of the vessel. The mixture of crude-oil and water enters the vessel through an internal
distributor into the high voltage electrical field. Part of the water is separated by gravity and the rest is passed through the
electrical field with the crude-oil. The high voltage field aids in the aggregation of the small water droplets to larger that can be
separated by gravity. The low voltage electrical field inside the vessel further aids in the separation of the water droplets by
achieving additional aggregation of the water droplets. Water and various impurities dissolved in it (oil droplets, asphaltenes, iron
oxides, iron sulfide and others) are gathered in the bottom of the vessel and form of water layer. This sour water is constantly
being removed and guided to the sour water processing unit for treatment. Water level is controlled by the LV-101 and the
pressure inside the vessel is controlled by PV-101. The electrical transformer of the vessel ME-101 has a selectable voltage output
in five steps, from 15 KV to 22 KV. The voltage applied is chosen based on the samples taken at the output of the vessel. If the
water and salts level is above the specified level then the voltage can be increased to better aggregate the water droplets. Inside
the desalter there are two parallel grids. Voltage is applied to the bottom one whereas the top one is grounded, as is the vessel
itself. In reality inside the vessel there are two electrical fields. The one is strong and is formed between the charged and the
grounded grid and the other is weak and is formed between the charged grid and the water layer that is in contact with the
grounded vessel wall.
V-102: It is the crude stabilizer column. It has 30 valve tray disks and operates at 2.6 bars and the bottom temperature is
160 oC. Sour crude-oil is inserted through a distributor above the top tray. Bellow the bottom valve tray there is chimney tray,
where crude-oil is being collected and is passed through the reboilers E-101 to be heated and partly gasified. The returning gases
and liquid crude-oil is returned to V-102 below the chimney tray where the gases can ascent through the chimney and come into
contact with the sour crude-oil descending.
As the gases move upwards through the valves of the disks of the column they come into contact and heat the incoming
crude-oil releasing the more volatile components such as light hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide. The result of this process is
that the crude-oil collected in the bottom of V-102 is virtually free of hydrogen sulfide and with low enough vapor pressure to
meet the specifications of the final crude-oil to storage requirements. Stabilized crude-oil from the bottom of the column is fed in
the P-101 pumps to be transferred to storage after heat is recovered in E-102 and is cooled in E-103. The level in the bottom is
controlled via LV-106 which is located after the heat exchanger E-103. The pressure inside the vessel is kept constant with
pressure control and PV-103.
V-103: It is scrubber vessel that is intended to retain water that is contained in the gas output from the top of V-102. The
sour water that is collected in V-103 is guided through level control and LV-109 to the sour water processing unit for treatment
before it is released in the sea. At the top of the vessel there is a demister to increase the collection of water droplets from the
gas.
V-106: It is a vessel that acts as a buffer between the potable water intake and the crude-oil pipeline injection point. It has
attached in its bridle a level transmitter that controls the LV-102 keeping the water level inside the vessel constant. Blocking the
valve and measuring the decrease in the water level aids in the calculation of the water injection rate. At the bottom of the vessel
there is a connection to P-102.
V-107: It is NGL separator and is intended to collect the NGL from the cooled gas stream from E-104 that also contains the
NGL separated at V-110. It has a side intake for the gas and a demister at the top bellow the gas exit. The NGL collected at the
bottom is fed to P-103 to be stripped at V-108. The gas that exits from the top is guided to the sour gas treatment unit as it is
mostly hydrogen sulfide.
V-108: It is a condensate stripper column. The sour condensate that is separated in V-107 is fed to the condensate stripper
V-108 through flow control valve FV-124. The stripper column consists of 3 layers of filler material. A liquid outtake is situated
above a chimney tray disk at the bottom of the vessel. The liquid is moved through there to E-105 where it is heated with 20,7 bar
steam to gasify it and returned at a point below the chimney tray. As the hot gases ascent in the column they come into contact
with the sour NGL that is descending forcing hydrogen sulfide and some more volatile components to be released and exit
through the top of the column. The gas from the top joins the stream from V-107 and is fed to the sour gas processing unit. The
H2S free NGL at the bottom is cooled in E-106 using sea water and it joins the stream of crude-oil to storage.
V-110: It is a three-phase separator. Cooled gas from E-104 enters the vessel and separates into liquid and gas. The gas
exits the vessel from the opposing side to the entry. The liquids are further separated into water which is collected by gravity in
the boot and NGL between the water and the gas. There is a demister situated before the boot of the vessel to retain more liquid
droplets. Sour water from the boot is guided to the sour water processing unit and NGL is reinjected in the gas stream after the
PV-118. This is done because there is minimum flow line before PV-118 that recirculates gas that exits the vessel back to C-101.
2. Heat E-101: It is a heat exchanger that uses 20.7 bar steam to heat the sour crude-oil in V-102. The steam provided to E-101 is
Exchangers controlled through FV-110.
E-102: It is a heat recovery heat exchanger that utilizes the energy from the stabilized crude-oil leaving V-102 to heat the
incoming sour crude-oil entering the unit. There are additional advantages to this process, as the increased temperature of the
sour crude-oil is increasing its mobility by lowering its viscosity. Furthermore there are advantages in the desalinization process in
ME-101 as the increased temperature favors the separation of the water and salts from the crude-oil. Only one of the two heat
exchangers is in operation at any given moment.
E-103: It is a cooling heat exchanger that uses sea water to achieve its purpose. It a situated after E-202 and the stabilized
crude-oil after being cooled in E-203 is shifted to storage. The reason for cooling the crude-oil before moving the stabilized crude-
oil to storage is to avoid creating an explosive environment in the tanks and avoid losing valuable volatile hydrocarbons due to
evaporation in the tanks.
E-104: It is an air cooled heat exchanger that is used to cool the stream of sour gas originating from C-101 and V-101. It has
3 fans and regulated shutters to control the gas output temperature. The gas, after exiting E-104, is passed through V-110 where
it deposits its liquefiable content.
E-105: It is a heat exchanger that uses 20,7 bar steam to heat the sour crude-oil in V-108. The steam provided to E-105 is
controlled through FV-127.
E-106: It is water cooled heat exchanger using sea water as a cooling medium. NGL exiting V-108 passes through E-106 and
is cooled to 38 oC and afterwards it joins the stream of stabilized crude-oil to storage.
3. P-101: It is a centrifugal pump to move the stabilized crude-oil from the bottom of V-102 through E-102 and E-103 to
storage. It has a design flow rate of 216 m3/hr. The rated suction pressure is 3.1 barg and the rated discharge pressure is 8.1 bar,
Pumps so it has a dP of 5 bar. The design operating temperature of the liquid is 160 oC. It is rotating at 2900 rpm and has a rated hydraulic
power of 30.2 kW. The efficiency is 72.6% and the motor power is 75 kW.
P-102: It is a reciprocating pump to inject potable water in the sour crude-oil stream. The suction pressure is 1 barg and the
discharge pressure is 20 barg in order to be able to be connected with the crude-oil pipeline. The water supply is from V-106 and
the flow rate is controlled through a recirculating valve which defines the percentage of the total water flow rate will be mixed
with the crude-oil. The maximum flow rate is 3 m3/h. It has a rated power of 4 kW.
P-103: It is a centrifugal pump to move the sour NGL from the bottom of V-107 to V-108 for stripping. It has a design flow
rate of 3.4 m3/hr. The rated suction pressure is 9.3 barg and the rated discharge pressure is 12.3 bars, so it has a dP of 3 bar. The
design operating temperature of the liquid is 16 oC. It is rotating at 2900 rpm and has a rated hydraulic power of 0.29 kW. The
efficiency is 18 % and the motor power is 1.64 KW.
4. C-101: It is a two-stage double action reciprocating gas compressor that is in place to pressurize gas originating from the top
of V-102 to be able to merge with the gas released from V-101. The first stage of the compressor has a suction pressure of 2.2
barg at 71 oC from V-103 and a discharge pressure of 5 barg at 108 oC. In the second stage the pressure rises to 10 barg at 145 oC.
The rated flow rate for the compressor is 4900 Nm3/h. It is rotating at 490 rpm and has an electric motor with a rated power of
400 kW. To achieve the minimum flow rate required by the compressor there is a recirculating scheme where some of the gas,
after being cooled is returned through pressure control to V-103 to be fed to C-101 once more. There is a PD vessel on the suction
Compressors and discharge side of each stage to damp the pressure fluctuations on the compressor. Because of the fact that the compressor
contains sour gas which is lethal to humans and highly flammable if released in the atmosphere, there is a sealing system in place
on each stage. Beside the mechanical barriers there is space containing pressurized nitrogen that continuously flows to the flare
system. If the mechanical seals fail then the flow rate would increase, thus increasing the flow rate and alarming the operators to
stop the compressor. Besides this, there are numerous switches that would either alarm the operators of a deviation from the
normal operation or in some cases would cause the compressor the shut-down.
4. The methodogical framework of E-HAZOP

In Figure 2, we illustrate, by “amalgamating” HAZOP with Risk-Matrix (DMRA) and the typical Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP), the flowchart of the new-proposed E-HAZOP alternative risk-assessment framework, as a part of the
risk-management process.
This methοdοgical framewοrk, cοnsists οf four separate steps: the first includes hazard-sοurces’ identificatiοn
using ΗΑΖΟΡ-analysis, next follows the risk-quantification step, and third is applied the cοmbinatiοn and jοintly
evaluatiοn using the ΑΗΡ and DΜRΑ, as a part οf the quantified risk evaluatiοn. Τhe ΑΗΡ method is used fοr
priοritizing the risk factοrs. Finally, in case that the resulting amount of risk is not tolerable, the process incοrpοrates
safety related decisiοn making in order to apply policies to reduce risk. We nοte that the new alternative risk-
assessment framewοrk and the develοpment οf this figure were based οn the safety aspects–guidelines οf ΙSΟ/ΙΕC
(1999, 2009), Ηøj and Κröger (2002) and Μarhavilas (2015; chapter 10).
Below, we present some fundamental elements of the HAZOP-study, DMRA technique and the typical AHP in
order to be more comprehensible, the application of E-HAZOP (as case study) in a sour crude-oil industry.
4.1 HAZOP study

There are two aspects that a HAZOP team leader must take into consideration when deciding on the node
selection issue: (i) The equipment in the node must share the same design intention, (ii) The sections should be equal
in size. There are specific steps that a team leader must take in order to ensure a well selected set of nodes, regardless
of the process in which it is being applied. The data that are required to assist in this process are the following (Kletz,
1997; 1999): (i) Process description, (ii) Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), (iii) Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs).
The execution subphase of HAZOP analysis, concerning a part of the system with specific function and
interconnectivity, follows the organization of this system into nodes. The method is based on using guidewords, such
as “no”, “more” or “less”, in combination with various parameters, such as “temperature”, “flow” or “pressure” in
order to create deviations from normal operation. This procedure is applied on every node. The HAZOP team, after
the exploration of all possible deviations of a node, proceeds to exploration of practical causes and possible
consequences. For every “cause/consequence” combination, which constitutes a scenario, existing safeguards must
be identified (or newly proposed), that could prevent, detect, control or mitigate the hazardous situation. Finally, if
the safeguards are insufficient to properly handle the problem, then the HAZOP-team will have to provide its
recommendations (Macdonald, 2004; CCPS, 2008).
4.2 The DMRA technique

Marhavilas and Koulouriotis (2008) presented a DMRA technique, which was based on the works of Johnson
(1973), Woodruff (2005) and Reniers et al. (2005). In particular, they developed two tables, one for showing the
criticality rating (i.e. the severity S of consequences ratings), and a second one for the hazard probability ratings L (i.e.
the frequency rating). Finally, the risk (R) was resulted by the development of the risk matrix according to relation
R=SxL.
Table 2 depicts, according to IEC (2003), the basic risk-ranking levels by combining the severity levels with the
cause frequency levels. Furthermore, Table 3 illustrates according to Alaei (2014) and Filippidis (2014, 2017) the risk-
matrix parameters for the severity (S) and likelihood (L), wheareas Table 4, the produced risk matrix. Therefore, the
assigned values for likelihood and severity, concerning each of the hazards identified in the HAZOP process, have to be
placed in the risk-matrix in order to be acquired a single risk value (that means the risk assessment of that specific
risk).
Table 2. Basic risk ranking criteria (IEC, 2003)
Risk Matrix (R)

Consequence Severity Levels (S)
SM SS SE
LL R6 R5 R3
Frequency
Levels (L)
Cause
LM R5 R4 R2
LH R3 R2 R1
Annotations:
Minor (SM) : Impact initially limited to local area of event with potential for broader
consequence, if corrective action not taken
Serious (SS) : Impact event could cause serious injury or fatality on site or off site
Extensive (SE) : Impact event that is five or more times severe than a serious event
Low (LL) : A failure or series of failure with a very low probability of occurrence within
the expected lifetime of the plant
Medium (LM) : A failure or series of failure with a low probability of occurrence within
the expected lifetime of the plant
High (LH) : A failure can reasonably be expected to occur within the expected lifetime of
the plant
Table 3. Ranking of the risk-matrix parameters for the severity and likelihood [the table development
was based on the works of Alaei (2014) and Filippidis (2014, 2017)]
Severity (S)
Ranking Likelihood (L) Consequences regarding Consequences regarding
personnel injury environmental damage
1 Very likely (occurs
Catastrophic/ single fatality or multiple Multiple environments
frequently) :
Fatal fatalities) affected
Once per month
2 Likely (recurrent but
Severe/ fracture, hospitalisation >24
not frequent) : Major localized effect
Serious hrs, incapacitation >4 weeks
Once per year
3 Possible (could
strain/twist, sprain/ cramp/
occur, but
Major dislocation, incapacitation > Localized effect
uncommon) :
3 days
Once per 10 years
4 Unlikely (occurs small cut, abrasion/
rarely) : Small/ Minor scratch/scrape, basic first- Minor effect
Once per 25 years aid need, no-hospitalization
5 Remote (almost Trivial/No
discomfort, slight bruising,
never) : impact, only Slight/no effect
self-help recovery
Once per 100 years Minor
Table 4. Risk Matrix
[1] 4 3 2 1 AC 4: “Critical Risk”
[2] 3 2 1 AC AC 3: “High Risk”

Severity
Risk (R) escalation

escalation ↑[3] 2 1 AC AC NSR 2: “Medium Risk”
(S)
→
[4] 1 AC AC NSR NSR 1: “Low Risk”
[5] AC AC NSR NSR NSR AC: “Acceptable”
NSR: “No special

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] risk”
←
Likelihood escalation (L)
4.3 The Analytical Hierarchy Process

The AHP method supports organizing the multicriteria problem into a hierarchical structure and then, via pairwise
comparisons and weightings, defining the local and global priorities for the criteria and subcriteria of the problem.
AHP uses as input the judgments of the decision maker on how important is a criterion over another, during
conducting the pairwise comparisons, and outputs a ranking according the importance of each criterion and/or
subcriterion of the analysis. Assignments of the decision maker’s qualitative estimations of importance to numerical
values are realized using a standard scale (Table 5).
Table 5. The basic scale used for assigning numerical values to linguistic variables (Saaty, 1990)
Definition Intensity of
importance
Two activities are equally important to the objective 1
An activity is moderately more important than another 3
An activity is strongly more important than another 5
An activity is very strongly more important than another 7
An activity is extremely more important than another 9
Intermediate values, used when compromise is needed 2,4,6, and 8
A very important characteristic of the method is that it checks the input judgments of the decision maker, for possible
inconsistency. The latter improves the quality of the results. In the present study, we use typical AHP for ranking
hazards identified by the HAZOP method.
5. Case Study
5.1 Application of HAZOP with DMRA on a Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant

The descriptive/analytical study was carried out in a sour crude-oil processing plant, located in Greece, by a three-
mebers team. The HAZOP team was consisted, on the one hand, of two unit-operators in the process facility under
examination, i.e. the installation’s operations superintendent (IOS) and the maintenance department superintendent
(MDS), and on the other side, of the risk manager (RM), who directed this team, and who was also the expert and
decision maker (DM) for the judgments of Saaty’s scale in AHP technique. The RM/DM was a qualified mechanical
engineer with significant experience in hazard identification in process industries. The IOS was a qualified chemical
engineer with considerable expertise in the chemical process industry, while the MDS was a mechanical engineer. The
unit operators had long experience in operating the facility and acquired valuable knowledge on previous incidents
and possible hazards. The HAZOP sessions took place during a period of six months, and were completed totally in
twelve sessions. At the first two sessions the process was explained to the team and the nodes of the unit were
selected. During the compilation of the HAZOP tables, any guidewords that didn’t apply to the particular node were
omitted. Also any deviation that didn’t cause any effect was also left out. Finally, in the last session, the three-member
team of experts extracted the judgments for the hazards-ranking of the typical AHP method.
• Step 1 - Node selection and purpose: The HAZOP meeting is started with node selection. A node represents a
section of the process in which the condition has significant change in term of pressure, temperature, chemical
composition. During the compilation of the HAZOP tables, any guidewords that didn’t apply to the particular node
were omitted. Also any deviation that didn’t cause any effect was also left out. Taking into account the function of the
equipment involved and the connections between the vessels, totally nine (9) nodes were selected as follows:
• Node 1: Water Injection System
• Node 2: Preheating and Cooling Exchangers
• Node 3: Desalter Vessel ME-101
• Node 4: Low Pressure Separator
• Node 5: Crude stabilization column
• Node 6: Gas Compressor station and its accompanying scrubber vessel
• Node 7: Compressor gas cooling & liquid recovery
• Node 8: Condensate stripper column feeds vessel and pump P-103
• Node 9: Condensate stripper and cooling
• Step 2 - Process guideword/safe limits: The basic idea of HAZOP is identifying the deviation from design or safe
process conditions. So, the process parameter which will be discussed should be identified. The general process
parameters are: “Flow”, “Pressure”, “Temperature”, “Level”, “Composition”, “Containment” and “Phase”. And the
guidewords for deviation from the safe operating limits are: “More”, “Less”, “No”, “Reverse”, and “Other than”. The
guidewords are combined with process parameters to identify the deviation from safe process condition. Table 6
illustrates the HAZOP study elements associated with the above selected nodes.
• Step 3 - Identification of hazards and their causes: Once the nodes are described and the guidewords and process
parameters are defined, the hazards are determined. A hazard is a deviation from the safe operating limit which is
determind by using the particular guidewords. The HAZOP team identified the root causes of the hazards associated
with the specific node.
• Step 4 - Consequences: At the next step the HAZOP team had determined the consequence of hazards in term of
safety, environmental, and economic. These consequences are determined with and without safeguards in place.
• Step 5 - Identification of safeguards: The relevant available safeguards to detect the identified deviations
(hazards) and prevent the identified consequences are considered and documented in HAZOP worksheet.
• Step 6 - Recommendations: The recommendations to decrease the level of risk are discussed by HAZOP team and
recorded in the HAZOP worksheet.
The risk-matrix format that was used in the risk assessment will have the form illustrated in Table 4. Our method
was based on significant historical data to analyze occurrences per number of operations for specific hazards. The
likelihood of the identified hazards has been assigned by using the information base of previous incidents in the unit
with similar equipment. Moreover, the failure rate of common control equipment, such as level or pressure
transmitters, has been calculated by the usage of previous incidents as well. On the other hand, the estimation of the
hazards severity was based on the consensus of the team and personal judgment. We assigned values for the hazard
severity (S) and likelihood of occurrence (L) (taking into account the frequency and duration of exposure, and
according to Table 3) on a scale of 1 to 5, then multiply them together to give the rating band. The overall aim is to
reduce or remove the risk to an acceptable (as close to 1 as possible) level.
Table 6. HAZOP study elements associated with the selected nodes
Elements
Nodes Level Flow Pressure Temperature Composition Phase Containment
1 √ √ √ √
2 √ √ √ √ √
3 √ √ √ √ √ √
4 √ √ √ √ √
5 √ √ √ √ √ √
6 √ √ √ √ √ √
7 √ √ √ √ √
8 √ √ √ √
9 √ √ √ √ √
The study was based on the unit’s PFD diagram illustrated in Figure 1. Taking into account the enormous size of the
crude-oil processing-plant, the plethora of the established HAZOP nodes, and also their functionality, we concentrate
through this section, on the more significant node of the processing-plant as far as the risk is concerned. In other
words, we choose Node 1, for performing (as an example) the conventional HAZOP-DMRA technique, in order to
identify the possible fault causes due to abnormal conditions (deviations). So, for the first node, which is unfolded in
Figure 3, we proceeded to the application of HAZOP analysis concerning the elements “Level”, “Pressure”, “Flow” and
“Containment” with the depicted results of Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10, respectively. We clarify, that the conventional
HAZOP-DMRA technique was also performed for the rest nodes (i.e Nodes 2 – 9) in order to achieve, in a second
phase, the application of E-HAZOP-technique in the crude-oil processing-plant.
.
Figure 1. The Unit Process Flow Diagram (PFD)

Figure 2. The flowchart of the proposed E-HAZOP alternative risk assessment framework by including HAZOP analysis, Risk Matrix (DMRA) technique and the
typical Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), as a part of the risk management process.
Figure 3. Node 1: Water Injection System
Table 7. Node 1, “Level” element
Node 1
Element Level
Risk Matrix
GW Deviation Possible Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
S L R
1. P-102 -Poor desalinization 1.1 LV-102 will close 4 3 AC Install a Backup P-102.
Shutdown in ME-101 1.2 Water will overflow to drain
1.3 High Level Alarm LT-102
2. Pipeline -Poor desalinization 2.1 LV-102 will close 4 3 AC None

Blockage in ME- 101 2.2 Water will overflow to drain
More Water
More to P- 102 2.3 High Level Alarm LT-102
Level in V- 106
3. LV-102 - Water waste 3.2 Water will overflow to drain 5 4 NSR None
Failure 3.3 High Level Alarm LT-102
4. LT-102 - Water waste 4.1 Water will overflow to drain 5 4 NSR Install a LSH alarm in V-106
Failure
5. LV-102 - P-102 pumping air. Possible 5.1 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown the 2 4 AC Install a LSLL in V-106
Failure explosive environment in ME- transformer to shutdown P-102
101 5.2 Low Oil Level Alarm
- Poor desalinization in 5.3 Low Level Alarm LT-102
ME-101 5.4 LV-102 by-pass line
6. LT-102 - P-102 pumping air. Possible 6.1 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown the 2 4 AC -Install a LSLL in V-106
Failure explosive environment in ME- transformer to shutdown P-102.
Less Water Level
Less 101 6.2 Low Oil Level Alarm -Schedule a regular
in V- 106
- Poor desalinization in LT- 202 test.
ME- 101
7. No potable - P-102 pumping air. Possible 7.1 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown the 2 3 1 None
water supply to explosive environment in ME- transformer
the LV-102 101 7.2 Low Oil Level Alarm
ME- 101
8. Blockage in - P-102 pumping air. Possible 8.1 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown the 2 5 NSR None
the pipeline to explosive environment in ME- transformer
V-106 101 8.2 Low Oil Level Alarm
ME- 101
Table 8. Node 1, “Pressure” element

Node 1
Element Pressure
Possible Risk Matrix
GW Deviation Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
Cause S L R
9. Blockage in - Damage to P-102 9.1 PSV-107 will open 2 3 1 None
the line to - Pipeline rapture
crude-oil
More Pressure
pipeline.
More in the discharge
10. Increased - Damage to P-102 10.1 PSV-107 will open 2 2 2 None
of P-102
Crude-oil - Pipeline rapture 10.2 PSV-103/104 will open
pressure 10.3 High Pressure Alarm
PT- 101
Table 9. Node 1, “Flow” element
Node 1
Element Flow
Possible Risk Matrix
GW Deviation Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
Cause S L R
11. LV-102 - Water Waste 11.1 High Level Alarm LT-102 5 4 NSR None
More flow from
Failure 11.2 Water overflow to drain
More LV- 102
12. LT-102 - Water Waste 12.1 Water overflow to drain 5 4 NSR None
to V-106
Failure
13. LV-102 - P-102 pumping air. Possible 13.1 Low Level Alarm LT-102 2 4 AC Install a LSLL in V-106 to
Failure explosive environment in ME- 13.2 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown the shutdown P-102
101 transformer
- Poor desalinization in 13.3 Low Oil Level Alarm
Less flow from ME- 101 13.4 LV-102 by-pass line
Less LV- 102
to V-106 14. LT-102 - P-102 pumping air. Possible 14.2 LSLL-119/126 will shutdown 2 4 AC Install a LSLL in V-106 to
Failure explosive environment in ME- the transformer shutdown P-102
101 14.3 Low Oil Level Alarm
- Poor desalinization in
ME- 101
15. Pump - Sour crude-oil to V-106 15.1 Check valve at P-102 1 3 2 None
Reverse Flow to shutdown - Oil spill in the unit discharge
-
Reverse from P- 102 H2S release 15.2 Check valve at injection point
to V-106 - Fire hazard
- Explosion hazard
16. P-102 -Poor desalinization in ME- 15.1 Check valve at P-102 4 3 AC Install a backup pump.
No flow from shutdown 101 discharge
No
P-102 15.2 Check valve at injection point
Table 10. Node 1, “Containment” element
Node 1
Element Containment
Risk Matrix
GW Deviation Possible Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
S L R
No No containment 17. Pipeline - Loss of pressure in the 17.1 Check valve at injection 1 2 3 Perform regular inspections
in the pipelines failure due to water pipelines. point on the pipelines
after P-102 corrosion - Crude-oil spill 17.2 H2S detectors in the area.
-
H2S Release
- Explosion hazard
- Fire Hazard
In the produced HAZOP tables, concerning the established nodes 1-9, all the probable sources and hazards originating
from a specific deviation have been identified. Many of them are common for multiple deviations and some further
analysis was necessary to identify unique hazards. The analysis of the data created from the HAZOP method will be
presented and also the key role which this data analysis can perform in organizing maintenance and inspection
operations of the facility.
It is worth noting that the unique hazards identified by the HAZOP study have been grouped into three
categories: (i) the first one includes “hazards to human life and the environment” (HLE hazards) originating from the
installation, (ii) the second one presents the “operability hazards” (OP hazards) i.e. the hazards reacting on the
product quality and economic operation of the installation, while (iii) the third group contains the “hazards with both
economic and health/environmental impact” (EHE hazards) i.e. the hazards that affect the economic performance of
the installation and simultaneously pose a danger to human life and/or the environment.
Taking into account the enormous size of the crude-oil processing-plant, the plethora of the established HAZOP
nodes, and also their functionality, we concentrate through this paper, on the first category of hazards i.e. the HLE
hazards, while in a future paper we will focus on the OP hazards. Therefore, Table 11 illustrates the data of HLE
hazards created from the above referred HAZOP method, and more explicitly, the data coming from the column
“Consequences” of Tables 7, 8, 9, 10. For example the hazard “Explosive environment in ME-101” (rows 6 and 7, Table
11) is presented as a consequence in Table 7 (4 times), Table 9 (2 times).
The most significant hazards according to Table 11 are H2S-releasing and hydrocarbons-releasing as well, taking
into account the implications of inhalation that may occur to people, causing considerable harms to their health.
Furthermore where hydrocarbons are mentioned, these may be either in liquid or gas form. The distinction can be
difficult because of the volatility of these components. NGL can be liquid inside a vessel under pressure and be
evaporated almost instantaneously, when it is exposed to atmospheric conditions. The pipeline and vessel fracture (or
rupture) may be a combination of elevated pressure and poor condition of the equipment. Rust is an especially critical
problem, when considering the age of the facility under examination.
The HAZOP study can be a useful guide to provide maintenance and inspection staff a list of priorities. By far, the
most frequent causal issue for the hazards listed above, was identified in the HAZOP study as the malfunction of level
and pressure transmitters and controllers. These can often fail because they come into contact with impure
substances with high deposits content. This work suggests that due to the fact that the cause of high percentage of
hazards identified in the HAZOP study is attributed to level and pressure transmitter failure, they should be checked
thoroughly. Also, pressure and level transmitters that have an age of more than ten years should be replaced
preemptively.
Another very common issue that could have catastrophic consequences is pipeline and vessel rapture. Because
of the facility’s long operations span and the highly corrosive chemicals it contains, extensive pipeline and vessel wall
thickness inspections must be performed regularly. Priority should be given to vessels and pipelines operating with
high pressure content, and especially those with H2S content.
Generally speaking, the equipment in oil facilities is very expensive, due to increased quality specifications are
required and due to the fact, such equipment is usually custom-engineered to specific applications. Thus, any action of
replacing the whole or a part of such equipment can have a severe economic impact for the company operates the
facility.
Table 11. List of hazards only related to “human life or the environment”, after subgrouping the hazards
Nr Hazard
1 Hydraulic pressure damage due to liquids in C-101
2 H2S release due to C-101 nitrogen seal failure
3 C-101 failure due low suction pressure
4 Pipeline rapture due to C-101 high discharge pressure
5 C-101 PD vessels rapture due to high intermediate-pressure
6 Explosive environment in ME-101 due to air from P-102
7 Explosive environment in ME-101 due to light hydrocarbons
8 H2S release (due to human error/opened valve) to atmosphere in node 2
14 H2S release due to pipeline rapture in node 1
22 H2S release through V-106 overflow
23 H2S release due to Vessel rapture in node 4
24 H2S release due to Vessel rapture in node 5
25 H2S release due to vessel rapture in node 7
27 H2S to the crude oil tanks from V-108
29 H2S release due to heat exchanger rapture in node 2
30 H2S release due to transformer bushing insulation failure
31 H2S release due to ME-101 rapture
32 H2S release due to P-101 mechanical seal fail
33 Hydrocarbons release (due to human error/opened valve) to atmosphere in node 2
36 Hydrocarbons release due to pipeline rapture in node 2
40 Hydrocarbons release through V-106 overflow
41 Hydrocarbons release due to Vessel rapture in node 4
42 Hydrocarbons release due to Vessel rapture in node 5
43 Hydrocarbons release due to heat exchanger rapture in node 2
44 Hydrocarbons release due to transformer bushing insulation failure
45 Hydrocarbons release due to ME-101 rapture
46 Hydrocarbons release due to P-101 mechanical seal fail
5.2 Application of E-HAZOP on a Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant

Taking into account the results of the previous HAZOP-DMRA study, which are depicted in Table 11, we proceed (as a
case study) to the next step i.e. the application of AHP process on the sour crude-oil processing-plant (by using the
hazards of Table 11) in order to complete the implementation of E-HAZOP method, in this industry.
In the beginning, we note that we have subgrouped the “hazards to human life or the environment” presented in
Table 11, in order to create such a compact hierarchical structure that will help the decision maker to define the local
and global priorities and the input judgments as well. Therefore, Table 11 illustrates the “hazards to human life or the
environment” after the essential subgrouping (intermediate table of hazards), while Table 12 the final ten
transformed hazards, necessary for the pairwise comparisons (transformed table of hazards). More specifically, for
attaining the necessary hazard-subgrouping, we have taken into account the presented similarities, as far as the
nature/origin/properties of the hazards are concerned, and in association with the nodes which incorporate a specific
hazard. For example the hazard “H2S release due to pipeline rapture” undergoes almost in the entire number of nodes
(i.e. node 1 to 9) as it is illustrated by the rows 14 -21 in Table 11. So, we have grouped them according to Table 11,
and the result is depicted in Table 12 by the row (or new hazard number/code) of “[4]”.
It is worth mentioning, that the different colors don’t express any meaning concerning each hazard, but on the
other side, we have used them in order to present more clearly (or to help the reader to understand easily) the way of
subgrouping the “hazards to human life or the environment” of Table 11, as far as the creation of the hierarchical
structure is concerned.
Consequently, the hierarchy of the present case consists of ten hazard factors belonging to the same level, as
illustrated in Figure 4. It contains the analysis’ goal which is preserving safety in the workplace, and ten criteria at the
same hierarchy level which means that they are directly comparable to their contribution to the overall risk. In this
analysis, we considered as criteria the ten groups of hazards (Table 12) resulted from grouping the unique hazards to
the human life or the environment according to their source, included in Table 11. These unique hazard factors
considered after making sub-groups of the hazards which includes all the hazards irrespective of their category.
Table 12. Unique hazards to human life or the environment, necessary for the pairwise comparisons of
AHP process (transformed table of hazards)
New
Numbering Hazard
(Nr)
[ 01 ] C-101 failure (due to pressure level or liquids presentation)
[ 02 ] Explosive environment in ME-101 (due to air or hydrocarbons)
[ 03 ] H2S release to atmosphere (due to human error/opened valve) in a specific node
[ 04 ] H2S release due to pipeline rapture in a specific node
[ 05 ] H2S release due to Vessel rapture (or failure) in a specific node
[ 06 ] H2S release due to other machinery-rapture (or failure) in a specific node
[ 07 ] Hydrocarbons release to atmosphere (due to human error/opened valve) in a specific node
[ 08 ] Hydrocarbons release due to pipeline rapture in a specific node
[ 09 ] Hydrocarbons release due to Vessel rapture (or failure) in specific node
[ 10 ] Hydrocarbons release due to other machinery- rapture (or failure) in specific node
SAFETY
HC release due to other
C-101 failure machinery- rapture (or
failure)
Explosive environment in HC release due to Vessel

ME-101 rapture (or failure)
H2S release to HC release due to

atmosphere pipeline rapture
H2S release due to HC release to

pipeline rapture atmosphere
H2S release due to other

H2S release due to Vessel
machinery-rapture (or
rapture (or failure)
failure)
Figure 4. The hierarchical structure for the hazards of the case
The expert asked to be the decision maker, made judgments using the classic Saaty’s scale (Table 5) and filled in
the pairwise comparisons matrix of the hazard factors (Table 13), in which he expressed his preference of importance
of each hazard in comparison with all the other hazards of the present case. The Typical AHP is used to transform
expert judgments into weights and then to rank the risks in descending order of significance, according to the decision
maker's values. It is crucial for the resulting ranking that the judgments proved to be consistent since the Consistency
Ratio (CR) (Saaty, 1990) found to be less than 10% for the pairwise comparison matrix.
In the present analysis, there is one person considered as the decision maker. The specific expert chosen to
assign preferences in the pairwise comparison matrix serves as the leading engineer- production manager (i.e. the
RM/DM) of the sour crude-oil processing-plant, with several years of experience in managing risks in industry. Thus,
due to his experience and expertise, his opinion considered of being very important to the proposed approach
application in the specific case. However, there is a merit in extending the present approach to group decision making
in order to include the opinions of a larger number of executive managers/engineers and increase the reliability of the
final total risk estimations and rankings.
Table 13. The judgments of the expert for extracting ranking using the typical AHP
Safety [01] [02] [03] [04] [05] [06] [07] [08] [09] [10]
[01] 1 1/2 1/8 1/5 1/4 1/4 1/7 1/5 1/3 1/3
[02] 1 1/7 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/6 1/4 1/3 1/2
[03] 1 3 3 5 2 5 6 5
[04] 1 4 6 1/4 4 5 6
[05] 1 3 1/4 4 3 5
[06] 1 1/5 1/3 1/2 3
[07] 1 5 6 7
[08] 1 2 4
[09] 1 2
[10] 1
5.3 Results of the E-HAZOP application

Table 14, summarizes the results of E-HAZOP after its final step (i.e. the application of AHP) and is constituted with the
priorities of hazards calculated by the typical AHP (column a) and also the ranking of hazards with decreasing
importance (coloumn b).
According to the typical AHP calculations, and based on the input judgments of the expert, the factors “H2S
release to atmosphere (due to human error/opened valve) in a specific node” (03) and “Hydrocarbons release to
atmosphere (due to human error/opened valve) in a specific node” (07) are more important than the other hazards,
since they cause the 50.33% of the total risk.
Next, the factors “H2S release due to pipeline rapture in a specific node” (04), and “H2S release due to Vessel
rapture (or failure) in a specific node” (05) consist the second more important hazards group, responsible for the 27%
of the total risk.
Also, the hazards “Hydrocarbons release due to pipeline rapture in a specific node” (08), “Hydrocarbons release
due to Vessel rapture (or failure) in specific node” (09), and “H2S release due to other machinery-rapture (or failure)
in a specific node” (06) have slightly different resulting weights but clearly higher than the impact of the last three
hazards, namely “Hydrocarbons release due to other machinery- rapture (or failure) in specific node” (10), “Explosive
environment in ME-101 (due to air or hydrocarbons)” (02), and “C-101 failure (due to pressure level or liquids
presentation)” (01) which are responsible,cumulatively, for the 7.04% of the total risk.
Table 14. Results of E-HAZOP application: (i) the priorities of hazards calculated by the typical AHP
(column a), and (ii) the ranking of hazards (column b)
Weights for the hazards Ranking of hazards
(a) (b)
[01] 1,85% [03] 25,57%
[02] 2,32% [07] 24,76%
[03] 25,57% [04] 16,75%
[04] 16,75% [05] 10,25%
[05] 10,25% [08] 6,80%
[06] 4,33% [09] 4,50%
[07] 24,76% [06] 4,33%
[08] 6,80% [10] 2,87%
[09] 4,50% [02] 2,32%
[10] 2,87% [01] 1,85%
6. Discussion
The chemical process industry (CPI) is currently one of the safest workplaces in the world (Lees, 1980; Filippidis,
2017). This is due to the strict procedures and extreme caution that the industry exhibits towards hazards. However
the public perception towards CPIs is that, they are highly dangerous and people often protest the installation of
chemical process facilities near their place of residence, fearing for their lives and properties.
During the last thirty years, the risk management and process safety have been developed to an amazing level
and cases like Bopal and Seveso are beginning to fade from memory. The goal of CPI is to change the hazardous public
perception into what it actually is today, an industrial and economic powerhouse that is beneficial for the society as a
whole. Especially the crude-oil process industry (COPI) can be highly beneficial for local economies, either for the job
opportunities it provides or due to the general economic benefits. Nonetheless, like all CPIs, there is always present a
potential for catastrophe. The experience over the past 30 years is that with proper risk management, catastrophe
would be impossible.
One of the most important aspects of risk management is hazard identification and a highly effective tool to that
point, is the HAZOP methodology. The HAZOP study execution may be tedious and laborious but it has proven over
the years to be one of the most important tool of chemical process industry to assure the safety of the people working
in a facility, the environment and of course the integrity of the facility itself. In addition, HAZOP is one of the best and
highly disciplined and versatile techniques for hazard idendification in the chemical engineering industry, and also
widely used in the process industries for identifying potential hazards and operability problems (Mayes and Kilsby,
1989; Baladeh, 2019; Danko et al. 2019). As the motive for all industrial operations is the maximization of profit,
HAZOP analysis has the great additional advantage that it aims in identifying not only hazards to health and safety but
also operational problems of the installation. Operational problems may cause increased cost for the facility’s
management or unsatisfactory products. Experience has shown that HAZOP technique does work, identifying hazards
and critical control points with priorities for control (Mayes and Kilsby, 1989; Baladeh, 2019). By using the HAZOP
analysis, the operators can quickly seek out the locations of necessary documents to address abnormal situations
(Alaei et al. 2014). In addition, HAZOP studies have the main purpose of hazards identification and are considered as
the best PHA techniques for producing data for subsequent quantitative analysis techniques such as LOPA, FTA or
QRA.
The main interest for implementing the HAZOP methodology in the sour-COPI, was to validate its safety and
identify some safety issues that may have been arisen during its operation for many years. For example, pipeline
rapture may not have been considered as a probable occurrence when the installation was constructed. However,
after many years of being in operation, issues like this become more possible to occur. In other words, the installation
under examination is an aged facility but with high safety standards for the age it was constructed. The goal of the
authors was to validate that those safety standards stand true today. As the safety regulations and technology evolve,
there are more strict safety standards that must be adhered in the chemical process industry. However, there are a lot
of legacy installations that may not be up to standards and furthermore there is the added issue of the material and
equipment aging that complicates the issue.
Consequently, the objective of this article is dual, first the presentation of the HAZOP method, and secondly the
implementation of the extended HAZOP-DMRA-AHP approach (E-HAZOP) in the previous referred COPI. The selection
of the specific facility for the application of HAZOP is highly advantageous for the demonstration of the method
because of the numerous hazards involved in the process (such as flammable liquids and gases and also toxic gases)
and also due to its sophisticated design. The identification of hazards by HAZOP indicates that they could, systemically,
assess and criticize the process. These techniques can be, therefore, considered as an effective method for recognition
and prediction of hazards and it may increase the safety levels, prevent accidents and enhance the reliability of
systems via the reduction of operational problems (Alaei et al. 2014). The processing-plant that came under
examination proved to be safe and reliable, in the condition that proper installation-inspections and maintenance are
enforced. To this point, it is suggested that hazard identifications should be used as a priority setting mean for
inspection and maintenance operations. The structured approach and thorough analysis that HAZOP provide, is an
excellent tool on which to judge the focus of those departments.
Although being effortless and uncomplicated, HAZOP has the weakness of a deficient systematic-approach to
clarify different conclusions into an integrated result, thus it is vulnerable to imprecise and baseless decisions
(Othman et al., 2016). On the other side, risk prioritization can surely help the manager to act in order to reduce or
better eliminate the most urgent risk factors and protect workers’ health by implementing the most important safety
measures (Koulinas et al., 2019). Better allocation of the constrained budget can reduce support and mortgage costs,
and generally allow managers to have budget available to further reduce the risk in projects.
Therefore, by this work, an extended-HAZOP (E-HAZOP) study (i.e. the conventional HAZOP combined with other
two precious techniques, both the DMRA and the AHP), is proposed as a new approach for (i) incorporating
prioritization in HAZOP analysis through the usage of AHP, and (ii) identifying and prioritizing critical points and
potential hazards in a sour crude-oil process industry (as a case study). In the beginning, the application of the
conventional HAZOP study is performed, in order to identify the possible causes and consequences, which correspond
to abnormal conditions or deviations. With the results of the HAZOP study, on the one side and also the application of
the DMRA technique for risk-Assessment, on the other side, the typical AHP process is then used successively, to
extend HAZOP analysis by prioritizing the risks in the plant.
Even though, conventional HAZOP is a popular technique for hazard identification and risk ranking in hazardous
facilities (according to Cheraghi et al., 2019) it has various handicaps: (i) it considers a limited number of risk factors
(i.e. only the frequency and the severity of hazards), (ii) it assumes equal weights for the risk factors (so that, “low-
probability/high-consequence” and “high-probability/low-consequence” hazards are considered equally important as
far as their ranking is concerned), and (iii) it uses precise data, which are rarely available (or highly uncertain),
especially in the case of complex COPI facilities.
The present work is an attempt to improve the foregoing negative aspects of conventional HAZOP via the
extended E-HAZOP approach (HAZOP-DMRA-AHP). In the scientific literature the growth of HAZOP-analysis is in
progress, so that other processes have been embodied in conventional-HAZOP by the following combinations: (i)
HAZOP-DMRA (Alaei et al., 2014; Filippidis, 2014), (ii) HAZOP-dynamic FTA (Guo and Kang, 2015), (iii) HAZOP-AHP
(Othman et al., 2016), (iv) Fuzzy-based HAZOP (Ahn and Chang, 2016), (v) Fuzzy-DMRA (Gul and Guneri, 2016), (vi)
Fuzzy multi-attribute HAZOP technique (FMA-HAZOP), and in particular HAZOP-fuzzy AHP and HAZOP-fuzzy TOPSIS
(Cheraghi et al., 2019).
It is worth noting that for first time, through this work, we determine the weight of risk factors and prioritize the
hazards by using together DMRA and AHP in the environment of HAZOP. Moreover, the application of the E-HAZOP
scheme (HAZOP-DMRA-AHP), on a sour crude-oil plant, shows that E-HAZOP presents a more transparent
environment as far the rank of hazards is concerned, compared to conventional HAZOP.
We have the opinion, that the extension of HAZOP-DMRA with AHP (i.e. E-HAZOP approach) could create a useful
tool for the decision makers to estimate the emergency of investing constrained budget in actions preventing specific
kind of deviations. In addition, the proposed E-HAZOP framework can provide a trustworthy basis to boost process
safety and improve occupational health and safety.
According to Guo and Kang (2015), the improvement of the completeness of HAZOP analysis is in progress, in
such a way that various procedures (like the DyPASI) are incorporated in HAZOP scenario analysis and provide
effective contribution to the extended-HAZOP analysis. Taking into account this scientific tendency, in a future
research, we will introduce a new extended-HAZOP scheme, i.e. the Fuzzy-E-HAZOP procedure for prioritizing the risks
in the above referred COPI, and extend the present approach to group decision making in order to include the
opinions of a larger number of executive managers/engineers and increase the reliability of the final total risk
estimations and rankings.
7. Conclusions
By this work, an alternative approach in prioritizing hazards in industry, by using the combination of HAZOP-study with
the DMRA-technique and the AHP-process, is introduced. Our approach, not only supports the cooperation of HAZOP
and AHP for ranking risks, but in addition, it incorporates the combination of HAZOP with DMRA in order to construct
a process for identifying, assessing and prioritizing risks in industry. The proposed method (called as E-HAZOP) has
been applied to a sour crude-oil processing-plant in order to identify health and safety risks in the plant.
The results prove that, the new method is appropriate for identifying and ranking the most considerable hazards
amid the identified lengthy listing of hazards. Nevertheless, weights-assignment throughout the pairwise comparison-
phase is subjected to individual choise (appraiser) and consequently, should be bound by the judgement of a capable
team of executive managers/engineers in order to include the opinions of a number of managers (i.e. group decision-
making) and increase the reliability of the final total risk estimations and rankings.
Overall, the findings indicate that the extended-HAZOP (E-HAZOP) framework, proposed in this paper: (i) is an
efficient safety assessment method for the complex chemical industry, (ii) can provide a trustworthy basis to boost
process safety and improve occupational health and safety, and (iii) could be a useful tool for the decision makers to
estimate the emergency of investing constrained budget in actions preventing specific kind of deviations. Accordingly,
by using this technique as a decision-making tool, the project-team will be capable of prioritizing any action to
industry modification, retrofitting or construction within the existing resources constraints.
As a final point, the examined COPI plant, despite its long time span, has acceptable risk in its operation, due to
proper maintenance and inspection.
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Αbbreviations and Αcronyms
BDV Blowdown Valve

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CPI Chemical Process Industry
COPI Crude-Oil Process Industry
ESD Emergency Shutdown
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
LAHH Level Alarm High High
LALL Level Alarm Low Low
P&IDs Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
PFD's Process Flow Diagrams
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PIC Pressure Indicator Controller
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PT Pressure Transmitter
PV Pressure Valve
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SMS Safety Management System
Highlights
 General lines of HAZOP study and Decision-Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA)
 Application of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) for prioritizing the risks
defined by HAZOP
 Integration of HAZOP with DMRA and AHP as a new extended study E-HAZOP
for identifying hazards in industry
 Case study: Application of E-HAZOP in a part of a sour crude-oil processing
industry

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Panagiotis K. Marhavilas, Michail Filippidis, Georgios K. Koulinas, Dimitrios E.

To appear in: Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

Received Date: 17 May 2019

© 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Panagiotis K. Marhavilas1∗∗, Michail Filippidis1, Georgios K. Koulinas1, Dimitrios E. Koulouriotis1

1.3 Structure of the article

3. Presentation of the Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant

3.1 Description of the installation and its purpose

3.2 Installation Equipment

Table 1. A concise description of the installation equipment

4. The methodogical framework of E-HAZOP

4.1 HAZOP study

4.2 The DMRA technique

Risk Matrix (R)

Table 4. Risk Matrix

[1] 4 3 2 1 AC 4: “Critical Risk”

[2] 3 2 1 AC AC 3: “High Risk”

Risk (R) escalation

[5] AC AC NSR NSR NSR AC: “Acceptable”

NSR: “No special

4.3 The Analytical Hierarchy Process

5.1 Application of HAZOP with DMRA on a Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant

Nodes Level Flow Pressure Temperature Composition Phase Containment

Figure 1. The Unit Process Flow Diagram (PFD)

2. Pipeline -Poor desalinization 2.1 LV-102 will close 4 3 AC None

Table 8. Node 1, “Pressure” element

5.2 Application of E-HAZOP on a Sour Crude-Oil Processing Plant

Explosive environment in HC release due to Vessel

H2S release to HC release due to

H2S release due to HC release to

H2S release due to other

Figure 4. The hierarchical structure for the hazards of the case

5.3 Results of the E-HAZOP application

Αbbreviations and Αcronyms

BDV Blowdown Valve

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