J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. Vol. 10. Nos. 5-6. pp.

333-343, 1997
0 1997 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
PII:SO!950-4230(97)00023-5 0950-4230/97 $17.00 + 0.00
ELSEVIER

TOPHAZOP: a knowledge-based software

tool for conducting HAZOP in a rapid,
efficient yet inexpensive manner

Faisal I. Khan and S. A. Abbasi

Risk Assessment Division, Centre for Pollution Control & Energy Technology,
Pondicherry University, Pondicherry 605 014, India

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies constitute an essential step in the risk analysis of any
chemical process industry and involve systematic identification of every conceivable abnormal
process deviation, its causes and abnormal consequences. These authors have recently pro-
posed optHAZOP as an alternative procedure for conducting HAZOP studies in a shorter span
of time than taken by conventional HAZOP procedure, with greater accuracy and effectiveness
[Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A., optHA.ZOP. An effective and efficient technique for hazard identifi-
cation and assessment. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process industries, 1997, 10, 191-2041.
optHAZOP consists of several steps, the most crucial one requires use of a knowledge-based
software tool which would significantly reduce the requirement of expert man-hours and speed
up the work of the study team. TOPHAZOP (Tool for OPtimizing HAZOP) has been developed
to fulfil this need.
The TOPHAZOP knowledge-base consists of two main branches: process-specific and gen-
eral. The TOPHAZOP framework allows these two branches to interact during the analysis to
address the process-specific aspects of HAZOP analysis while maintaining the generality of the
system. The system is open-ended and modular in structure to make easy implementation
and/or expansion of knowledge. The important features of TOPHAZOP and its performance on
an industrial case study are described. 0 1997 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
reserved

Keywords: HAZOP; risk assessment; process deviation; chemical industries

Introduction 1. Hazard identification.

Chemical industries which often handle hazardous
chemicals and operate reactors/storage vessels under
extreme conditions of temperature and pressure are sus-
ceptible to accidents. These accidents may be triggered
by human, process, or material failures. The increasing
density of industries alongside increasing density of
human population has not only increased the frequency
of accidents but also the extent of damage caused by
such accidents. The most gruesome example is the Bho-
pal gas tragedy which claimed over 20 000 lives.
The science of risk analysis has emerged to (a) fore-
cast the likelihood of accidents, (b) assess the conse-
quences of the likely accidents, (c) work out strategies
to prevent the accidents, and (d) to cushion the adverse
impacts if an accident does occur.
Risk analysis essentially involves three steps:
2. Hazard quantification and consequence analysis.
3. Development of hazard minimization strategies.
The first two steps come under the broader classi-
fication of “hazard assessment”, the first step covers its
qualitative aspect and the second its quantitative dimen-
sion.
Different agencies and individuals have proposed
different variants of this three-pronged process [l-3] but
they all essentially involve the three steps mentioned
above.
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) is one of
the commonest tools to accomplish hazard assessment,
qualitatively and quantitatively. Thus HAZOP is one of
the essential tools for all the three steps mentioned
above. It involves a detailed study of each and every
part of the entire process line from start to finish with

333
334 TOPHAZOP: F. 1. Khan and S. A. Abbasi
the help of “piping and instrument diagrams” (PIDs)
covering each and every vessel, conduit, valve, and other
control equipment employed in the process line. In
HAZOP these PIDs are studied in relation to the oper-
ation of the process, the causes that may lead to vari-
ations in the plant operation due to human, process, or
material failures, and the likely consequences. HAZOP
thus takes into consideration the conditions such as tem-
perature, pressure, creep, fatigue, etc. under which the
physical parts (piping and instruments) are used, the
aspects of human interaction with the piping and instru-
ments, and the possible aberrations that may occur due
to human errors, loss of process control, or material fail-
ures.
The concept of HAZOP was developed in the early
1970s at the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) based
in the UK. In subsequent years refinements have been
introduced in the HAZOP procedure but it essentially
remains very similar in form and content to the original
ICI system [4-71. Even other schemes of risk analysis
proposed from time to time such as Qualitative Risk
Analysis [8,9], Probabilistic Risk Analysis [lo], Safety
Analysis [l 11, and Optimal Risk Analysis [ 12,131 have
all included HAZOP as an integral part of the overall
risk assessment process. All this points towards the
prominent position of HAZOP in risk assessment.
During HAZOP studies, the process piping and
instrument diagrams (PIDs) are examined systematically
by a group of experts, and the abnormal causes and
adverse consequences for all possible deviations from
normal operation that could arise are searched out. The
imagination of HAZOP study team is helped along by
“guide words” to cover all possible malfunctions in the
plant in a systematic way.
The set of guide words that are often used are
NONE, MORE OF, LESS OF, PART OF and MORE
THAN. When these guide words are applied to the pro-
cess variables in each line or unit of the plant, the corre-
sponding process variable deviation to be considered in
the HAZOP analysis is obtained. A list of process vari-
ables and their associated deviations are given in
Table 1.
All the guide words cannot be applied to all process
variables because the two should be combined in such
a way that they lead to meaningful process variable devi-
ations. For example, when the process variable under
Table 1 Parameters and applicable guide words
Process variables Guide words
Pressure More, Less, None
Temperature More, Less
Flow rate More, Less, None, Reverse
Capacity More, Less, None
Level More, Less, None
Concentration More, Less, Part of, Other than
Signals No, Other than
consideration is pressure, only the guide words MORE
OF and LESS OF lead to meaningful process variable
deviations. The sequence of a typical HAZOP analysis
is shown in Figure 1.
The application of HAZOP in hazard identification
was first presented by Lawley [4]. In subsequent years
various other studies on the application of HAZOP have
been reported [14-201. Some authors have suggested
modifications in HAZOP to improve its effectiveness
[7,21,22] in terms of speed and reliability.
Even as HAZOP is important and essential-as
explained in the preceding section-it also happens to
be the most costly and time-consuming of all the steps
needed in risk assessment. This is due to the following
reasons:
1. In order to conduct HAZOP successfully by the exist-
ing methods it is essential to put together a fairly
large team of experts (six or more) who have to sys-
tematically and critically examine the PIDs in relation
to the process conditions and human factors. The
team has to work out the various permutations and
combinations of possible deviations that can occur
during the operation of the plant and the adverse
consequence of all such deviations. The end objective
is to identify the potential problems or the “soft
spots”.
2. In order to do justice to the study as mentioned above
the HAZOP team must be fairly multi-disciplinary
and must be composed of experts who have extensive
knowledge of the design, operation, and maintenance
aspects of the process plant. The experts must also
be senior enough to be able to foresee all possible
ways in which hazards and operational problems
might arise in a process plant.
HAZOP thus becomes costly due to its requirement
of highly paid manpower for a fairly large number of
man-days. As HAZOP is a prelude to other major steps
in risk assessment and damage prevention it is unsafe to
compromise on thoroughness; in other words it would
be dangerous to cut costs at the expense of exhaus-
tiveness of the study. Hence HAZOP continues to be
used in spite of its costly and cumbersome form.
Other limitations of HAZOP are
Non-availability of experts: even when a company is
willing to foot the bill it might be difficult to get per-
sonnel of the desired level of sophistication and
experience.
Work of repetitious nature: a large number of likely
deviations from normal are of routine nature yet the
HAZOP team has to consider and study each one of
them. This makes the team’s task rather tedious. At
the same time the team cannot overlook or bypass
any of the large number of routine causes as each one
of them has the potential to cause an accident.
 TOPHAZOP: F. I. Khan and S. A. Abbasi 335

I I
What changes in
plant will tell -
him for deviation

What changes in
plant will
prevent deviation
* or make it less *
likely or protect
against
consequences ?

Consider other
modifications

Figure 1 A typical HAZOP sequence.

Review of past work
Even though experts have felt the need for automating
HAZOP in the past [21,22,24], there has been only lim-
ited work and even less success in this area. We have
conducted a very thorough literature search in the fol-
lowing manner: (a) manual search through Current Con-
tents, (b) search through CD-ROM Current Contents, (c)
INSPEC, and (d) COMPENDEX. These multiple
searches were made just to ensure that no relevant report
 336 TOPHAZOP: F. 1. Khan and S. A. Abbasi
is left out. The search reveals that as one of the first
attempts, Parmar and Less [23,24] have developed a
rule-based system approach utilizing qualitative reason-
ing and have described its application for the hazard
identification of a water separator system. Other attempts
in this area have been by Karvonen et al. [25] and Chae
et al. [26]. Karvonen et al. [25] have developed a frame-
and-knowledge-based system to study the fault propa-
gation in the process plant. The limitations of their sys-
tem are:
1. Large volume of data regarding process and equip-
ment are to be keyed-in each time for analysing a
single deviation.
2. The applicability of the system is restricted to pre-
design stage.
3. The system places greater emphasis on the identifi-
cation of causes of deviations rather than the effect
(consequences) of these deviations.
4. The acquisition of knowledge is limited, as it ident-
ifies only four types of equipment-storage vessel, pipe
lines, operational unit, and control systems. It neg-
lects typical process operations such as mass transfer,
heat transfer, reaction, etc.
5. The system uses the fault-tree analysis technique to
identify the deviation and causes, which decreases the
speed of knowledge extraction.
6. There is no direct avenue to study fault propagation
(deviation propagation) from one unit to other.
7. The knowledge-base has been constructed in terms of
rule networks; for every cause of deviation and its
consequences all rules have to be checked which
further slows down the knowledge extraction process.
The work of Chae et al. [26] has some limitations
common with the system of Karvonen et aZ. [25] serial-
ized as l-3 above. In addition it has the following draw-
backs:
1. It specifies only three general categories of equipment
vessels, transportation, and adjunct equipment. It
does not take account of process operations in this
equipment, which is a key factor in deciding causes
and consequences.
2. The knowledge-base incorporates only limited devi-
ations, their causes and consequences, for each equip-
ment type.
3. It does not take into account the fault propagation
from one unit to another.
4. It does not take cognizance of process operation and
process conditions in development of (creation of)
knowledge-base.
5 A total of only six different pieces of equipment in
d.
three different types of equipment category are con-
sidered and several other relevant ones are left out.
Recently a knowledge-based expert system has
been reported by Venkatasubramanian and Vaidhyana-
than [27]. This system is relatively more elaborate;
indeed it is the best reported thus far, but it still has
several short-comings which we wish to overcome as
detailed in Table 2. Since 1994 no other report on auto-
mating HAZOP (elaborate knowledge-based expert
system) has appeared though the above-mentioned work
of Venkatasubramanian and Vaidhyanathan has been
cited in several recent publications on computer-aided
HAZOP [28-341.
OptHAZOP procedure and the
TOPHAZOP software
These authors have recently proposed optHAZOP as an
alternative procedure for conducting HAZOP study in a
shorter span of time than taken by conventional HAZOP
procedure, with greater accuracy and effectiveness [22].
The algorithm of optHAZOP is presented in Figure 2.
In this procedure, a knowledge-based software tool is
needed to identify general and specific causes and conse-
quences of all probable deviations in the functioning of
a process unit. It is the use of this type of knowledge-
based software that is envisaged to play a major role in
optHAZOP towards (a) cutting short the total study time
by more than 45%, (b) significantly reducing the require-
ment of expert manpower, thus drastically reducing the
HAZOP costs as well as margins of error [22]. We have
since developed TOPHAZOP (Tool for Optimizing
HAZOP) to serve as the requisite tool, the details of
which are presented in this paper.
Structure of TOPHAZOP
TOPHAZOP consists of the following main modules:
knowledge-base, inference engine, and user interface.
The object-oriented architecture (OOA) of
TOPHAZOP is presented in Figure 3.
Knowledge-Base
Knowledge-base is a collection of information set up in
a pre-defined format which can be retrieved and used for
HAZOP study. The knowledge-base is created in two
segments in order to cover all the equipment,
process/ambient conditions, and typical problems that
have been encountered in various industries. The knowl-
edge-base is developed in terms of rule networks with
equipment specified as the derived objects of the main
equipment object class. These derived objects (different
equipment) have various sub-objects, functions and attri-
butes attached to them. The architectural and message
flow diagram of the knowledge-base is shown in Figure
4. The complete knowledge-base has been developed
using a PC expert shell (G2 Gymsum expert shell).
The knowledge-base has the following four main
features: general process causes, general process conse-
quences, process-specific causes and process-specific
consequences.
We have incorporated 15 different equipment types
in the overall knowledge-base:
1. Pipelines.
 TOPHAZOP: F. I. Khan and S. A. Abbasi

Table2 The comparison of the present system with the most recent published work (f271)

The system developed by Venkatasubramanian and Present system

Vaidyanathan [271

Developed in object-oriented architecture with G2 expert shell
system
Needs large memory which restricts running of the system on
mainframe or big machines
Handles up to 12 process units
The knowledge base creation is complex and is not accessible
by user for any modification
Versatile in terms of knowledge (process general and process
specific) on causes and consequences of operability problem
User friendly, being fully menu driven
Developed under object oriented environment using C + +
language
Envisaged to be PC compatible so that it can be run on
commonly available desktops and also on mainframes
Handles at least 15 process units
More simpler approach for knowledge base creation and an
open structure for further modification
Same
Even more user friendly and interactive; fully menu driven with
on-line help. In addition, attractive visual features to make its
use a pleasure.

2. Storage units. 5. Chemical properties.

3. Reactors. 6. Masses of chemicals.
4. Mass transfer units. 7. Interaction among different units.
5. Heat transfer units.
6. Mass and heat transfer combined units.
General knowledge
7. Transportation units.
General knowledge is the information which is inde-
8. Indirect heating units (furnaces).
pendent of process/unit operation. This knowledge has
9. Direct heating units (boilers, evaporators, etc.).
been developed in the same way as for process-specific
10. Compressors/blowers.
knowledge, except that there are no attributes attached
11. Pumps.
to the objects. The general knowledge is classified in
12. Control systems.
generic causes and generic consequences. This infor-
13. Settling tanks.
mation is created in rule networks, similar to process-
14. Valves.
specific information. The parameters associated with
15. Sensoring and measuring devices.
general process knowledge are: (1) equipment and their
We have implemented the knowledge-base in terms capacities, (2) physical state of the chemicals, (3) attri-
of frame structure and rule networks. The equipment is butes such as flammability/non-flammability/toxicity, (4)
defined in terms of frame structure while causes and reactivity/corrosiveness, (5) physical properties of
consequences are defined in rule networks. The design chemicals such as vapour pressure. The simplified rule
architecture and hierarchy of knowledge-base is shown network for general knowledge is presented in Figure 6.
in Figure 4.
Inference engine
Process-Specijic knowledge The inference engine is a type of controller which acts
The process-specific knowledge varies from plant to as a manager of the knowledge-base, according to the
plant and is related to the type of unit operations, chemi- user intention and requirements of the problem under
cal in use and operating conditions. study. The user interface enables the user to easily and
The process-specific knowledge has been classified swiftly interact with various modules of the software. It
in two main groups: objects (process unit) and its attri- also provides on-line help for each option. The flow and
butes, causes and consequences. The objects are control information in the HAZOP inference engine of
developed in frame structure with attributes while causes the knowledge-based system TOPHAZOP is presented
and consequence are developed in rule networks in Figure 7 and a brief description is given below.
attached to the frame. The causes and consequences for
1. The exercise of mapping starts with the identification
a particular object are invoked by the forward chaining
of process-variable deviations.
technique, while verification (justification) of results is
2. The deviation is applied to that particular process unit
done by backward chaining. The rule sequence for spe-
and to all up-stream units to find the general and spe-
cific causes and consequences is shown in Figure 5. The
cific causes.
attributes attached to the process-specific knowledge-
3. Later the same deviation is applied to all down-
base are:
stream units to find general and specific conse-
1. Equipment (process units). quences.
2. Types of operation. 4. The propagation of deviation (fault) to various up-
3. Operating conditions. stream units is done by the “find cause” method
4. Atmospheric conditions. which is a function of the basic process unit class.
338 TOPHAZOP: F. I. Khan
at a moment
ir’
and consequences
APP’Y
guide
words
Figure 2 The OptHAZOP algorithm.
5. Similarly, the propagation of the fault to analyse the
consequences is done by the “find consequence”
method which is again a function of the basic process
unit class. This function uses forward chaining for
retrieving the information and the backward chaining
technique to verify the retrieved information.
User interjace
This option provides a mode of external interface
between the knowledge and the user. This option enables
the user to choose particular equipment from the set of
equipment and associated parameters and interact with
the knowledge-base to carry out the HAZOP study. This
option also provides a means of modification or upgrad-
and S. A. Abbasi
of
and consequences
0
stop
ing of the knowledge-base according to the need and
experience of the expert user (Figure 8).
The user interface has two options: analysis and
modification. Choosing one of these options will link the
user to the appropriate module of knowledge and on key-
ing in the necessary information the results of the
HAZOP study will be obtained. The user has the liberty
to check, and modify the knowledge-base or add new
information to it. The output of TOPHAZOP is in the
form of normal HAZOP reports and can be directly used
in the presentation of the HAZOP study. The user inter-
face also has file processing and other user-friendly
options such as on-line help and examples.
The application of the TOPHAZOP is illustrated by
a real-life case study discussed below.
 TOPHAZOP: F. I. Khan and S. A. Abbasi 339

and a fractionating column (Table 3). The full plant has

been considered in three different study nodes: storage,
transportation (containing pipes, valves and heat
exchangers) and fractionating column. For the sake of
brevity we shall discuss here results of only one of the
units of each study node with reference to the general
and specific information on the causes and conse-
quences.

Pump
The function of the pump is to increase the flow and
pressure of LPG and send it to the fractionating column.
The guide words applicable here are low, more, and no.
The TOPHAZOP output if there is a deviation (fall) in
the pressure at the outlet is shown in Table 4. Besides
maintaining the flow, the pump also serves the specific
purpose of maintaining the design pressure of the flow.
Further, the step involves a highly volatile and flam-
mable chemical. This makes it imperative to study the
Figure 3 The Object-oriented architecture of TOPHAZOP. specific causes and consequences of all such deviations.
The study concludes that among various causes the one
that may lead to the worst consequence (failure of the
column) is the rise in temperature of the chemical.

Storage unit

;
r-----------t
P~cyJl~” _c’_as_S,b
I i
- q-p- - - I
-- The storage unit is a vessel capable of withstanding high

F
internal pressure for storing liquid LPG. As illustrated
I- ;,,,,t,,
II
-;m - q-pp - - -
in the preceding example of the pump, the general as
------------I well as the specific causes and consequences have been
;----_-_-_-----_-_, I I I
CaW3 b+FFT--- ---------*I Rule network searched out for all possible deviations for this unit. The
L________J for causes result for the deviation involving rise in pressure in the
IIll I
Rule network for vessel is presented in Table 5. It reveals that this unit is
pgz$F-- ----__---4 consequences
;
I
01 susceptible to boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
_-_--_----_J
(BLEVE), which could be a disastrous event. Among the
various causes that may lead to this accident, failure of
Figure4 The architecture of knowledge-base. flair and choking of the valve are the most serious ones.

Fractionating column
Case study The fractionating column is a process unit that performs
TOPHAZOP has been applied to the HAZOP study of a specific operation in each plant. This unit is matched
a LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) plant. The plant with the mass and heat transfer unit of TOPHAZOP. The
includes LPG storage units, LPG transportation system cause-consequence analysis, in general as well as spe-

Cause 1

/
Attribute 1
/
Deviation 1 L Cause 2

\ Consequence 1

Consequence 2

\ Parameter 3 ~
\ Attribute 4 \ Consequence 3

Figure 5 The rule network for specific causes and consequences.

340 TOPHAZOP: F. 1. Khan and S. A. Abbasi

Parameter 1 Cause 1

Deviation I Cause 2
Parameter 2
Process unit
class < 4 Deviation 2 Cause 3
Parameter 3

Deviation 3
Parameter 4

Consequence 1

Consequence 2

Consequence 3

Figure 6 The rule network for the general causes and consequences.

TOPHAZOP
Tool for CQtimizing HAZOP study

consequences

Take one unit

Apply propagation

I
Apply propagation
consequences
**** OPERATIIC CCNDITICN GJI!X WlRD : HIGFi****
method to
identify general
causes
Apply propagation Figure 6 A typical menu of TOPHAZOP.

mable and is processed under hazardous working con-

ditions (high temperature and pressure).
This entire case study has been performed by a sin-
gle person who took only 3 hours to formulate the prob-
lem as well as to run TOPHAZOP, and 1.5 hours to
interpret the results. Using conventional HAZOP study
procedures the same study took 2.5 weeks. Moreover,
the results obtained by TOPHAZOP are comparable with
a study of a team of experts using the conventional
HAZOP study procedure [22].

Figure 7 The TOPHAZOP inference engine.
cific terms, has been performed for this unit. The results
pertaining to a deviation-lowering of concentration-
in the feed stream, are given in Table 6. It is evident
that the main causes leading to the deviation are changes
in feed conditions and/or failure of the reboiler. The ulti-
mate consequence of this deviation is explosion
(BLEVE). This is because the chemical is highly flam-
Conclusion
TOPHAZOP is a knowledge-based user-friendly
software for conducting HAZOP studies in a compre-
hensive, effective, and efficient manner within a short
span of time. TOPHAZOP overcomes several major
limitations (time, effort, repetitious work, etc.) of the
existing HAZOP procedure. The software has an in-built
knowledge-base which is extensive and dynamic. It
incorporates process units, and works out numerous
modes of failure for certain input operational conditions.
It drastically minimizes the need of expert time. The
knowledge-base has been developed in two segments:
process-general knowledge, and process-specific knowl-
edge. The process-specific knowledge segment handles
 TOPHAZOP: F. I. Khan and S. A. Abbasi 341

Table 3 List of equipment along with associated parameter available in TOPHAZOP

Equipment Parameters

Reactor Pressure, volume, temperature, concentration, flow rate

Heat exchanger Flow rate, temperature, pressure
Distillation column Concentration, flow rate, temperature, pressure
Mass transfer unit Concentration, flow rate, temperature
Evaporator/condenser Temperature, concentration, pressure, flow rate
Pump Flow rate, pressure
Pipe line Temperature, pressure, flow rate
Valve Flow rate, pressure
Storage unit Level, temperature, pressure
Transportation vessel Temperature, pressure, capacity
Control valve Temperature, pressure, flow rate
Control system Signal, temperature pressure, flow rate
Direct combustion unit Temperature, pressure, flow rate/capacity
Non processing unit (settling tank, agitation tank) Temperature, pressure, level
Sensing and measuring devices Signal, transmission

Table 4 Output of TOPHAZOP for a deviation-decrease in pressure-at outlet stream. Result of HAZOP study of a pump. Plant: LPG;
unit: transportation

Deviation Causes Consequences

General Analysis
Low pressure atoutlet 0 leak in pump/line 0 over heating of pump
0 seal fail 0 adverse effect to next unit
0 lubricant loss
0 pump running under speed
0 suction line plugged
0 relief valve open
Specific Analysis
Low pressure atoutlet 0 storage tank leak 0 low pressure and flow rate in
0 cavitation occur fractionating column
0 line Ll leak
0 valve VLI closed 0 excessive high temperature in column
0 pump running under speed
0 good chances of column failure
Operational data (attributes)
Inlet to unit: line Ll, valve VLI, storage Sl
Outlet of unit: line L2, fractionating column DSI
Chemical: highly flammable, low autoignition temperature
Pressure: high
Temperature: normal
Flow rate: high
Phase: liquefied gas

information specific to a particular process unit in a
particular operation, whereas the process-general knowl-
edge segments handle general information about process
units. At present, the knowledge-base incorporates infor-
mation pertaining to 15 different process units including
their characteristics and modes of failures. The avail-
ability of on-line help and graphical user-interface
enhances its user-friendliness so that even an inexperi-
enced professional can utilize the software with rela-
tive ease.
In order to test the effectiveness of the software, a
real-life industrial case study has been performed using
TOPHAZOP. It reveals that by using TOPHAZOP the
time taken in conducting HAZOP can be drastically
reduced in comparison to the conventional HAZOP. In
the present case the use of TOPHAZOP enabled the
HAZOP to be completed within 4.5 hours while the
same study by conventional procedures took 2.5 weeks.
The expert manpower requirements were also drastically
lesser: TOPHAZOP could be completed by just one
engineer whereas conventional HAZOP required six
experts.
Further advancements are possible in the
TOPHAZOP system in terms of incorporating: more
complex process units, more efficient search methods,
ability to handle more complex process situations such
as reverse flow, recycle loop, purging, etc., and user-
interactive flow charting options. Further work along
these lines is in progress.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank All India Council of Technical Edu-
cation (AICTE) New Delhi for supporting Computer
342 TOPHAZOP: F. 1. Khan and S. A. Abbasi

Table 5 Output of TOPHAZOP for a deviation-increase in pressure-in storage vessel. Result of HAZOP study of a storage vessel.
Plant: LPG; unit: storage unit

Deviation Causes Consequences

General Analysis
High pressure in vessel 0 overfilling the tank 0 high pressure in vessel
0 relief valve fail 0 chances of failure of tank accidentally
0 external heating
0 out to tank closed
0 phase change
0 leak in line or vessel
Specific Analysis
Low pressure in vessel 0 phase change of LPG 0 high pressure in the vessel
0 leak in vessel
0 external heating
0 cooling system fail 0 high chances of boiling liquid
0 relief valve to flare got stuck expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)
0 valve VLI closed
Operational data (attributes)
Inlet to unit: external loading, addition
Outlet of unit: relief valve to flare, valve VLI, line Ll
Chemical: highly flammable, low autoignition temperature
Pressure: very high
Temperature: low
Flow rate: high
Phase: liquefied gas

Table 6 Output of TOPHAZOP for a deviationdecrease in concentration-at the feed stream of the fractionating column. Result of
HAZOP study of fractionating column. Plant: LPG; unit: distillation

Deviation Causes Consequences

General Analysis
Low concentration in feed stream 0 impure raw material 0 performance of equipment get effected
0 leak in line 0 impure product
0 phase change 0 chances of severe working conditions
0 excess ingredient 0 chances of equipment failure
Specific Analysis
Low concentration in feed stream ??impure feed 0 high temperature in fractionating column
??excess N2 in storage 0 low product quality
0 high pressure
0 high chances of explosion
Operational data (attributes)
Inlet to unit: line Ll, valve VLl, storage Sl, pump PPl and PP2
Outlet of unit: to final product, to reboiler, to condenser
Intermediate: heat to the column
Chemical: highly flammable, low autoignition temperature
Pressure: high
Temperature: high
Flow rate: high
Phase: liquefied gas

Aided Environmental Management (CAEM) Unit which
enabled this study.
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