Chapter 6

Hazard Identification
Let’s think together....identify the potential hazards
Let’s think together....identify the potential hazards
Contents
 Introduction of Hazard Identifications
 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
 HAZOP guidewords
Objectives
 Identify study nodes and decide on possible
hazards based on HAZOP guidewords
 Construct HAZOP review table subsequently
assess the hazard’s cause, consequence and action
required.
What is Hazard Identification?
 Questions that must be asked for each process in
chemical plant
 What are the hazards?
 What can go wrong and how?
 What are the chances?
 What are the consequences?
 Provide basic information for risk assessment
Figure 10-1 Hazards identification and risk assessment procedure
When it should be performed?
 At any stage during the initial design or ongoing
operation of a process.
 It serves to enables modifications to be easily
incorporated into the final design and to operate
the ongoing process better in terms of safety.
Who should perform?
 It usually requires a committee which composed of cross-section of
experienced plant, laboratory, technical and safety professional
 One individual must be a trained safety personnel and serves as the
committee chair. He will lead the discussion and must be expert in the
chemical process under review
 One individual must also be assigned the task of recording the results
 The meeting duration must be short enough to ensure continuing
interest and input from all committee members
 It takes a large investment of time and effort, but the results are well
worth the effort
How to perform?
1. Process hazard checklists
 provide a list of items and possible problems in the
process that must be checked.
 should only be applied during the preliminary stage of
hazard identification and not be used as a
replacement for a more complete hazard procedure.
1. Process hazard checklists
A classic example is an automobile checklist that one might review before driving away on
a vacation. This checklist might contain the following items:
 Check oil in engine.
 Check air pressure in tires.
 Check fluid level in radiator.
 Check air filter.
 Check fluid level in windshield washer tank.
 Check headlights and taillights.
 Check exhaust system for leaks.
 Check fluid levels in brake system.
 Check gasoline level in tank.
Checklists for chemical processes can be detailed, involving hundreds or even thousands
of items.
2. Hazard surveys
1. Hazards surveys
 It is more like to inventory of
hazardous materials, or, it
can be detailed as the Dow
Fire & Explosion Index.
 use a rating form
How to perform?
3. Safety review
 It is a method used to identify safety problems in laboratory and process area
and to develop solutions.
 Two (2) types
 Informal: small changes to existing processes
 Formal: new process, substantial changes to existing processes

4. Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)

 is a formal systematic procedure used to identify hazards in a chemical
process facility
 very effective in identifying hazard
Hazard and Operability Studies
 What is HAZOP
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic
examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and
evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent
efficient operation.

The HAZOP technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process

systems, but has later been extended to other types of systems and also to
complex operations and to software systems.

A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guide-words and is carried out by a

multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.
 When to perform HAZOP ?
The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out as early in the design phase
as possible - to have influence on the design. On the other hand; to carry out a
HAZOP we need a rather complete design. As a compromise, the HAZOP is
usually carried out as a final check when the detailed design has been completed.

A HAZOP study may also be conducted on an existing facility to identify

modifications that should be implemented to reduce risk and operability problems.
 When to perform HAZOP ?
HAZOP studies may also be used more extensively, including:

 At the initial concept stage when design drawings are available

 When the final piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) are available

 During construction and installation to ensure that recommendations are

implemented

 During commissioning

 During operation to ensure that plant emergency and operating procedures are
regularly reviewed and updated as required
 Type of HAZOP
 Process HAZOP
The HAZOP technique was originally developed to assess plants and
process systems
 Human HAZOP
A “family” of specialized HAZOPs. More focused on human errors than
technical failures
 Procedure HAZOP
Review of procedures or operational sequences
Sometimes denoted SAFOP - SAFe Operation Study
 Software HAZOP
Identification of possible errors in the development of software
 Objective of HAZOP
 For identifying causes and the consequences of
perceived mal operations of equipment and
associated operator interfaces in the context of
the complete system.
 Why & How HAZOP Is Used?
 Identifies potential hazards, failures and operability problems.
 Recommended as a principal method by professional institutions and
legislators on the basis of proven capabilities for over 40 years.
 Most effective as a team effort consists of plant designers, operating
personnel, control and instrumentation engineer etc.
 Encourages creativity in design concept evaluation.
 Results in fewer commissioning and operational problems and better
informed personnel, thus confirming overall cost effectiveness
improvement.
 What is needed to perform HAZOP?
 For preliminary HAZOP
 Process Flow Sheet (PFS
or PFD)
 Description of the
Process
 For Detailed HAZOP
 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
( P & ID )
 Process Calculations
 Process Data Sheets
 Instrument Data Sheets
 Interlock Schedules
 Layout Requirements
 Hazardous Area Classification
 Operating instructions
HAZOP Procedures
1. Detailed flow sheet, break into process units, select a unit
2. Choose study node (vessel, line, operating instruction)
3. Describe the intent of study node (vessel: to store)

4. Pick a process parameter: flow, level, temperature, pressure, etc.

5. Apply guide words to generate deviations from normal operation corresponding to

all conceivable possibilities such as NO or NOT, MORE, LESS, AS WELL AS, PART
OF, REVERSE, OTHER THAN.
6. If deviation is applicable, determine possible causes and note any protective systems

7. Evaluate consequences

8. Recommend actions

9. Record information
 Process flow for HAZOP
Select Line

Select deviation (eg. MORE flow)

Move on to next deviation Is more flow possible?

Is it hazardous or does it prevent efficient operation? Consider other causes of

more flow
What change in plant will tell him ? Will the operator know that there is more flow?

What changes in plant or method will prevent the deviation or make it Consider other changes or agreed
less likely or protect against the consequences? to accept hazard

Is the cost of the change justified?

Agree change(s), who is responsible for action

Follow up to see action has been taken

Guidelines for Division into Sections
 Choices of lines – P&ID must be divided logically, not too many
sections
 Factors to be considered:
 Each section should contain active components, which gives rise to
deviations. E.g piping which contains control valves can give rise to
flow deviations, heat exchangers can cause T deviations.
 Materials in section – contain significant amount of hazardous
materials.
 Section based on process and states of materials. Only one process
operation per section.
Guidelines for Division into Sections
 General guidelines:
 Define each major process component as a section. Usually
anything assigned equipment number should be considered a
major process component.
 Define one line section between each major process component.
 Define additional line sections for each branches off the main
process flow.
 Define a process section at each connection to existing
equipment.
Guidelines for Division into Sections
 Supplementary guidelines
 Define only one process section for equipment in identical
service. However, pumps in different service with a common
spare must be treated separately.
 Define only one line at the end of a series of components if
there are no other flow paths.
 Define only one additional line section if there are alternative
flow paths, regardless of how many branches there are.
Guidelines for Division into Sections
 Do not define line between major equipment items
if there are no single active components that could
cause deviations.
 Do not define sections for existing equipment that
is upstream of new or modified equipment. Address
malfunctions of such upstream equipment as
deviations in the new or modified equipment.
Guide Words
NONE No forward flow when there should be
MORE More of any parameter than there should be, e.g
more flow, more pressure, more temperature, etc.
LESS As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART System composition difference from what it should
be
MORE THAN More "components" present than there should be for
example, extra phase, impurities
OTHER What needs to happen other than normal operation,
e.g. start up,shutdown, maintenance
Guide Words
NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve
closed or jammed : leak: valve open ;suction vessel
empty; delivery side over - pressurized : vapor lock ;
control failure
REVERSE e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure : NRV
failure or wrongly inserted ; wrong routing; delivery over
pressured; back- siphoning ; pump reversed
MORE OF e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery head ;
surging ; suction pressurised ; controller failure ; valve
stuck open leak ; incorrect instrument reading.
 Guide Words
MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external fires;
blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming; gas release;
reaction;explosion; valve closed; loss of level in heater; sun.
LESS OF e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale in
delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction head;
process turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of input
and output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of mixture;
additional reactions in reactor or other location ; feed change. 
Guide Words
MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of contaminants such
as air, water, lube oils; corrosion products; presence of
other process materials due to internal leakage ; failure
of isolation ; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up and
shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ; sampling ;
maintenance; activating catalyst; removing blockage
or scale ; corrosion; process emergency ; safety
procedures activated ; failure of power, fuel, steam , air,
water or inert gas; emissions and lack of compatibility
with other emission and effluents.
Guide Words
 The application of each guide word to a process line to generate
all conceivable deviations must be thorough and exhaustive.
 For each deviation generated the cause and the consequences
must be determined . Typical questions which could arise are:
 Do we need a high liquid level alarm as well as a level indicator?
 Is a single non-return valve sufficient ?
 Is the vent big enough ?
 HAZOP Study Form
HAZOP Study Report Form
Project Date Sheet 1 of 12
Process Section
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTIONS, OR
WORDS RECOMMENDATIONS

 Table 10-6 (page 451)

Strengths of HAZOP
 Systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible
 suitable mainly for team use whereby it is possible to incorporate the
general experience available
 gives good identification of cause and excellent identification of critical
deviations
 use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to participate
 excellent well-proven method for studying large plant in a specific
manner
 identifies virtually all significant deviations on the plant, all major
accidents should be identified but not necessarily their causes.
Weaknesses of HAZOP
 Time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency for boredom for
analysts
 Tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the

technique should be amenable to human error application

 Tends to generate many failure events with insignificance consequences

and generate many failure events which have the same consequences
 Stifles brainstorming although this is not required at the late stage of

design when it is normally applied

 Does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits many

scenarios.
Weaknesses of HAZOP
 Takes little account of the probabilities of events or consequences, although
quantitative assessment are sometime added. The group generally let their
collective experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful
 Poor where multiple-combination events can have severe effects

 Tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of construction will

not arise
 When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to encourage listing these as

resulting in action by emergency control measures without considering that

such action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution which can be
made by operator interventions
HAZOP Example
 Exothermic reaction controlled by cooling water
Cooling Coils
Monomer
Feed
Cooling Water to Sewer

Cooling
Water In

TC
Thermocouple
 HAZOP Example
 Description of the process
 The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is provided to remove the
excess energy of reaction. In the event of cooling function is lost, the
temperature of reactor would increase. This would lead to an increase in
reaction rate leading to additional energy release. The result would be a
runaway reaction with pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor. The temperature within the reactor is measured and is used to
control the cooling water flow rate by a valve.
Perform the HAZOP study on this unit to improve the safety of the process

 HAZOP study as in Table 10-7 (page 453) : handout

 See the Figure. An alkene / alkane fraction containing small amounts of suspended water is
continuously pumped from a bulk intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer / settling tank where residual water is settled out prior to passing via a feed / product
heat exchanger and preheater to the reaction section. The water, which has an adverse effect
on the dimerization reaction, is run off manually from the settling tank at intervals. Residence
time in the reaction section must be held within closely defined limits to ensure adequate
conversion of the alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.
 Node is flow
in pipe
Factors for a Successful HAZOP Study
 Throughout the study
 Should be an integral part of an overall safety
management system
 Process must have full backing and support of senior
management
Factors for a Successful HAZOP Study
 Before the study
 Must be initiated by a person with authority, who will receive
and implement the actions
 The design must be well developed and firm, drawings must
be well prepared
 Skilled and suitably experienced team leader should be chosen
 Team must be balanced and well chosen to combine
knowledge and experience
Factors for a Successful HAZOP Study
 During the study
 Team must be motivated and have adequate time to complete the
task
 The boundary of the study must be clearly analyzed and studied
 Must have clear process description, design intent and design
envelope
 The study uses a creative thought process. Should fatigue sets in,
study must be halted and resumed when the team is refreshed
Factors for a Successful HAZOP Study
 After the study
 Every action raised must be analyzed and answered
accurately
 Those which require a positive change should be
subject to a management of change process
Summary
 Hazard identifications is one of the most
important tasks for a process plant
 HAZOP is a mature and most popular tool for
identifying hazards without waiting for an
accident to occur
Thanks…..