PSM Course 2014 Day 3

Process Safety Management
Eindhoven, June 4th, 2013 dr. ir. M.A. Stam

Summary Day 2
• Process Safety in General

• Personal Safety - Process Safety
• Incident Sequence - Layers of Defense
• Process Safety Culture
• HSE Culture Ladder (Hearts and Minds)
• Life Saving Rules
• Human Perception
• Commitment to Process Safety
• 5 elements
• Plant General Inspections
Outline Course
• Industrial Processes
• Operations Management
• Commitment to Process Safety
• Understand Hazards and Risks
• Manage Risks
• Learn from Experience
Process Safety Management
*) Center For Chemical Process Safety, *) Sepeda, L.A., “Understanding Process Safety Management”, American
“Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety”, Institute of Chemical Engineering, August 2010
2007
Day 3
• Process Knowledge Management 09.00-09.30

• Hazard Identification and Risks (1) 09.30-10.00
• Coffee Break 10.00-10.30
• Hazard Identification and Risks (2) 10.30-12.00
• Lunch 12.00-13.00
• Workshop – Hazop Study “ProPac” 13.00-15.00
• Tea Break 15.00-15.30
• Presentation + Discussion 15.30-16.00
• Operating Procedures 16.00-16.30
• Safe Working Practices 16.30-17.00
Process Knowledge Management
“Work Activities Associated With Compiling, Cataloging and

Making Available a Specific Set of Data That is Normally Recorded
in Paper or Electronically”
“Risk Understanding Depends on Accurate Process Knowledge”
“Knowledge Grows and Evolves Throughout the Life Cycle of a

Process and Thus is The Responsibility of a Number of
Organizations”
*) Center For Chemical Process Safety, “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety”, 2007
“Lehigh County, PA (February 19, 1999)”
1. Inadequate Understanding of Process Safety During Design

2. Inadequate Translating of Knowledge for Pilot Plant Operation
What Is It?
• Written Technical Documents and Specifications

• Engineering Documents and Calculations
• Specifications for Design, Fabrication, and Installation of
Process Equipment
• Other Written Documents Such As Material Safety Data Sheets
(MSDS)
*) Center For Chemical Process Safety, “Risk Based Process Safety – An Overview”, San Antonio, April 28, 2013
Typical Information
• A Compilation of Written Process Safety Information is

Required
• Before Conducting Any Process Hazards Analysis
• Identify and Understand The Hazards Posed By The Process
Maintain a Dependable Practice
1. Ensure Consistent Implementation

2. Define the Scope
3. Thoroughly Document Chemical Reactivity and
Incompatibility Hazards
Catalog Process Knowledge
1. Make Information Available and Provide Structure

2. Protect Knowledge from Inadvertent Loss
3. Store Calculations, Design Data and Similar Information in
Central Files
4. Document Information in a User-Friendly Manner
Protect and Update Process Knowledge
1. Control or Limit Access to Out-of Date Documents

2. Ensure Accuracy
3. Protect Against Inadvertent Change
4. Protect Against Physical (or Electronic) Removal or Misfiling
5. Support Efforts to properly Manage Change
Use Process Knowledge
1. Ensure Awareness
2. Ensure that Process Knowledge Remains Useful
Typical Information
1. Chemical Hazard Information

2. Process Technology Information
3. Process Equipment Information
Question?
Can you give examples of required documents?
1. Chemical Hazard Information

2. Process Technology Information
3. Process Equipment Information
Chemical Hazards Information
• Toxicity Information
• Permissible Exposure Limits
• Physical Data
• Reactivity Data
• Corrosivity Data
• Thermal and Chemical Stability
• Hazardous Effects of Inadvertent Mixing That Could Occur
• Thermodynamic Data
• Other Special Hazards (e.g. shock sensitivity, etc.)
Process Technology Information
• Block or Simplified Process Flow Diagram

• Process Chemistry
• Maximum Inventory
• Safe Upper and Lower Control Limits
• Temperatures
• Pressures
• Flow Rates
• Compositions
• Consequences of Deviation From Those Limits
Process Equipment Information
• Materials of Construction
• Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
• Electrical Classification
• Relief Systems Design and Design Basis
• Ventilation System Design
• Design Codes Employed
• Material and Energy Balances
• Safety Systems
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
“All Activities Involved in Identifying Hazards and Evaluating Risk

at Facilities”
“Hazard – What Can Go Wrong”
“Consequences – How Bad Could It Be?”
“Likelihood – How Often Might It Happen?
“Longford, Victoria, Australia (October 14, 1998)”
1. Lack of Risk Study (Planned 3 Years Prior to Accident)
Process Hazard Analysis (1)
• Identify and Evaluate the Hazards in A Process

• Define Where the Hazards Exist
• Define What The Existing Safeguards Are
• Evaluate the Adequacy of Those Safeguards
• Recommend What Can Be Done to Reduce the Risk
Process Hazard Analysis (2)
• Previous Incidents
• Engineering and Administrative Controls
• Consequences of Failure of Controls
• Health and Safety Effects
• Process Effects
• Facility Siting
• Protection of People in Buildings
• Human Factors
• Regulatory Requirement
Process Hazard Analysis Team
• Persons Trained and Knowledgeable in PHA Methodologies

• Persons Knowledgeable
• Process
• Process Chemistry
• Equipment
• Appropriate Employees
• Process Engineers
• Operators
• Maintenance Personnel
Question: What are your Belbin Team Roles?
• Analyst
• Chairman
• Completer
• Driver
• Executive
• Expert
• Explorer
• Innovator
• Team Player
http://www.123test.com/team-roles-test/
Process Hazard Analysis Flow Diagram
Accident
Severity Modify
Estimation System
System Hazard Risk Risk Operate

Description Identification Determination Acceptance System
Accident
Likelihood
Estimation
Definitions
• Severity
• Impact of the Incident in Terms of the Effects on People, Property or
Environment
• Qualitatively Described as Fatalities, Injuries, Environmental Impact,
Business Interruption, Etc.
• Likelihood
• How Often the Entire Scenario Happens
• Either Probability (Chance of an Event Occurring) or Frequency (How Often
It Occurs)
• Qualitatively Described as Once in the Lifetime of the Plant, Once a Year,
Etc.
• Risk (R = S x L )
• A Measure of Potential Human Injury, Economic Loss or Environmental
Impact in Terms of Its Severity and Likelihood
Risk Acceptance Matrix
Sequence of a Hazard Scenario
Initiating Final
Intermediate
Event Event
Events
Operator Release Injury

Level
Overfills From from
Increases
Tank Tank Release
High Level Operator Personnel

Alarm Fails to in the
Fails Control Area
Dependent Events
Methodologies Used
• What-If-Analysis
• What-If/Checklist Analysis
• Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA )
• Fault Tree Analysis
• Event Tree Analysis
• Cause-Consequence Analysis
What If
• Simple Format
• Easy to Facilitate
• Quick to Execute
• Highly Flexible
• Can Be Used in Every Stage
• Design
• Construction
• Operation
• Dependent on Skilled and Experienced Participants
What If (Steps)
1. Divide the system up into smaller, logical subsystems

2. Identify a list of questions for a subsystem
3. Select a question
4. Identify hazards, consequences, severity, likelihood, and
recommendations
5. Repeat Step 2 through 4 until complete
What If (Example)
My car will not start
1. The battery is dead.

2. The alternator is not functioning.
3. The alternator belt has broken.
4. The alternator belt was well beyond its useful service life and
has never been replaced.
5. I have not been maintaining my car according to the
recommended service schedule.
What If (Summary)
• Perhaps the most commonly used method

• One of the least structured methods
• Can be used in a wide range of circumstances
• Success highly dependent on experience of the analysts
• Useful at any stage in the facility life cycle
• Useful when focusing on change review
Checklist
• Consists of using a detailed list of prepared questions about

the design and operation of the facility
• Questions are usually answered “Yes” or “No”

• Used to identify common hazards through compliance with
established practices and standards
Checklist (Question Category)
• Causes of accidents
• Process equipment
• Human error
• External events
• Facility Functions
• Alarms, construction materials, control systems, documentation and
training, instrumentation, piping, pumps, vessels, etc.
Checklist (Questions)
• Causes of accidents
• Is process equipment properly supported?
• Is equipment identified properly?
• Are the procedures complete?
• Is the system designed to withstand hurricane winds?
• Facility Functions
• Is it possible to distinguish between different alarms?
• Is pressure relief provided?
• Is the vessel free from external corrosion?
• Are sources of ignition controlled?
Checklist (Summary)
• The simplest of hazard analyses

• Easy-to-use; level of detail is adjustable
• Provides quick results; communicates information well
• Effective way to account for ‘lessons learned’
• NOT helpful in identifying new or unrecognized hazards
• Limited to the expertise of its author(s)
• Should be prepared by experienced engineers
• Its application requires knowledge of the system/facility and
its standard operating procedures
• Should be audited and updated regularly
What If/Checklist
• A hybrid of the What-If and Checklist methodologies
• Combines the brainstorming of What-If method with the

structured features of Checklist method
What If/Checklist (Steps)
• Begin by answering a series of previously-prepared ‘What-if’

questions
• During the exercise, brainstorming produces additional

questions to complete the analysis of the process under study
What If/Checklist (Summary)
• Encourages creative thinking (What-If) while providing

structure (Checklist)
• In theory, weaknesses of stand-alone methods are eliminated

and strengths preserved – not easy to do in practice
• E.g.: when presented with a checklist, it is typical human

behavior to suspend creative thinking
Fault Tree Analysis
• Graphical method that starts with a hazardous event and

works backwards to identify the causes of the top event
• Top-down analysis
• Intermediate events related to the top event are combined by

using logical operations such as AND and OR.
FTA (Example)
Fault Tree Analysis (Summary)
• Provides a traceable, logical, quantitative representation of

causes, consequences and event combinations
• Amenable to – but for comprehensive systems, requiring – use
of software
• Not intuitive, requires training
• Not particularly useful when temporal aspects are important
“Texas City, Texas (March 23, 2005)”
Video (06:15)
HAZOP Objectives
• To identify potential Hazards and Operability problems

associated with a process
• Hazards are safety related fire, explosion, toxic release, employee injury,
public injury, equipment damage issues
• Operability problems are unnecessary shutdowns, loss of product, quality
issues, and other production issues
• To analyze the adequacy of existing safeguards that minimize
the hazards
• To develop recommendations where the team’s opinion is that
safeguards are inadequate
Description of a HAZOP
• Presumes hazards and operability problems are created when

the process deviates from the design or operating intent
• Results in identification and analysis of hazards or operability
problems and safeguards
• Uses a team approach to ensure involvement of appropriate
individuals and efficient, realistic input
Application of a HAZOP
• Systems
• Continuous Processes
• Batch Processes
• Procedures
• Control Systems
• All Stages of Facility’s Life
• Design
• Start-up
• Operation
• Modification
• Maintenance
• Shutdown
• Emergency Shutdown
Steps to Conduct a HAZOP
1. Collect the information needed to conduct the HAZOP

2. Conduct a kick-off meeting to plan the study and agree on
assumptions
3. Conduct the HAZOP study
4. Prepare a report
5. Conduct any follow-up activities
Collect Information Needed in PHA
• Collect and/or update the Process Safety Information (PSI)

• Prepare a list of modifications to the system and collect MOC
forms
• Prepare a summary of previous incidents and collect incident
investigation reports
• Obtain a copy of all previous PHA’s
• Prepare a document that summarizes the resolution of
previous recommendations
Conduct a Kick-Off Meeting
• Identify the purpose and scope of the study including the

systems to be covered
• Review the process safety information
• Choose the technique assumptions
• Identify roles and responsibilities for team members
Beginning The Study
• Orient all team members in the objectives and scope of the

study
• Present an explanation of the process so that everyone is
familiar with the process
• Provide team members inexperienced in the PHA method
being used with training in the methodology
• The kick-off may include a walk-through of the facility
HAZOP Methodology
• A section of the process, called a Node, is selected

• A Parameter which characterizes the design intent within the
node is selected (e.g., flow, temperature)
• A Guide Word which qualifies the parameter is selected (e.g.,
no, more, less)
• A Deviation from the design intent is created by combining the
guide word and parameter (e.g., “no flow”).
• A Deviation is studied at every Node. Causes of the deviation
within the node are identified and analyzed
HAZOP Deviation (Example)
• Node: Feed line to drum

• Parameter: Flow
• Guide Word: More
• Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation
• Deviation: “More Flow”

HAZOP Deviation (Example)
• Identify credible causes

• Evaluate consequences
• Document existing safeguards
• Rank the severity of the worst consequence
• Rank the likelihood of occurrence of the worst consequence,
based on the cause and the existing safeguards
HAZOP Process Parameters
• Temperature • Speed
• Pressure • Frequency
• Flow • Viscosity
• Level • Power
• Composition • Addition
• Agitation • Separation
• Reaction • …
HAZOP Guidewords
• No or Not
• More or More of
• Less or Less of • Sooner Than
• As Well As • Later Than Batch Operations
• Part of • Where Else
• Reverse
• Other Than
HAZOP (Example)
1. Choose a vessel and describe intention

2. Choose and describe a flow path
3. Apply guideword to deviation
HAZOP (Example)
2. FLOW PATH
1. Vessel
Check
Valve
Feed Tank Pump
3. REVERSAL OF FLOW
HAZOP (Example)
4. Can deviation initiate a hazard of consequence?

5. Can failures causing deviation be identified?
6. Investigate detection and mitigation systems
7. Identify recommendations
8. Document
9. Repeat 3-to-8, 2-to-8, and 1-to-8 until complete
HAZOP (Example)
2. FLOW PATH
1. Vessel
Check
Valve
Feed Tank Pump
3. REVERSAL OF FLOW
4. Distillation materials returning via pumparound
5. Pump failure could lead to REVERSAL OF FLOW
6. Check valve located properly prevents deviation
7. Move check valve downstream of pumparound
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
• Holistic Analysis of System Failures

• Evaluates Effect on other Components and on Entire System
• Method is Equipment Oriented
• Evaluates the Failure of Individual Components
• Determines Criticality for All Components
• Does Not Address Combinations of Failures
FMEA Key Words
• Rupture • Spurious start

• Crack • Loss of function
• Leak • High pressure
• Plugged • Low pressure
• Failure to open • High temperature
• Failure to close • Low temperature
• Failure to stop • Overfilling
• Failure to start • Hose bypass
• Failure to continue • Instrument bypassed
• Spurious stop
FMEA (Example Heat Exchanger)
Failure Causes of Symptoms Predicted Impact

Mode Failure Frequency
Tube Corrosion H/C at Frequent – Critical –

rupture from fluids higher has could
(shell side) pressure happened cause a
than 2x in 10 yrs major
cooling fire
water
• Rank items by risk (frequency x impact)

• Identify safeguards for high risk items
FMEA (Summary)
• FMEA is a very structured and reliable method for evaluating

hardware and systems.
• Easy to learn and apply and approach makes evaluating even
complex systems easy to do.
• Can be very time-consuming (and expensive) and does not
readily identify areas of multiple fault that could occur.
• Not easily lent to procedural review as it may not identify
areas of human error in the process.
Layer of Protection Analysis
• Dependent on PHA to Identify the Hazardous Events

• List of Causes and Safeguards
• Analysis of Benefits of Identified Layers of Protection
• Determination of Additional Ones If Required
• Specific Cause-Consequence Pair
Layers of Protection (Examples)
• Basic Process Control System

• Maintenance Procedures
• Inspection, Tests, Maintenance
• Operating Procedures
• Training People in Procedures
• Conducting a Procedure or Operate a Process Correctly and Consistently
• Keeping a Process Within Established Limits
• Guards, Barriers Against External Forces
• Management of Change
LOPA (Example)
Bow-tie
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
• Maintain A Safe Process State

• Designed and Managed per Regulation, Guidelines and
Internal/External Standards
• Require Rigorous Management System to Justify Risk Reduction Claim
• Inspection
• Testing
• Maintenance
Prevention of Loss of Containment
• Safety Instrumental Systems

• Preventive Safeguards
• Overpressure/Vacuum Relief Protection
• Blowdowns
• Flare Systems
Safety Instrumented System (Example)
Safety Instrumented Basic Process Control

System (SIS) System (BPCS)
Inputs Outputs Inputs Outputs
PT PT
1A 1B
I/P
FT
Reactor
Multiple Layers of Protection
Cost of Poor Alarm Management
*) http://www.dsquare.be/
Root Cause of Alarm Problems
EEMUA Alarm Management Audit
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)
• Single Set of Actions and Associated Equipment

• Identify a Single Hazard
• Act to Bring the System Back to Safe State
• One SIS May Have Multiple SIF’s, Each With a Different Individual SIL
Sensors Logic Solver Final Elements

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
• Dependent on PHA to Identify the Hazardous Events

• List of Causes and Safeguards
• Analysis of Benefits of Identified Layers of Protection
• Determination of Additional Ones If Required
• Specific Cause-Consequence Pair
Safety Integrity Level (Example)
Risk Management – The End Result
• Critical Variables Monitored

• Significant Risks Identified
• Appropriate Risk Methods Utilized
• Risk Tolerance Criteria Satisfied
• Controls In Place for All High Risks
• Contingency Plans In Place with Trigger Points Identified
• Improvements to The Bottom Line
“Point Comfort, Texas (October 6, 2005)”
Video (08:24)
Workshop – HAZOP Study
• “Understand Hazards and Risks”
• 4 Group
• 1 Representative (with experience), 15 Minutes Presentation
• Company “ProPac”
Drawings / Equipment
Node Type Design Conditions/Parameters
References ID
1. Liquid propane Liquid propane from bullet offsite is batched manually into the 39-E-54-1004 39-PV-101
feed from tank farm propane work drum. Non-condensables are vented through to the PSV 39-13
and propane work off-gas system during filling and intermittently thereafter. PSV39-15
drum HV104
HV110
Workshop – HAZOP Study
4 4 8 12 16
3 3 6 9 12
Severity
2 2 4 6 8
1 1 2 3 4
Template
• 11 deviations, 18 causes 1 2 3 4
Likelihood
• Start with “Flow”
1. Document the Intended Risk Management System

2. Integrate HIRA Activities into the Life Cycle of Projects or
Processes
3. Clearly Define the Analytical Scope of HIRAs and Assure
Adequate Coverage
4. Determine the Physical Scope of the Risk System
5. Involve Competent Personnel
6. Make Consistent Judgments
7. Verify that HIRA Practices Remain Effective
Identify Hazards and Evaluate Risks
1. Gather and Use Appropriate Data to Identify Hazards and

Evaluate Risks
2. Select Appropriate HIRA Methods
3. Ensure that HIRA Reviewers have Appropriate Expertise
4. Perform Risk Activities to the Appropriate Level of Technical
Rigor Commensurate with the Life Cycle Stage and the
Available Process Information
5. Prepare a Thorough Risk Assessment Report
Assess Risks and Make Risk-Based Decisions
1. Apply the Risk Tolerance Criteria

2. Select Appropriate Risk Control Measures
Follow Through on the Assessment Results
1. Communicate Important Results to Management

2. Document the Residual Risk
3. Resolve Recommendations and track Completion of Actions
4. Communicate Results Internally
5. Communicate Results Externally
6. Maintain Risk Assessment Records
Operating Procedures
“Operating Procedures are written instructions that list the steps

for a given task and describe the manner in which the steps are to
be performed”
“A consistent high level of human performance is a critical aspect

of any process safety program”
“Procedure are jointly developed by operators and process

engineers”
“Port Neal, Iowa (December 13, 1994)”
1. Lack of Written Procedures Temporary Shutdown
1. Establish Management Controls

2. Control Procedure Format and Content
3. Control Documents
Identify What Operating Procedures are Needed
1. Conduct a Task Analysis

2. Determine What Procedures are Needed and Their
Appropriate Level of Detail
3. Address all Operating Modes
Develop Procedures (1)
1. Use an Appropriate Format

2. Procedure:
• Describe the Expected System Response
• How to Determine if a Step or Task has been done Properly
• Possible Consequences associated with Errors or Omissions
3. Address Safe Operating Limits and Consequences of
Deviation from these Limits
4. Address limiting Conditions of Operation
5. Provide Clear, Concise Instructions
6. Supplement Procedures with Checklists
Develop Procedures (2)
7. Make Effective Use of Pictures and Diagrams

8. Develop Written Procedures to Control Temporary or Non-
routine Operations
9. Group the Tasks in a Logical Manner
10. Interlink Related Procedures
11. Validate Procedures and Verify that Actual Practice Conforms
to Intended Practice
Ensure that Procedures are Maintained
1. Manage Changes
2. Correct Errors and Omissions in a Timely Manner
3. Periodically Review All Operating Procedures
Use Procedures to Improve Human Performance
1. Use the Procedures when Training

2. Hold the Organization Accountable for Consistently Following
Procedures
3. Ensure that Procedures are Available
Safe Working Practices
“Safe Work Practices Help Control Hazards and Manage Risk

Associated With Non-Routine Work”
“Safe Work Practices are a Critical Element in the Management of

Industrial Safety”
“Permits are Normally Issued/Authorized by Trained Operators,

Supervisors or Safety Specialists”
“Piper Alpha (July 6, 1988)”
1. Failure in Following The Safe Working Procedure

2. Safe Work Procedure Was Not Properly Trained
3. Inadequate Emergency Response Training
1. Define the Scope

2. Specify when in the Facility’s Life Cycle the Safe Working
Procedures Apply
3. Ensure Consistent Implementation
4. Involve Competent Personnel
Effectively Control Non-Routine Work Activities
1. Develop Safe Working Procedures, Permits, Checklists, and

Other Written Standards
2. Control Access to Particularly Hazardous Areas
3. Enforce the Use of Safe Working Procedures, Permits, and
Other Standards
4. Review Completed Permits
Examples
• Work Permit
• Task/Job Risk Analysis
• Last Minute Risk Analysis (LMRA)
• Operations and Maintenance Supervision
Work Permit Maatregelen door vergunningverlener
Nodig Gereed In te vullen door de vergunningverlener
□ □ Apparatuur/leiding bevat(te) (pull down menu stoffen per fabriek)

Relevante risico’s: (Risico's benoemen in pull down menu)
□ □ Systeem inblokken en afsluiters labelen
Aantal uitvoerenden:
□ □ Systeem productvrij maken
Datum: 11-04-2013 Tijd: 08:00 Bijlagen: Nee
□ □ Systeem spoelen/stomen
Werkwijze:
□ □ Systeem drukvrij maken
□ Werken in ATEX zone (pull down menu 0,1,2,geen)
□ □ Systeem afsteken
□ Asbest aanwezig (pull down menu ja,nee)
□ □ Stoomtracing veilig gesteld
□ Betreden Besloten ruimte
□ □ Natuurlijke ventilatie
□ Betreden Bijzondere ruime
□ □ Geforceerde ventilatie
□ Openen installaties
□ (De)monteren apparatuur □ □ Apparatuur mechanisch blokkeren
□ Handgereedschap □ □ Eerste opening installatie onder toezicht
□ Vonkvormend gereedschap □ □ Gasmeetplan toevoegen aan vergunning
□ Lassen en/of open vuur □ □ Persoonsgebonden luchtmeting pas/stel
□ Hitte inbrengende werkwijze □ □ Automatische blusinstallatie(s) veiligstellen
□ Graafwerkzaamheden □ □ Bij afzetten wegen Loge 2 inseinen
□ Afzetten wegen Waardes tbv veilig werken aan installaties (30.19) ---->
□ Werk aan hoogspanningsinstallaties Gespoeld met: ………………………….
□ Werk aan laagspanningsinstallaties Gemeten waarde laatste spoeling: ………………………
□ hogedruk reiniging > 250 bar
□ Vacuüm cleaning Datum:………………………………..………….. Tijd: ………………………………..
□ Röntgenen Naam:………………………………………...…………
□ Hijsen, heffen en takelen Nodig Gereed Electrotechnische maatregelen
□ Rayon overschrijdende werkzaamheden □ □ Hangslotvergrendeling door verlener
□ Werken in leidingbruggen □ □ Zekeringen getrokken
□ Uit bedrijf nemen detectiemiddelen □ □ Losgekoppeld
□ Werkplek nabij radioactieve bron □ □ E-tracing veilig gesteld; groep ………………….
□ □ Hoogspanningsschakelaar uitgereden
□ □ Geaard en ontladen
Task Risk Analysis
Last Minute Risk Analysis
Example Chemelot

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Process Safety Management

Eindhoven, June 4th, 2013 dr. ir. M.A. Stam

• Process Safety in General

• Process Knowledge Management 09.00-09.30

“Work Activities Associated With Compiling, Cataloging and

“Risk Understanding Depends on Accurate Process Knowledge”

“Knowledge Grows and Evolves Throughout the Life Cycle of a

1. Inadequate Understanding of Process Safety During Design

• Written Technical Documents and Specifications

• A Compilation of Written Process Safety Information is

1. Ensure Consistent Implementation

1. Make Information Available and Provide Structure

1. Control or Limit Access to Out-of Date Documents

1. Chemical Hazard Information

Can you give examples of required documents?

1. Chemical Hazard Information

• Block or Simplified Process Flow Diagram

“All Activities Involved in Identifying Hazards and Evaluating Risk

“Hazard – What Can Go Wrong”

“Consequences – How Bad Could It Be?”

“Likelihood – How Often Might It Happen?

1. Lack of Risk Study (Planned 3 Years Prior to Accident)

• Identify and Evaluate the Hazards in A Process

• Persons Trained and Knowledgeable in PHA Methodologies

System Hazard Risk Risk Operate

Operator Release Injury

High Level Operator Personnel

1. Divide the system up into smaller, logical subsystems

My car will not start

1. The battery is dead.

• Perhaps the most commonly used method

• Consists of using a detailed list of prepared questions about

• Questions are usually answered “Yes” or “No”

• The simplest of hazard analyses

• A hybrid of the What-If and Checklist methodologies

• Combines the brainstorming of What-If method with the

• Begin by answering a series of previously-prepared ‘What-if’

• During the exercise, brainstorming produces additional

• Encourages creative thinking (What-If) while providing

• In theory, weaknesses of stand-alone methods are eliminated

• E.g.: when presented with a checklist, it is typical human

• Graphical method that starts with a hazardous event and

• Intermediate events related to the top event are combined by

• Provides a traceable, logical, quantitative representation of

• To identify potential Hazards and Operability problems

• Presumes hazards and operability problems are created when

1. Collect the information needed to conduct the HAZOP

• Collect and/or update the Process Safety Information (PSI)

• Identify the purpose and scope of the study including the

• Orient all team members in the objectives and scope of the

• A section of the process, called a Node, is selected

• Node: Feed line to drum

• Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation

• Deviation: “More Flow”

• Identify credible causes

1. Choose a vessel and describe intention

4. Can deviation initiate a hazard of consequence?

• Holistic Analysis of System Failures

• Rupture • Spurious start

Failure Causes of Symptoms Predicted Impact

Tube Corrosion H/C at Frequent – Critical –

• Rank items by risk (frequency x impact)

• FMEA is a very structured and reliable method for evaluating

• Dependent on PHA to Identify the Hazardous Events