ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share in
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO
GANUELAS, Petitioner
vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the RTC of San Fernando, La
Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G.
AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA
GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA,
Administrator, Respondents
G.R. No. 123968             April 24, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Case Digest by: Jean Marie L. Abellana
DOCTRINE: If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated
properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death,
then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation
mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or
independently of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
FACTS:
Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real
Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent
portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration
of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of
the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former,
the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way
of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.
However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a
document revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed
the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus,
prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They
alleged that such donation is void for failure to comply with the
formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition
mortis causa.
On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to
comply with the formalities of wills and testaments because such
donation was inter vivos. The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is
a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply with the
formalities of wills and testaments.
ISSUE:
Is the Deed of Donation void for failure to comply with the formalities
of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis
causa?
RULING:
Yes. The donation is mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the
issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer
the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the
former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution
may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties
will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at
that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if
the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently
of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda
proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the
donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is
important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon
its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of
the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the
form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise
it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein
which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated
properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of
Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended
to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death,
not during her lifetime.
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
CARPIO, J.
Case Digest by: Jean Marie L. Abellana
DOCTRINE: The transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that
"the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the
donor’ are not controlling criteria but are to be construed together with
the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed.
FACTS:
Gonzalo Villanueva represented by his heirs, sued spouses Branoco to
recover a subject parcel of land. Petitioner claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere),
who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August
1970. Spouses Branoco similarly claimed ownership over the Property
through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom
Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965 evidenced by a deed of
donation. The Deed of Donation contained the following stipulations:
I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs,
successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing
thereon, ….
It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21,
1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
THAT I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above
described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since
May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but
will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. It treated Deed as a donation
mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the
Property to Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the
Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
The CA found the Deed as donation inter vivos because Rodriguez had
been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962,
subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; the Deed’s
consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; Rodrigo
waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and Rodriguez accepted
the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate
donations inter vivos, not devises.
ISSUE:
What is the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest,
Rodrigo and Rodriguez?
RULING:
The contract was a perfected donation inter vivos because the naked
title passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez under a perfected donation.
The Supreme Court said that Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.
[4] The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather
than a disposition mortis causa;
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect
at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements
are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order
to give effect to the real intent of the transferor; and,
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation
inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as
to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First, Rodrigo
stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will
not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x
Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to
Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the
Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance
by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over
the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in
another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any
person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to
that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in
case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second, what Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title
to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one
[half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."
Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion
clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the
same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso where, as here, the donor,
while "b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x
that none shall question or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated
that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my
lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the
donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos,
the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed as a whole, it is noted that in the same deed [the
donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the
right to said property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor]
guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels
of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right;
otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore,
when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base
their contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa
[that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die,
she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the
donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at
which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it
was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third, the existence of consideration other than the donor’s death,
such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services
the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
"corroborates the express irrevocability of [inter vivos] transfers."
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from
the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be
vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions
bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give
effect to the donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring
deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court,
after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos, consistent with the principle that "the designation of the
donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that
the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are not
controlling criteria [but] are to be construed together with the rest of
the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved
to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership
of the property subject of the deed.
Ramirez vs. Vda De Ramirez
G.R. No. L-27952            February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
Parties of the Case:
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix (petitioner-appellee)
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ (legatees, oppositors- appellants)
Keyword: usufruct land in favor of a foreigner as stated in the
Filipino’s will
Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964, with only his widow (a French national living in
Paris) as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965 by
Maria Luisa Palacios who was appointed administratrix of the estate.
The principal beneficiaries are as follows: his widow Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition
as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of
her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3)
of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda (An
Austrian living in Spain).
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution

Held: No. It is not violative of the Constitution.
Ratio: The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of
the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the
opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to
a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Ruling: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski
with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No
special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED
ANTONINA CUEVAS v. CRISPULO CUEVAS,
GR No. L-8327, 1955
Facts:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized
conveyance entitled "Donacion Montis Causa," ceding to her nephew
Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in
Nueva Ecija
In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
on May 26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument...
purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance... on August 26,
1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover
the... land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis
causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it
were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it
was not properly accepted; (b) because... the donor did not reserve
sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the
donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to support the
donor.
Court of First Instance denied the recovery
Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court... crux of the
controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of
donation:
"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas m samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin
ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho, makikinabang
at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin
hanggang hindi ko binabawian ng... buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman
ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan
ko sa kaniya."... apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in
that the donor reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation,
harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am
not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same donor...
states that she "will not take away" (the property) "because I reserve it
for him (the donee) when, I die." :
Issues:
whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of
property mortis causa revocable freely by the transferor at any time
before death
The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part
with the title to the property immediately upon the execution of the
deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation is
operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted... with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the
formalities of testaments were not observed
Ruling:
We agree with the Court below that the .decisive proof that the
present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the
effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko ñga iya-
alis" in the priginal) the land "because I am reserving it... to him upon
my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to
freely dispose of the property in. favor of another (a right essential to
full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of
the naked, title to the property in favor of the... donee.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the
donor intended that she should retain-the entire beneficial ownership
during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass to
the donee... and when the donor stated that she would continue to
retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and
attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile, not the
full ownership.
the words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed
ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation
and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed.
Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership... she had
no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all
these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would
she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights
and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.
Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid
donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title during the
lifetime of the donor.
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the
deed "merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the contents
of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and (3)
that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his... gratitude" but
there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without
basis. To respect.the terms of the donation, and at the same time
express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient
acceptance.
Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void because
the donor failed to reserve enough for her own support. As we have
seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits derivable from
the donated property as long as she lived.
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude,
because it was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income
of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his wife
and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add
the... donor's support to his own burdens.
Principles:
neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a
donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling
criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata
As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such
irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is
incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Witness
article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:
"Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void."... it is highly
desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds...
of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of
clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to
retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property before
their death, without need of the consent or intervention of the...
beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be
conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free...
disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation
beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals.
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,  donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE,
PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER,
and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187056               September 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:
Case Digest by: Jean Marie L. Abellana
DOCTRINE:The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the
"distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter
vivos." The reservation of the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon
the donor’s death in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Moreover, an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter
vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not
be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
FACTS:
The spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children,
Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter
of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126-square
meter lot and the house in equal shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and
shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales
will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in
any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to
any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right,
ownership, possession and administration of this property herein
operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the
equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was
witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified
their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died and a few months later, Leopoldo, the
donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo
died subsequently. So, Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the
August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional
Trial Court to which Asuncion opposed, invoking his father Leopoldo’s
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.
The RTC rendered a decision finding that the donation was in fact one
made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the
property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its
irrevocability. Consequently, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his
rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to
assign. The RTC thus directed the registration of the property in the
name of the donees in equal shares.
The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate
of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s
deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor. The CA held that the
donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the
requirements of a notarial will rendering the same void.
ISSUE:
Is the donation made by spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe to
Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini a donation mortis causa or in fact a
donation inter vivos?
RULING:
The donation is inter vivos. That the document in question in this
case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. The
Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the
essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability"
of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the
document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said
that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable
and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make
the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property" and made the
donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently
held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their
naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation,
which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an
acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need
not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of
doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership
of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of
donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the
donee the absolute owner of the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter
vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he
had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer
had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for
probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa,
the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity
of one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interests in the property. The Court has held before that the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute. Moreover, in opposing the
petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of
assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her
may not now claim that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral
attack on such assignment.
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC v. CA,
GR No. L-44628, 1987-08-27
Facts:
Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the
then Court of First Instance... against the petitioners for partition and
accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging... they are
heirs of the decedent.
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. 
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned -- (1) a parcel of agricultural
land
Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville,...
desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights, interest, share
and participation over the above-mentioned property and that he shall
succeed to me in case of my death, however, as long as I am alive I
will be the one to... possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce of my
said land and that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I
shall be the one to enjoy it;
Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National
Bank in consideration of a loan.  This was done with the knowledge
and acquiescence of Melquiades
Seville.
Arsenio Seville died intestate. He was survived by his brothers,
Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville who are included as
respondents... brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters Encarnacion
Seville and Petra Seville.
Thereafter, Melquiades died and is survived by his children Consuelo
Sisters Encarnacion and Petra died later. 
Encarnacion is survived by her children Trinidad. The children of
Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the
properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument
executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their
alleged actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots...
continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of
Arsenio Seville's death.
Issues:
whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to
Melquiades Seville.
Ruling:
a close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter vivos... or
mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire.
it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating.
There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio
Seville to Melquiades. Seville at the time of the instrument's
execution.
It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that
in the event of his death at some future time, his properties should go
to Melquiades Seville.
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be
governed by the rules established in the title... on succession (Art.
728, Civil Code).
Arsenio dealt with the land and entered into transactions as its
owner.  All these happened with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville.  consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE,
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in their brief, there was no
immediate transfer of title upon the execution of Exhibit 4.
Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal
heirs of Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial interests in the
subject of litigation thus qualifying them as real parties-in?interest.
any claim of ownership of the petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4
but on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio Seville together with the
private respondents.
It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the
signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate
during his lifetime.
He executed documents by affixing... his thumbmark
Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their claim of
ownership.  During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, no paid the PNB
amortization out of his personal funds and out of the income on his
property.  The payments were not continued by the petitioners when
Arsenio Seville died so much so that the property was extrajudicially
foreclosed and had to be repurchased by Zoilo Seville, one of the...
respondents, through installment arrangements.
MAGLASANG v. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002
FACTS: On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in
favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a “Deed
of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot” covering
one-half (½) portion of the former’s house and lot. Four (4) other
deeds of donation were subsequently executed
by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a)
petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, and
(c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan real properties. These deeds of
donation contain similar provisions, to wit: “That for and in
x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by
way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property,
together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before
the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x”3 (Emphasis
Ours) On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of
Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said
four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14, 1995.
Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister
machinations and strategies and taking advantage
of Conchita Cabatingan’s fragile condition, caused the execution of
the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to
comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa.
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents’ allegations.
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these
were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan “in consideration of the
love and affection of the donor” for the donee, and there is nothing in
the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in
consideration of Cabatingan’s death. In addition, petitioners contend
that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of
Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the
donation as inter vivos.
ISSUE: WON the donation is inter vivos.
NO. In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.”In determining
whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as
mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s death. The phrase “to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as
mortis causa in their Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly
found in the subject deeds of donation.
That the donations were made “in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor” does not qualify the donations as inter
vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
same reason.
The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As
stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void
if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that
the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the
ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not
expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. Considering that the
disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must
be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills
and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.The
deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of
the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the
manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET. AL., V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.
G.R. NO. 103577 OCTOBER 7, 1996
MELO, J.
Digested by: Kelvinn Banuelos
DOCTRINE: It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
FACTS: On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel,
et al. executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor
of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On the same date, plaintiff-
appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz, mother of Ramona, paid the down
payment of P50,000.00 Pesos.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property to intervenor-
appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for
P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid P300,000.00. For this reason,
Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona.
Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance against the
Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens. They
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of
Catalina.
A judgment was handed down for a specific performance ordering
defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale
covering that parcel of land. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner before the new presiding judge of the Quezon City RTC but
the same was denied.
ISSUE: Is the petitioners the absolute owners of the property at the
moment of the contested sale?
RULING: YES.Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a
mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to be extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of
the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were
called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their
father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar
as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon
them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be
declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the
fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the
property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6,
1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed
lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they
cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they
took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent
Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject
property at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they
were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
CELESTINO BALUS, V. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA
BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD.
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
Digested by: Kelvinn Banuelos
DOCTRINE: The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from
the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession.
FACTS: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the
spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6,
1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns,
as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao
del Norte (Bank).
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at
a public auction held for that purpose. A Certificate of Sale was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. The sheriff executed a
Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was
issued in the name of the Bank.
Petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the
subject property. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions
wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to
redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed
petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed
property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the
same to them.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by
itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it contains a
provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of
the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from
the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the
parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner
asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the
Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right
to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by
reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the
Bank.
ISSUE: Does co-ownership exists the moment the respondents bought
back the foreclosed property as part of the inheritance?
RULING: NO. Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong
premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their
deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with
respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the
hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence
shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on
January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is
neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name
before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the
Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment
of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time
of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows
that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot
from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that
they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising
from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested
parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents
as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an
agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they
thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the
same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk
about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father.
UY V VALBUECO

FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse
Diana Liu, and children, namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr.,
Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui and Pearl
Liu Rodriguez, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR., TERESITA A.
LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 145982 July 3, 2003
FACTS: Teodoro Vaño (Teodoro), as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño, sold
seven lots to Benito Liu, through petitioner Frank Liu (Frank), and to
Cirilo Pangalo. The lots sold to Benito Liu were Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14,
and 15 while the lots sold to Cirilo Pangalo were Lot Nos. 14 and 15.
When Jose Vaño passed away Benito Liu stopped further payments
but after the Supreme Court declared valid the will of his father,
Teodoro informed Frank that he could already transfer the titles to the
buyers’ names upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. It
was only after nine years that Frank responded that he was ready to
pay the balance of the purchase price of the seven lots after he had
purchased the lots formerly sold to Benito Liu and Cirilo Panglao. He
requested for the execution of a deed of sale of the lots in his name
and the delivery of the titles to him.
Despite repeated demands by Frank, Teodoro sold Lot No. 6 to
respondent Teresita Loy. Frank then filed a complaint against Teodoro
for specific performance, execution of deed of absolute sale, issuance
of certificates of title and construction of subdivision roads, before the
Court of First Instance and a notice of lis pendens on the seven lots
was filed before the Register of Deeds. A year after, Teodoro sold Lot
No. 5 to respondent Alfredo Loy.
When the complaint filed by Frank was dismissed, he filed his
claim to the probate court which was subsequently granted. Milagros
Vaño, who succeeded as administratrix of the Estate of Jose Vaño,
executed a deed of conveyance covering the seven lots in favor of
Frank. The probate court, however, also approved the sale to
respondents Teresita and Alfredo Loy upon their motion and new
titles were issued under their name.
As a result, Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance or
annulment of title of Lot Nos. 5 and 6. The trial court confirmed the
unilateral extrajudicial rescission of the contract by the late Teodoro
Vaño and it was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the registration by the Loys of their contracts of sale
made them the first registrants in good faith to defeat petitioner’s
claim as prior buyers.
HELD: No, registration by the Loys of their contracts of sale did not
defeat the right of petitioner as prior buyers because the person who
signed the Loys’ contracts was not the registered owner. The
registered owner of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 was the “Estate of Jose Vaño.”
Teodoro Vaño was the seller in the contract of sale with Alfredo Loy,
Jr., while the Estate of Jose Vaño was the seller in the contract of sale
with Teresita Loy. Teodoro Vaño signed both contracts of sale. The
rule is well-settled that “one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith. This is because
purchasers were under notice to inquire why the land was not
registered in the name of the person who executed the contracts of
sale. In this case, the Loys were under notice that the lots belonged
to the “Estate of Jose Vaño” and any sale of the lots required court
approval.
Moreover, the contracts of the Loys did not convey ownership of
the lots to them as against third persons because there was no
approval of the sale by the probate court and registration with the
Register of Deeds. The Court ruled that registration of the contracts
without court approval would be ineffective to bind third persons,
especially creditors of the estate. Otherwise, this will open the door to
fraud on creditors of the estate.
PAULA CONDE v. ROMAN ABAYA,
GR No. 4275, 1909-03-23
Facts:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina
Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula  Conde, as the
mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she
states she  had by Casiano Abaya, on... the 6th of November, 1905,
moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an
administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of
November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya
and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came
forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as
being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by
the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of
November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of
law,... the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to
the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to
be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said
estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22,
1906, the... court ordered the publication of notices for the
declaration of heirs and distribution of the  property of the estate.
II.  That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the
foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated
that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but
that she considered that her right,was superior to his and moved for...
a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she
intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by  Casiano Abaya, and that the
same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products
thereof.
III.  That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and
oral evidence and the court below entered the following judgment:
"That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should
recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of
Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of...
their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is
hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said
intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the
acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
RULING:
NO. The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the
child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and
in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to
wit: (a) if he or she died during his or her minority, (b) while insane, or
(c) after action had already been instituted.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or
her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may
exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendant
JUNIO CASE
Great Pacific v CA G.R. No. 113899. October 13, 1999
J. Quisimbing
Facts:
A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner
Great Pacific and Development Bank Grepalife agreed to insure the
lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP.
Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor of
DBP, applied for membership in the group life insurance plan.  In
an application form, Dr. Leuterio answered questions concerning his
health condition as follows:
“7.  Have you ever had, or consulted, a physician for a heart
condition, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, lung, kidney or
stomach disorder or any other physical impairment?
8.  Are you now, to the best of your knowledge, in good health?”
Grepalife issued a coverage to the value of P86,200.00 pesos.
Dr. Leuterio died due to “massive cerebral hemorrhage.” DBP
submitted a death claim to Grepalife.  Grepalife denied the claim
alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when
he applied for an insurance coverage.  Grepalife insisted that Dr.
Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension,
which caused his death.  Allegedly, such non-disclosure constituted
concealment that justified the denial of the claim.
The widow, respondent Medarda V. Leuterio, filed against Grepalife.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent widow and
against Grepalife.  The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s
decision.  Gonzales vs. Yek Tong Lin- Insured, being the person with whom the
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to
DBP as beneficiary in a group life insurance contract from a
complaint filed by the widow of the decedent/mortgagor?
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Dr. Leuterio
concealed that he had hypertension, which would vitiate the
insurance contract?
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Grepalife liable in
the amount of eighty six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos
without proof of the actual outstanding mortgage payable by the
mortgagor to DBP.
Held: No to all three. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner alleges that the complaint was instituted by the widow of
Dr. Leuterio, not the real party in interest, hence the trial court
acquired no jurisdiction over the case.  It argues that when the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, Grepalife was held
liable to pay the proceeds of insurance contract in favor of DBP, the
indispensable party who was not joined in the suit.
The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his
rights or interests in the insurance, the policy stating that:  “In the
event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the Creditor
[DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding
indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance of sum
assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies
designated by the debtor.” When DBP’s claim was denied, it collected
the debt from the mortgagor and took the necessary action of
foreclosure on the residential lot of private respondent.
contract was made, is primarily the proper person to bring suit
thereon.  Insured may thus sue, although the policy is taken wholly
or in part for the benefit of another person named or unnamed, and
although it is expressly made payable to another as his interest may
appear or otherwise.  Although a policy issued to a mortgagor is taken
out for the benefit of the mortgagee and is made payable to him, yet
the mortgagor may sue thereon in his own name, especially where the
mortgagee’s interest is less than the full amount recoverable under
the policy. Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest,
although he has assigned the policy for the purpose of collection, or
has assigned as collateral security any judgment he may obtain.
And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by
transfer, will or succession to any person, whether he has an
insurable interest or not, and such person may recover it whatever
the insured might have recovered,[14] the widow of the decedent Dr.
Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer, Grepalife.
2. The medical findings were not conclusive because Dr. Mejia did not
conduct an autopsy on the body of the decedent.  JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
The medical certificate stated that hypertension was “the possible
cause of death.” Hence, the statement of the physician was properly
considered by the trial court as hearsay.
Contrary to appellant’s allegations, there was no sufficient proof that
the insured had suffered from hypertension.  Aside from the
statement of the insured’s widow who was not even sure if the
medicines taken by Dr. Leuterio were for hypertension, the appellant
had not proven nor produced any witness who could attest to Dr.
Leuterio’s medical history.
Appellant insurance company had failed to establish that there was
concealment made by the insured, hence, it cannot refuse payment of
the claim.”
The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established
to entitle the insurer to rescind the contract. Misrepresentation as a
defense of the insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and
the duty to establish such defense by satisfactory and convincing
evidence rests upon the insurer.
3. A life insurance policy is a valued policy. Unless the interest of a
person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary measurement, the
measure of indemnity under a policy of insurance upon life or health
is the sum fixed in the policy. The mortgagor paid the premium
according to the coverage of his insurance.
In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the
creditor shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding
indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor.
DBP foreclosed one of the deceased person’s lots to satisfy the
mortgage. Hence, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of
the heirs of the deceased person or his beneficiaries
and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of
residential land with an area of 168 square meters located in Rosario,
Pasig City. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. On
February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name
of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
436465 with the encumbrance, among others that vendee must not
sell or lease the property within five (5) years after full ownership over
the said property is vested on the vendee. A day after the issuance of
TCT No. 436465, or on February 20, 1974, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep
sold the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The said deed was lost when
military men ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon consulting a
new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss was filed with the Register of Deeds
of Pasig and a certified copy of TCT No. 436465 was issued. Private
respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a
certification thereof from the Assessor’s Office. Private respondent
sent notices to the registered owner at her address appearing in the
title and in the Deed of Sale. With his counsel, he searched for the
registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar,
Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern
Samar. However, their search proved futile. On July 8, 1992, private
respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R4659 with the
RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. On
September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his
evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted his petition in its decision
dated September 30, 1992. On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner,
Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the trial court’s decision. He
claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her
aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime
in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property
and the heir of Macaria, he filed his “Motion to Reopen Reconstitution
Proceedings” October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an
order denying said motion. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals which was denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but it was denied in a resolution dated
September 11, 1995.
Issue: Whether petitioner can legally assail the deed of absolute sale,
executed by and between his aunt and private respondent.
Held: As far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive condition
imposed by GSIS in its contract with petitioner’s predecessor-in-
interest is concerned, it is the GSIS and not petitioner who had a
cause of action against private respondent. Vide the instructive case
of Sarmiento v. Salud. In this case, the GSIS has not filed any action
for the annulment, nor for the G.R. No. 121940 Object of Succession
December 4, 2001 Page 2 of 2 16 th Case forfeiture of the lot in
question. In our view, the contract of sale remains valid between the
parties, unless and until annulled in the proper suit filed by the
rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale is binding
upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who
alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are
bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.
PURISIMA, J.:
Digested by: Rascille Laranas
DOCTRINE:A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.
(Article 783, New Civil Code) Since the will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes
and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat
the very purpose of making a will.
FACTS: From the Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla who was the predecessor-
in-interest of Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
511,855 square meter parcel of land at the Bacolod Cadastre.
In the fourth paragraph of the said will, it stated that: “should I die
and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the
said lot, … Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies,
every year to give Maria Marlina Coscuella y Belleza, 75 piculs of
export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar, until Marlina dies.”
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife, Rufina,
and children Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscuella y Belleza brought a
complaint against the heirs of Rabadilla to enforce the provisions of
the subject codicil.
The lower court dismissed the complaint finding that the action was
premature since no intestate proceeding was yet initiated to give full
meaning and semblance to the claim of Maria Marlena under the
Codicil.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and established the right
of Maria Marlena to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually, which was
the heirs of Rabadilla’s obligation under Aleja Belleza’s codicil.
ISSUE:Does Johnny Rabadilla have an obligation to deliver to
Marlena Coscuella 100 piculs of sugar annually?
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court held that the subject codicil provides that the
instituted heir is under obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar yearly
to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgate or otherwise negotiate
the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event
that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the
testatrix’s near descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and
reversion thereof to the testatrix’s near descedants. Since the said
obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation
should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest.
Suffice it to state that a will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free
act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death. (Article 783, New Civil Code) Since the will expresses the
manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a
will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will.
The petition is dismissed. CA decision is affirmed.
ALVAREZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. L-68053 MAY 7, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.
Digested by: Kelvinn Banuelos
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
FACTS:
2 real properties involved:
1. Lot 773-A
2. Lot 773-B
**Both lots above were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral
survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Lot 773- registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Private respondents in this case are the children of Rufino
who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her
child, Jovita Alib.
Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a TCT covering Lot 773-A and 773-B.
On May 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Fuentebella, Jr.
After Fuentebella's death, his wife, as the administratrix thereof, filed a
Special Proceeding requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.
Hence, Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued and sold to
Rosendo Alvarez.
The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Fuentebella’s wife,
Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return”
of the ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an
accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the
complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be
delivered to them, and damages. During the pendency of the case,
Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Siason.
Lower court - found that Siason, who purchased the properties in
question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further
medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration.
Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of
lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order
to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No.
5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land
because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was
without court approval.
Alvarez appealed to the then IAC which in its decision affirmed the
lower court's decision.
ISSUE: Is the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate or to his heirs also?
RULING: It will be transmissible to his heirs. The general rule is
that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to
the successors. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the
value of the property received from the decedent.
In the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. it was held
that:
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot
escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which
gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of
their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of
the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and
considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left
by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in
favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
PAMPLONA vs. MORETO
96 SCRA 775, March 31, 1980
Facts:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife with 6
children. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos.
1495, 4545, and 1496.
Monica Maniega died intestate. more than (6) years after, Flaviano
Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife, and
before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership, executed in favor of
Geminiano Pamplona, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495
for P900.00.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed
their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the
time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on
the defendants to vacate the premises on the ground that Flaviano
Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano
and his deceased wife.
The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate hence, this suit was
instituted seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale
as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property
in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
Held:
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. It is therefore,
clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate
properties located in different places but they abut each other. And
since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect
legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the
Pamplona spouses.
Moreover, private respondents, as heirs are duty-bound to comply
with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transferring
the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his
death to his heirs, the herein private respondents.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private
respondents received from their deceased parents and/or
predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and
obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547
FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin
and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma,
spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to
declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two
years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some
personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding
was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did
not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the
plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note
then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate
proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of
the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the
successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father
Eusebio.
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father
from her grandfather's estate?
HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the
payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died
without leaving any property. While it is true that under the
provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his
father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not
make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory,
that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from
their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco,
in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to
pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit
anything.
ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does
not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s
heirs.
FACTS:Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a
parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title.
Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his
siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now
both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega. Leonardo in turn is
survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo
M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
respondents.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property
belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed for
partition against Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo alleged that on several
occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s
heirs refused to heed his.
In their Answer, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and
Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against
them. They have become the sole owners of the subject property
through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from
Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact.
ISSUE:Whether the court erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court on the ground that Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-
ownership only on February 9,1979?
HELD:NO. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo
Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate.
Leon died without issue; he had siblings, Romana and Gregoria. Since
Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn,
Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled
to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As
co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided
they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. 
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-
owner. It has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe
in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence
thereof is clear and convincing."
However, it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may
be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he
is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to
Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family
relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations
by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the
property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this
reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his
right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
G.R. No. 129008             January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by
her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS,
petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and
ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
DOCTRINE: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate
of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the
New Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to
the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of
law.
FACTS: May 13, 1995- Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in
Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in
Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow,
respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11,
1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P.
Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and
Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in
mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into
an extra-marital relationship and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and
Rowena.
November 14, 1995- respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes
Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of
the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that
accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of
Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora,
Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents also found out that
petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural
Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
December 1, 1995- respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration  before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the
estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.
December 4, 1995- respondents filed a Complaint for the
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985
and 63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against
petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of
Deeds of Dagupan City.
February 5, 1996- petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid
complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the
contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the
decedent had managed to register them in his name. They also raised
the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-
interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings. Petitioners then filed a
Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed.
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court arguing that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of
the decedent and not the respondents. The Court of Appeals stated
that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied
petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its
discretionary nature.
ISSUE:Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the
estate pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in
this case.
HELD: YES.Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777
of the New Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn
is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced,
the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed.This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely
Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact,
in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court recognized the legal
standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the
decedent under administration pending the appointment of an
administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator
to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not
prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are
easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been
appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already
been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of
an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator
appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and
the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while
the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes
two exceptions: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief
to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no
appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the
guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue
for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions, (3) the third being
when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and
TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., 
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA,
all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO
G.R. No. 156879     January 20, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Digested by: Janice Dahiroc
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which
was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership to operate.
FACTS:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died leaving a residential
land situated in Quezon City. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio
Calpatura. In order to support her six (6) minor children with her first
husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr.,
executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former
agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for
the sum of P10,500.00. Subsequently, Narcisa executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.
Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, then built a two-storey
duplex with firewall on the northern half portion of the property.
Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did
not object to the construction. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of
Tomas’ cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the
property.
Respondents (The Prados) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the
subject property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora,
Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura. Petitioners countered
that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of 1⁄2 as her
share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as
her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that the
consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully
paid as of April 1, 1968. On April 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed the
complaint and found that the sale was valid.
ISSUE: Was the sale was valid?
RULING:
Yes. The sale was valid. The subject property belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Patricio and Narcisa.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is
contained in a notarized document. It was held that a public
document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary
public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein
expressed.
While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never
registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of
the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the
property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas,
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr.,
one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership.
Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his
death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled
to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as
a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose
between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the property. The
remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate
succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and
Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) eachpro
indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her
husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of
one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14
of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total
undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her
children are deemed co- owners of the subject property.
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet
and delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property
had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court.
While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her
share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly
conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms
of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial
court.
EDUARDO FELIPE VS HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Digested by: Janice Dahiroc
DOCTRINE: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain exceptions, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent,
except in cases provided by law.
FACTS:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses
bought several parcels of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In
1960-62 the lands were divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415
of the San Jacinto Public Subdivision, San Jacinto Masbate.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo
Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the
consent of her husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow
Gimena and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint
in the CFI of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint alleged that
the plaintiffs were the owners of lots 1370, 1371 and 1415; that they
had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an offer to
redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in
order to recover the three parcels of land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the
plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The Trial
Court sustained the claim of the defendants and rendered that they
are the lawful owners of the subject property.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the defendants to surrender the lots in question as well as the
muniments of title thereof.
ISSUE: Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon was barred
by the statute of limitation.
RULING:
NO.The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her
husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had
an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for
the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not
likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage
subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands
sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve
the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage,
she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of
Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract
insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's
share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands
and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining
to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It
was only in 1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the
lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died.
The children's cause of action accrued from the death of their father
in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it.They filed action
in 1976 which is well within the period.
Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador their shares of
the lands as stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as
possessors in bad faith shall make an accounting of the fruits
corresponding to the share aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity
pay their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., 
vs.
JOSEPHINE LUCERO
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
ESCOLIN, J.:
Digested by: Janice Dahiroc
DOCTRINE: a preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages
and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be
logically inferred that the vessel has sunk, and the crew perished
FACTS:
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern
Minicon plying the Hong Kong-Manila route, with the salary of
P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits.
Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip
only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of
the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed
that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs.
Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
While the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila, Captain
Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the following
dates: February l6,1980 7am; February l6/80 3:30pm; FEBRUARY
16/809:50pm. On the third message he stated that sea water was
entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon ship.
The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative.
The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel.
Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the
heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who
refused to accept.
 
Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary
allotment of her husband which the Company had stopped since
March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the
M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment entered into by her
husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and
that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in
Manila.
The company refused to pay. The National Seamen Board upheld the
complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC.
ISSUE: When will the presumption of death arise?
HELD:
The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391regarding the presumption of
death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr.
Lucero has died because under the law, four (4) years have not yet
passed. Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A
person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence
from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not
heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel
has sunk, and the crew perished. 
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending
the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew.
The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral
certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had
perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death
under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs.
Navarro” Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a
rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
The decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside,
and the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed.
However, Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
EMILIO EMNACE vs. CA, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO,
SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE
TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA
TABANAO AND VINCENT TABANAO
G. R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Digested by: Janice Dahiroc
DOCTRINE: The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as
executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action.
FACTS:         moment of death of the decedent.
Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were
partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing
Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their
partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution
of the partnership properties among them.   the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6)
vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente
Tabanao’s untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to
Tabanao’s heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership’s
finances.
Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s heirs
the deceased’s 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,
amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite
formal demand for payment thereof.
Consequently, Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against
petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of
assets and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. Petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Does the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao have the legal
capacity to sue even if she was never appointed as administratrix or
executrix of his estate.
HELD: YES. Emnace’s objection in this regard is misplaced.
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and
her children are complainants in their own right as successors of
Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death,
his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted
to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the
partnership and Emnace were transmitted to respondents by
operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary
shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
LAVIDES CASE
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors v.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN
TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First
Instance of Abra
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
DOCTRINE:Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owner of his property, subject
to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be
deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent.
FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla,
instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet
title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975,
the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
capacity to sue. During the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution
by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but
the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the
ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has
no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE: Whether the children of the deceased, Fortuna Barcena, be

allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.

HELD: YES. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in
court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case to
its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If
thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure
whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can
be substituted.

Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owner of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The
right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or
intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856,
was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.