HUM111

Pakistan Studies
TerminalExaminationsSP20
HybridCourse
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Question 2:

How inflation affect the production of industrial sector in Pakistan? What measures are
required to overcome this problem?

Answer:

It can be described in follwing points:

 Disputable industrial strategy as an obstacle in the way of industrial advancement

 Acute shortage of mineral resources such as coal, oil etc that is only 0.8% in Pakistan
 Low investments and low savings as another obstacle in growth of industries in Pakistan
 Inflanationary pressures which is causing increase of rate of imported machineries that is
14.1%
 The narrowness of domestic and foreign markets for the industrial goods and acting as a
narrow end for industrial sector of Pakistan
 Unfavorable industrial structure of Pakistan. As a result, the requirements are not met and
hence, results in loss

Solutions to these problems:

 Propelled framework is important for the modern advancement of Pakistan.

 Financial organizations ought to give credit offices to the modern part at adaptable terms
and conditions.
 There ought to be an extension of business sectors, at the household and outside level of
mechanical products.
  Foreign venture ought to be supported; more impetuses ought to be given to financial
specialists.
 To advance the mechanical area, there ought to be specialized information.
 Tax concession is additionally expected to expand the interest in new ventures.
 In time, the gracefully of crude material is fundamental for the improvement of the
mechanical part

Question 3:

How East India Company was exploiting the Indian and Muslims before partition? Give
your answer in 5 to 6 points.

Answer:

 The Indian exports to Britain, i.e. cotton, tea, spices ended up in India as finished goods
or were further exported to other countries and it acted as an economic cause for both the
Hindus and Muslims
 All high posts; civil or military were given to Europeans rather than to the locals and it
became a cause of Administrative lack for both the Hindus and Muslims
 Order of Lord Canning to the Mughal Emperor to leave Red Fort Delhi and stay at Qutab
Minar further added an insult to the injury for both the Muslims and Hindus and result in
having the political causes in the subcontinent
 Sepoys were sent to distantoverseas- parts of the Empire but they were not given by extra
salaries. The Indian sepoys were treated with contempt by their English officers as the
English thought they were a superior race and were more advanced than Indian. So this
was a major issue that acted as a military cause for the subcontinent
 The Religious Disability Act was ordered which declared numerous impetuses for those
Indians who might change over to Christianity.A law made changes in Hindu traditions.
Be that as it may, they were considered as a bending of the educating of Hinduism.

Question 4:

How geographic location of Pakistan affects its foreign policy?

Answer:

The plan of Pakistan's international strategy pivots upon its geopolitical condition where local
players are in front of an audience with the New Great Game in the district. Pakistan is a
topographical rotate and arranged at the crossing point of various locales for example Focal Asia,
West Asia, and South Asia. Thusly, it has aligned itself inside the district (South Asia) yet
Central Asian and West Asian states are additionally very much connected financially and
geologically. Be that as it may, constant unsteadiness in Afghanistan and India's unending
threatening vibe can possibly make emergencies and territorial flimsiness. By and large, India's
international strategy stayed urgent in forming Pakistan's international strategy; the adversarial
publicity against Pakistan's advancement is self-evident. It can likewise be evaluated that US has
picked India as a stabilizer to China (our most grounded partner), which is inciting Pakistan's
security concerns.

Question 5:

Briefly describe your project on “Current Social, Economic and Political Challenges
related to Industrial Sector of Pakistan”. State the particular challenge you chose and
describe your findings and your proposed solution.

Answer:
Import and Export Difference:

Fare seriousness is a mind boggling issue. The variables that effect send out intensity differ after
some time, and across parts and topography. To keep the examination sensible, we recognize
some regular highlights that for the most part help improve the business condition by
diminishing dangers, costs, what's more, time, in this manner propelling business people to put
more as far as cash also, exertion. The significant requirements to making a decent business
condition are ordered under:

 Lack of trained labor

 Financial inputs
 Energy
 Physical infrastructure
 Bureaucratic hurdles
 Institutional rigidities

Solution:

The solution to these problems is that the workers or labourers should be trained enough so that
they could be able to achieve the manufacturing quality that could be exported at international
level. The machineries should be updated and maintained uptodate. Moreover, the Quality of
product should be enough so that it could be able to achieve the product level manufactured by
other countries. If these problems are overcame then Pakistan can easily export its products that
will result in good progress by leaps and bounds.

Long Question:

Question 6:
What factors makes a state weak? In case of Pakistan, what are the factors involves in
destabilizing the state?

Answer:
Weak State:

Lacking information and infiltration, administrations of solid states regularly close they have no
other method to accomplish security than by the utilization of power, as in Iraq and Lebanon. In
any case, utilizing power against feeble states brings into play an assortment of issues that false
the pragmatist's faith in authenticity's utility, for what debilitates a solid state will frequently
reinforce a frail state, inciting expanded opposition. Along these lines, Hezbollah rose more
grounded in Lebanon subsequent to losing each fight and carrying discount pulverization to the
nation. In a similar way, the Bush organization's dangers against Syria and Iran — joined with its
endeavors to disconnect them — have would in general fortify help for these administrations
from the Arab and Muslim "road."

These and many different Catch 22s of state, society, and security add to one thousand oddity: It
is outlandish for the United States and its partners to accomplish security except if the present
frail states become solid. Yet, that is unimaginable as long as their social orders stay prevailing.

In this paper, we contend that in managing feeble states, remote policymakers must grow their
scholarly skylines and endeavor to impact social orders and societies. This implies figuring two
separate arrangements, one for states and one for social orders — with customary international
strategy tending to the target interests of states and the other tending to the to a great extent
emotional difficulties of social orders and societies.

Inability to address the different, frequently generally emotional difficulties of social orders
clarifies the tremendous capitulation to the inevitable that denotes the present discussion on
international strategy. When innovation, media, and monetary advancement are enabling
nonstate entertainers, engaging the "road," and intensifying the intensity of general supposition
— all to the detriment of governments — inability to draw in nonstate on-screen characters and
social orders leaves policymakers with miserable and exceptionally constrained other options.
On the one side are the organization's "intense" arrangements, maintaining a strategic distance
from or extraordinarily restricting contact with unpleasant systems (Palestine, Syria, Iran) and
critical nonstate entertainers that are in struggle with well disposed systems (Hezbollah, Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, different gatherings in Iraq) and that may likewise have noteworthy effect
on threatening ones (in Palestine, Syria, and Iran). On the opposite side is the Democrats' and a
few Republicans' "delicate" energy to haggle with hostile systems (Syria, Iran) without
understanding their requirements as frail states.

Factors involved in destabilizing Pakistan:

Public sentiment:
There is widespread belief that the West has an agenda of destabilizing the Muslimworld, of
which Pakistan is an important part due, among other factors, to its nuclearcapability. As the
perceptions rise, so does intolerance and extremism in retaliation Whether or not the claims are
justified, they need to be given adequate attention since perceptions – real or imagined – cause
tensions between a frustrated, suspicious public and a State that is allied with the U.S. Recent
events have exacerbated an antiAmerican sentiment even as conciliatory approaches from the
U.S. try to reach out to the civil society. The discourse on social exclusion in this context might
do well to expand to a more global framework. Matters have not been helped as reports of
„arrogant‟ American officials, presence of foreign security companies involved in secret
missions in the country, and of cases such as Dr. Aafia Siddiqui keep trickling in and are taken
up by media and human rights groups. Coupled with reported harassment of these diplomats,
rejection of visas to numerous Americans and conflicting reports regarding the presence of
Blackwater/Xe services, conspiracy theories are bundled in with facts. Consequently, public
sentiment seems driven towards venting frustrations and a general hatred of the West. It becomes
a bigger issue when this leads to acts of terrorism which are then justified on religious or
retaliatory grounds.

Militant groups:
For any approach expecting to defeat radicalism, focusing on set up activist gatherings, and the
underlying foundations of militancy inside them, is a vital beginning stage. Questions emerge as
to regardless of whether activist gatherings in Pakistan, the most notable among them being the
Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are a piece of the Taliban development everywhere or whether
they convey various beliefs. With an assortment of such activist associations, or non-State on-
screen characters in conversational terms, some going about as auxiliaries of real bodies, it stays
muddled whether their interests combine on all angles. Care must be taken to see further
complexities in jihadi gatherings, all of which may not be moved to activity with the equivalent
intentions. Plans might be extraordinary, yet the usual way of doing things, i.e., utilizing
psychological warfare to accomplish objectives, might be the equivalent. What's more, with
regards to this investigation, it turns out to be urgently essential to inspect activist groups‟
connections in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Miscommunication and mistrust:

The U.S. has been called Pakistan‟s „fickle ally‟, and even a cursory glance at the ups and
downs of the relationship will confirm this claim. In the current phase where Pakistan has been
declared a major non-NATO ally, there has been need felt to rethink the norms of its
relationships. Pakistan‟s status as a „frontline State‟ has long been established. Opinion
remained divided, at least initially, as to whether current counter-insurgency operations were part
of „our‟ war or „theirs‟. This „other‟ has remained part of national psyche. On the other hand,
the U.S. has also recognized the need for deeper understanding with Pakistan if the war on terror
is to reach a successful end, and many confidence-building measures have been undertaken,
including a high-level visit from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that sought to appease the
masses and gain their trust. However, even as the war goes deeper into Pakistani territory at huge
physical, social and economic costs to the country, there is constant pressure from the U.S. to
expand operations into other parts that are perceived to be Taliban strongholds. Given the
already ambivalent feelings to the law-enforcing operations and perennially high
antiAmericanism, such pressure is treated with contempt and adds to tensions in the country.
Indeed, there have been instances of the military leaders‟ strongly reacting against external
pressure in rare public shows of defiance as they reiterate Pakistan‟s stance. The reaction comes
also in view of American determination to accord greater responsibility in the region to India and
convincing Pakistan of its peaceful intentions. This is the pretext used to convince the military to
expand its operations, moving soldiers from the Indian border to the western Taliban
strongholds. For many Pakistanis, this is enough evidence of the lack of understanding that the
American officials hold – or, of ulterior motives to destabilise Pakistan.

War and Terror:

Since the events of September 11, Pakistan has had to carve out a new strategy for its future. An
alliance with the U.S. has seen a turbulent decade of war against terrorist groups – namely, the
Al Qaeda and Taliban, but as far as Pakistan has been concerned, it includes other groups as well
– with numerous expected and unexpected consequences. And, while addressing terrorism is
repeatedly professed as the collaborative goal for both, there remain conflicts of interest,
financial issues and scepticism of commitment on both sides – or what has entered diplomatic
jargon as the „trust deficit‟. Given that a fundamentalism of religious nature is being targeted, it
was inevitable that a collective Muslim psyche would become disillusioned - especially since
much of the Islamic world has faced its ramifications in some form. As the argument takes the
unfortunate turn towards an axiomatic „us vs. them‟ debate, Pakistan finds itself in the unique, if
also unwanted, position of a Muslim country siding with the U.S. against Muslim extremists. The
irony of a country founded in the name of religion now fighting against „religious‟ insurgencies
is not lost on many.

Self-contradictions abound in Pakistan and the war on terror is no exception. It is for this reason
that an alliance with the major perpetrators of the said war– primarily the United States – has not
had popular support. While details of military operations against insurgents in Pakistan are
beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say that its role, both ideologically and
militarily, has been gradually increasing. While the U.S. concentrates on the situation in
Afghanistan, Pakistan has simultaneously been carrying out operations in regions reportedly
being used by a vast terrorist network that includes Al Qaeda and now primarily the Tehrik-
eTaliban Pakistan (TTP). However, this does not mean that the U.S. is not involved in the
country, either. In fact, the extent of its involvement becomes a bone of contention, creating
widespread unease. From the much publicised ground operations and the legitimate rancour that
followed, to cases of „missing persons‟ and most persistently the continued attacks by unmanned
predator planes, feelings of condescension in an imbalanced relationship remain prevalent.
Drone attacks necessitate some scrutiny since they have come to symbolize much of what is
wrong with the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. Apart from valid legal and ethical considerations, there is
the very real anxiety due to numerous civilian deaths that are, regrettably, dismissed as
„collateral damage‟.

Indeed, reports show that militant deaths account for a fraction of total killings, and opinion
remains divided regarding the very usefulness of the strategy. Severely destabilising, this has led
to public unrest and retaliation – a phenomenon which appears to be moving into international
spheres as well. Interestingly, concerns are also echoed in government circles, with the highest
possible levels of State authority acknowledging the dangers of such measures and calling for
technology transfer, which has only partly been responded to.

THE END