RESOHARDIJO Crises, Inquiries, and The Politics of Blame

Crises, Inquiries and
the Politics of Blame
Sandra L. Resodihardjo
Crises, Inquiries and the Politics of Blame
Crises, Inquiries and

the Politics of Blame
Institute for Management Research
Radboud University
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ISBN 978-3-030-17530-6 ISBN 978-3-030-17531-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3
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To my parents
Acknowledgements
Writing this book was by no means a solo endeavour. Many people have
helped me along the way with their advice, feedback, and support. I would
therefore like to thank the following people, starting with Paul ’t Hart.
Paul, thank you for pointing out blame game research to me. Will Jennings,
thank you for taking the time to discuss your blame game research meth-
ods and to provide feedback on various publications. I would also like to
thank Daniel Aldrich for facilitating my sabbatical stay at Northeastern
University.
This research would not have been possible without the help of numer-
ous students, student-assistants, and co-authors who have taken the time
to code the newspaper articles. So a big thank you to Steven Boesveld,
Maarten Geraerts, Rob Jetten, Dorine van de Lustgraaf, Martha Mahlstedt,
Sanne Maris, Renske van der Maten, Marlou Meertens, Marloes Meijer,
Dineke Meijers, Annemarie van der Plas, Louisa Reumerman, Josien de
Reuver, Claudia Schorr, Anne Walraven, and Wouter Zantinge.
I would like to thank two co-authors in particular because they have
stuck with me even though the blame game project has taken years to
complete and they have been kind enough to provide feedback on various
blame game publications—including this book. Brendan Carroll: without
your statistical wizardry, I would not have gotten very far with my blame
game research. Thank you for your help, feedback, and patience as well as
being so kind as to create the figures in this book for the Love Parade on
short notice. Carola van Eijk, thank you for the wonderful cooperation
over the years and your insightful feedback.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Over the years, numerous people have provided feedback at confer-

ences, workshops, and seminars—for which I am grateful. I would also like
to thank the following people for their feedback: Mark Bennister, Annika
Brändström, Michiel de Vries, Michel Dückers, Jean Hartley, Leonie
Heres, Wouter Jong, Niels Karsten, Sanneke Kuipers, Christiaan Lako,
Karin Lasthuizen, Jo Luetjens, Ruth Prins, Arjen Schmidt, Sabine Stiller,
Paul ’t Hart, Marieke van Genugten, Sabine van Zuydam, and Pieter Zwaan.
This book could not have been written without the support of my boss,
my co-workers, my parents, and my friends—a huge thank you, particu-
larly for their patience while I was submerged in this book. Lastly, but
certainly not least, I would like to thank Jemima Warren and Ollie Foster
for their support during this project.
As always, any mistakes are my own.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Framing and Blaming 11
3 Inquiries Following Crises 33
4 Three Festivals Gone Wrong 47
5 Towards a Better Understanding of Blame Games123
Index133
ix
About the Author
Sandra L. Resodihardjo is Assistant Professor of Public Administration

at the Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, the
Netherlands. She studies framing, blame games following crises, and resil-
ience in formal emergency networks. Her work has been published in,
amongst others, the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
Safety Science, and Public Administration. Her published work includes a
monograph titled Crisis and Change in the British and Dutch Prison
Services. Understanding Crisis-Reform Processes (Ashgate, 2009) and
chapters in edited volumes including The Palgrave Handbook of Public
Administration and Management in Europe (Palgrave, 2018).
xi
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-

accommodative continuum based on Ihlen (2002, p. 190) and
Hood et al. (2009, p. 698) 26
Fig. 4.1 Police chief’s blame and blame response from 24 August 2009
to 28 February 2010 (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, p. 237).
Reprinted from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
2012) with permission of John Wiley & Sons 65
Fig. 4.2 Mayor’s blame and blame response from 24 August 2009 to 28
February 2010 (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, p. 237). Reprinted
from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012) with
permission of John Wiley & Sons 66
Fig. 4.3 The blame levels and blame responses of the six main actors in
the blame game from 26 July 2010 till 23 February 2012 97
Fig. 4.4 Blame levels and blame responses of the four actors (Resodihardjo
et al. 2018, pp. 10–12). Reprinted with permission of Boom
Juridisch111
Fig. 5.1 Factors influencing the blame game process (Resodihardjo et al.
2016, p. 361). Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons
Ltd124
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 A ‘blame barometer’ used for coding daily media stories (Hood
et al. 2009, p. 718) 18
Table 2.2 Some basic strategic options for officeholders facing media
firestorms: Denial and admission of problem and responsibility
(Hood et al. 2009, p. 698) 24
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
On 20 September 2018, a horrible accident took place in Oss, the

Netherlands. An employee of a day-care centre was using an electric
transport wagon (a so-called stint) to transport children from the day-care
facility to primary school. The stint is popular with Dutch day-care centres
because it allows easy transportation of the children. On 20 September
2018, however, a stint collided with a train, killing four children and
severely injuring a child and the employee driving the transport wagon.
The shock of this tragedy reverberated through the country. In response
to this tragedy, the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management Van
Nieuwenhuizen announced that it was no longer allowed to use the
stint—this to the dismay of day-care centres which heavily relied on the
electric transport wagon to transport children.1
It looks, though, as if the minister’s decision was not based on the wish
to ensure the safety of the public. Instead, the decision to prohibit the
usage of the stint seemed to be informed by the need to shift attention
away from the minister, the ministry, and the inspection agency (Inspectie
1
Henley, J. (2018, 20 September). Four children killed as train hits vehicle at Dutch level
crossing fifth child and woman driving electric wagon critically injured in collision in Oss. The
Guardian. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/sep/20/four-children-killed-as-train-hits-cargo-bike-at-dutch-level-crossing.
Van Heerde, J., Zuidervaart, B. (2018, 1 November). Minister onder vuur om Stint.
Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 8.
Van Heerde, J. (2018, 5 October). Weerstand tegen het wegverbod voor stints. Trouw,
Section Nederland, p. 10.
© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. L. Resodihardjo, Crises, Inquiries and the Politics of Blame,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_1
2 S. L. RESODIHARDJO
Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT)) which should have kept an eye on these

transportation vehicles but had failed to do so. By claiming that the stint
was unsafe, the transport wagon could be prohibited even though at the
time that decision was made, no real evidence existed which supported
this claim.2
RTL Nieuws’ reconstruction of the events makes for interesting reading.
The Dutch broadcasting station’s reporting shows how the government
had been warned in 2011 about these types of vehicles. Yet, the inspection
agency had failed to keep an eye on these transport devices—in fact, it did
not even know it had to keep an eye on the stint. Moreover, no clear
regulations had been made for these new types of vehicles. Consequently,
panic broke out. There was a pressing need to get rid of the stint. “From
that moment on, the Minister, Secretary-General, Director-General,
director, [civil servants], and lawyers worked on a laundry operation: all
the dirt[y laundry] from the past needed to be aired as quickly as possible,
but in a measured way so that it would not stand out too much. Quick
actions were needed to ensure that mistakes from the past would not
[negatively affect] the current minister and civil servants.”3
Prohibiting the stint was made difficult by the fact that there was no
evidence at the time that the stint was unsafe. But there was such a need
within the Ministry to prohibit the stint that “evidence was manipulated in
order to create reasonable ‘doubt.’”4 Amongst other things, actors
creatively copied and pasted from an investigative report by the Dutch
Forensic Institute into the stint while the inspection agency had also
influenced this investigation. Creative writing was also used when it came
to the company’s response to the questions raised about the safety of their
product as that response was either ignored or misrepresented in government
documents. Moreover, an incorrect police report—which the police
2
Vugts, Y., Klein, P. (2018, 29 October). Reconstructie Een giftige cocktail: vier dode
kinderen, paniek en House of Cards. RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/4466311/een-giftige-cocktail-vier-dode-
kinderen-paniek-en-house-cards.
3
4
1 INTRODUCTION 3
and the ministry knew to be incorrect—on another alleged stint related

accident experienced by an employee of another day-care centre was used
even though that day-care centre and its employee had made it clear that
the report did not truthfully depict the incident. Additionally, a rule was
fabricated that companies needed to inform the ministry when changing
aspects of these types of vehicles such as a more powerful battery.5
At the time of writing, it is not known what the causes were of the
incident and how this blame game ended. The plot was thickening though
as a day-care centre went to court to object to the stint’s prohibition, but
the court upheld the minister’s decision.6 Questions were raised about the
extent to which the minister had misinformed parliament.7 A research
organization (TNO) was asked to investigate the stint.8 This investigation,
in turn, allowed the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management to
say that “until the results [of this investigation] are known, I will not make
any decisions.”9 Meanwhile, the inspection agency told a newspaper that
it lacked the capacity to inspect everything10 and the company which
5
6
Van Heerde, J. (2018, 5 October). Weerstand tegen het wegverbod voor stints. Trouw,
Section Nederland, p. 10.
‘Nieuwe regels voor de Stint zijn nodig.’ (2018, 2 November). De Telegraaf, Section
Binnenland, p. 8.
Uitspraak kort geding. Kinderopvang verliest kort geding: rijverbod stint blijft van kracht.
(2018, 1 November). RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.
rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/4470621/kinderopvang-verliest-kort-geding-
rijverbod-stint-blijft-van.
7
Van Heerde, J., Zuidervaart, B. (2018, 1 November). Minister onder vuur om Stint.
Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 8.
Mebius, D. (2018, 2 November). Stint-storm is voor even geluwd. De Volkskrant, Section
Ten Eerste, p. 3.
‘Nieuwe regels voor de Stint zijn nodig.’ (2018, 2 November). De Telegraaf, Section
Binnenland, p. 8.
8
Van Heerde, J. (2018, 19 October). Stints gaan de komende maanden de weg nog niet
op. Trouw, Section Nederland, p. 11.
9
Uitspraak kort geding. Kinderopvang verliest kort geding: rijverbod stint blijft van kracht.
(2018, 1 November). RTL Nieuws. Retrieved November 6, 2018 from https://www.
rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/4470621/kinderopvang-verliest-kort-geding-rijverbod-
stint-blijft-van.
10
Pas na drama ILT-onderzoek. (2018, 30 October). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland,
p. 9.
produced the stint had to file for bankruptcy.11 In December, TNO

concluded its investigation into the stint: it was deemed to be an unsafe
transportation device. Consequently, the minister announced that her
decision to prohibit the stint was now final.12
The blame game following the tragic accident exhibits all the elements
of a classic blame game: actors try to shift the blame to the company which
produced the stints, there are already hints of internal strife between
government actors (e.g. whether or not the inspection agency had shared
certain information with the ministry), there are hints of excuses (e.g. the
inspection agency told the media it did not have enough resources to do
its job), and an inquiry is used to temporarily stop the decision-
making process.
Blame games are nothing new. Crises are often followed by questions
about what happened and how this could have happened as well as whether
someone is responsible for what happened. The accountability phase
following a crisis thus consists of two elements: understanding what
happened so one can learn from the crisis in order to prevent its recurrence
and determining whether someone is responsible for what happened. The
learning part is often facilitated by an inquiry aimed at investigating the
events, pointing out what went wrong, and providing a list of
recommendations to avoid a similar crisis from happening again. Ideally,
the investigation is thorough and looks at the underlying causes of the
crisis and the lessons and recommendations of the inquiry are then
implemented (Greenwood 1998; Elliott and Smith 2006; Birkland 2009;
Elliott 2009). The second element is focused on determining whether
someone should be blamed and, if so, who that will be. This process is
known as the blame game.
Now I realize that the concept of blame game carries a negative
connotation for some readers as they will perceive blame games as processes
where self-serving actors dodge responsibility and shift blame to, for
instance, unsuspecting subordinates. A valid perception considering the
example described above where it seems as if various actors are trying to
do their best to protect themselves at the expense of others.
11
Misérus, M. (2018, 29 October). Fabrikant Stint vraagt faillissement aan. De Volkskrant,
Section Ten Eerste, p. 1.
12
Stint definitief van de weg, oorzaak ongeval onduidelijk. (2018, 14 December). Trouw,
Section Binnenland, p. 10.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
Despite the negative association with the word blame game, I decided
to use the word in this research for two reasons. First, if I were to use a
different word to describe blame games—e.g. to be held accountable—
then this could lead to confusion throughout the book because I would be
using the same word (accountability) to describe a specific phase of crisis
management (the accountability phase which consists of learning and
blame games) and to describe a part of the process within that phase
(people being held accountable). That is why I decided to use the
commonly accepted concept of blame games.
The second reason for sticking with the concept of blame games has to
do with the fact that blame games entail more than just holding people
accountable. As I will show in the next chapter, blame games are complex
framing processes where debate in society leads to a commonly shared
definition of the event (that yes this was indeed a crisis) and a commonly
shared acknowledgement of the avoidable harm caused by the crisis. This
shared problem definition will also address the cause(s) of the crisis and
thus whether someone or an organization can be held responsible for what
happened. These blamed actors will then either accept, deflect, shift, or
minimize the blame they are facing. Depending on how society receives
these blame responses (favourably or not), the blame game will either
come to a conclusion or continue. The concept of blame games therefore
not only refers to that specific point in time when actors are trying to pass
the buck to someone else. It also refers to the framing contest which
determines, for instance, whether blame should be assigned and whether
that blame can be assigned to an actor or whether we are dealing here with
an act of God—in which case the blame game will come to a halt. So
despite the fact that some of the readers will perceive the concept of blame
game in a negative light, it does best describe the whole process from start
to finish.
Having said that, there is a problem with blame games and that problem
is actually the reason why I wrote this book. In recent years, blame games
have become more prominent in the accountability phase of crisis
management. Nowadays, media, politicians, and the public are quickly
outraged, searching almost frantically for someone who can be blamed
for what happened while demanding quite easily someone’s resignation
(cf. De Vries 2004; Weaver 2018; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019). This
focus on finding a culprit can be detrimental for the learning part of the
accountability stage because people will be less willing to open up if anything
they say can be used against them. After all, learning requires openness. It
requires a willingness to share information about mistakes that have been

made—mistakes which might have led or contributed to the crisis. But if
divulging any information leads to calls for resignation, then people will not
be willing to share information—information which can be vital in
understanding how the crisis came about and how it can be prevented in the
future (May 1992; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Choularton 2001; Sulitzeanu-
Kenan 2010; Stark 2010; Kuipers and ’t Hart 2014; Brändström 2016;
Guerin et al. 2018).
In an ideal world, there is room for both a blame game and for learning
as both are crucial elements of a responsive democracy. This, however,
requires a balanced accountability phase. Too much focus on finding a
culprit can result in a hostile environment where people do not feel safe to
share vital information. Conversely, a society where actors can get away
with murder by just saying sorry also hinders the learning process because
no one will have an incentive to dig deeper and find the underlying reasons
why something went wrong. Consequently, only superficial learning will
take place. Both types of unbalanced accountability will have a negative
impact on a society’s capability to learn and thus prevent future mishaps.
An unbalanced accountability phase could therefore lead to a society
which is not resilient, that is, not capable of bouncing back from crises,
because proper learning cannot take place (Resodihardjo et al. 2018b).
The aim of the book is to provide information about how blame games
work. This will help the audience of a blame game as well as the participants
therein to better understand why some crises result in the search for a
culprit while others do not and why some responses to allegations of
blame are more favourably met than others. Having a better understanding
of blame games allows for a better management of the blame games and,
hopefully, a more balanced accountability phase where learning no longer
takes a backseat.
It is, however, impossible to write an all-encompassing book on blame
games as blame games are complex cases where so many variables (such as
political and societal context, prior reputation, upcoming elections, and
even holidays) have an impact on how the blame games evolve. Though
blame game research is gaining traction, there is still much to be learned.
Having said that, the theories and cases explored in this book do help to
provide insight into what happens during a blame game as various theories
from a range of disciplines are connected in the theoretical chapters
(Chaps. 2 and 3) and the detailed description and analysis of the three
cases improves our understanding of how blame games evolve.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
In the next chapter, theories on blame games will be addressed. The

chapter starts with an explanation of the importance of perceptions and
framing during blame games. These perceptions consist of negativity bias
and risk and causal perceptions. Negativity bias is a concept which describes
humans’ tendency to give more weight and meaning to things that (could)
go wrong than to things that (could) go well. Combine that with the fact
that people are more and more risk averse and that they demand
government to step in and make sure that they are safe and one can
understand how people are becoming less inclined to accept risks.
Considering the lower tolerance for and acceptance of crises, it is not
surprising that crises are quickly followed by public outcries. However, for
an event to be labelled as a crisis, there needs to be a shared understanding
of that event. This is where the framing contest within blame games starts
because if you are able to influence this discussion and achieve a shared
definition that the event was not a crisis, the blame game will not take off.
If the event is defined as a crisis, then various variables (such as the level of
harm resulting from the crisis, the cause of the crisis, and the prior
reputation of actors) influence who is going to be blamed for what
happened and how much blame these actors will receive. Following the
explanation of how blame is attributed, strategies to deal with blame will
be described. According to the literature, an adequate response to blame
matches the level of blame one is facing: low levels of blame allow you to
respond in quite a defensive manner whereas higher levels of blame require
a more accommodative response. The concept of a staged retreat is also
introduced: actors are likely to stay as defensive as possible until that
response no longer works. Only then will they become more accommodative
in their response.
One of the blame responses described in Chap. 2 is appointing an
inquiry. A number of blame game authors merely state that appointing
inquiries is a useful tactic. There is, however, much more to be said about
inquiries: why they are established in the first place, what their functions
are within the crisis management process, and how actors can try to
influence inquiries. Moreover, an inquiry which was initially established to
get an issue off the agenda can actually become influential and set the
agenda in terms of recommendations that need to be implemented. Such
an inquiry—also known as a catalytic inquiry—is, however, quite rare.
Most of the times, inquiries will have less impact on the policy making
process. But they can have quite an impact on how the blame game
unfolds—hence the focus on inquiries in Chap. 3.
In Chap. 4, I draw and extend on existing publications (Resodihardjo

et al. 2012, 2016, 2018a) to study three blame game cases in order to
further our understanding of how blame games evolve in reality. All three
cases revolve around festivals where something awful happened and where
the mayor was one of the key players in the blame game. The three cases
are the 2009 Sunset Grooves festival (Hoek van Holland/Rotterdam, the
Netherlands), the 2010 Love Parade (Duisburg, Germany), and the 2014
monster truck accident (Haaksbergen, the Netherlands). In the first case,
the mayor—being officially responsible for public safety—could stay in
office; in the second case, Duisburg citizens used a new state law to vote
their mayor out of office; and in the third case, the mayor resigned. In
each case, reality was more complex than expected by theory and
idiosyncratic factors appeared to be crucial. In the first case, for instance, a
more accommodative response to blame did not result in a decrease of the
mayor’s and police chief’s blame levels while length of tenure affected the
blame game outcome. In the second case, the mayor could not voluntarily
resign because that would negatively affect his pension; a new state law
had to be implemented which allowed citizens to vote their mayor out of
office. And in the third case, the mayor experienced an unsolvable conflict
between his role of a caring mayor and his role as administrator which
affected how his citizens perceived him.
These and various other factors influenced the three blame games. In
the concluding chapter, the determinative impact of such case-specific
details results in the creation of a more detailed overview of the variables
influencing the way in which a blame game evolves. This overview results
also in a number of avenues for future research.
References
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CHAPTER 2
Framing and Blaming
Before we delve deeper into how blame games work, it is important to

keep in mind that blame games are basically framing contests. First, since
people perceive reality differently, a framing contest will start to determine
whether the event was a crisis or not. Second, framing plays a role in
attributing blame since a shared understanding of the frequency of the
crisis (one-off event or a symptom of a bigger crisis) and the level of harm
caused by the crisis will determine who will be blamed and how much
blame these actors will receive. Lastly, the blame game itself is also a
framing contest where actors use rhetoric to try to redirect or minimize
the level of blame they are facing (Gephart 1993; Stone 1997; Brändström
and Kuipers 2003; De Vries 2004; Boin et al. 2009). Considering the
importance of perceptions and framing, it comes as no surprise that the
first section of this chapter addresses these two. The attribution of blame
is discussed in the second section. In the third and final section, I will
provide an overview of how one can deal with blame—either by actions
taken prior to a crisis or during a blame game—and explain how to choose
an appropriate blame response.
2.1 Perceptions and Framing

Blame games do not appear out of the blue. If you look carefully, you can
detect signs that a blame game is about to start. These signs consist of
perceptions and framing. People have perceptions regarding reality. These

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_2
perceptions are informed, amongst other things, by people’s negativity

bias and their risk and causal perceptions—all three act as lenses through
which people perceive the information they receive. Since people perceive
reality differently, they will try to convince others of the correctness of
their perception. If they are successful, a general consensus on what the
problem exactly is will be established. This shared problem definition will
then determine whether there will be a public outcry for heads to roll. To
convince others that their perception of reality is the right one, they will
use framing tactics. Both perceptions and framing will be addressed in
this section.
2.1.1 Perceptions
When it comes to perceptions and blame games, negativity bias and risk
and causal perceptions play an important role as they influence how
people process the information they receive and thus come to a certain
perspective on reality. Negativity bias, for instance, affects which type of
information (positive or negative) people will pay more attention to.
Psychological research has shown that people attach more importance to
negative than to positive events. That basically means that if something
bad happens, people will tend to forget the positive news they received
about this organization or person so far. Instead, they will focus on the
bad news (Lau 1985; Weaver 1986; Rozin and Royzman 2001; James
et al. 2016). Politicians are well aware of this phenomenon and they will
take steps to ensure that they cannot be blamed if something goes wrong.
One of these steps is to not claim any credit for creating a policy because
if that policy fails, then people will remember that the politician took
credit for this policy and they will then blame the politician for the failing
policy (Weaver 1986; McGraw 1991; Hood et al. 2009; Hinterleitner and
Sager 2015).
Risk and causal perceptions also affect the way in which people perceive
the world. We live in a risk society. The way in which we manufacture
products makes it more likely that something bad will happen.
Industrialization and the way in which we deplete our natural resources
have thus increased the number of risks we are facing in society (Shrivastava
1995) and people are becoming more aware of the fact that they are
surrounded by risks (Power 2004). Within a risk society, it is not just this
perception of realistic and unrealistic risks (i.e. risks that we think we should
be afraid of even though they are not real) (Bache et al. 2015) that is of
2 FRAMING AND BLAMING 13
importance, but also the fact that humans are now less tolerant of these
risks (Boin et al. 2018).
People want to live in a safe society and expect government to make
sure that they do. If something does happen, then someone must be
blamed for that (Brändström and Kuipers 2003). This is where causal
perceptions come into play. Because if actors are able to convince others
that they had no control over the events—and thus did not cause or
contribute to the crisis—then these actors are able to avoid being blamed
for the events (Stone 1997). Claiming that the unfortunate event was the
result of an act of God, however, is no longer quite as acceptable as it once
was because people’s causal perceptions have shifted. Nowadays, a lot of
people think that most events can be shaped by human actions and are
thus no longer in the hands of God. Hence the belief that if something
goes wrong, humans (i.e. government) could have prevented or minimized
the event (Power 2004; Kuipers and ’t Hart 2014; Dodds 2015). Flooding,
for instance, is now usually perceived to be a result of government failing
to build and maintain dykes (cf. Hartman and Squires 2006). This does
not mean that no one refers to an act of God anymore—some insurance
companies, for example, did so when faced with the volcanic outburst in
Iceland which played havoc with airplane travel—but the references to an
act of God are becoming less frequent (Burgess 2012; Dodds 2015). All
in all that means that if something does go wrong, there is a strong
expectation that government should have done something to avoid the
disaster from happening (cf. Boin et al. 2009).
Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions thus shape the way in
which information about events is processed. But in order for these lenses
to become active, people need to receive information in the first place.
After all, without information detailing that something has happened, no
opinion about these events can be formed. This is where the media comes
into play.
It used to be that crises could take place without the rest of the country
knowing about it, especially if the crises took place in remote areas where
means of communication were destroyed through, for instance, a storm.
Nowadays, however, there are TV channels and internet sites solely
focused on bringing us the news. Combined with the rise of social media—
which allows people to quickly communicate about events—this has not
only led to an increase of the speed in which news is shared with the
public, but also changed the way in which the public perceives these events
(Roberts 2010). “[T]he infosphere is clearly being transformed and in the
process is profoundly altering the American public’s awareness and

perception of crises. Two obvious changes are in immediacy and vividness
of awareness: Americans now become alerted to crises more quickly, and
have a stronger appreciation of the human costs of a crisis, than ever
before” (Roberts 2010, p. 91).
Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions help to explain why peo-
ple are so quick to ask the question of who is responsible. This trend is
reinforced by the changes in which information is spread: the 24-hour
news cycle results not only in an ever-increasing number of events that the
public are informed about, but also in the public being informed very
quickly. Combined, these trends could help to explain why it sometimes
feels as if one public outcry for heads to roll is quickly followed by yet
another public outcry for resignations.
2.1.2
Framing
Negativity bias and risk and causal perceptions will act as lenses through
which the information people receive will be analysed. Based on that
analysis, people will create their own perception of what is going on.
However, people can perceive situations differently. If people find it
particularly important to convince others that their perception is the
correct one, a debate will ensue in which they will use framing techniques—
such as stressing the severity of the problem or emphasizing the frequency
of the incidents—to show that their perception of the issue is indeed the
one that needs to be supported by everyone. Such a debate could thus
result in a shared understanding of what is going on. A shared problem
definition will make it easier to take action because a problem definition
not only contains what the problem is all about, but also what its cause(s)
and solutions are (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; cf. Stone 1997).
Framing is important even before a blame game starts because being
able to sway the debate in one direction or the other will have an impact
on whether a blame game will ensue or not. After all, if actors are able to
convince everyone involved that no crisis took place, then no blame game
will start. Note though that not all actors are trying to avoid blame games.
Some actors will try their best to ensure that the general consensus is that
the event was indeed a crisis, since labelling an event as a crisis results in a
sense of urgency which, in turn, will create room to propose and implement
reform measures (Keeler 1993; Boin et al. 2009).
Now the reason why it is possible to hold a debate on the nature of the
event is because it is quite rare that an event is clearly a crisis in and by
itself. More often than not, an event needs to become defined as a crisis (’t
Hart 1993). A debate will therefore start in which society tries to find a
shared definition of the event either being a crisis or not. If the event is
defined as a crisis, then questions will be raised about the cause of the crisis
and whether someone was responsible for what happened. If the event is
defined as a non-crisis, no blame game will start (Brändström and Kuipers
2003; Boin et al. 2009; Hood et al. 2016).
It therefore comes as no surprise that one of the tactics listed in the
blame game literature is to deny that there is a crisis (Benoit 1997; Bovens
et al. 1999; Hood 2002; Coombs 2007a; Hood et al. 2009). This tactic
can work but it could also backfire in those cases where an event is clearly
a crisis. No one would argue, for instance, that a tsunami and its devastating
toll on society does not constitute a crisis. Trying to define such an event
as a non-crisis could actually harm your position as you might be perceived
as being out of touch with reality (Boin et al. 2009). It is therefore
important to get a good read of the situation so you can ascertain whether
using the tactic of denying that there is a crisis is a viable option or not.
Framing is not only important in determining whether the event was a
crisis—and thus whether a blame game should start. Framing is also
important when it comes to the attribution of blame since framing is also
involved when people are defining the extent to which actors are
responsible for the crisis, the extent of the harm caused by the crisis, and
whether the crisis was incidental or a symptom of a much bigger problem.
The latter influences who is going to be blamed whereas the former two
affect how much blame actors will receive. These and other factors
influencing how much blame actors will face will be discussed in the
next section.
2.2 Attributing Blame

Now that we know when a blame game could start—if an event is defined
as a crisis—we can turn our attention to who is going to be blamed and
how much blame that actor is going to receive. Understanding blame
attribution not only helps you to understand how the blame game works
but also helps you to select the right blame response when facing blame.
Hence there is the need to describe blame attribution in such detail.
Who is going to be blamed is largely determined by the way in which the

event is further defined: either as a one-off crisis or as a symptom of an
endemic crisis. If the general consensus is that the crisis was a one-off event,
it is quite likely that blame will be attributed to actors at the operational
level such as an individual employee or an agency responsible for
implementing policies. If, however, the general consensus is that this new
event is proof of a bigger crisis, then the blame will focus on actors at the
political or strategic level such as a minister (Brändström and Kuipers 2003).
It is important to keep in mind that a blame game is not a static process.
The fact that at one point a shared understanding has been reached that
the crisis was a one-off event and actor X is to be blamed does not mean
that that perception of reality remains stable for the remainder of the
blame game. On the contrary, new information can come to the fore
which shows that indeed mistakes were made at the operational level, but
that these mistakes could only be made through errors at the political
level—in which case blame either spreads or shifts to include actors at the
political level (De Vries 2004).
Consider, for instance, the fire in a detention centre at Schiphol airport
on 26 October 2005. The fire killed 11 people, and numerous others were
injured. The fire started in a cell. When rescuing the person locked up in
this cell, prison guards left the door of this cell open, thereby allowing the
fire to spread. An investigation revealed, amongst other things, that the
prison guards had not received proper training and were unfamiliar with
the emergency plans—plans which happened to be insufficient anyway. As
a consequence, prison guards did not know what to do in case of fire.
These findings resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Justice as he
was responsible for prison services. Additionally, the investigation showed
that the building was not built in accordance with various regulations.
Consequently, the Minister responsible for the Government Buildings
Agency resigned as well. Lastly, the investigation showed that the
municipality of Haarlemmermeer—where the detention centre is located—
had granted building and usage permits even though the municipality did
not have enough information to make an informed decision whether these
permits should be granted. The third and last person to resign over this
crisis was therefore the mayor of Haarlemmermeer (Dutch Safety
Board 2005).1
1
Kritiek blijft overeind in rapport Schipholbrand. (2006, 21 September). Trouw; Donner
en Dekker treden af na rapport. (2006, 21 September). De Volkskrant; Burgemeester
Haarlemmermeer dient ontslag in. (2006, 21 September). De Volkskrant.
Who is going to be blamed can thus change over time—just like how
much blame they will receive. The level of blame one can face depends on
the effectiveness of the blame game strategies used to deal with blame (see
the next section); new information which sheds new light on what
happened; and four other factors: the extent to which actors are perceived
to be responsible for the crisis, whether the negative effects of the crisis are
seen as avoidable, what the actor’s reputation was prior to the crisis, and
whether similar incidents happened before.
When the general perception is that an actor caused or contributed to
a crisis by either doing something or failing to do something, then this
actor will face a lot of blame. Conversely, if the crisis is seen as something
which was outside of the actor’s control and the actor’s (in)actions did not
exacerbate the situation, then this actor’s blame levels will remain low
(Stone 1997; De Vries 2004; Coombs 2007a, 2007b; Boin et al. 2009;
Hood 2011).
If a crisis does not result in any negative effect, that is, it does not result
in any harm, then no one will be looking for someone to blame. If,
however, the crisis did result in harm and this harm could have been
avoided, then people will start their search for a culprit. How much blame
actors will receive depends on the extent of the damage. The more
avoidable harm the crisis caused, the more actors will be blamed for what
happened (McGraw et al. 2011; Hood 2011).
An actor’s reputation prior to the crisis will also affect the level of blame
they will face. If an actor’s reputation was already damaged prior to the
crisis, then it will be easier for others to attack this actor. In other words,
a damaged reputation makes actors more susceptible to blame (Coombs
and Holladay 2006; Coombs 2007a, 2007b; Hinterleitner and Sager
2019; for a contrasting view, see Brändström 2016, p. 124).
The last factor influencing the level of blame actors will face is prior
occurrence of a similar crisis. If a similar crisis happened before, then actors
could have learned from this event and thus could have prevented a
recurrence. As a result, they will be facing a lot of blame. In contrast, if the
crisis has never happened before, actors could not have learned from
previous events and thus will face lower blame levels (Coombs 2007a, 2007b).
In short, numerous factors influence how much blame people will
receive and their blame level will fluctuate during a blame game. Effective
presentational strategies, for instance, should result in lower blame levels.
In contrast, ineffective presentational strategies or new information
coming to the fore could increase the level of blame one is facing.
Table 2.1 A ‘blame barometer’ used for coding daily media stories (Hood et al.
2009, p. 718)a
Level General description Salience Stance of ‘usual Typical
suspects’ (habitual accountability
opponents) calls on responsible
officeholders
1. Very Either benign neglect High and Muted Either low or as

calm or or favourable reactions favourable objects of praise
fair from media, legislature, or low and
and other forums neutral
2. Fairly Broadly favourable, with Low and Point scoring at Some calls for
calm criticisms in the form of fairly neutral fairly low level information or
‘background noise’ in explanation
isolated sources with
limited coverage
3. Mixed coverage, with Medium Active, with limited Calls for serious
Mid- criticisms given and mixed criticism coming inquiries, special
range moderate attention in from neutrals and debates, etc., as
mainstream forums supporters too well as explanations
4. Largely negative points Medium to Joined by Calls for
Stormy given substantial high and non-trivial criticismindependent
coverage in mainstream mainly from the ranks of inquiries and
sources negative normal loyalists remedies as well
as explanations
5. Very Overwhelmingly High and Overshadowed by Calls for
stormy negative points given negative critics drawn from resignations as
saturation coverage, normal loyalists and well as remedies,
with ‘legs’ (i.e., payroll supporters etc.
expectations of
continuance)
a
Reprinted from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) with permission of John Wiley &
Sons
Hood et al. (2009) discern five levels of blame one could be facing
ranging from non-existent to very stormy. These levels are listed in
Table 2.1. The lowest level of blame describes a situation where journalists
are reporting in a neutral or even positive manner about an actor and
where the actor faces no calls for explanation or information. If media
reports remain mainly neutral but there are some low-level rumblings
where people want to know more about what happened, then the blame
level shifts to the second level of blame. The third level of blame is reached
when calls for information become more serious—people ask for inquiries,
Members of Parliament (MPs) request emergency debates—and the

attention in the media becomes more negative. The fourth level of blame
is characterized by a combination of quite negative media attention, calls
for independent inquiries, demands for solutions, and some criticism from
people who are normally the actor’s allies. The highest level of blame
occurs when the media attention is mostly if not completely negative, the
actor’s allies are starting to really question the actor’s performance, and
there are demands for the actor’s resignation.
2.3 How to Deal with Blame

Now that we understand who is going to be blamed and how much blame
they will receive, it is time to turn our attention to the way in which actors
can deal with blame. In this section, three blame game strategies will be
introduced: policy strategies, agency strategies, and presentational
strategies. The latter strategy becomes active during a blame game whereas
the former two strategies are strategies which already need to be in place
before the crisis starts. Since this book focuses on the strategies employed
during blame games, the proactive strategies will only be briefly described.
The presentational strategies will be addressed in more detail by describing
a number of presentational strategies, listing the presentational strategies
studied for this research, and explaining how to select an appropriate
presentational strategy when facing blame.
2.3.1 Proactive Strategies
Within the literature, a distinction is made between strategies implemented
prior to and during a crisis. Basically, the idea is that proactive (or
anticipatory) strategies implemented before a crisis occurs could help you
to either deflect and/or minimize blame if a blame game starts following
the crisis. Only if these strategies fail or were not in place do you need to
rely on presentational strategies—that is, the strategies used during the
blame game (Hood et al. 2009; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019).
The proactive strategies consist of policy strategies and agency strate-
gies. Policy strategies basically mean that you have policies in place to
which you can refer in case of potential blame. If someone wants to blame
you, your response will be to say that you, your organization, or employ-
ees cannot be blamed since existing policies or standard operating proce-
dures were followed (Hood et al. 2009; Hood 2011 cf. Hinterleitner and
Sager 2019). The use of standard operating procedures and protocols

“makes it harder for the functionaries concerned to be blamed for
arbitrariness, favouritism, corruption, double standards, or poor personal
judgement” (Hood 2011, p. 93). One way for the police to deflect any
accusations of racism while doing stop and searches would be to implement
a policy which clearly states that every nth person needs to be stopped and
searched. One could then argue that since every nth person is going to be
stopped and searched, the selection of citizens is based on randomness and
not on racism.
The literature, however, points to a potential flaw of this policy strategy
when it comes to using this strategy in the field of risk management. Risk
management focuses on the operational aspects of an organization
(identifying risks, figuring out how to prevent risks from happening, and
what to do if a risk manifests) and its reputation (how to ensure that a risk
which has come true does not damage the organization’s reputation).
There is a danger that organizations will focus too much on their reputation
management, resulting in the creation of numerous risk policies and
protocols that are only in place to deflect potential blame in the case a
crisis does happen—these regulations and protocols do not actually help
to prevent risks from becoming reality. Moreover, if an organization is too
focused on risk management as a way to protect its own reputation, that
focus could lead to less attention and less resources to implement the
organization’s original tasks, to inflexibility, and to “abandoning services,
such as advice, that carry substantial potential for blame” (Hood 2002,
p. 33; Power 2004; Hinterleitner and Sager 2019).
The second proactive strategy is the agency strategy. Agency strategies
consist of “all the attempts officeholders and organizations make to deflect
or limit blame by creative allocation of formal responsibility, competency,
or jurisdiction among different units and individuals” (Hood 2011, p. 67).
An agency strategy could, for example, revolve around creating distance
between the organization which makes policy—such as a ministry—and
the organization which implements the policy—such as an agency. The
idea being that ministers can dissolve themselves from any blame by
pointing out that they merely created the policy while the problem lies
with the executive agency which failed to implement the policy properly
(Hood 2002, 2011; Power 2004; Bache et al. 2015; James et al. 2016;
Hinterleitner and Sager 2019).
Again, this strategy has its drawbacks. For one, the implementing orga-
nizations might refuse to accept the blame (Hood 2002; Hinterleitner and
Sager 2019). For another, this strategy might be seen as ministers passing
the buck to someone else. This happened in the case of Home Secretary
Howard and his response to two serious prison escapes—the first in
September 1994 when six prisoners (five of which were IRA terrorists)
escaped from the Special Secure Unit at Whitemoor Prison and the second
escape in January 1995 when three prisoners escaped from Parkhurst
Prison (a prison located on an island) and remained at large for a couple
of days on the island. Howard’s response was to shift blame to Director
General Lewis—head of the Prison Service of England and Wales which
had become an executive agency on 1 April 1993. Howard fired Lewis
because the Learmont inquiry into the second escape showed that
responsibility lay with the agency and that no “policy decision of mine,
directly or indirectly, caused the escape.”2 From the start of the crisis,
however, the distinction between making policy and implementing policy
had been suspect. Following the first escape, for instance, The Times
published an article stating that “[t]he creation of executive agencies,
operating at a distance from ministers, was supposed to make public
services more efficient and less political. In this case, it has simply made
blame easier to shift around the machine”3 (Resodihardjo 2009).
2.3.2 Presentational Strategies
If the proactive (or anticipatory) strategies do not work sufficiently or if
these strategies were absent, then actors will be facing blame. Actors will
then rely on presentational strategies to minimize, deflect of shift blame
(Hood 2002, 2011). These strategies are mostly rhetoric in nature with
the exception of strategies such as resignation, financial compensation,
and appointing an inquiry. The literature is rife with examples of
presentational strategies and it is impossible to list every one of them. I
will therefore not attempt to provide the ultimate list of presentational
strategies. Instead, I will first describe a variety of examples to give you an
idea of what this strategy actually entails before introducing a table listing
the presentational strategies used to investigate the three blame game cases.
A strategy which was already mentioned earlier is denial. During a
blame game, a lot of things can be denied. For starters, one could deny
that there was a crisis. If the existence of a crisis cannot be denied, one
2
House of Commons, Prison Service, [264] (16.10.1995) 30–43, p. 31.
3
The Times (1994, 14 September). Who Goes There? The Times, Section Editorials, p. 15.
could still deny that the crisis was severe by downplaying the effects of the
crisis. If that does not work, one could always deny any responsibility for
the crisis by claiming that one acted in response to someone else’s actions
(provocation), by claiming not to have caused the crisis (combat causality),
by claiming not to have been informed about what happened (defeasibility),
and/or by claiming an inability to influence the events (defeasibility as
well). In response to allegations of responsibilities, actors can also try to
shift the blame to someone else. Blame shifting or scapegoating is a variation
on the denial strategy because it focuses on denying any responsibility
while pointing the finger to another actor. One could try to shift the blame
to someone outside of the organization or someone inside the
organization—such as a subordinate. Blame is also quite often shifted to
predecessors who, for instance, implemented a set of austerity measures
which resulted in the executive agency being unable to do its job. Hence,
it is the predecessor’s fault that the crisis was not prevented. Sometimes
actors try to shift the blame to the victims—though one can wonder the
wisdom of such a strategy considering the fact that we live in a risk society
where people expect government to ensure their safety. Another denial
strategy is attacking the actor who is attacking you. One could, for instance,
threaten to sue, emphasize that the allegations are politically motivated or
demand proof from the attackers that you are indeed the one to be blamed
(Benoit 1997; Bovens et al. 1999; Hearit 2001; McConnell 2003; Coombs
2007a; Hood et al. 2009).
Besides the denial strategies, there are numerous other strategies at
one’s disposal. One could, for instance, appoint an inquiry. This allows
actors to show that they are taking steps in response to allegations without
actually acknowledging any responsibility. In fact, it allows them to show
that they too are concerned about what happened, but that more
information is needed before one can make a correct assessment of what
happened and who was responsible (if indeed someone can be held
responsible). At the same time, establishing an inquiry helps to depoliticize
the situation as it drops off the agenda for a while. Appointing an inquiry
also helps to evade annoying questions as one could refuse to answer any
media and political questions using the argument that inquiries need to be
able to do their job unhindered. Moreover, when experts are heading an
inquiry instead of politicians, there is less danger that the inquiry’s report
will result in (forced) resignations (Bovens et al. 1999; McConnell 2003;
Hood et al. 2009; Boin et al. 2009; Brändström 2016).
One could also try to minimize the extent to which one can be blamed
by making excuses. An excuse, for example, could focus on the fact that the
organization had no or little control over what happened because the train
delays were caused by an unexpected amount of fallen leaves. Justification
can also be used to minimize blame. Examples of justification include
stating that you thought you acted in the best interest of others (such as
the general public) or “claiming that the victims deserved what they
received” (Coombs 2007a, p. 140; McGraw 1990; Bovens et al. 1999;
Hood et al. 2009).
Once responsibility has been established, one can still use presenta-
tional strategies to ensure that blame levels do not get too high. One
could, for instance, offer financial compensation or take remedial action by
firing an employee or changing policy. Offering apologies and asking for
forgiveness (also known as mortification) can be a helpful strategy when
actors apologize because they want to apologize and not because they
were forced to apologize. When actors offer generous apologies where
they acknowledge their own mistakes, then this apology can have “a cush-
ioning effect on the debate (…) [by robbing] the opposition of the oppor-
tunity to attack” (Brändström 2016, p. 126; Benoit 1997; Bovens et al.
1999; Coombs 2007a).
There are also presentational strategies that cannot be used on their
own because the public might perceive these strategies as self-serving.
These strategies are, for instance, aimed at bolstering the reputation of the
blamed actor by reminding the audience of the blamed actor’s excellent
past performance or by explaining how much (local) society has benefitted
from the actor’s actions and/or policies. Additionally, actors can claim
that they do not deserved to be blamed because they are a victim as well
(victimage). And lastly, actors who are facing blame can take actions to
ensure the continuous support of their stakeholders by, for instance,
commending their stakeholders (ingratiation). To avoid the perception of
self-centeredness, these strategies need to be used in tandem with one of
the previously mentioned presentational strategies (Benoit 1997; Hearit
2001; Ihlen 2002; Coombs 2007a).
There are thus numerous presentational strategies that actors can
choose from when facing blame. Although the summary presented here
does not address every possible presentational strategy—as it is impossible
to provide such a list—it does provide a good overview of the most often
mentioned presentational strategies in the blame game literature and
Table 2.2 Some basic strategic options for officeholders facing media firestorms:
Denial and admission of problem and responsibility (Hood et al. 2009, p. 698)a
A: Problem Denial PD B: Problem Admission but C: Problem and Responsibility
Responsibility Denial Admission
(PA + RD) (PA + RA)
A1. Pure denial (‘crisis, B1. Open stance on who is C1. Explanation-only
what crisis?’) responsible (announce or response, offering some
agree to investigation to account of what went wrong,
determine who is but not accepting culpability
responsible, without
accepting responsibility)
A2. Qualified denial B2. Assert others to be C2. Institutional action-
(admission that there is responsible (blame victims, taking response, offering
some problem but denial other agents, predecessors, institutional apology,
that it is serious or successors, subordinates, compensation, remedial
significant (e.g., through superordinates, colleagues, action (e.g., dismissal or
justificatory arguments) etc.) disciplining of subordinates)
A3. Denial plus B3. Admission of some C3. Admission of personal
counterattack (portrayal of responsibility, but denial of culpability (which may
critics as whingers, major or ultimate include resignation or an
knockers, politically responsibility (e.g., by acknowledgement of error
motivated etc., assertion offering ‘wrong kind of accompanied by an expression
that onus of proof rests on snow’ excuses or admission of determination to stay on
critics, threats of lawsuits, of only partial or ‘technical’ and sort out the situation)
dismissals of moles and but not substantial
leakers, and other responsibility)
sanctions)
a
Reprinted from the original journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) with permission of John Wiley &
Sons
therefore offers us a good idea of how actors can respond to blame. To

investigate actors’ blame responses during a blame game, we used Hood
et al.’s (2009) overview of presentational strategies to code actors’ blame
responses (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, 2016, 2018). As outlined in Table 2.2,
the codes assigned to actors’ responses ranged from A1 (pure denial) to
C3 (admission of personal culpability). What is interesting about Hood
et al.’s article (2009) is the fact that their work allows researchers to code
not just blame responses, but also blame levels (see Table 2.1). Researchers
interested in understanding how blame games work can compare the
blame responses to the blame levels in order to determine whether
blame responses resulted in a decrease in blame levels. If so, that would
indicate that the chosen presentational strategy was the appropriate one.
This raises the question which presentational strategy one should choose
when facing blame since an inappropriate response will result in an increase
in blame levels. This question will be addressed in the next subsection.
2.3.3 Using Which Strategy When

It is impossible to say with certainty which presentational strategy to use
when facing a particular blame level. Although each blame game shares
certain characteristics, each case is also a unique combination of, for
instance, the type of crisis, the level of harm caused by the crisis, the prior
reputation of the main players in the blame game, the victims, and the
perception of the victims. This makes it difficult to say with certainty how
to respond when facing blame. Having said that, the literature does point
out to three things that could help to inform actors when to choose which
presentational strategy: (1) the possibility of strategies backfiring, (2) the
use of multiple strategies simultaneously, and (3) staged retreat.
It is important to keep in mind that presentational strategies can back-
fire. A risky strategy, for instance, would be to deny responsibility even
though you know full well that you are responsible. When the truth comes
out, then your reputation and credibility will be severely damaged (Benoit
1997). Furthermore, the public might perceive inquiries as a whitewash if,
for instance, actors try to control the investigation too much (McConnell
2010). Lastly, apologizing could open the door to lawsuits (Benoit 1997).
However, fear of lawsuits should not solely drive a blame response as it
could result in a legally correct but non-emphatic response which only
further angers the public.
There are also presentational strategies that cannot be used on their
own because the public might perceive these strategies as self-serving.
These strategies are aimed at bolstering the reputation of the blamed actor,
explaining that the blamed actor is a victim as well of what happened
(victimage), and commending the blamed actor’s stakeholders
(ingratiation). To avoid the perception of self-centeredness, these
strategies need to be used in tandem with one of the previously mentioned
presentational strategies (Benoit 1997; Coombs 2007a).
Sometimes it makes sense to use multiple strategies at the same time—
and not just in the case of presentational strategies that might be perceived
as egoistical (Benoit 1997; Coombs 2007a). It could be a smart move, for
attack the appointing apology with

attacker an inquiry resignation
Defensive Accommodative
Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-

accommodative continuum based on Ihlen (2002, p. 190) and Hood et al. (2009,
p. 698)
instance, to combine denial with remedial action to show that steps are
taken to minimize the effects of the crisis and to ensure it will not happen
again (Hearit 2001).
The question then remains which presentational strategy should be
used when. To answer this question, one needs to keep in mind that
presentational strategies range from very defensive to very accommodating.
Presentational strategies can therefore be placed on a defensive-
accommodative continuum depending on how defensive/accommodative
a presentational strategy is (see Fig. 2.1) (Ihlen 2002; cf. Benoit 1997;
Bovens et al. 1999; Coombs 2007a; Hood et al. 2009).
Ideally, actors select a presentational strategy from this continuum that
fits with the level of blame they are facing. When an actor is facing high
levels of blame, a response which is too defensive will only angry the public
further and thus result in higher blame levels. Conversely, a response
which is too accommodative considering the low blame levels might result
in people wondering why the blamed actor was so accommodating and
thus result in requests for inquiries. A blame response should thus fit the
level of blame one is facing otherwise the blame level will only
further increase.
The selection of a presentational strategy is also influenced by the fact
that actors want to avoid blame as much as possible. Acknowledging that
there is a problem opens the door to blame. Actors will therefore be
reluctant to admit that there is a problem. If it is impossible to deny that
there is a problem, then they will try, for instance, to deny that the problem
is severe. When it is no longer possible to use any of the problem denial
strategies, then actors will move away from the most defensive strategies,
but still remain somewhat defensive as they will acknowledge that there is a
problem but will deny that they are responsible. Only when these strategies
fail, will actors move towards the accommodative end of the defensive-
accommodative continuum by selecting strategies where they accept both
the fact that there is a problem and that they are (to some extent) responsible.
This shifting from problem denial to problem admission but responsibility
denial and then to problem and responsibility admission (see also Table 2.2)
is also known as a staged retreat (Hearit 2001; Hood et al. 2009, 2016).
So in short, actors need to find a presentational strategy that nicely fits
with the blame level they are facing. But at the same time, they will initially
prefer a defensive approach. Only when that approach does not work and
blame levels remain high or are even increasing will actors become more
accommodative.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explained how blame games come about and how actors
can respond to blame. The study of blame games is gaining popularity and
numerous studies on blame games have been published in recent years.
Each publication has furthered our understanding of how blame games
work by addressing, for instance, the role of social media (Schwarz 2012),
auditing (Skærbæk and Christensen 2015), and multi-level governance
structures (Bache et al. 2015) in blame games. Various types of crises have
also been investigated, ranging from a tsunami (Brändström et al. 2008)
to terrorist attacks (Olmeda 2008) and from malfunctioning examination
systems (Hood et al. 2009) to a flooding (Bytzek 2008).
In this book, the focus is on blame games following festivals where
something went horribly wrong. Before we can move to these cases,
however, there is one presentational strategy which deserves more
attention: appointing an inquiry in times of trouble. Considering the
immense impact an inquiry can have on the way in which the blame game
evolves and what its outcome will be, it is worth taking a closer look at this
strategy. That is why the next chapter is solely about inquiries
following crises.
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CHAPTER 3
Inquiries Following Crises
I started this book by pointing out that the accountability phase of crisis
management consists of two important elements: blame games (what
happened and who can be held responsible/is to be blamed for what
happened?) and learning (what happened and how can we ensure it does
not happen again?). In an ideal world, those two elements are balanced. In
reality, blame games are becoming more prevalent, thereby endangering
the learning part of the accountability phase as people will be less likely to
open up and explain what happened—especially if their actions contributed
to or exacerbated the crisis.
Learning and holding actors accountable for what happened are two
important roles which inquiries can fulfil following crises. But at times,
inquiries can play a third role: that of an actor (substantially) affecting the
outcome of a blame game either through its proceedings and/or its
report. To better understand this third role, we need to combine what is
said in the blame game literature on this topic with the crisis management
and political science literature. These latter two streams of literature
address why actors appoint inquiries in the first place and how actors can
try to influence the inquiry so that the inquiry’s report fits their needs.
Inquiries are thus seen as an instrument to manage the political fallout,
particularly following a crisis. Such an instrumental view on inquiries is
quite pervasive within the literature—and understandably so. After all,
inquiries are often established following a crisis (Gosnell 1934; Elliott
and McGuinness 2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Holzman-Gazit 2016;

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_3
Brändström 2016). And although inquiries may have an “aura of

independence,” they do not operate in a political vacuum (Gilligan 2002,
p. 295). Their creation is politically motivated just as their terms of
reference. Even the selection of members and resources is prone to political
debate and compromise.
Having said that, inquiries are more than just instruments to manage
the aftermath of a crisis. Although actors can try to influence the outcome
of inquiries, inquiries can act quite independently. In fact, actors can find
themselves in a situation where they are facing a so-called catalytic
inquiry—that is, an inquiry which has become so independent and
influential that it can shape the public debate and recommend reforms and
changes which cannot be ignored. Such an outcome can come as quite a
surprise to those actors who appointed the inquiry merely as a means to
shift away some of the unwanted attention. These inquiries do not occur
that often. But if they do occur, they will have quite an impact on how the
accountability phase unfolds.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive picture of the
various roles inquiries can fulfil following crises so we can truly understand
how inquiries could affect the blame game. To achieve this, I will start by
listing the general reasons why actors establish inquiries in response to
crises followed by a description of the politically motivated reasons to
appoint an inquiry as actors are trying to manage the political fallout
following a crisis. Once I have done that, I will address the various ways in
which actors can influence inquiries in Sect. 3.2 whereas in Sect. 3.3 I will
describe in more detail what catalytic inquiries are.
3.1 Reasons to Appoint an Inquiry

A crisis can shake the public’s trust in government operations. After all,
would the chemical plant not have exploded if permits had been up-to-
date and inspections had taken place regularly? So why were the permits
out of date and why did inspections of the chemical plant fall short? And
was the disaster exacerbated by malfunctioning crisis communication
systems and confusion about who was supposed to do what in case of a
chemical explosion? If so, then multiple government organizations will be
facing intense public scrutiny in the media and political arena; trust and
confidence in government operations will decline and the legitimacy of
government organizations might even be at stake (Suchman 1995). An
3 INQUIRIES FOLLOWING CRISES 35
inquiry can help to understand what happened, show whether the disaster
was a one-off event or not, and provide recommendations to prevent a
recurrence. Appointing an inquiry can therefore be motivated by the wish
to restore the trust and confidence in and the legitimacy of government
(Gephart 1992; Weller 1994a; Woodhouse 1995; Brown 2000; Maclean
2001; Gilligan 2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006, 2007; Boudes and Laroche
2009; Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Holzman-Gazit 2016).
By investigating what happened, the inquiry will be able to come up
with recommendations that might help prevent a similar disaster in the
future (assuming that the recommendations will actually be implemented)
(Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Boin 2009). Learning from the events is
often cited as one of the main reasons to set up an inquiry (Howe 1999;
Maclean 2001; Hutter 1992; McConnell 2003; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006,
2007; Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Holzman-Gazit 2016).
The public not only demands to know what happened but also whether
someone was responsible for what happened. Depending on the inqui-
ry’s terms of reference, the inquiry will investigate if a person or organi-
zation was indeed responsible for what happened. As such, an inquiry can
be an “instrument of accountability” [italics added] (Sulitzeanu-Kenan
and Holzman-Gazit 2016, p. 4; Hutter 1992; Gilligan 2002; Brändström
and Kuipers 2003).
The inquiry’s hearings will allow the bereaved to tell their story, express
their grief, and give them the feeling of being heard. As such, it acts as a
“cathartic process of exorcising public grief” (Howe 1999, p. 296; Weller
1994a; Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Brändström 2016). The inquiry
thus helps to bring closure (Maclean 2001; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010).
The inquiry will also help to alleviate the public’s fears about what
caused the disaster and whether something like this could happen again
(Hutter 1992; Howe 1999; McConnell 2011; Gilligan 2002). There is a
danger, though, that the wish to reassure people can result in a report
which simplifies reality too much (Howe 1999) and which includes
“elaborating fantasies of omnipotence and control” (Boudes and Laroche
2009, p. 379).
Besides the abovementioned general reasons for setting up an inquiry
following a crisis, there are also reasons to establish an inquiry which focus
more on the management of the political fallout following a disastrous
event. It is important to keep in mind that once an event is over, the crisis
may not yet be over. In fact, mismanagement of the post-disaster situation
can result in a huge political fallout where actors have to resign because
they were not able to properly manage the accountability phase (Boin
et al. 2005; cf. McConnell 2003).
So how can appointing an inquiry help to manage the crisis manage-
ment process? Well, first of all, the very act of establishing an inquiry
allows actors to show the public that they are in control of the crisis man-
agement process. They are, after all, taking steps in response to the crisis
(Prasser 1994; McConnell 2003; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006).
Second, launching an inquiry will help to temporarily remove the issue
from the political debate. There are two arenas where this political debate
about the causes of and responsibility for the crisis is the most intense and
requires the response of actors involved: the political and media arenas (cf.
Brändström 2016). Depending on the type of crisis, where it happened,
and who was affected, the political arena could be, for example, the
municipal council or parliament (cf. McConnell 2010). Establishing an
inquiry helps to temporarily shift the problem away from the political
(Bulmer 1983; Prasser 1994; Woodhouse 1995; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006)
and media arenas as convention allows actors to not answer any questions
by parliament and the media until the inquiry has published its report.
After all, the inquiry should be able to do its job without any hindrance
(Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010).
Lastly, appointing an inquiry can help actors to stall for time (Simpson
1978; Stone 1994; Woodhouse 1995; Brändström and Kuipers 2003;
Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006). Since it could take inquiries a long time to do
their job—in fact, some inquiries take years before they can publish their
report (Rhodes 1975)—actors can hope that by the time the inquiry
finally does publish its report, media attention has shifted to other issues
(Prasser 1994; McConnell 2003). In the meantime, they do not have to
do anything to deal with the problem (Weller 1994a).
It cannot be stressed enough that actors need to realize that setting up
an inquiry does not necessarily result in less media attention and a decrease
in the level of public scrutiny (Sedley 1989; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2007;
Hood et al. 2009; Van Duin et al. 2013). Though tradition allows
politicians to get away with temporarily not answering any questions
(Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010), the media may
decide to keep the issue firmly on the public agenda by, for instance,
providing detailed descriptions of the inquiry’s proceedings till the inquiry
publishes its report. It therefore varies per case whether or not media
attention will dwindle following the appointment of an inquiry.
3.2 Influencing Inquiries

In order to make sure that the inquiry will publish a report which allows
actors to survive the accountability stage of the crisis management process,
some actors will try to influence the way in which the inquiry is set up
(Bovens et al. 2008; McConnell 2010). The first decision which needs to
be made is whether the inquiry should be an internal or an external one.
An example of an internal inquiry is a working group consisting of civil
servants working for the government agency which is facing public
scrutiny. An external inquiry is defined here as an inquiry by anyone not
working for the organization under fire. An external inquiry can thus still
be conducted by a government organization—including parliamentary
investigating committees—but also by non-government organizations
such as consultancy firms.
Besides determining whether the inquiry should be internal or external,
actors need to decide whether the inquiry should be public or not
(McConnell 2010). Public inquiries are often appointed following crises
(Gosnell 1934; Hutter 1992; Elliott and McGuinness 2002). Such a
public inquiry could take the form of Royal Commissions or parliamentary
inquiries. Oftentimes (part of) the inquiries’ proceedings—such as its
hearings—are in public. The assumption is that public hearings will help
to restore the public’s confidence as they can actually see and hear what
happens during the proceedings (Woodhouse 1995; Maclean 2001).
One needs to keep in mind, though, that not all public inquiries have
the same powers. Even though all public inquiries can request people to
come to the hearing and answer questions, only a few public inquiries have
the power to demand someone’s appearance and question them under
oath (Woodhouse 1995). Since powers vary per inquiry—and not all
actors want their inquiry to be (too) powerful—the decision to opt for
one type of inquiry instead of another will often be the outcome of political
compromise.
Actors’ influence on inquiries does not stop once a decision has been
reached on the type of inquiry which is going to be established. On the
contrary, actors still have various means at their disposal to influence the
outcome of the inquiry—one of which is the careful crafting of the terms
of reference. Basically, the terms of reference determine the scope of the
inquiry’s investigation by describing, for example, the issue, time frame,
and questions which the inquiry needs to address (Cartwright 1975).
Following an escape of two Category A prisoners from Brixton prison
(London, UK) in 1991, for instance, an inquiry was established headed by

HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Tumim. His terms of reference were
[t]o inquire into the circumstances of the escape of prisoners McAuley and
Quinlivan from HM Prison Brixton on Sunday 7 July, and in particular to
review the security arrangements for handling high risk prisoners in this
prison; to assess how those arrangements were operated on the day
concerned; and to make recommendations. (Home Office 1991, p. 3)
This inquiry was therefore very focussed in terms of location and time
period. In contrast, the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern
Ireland had a much broader scope as it “examine[d] if there were systemic
failings by institutions or the state in their duties towards those children in
their care between the years of 1922–1995” (Historical Institutional
Abuse Inquiry 2016).
By influencing the terms of reference, actors can steer the inquiry into
a certain direction, make sure that certain aspects are not investigated as
they fall outside the scope of the inquiry, and/or establish which procedures
the inquiry can use (Gosnell 1934; Rhodes 1975; Simpson 1978; Weller
1994a; Prasser 1994; Ransley 1994; Woodhouse 1995; McLean and
Johnes 2000; Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Gilligan 2002; Bovens et al.
2008; McConnell 2010; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010; cf. Stone 1994).1
Inquiries, however, will interpret these terms of references (Cartwright
1975). If one wants to make sure that that interpretation goes into the
right direction, one could use the installation speech, write a clarifying
letter, or attend one of the first meetings of the inquiry to point the inquiry
into the right direction (Cartwright 1975; Rhodes 1975).
Another way to influence the inquiry’s outcome is through the selec-
tion of its chair and members. One could, for instance, select a chair and
members who will be thinking along the same lines as those who appointed
them—resulting in a safe report (Cartwright 1975; Prasser 1994; Ransley
1994; Woodhouse 1995; Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Gilligan 2002; cf.
McConnell 2010). Or one could choose inappropriate members for the
inquiry (Prasser 1994; cf. Stone 1994) in the hopes of an inquiry imploding
or delivering a report which can be easily ignored.
Inquiries need money and other resources (such as administrative staff)
to do their job (Gilligan 2002). By limiting these resources, inquiries
1
Jenkins, S. (2002, 2 April). A tragedy of errors. The Times, Section News, p. 2.
could, for instance, be forced to work more quickly (and thus more
superficially) than they actually would like to (Prasser 1994; Woodhouse
1995; McConnell 2010; cf. Stone 1994).
A specific type of resource is time: inquiries need time to do their job.
Usually, those who appointed the inquiries will be the ones setting the
deadline. That means that another way in which the outcome of the
inquiry can be influenced is through limiting the time available to inquiries
to properly do their job (Chapman 1973; Rhodes 1975; Prasser 1994;
Stone 1994; McConnell 2010).
Lastly, one can affect the inquiry’s progress by housing the inquiry in a
volatile department. The idea being that the members of the inquiry will
somehow be drawn into the political bickering going on at the department,
leaving them with little time to do their job (Prasser 1994).
3.3 The Independent Streak of Public Inquiries

Public inquiries are thus never truly independent. Some authors go as far
as describing inquiries purely as instruments to legitimatize state actions
and existing policies (Gephart 1992; Boudes and Laroche 2009; Brown
2000, 2003, 2005). Other authors give a more nuanced picture of
inquiries on fact-finding missions thereby helping people to make sense of
and come to terms with what actually happened while these authors
simultaneously acknowledge that public inquiries operate within a political
context which affects both the inquiry and the implementation of its
recommendations (Gosnell 1934; Gilligan 2002; Elliott and McGuinness
2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010; Brändström 2016).
Even if no political members are appointed to the inquiry, the public
inquiry still remains well within the sphere of influence of those actors
who established the inquiry as these actors not only determine the terms
of reference, but also how many resources are at the inquiry’s disposal and
who its members will be. The political context within which public
inquiries operate can therefore not be underestimated (Woodhouse 1995;
Bovens et al. 2008).
The extent to which actors are actually able to influence the outcome of
the public inquiry varies and sometimes actors who appointed a public
inquiry hoping for one outcome end up with something completely
different (Rhodes 1975; Gilligan 2002). After all, once it has been
established, the inquiry’s chair and members will need to determine, for
instance, what the terms of reference actually mean, which witnesses will
be invited, and which parts of the proceedings will be public (Gosnell

1934; Cartwright 1975; Weller 1994a, 1994b). So in spite of the political
context within which the inquiry was set up and needs to operate, an
inquiry does have room to manoeuvre and in doing so, they can become
quite independent (McConnell 2010).
If such an inquiry is able to set the agenda by breaking the ice and pro-
moting policy changes hitherto seen as unacceptable, then these inquiries
are known as catalytic inquiries (Chapman 1973). Whether or not an
inquiry becomes a catalytic inquiry depends on various factors
(Resodihardjo 2006). First, the inquiry’s chair has a huge impact on the
way in which the inquiry is conducted and how the terms of reference are
going to be interpreted (Gosnell 1934; Rhodes 1975; Cartwright 1975;
Weller 1994b; Woodhouse 1995; Gilligan 2002). Second, the inquiry’s
standing is of importance. The higher its standing, the more difficult it
will be to oppose the inquiry’s recommendations. An inquiry’s standing is
affected by, for instance, the type of inquiry and its procedures. Just the
fact that an inquiry is a Royal Commission, for example, lends a certain
level of legitimacy to the inquiry thereby giving it more political clout
(Cartwright 1975; Gilligan 2002). But even if the inquiry is not a Royal
Commission or does not have special powers, it can still be held in high
regard by the public thanks to the inquiry’s use of procedures, particularly
those that lend an aura of independence to an inquiry (Sulitzeanu-Kenan
and Holzman-Gazit 2016; cf. Woodhouse 1995). Third, if the inquiry is
able to shape the debate and thus act as an interpretative authority, it will
have an enormous influence on how the issue is going to be solved. After
all, if the inquiry is able to determine what the problem definition is, then
that problem definition contains not only a definition of the problem and
its causes, but also its solutions (Stone 1994; Rochefort and Cobb 1994).
And fourth, the inquiry’s tactics play a role as well. Tactics include whether
or not the inquiry sets itself at a distance from the actor who established
the inquiry; if and how the media will be used to generate attention for the
investigation and report; and whether to interpret the terms of reference
broadly or not (Cartwright 1975; Rhodes 1975; Weller 1994a, 1994b;
Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Holzman-Gazit 2016). These factors can reinforce
one another. Interpreting the terms of reference broadly, for instance, so
that the inquiry looks at the underlying causes of a problem, could enhance
its standing. Though these factors can explain why one inquiry is more
influential than another, it is important to note that the inquiry’s
recommendations will not be accepted unless they are financially, politically,
and technically feasible as well as in line with existing government aims

(Gosnell 1934; Rhodes 1975).
Though catalytic inquiries are quite rare, they do exist. Consider, for
instance, the Woolf inquiry which investigated the worst prison riot in the
history of the Prison Service of England and Wales: the riot in Strangeways
Prison in Manchester. This riot started on 1 April 1990 and lasted for
25 days. During this time, riots and disturbances broke out in more than
20 prisons. The inquiry was able to gain the public’s trust thanks to,
amongst other things, its broad interpretation of its terms of reference
(Woolf opted to investigate the underlying causes of the prison riots and
not just the operational factors contributing to the riots) and its innovative
procedures (such as holding public seminars and hearing prisoners) which
ensured that the people involved felt heard. Consequently, the inquiry was
able to expand the public debate on prison riots from control and security
to the need to find a balance between justice (treating prisoners fairly and
humanely), security (locking prisoners up), and control (preventing
disturbances). In order to achieve that balance, the report includes 12
recommendations and 204 proposals ranging from ending slopping out
(the practice of prisoners emptying their chamber pot every morning) to
supporting better contact between prisoners and their families and
communities (Woolf 1991; Morgan 1992, 1997; Player and Jenkins 1994;
Resodihardjo 2009).
A more recent example of a catalytic inquiry is the O’Connor inquiry
which studied the contamination of drinking water with Escherichia coli
and Campylobacter jejuni in Walkerton, Ontario, Canada. The outbreak
happened in 2000 and resulted in seven deaths and 2300 sick people—on
a population of 4800. Again, an inquiry was able to shape the public
debate as the inquiry concluded that yes things had gone wrong at the
operational level, but these things could only have gone wrong thanks to
the Ontario government’s neo-liberalistic approach which had gone too
far. In the end, “[t]he Report forced government to re-regulate and
re-staff the Ministry of the Environment” (Snider 2004, p. 265). The
O’Connor inquiry was able to achieve this thanks to, for example, its
broad interpretation of its terms of reference (looking at the underlying
causes of the outbreak and not just at the mistakes made at the operational
level) while its procedures (including holding private and public hearings
in Walkerton and organizing expert meetings) bolstered the public’s con-
fidence in the inquiry (O’Connor 2002; Holme 2003; Snider 2004).
3.4 Conclusion
Though one can wonder about the extent to which any catalytic inquiry
will have a lasting impact—due to the difficulty of implementing policy
change let alone reform (cf. Hogwood and Gunn 1993; O’Toole 1997;
Pülzl and Treib 2007)—one should not underestimate the impact catalytic
inquiries can have on society. Catalytic inquiries can influence how the
problem is defined—and thus which solution is suitable (Rochefort and
Cobb 1994)—as well as influence the media and public agenda through
its proceedings and publications of (interim) reports—both of which will
draw the media’s attention and subsequently the public’s attention.
It is true that appointing an inquiry can help to temporarily remove an
issue from the political agenda. After all, actors can argue that answering
questions from politicians and the media could hinder the inquiry’s
investigation. Consequently, they will not be answering any questions
while the inquiry is doing its job (Bulmer 1983; Prasser 1994; Woodhouse
1995; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006, 2010; Elliott and McGuinness 2002).
But setting up an inquiry does not necessarily mean that there is no
attention whatsoever from the media and public to the inquiry’s
proceedings and outcomes. This not only holds true for catalytic inquiries
but also for non-catalytic inquiries—especially on slow news days (Sedley
1989; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2007; Hood et al. 2009; Van Duin et al. 2013).
Moreover, the non-catalytic inquiry’s report can still contain ammunition
that media and politicians can use to blame an actor for what happened.
In short, inquiries can have an impact on the way in which the blame
game evolves as well as its outcome. This impact will vary per blame game.
As you will see in the three blame game cases described in the next chapter,
the effect of an inquiry on the blame game ranged from almost none to
substantial. Actors who face blame therefore need to keep this possible
effect on the blame game in mind when deciding whether or not to
appoint an inquiry.
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CHAPTER 4
Three Festivals Gone Wrong
Now that we understand how blame games work and which roles inquiries
can play in the aftermath of a crisis, it is time to take a look at three blame
games to see how blame games work in reality. The three blame games
described in this chapter are the Sunset Grooves festival in Rotterdam, the
Netherlands (2009); the Love Parade in Duisburg, Germany (2010); and
the monster truck disaster in Haaksbergen, the Netherlands (2014).
In all three cases, festivals turned into disasters where people died and
got injured. The scale of the disasters varies, but in all cases the disasters
occurred at the municipal level and the mayors were one of the main
players in the blame game. Drawing on previous publications on these
cases (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, 2016, 2018) as well as the research
material gathered for each publication, I will describe the crisis and the
ensuing blame game as well as provide an explanation of how these blame
games evolved.
Please note that I do not pretend to write the definitive case descrip-
tions on these three cases because of the data used for this research and the
complexity of the cases. Regarding the former: because no interviews were
conducted for this research, information not available in public sources
(such as newspaper articles and minutes of meetings) is not included in
this chapter. Regarding the complexity of the cases: the cases are quite
complex, particularly the Love Parade case. This complexity makes it
impossible to mention everything that happened prior, during, and after
the disastrous events. For the sake of readability, I focused on information

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_4
that helps to provide readers with a good sense of what happened and
information that helps to understand how the blame game evolved.
4.1 Sunset Grooves Festival

On 22 August 2009, the Sunset Grooves festival was held on the beach of
Hoek van Holland (part of the municipality of Rotterdam). In an unprec-
edented show of violence, football hooligans attending the festival attacked
the police (Muller et al. 2009, p. 7; Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2010,
p. 124). In order to defend themselves, police officers fired 76 times. Of
the 76 shots fired, 16 were aimed at the limbs of rioters and 60 were warn-
ing shots. The gun usage was another unprecedented event in the
Netherlands (Muller et al. 2009, p. 7; Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2010,
pp. 9–10; Punch 2011, pp. 51–63).1 The riot resulted in 1 death and sev-
eral injured people—some of whom were injured quite severely (Muller
et al. 2009, p. 7). Following the riot, questions were raised about how this
could have happened. In the ensuing blame game, the focus was on the
mayor of Rotterdam (Aboutaleb) and the police chief (Meijboom). In the
end, the police chief resigned on 8 February 2010. Officially, his resigna-
tion had nothing to with the riot. In fact, the mayor made it clear that the
police chief resigned because changes were needed in the police force and
someone else should be in charge of the police force’s reorganization. The
reorganization, however, was a direct result of the riot since it was a means
to ensure that similar problems would not happen again. A connection can
therefore be made between the riot and the resignation.
4.1.1 The Festival
Prior to the festival, Rotterdam had been working on ways to promote
itself as the city where interesting festivities took place. These festivities
range from festivals to races. As a result of Rotterdam’s approach to festivi-
ties, the number of events in recent years had doubled “from approxi-
mately thirty to more than sixty” (Muller et al. 2009, p. 11). The city of
Rotterdam was not the only city within the municipality of Rotterdam
working on ways to draw more tourists. Hoek van Holland did as well.
1
Kotman, P. (2009, 24 August). Paniek en bloed op het strand; Uitgaansgeweld Strand
Hoek van Holland ‘oorlogsgebied’ tijdens strandfeest. NRC Handelsblad, Section
Binnenland, p. 3.
4 THREE FESTIVALS GONE WRONG 49
Hoek van Holland’s goal was to become the place where people would go
to if they wanted to attend beach events (Muller et al. 2009, p. 13). The
Sunset Grooves festival was part of this strategy.
This free open-air dance festival was held for the first time on Hoek van
Holland’s beach on 23 August 2008. Tridee—an experienced organizer—
organized this festival with the help of ISA—a security firm. They had
worked together many times before, but it was the first time they organized
such a festival in Hoek van Holland. The evaluation of the 2008 festival
was mostly positive—though the train operator (NS) pointed out that a
lot of people had been drunk and possibly drugged and that some people
had acted in a foolish and reckless manner. Based on the evaluation, a
limited number of improvements were recommended, including an
increase in the number of trains travelling to and from the beach and the
improvement of the terrain’s lighting (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 14–15).
In July 2009, the district chief of police wrote an internal memo in
which he expressed his concerns that Hoek van Holland’s goal of becoming
the place to be for beach events was more than Hoek van Holland could
handle. Considering the stark increase in the number of events and the
number of visitors, the police did not have enough people to prepare for
and deal with this increase (Muller et al. 2009, p. 15). Nevertheless, the
municipality and the fire department gave Tridee (who worked with ISA
again as well as a private medical company) the permits needed to organize
the 2009 festival (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 35, 41).
In the run up to the festival, actors’ expectations regarding the number
of festival goers varied. In its permit request, Tridee stated that no more
than 15,000 people would be present at the same time, with a maximum
of 20,000 during the whole time period. The municipality used the
expected 15,000 festival goers to process the permit request. Later on,
Tridee announced that it expected 28,000 visitors. The Safety Region’s
safety advice was, however, based on 25,000 visitors. Medical organizations
were also using the 25,000 while writing their safety advice. And even
though the police knew that the 2008 festival had attracted 35,000 visitors
and they expected 15,000–30,000 people to attend the 2009 festival
depending on the weather, the local police based their plan on the
assumption that only 15,000 visitors would attend. They thought that
would work since the 2008 local police plan had also been based on
15,000 festival goers and that plan had worked, even though more
people had attended than anticipated (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 26–27,
30, 33–34).
Prior to the festival, Tridee informed the municipality that following a

consultation with the police the number of security personnel present
would be less than originally planned: the number of traffic controllers
would decrease from 20 to 12 while the number of security officers would
decrease from 60 to 54 (Muller et al. 2009, p. 41). Moreover,
miscommunication about monitoring the number of visitors through the
usage of gates at the entrance, led to the Safety Region’s assumption that
the organizers would ensure that no more than the maximum number of
visitors would be allowed onto the terrain (Muller et al. 2009, p. 37). And
lastly, reliable information about the presence of hooligans and their intent
to use the festival to fight was only acted upon to some extent. Extra
police personnel (such as officers trained to spot hooligans) were deployed,
but there was no riot police at the festival and ISA refused to increase its
security personnel because dealing with hooligans was not part of their job
description, though ISA later promised to add two extra security officers
to their security team (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 50–54, 57–58).
Some of the people who arrived at the festival were already rowdy and/
or drunk while some hooligans made their presence clear from the start by
shouting that they were hooligans (Muller et al. 2009, p. 60). Hooligans—
including people whom the police consider to be hard core hooligans—
were also spotted in other areas inside as well as outside of the festival
terrain (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 58, 61). Additionally, approximately
35,000 people (Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2010, p. 103) attended the
festival which resulted in trains operating beyond capacity and roads
becoming inoperable due to the number of cars headed towards the festi-
val. A couple of incidents took place before the situation escalated. Because
of the continuing incidents, the nasty atmosphere, and the presence of
hooligans, more police officers were directed towards the festival terrain
though there was no request for riot police. The aggressive behaviour of
some of the people on the train resulted in the decision to stop transport-
ing people to the festival, though trains continued to operate to allow
festival goers to leave the festival area (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 59–68).
Around 23.30, two plain-clothed police officers walking on the festival
terrain found themselves surrounded by hooligans. The officers made it
clear that they were police officers and that the hooligans should step
back, but to no avail. The hooligans moved in on the officers and
threatened them. In response, a warning shot was fired—the effect of
which was short lived as the hooligans continued their threatening
behaviour. A second warning shot had no effect whatsoever. Two
additional police officers who came to the rescue were also cornered by
the hooligans. Together, the four officers moved slowly across the terrain
while facing an increasing number of hooligans. One of the four officers
was informed by a hooligan that the hooligans knew that there was no riot
police and that it was therefore better for the police officers to make
themselves scarce. In the meantime, a rescue operation had started and
other police officers were moving towards the four police officers. Those
reinforcements, however, were also attacked by hooligans (Muller et al.
2009, pp. 70–71). The newly arrived police officers decided to retreat
when hooligans started to count down to zero—a signal that the hooligans
were about to attack. Warning shots were fired while the police officers
backed away and moved towards the fences surrounding the festival
terrain. An emergency exit was used to leave the festival terrain, but the
hooligans were not deterred by the fences. They continued to follow the
police officers outside into the dark sand dunes while shouting threats and
throwing things (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 71–73). Meanwhile, the four
officers had been able to get away from the crowd. When these four
officers saw that their colleagues were under siege in the dunes, they
decided to help them. To ensure they would not get shot by friendly fire,
the four police officers took a roundabout route to get to their colleagues
(Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2010, pp. 39, 50). Together, the police
officers continued to retreat while fearing for their lives. When warning
shots were not heeded, the police officers started to shoot at the hooligans
(Muller et al. 2009, p. 73), thereby killing a 19-year-old man.2 In
accordance with their training, police officers aimed at the hooligans’
limbs (Punch 2011, pp. 51–63). Only when the mounted police arrived,
did the hooligans stop their attacks—though multiple charges from the
mounted police were needed before the hooligans finally stopped (Muller
et al. 2009, pp. 73–74). Though the riot had ended, incidents continued
to occur during the remainder of the night (Muller et al. 2009, pp. 75–76,
80–81, 83). Once the riot was over, the mayor, the public prosecutor, and
high ranking police officers were informed about what had happened. The
police chief, however, was only informed about the events the following
morning because he was on holiday. He returned on Tuesday (Muller
et al. 2009, pp. 77, 84).
2
Stille tocht politie blijft op gepaste afstand. (2009, 27 August). De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1.
In response to the events, and as part of standard-operational-

procedures, a special division of the police started an investigation into the
police officers who had used their gun during the riot; based on the
investigation, none of the police officers were prosecuted. Additionally, a
police team focused on finding the rioters. No rioters had been arrested
during or right after the riot. But in the end, this police team was able to
apprehend 56 suspects—all but one were convicted by the court (Politie
Rotterdam-Rijnmond 2010, pp. 114–115).3
4.1.2 The Blame Game

The morning after the festival, the mayor talked to the media about the
riot. He was appalled by what had happened, but did not address possible
causes of the riot or who the culprits were. Instead, he announced that a
thorough investigation would be held into the matter.4 He also announced
that free dance festivals which were potentially risky would no longer be
held in the municipality of Rotterdam in the next two years.5
On the evening of 26 August, a silent walk was held to commemorate
the 19-year old who had been killed during the riot. The mayor and police
chief did not attend this silent walk, though the mayor did visit the parents
(Aboutaleb 2009).6
The chair of one of the police unions was clear in his condemnation of
what had happened: more police officers should have been present at the
festival and the riot police should have been on standby. By not doing so,
the lives of the police officers at the festival had been endangered. The
absence of the riot police was particularly mindboggling considering the
fact that the police had known that hooligans would attend the festival.
3
Kogelregen op strand; Feyenoordfan Robby (19) doodgeschoten. ‘Drie debielen knalden
lukraak in het rond.’ (2009, 24 August). De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
4
Kotman, P. (2009, 24 August). Paniek en bloed op het strand; Uitgaansgeweld Strand
Hoek van Holland ‘oorlogsgebied’ tijdens strandfeest. NRC Handelsblad, Section
Binnenland, p. 3.
5
Janssen, C. (2009, 25 August). ‘Alleen politie schoot op strandfeest’; Ooggetuigen: het
schieten begon nadat ‘stillen’ waren herkend en in het nauw gedreven. De Volkskrant, Section
Binnenland, p. 3; R’dam verbiedt gratis dancefeesten. (2009, 25 August). NRC Handelsblad,
Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
6
Stille tocht politie blijft op gepaste afstand. (2009, 27 August). De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg, E. (2009, 31 August). ‘4, 3, 2, 1 … en dan
vallen ze politie aan’; Hooligans opereren in commandostructuur, weet burgemeester
Aboutaleb. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
The chair therefore wondered what had inspired this decision. Was it
budget cuts?7
Both the mayor and the police chief vehemently opposed the notion
that budget cuts had played a role in the decision not to deploy the riot
police. The police chief did acknowledge that an error had been made by
not having the riot police on standby. He therefore announced the
appointment of an inquiry into the riot. The inquiry would investigate, for
instance, the flow of communication as well as the absence of the
riot police.8
The inquiry, however, was chaired by a former district chief (and thus a
former subordinate of the police chief) who also happened to be a friend
of the police chief. It thus comes as no surprise that questions were raised
about the extent to which this inquiry was truly independent.9
From 27 August onwards, newspapers published articles on the police
chief’s internal letter to his employees. The letter had been leaked to the
press. In the letter, the police chief made it clear that riot police should
have been present at the festival and that he did not know why the riot
police was absent.10 De Telegraaf—a populist newspaper—was quite
damning in its reporting. “It is rare that a police chief makes it so clear that
he has failed. Under Aad Meijboom’s supervision, public safety in
Rotterdam has degenerated into one big mess—with the deadly chaos last
weekend as an (…) all-time low.”11
The police chief was not the only one under pressure; the mayor was
having a difficult time as well. In the Netherlands, the mayor is the one
who is responsible for local safety. It was therefore not surprising that
Aboutaleb would have to answer questions about the riot and the
7
Hoogstad, M. (2009, 26 August). ‘Door bezuinigingen te weinig agenten ingezet op
strand’; Voorzitter politievakbond verwijt Rotterdamse korpsleiding verkeerde keuzes bij
strandfeest Hoek van Holland. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3; De Graaf, P.
(2009, 27 August). Vakbonden: opheldering over toedracht dancefeest. De Volkskrant,
8
De Graaf, P. (2009, 27 August). Vakbonden: opheldering over toedracht dancefeest. De
Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Janssen, C. (2009, 28 August). Politie onderzoekt zelf
de rellen op het strand. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
9
Vriend politiechef onderzoekt stranddrama; ‘Ze wilden bloed.’ (2009, 28 August). De
Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; ‘Schouten moet weg als onderzoeksleider’; Agenten
vrezen escalatie. (2009, 29 August). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
10
Korpschef: wegblijven ME fout. (2009, 27 August). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1.
11
Puinhoop. (2009, 28 August). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
investigation into the riot.12 The municipal council, however, was also
displeased with the mayor’s recent letter on the events—which was deemed
to be unhelpful in understanding what had happened—and the mayor’s
decision to forbid free dance festivals for the next two years—which was
deemed to be an unhelpful kneejerk reaction. It was not just the opposition
parties who were making it clear that they were not happy with the riot
and the mayor’s response to the riot. The biggest municipal party
(Labour—which also happened to be the mayor’s party) was also displeased
with the mayor’s decision to cancel the free dance festivals.13
Another action from the mayor also drew criticism—though this time
from MPs. The mayor had suggested to change the football law—a law
which had already been approved by the House of Representatives but
which still needed to be approved by the Senate. According to the mayor,
it should become possible to arrest hooligans proactively. His reasoning
was that terrorists can be arrested because they are planning a terrorist
attack—you do not have to wait with their arrest till they have actually
committed a crime. Following that reasoning, the mayor wanted to change
the football law so that hooligans could be arrested for planning to commit
criminal acts like riots.14 The mayor’s recommendation, however, was met
with disdain by MPs because the new football law already criminalized
preparations to riot.15 The Minister of Justice’s press officer also concurred
that the new law would suffice.16 The press officers of the mayor and of the
Rotterdam Public Prosecution Office, however, disagreed. Particularly the
latter press officer raised questions about the extent to which this new law
12
‘Schouten moet weg als onderzoeksleider’; Agenten vrezen escalatie. (2009, 29 August).
De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
13
R’dam verbiedt gratis dancefeesten. (2009, 25 August). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoedeman, J., & Reijn, G. (2009, 28 August). Rotterdam valt over brief
Aboutaleb; dancefeest Raad leest te veel onduidelijkheden. De Volkskrant, Section
Binnenland, p. 3.
14
Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg, E. (2009, 31 August). ‘4, 3, 2, 1 … en dan vallen ze poli-
tie aan’; Hooligans opereren in commandostructuur, weet burgemeester Aboutaleb. NRC
Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg, E. (2009, 31 August).
Aboutaleb: stel voorbereiden van rellen strafbaar. NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina,
p. 1.
15
Wanders, J. (2009, 1 September). ‘Alles wat Aboutaleb wil, is al in de wet geregeld.’ De
Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
16
Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg, E. (2009, 31 August). Aboutaleb: stel voorbereiden van
rellen strafbaar. NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
could actually be applied because it would still remain quite difficult to

arrest hooligans based on the things they had said.17
On 2 September, MPs discussed the mayors’ role in ensuring local
safety in the Select Committee on the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Prior to that meeting, MPs made it clear that mayors already had ample
powers to deal with (the possibility of) civil unrest, but mayors were either
ignorant of those powers or too hesitant to use them. One possible way to
remedy this would be to offer additional training to mayors so they would
know which powers they have and when they can use these powers
(Tweede Kamer 2009a, 2009b).18
That evening, the mayor sent a letter to the municipal council. In the
letter, Aboutaleb explained that two quick scans had been made: one of
the permit granting process and the other of the police. The latter quick
scan was actually the investigation chaired by the former district chief.
Additionally, the mayor announced two new investigations. First, COT (a
crisis consultancy firm) would conduct an independent investigation into
the riot. And second, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
together with the mayors of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, and
Utrecht had given the order to study hooliganism and the increasing usage
of violence against, for instance, police officers and ambulance personnel
during large scale events (Aboutaleb 2009).
The quick scan of the permit procedure showed, amongst other things,
that not everyone involved in the permit procedure had taken the updated
number of attendants into account. The quick scan provided some
recommendations on how to prevent this in the future (Aboutaleb 2009).
The quick scan into the actions of the police showed, for instance, that the
communication system (C2000) had overloaded which had resulted in
gaps in the information flow. One of the quick scan’s conclusions was that
“the general commanding officer [algemeen commandant] had made mis-
takes” (Schouten 2009, p. 2). Based on that conclusion, the general com-
manding officer and the operational commanding officer were relieved
17
Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg, E. (2009, 31 August). Aboutaleb: stel voorbereiden van
rellen strafbaar. NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M., & Rosenberg,
E. (2009, 1 September). Ingrijpen lang voordat de eerste klap is uitgedeeld; Mooie wet,
maar bewijslast blijft het probleem. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
18
Burgemeester moet meer lef tonen; ‘Vooral die van de PvdA zijn veel te slap.’ (2009, 2
September). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 7.
from their duties (De Nederlandse Politiebond 2009).19 Yet again, this
action drew criticism as people wondered why the mayor (as well as the
police chief) remained in office. Pastors (a Leefbaar Rotterdam politician),
for instance, said that “the mayor should start acting firmly before passing
the buck to others.”20
Considering the criticism already expressed, it comes as no surprise that
the emergency council meeting on 3 September was not an easy ride for
the mayor. Leefbaar Rotterdam (a local populist opposition party) had
requested the emergency meeting and they made it clear that they were
not too happy about the performance of the mayor and the police. In fact,
Pastors gave the mayor a yellow card for his performance. Other parties
had questions as well. The Liberal party, for instance, questioned the
police’s preparation for this festival. A number of councillors expressed
their surprise that it took so long before the mayor was informed about
the riot while also questioning the mayor’s decision to prohibit free dance
festivals for the next two years. All parties agreed though that the hooligans
were to be blamed for what had happened. In the end, the councillors saw
no reason to fire the mayor. Having said that, the newspapers agreed that
the mayor was on shaky ground (Gemeente Rotterdam 2009a).21
The emergency council meeting also sparked a sub-blame game as
Pastors made a comment about Aboutaleb being the first Muslim mayor
in the Netherlands. A sub-blame game is a blame game spin-off which
starts when statements or actions regarding the original blame game result
in a new blame game. A couple of days after the meeting, Pastors
acknowledged that his remark about Aboutaleb being the first Muslim
19
Kop van lagere politiechef rolt na stranddrama; ‘Aboutaleb moet opstappen.’ (2009, 3
September). De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2009, 14 December).
‘Zulk geweld zag ik nooit eerder.’ De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
20
Hoogstad, M. (2009, 3 September). Politiekogel trof jongen op strandfeest; Leefbaar en
SP hekelen ‘paniekvoetbal’ Aboutaleb Uitgaansgeweld Fouten politie zetten debat in raad op
scherp; forse kritiek op Aboutaleb verwacht. NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1;
Kop van lagere politiechef rolt na stranddrama; ‘Aboutaleb moet opstappen.’ (2009, 3
September). De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Nordholt: Aboutaleb moet zelf opstap-
pen. (2009, 3 September). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Wanders, J. (2009, 14
December). ‘Zulk geweld zag ik nooit eerder.’ De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
21
Hoogstad, M. (2009, 4 September). Strandhooligans wekken woede raad Rotterdam.
NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Waarschuwing voor Aboutaleb; Robby door
politiekogel gedood. (2009, 4 September). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 9; Test voor
Aboutaleb; Commentaar. (2009, 4 September). De Volkskrant, Section Forum, p. 11.
mayor was “quite unfortunate.”22 Still, his remark did not sit well with
other councillors because linking the mayor’s performance to his (religious)
background was deemed unacceptable. In response to the emergency
debate, a number of local party leaders sent a letter to the councillors in
which they asked them to behave in a civilized manner.23
Meanwhile, a debate took place on C2000—the crisis management
communication system. Police officers had complained about the
malfunctioning communication system during the riot. This complaint
was not new: the system was infamous for becoming overloaded, not
having enough capacity, and not covering all areas in the country, thus
making it difficult for emergency responders to communicate during an
emergency. Earlier that year, the system had also malfunctioned during the
attack on the royal family in Apeldoorn and the crash of a Turkish Airlines
aeroplane near Schiphol airport. The Safety Region Rotterdam-Rijnmond’s
response to the complaints was also not new: you just have to correctly use
the communication system. Research, however, showed that some users
had never received a proper instruction on how to operate the system.
Their unfamiliarity with the system could result in communication
problems during emergency situations. Moreover, the Minster of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations did acknowledge that measures needed
to be taken to improve the communication system’s coverage; so she
introduced a set of measures to achieve that.24
Police unions were unhappy with the Public Prosecution Office’s
announcement that five police officers were suspects in the investigation.
Why were these police officers targeted while hooligans remained at large
and higher ranking people (like the police chief and the mayor) got away
scot-free? In response, the police chief made it clear that treating the police
22
Pastors: opmerking ‘minder gelukkig.’ (2009, 7 September). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Binnenland, p. 3.
23
Herderscheê, G. (2009, 7 September). Na de Brabanders en Zeeuwen kamen de Turken;
de volkrant op zondag verslag van 6 september. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 2;
Raad Rotterdam eist beter gedrag. (2009, 8 September). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Binnenland, p. 3.
24
Verlaan, J. (2009, 5 September). C2000 werkt niet – of toch fout gebruikt?; Onnodig
geklets belast zendmasten. NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; ‘De ramp C2000’;
ZEMBLA. (2009, 26 September). De Telegraaf, Section RTV_PROGRAMMA_ZON,
p. 14; ACP eist enquête over falen C2000; Helft agenten voelt zich onveilig. (2009, 27
September). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 2; Minister wil extra masten voor C2000;
Na falen communicatiesysteem. (2009, 19 November). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Binnenland, p. 2.
officers as suspects was a standard operating procedure following a police

shooting. The mayor supported this statement while acknowledging that
treating police officers as suspects might be difficult to understand for
citizens. Particularly because it was the hooligans who were to blame for
what had happened, not the police officers.25
From October onwards, the blame game started to dwindle and was
basically non-existent. Newspapers did publish a number of articles on the
topic in October and November. But these articles mainly focused on the
police’s progress in arresting suspects and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations’ decision to improve the C2000 communication
system.26
The reprieve ended with the publications of the COT report and the
report into the lawfulness of the shooting. The latter report was written by
the rijksrecherche (the State Detective Agency) and was published on 8
December 2009. The rijksrecherche’s investigation showed that the police
officers at the beach had acted in self-defence and not disproportionally—
the usage of their guns was therefore justified. Based on these findings, the
Public Prosecution’s Office decided not to prosecute the five suspected
police officers.27
On 9 December, the consultancy firm COT published its report on the
riot. COT’s investigation showed that grave errors had been made. COT,
however, did not put the blame on a single actor. Instead, COT basically
blamed everyone involved since everyone had done something wrong
either prior to and/or during the dance festival (Muller et al. 2009, p. 106).28
In response to the report, a number of councillors told the media that
it was time for the police chief to resign. After all, the biggest mistakes had
been made in the police organization. Moreover, the police chief’s
25
‘Hou politieleiding niet uit de wind’; Bonden bang dat ‘werkvloer’ schuld strandrellen
krijgt. (2009, 30 September). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 7; Wanders, J. (2009, 30
September). ‘Agent trekt niet zomaar zijn pistool.’ De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
26
Cf. Weer arrestaties voor strandrellen. (2009, 30 October). De Telegraaf, Section
Metropoolrotterdam, p. 31; Moeders geven zonen aan na tv-uitzending. (2009, 19
November). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 13; ‘C2000 binnen twee jaar beter.’
(2009, 19 November). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 13.
27
‘Politieoptreden dancefeest terecht.’ (2009, 9 December). De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1; Politie schoot terecht tijdens strandrellen; OM staakt vervolging agenten.
(2009, 9 December). De Telegraaf, Section Advertentie, p. 10.
28
Hoogstad, M. (2009, 9 December). Politie faalde volledig bij strandrel. NRC
Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M. (2009, 9 December). Wat bij strand-
feest fout kon gaan, ging ook fout; Rapport COT verwijt betrokkenen in Hoek van Holland
‘onvoldoende scherpte en alertheid.’ NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
response that “a captain should (…) remain on the bridge in times of bad
weather” was quickly rebutted by a councillor: “if your ship is about to
strand, then it is a good idea to give the helm to your first mate.”29
Interestingly, the very critical media and councillors made it clear that
the mayor was responsible for what happened in his municipality. Yet at
the same time, the fact that the mayor was recently appointed (he had
been in office for eight months when the riot took place) was also
frequently mentioned. In fact, one of the mayor’s fiercest opponents—
Pastors—was relatively mild when saying “It is quite a big deal to send a
mayor away after 11 months.”30 Because of his recent appointment, the
mayor had to deal with his predecessor’s legacy. Yet at the same time, his
recent appointment gave him the credibility to clean up the mess which
the COT report had exposed. In contrast, the media referred to the fact
that the police chief had been in office since 2001.31
The mayor and police chief made it clear they were not planning to
resign.32 In addition, the mayor announced that he accepted all the COT’s
recommendations.33 Police officers, however, were not pleased with the
way in which the mayor and police chief had responded to the COT
report. Police officers felt that the mayor and police chief had just shrugged
off the COT’s criticism of their own actions during and after the riot.34
29
Wanders, J. (2009, 10 December). Positie van korpschef Rotterdam onder druk; ‘Politie
faalde bij Hoek van Holland.’ De Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
30
R’dam verbijsterd door falen van politie. (2009, 10 December). NRC Handelsblad,
Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Politiek geschokt door onderzoeksconclusies; ‘Dit kan niet zonder
personele gevolgen blijven’ Grote zorgen om veiligheid in de stad. (2009, 10 December). De
Telegraaf, Section Metropoolrotterdam, p. 37; Wanders, J. (2009, 10 December). Positie
van korpschef Rotterdam onder druk; ‘Politie faalde bij Hoek van Holland.’ De Volkskrant,
31
Onveilig Rotterdam; Commentaar. (2009, 10 December). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Opinie, p. 7; Opstappen. (2009, 11 December). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3;
Wanders, J. (2009, 12 December). Houding politietop R’dam voedt onrust. De Volkskrant,
Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M., & Derix, S. (2009, 16 December). Aboutaleb moet
spitsroeden lopen; Burgemeester worstelt met erfenis van zijn voorganger Opstelten. NRC
Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
32
Onveilig Rotterdam; Commentaar. (2009, 10 December). NRC Handelsblad, Section
Opinie, p. 7.
33
34
Wanders, J. (2009, 12 December). Houding politietop R’dam voedt onrust. De
Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
Meanwhile, a new but linked sub-blame game developed. As stated

earlier, a sub-blame game happens when a statement or action regarding
the original blame game results in a new blame game. This new sub-blame
game was definitely a spin-off from the original blame game as it started
with a remark about the police officers’ actions during the riot. In contrast
to the previous sub-blame game, this new sub-blame game was not the
result of any action or statement by one of the actors in the original blame
game. Instead, it was a statement by the National Ombudsman which
started this round of blame. Moreover, what is also interesting is that this
blame game was played parallel to the original blame game. So, two blame
games were played at the same time and in different venues (municipal
council vs. the Council of Ministers and Parliament), though they shared
one arena: the media.
The new blame game started with a speech by the National Ombudsman
in which he questioned the actions police officers had taken during riot.
“The police (…) used excessive [force] to defend themselves. The lives of
those present were in jeopardy.”35 The Vice-Prime Minister labelled the
Ombudsman’s statement as “irresponsible and inappropriate.”36 And even
if the Ombudsman had used a different intonation—the Ombudsman
claimed he had asked questions and had not made statements—the Vice-
Prime Minister remained adamant the Ombudsman had gone too far with
his uninformed statements. The Ombudsman had jeopardized his own
credibility because these statements would make it impossible for him to
objectively investigate the police officers’ actions if a citizen would file a
complaint—after all, he had already said that police officers had used
excessive force. Moreover, since the Ombudsman can only investigate
cases when all court options have been exhausted, the Ombudsman had
spoken out of turn as people could still go to court in order to force the
Public Prosecutor’s Office to revise its decision not to prosecute the police
officers (Neelen et al. 2003).37
The National Ombudsman replied that he had been misunderstood. In
his speech, he had reflected on the state’s duty to protect the human rights
35
Bos, W. (2009, 14 December). Nationale ombudsman blijf bij je leest. De Volkskrant,
Section Forum, p. 9.
36
Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Kabinet ‘geschokt’ door kritische noot van ombuds-
man. (2009, 12 December). NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
37
Bos, W. (2009, 14 December). Nationale ombudsman blijf bij je leest. De Volkskrant,
Section Forum, p. 9.
of citizens. One of the questions he posed during his speech was whether
citizens’ human rights had been violated during the Hoek van Holland
riot. He was therefore not commenting on the individual actions of the
police officers, but raising questions about the actions of the state
as a whole.38
The fallout following the speech was pretty big because the Vice-Prime
Minister, numerous MPs, and the Public Prosecution’s Office were not
amused by the Ombudsman’s actions. According to the Public
Prosecution’s Office, the uninformed Ombudsman had “spoken out of
turn” thereby “undermining his own authority.”39 In order to manage the
fallout, the Ombudsman met with the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations (who would then discuss the issue in the Council of
Ministers) and the Select Committee on the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.40
Not everyone, however, appreciated the Ombudsman’s criticasters.
The Vice-Prime Minister’s actions were deemed inappropriate by some
MPs, while one newspaper concluded that these actions had actually
undermined the Ombudsman’s authority.41
In the meantime, the original blame game continued as one of the
police unions—in response to a new letter from the police chief—made it
clear that there was not a lot of support for the police chief.42 The police
chief, however, still refused to resign because it would be better if he
stayed on during these times of difficulty. This time he explicitly stated
that he left it up to the mayor to decide whether or not he could stay.
Moreover, the police chief was aware of the unrest within his organization—
an unrest fuelled by police officers’ suspicions that their jobs were on the
line while the higher ups remained safe. In response to this unrest, the
38
Kist, R., & Rijlaarsdam, B. (2009, 15 December). ‘Kabinet moet mij tegemoet komen.’
NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
39
Wanders, J. (2009, 14 December). ‘Zulk geweld zag ik nooit eerder.’ De Volkskrant,
40
Kist, R., & Rijlaarsdam, B. (2009, 15 December). ‘Kabinet moet mij tegemoet komen.’
NRC Handelsblad, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
41
Kwalijk. (2009, 16 December). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Kist, R., &
Rijlaarsdam, B. (2009, 21 December). Zachtmoedig en vasthoudend de bureaucratie te lijf;
Nationale Ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer stuit als luis in de pels steeds vaker op weer-
stand in de politiek. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
42
Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Bond: Klein draagvlak Meijboom. (2009, 13
December). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
police chief made it clear that he would resign if one of his officers would
get fired because of the riot.43
This latter response, however, did not sit well with the mayor. In a let-
ter to the police chief, the annoyed mayor emphasized that it was the
mayor who would decide who could stay and who could go—not the
police chief. In addition, the mayor repeated the police chief’s assignment
to come up with a plan to reorganize the police in order to avoid a
recurrence of the mistakes made prior to and during the festival.44
The media were quick to point out the tension between the police chief
and the mayor. The pressure on the mayor and police chief further
increased as councillors were preparing for the municipal council meeting
where they would discuss the COT report. A number of councillors told
the media that they seriously questioned whether the police chief could
stay. They continued to be a bit more lenient towards the mayor—after all,
he had only been in office for eight months when the riot happened,
though they did expect the mayor to reflect on his own mistakes and show
some leadership when he reorganized the police.45
On 17 December 2009, the municipal council meeting took place. As
expected, a number of councillors wanted to replace the police chief. The
mayor, however, refused to do so. Instead, he repeated that he had asked
the police chief to write a reorganization plan to improve the police force
and that the police chief had to come up with an assessment of how
everyone had performed prior and during the riots and whether—based
on that assessment—measures needed to be taken against some of the
police officers and the police chief. To avoid any hint of subjectivity—as
the police chief would have to assess his own performance as well—an
external legal advisor was hired. The mayor emphasized that he did not
want to act rashly when it came to making changes within the police force
(Gemeente Rotterdam 2009b, 2009c). “Short-term measures, which look
tough and might look decisive, can cause immense damage to the police
43
Wanders, J. (2009, 14 December). Korpschef legt lot in handen van Aboutaleb. De
Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2009, 14 December). ‘Zulk geweld zag ik
nooit eerder.’ De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
44
Korpschef bungelt; Aboutaleb eist maatregelen na strandrellen. (2009, 16 December).
De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M. (2009, 16 December). Aboutaleb zet
korpschef op zijn plaats; Over affaire Hoek van Holland. NRC Handelsblad, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1.
45
Raad wil van Meijboom af. (2009, 17 December). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland,
p. 3.
force. That is why it is very important [to act] carefully when taking tough
measures. This is about people and what is more this is about my people”
(Gemeente Rotterdam 2009c, p. 1127).
Not pleased with the mayor’s response, Leefbaar Rotterdam submitted
a motion of no confidence against the mayor—a motion which was
rejected by all the other parties. Leefbaar Rotterdam and the socialist party
also submitted a motion to replace the police chief—this motion was
rejected as well (Gemeente Rotterdam 2009c).46 There was, however,
consensus between the parties that the mayor should have called a meeting
the night of the riot (between the mayor, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and
the vice-police chief) instead of the following morning. But the councillors’
responses to that mistake were mild compared to the way in which they
talked about the police chief. Basically, they said that the mayor had made
“a rookie mistake.”47
During the debate, the mayor apologized to the police officers who had
been on the beach without proper support. He also announced that he
would “take full responsibility for the events.”48 In the end, the majority
of councillors concluded that the mayor had sufficiently reflected on his
own performance and that he had explicitly accepted full responsibility for
what had happened. That combined with his recent appointment allowed
the mayor to stay on. Councillors, however, did emphasize that the mayor
was expected to take the lead when it came to reorganizing the police
force. After all, no one wanted a repeat performance.49
On 11 January 2010, the police chief presented his plan to reorganize
the police to the mayor.50 Before the mayor could respond to that plan,
however, a new hooligan-related incident took place. This time, hooligans
wanted to celebrate the New Year. Unfortunately, the party got out of
46
Leefbaar Rotterdam dient motie van wantrouwen in tegen Aboutaleb. (2009, 18
December). De Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2009, 18 December).
Pastors snijdt zichzelf behoorlijk in de vingers. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
47
Raad wenst vertrek korpschef Meijboom. (2009, 17 December). NRC Handelsbad,
Section Binnenland, p. 3; Aboutaleb en zijn korpschef blijven; Burgemeester Rotterdam
overleeft motie van wantrouwen. (2009, 18 December). De Telegraaf, Section Advertentie,
p. 8.
48
Wanders, J. (2009, 18 December). Pastors snijdt zichzelf behoorlijk in de vingers. De
Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
49
Aboutaleb en zijn korpschef blijven; Burgemeester Rotterdam overleeft motie van wan-
trouwen. (2009, 18 December). De Telegraaf, Section Advertentie, p. 8.
50
Advies Meijboom naar burgemeester. (2010, 12 January). De Telegraaf, Section
Metropoolrotterdam, p. 29.
hand and a pub was severely damaged. The incident happened on a

Saturday, but the mayor was only informed about it on Monday—
something he did not appreciate since he had made it clear following the
riot that he wanted to be informed on time and not hours or even days
after a major incident. Because of this delay in communication, the police
director responsible resigned (RTV Rijnmond 2010).51
In the meantime, various meetings took place between the mayor, the
police chief, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and representatives of the
Regional College.52 The Regional College consists of “all the mayors of all
the municipalities in the judicial district, the Chief Public Prosecutor of
the judicial district, and the police chief” (Nederlands Genootschap van
Burgemeesters n.d., pp. 1–2). Based on these discussions, the police chief
decided to resign on 8 February 2010—though he would remain in office
till his successor was appointed.53
The media were quick to make the connection between the riot and the
police chief’s resignation. The mayor, however, did not publicly make
that connection. Instead, he said that the police chief’s resignation was
“inevitable” because “[c]hanges are needed in the police force. Under
Meijboom’s leadership, a great contribution to the improvement of safety
was made. He deserves to be (…) honoured and recognized for his
work. However, these are different times, different problems, and
different people.”54
51
Aboutaleb zet directeur politie aan de kant. (2010, 22 January). De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2010, 22 January). Aboutaleb: zwijgen is een doodzonde;
Informatie over nieuwjaarsborrel Feyenoord-hooligans bereikt Rotterdamse burgemeester
veel te laat. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
52
Wanders, J. (2010, 9 February). Korpschef Rotterdam stapt op; Aad Meijboom vertrekt
na ‘indringende gesprekken’ met burgemeester Aboutaleb. De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1.
53
Wanders, J. (2010, 9 February). Korpschef Rotterdam stapt op; Aad Meijboom vertrekt
na ‘indringende gesprekken’ met burgemeester Aboutaleb. De Volkskrant, Section
Voorpagina, p. 1.
54
Korpschef alsnog weg om rellen; Goede opvolger nodig. (2010, 9 February). De
Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2010, 9 February). Meijboom bungelde al
twee maanden; Positie korpschef Rotterdam werd onhoudbaar na publicatie onderzoeksrap-
port Hoek van Holland. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Hoogstad, M. (2010, 9
February). Aboutaleb beslissend bij vertrek korpschef; Irritaties tussen stadhuis en politie
liepen op. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
4.1.3 The Blame Game Explained

The blame game focused on two actors: the police chief and the mayor.
Their blame levels and blame responses are depicted in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2.
A 0 in the figure means that the actor was not mentioned in the media that
day; a 1 means that the actor was mentioned in the media but either no
blame or no blame response was described; a 2 describes the lowest level
of blame and the most defensive blame response an actor can use. Further
increasing numbers indicate higher blame levels and more accommodative
blame responses.
According to the theory, actors’ blame responses should match the
level of blame they are facing. So if they are facing high levels of blame,
their response should be more accommodative than when they are facing
lower levels of blame. The idea is that if the blame response matches the
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
24/8/2009
14/9/2009
5/10/2009
26/10/2009
16/11/2009
7/12/2009
28/12/2009
18/1/2010
8/2/2010
police chief blame

police chief response
Fig. 4.1 Police chief’s blame and blame response from 24 August 2009 to 28
February 2010 (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, p. 237). Reprinted from the original
journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012) with permission of John Wiley & Sons
0
24/8/2009
7/9/2009
21/9/2009
5/10/2009
19/10/2009
2/11/2009
16/11/2009
30/11/2009
14/12/2009
28/12/2009
11/1/2010
25/1/2010
8/2/2010
22/2/2010
mayor blame
mayor response
Fig. 4.2 Mayor’s blame and blame response from 24 August 2009 to 28
February 2010 (Resodihardjo et al. 2012, p. 237). Reprinted from the original
journal (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012) with permission of John Wiley & Sons
level of blame then the level of blame will decrease. Previous research has
shown that in this case the mayor and police chief did become more
accommodative when they were facing higher levels of blame. This
response, however, did not result in a decrease in blame levels. On the
contrary, their blame levels increased (Resodihardjo et al. 2012).
To understand the outcome of the blame game, I will address to what
extent blame shifting occurred, the role that inquiries played in this
process, and the position of the police chief in the blame game.
4.1.3.1 Shifting Blame

From the start, hooligans were seen as the culprits—they were to be
blamed for what had happened. As the blame game progressed, however,
more and more questions were raised about the continued employment of
the police chief considering the mistakes made prior and during the riot.
Although the police chief was on holiday during the riot, he was formally
responsible for what happened in his police force and basically, the actors
argued that the police chief should acknowledge his responsibility by
resigning. In comparison, actors were more lenient towards the mayor;
the exception being Leefbaar Rotterdam which remained quite negative
towards the mayor. That does not mean that the mayor had it easy. In fact,
when writing about the emergency council meeting, the media described
the mayor as being on shaky ground. In the end, however, the media and
councillors took the recent appointment of the mayor into account while
continuing their critical stance towards the police chief. Consequently,
there was no shifting of blame from one actor to another, but instead
there was a spreading of the blame as hooligans, mayor, and police chief
were blamed for what had happened—though actors did become more
lenient towards the mayor over time.
4.1.3.2 The Use of Inquiries

In Chap. 3, I described inquiries and the role they play in blame games. In
this case, numerous investigations were held following the riot. There was,
for instance, not only an investigation into the lawfulness of the shooting,
but also into the extent to which police officers involved had acted in a
culpable manner. However, the number of inquiries that fit the description
provided in Chap. 3 is limited to two: the inquiry by Schouten (the former
subordinate of the police chief) and by the COT.
There was some confusion as to what extent the first inquiry was an
independent inquiry considering the fact that Schouten—a friend and
former subordinate of the police chief—chaired this inquiry. Questions
were thus raised in the media about the inquiry and some media implied
that the inquiry was a whitewash.55 However, a more nuanced picture
came to the fore during the municipal council meeting where the inquiry’s
report was discussed. A Labour councillor, for instance, praised the
thorough investigation into the police’s own performance. Nevertheless,
the inquiry was perceived as a preliminary investigation and there was a
strong and shared wish for a truly independent inquiry. This inquiry could
then help them to draw proper conclusions about what had happened
(Gemeente Rotterdam 2009a).
55
Vriend politiechef onderzoekt stranddrama; ‘Ze wilden bloed.’ (2009, 28 August). De
Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; ‘Schouten moet weg als onderzoeksleider’; Agenten
vrezen escalatie. (2009, 29 August). De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
Councillors considered the second inquiry’s report to be a thorough

and critical report. Any hesitancy (particularly from Leefbaar Rotterdam)
about the COT conducting this inquiry had disappeared upon the report’s
publication. Even Leefbaar Rotterdam acknowledged that the report was
very critical and clear (Gemeente Rotterdam 2009b). Throughout the
council meeting, councillors used the report to ask the mayor numerous
questions (Gemeente Rotterdam 2009b, 2009c).
4.1.3.3 The Police Chief

Officially, the police chief did not resign over the riot. As the mayor
pointed out, the police chief had resigned because someone new should
be in charge when the police reorganization was implemented. It is not
surprising, however, that the media were quick to draw a connection
between the riot and the resignation, considering the fact that the police
reorganization was a direct result of the riot.56
The most obvious reason why the mayor could stay and the police chief
could go is length of tenure. The police chief had been in office since
2001. In contrast, the mayor had only been in office for eight months
when the festival took place. Councillors could therefore not only forgive
the mayor for the mistake he had made by not holding a meeting between
the mayor, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the vice-police chief the night
of the riot, but they could also state that his recent appointment gave the
mayor the credibility needed to reform the police force.57
56
Korpschef alsnog weg om rellen; Goede opvolger nodig. (2010, 9 February). De
Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Wanders, J. (2010, 9 February). Meijboom bungelde al
twee maanden; Positie korpschef Rotterdam werd onhoudbaar na publicatie onderzoeksrap-
port Hoek van Holland. De Volkskrant, Section Binnenland, p. 3; Hoogstad, M. (2010, 9
February). Aboutaleb beslissend bij vertrek korpschef; Irritaties tussen stadhuis en politie
liepen op. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
57
Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Politiek geschokt door onderzoeksconclusies; ‘Dit kan niet zonder
personele gevolgen blijven’ Grote zorgen om veiligheid in de stad. (2009, 10 December). De
Telegraaf, Section Metropoolrotterdam, p. 37; Wanders, J. (2009, 10 December). Positie
van korpschef Rotterdam onder druk; ‘Politie faalde bij Hoek van Holland.’ De Volkskrant,
Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Onveilig Rotterdam; Commentaar. (2009, 10 December). NRC
Handelsblad, Section Opinie, p. 7; Opstappen. (2009, 11 December). De Telegraaf, Section
Binnenland, p. 3; Wanders, J. (2009, 12 December). Houding politietop R’dam voedt
onrust. De Volkskrant, Section Voorpagina, p. 1; Hoogstad, M., & Derix, S. (2009, 16
December). Aboutaleb moet spitsroeden lopen; Burgemeester worstelt met erfenis van zijn
voorganger Opstelten. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 3.
Besides length of tenure, there are two other factors which could have
played a role in the blame game though no conclusions can be drawn
based on the data used in this research. Nevertheless, considering the fact
that these factors could have played a role and are thus of interest not only
to practitioners but also to academics, it is worth mentioning them. The
two factors are: inward orientation and the hierarchical relationship
between the mayor and police chief.
There is a distinct difference between the mayor’s and police chief’s
response to blame. Not only had the mayor two settings at his disposal
where he could reply to the blame (the media and the municipal council
meetings), he also frequently used these settings to respond to blame. The
police chief, in contrast, only had one setting at his disposal (the media)
and rarely used that setting to respond to blame, though the police chief
did communicate with his organization about what had happened. All in
all, that means that the police chief’s response was mostly inwardly
oriented and he rarely responded to blame. One could wonder to what
extent the police chief’s mostly inwardly oriented response made him an
easy target for those who were seeking someone to blame. Would he have
received less blame if he had defended himself publicly?
One can also wonder where his inward orientation came from. In a
number of newspaper articles, the media made it clear that this was just the
way in which the police chief acted. He was always reticent.58 It is, however,
also possible that the police chief’s reticence was partly influenced by his
function and the relationship between the police chief and the mayor. This
brings us to the second factor worth considering: the hierarchical
relationship between mayors and police chiefs.
The Dutch police force is divided into regions. The mayor of the largest
municipality in a region is the korpsbeheerder. At the time of the riot, that
meant that the mayor of the largest municipality was, amongst other
things, responsible for the management of the police force. The police
chief was there to support and assist the mayor while also being in charge
58
Hoogstad, M., Rosenberg, E. (2010, 11 January). Filosoof die de kunst van de kalmte
verstaat; Rotterdamse korpschef Aad Meijboom staat onder druk na de strandrellen in Hoek
van Holland. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 2; Wanders, J. (2010, 19 January).
Liever het fileermees dan de moker; dinsdagprofiel Aad Meijboom. De Volkskrant, Section
Binnenland, p. 2; Hoogstad, M. (2010, 9 February). Aboutaleb beslissend bij vertrek korp-
schef; Irritaties tussen stadhuis en politie liepen op. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland,
p. 3.
of the day-to-day management of the police force.59 To complicate matters,

police chiefs are hired and fired by the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations—though the Ministry of Justice has to agree with
these decisions.60 Moreover, the Public Prosecution’s Office has a say in
which criminal cases the police are investigating (Neelen et al. 2003). The
hierarchical relationships surrounding the police chief are thus complex,
but as the korpsbeheerder the mayor of Rotterdam was one of the police
chief’s ‘bosses.’ One could therefore wonder to what extent the hierarchi-
cal relationship affected the police chief’s actions—not only in general but
also in particular when the relationship between the mayor and police
chief became strained. Did the hierarchical relationship, for instance, affect
the leeway he had to respond to blame?
It is possible that these two factors influenced the blame game though
more research is needed to investigate this. Unfortunately, the two other
cases in this book only focus on the mayor as the police chiefs did not play
a role in these two blame games. In fact, the reason why the police chief
did not play a role in the next blame game was because he was asked to
resign prior to the festival because his critique that the festival was unsafe
was not appreciated by politicians.
4.2 Love Parade

On 24 July 2010, the dance festival Love Parade was held in Duisburg in
the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany. There were two
entry/exit points to the festival terrain. The smaller one was largely
ignored by the festival goers who mainly used the main entry tunnel.61
This tunnel was also used as an exit. As these two streams of people met in
the tunnel, a blockade was created inside the tunnel.62 The situation was
59
Note that this has changed with the introduction of a new police law. Article 24 of the
1993 police law stated that the korpsbeheerder is the one responsible for the management
(beheer) of the police force whereas article 27 of the 2012 police law states that it is the police
chief who is responsible for the police force’s management.
60
Note that this has changed as well with the introduction of a new police law and the
establishment of a new ministry: the Ministry of Justice and Security. Article 25 of the 1993
police law has been replaced with article 28 of the 2012 police law.
61
Isringhaus, J. (2010, 3 August). Krisen-Manager ohne Funkgerät. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
62
Kahlweit, C. (2010, 26 July). Tunnel ins Verderben. Die Veranstalter führten alle
Teilnehmer über einen einzigen Zugang auf das Gelände – ein tödlicher Fehler. Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
further exacerbated as more people entered the tunnel while those exiting
onto the festival terrain did not always disperse themselves but stayed close
to the exit of the tunnel to watch the trucks with DJs—thereby further
hindering the flow of people. Problems with the police communication
and the mobile phone network did not help the situation.63 Some parts of
the tunnel were located in the open air—which allowed a number of
people to climb out of the tunnel using stairs, lamp posts, and bill boards.
Some of these people, however, fell down while trying to escape.64 As
more and more people entered the tunnel, people were crushed. As a
result, 21 people suffocated and more than 650 people were injured—
some of them severely.65 A severe blame game evolved focusing on the
mayor (Sauerland), the municipality of Duisburg, the organizers of the
event (Lopavent) and its director (Schaller), and the police (for which the
NRW Minister for Interior and Local Government Jäger (SPD) was
responsible).66 Blame was shifted back and forth with the mayor refusing
to resign because that would cost him his pension. Since a majority of the
municipal council supported the mayor, he could stay despite the anger of
the citizens of Duisburg who wanted him gone. Following the introduction
of a new NRW state law which allowed citizens to call for a referendum to
vote on the mayor and whether he could stay, the citizens of Duisburg
literally voted the mayor out of office on 12 February 2012. Moreover,
the Public Prosecution’s Office decided to prosecute 10 people for
negligent manslaughter. The suspects were four Lopavent employees and
six civil servants working for the municipality of Duisburg (BBC 2014,
2017). At the time of writing, the outcome of the court procedures was
not known.
63
Duesseldorf; Burger, R. (2010, 5 September). Die selbsternannten Unschuldigen. Sechs
Wochen nach der Love Parade geht das gegenseitige Schuldzuweisen weiter. Frankfurter
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, no. 35, p. 7.
64
19 Tote – die Suche nach den Schuldigen. Duisburger Loveparade endet in einer
Katastrophe / Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt wegen fahrlässiger Tötung. (2010, 26 July).
Süddeutsche Zeitung.
65
Diehl, J., Gebauer, M. (2016, 5 April). Gericht lehnt Prozess um Love-Parade-
Katastrophe ab. Spiegel online. Retrieved October 30, 2018 from http://www.spiegel.de/
panorama/justiz/duisburg-landgericht-lehnt-love-parade-prozess-ab-a-1085446.html.
66
Sauerland is the Oberbürgermeister of Duisburg.
4.2.1 The Festival
In 2010, the European Capital of Culture consisted of 53 cities in the
Ruhr area of Germany. These cities wanted to host various cultural events
in order to show that the area had improved in recent years. One of these
events was the Love Parade in Duisburg.67 The Love Parade was an elec-
tronic dance festival where trucks with DJs would travel through the
streets or on a large terrain. Originally, the Love Parade was held in Berlin.
But the festival got bigger and bigger while the negative side effects of the
festival—such as people urinating in the park thereby destroying plants—
increased as well. Berlin therefore decided to stop hosting the event. From
2007, the festival was held in the Ruhr area. In 2009, however, the festival
was cancelled because of safety concerns.68
Safety concerns were also raised about the location in Duisburg. The
fire department, for instance, had expressed their safety concerns in an
internal memo. The chair of the police union was against holding the Love
Parade in Duisburg. Moreover, in February 2009, the Duisburg police
chief Cebin (Der Duisburger Polizeipräsident or chief superintendent)
expressed serious safety concerns and made it clear that he did not want
the festival to go through. CDU state and federal MP Mahlberg was
“worried that Duisburg’s image would be damaged by the police chief’s
statements.”69 So he wrote a letter to then NRW Minister for the Interior
Wolf demanding the police chief’s resignation. Wolf did not fire the police
chief. Instead, he ensured that the police chief retired in May 2010.70
67
Dörries, B., Arntz, J., Gorkow, A. (2010, 26 July). Kein Weg zurück. Süddeutsche
Zeitung; Rossmann, A. (2010, 27 July). Metropole war Traum. Nach dem Inferno von
Duisburg: Das Ruhrgebiet muss umdenken. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, no.
171, p. 31.
68
Dörries, B., Arntz, J., Gorkow, A. (2010, 26 July). Kein Weg zurück. Süddeutsche
Zeitung; Reisener, T., Stock, J. (2010, 28 July). Protokolle zeigen, wie Loveparade geplant
wurde: Öffentlich äußerte in der Sitzung niemand Bedenken. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
69
Reisener, T., Stock, J. (2010, 28 July). Protokolle zeigen, wie Loveparade geplant
70
20 Tote, 510 Verletzte. Duisburger Oberbürgermeister lehnt Rücktritt ab. (2010, 27
July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B., Kahlweit, C., Leyendecker, H., Gorkow, A., Richter,
N. (2010, 27 July). Fluchtwege. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Reisener, T., Stock, J. (2010, 28 July).
Protokolle zeigen, wie Loveparade geplant wurde: Öffentlich äußerte in der Sitzung nie-
mand Bedenken. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Warum wurden Warnungen ignoriert? (2010,
28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2010, 11 August). Chronik des tödlichen
Versagens. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
The safety concerns were overruled as holding the festival in Duisburg

was deemed too important. One FDP member argued that “because of
image reasons, the city can hardly afford to cancel the Love Parade in the
year of European Capital of Culture.”71 Kraft (who would later become
Prime Minister of NRW as well as the president of the Bundesrat) said that
“[t]he Love Parade belongs in the Ruhr area.”72As Gorny (one of the
artistic directors of the Ruhr.2010) put it “[a] real metropolis is able” to
do this,73 whereas a representative of the Ruhr.2010 company was in
favour of continuing with the festival considering the festival’s
international appeal.74
Besides safety concerns, there were also financial concerns because
Duisburg was not a wealthy city and could not carry the financial burden
of the festival. The decision was therefore made that Duisburg would not
finance the festival.75 Looking back, a councillor commented that the
municipal council’s discussions on the festival were focused on the financial
aspects of the event—not the safety aspects. There was a feeling that the
organizers “knew what they were doing.”76
Lopavent (the organization which organized the festival), however,
failed to hand in all the paperwork for the permit. In fact, safety plans were
incomplete and Lopavent failed to remedy this even though the
municipality asked for more documents to support the permit request.
Because of that, the municipality could not give the permit. When there
was still no permit five days before the festival, Lopavent’s lawyer demanded
71
Dörries, B. (2010, 11 August). Chronik des tödlichen Versagens. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
72
Dörries, B. (2010, 11 August). Chronik des tödlichen Versagens. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
See also Presseportal. (2010, 24 January). WAZ: Kraft fordert Hilfe vom Land für die
Loveparade. Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved October 31, 2018 from https://
www.presseportal.de/pm/55903/1549552.
73
See also Gerrits, W. (2010, 23 January). Loveparade-Absage wäre laut Gorny eine Blamage.
WAZ. Retrieved October 31, 2018 from https://www.waz.de/staedte/duisburg/lovepa-
rade-absage-waere-laut-gorny-eine-blamage-id2425980.html.
74
75
Zeitung.
76
Dörries, B., Kahlweit, C., Leyendecker, H., Gorkow, A., Richter, N. (2010, 27 July).
Fluchtwege. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Reisener, T., Stock, J. (2010, 28 July). Protokolle zeigen,
wie Loveparade geplant wurde: Öffentlich äußerte in der Sitzung niemand Bedenken.
Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
a permit considering the real and perceived costs at stake for Lopavent, the
municipality, and the Ruhr area if the festival would not go through. In
response, a permit was given even though safety plans were still
incomplete.77 On 21 July, Lopavent received the permit to hold the Love
Parade on 24 July. In the permit, the maximum number of people who
could attend the festival was set at 250,000—the number of people which
Lopavent claimed would be on the festival terrain at the same time.78
However, just before the disaster happened, Lopavent claimed that 1.4
million people were attending the festival. In the end, the police estimated
that around 350,000 people had attended the festival.79
As stated earlier, the main entrance to the festival terrain also func-
tioned as an exit.80 The idea was for people who entered the festival area
to be lured away from the tunnel by the trucks with DJs. This, however,
did not work. As the number of people increased within the tunnel, the
police took action to control the flow of people, but to no avail. The situ-
ation was further complicated by the fact that police communication did
not run smoothly. The police officer working with the crowd manager, for
instance, experienced problems when trying to contact his fellow police
officers. Communication was further hindered by the fact that not only
the mobile phone network but also the radio device telephone network
malfunctioned.81 In the end, 21 people died and more than 650 people
were (severely) injured.82
77
78
wurde: Öffentlich äußerte in der Sitzung niemand Bedenken. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
79
80
Zeitung.
81
Burger, R. (2010, 5 September). Die selbsternannten Unschuldigen. Sechs Wochen
nach der Love Parade geht das gegenseitige Schuldzuweisen weiter. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, no. 35, p. 7; Isringhaus, J. (2010, 3 August). Krisen-Manager ohne
Funkgerät. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
82
Diehl, J., Gebauer, M. (2016, 5 April). Gericht lehnt Prozess um Love-Parade-
Katastrophe ab. Spiegel online. Retrieved from October 30, 2018 http://www.spiegel.de/
panorama/justiz/duisburg-landgericht-lehnt-love-parade-prozess-ab-a-1085446.html.

On 25 July, the director of Lopavent (Schaller) announced that the festival
would no longer be organized.83 On that same day, the mayor held a press
conference. The mayor made it clear that “the question why this happened
can only be answered by those organizations [investigating the disaster].
(…) premature blaming would neither help the families nor the victims.”84
On the evening of the festival, the mayor had defended the safety plan.
One of the mayor’s statements, however, resulted in upheaval because he
said that people had tried to escape from the tunnel, but some of them had
fallen down into the crowd. Consequently, panic had broken out. This
statement was perceived as an implicit blaming of the festivalgoers—
something which resulted in indignation, particularly on the internet.85
While there was public outrage about what had happened, the Public
Prosecutor’s Office started an investigation in order to determine what
had happened and who was responsible. Cologne’s police force conducted
the investigation because Duisburg’s police force might have been affected
by the events and/or might not be able to objectively conduct the
investigation.86
Meanwhile, questions were raised in the media about the choices made
prior to the festival as safety concerns had been brushed off.87 Actors
involved in the organization and management of the festival were also
criticized for not wanting to be held accountable. From the start, actors
shifted blame away and were hesitant to answer the media’s questions
since the Public Prosecution’s Office was still conducting its investigation.88
The public’s outrage was focused on mayor Sauerland (CDU). They
wanted him to take responsibility and resign—a call which was supported
83
19 Tote – die Suche nach den Schuldigen. Duisburger Loveparade endet in einer
Katastrophe / Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt wegen fahrlässiger Tötung. (2010, 26 July).
84
Die Suche nach den Schuldigen. (2010, 26 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
85
86
Süddeutsche Zeitung (2010, 27 July). 20 Tote, 510 Verletzte. Duisburger
Oberbürgermeister lehnt Rücktritt ab. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
87
“Was war Ursache – wo liegt die Schuld?” (2010, 26 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
Haben die Behörden leichtfertig genehmigt? (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
88
Dörries, B., Kahlweit, C., Leyendecker, H., Gorkow, A., and Richter, N. (2010, 27
July). Fluchtwege. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Gösmann, S. (2010, 26 July). Trauerspiel nach der
Tragödie. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
by various actors, including the police union, someone from the mayor’s
own political party, and representatives of other parties.89 The citizens of
Duisburg were so angry with their mayor that he needed to hire protection
for himself and move his family away from Duisburg.90
The mayor made it clear that he was sorry for what had happened, but
that he was not going to resign.91 He stated that he had not been involved
in organizing the Love Parade; that he had merely executed the unanimous
decision by the municipal council to hold the festival in Duisburg; and
that he would help in any way he could with the investigation.92 Besides,
he could not resign because that would negatively affect his pension.93
The municipal council could dismiss him though, but that would require
a two-thirds majority.94
The mayor was not the only one who was blamed for what had hap-
pened. The municipality,95 Lopavent and its owner Schaller, and the police
were also blamed. Their blame responses included blaming each other.96
The municipality faced fierce criticism because it had known about
89
Von Kittlitz, A. (2010, 1 August). Duisburg sehen und sterben. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, no. 30, p. 19; Von Stock, J. (2010, 28 July). Polizei im Visier der Ermittler.
Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Loveparade II: VWG kritisieren Sauerland. (2010, 29 July).
Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Loveparade III: Linke verurteilen Morddrohung. (2010, 29
July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
90
Streichan, A., Henle, C., and Chudobba, H. (2010, 27 July). Trauernde am Unglücksort.
91
Dörries, B., Kahlweit, C., Leyendecker, H., Gorkow, A., and Richter, N. (2010, 27
July). Fluchtwege. Süddeutsche Zeitung; 20 Tote, 510 Verletzte. Duisburger
Oberbürgermeister lehnt Rücktritt ab. (2010, 27 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
92
Duisburgs OB: Mir sind keine Warnungen bekannt. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf; 20 Tote, 510 Verletzte. Duisburger Oberbürgermeister lehnt Rücktritt ab.
(2010, 27 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; 19 Tote – die Suche nach den Schuldigen. Duisburger
Loveparade endet in einer Katastrophe / Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt wegen fahrlässiger
Tötung. (2010, 26 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
93
Dörries, B. (2010, 30 July). Im Aufruhrgebiet. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
94
Duisburgs OB: Mir sind keine Warnungen bekannt. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
95
Please note that the newspaper articles talk about die Stadt Duisburg being responsible
for what happened. This has been translated as municipality.
96
Loveparade: Stadt beschuldigt Polizei. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
Please note that a limited number of newspaper articles also refer to internal strife as Dressler
(Planungsdezernent) criticizes the municipality/mayor. Cf. Reisener, T. (2010, 7 August).
Duisburg: SPD-Dezernent greift OB Sauerland an. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
the safety problems.97 Questions were raised about the permit procedure
and who had forced whom to agree to the festival.98 According to
Dressler99 (Planungsdezernent), it looked as if the disaster had been the
result of “a communication breakdown between the police and the
organizer.”100 Moreover, his department had only approved the plans for
the festival area and not the access roads. Consequently, the police, fire
department, and Lopavent were responsible for what had happened, not
his department.101
In contrast, NRW Prime Minister Kraft (SPD) claimed that safety was
the responsibility of the municipality since the municipality had granted
the permit.102 NRW regulations, however, clearly stated that it is the
festival organizer (Lopavent in this case) who is responsible for the safety
at festivals.103
Lopavent faced a lot of criticism because of its low safety budget and its
failure to adhere to its own safety plan by hiring, for instance, less crowd
control units than promised.104 Lopavent was also accused of ignoring
safety warnings, using incorrect estimated numbers for its safety plan and
97
Loveparade-Tragödie: Das Protokoll des Versagens. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf; Haben die Behörden leichtfertig genehmigt? (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
98
Haben die Behörden leichtfertig genehmigt? (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Die
Tragödie von Duisburg. (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Trauerfeier ohne Duisburgs
OB. (2010, 28 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Duisburger Verhältnisse. (2010, 29 July).
Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2010, 9 August). “Nicht geeignet für eine Genehmigung.”
99
Note that dezernent can be translated in various ways. Translations include councillor,
head of a department, and deputy mayor. To avoid incorrect translations, I will not translate
the function. In addition, please note Dressler’s function is also described as Baudezernent
(e.g. Duisburger wollen OB stürzen. (2010, 30 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf). Moreover,
Rabe’s function is described as Sicherheitsdezernent (e.g. Dörries, B. (2010, 11 August).
Chronik des tödlichen Versagens. Süddeutsche Zeitung) and as Ordnungsdezernent (e.g.
Dörries, B. (2010, 9 August). Nicht geeignet für eine Genehmigung. Süddeutsche Zeitung);
For clarity’s sake, I will use Planungsdezernent to describe Dressler’s function and
Sicherheitsdezernent to describe Rabe’s function.
100
Loveparade: Stadt beschuldigt Polizei. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
101
102
103
Die Tragödie von Duisburg. (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
104
Das Ausmaβ der Katastrophe. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Zu wenig
Ordner am Tunnel. (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2010, 28 July).
Heftige Vorwürfe gegen Veranstalter der Loveparade. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Isringhaus, J.
and Reisener, T. (2010, 29 July). Der Veranstalter. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
safety budget, and putting pressure on the municipality to get the

permit.105 Moreover, the fact that Lopavent had insured the festival for a
relatively low amount (7.5 million euro) also raised questions, particularly
because this could potentially affect the victims if they had to wait before
receiving any compensation for what had happened.106
Lopavent’s owner Schaller responded to the blame by blaming the
police. According to Schaller, the police had mismanaged the influx of
party goers into the tunnels thereby contributing to the safety problems.107
Deputy police chief Von Schmeling, however, argued that police officers
had done their best to help the festival goers.108 NRW Minister for the
Interior Jäger (responsible for the police) also defended the police. He
stated that enough police officers had been present, that the rescue plans
had worked, and that Lopavent was responsible for the safety on the
festival terrain.109 The police union pointed out that police officers had
expressed their safety concerns prior to the festival, but that their concerns
had been ignored and that the police did not have the authority to prohibit
festivals.110 Other police officers pointed out that officially they could have
asked the Ministry for the Interior to cancel the festival, but they had felt
that the situation was not dire enough to use this option.111 The NRW
government did say that they wanted to take on more responsibility when
large scale events were organized.112
105
Dörries, B. (2010, 28 July). Heftige Vorwürfe gegen Veranstalter der Loveparade.
Süddeutsche Zeitung; Das Ausmaβ der Katastrophe. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf; Das Geschäft mit der Loveparade. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
106
Das Ausmaβ der Katastrophe. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Opfer
brauchen einen Anwalt. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
107
Das Geschäft mit der Loveparade. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Hat die
Polizei Fehler gemacht? (2010, 28 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Trauerfeier ohne Duisburgs
OB. (2010, 28 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
108
109
“Es war genug Polizei im Einsatz.” (2010, 26 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
Dörries, B., Leyendecker, H., Richter, N. (2010, 31 July). Das Auge des Gesetzes.
110
Loveparade-Tragödie: Das Protokoll des Versagens. (2010, 27 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
111
Dörries, B., Leyendecker, H., Richter, N. (2010, 31 July). Das Auge des Gesetzes.
112
Trauerfeier ohne Duisburgs OB. (2010, 28 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Kessler,
M., Reisener, T., and Voogt, G. (2010, 29 July). “Ich war stundenlang in gröβter Sorge.”
As time progressed, more information about what had happened and

what had gone wrong became public. The NRW police’s preliminary
report into the festival heavily criticized Lopavent’s implementation of its
own safety plan. Lopavent’s inability to steer the flow of party goers in the
right direction had resulted in the disaster.113 At the presentation of this
report, Minister for the Interior Jäger made it clear that the municipality
was also to be blamed for what had happened because of the municipality’s
lack of cooperation with security forces. The municipality, for instance,
had only notified the police about the definite approval of the festival on
the day of the event itself.114 A reporter, however, pointed out that in a
press release published just a day before the event, Minister Jäger had been
very enthusiastic about the safety plan—a press release which was
subsequently removed from the website.115
In response, Schaller said that he would “carry the consequences.”116
He had also provided the Public Prosecutor’s Office material relevant for
the investigation (video footage and computer server). At the same time,
however, he continued to defend himself and his organization by, for
instance, claiming that all safety concerns had been dealt with prior to the
event and by pointing out the police’s actions which had contributed to
the disaster.117
Meanwhile, more and more people demanded the mayor’s resignation.
On 29 July 2010, citizens demonstrated in front of the city hall to demand
Sauerland’s resignation. Afraid that the issue would not get the attention
it deserved in the municipal council, Duisburg’s citizens were also
collecting signatures for a citizen’s initiative to remove not just the mayor
but also Rabe (Sicherheitsdezernent) and Dressler (Planungsdezernent). To
force the municipal council to discuss the initiative, the citizens needed to
collect 8000 signatures in 14 days.118 Other actors calling for the mayor’s
113
Richter, N. and Dörries, B. (2010, 29 July). Auβer Kontrolle. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Dörries, B. (2010, 29 July). “Das Sicherheitssystem hat versagt.” Süddeutsche Zeitung.
114
Dörries, B. (2010, 29 July). “Das Sicherheitssystem hat versagt.” Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Duisburger Verhältnisse. (2010, 29 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
115
Gösmann, S. (2010, 31 July). Lehren aus der Katastrophe. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
116
Deininger, R. (2010, 29 July). Rainer Schaller. Veranstalter der Loveparade und ein
Mann des Risikos. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
117
Deininger, R. (2010, 29 July). Rainer Schaller. Veranstalter der Loveparade und ein
Mann des Risikos. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Isringhaus, J. and Reisener, T. (2010, 29 July). Der
Veranstalter. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
118
Chudobba, H. (2010, 30 July). Burger sollen entscheiden. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
Duisburger wollen OB stürzen. (2010, 30 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
resignation included municipal council parties Die Linke and FDP as well
as a CDU Bundestag member (Bosbach). NRW Minister for the Interior
Jäger (SPD), NRW Prime Minister Kraft (SPD), and Federal President
Wulff (CDU) were hinting at Sauerland’s resignation.119
Sauerland refused to resign because resigning would result in forever
being blamed for the deceased and losing his pension.120 Also, he wanted
to wait before taking political responsibility until there was more
information on the extent to which the municipality was responsible for
what had happened.121 There were stories floating around in the media
that within CDU circles it was known that Sauerland was willing to resign
if the municipal council would remove him from office since his pension
would be safe then.122 Yet these stories also seemed to indicate that the
mayor had then changed his mind.123 The municipal council, however,
was unable to address the topic of Sauerland’s resignation because of the
summer holiday.124 Die Linke was the first municipal council party to
announce that they would use the first council meeting following the
summer holiday (4 October 2010) to put Sauerland’s resignation to a
vote.125 Die Linke was soon supported by the FDP and SPD—with the
FDP suggesting an earlier council meeting to be held on 30 August instead
of 4 October.126
On 29 July, Sauerland offered a written apology to his civil servants for
the incorrect information he had given on the day of the festival. In his
letter, he also referred to an interview in which he had said that he had not
119
Duisburger wollen OB stürzen. (2010, 30 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Bosbach
legt Duisburgs Stadtchef Rücktritt nahe. (2010, 31 July). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf;
Dörries, B. (2010, 2 August). Wulff legt Duisburgs OB den Rücktritt nahe. Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
120
Duisburger Verhältnisse. (2010, 29 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2010, 30
July). Im Aufruhrgebiet. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
121
Reisener, T. and Stock, J. (2010, 3 August). “Das Unglück wird mich nicht mehr loslas-
sen.” Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
122
Zeitung; Sauerland bereit zum Rückzug. (2010, 31 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
123
Dörries, B. (2010, 2 August). Da wächst kein Gras drüber. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
124
Dörries, B. (2010, 30 July). Im Aufruhrgebiet. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2010,
3 August). Gnadenfrist für Adolf Sauerland. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
125
Reisener, T. and Stock, J. (2010, 29 July). OB Sauerland noch bis Oktober im Amt?
Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Duisburger wollen OB stürzen. (2010, 30 July). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
126
signed the permit. This interview made it seem as if the mayor was trying
to put some distance between himself and his civil servants. In the letter,
he made it clear that that had not been his intention; his intention had
been to explain to the journalist how a municipality works. He also wrote
that he would resign if needed, but that he would not resign now because
he “wanted to avoid that [his] resignation at this particular time would
amount to an [early condemnation] of the administration which had
[contributed] to the preparation for the Love Parade in a highly dedicated
[manner]. I cannot and will not allow that.”127
The responses to the letter were negative—both from actors working
within and outside of the municipality. People working at city hall, for
instance, thought “that the letter (…) had made the situation worse”
whereas Bundestag member Pflug (SPD) stated that “[t]he letter should
have been sent much sooner. [And that the mayor’s] announcement that
[he] would face the consequences, came too late.”128
A memorial service was held a week after the disaster on 31 July 2010.
The service was attended by Federal President Wulff, NRW Prime Minister
Kraft, Bundestag President Lammert, and Chancellor Merkel. Mayor
Sauerland and organizer Schaller, however, were absent as “[t]hey did not
want to provoke the surviving dependents with their presence.”129 NRW
Prime Minister Kraft understood Sauerland’s decision not to attend since
he “and his family had been threatened” and because people should be
able to mourn the deceased “in quiet and with dignity.”130
Following Sauerland’s claim that resigning would negatively affect his
pension, a debate ensued as even government lawyers could not agree on
how Sauerland’s resignation would affect his pension. From this debate, it
became clear that if Sauerland was voted out of office, he could keep his
pension. But if he resigned, he would (partially or completely—depending
127
Schwerdtfeger, C. and Stock, J. (2010, 30 July). Sauerlands Brief empört Mitarbeiter.
128
Schwerdtfeger, C. and Stock, J. (2010, 30 July). Sauerlands Brief empört Mitarbeiter.
129
Zeitung; Schwerdtfeger, C., Klucken, P., and Stock, J. (2010, 2 August). “Die Loveparade
wurde zum Totentanz.” Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
130
Kessler, M., Reisener, T., and Voogt, G. (2010, 29 July). “Ich war stundenlang in
gröβter Sorge.” Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
on who was asked in interviews) lose his pension.131 NRW Minister for the
Interior Jäger announced that the law would be changed so that if mayors
were to resign in the future, then they would keep their pension.132
At city hall, the idea seemed to have taken root that the mayor wanted
to be voted out of office so he would not lose his pension.133 In fact, on 2
August 2010, Sauerland published a personal statement in which he
acknowledged “full responsibility (…)—personally and politically” for
what had happened, but that “I ask for [people’s] understanding, that I
first have to have more clarity about [if and to what extent] the municipality
was responsible, before I take political responsibility for this.”134 He
therefore asked the NRW state parliament to appoint a parliamentary
inquiry into the events to determine “to what extent the municipality had
made mistakes and whether there was knowledge that third parties had
violated the city’s permit specifications.”135 Moreover, he would await the
outcome of the municipal council’s vote on whether or not he could stay.136
Political parties’ response to the mayor’s statement was mixed. At the
NRW state level, the Grünen chairman’s response, for instance, was quite
negative because the mayor was seen as avoiding responsibility by calling
for an inquiry, whereas the CDU chairman’s response was more positive.137
Having said that, there was a shared understanding between the CDU,
FDP, and the Grünen, that a parliamentary inquiry might be needed. At
the local level, the CDU supported their own mayor, including his request
for a parliamentary inquiry.138 The CDU also declared that they would
vote in favour of the mayor, unless there was substantial evidence against
131
Bielicki, J. and Dörries, B. (2010, 4 August). Duisburger CDU stellt sich hinter
Sauerland. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
132
Reisener, T. and Voogt, G. (2010, 5 August). Loveparade: Land will neue Standards für
Ordner. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Esslinger, D. (2010, 2 August). Unfriede per Gesetz.
133
Dörries, B. (2010, 2 August). Da wächst kein Gras drüber. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
134
135
Reisener, T., Stock, J., and Voogt, G. (2010, 3 August). OB Sauerland wartet auf
Abwahl. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
136
137
Reisener, T., Stock, J., and Voogt, G. (2010, 3 August). OB Sauerland wartet auf
Abwahl. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
138
Reisener, T., Stock, J., and Voogt, G. (2010, 4 August). Duisburgs CDU will OB nicht
abwählen. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
the mayor.139 In contrast, the SPD, FDP, and Die Linke, made it clear that
they would vote against the mayor.140
If a vote were to be held, the voting procedure would be as follows: A
two-thirds majority needs to vote against the mayor. Once that is achieved,
citizens need to vote against the mayor as well. A mayor can opt to forego
the citizen vote. If a mayor chooses this option, then they are automatically
removed from office.141 However, considering the fact that a two-thirds
majority is needed in the municipal council to vote the mayor out of office,
the CDU would effectively block the attempt to remove Sauerland from
office because they held 25 of the 74 seats in the municipal council.142
In order to support the surviving relatives, Federal President Wulff rec-
ommended the appointment of an Ombudsman to represent their inter-
ests as well as the creation of a financial support fund for them.143 In early
August 2010, an Ombudsman was appointed for the victims and bereaved
of the Love Parade. Financial funds were set up by the NRW state govern-
ment and by Schaller and his insurance company.144 Surviving relatives
could also use a state fund to pay for the funeral costs.145 Considering the
fact that the Love Parade was only insured for 7.5 million euros, politi-
cians were contemplating setting a minimum on the amount of money
that needs to be insured for such events.146 Moreover, Minister for the
Interior Jäger issued stricter safety standards and procedures for major
public events.147
139
Dörries, B. (2010, 3 August). Gnadenfrist für Adolf Sauerland. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Bielicki, J. and Dörries, B. (2010, 4 August). Duisburger CDU stellt sich hinter Sauerland.
140
sen.” Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Duisburger wollen OB stürzen. (2010, 30 July). Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
141
Dörries, B. (2010, 3 August). Gnadenfrist für Adolf Sauerland. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
142
Bielicki, J. and Dörries, B. (2010, 4 August). Duisburger CDU stellt sich hinter
Sauerland. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Stock, J. (2010, 4 August). Duisburger CDU stellt sich vor
Sauerland. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
143
Stock, J. and Voogt, G. (2010, 2 August). Wulff legt Duisburgs OB Rücktritt nahe.
Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Dörries, B. (2010, 2 August). Wulff legt Duisburgs OB den
Rücktritt nahe. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
144
Dörries, B. (2010, 6 August). Stiller Vermittler. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
145
Ordner. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
146
Dörries, B. (2010, 6 August). Stiller Vermittler. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
147
Ordner. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf; Isringhaus, J. and Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 18 August).
Nach Loveparade: NRW erlässt strengere Regeln. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
The municipality of Duisburg had asked external lawyers to help inves-

tigate what had happened. On 3 August 2010, an interim report was pub-
lished and sent to the Ministry for the Interior as well as the Public
Prosecutor’s Office. The findings indicated that no evidence had been
found “that the municipality had made mistakes when planning and
approving the event” and that “third parties might not have adhered to
the municipality’s requirements and regulations.”148 Moreover, as soon as
people set foot on the festival terrain, their safety was the organizer’s
responsibility—not the municipality’s.149
Meanwhile, new information about the event came to the fore.
Newspapers wrote about Lopavent’s crowd manager who had realized at
approximately 15.00 that access to the festival terrain was blocked and
that there were too many people in the tunnel. Prior to the festival, a
strategy on how to deal with such a situation had been created. However,
it took a while before this strategy could be used because the police officer
who was seated next to the crowd manager in a container could not
contact the policy by radio. According to the crowd manager, the reason
why the police officer was unable to do so was because the police officer
did not carry his radio. The fact that the mobile phone network had also
broken down, did not help matters.150 The police union’s chair responded
that it was “inconceivable” that the police officer did not have his radio
with him, though the chair did point out that it was well known that older
radios did not always work properly in tunnels.151 Whatever caused the
inability to communicate, the result was that it took 30 minutes before the
crowd manager’s request reached the police and was processed and acted
upon by the officer in charge. However, radio interference hampered this
process even further. As a result, the west tunnel was only closed off by
police officers forming a chain at 15.45. Police officers, however, had to
allow an ambulance to enter the tunnel and people followed the ambulance
towards the terrain. These people came across another police chain. At the
148

Chudobba, H. (2010, 4 August). Ein Schritt zur Aufklärung. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
149
Reisener, T. (2010, 5 August). Der Zwischenbericht der Stadt Duisburg. Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
150
Duesseldorf.
151
Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 10 August). Loveparade: Neue Hinweise auf schwere Polizei-
Fehler. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
other side of the police chain were people leaving the festival. As the
pressure became too much, the police could no longer hold the chain. As
a result, the two streams of people collided and people were crushed to
death. The media noted that it was unclear who was in control: the police
or Lopavent. Lopavent’s crowd manager claimed that the police had been
in control because they had taken over the situation at 16.00. The police,
however, said that they had merely responded to Lopavent’s request for
help—the crowd manager had thus remained responsible.152 The crowd
manager did acknowledge that he “should have pointed out the problems
more urgently.”153
On 4 August 2010, the NRW Committee on Internal Affairs
(Innenausschuss) met—even though the state parliament was on recess—
to discuss the Love parade. Normally, the committee of the newly elected
state parliament would convene for the first time in September. However,
the committee convened early in order to enable NRW Minister for the
Interior Jäger to give an update on the investigation into the Love
Parade.154 During the meeting, the police’s performance was discussed
and references were made to the municipality’s interim report
(Innenausschuss 2010a). Jäger refused to let the police be used “as a
scapegoat for the mistakes and omissions of others.”155 He added that “it
was unrealistic ‘to expect a [perfect police performance] when the
organizer’s safety plans’ had collapsed.”156
On 9 August 2010, the Süddeutsche Zeitung published an article on the
documents pertaining to the permit procedure for the Love Parade. From
one of those documents, dated 14 June, it became clear that information
needed for the permit (such as a safety plan) was still lacking. Another
document showed that Rabe (Sicherheitsdezernent) had said in a meeting
that the NRW Prime Minister at that time had stated that “the Love
152
Duesseldorf.
153
Reisener, T. and Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 9 August). Erstes Schuldbekenntnis nach
Loveparade-Unglück. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
154
Yetims trauriger Einstand. (2010, 5 August). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
155
156
Parade ought to take place in Duisburg. A cancellation could only happen

if there were serious safety concerns.”157
In order to help the victims and the surviving relatives, the municipality
gave 500,000 euros to the insurance company’s emergency fund. By
giving the money to the insurance company, the municipality wanted to
help people without interfering with the investigation or acknowledging
any responsibility.158
Numerous demonstrations were held, varying from people who
expressed their wish to erect a Love Parade monument (19 August 2010),
people who wanted Sauerland to resign (21 and 28 August), and left-wing
activists who held a counter-demonstration (28 August) because the 28
August demonstration was organized by right-wing populists.159
Meanwhile, the public was informed that it could take years before the
Public Prosecution’s Office would wrap up its inquiry because of the huge
amount of data they needed to investigate. Trials could only start if the
investigation’s report showed that there were indeed people who could be
prosecuted.160
In response to new information that the police’s official assignment for
the festival “had been to ensure a safe entrance and exit for visitors,”161 the
CDU and FDP criticized NRW Minister for the Interior Jäger. They
claimed that he should take responsibility instead of shifting it to
Lopavent.162 Jäger introduced several proposals (e.g. better collaboration
between government actors) to improve the safety of large scale events.163
The municipality asked the law firm which it had hired to investigate
the Love Parade to use its copyright to forbid the publication of the
attachments to the interim report. Publishing these attachments could
157
Dörries, B. (2010, 9 August). “Nicht geeignet für eine Genehmigung.” Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
158
Stadt stockt Soforthilfesumme auf. (2010, 13 August). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
159
Demos: bürgerlich, rechts, links. (2010, 20 August). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
160
Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 11 August). Loveparade: Bis zu einem Urteil vergehen noch
Jahre. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
161
Loveparade: CDU und FDP attakieren Innenminister (2010, 13 August). Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
162
Loveparade: CDU und FDP attakieren Innenminister (2010, 13 August). Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 17 August). Loveparade: die Aufgaben der Polizei. Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
163
Chudobba, H. and Isringhaus, J. (2010, 18 August). Duisburg: Neues Protokoll belas-
tet Polizei. Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
lead to a fine of up to 250,000 euros. Various newspapers, however, had

already published texts based on these attachments. Angry about this
attempt to censure journalists, both bloggers and journalists placed the
documents online. In the end, the municipality gave in and took no
further legal steps against those publishing the attachments to the interim
report.164 Irritation was also experienced in the town hall because the
mayor had consulted a media advisor “even though the municipality (…)
had its own press office.”165
In an interview, Sauerland said that he still stood by his decision not to
attend the memorial service as that would have pained the bereaved “and
would have caused public unrest.”166 However, he had not expected to
meet “so much hate and anger [as expressed] at a demonstration in front
of the town hall just a couple of days after the” disaster.167 He did admit
that he had made mistakes right after the incident. He felt terrible about
what he had said during the first press conference because what he had
said turned out to be untrue. He added “once the investigation has been
concluded, I will face the consequences.”168 In response to allegations that
he had lied about visitor numbers, he said that realistic numbers had been
used and that Lopavent “had asked [the municipality] not to make any
other visitor numbers public [but the numbers of the organization].”169
He also stated that he had never wanted the festival to go through at all
costs. Visitors’ safety was and is of the utmost importance. “Once all
concerns had been dealt with, did we (…) give the O.K. (…) shortly
before the Love Parade started, we checked that the organizer had
complied with our requirements.”170
Four weeks after the festival, the SPD, Die Linke, and the FDP submit-
ted a request to vote on whether or not the mayor could stay. At that time,
164
Leyendecker, H. (2010, 19 August). Aufruhr im Netz. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
165
Schröder, L. and Schwerdtfeger, C. (2010, 14 August). Schlecht beraten. Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
166
Chudobba, H. (2010, 16 August). “Mit so viel Hass habe ich nicht gerechnet.”
167
168
169
170
they only had 38 votes in favour of removing the mayor from office. The
Grünen would also vote against the mayor even though the Grünen had
not signed the request. That would increase the number of votes to 45—
still not enough as 50 out 74 votes were needed to reach the required
two-thirds majority. The CDU continued to support their mayor, but had
not yet decided on how they would vote. Sauerland could not vote in this
procedure.171
On 18 August 2010, Sauerland invited approximately 50 employees to
a meeting at the town hall to discuss what had happened after the Love
Parade. He apologized for the pressure they faced and explained what the
municipal council was doing to determine the causes of the incident. He
also took the opportunity to clarify some misunderstandings. The mayor,
for instance, had not been able to write to the bereaved to offer his
condolences because he had been denied access to their addresses because
of privacy concerns. Addresses can only be used for the purpose for which
the address was supplied and cannot be used for other purposes without
the consent of citizens. Moreover, the interim report’s 300 page attachment
contained witnesses’ names and addresses. That is why attempts had been
made to keep the attachment confidential.172
Five weeks after the event, Schaller posted camera footage of the festival
on the internet. He brought 22 hours of footage back to 6.5 minutes to
show the errors the police had made. The police were outraged because
police officers had tried to help—sometimes at their own peril—once
Lopavent had asked for help when its safety plan had fallen apart. In fact,
various TV broadcasts had shown the police being overrun.173
At the beginning of September, the law firm hired to investigate the
municipality’s procedures published its final report. The conclusion was
that the municipality had acted in a lawful manner when planning and
preparing for the festival and that the municipality had met its obligations.
Though, “[i]t was not possible to rule out that third parties had violated
the city’s requirements.”174 Fences on the access ramp, for instance, had
not been removed by Lopavent. As a consequence, the road was narrower
than it could have been. The report did state that further investigation by
171
Stimmen gegen Sauerland. (2010, 28 August). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
172
Chudobba, H. (2010, 19 August). Rathaus: Applaus für Sauerland. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
173
Loveparade-Videos sollen ins Netz. (2010, 30 August). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Richter,
N. (2010, 31 August). Kettenreaktion. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
174
“Rechtmäβig gehandelt.” (2010, 2 September). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
the Public Prosecution’s Office was needed, yet at the same time the
report made it clear that ensuring safety on the festival terrain was the
responsibility of both police and Lopavent—not the municipality.175
On 2 September 2010, the NRW Committee on Internal Affairs
(Innenausschuss) met (Innenausschuss 2010b). During this meeting,
Lopavent, the municipality, and the NRW Minister for the Interior had to
account for their actions. Mayor Sauerland was present, but Schaller was
not. Instead, he was represented by his legal advisor.176 Lopavent blamed
the police for the mass panic. However, Lopavent had failed to follow its
own safety plan. Lopavent had, for instance, failed to close off access roads
on time. It had also not deployed enough security guards on the access
ramp to control the crowd. Additionally, the trucks with DJs remained too
close to the entrance of the festival. As a consequence, people were not
lured away from the entrance thereby blocking the flow of visitors. The
agreed upon announcements over the loudspeaker system were also
not made.177
During the Committee’s session, Sauerland tried to exonerate the
municipality by referring to the law firm’s report which showed that the
municipality had acted lawfully, that responsibilities had been met, and
that the event had been planned in a serious manner. However, “on the
day of the festival, there had not been any (…) [municipal inspectors] at
the site to check the safety measures. It remained therefore also unchecked
whether Schaller had placed enough stewards [at the entries of the tunnel
(an die Schleusen)] to manage the incoming masses. Moreover, what
remained unchallenged was that in contrast to what was agreed upon, a
fence on the ramp [had not been removed] and this [fence] had exacerbated
the situation when people panicked.”178
175
“Rechtmäβig gehandelt.” (2010, 2 September). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
176
König, M. (2010, 3 September). Sauerland: Loveparade wurde seriös geplant.
177
König, M. (2010, 3 September). Sauerland: Loveparade wurde seriös geplant.
Süddeutsche Zeitung; Burger, R. (2010, 5 September). Die selbsternannten Unschuldigen.
Sechs Wochen nach der Love Parade geht das gegenseitige Schuldzuweisen weiter.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, no. 35.
178
Sonntagszeitung, no. 35; König, M. (2010, 3 September). Sauerland: Loveparade wurde
seriös geplant. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
The NRW Minister for the Interior’s inquiry had shown that Lopavent
and the city of Duisburg were mainly responsible for the festival’s security.
However, FDP spokesperson Engel stated that the police had made
mistakes as well and should have intervened sooner when the situation
near the entrances had become dangerous. Jäger admitted that problems
had occurred, but he stated that a perfect police performance was
impossible considering the chaotic situation and the fact that the police
radios did not work.179
Six weeks after the event, the tunnel was opened again for the public. A
glass-windowed cube was placed near the tunnel. Things that had been
left at the scene to remember the victims (such as stuffed animals and
letters) were placed in this cube. A bronze tablet was also hung on the wall
of the tunnel to remember the victims.180
On 13 September 2010, the municipal council voted on whether or
not the mayor could stay in office. Only 41 councillors voted against the
mayor: the Grünen were divided whereas the CDU continued to support
their mayor. As the required two-thirds majority was not met, the mayor
could stay in office. Since Sauerland was not allowed to vote or attend the
procedure, he replied in writing to the outcome of the vote. He wrote that
“[i]t is clear to me, that we cannot simply move on to our day to day
business. The Love Parade-disaster will also preoccupy Duisburg in
the future.”181
In October, the FDP and CDU of the NRW state parliament were not
happy with the NRW Minister for the Interior. According to these parties,
Jäger was delaying the investigation into the disaster. Not only did the
minister not answer questions, he was also “hiding behind the Public
Prosecution.”182 In short, Jäger was “concealing, fiddling, and
deceiving.”183
In November, it became known that Jäger would not fulfil his promise
to publish information about mistakes the police might have made during
179
180
Eine Gedenktafel am Tunnel von Duisburg. (2010, 6 September). Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 206.
181
Dörries, B. (2010, 14 September). Sauerland bleibt im Amt. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
182
“Tarnen und täuschen.” (2010, 8 October). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
183
“Tarnen und täuschen.” (2010, 8 October). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
the festival. Fear that the investigation into the disaster would be hampered
had resulted in the Public Prosecution’s Office keeping the information
under lock and key.184
Even though the mayor had survived the voting procedure, there were
still people who were unhappy with the mayor. In November, the mayor
was sprayed with ketchup.185 In December, the municipality’s employee
council made it clear that they wanted the mayor gone. According to the
employee council, the mayor “was no longer in a position to run the
city.”186 Earlier that month, Schaller appeared on a TV show. During this
show, he apologized to a victim and a bereaved, stating that he was
“morally responsible” and would “accept [legal] responsibility” if
needed.187 At the end of the month, the mayor published a statement on
the municipality’s website in which he apologized to the victims and
bereaved for his actions in the days following the disaster where he was
focused on finding answers and determining responsibility. Consequently,
he did “not do justice to the situation following the disaster and particularly
to the victims’ feelings” and he might have given people the idea that he
was shirking his responsibility though he was not: he would take
responsibility if needed.188
In January 2011, the Public Prosecution’s Office announced that 16
people were to be investigated for negligent manslaughter and negligent
assault: one police officer, four Lopavent employees, and 11 civil servants
working for the municipality of Duisburg. Schaller and Sauerland were
not part of this list of people to be investigated.189
In February 2011, a self-help organization and the internet website
docunews.org organized a meeting for the victims and relief workers. One
of the items that came up during this meeting was that some of the
bereaved and victims were facing financial difficulties. Insurance companies,
for instance, refused to pay for treatments.190
184
Loveparade-Bericht zurückgehalten. (2010, 11 November). Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, no. 263.
185
Attacke auf Sauerland. (2010, 11 November). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
186
Dörries, B, (2010, 18 December). Sauerland bleibt unbeheiligt. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
187
Loveparade-Chef entschuldigt sich. (2010, 3 December). Rheinische Post Duesseldorf.
188
Loveparade: Duisburger OB entschuldigt sich. (2010, 27 December). Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
189
Der Fall Loveparade. (2011, 19 January). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Loveparade:
Beschuldigte sollen sich nun äuβern. (2011, 20 January). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
190
Dörries, B. (2011, 7 February). Selbstgespräch der Opfer. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
A newspaper article published in April pointed out that none of the civil
servants under investigation had resigned and that mayor Sauerland could
stay in office till 2015.191 In May, new information came to the fore which
showed that the police had indeed made mistakes. A change in how long
police officers could work resulted in a last minute shift change during the
festival. This, in turn, resulted in a lack of police officers just when they
were needed. Moreover, only a limited number of mobile phones had
been listed for priority usage in case the mobile network went down.192
That same month, the NRW state parliament published a new law. If
citizens collected enough signatures, they can hold a referendum to vote
whether a mayor could stay or had to go. The law was also known as Lex
Sauerland by CDU supporters because they thought that the SPD, the
Grünen, and Die Linke had only created the law to get rid of Sauerland
and to get a social democrat elected as mayor for Duisburg. Making this
law, however, had already been agreed upon in the NRW coalition
agreement—an agreement which had been signed before the Love Parade
took place (NRWSPD 2010, p. 21).193
To request a referendum, 15% of the voters needed to sign the petition
(that is 52,000 signatures in Duisburg). If enough signatures are collected,
a mayor gets a week to resign while keeping his pension or face the
outcome of the referendum. If more than 25% of the population votes
against a mayor in the referendum, the mayor would have to resign. All
local parties, except the CDU, supported the petition.194
Victims and their families were still awaiting financial compensation as
the Public Prosecution’s Office’s investigation had still not yielded any
results. To make sure that these people would not have to wait any longer,
the municipality and the insurance company (AXA) made a deal about
how to provide financial compensation to these people. The municipality
and the insurance company emphasized that giving money in no way
meant admitting liability. In fact, they both wanted to get the money back
191
Dörries, B. (2011, 27 April). Duisburg? Meine Stadt! Süddeutsche Zeitung.
192
Chaos beim Einsatz. (2011, 16 May). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
193
Dörries, B. (2012, 11 February). Duisburger urteilen über Adolf Sauerland. Süddeutsche
Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2011, 25 May). Der lange Schatten der Loveparade. Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
194
Dörries, B. (2011, 25 May). Der lange Schatten der Loveparade. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Dörries, B. (2011, 20 June). Duisburg und die Last des Gedenkens. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
79,149 Stimmen gegen Sauerland. (2011, 18 October) Süddeutsche Zeitung.
from whomever the Public Prosecution’s Office decided was responsible

for the disaster.195
In June 2011, a monument was unveiled to commemorate the deaths.
The memorial was not placed in the disaster area because the festival
terrain was being rebuilt into a furniture store. Sauerland did not attend
the unveiling. Instead, former mayor Krings gave the official speech.196
Two weeks before the anniversary of the disaster, a municipal council
meeting took place. At that meeting, Sauerland apologized to the victims
and bereaved and said that he was morally responsible for what had
happened. Because this statement was an admission of guilt, the mayor
had consulted his lawyer before making this statement.197
The disaster was also addressed in the NRW state parliament. But con-
sidering the fact that the memorial would be held the next day, numer-
ous parties thought the focus should be on the memorial, not on who had
caused and/or contributed to the disaster. It was clear though that there
were not enough votes to push for a parliamentary inquiry.198
A year after the disaster, a memorial service was held. Approximately
7000 people attended the service.199 Not wanting to provoke the bereaved,
Sauerland decided not to attend this service. In fact, the victims’ relatives
had asked the NRW government to make sure that Sauerland had no part
in the ceremony.200
That same month, the Public Prosecution’s Office published a very
critical interim report on the Love Parade disaster. Safety concerns, for
instance, had been consciously ignored by both the municipality and
Lopavent. Moreover, “Lopavent and Rainer Schaller had submitted a
completely unsuitable plan for the event, [they] had not kept to agreements,
and [they] had threatened with lawyers when the municipality had not
195
Loveparade-Opfer werden entschädigt. (2011, 28 May). Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, no. 124; Entschädigung für Loveparade-Opfer. (2011, 28 May). Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
196
Dörries, B. (2011, 20 June). Duisburg und die Last des Gedenkens. Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
197
Sauerland entschuldigt sich. (2011, 7 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries, B. (2011, 20
July). Erdrückend. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
198
Hüwel, D. (2011, 23 July). Loveparade: Im Landtag Kritik nur von der FDP. Rheinische
Post Duesseldorf.
199
Tückmantel, U. (2011, 25 July). Trauerfeier für die Loveparade-Opfer. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
200
Dörries, B. (2011, 20 June). Duisburg und die Last des Gedenkens. Süddeutsche
Zeitung; Ein Bürgermeister versteckt sich. (2011, 20 June). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
wanted [what Lopavent and Schaller had wanted].”201 Additionally, the

municipality never should have given the permit. In fact, the permit was
unlawful—the motivation for holding the festival was purely political. The
festival area should not have been chosen for this festival. Upon realizing
that the permit requirements had not been met (for instance, lack of
security guards and loudspeaker systems), the festival should have been
cancelled on the morning of the event. Furthermore, the police had made
mistakes as well—including responding too slowly to the unfolding
disaster. The malfunctioning communication devices did not make things
easier for the police officers. The Public Prosecution’s Office hoped to
press charges within a couple of months.202
In September, the municipality, the landowner, the bereaved, and the
Evangelic Church Rheinland agreed to place the monument where the
disaster had taken place.203 Later that month, enough signatures were
collected to call for a referendum. Sauerland and the municipality tried to
stop the referendum by claiming that a lack of house numbers meant that
numerous signatures were not valid. One of the initiators said that an
example of the list to collect signatures had been approved by the
municipality and that approved list only contained street names, not house
numbers. Moreover, the law does not require house numbers. The
initiators were angry that the person who could be voted out of office
could determine which of the signatures were valid and demanded that
the municipal council would do this instead of the mayor. Moreover, they
intended to collect even more signatures to compensate for possible
invalid signatures.204
Mid October, 79,149 signatures were collected.205 The next month,
the municipality concluded that there were enough valid signatures to
hold the referendum.206 The referendum would be held on 12 February
2012 unless Sauerland decided within a week to resign. The mayor,
201
Dörries, B. (2011, 20 July). Erdrückend. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
202
Dörries, B. (2011, 12 July). Die Schuld der Bürokraten. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries,
B. (2011, 20 July). Erdrückend. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
203
Gedenkstatte soll an Loveparade-Rampe. (2011, 12 September). Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 212.
204
Trickser im Rathaus. (2011, 23 September). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
205
79,149 Stimmen gegen Sauerland. (2011, 18 October) Süddeutsche Zeitung.
206
Schlappe für Sauerland. (2011, 15 November). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
however, announced that he would stay in office till it was decided other-
wise through a democratic voting procedure.207
In December 2011, the Public Prosecution’s Office of Wuppertal
started an investigation following a corruption scandal: various political
parties had received contributions from a construction company. Sauerland
was investigated in order to determine whether he had known that his
party (the CDU) had received money in exchange for favours. In response
to this investigation, the municipality released a statement that Sauerland
hoped that his innocence would be proven soon.208 In addition, the mayor
made it clear that “there is no connection between a contribution to the
CDU and construction contracts for the (…) project developer.”209
On 7 December 2011, the municipality organized a meeting for its
employees. The chair of the council representing the municipality’s
employees declared, amongst other things, that the municipality and the
city had a tarnished reputation thanks to the Love Parade. In response, the
mayor repeated that he would stay in office till 2015 unless he was voted
out of office210—in addition to which he later added that he “would only
resign if a court would find one of his employees guilty of [what had
happened at] the Love Parade disaster.”211 In contrast to the previous
year’s meeting, the mayor was hardly interrupted during his speech.212
Regarding Sauerland’s decision to stay in office, rumours abounded
that Sauerland expected that not enough voters would show up for the
referendum since voter turnout is normally low in Duisburg.213 In the
weeks before the referendum was to be held, Sauerland’s tactic consisted
of claiming that the SPD, the Grünen, and Die Linke had conspired to
create this law in order to get rid of him and replace him with a social
democrat. He also asked CDU voters to boycott the referendum. When
the CDU realized that numerous voters wanted to vote, the mayor started
207
Duisburg entscheidet. (2011, 25 November) Süddeutsche Zeitung; 79,149 Stimmen
gegen Sauerland. (2011, 18 October) Süddeutsche Zeitung.
208
Ermittlungen gegen Sauerland Wegen Parteispende Anfangsverdacht der Vorteilsnahme.
(2011, 9 December). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 287.
209
Sauerland wehrt sich. (2011, 27 December). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
210
Michel, M. (2011, 8 December). Verwaltung ist hoch belastet. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
211
Sauerland wehrt sich. (2011, 27 December). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
212
Michel, M. (2011, 8 December). Verwaltung ist hoch belastet. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf.
213
Burger, R. (2011, 26 November). Auf Biegen und Brechen. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, no. 276.
an election campaign which included flyers. Amongst other things, these

flyers described how to vote if they wanted Sauerland to stay in office,
because people had to vote no if they wanted the mayor to stay in office.214
Sauerland was not supported by the CDU party leaders, probably
because he was the last CDU mayor in the Ruhr area and the chances of
another CDU mayor getting elected were pretty slim.215
On 12 February 2012, the referendum was held. Approximately
129,000 people voted against Sauerland—thereby forcing him to resign.
The mayor’s response to this outcome was that his “term in office consisted
of many successes, but also the Love Parade.”216 In his statement, he did
not refer to his own mistakes. On 14 February, Sauerland left town hall.217

The main actors in the blame game were mayor Sauerland, the municipal-
ity, the police (sometimes represented in the debate by the Minister for the
Interior Jäger), and Lopavent and its boss Schaller. Figure 4.3 illustrates
how much blame these actors received and how accommodative their
blame response was. A 0 in the figure means that the actor was not
mentioned in the media that day; a 1 means that the actor was mentioned
in the media but either no blame or no blame response was described; a 2
describes the lowest level of blame and the most defensive blame response
an actor can use. Further increasing numbers indicate higher blame levels
and more accommodative blame responses.
To understand the outcome of the blame game, it is important to take
a closer look at the mayor. Before I do that, though, I need to address the
various attempts actors made to shift the blame away—including the use
of inquiries to achieve that.

Of the three cases, this is the case where attempts to shift blame are most
noticeably present. The mayor and municipality; the police and its
responsible minister Jäger; and Lopavent and its director Schaller all tried
214
Zeitung.
215
Zeitung.
216
Dörries, B. (2012, 13 February). Sauerland verliert sein Amt. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
217
Dörries, B. (2012, 13 February). Sauerland verliert sein Amt. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
26/7/2010 26/7/2010 26/7/2010
26/8/2010 26/8/2010 26/8/2010
26/9/2010 26/9/2010 26/9/2010
26/10/2010 26/10/2010 26/10/2010
26/11/2010 26/11/2010 26/11/2010
26/12/2010 26/12/2010 26/12/2010
26/1/2011 26/1/2011 26/1/2011
26/2/2011 26/2/2011 26/2/2011
26/3/2011 26/3/2011 26/3/2011
Schaller blame
mayor blame
26/4/2011 26/4/2011 26/4/2011
Jäger blame
Jäger
Mayor
26/5/2011 26/5/2011 26/5/2011
Schaller
26/6/2011 26/6/2011 26/6/2011
26/7/2011 26/7/2011 26/7/2011
26/8/2011 26/8/2011 26/8/2011
26/9/2011 26/9/2011 26/9/2011
26/10/2011 26/10/2011 26/10/2011
26/11/2011 26/11/2011 26/11/2011
Schaller response
mayor response
Jäger response
26/12/2011 26/12/2011 26/12/2011
26/1/2012 26/1/2012 26/1/2012
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
26/7/2010 26/7/2010 26/7/2010

26/8/2010 26/8/2010 26/8/2010
26/9/2010 26/9/2010 26/9/2010
26/10/2010 26/10/2010 26/10/2010
26/11/2010 26/11/2010 26/11/2010
blame game from 26 July 2010 till 23 February 2012

26/12/2010 26/12/2010 26/12/2010
26/1/2011 26/1/2011 26/1/2011
26/2/2011 26/2/2011 26/2/2011
their best to show that their actions had been lawful.

26/3/2011 26/3/2011 26/3/2011
municipality blame
Lopavent blame
26/4/2011 26/4/2011 26/4/2011
police blame
Police
26/5/2011 26/5/2011 26/5/2011

Lopavent
Municipality
26/6/2011 26/6/2011 26/6/2011

26/7/2011 26/7/2011 26/7/2011
26/8/2011 26/8/2011 26/8/2011
26/9/2011 26/9/2011 26/9/2011
26/10/2011 26/10/2011 26/10/2011
26/11/2011 26/11/2011 26/11/2011
4 THREE FESTIVALS GONE WRONG
police response
26/12/2011 26/12/2011 26/12/2011
Lopavent response
municipality response
26/1/2012 26/1/2012 26/1/2012
val terrain was not a public domain. It was thus the responsibility of
to shift blame away to one another. Lopavent was blamed, for instance, for
Fig. 4.3 The blame levels and blame responses of the six main actors in the
were only responsible for what happened in the public domain. The festi-
cation of responsibility. Both municipality and police pointed out that they
During this shifting of blame, references were often made to the demar-
for contributing to the disaster; whereas the mayor and municipality tried
97
a failing safety plan and a lack of security guards; the police were blamed
Lopavent to ensure the safety of the festival goers. In response to

Lopavent’s allegation that the police had taken over responsibility during
the festival, it was made clear that the police had only responded to a call
for help from Lopavent—in no way had the police taken over the
responsibility of running the festival’s safety.
Interestingly, inquiries and investigations were used to support claims
made during these attempts to shift blame away—which brings us to the
next subsection.

There was only one inquiry as defined in Chap. 3 (the lawyers hired by the
municipality) and there were two investigations: one by the Public
Prosecution’s Office and one by the NRW police. In the NRW police’s
interim report, blame was put squarely on Lopavent and the municipality.
Lopavent, for instance, had failed to implement its own safety plan whereas
the municipality had not cooperated properly with security forces. The
police, for instance, had only been informed about the municipality’s
definite approval of the festival only on the day of the event.218 More than
a month later, the NRW Minister for the Interior’s investigation showed
that Lopavent and the city of Duisburg were mainly responsible for the
festival’s security.219
The municipality hired lawyers to conduct an investigation. The munic-
ipality used that inquiry to show, for instance, that the municipality had
made no mistakes during the permit procedure and that the municipality
had not been responsible for the safety of the festival goers once they set
foot on the festival terrain. The report also stated that these findings, of
course, did not mean that other parties had adhered to the municipality’s
rules and regulations.220
218
Richter, N. and Dörries, B. (2010, 29 July). Auβer Kontrolle. Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Dörries, B. (2010, 29 July). “Das Sicherheitssystem hat versagt.” Süddeutsche Zeitung;
Duisburger Verhältnisse. (2010, 29 July). Süddeutsche Zeitung.
219
220
Chudobba, H. (2010, 4 August). Ein Schritt zur Aufklärung. Rheinische Post
Duesseldorf; Reisener, T. (2010, 5 August). Der Zwischenbericht der Stadt Duisburg.
Some of these findings were proven to be untrue when the Public

Prosecution’s Office published its interim report. The interim report was
very blunt and stated that the permit was unlawful and never should have
been given. Political gains had motivated the approval of the permit. In
fact, safety concerns had been ignored not only by the municipality but
also by Lopavent. The latter had also submitted a wholly unsuitable plan
for the festival. The police did not remain unscathed. The report concluded
that the police had made mistakes as well. In short, the report concluded
that the municipality, Lopavent, and the police had made mistakes.221
4.2.3.3 Pensions and Rituals

Even though many actors had made mistakes, only one actor faced the
political consequences for these mistakes: the mayor. Considering the fact
that mayors are responsible for what happens in their municipality and the
actions their civil servants take, it is unsurprising that the mayor had to
resign—especially considering the anger of Duisburg’s citizens. Having
said that, there are two factors that are worth exploring because they help
us to understand why and when the mayor resigned, when he did. These
are his pension and his absence during rituals.
According to blame game theory, actors should respond in a more
accommodative manner when facing high levels of blame. Only then will
blame levels decrease. In this case, the mayor faced high levels of blame,
but he did not use the most accommodative blame level response:
resignation. The reason for that is simple: the existing rules and regulations
meant that if he were to resign, he would lose (a substantial part of) his
pension. Even if he had wanted to resign, the effects of his resignation
would be such that it is understandable that he did not opt for it. Blame
game theory currently does not take into account that it is sometimes
impossible to use certain blame responses because of administrative
regulations. It would be a good idea to add this element to the blame
game theory because it helps to explain why the blame game took so long
before it was finally concluded with the mayor’s resignation. After all, once
the mayor had survived the voting procedure in the municipal council, the
NRW state parliament had to create a new law which allowed citizens to
hold a corrective referendum and vote the mayor out of office. Before that
221
Dörries, B. (2011, 12 July). Die Schuld der Bürokraten. Süddeutsche Zeitung; Dörries,
B. (2011, 20 July). Erdrückend. Süddeutsche Zeitung.
referendum could take place, enough signatures needed to be collected—

a time consuming process as well.
Rituals are also something which should be included in blame game
theories. There is some resemblance between rituals and presentational
strategies: both can be used to change the perception of the public on
what is going on and how much blame someone should be receiving
(Hood 2011). A major difference between rituals and presentational
strategies, however, is that rituals are not just about changing the public’s
perception. In fact, rituals are mostly aimed at offering sympathy to the
victims and bereaved. It is all about showing compassion, understanding,
and empathy—and yes, to some extent it could be (but does not need to
be) about changing the public’s perception.
Rituals can take many shapes. Memorial services, the unveiling of a
monument, and a silent walk are all examples of rituals. Another example
of a ritual is actors (such as a president, a mayor, or a representative of the
royal family) travelling to an area where disaster has struck to visit those
who were affected by the disaster.
Rituals are very important following crises. It allows people to grieve,
to connect, to feel heard, and to take a small step towards closure. It is also
a means for actors to (re)connect with citizens. If actors do not organize
or attend a ritual, they will face criticism (’t Hart 1993; Bytzek 2008).
In this case, citizens were quite clear that they did not want the mayor
to attend, for instance, the memorial and remembrance services. The
result, however, was that opportunities to reconnect with his citizens were
lost to the mayor—opportunities he needed, considering how angry the
citizens were with him. This raises the question of how the inability to
attend rituals affects the way a blame game evolves. Not attending a ritual
could have different effects as the previous case shows where the mayor
and police chief did not attend a silent walk for the youngster who had
died during the beach riot—and no one said anything negative about
their absence.
Lastly, it is worthwhile considering how not being welcome on these
occasions impacts the functioning of a mayor. After all, one of the core
functions of a mayor is caring for their citizens. If a mayor is not welcome
at these events, how could they fulfil one of their major functions as mayor?
The role of mayor as caring for their citizens (burgervader in Dutch) will
be further explored in the next case.
4.3 Monster Truck Disaster222

In this case, a monster truck drove into the audience, killing three people
and (severely) injuring many others. The blame game focused on the
driver of the monster truck (D.), the organization organizing the event
(Stichting Sterevenementen), the municipality of Haaksbergen, and the
mayor of Haaksbergen (Gerritsen). In the end, the municipal council
made it clear to the mayor that support had dwindled and that it was time
for the mayor to reconsider his position. Which is exactly what he did and
so he resigned on 27 May 2015.
The mayor and the municipality were not prosecuted by the Public
Prosecution’s Office because they cannot be prosecuted. The Public
Prosecution’s Office did prosecute the driver and Stichting Sterevenementen
for causing death and serious injuries (Openbaar Ministerie 2015). The
court rulings included a conditional fine for Stichting Sterevenementen
and 15 months in prison and a five-year ban on working as a stunt man for
the driver.223 The driver did not agree with the sentence and filed an
appeal. The Court of Appeal, however, upheld the original ruling.224
4.3.1 The Festival
On 28 September 2014, a festival took place in Haaksbergen. The
AutoMotorSportief event took place in the car park of the Jumbo grocery
store.225 A monster truck demonstration was part of the festivities. The
idea was for the driver to drive the monster truck over six car wrecks.
Unfortunately, once the driver had driven over the six wrecks, he was
unable to slow down the monster truck. He drove straight into the
222
This section was previously published in the journal Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid
(Resodihardjo et al. 2018) and was translated and reprinted with the permission of the pub-
lisher (Boom Juridisch) and editor-in-chief. Please note that parts of the translation have
been edited for clarity.
223
Voor Michiel gaat truckdrama nooit meer voorbij. (2016, 16 April). Twentsche Courant
Tubantia, Section Algemeen, p. 2.
224
Mario D.in hoger beroep. (2016, 30 April). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section
Algemeen, p. 2; Hof: Cel voor drama met monstertruck. (2018, 24 May). Trouw, p. 8.
225
Colijn, J. (2014, 29 September). Stuntterrein te krap; ‘Hoe kan zoiets worden geor-
ganiseerd midden in het dorp?’ De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 2; De ontreddering, die
vergeet je nooit. (2014, 4 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section SM-SPECTRUM.
audience killing three people—including a five-year old boy.226 Additionally,

many people were injured—some of them quite severely.227

In the following days, people started to speculate about why the driver had
not been able to slow down his monster truck. Possible explanations
ranged from steering problems to a defective break hose.228 The location
of the event was criticized because it was deemed too small—there was not
enough space between the monster truck and the audience. Furthermore,
safety measures only consisted of bike rack barricades placed between the
truck and the audience while at the same time the audience had been
allowed to stand right in the path of the oncoming monster truck—
something which should never have happened if international safety
measures had been followed (MTRA 2014).229
On the night of the monster truck accident, the municipality published
the permit for the festival. The permit itself was really brief—a bit over two
A4 sheets—and dated 24 September 2014 (Gemeente Haaksbergen
2014a). Moreover, only one paragraph in the permit covered safety
requirements. The permit merely stated that “Sufficient measures need to
be taken to ensure the safety of those attending the stunt show; in order
to achieve this, proper measures need to be taken (bike rack barricades).
These bike rack barricades need to ensure that the audience remains at a
distance of at least 10 meters” (Gemeente Haaksbergen 2014a, p. 2). The
226
Dohmen, A., & Toonen, A. (2014, 29 September). Mocht het publiek te dichtbij?
NRC Handelsblad, Section In het nieuws, p. 2; Colijn, J. (2014, 30 September). Tim (5)
kreeg geen genoeg van auto’s; Jongetje overleden, zusje in kritieke toestand. De Telegraaf,
227
Doden en gewonden bij stunt met monstertruck – Een inktzwarte zondag. (2014, 29
September). Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
228
Colijn, J. (2014, 29 September). Stuntterrein te krap; ‘Hoe kan zoiets worden geor-
ganiseerd midden in het dorp?’ De Telegraaf, Section Binnenland, p. 2.
229
Dohmen, A., & Toonen, A. (2014, 29 September). Mocht het publiek te dichtbij?
NRC Handelsblad, Section In het nieuws, p. 2; Colijn, J. (2014, 29 September). Stuntterrein
te krap; ‘Hoe kan zoiets worden georganiseerd midden in het dorp?’ De Telegraaf, Section
Binnenland, p. 2; Doden en gewonden bij stunt met monstertruck – Een inktzwarte zondag.
(2014, 29 September). Twentsche Courant Tubantia; Verdriet, en vraagtekens bij de vergun-
ning. (2014, 30 September). De Volkskrant, Section Ten eerste; Colijn, J. (2014, 30
September). Zwartepieten is begonnen; Burgemeester: ‘Ik wist niet van monstertruck.’ De
Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
permit, however, did not state from where these 10 metres should be
measured.230
The mayor said that he was unfamiliar with the content of the per-
mit.231 In fact, he claimed that the organization responsible for the event
(Stichting Sterevenementen) had not informed the municipality that a
monster truck would conduct a stunt. Consequently, the municipality had
processed the permit in the same manner as previously requested permits
by Stichting Sterevenementen: a civil servant with the mayor’s mandate to
act had processed the permit request and neither the mayor nor the
aldermen had seen the permit request. As the festival was supposed to
attract a limited number of visitors (up to 2500), the municipality had also
not consulted the police and fire department as that was only needed for
festivals drawing an audience of 2500 or more.232 In response to the
mayor’s allegation that the organization had not informed the municipality
properly, its director was quick to state that he had told the municipality
about the monster truck.233
While that discussion was going on, the Dutch Safety Board finished its
initial investigation into the accident. Based on its findings, it announced
that it would conduct a thorough investigation of the risk assessment and
risk management of all actors involved in granting the permit to Stichting
Stervenementen.234 The Safety Board later on extended its remit to
investigate other Dutch municipalities as well by changing its research
question into “To what extent does granting an event-permit contribute
to the safety of events?” (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015b, p. 15).
230
Timmers, F. (2014, 30 September). Garantie veiligheid show was flinterdun. Twentsche
Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
231
Schreuder, A., & Toonen, A. (2014, 1 October) Dat stuntteam reed al eerder op het
publiek af; Burgemeester zag vergunning niet. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 4.
232
Burgemeester Hans Gerritsen heeft vergunning nooit gezien. “Dat hoefde ook niet.” –
Amper oog voor veiligheid. (2014, 1 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia; Timmers, F.,
& Baard, L. (2014, 11 October). Haaksbergen vroeg politie en brandweer ondanks verand-
ering niet om advies. – Vergunning show op het laatste moment nog aangepast. Twentsche
233
Colijn, J. (2014, 30 September). Zwartepieten is begonnen; Burgemeester: ‘Ik wist niet
van monstertruck.’ De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1).
234
Timmers, F. (2014, 1 October). Onderzoeksraad bijt zich vast in Haaksbergen.
Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
The investigation’s aim was to learn from the events in order to prevent
similar accidents in the future.235
Because the permit had been granted so recently, it was possible to
appeal the permit even though the event had already taken place. At the
beginning of October, a number of appeals were submitted on behalf of
some of the victims236 to ensure that “the permit would not gain formal
legal status which would make it [completely or] near impossible to hold
the municipality liable” for the events.237
Meanwhile the municipality had conducted its own internal investigation
to determine what had happened during the permit procedure.238 This
investigation resulted in numerous documents and a fact sheet explaining
what was known at this point in time. These documents were uploaded to
the municipality’s website on 10 October 2014 (Gemeente Haaksbergen
n.d.) so that councillors could prepare for an informal council meeting on
15 October 2014.239 From these documents, it became clear that even
though the number of expected visitors had been increased, the police and
fire department had not been asked for advice on this event.240
On 15 October 2014, the informal council meeting took place. Talking
about the events in an informal setting allowed councillors to discuss the
events with the mayor without having to address the accountability
issue.241 During this meeting, numerous questions remained unanswered
as the mayor and aldermen wanted to wait for the results of the
investigations by the Public Prosecution’s Office, the Dutch Safety Board,
235
Timmers, F. (2014, 1 October). Onderzoeksraad bijt zich vast in Haaksbergen.
236
Bezwaar slachtoffers tegen vergunning. (2014, 4 October). Twentsche Courant
Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG; ‘Gemeente, help de slachtoffers.’ (2014, 10 October).
Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
237
‘Gemeente, help de slachtoffers.’ (2014, 10 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section RE-VANDAAG.
238
van monstertruck.’ De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
239
Timmers, F., & Baard, L. (2014, 11 October). Haaksbergen vroeg politie en brandweer
ondanks verandering niet om advies. – Vergunning show op het laatste moment nog aange-
past. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
240
Timmers, F., & Baard, L. (2014, 11 October). Haaksbergen vroeg politie en brandweer
ondanks verandering niet om advies. – Vergunning show op het laatste moment nog aange-
past. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
241
Tooms, B. (2014, 16 October). Haaksbergen stelt de schuldvraag uit; Documenten
online. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 4.
and the Board of Appeal (bezwaarschriftcommissie) before going into any

details.242 Councillors acknowledged that more information was needed
before certain questions could be answered and they made it clear that
they were willing to wait for these investigations to be completed
(Gemeente Haaksbergen 2014b).243
Although no actor or insurance company was willing to acknowledge
any liability, it became clear that some of the victims and bereaved needed
financial help urgently. On 24 October, the municipality’s and the event
organizer’s insurance companies therefore agreed to create an emergency
fund to help these people out though the insurance companies continued
to reject any liability.244
On 27 November 2014, a journalist of Brandpunt Reporter (a Dutch
TV show) reported that the truck driver had previously caused an accident
in Asten by driving his motorcycle into the audience, thereby injuring six
people. The journalist also reported that the driver had had no liability
insurance for the shows in Asten and Haaksbergen.245 The truck driver
denied the previous accident. Instead, he claimed that it had been so
crowded that some people got injured in the process.246
The next day, the Waarborgfonds Motorverkeer—an organization
which helps out victims of traffic accidents who, for various reasons,
cannot claim any money from an insurance company—announced that it
would help out the victims if needed.247 The organization also stated that
if the organization would give money to survivors of the monster truck
accident then it would try to get the money back from whomever was
liable for the accident.248 One way in which the Waarborgfonds
242
Rouwenhorst, E. (2014, 16 October). Haaksbergen moet nog zeker zes maanden
wachten op uitkomst onderzoeken. – Veel vragen, nu nog geen antwoorden. Twentsche
243
Bouwhuis, H. (2014, 17 October). Halfjaar wachten en niets doen is onbevredigend.
244
Noodfonds voor slachtoffers drama. (2014, 25 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section RE-VANDAAG.
245
Colijn, J. (2014, 28 November). Mario D. al eerder in de fout. De Telegraaf, Section
Nieuws-Regio-NL, p. 17.
246
Doornink ontkent, organisatie perplex. (2014, 29 November). Twentsche Courant
Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
247
Stuntrijder Mario Doornink is niet verzekerd. (2014, 29 November). Twentsche
248
Baard, L. (2015, 21 January). Beslag op alle panden van stuntcoureur. Twentsche
Motorverkeer ensured it could get its money back was by successfully

seizing some of the monster truck driver’s assets—something the victims
had been unable to achieve.249
In response to the permit appeals, the municipality said it rejected all
appeals though the municipality acknowledged that not every aspect of
the show had been assessed when deciding whether or not to grant the
permit. Nevertheless, “that [oversight] does not mean that the permit
would have been refused if those [assessments] had been made.”250
Additionally, the municipality claimed that Stichting Sterevenementen was
the one who had requested and had received the permit and thus was
responsible for implementing proper safety measures.251 The municipali-
ty’s defence did not sway the Board of Appeals. On 16 February 2015, the
board recommended the municipality to withdraw the permit. One of the
board’s findings was that there was “not enough certainty that the safety
of the visitors of the stunt show at Jumbo’s parking lot could be guaranteed
if an accident would happen during the stunts”252 (Gemeente Haaksbergen
2015b). The board’s harsh judgement that the permit procedure had not
been properly conducted253 resulted in a lot of blame towards the mayor.
One newspaper article, for instance, noted that mayors are politically
responsible for what happens in their municipality and that it was time that
Gerritsen actually took this political responsibility for what had happened
in Haaksbergen.254 Instead, the mayor needed time to determine how to
respond to the board’s advice.255 The mayor’s response, however,
249
Truck niet in handen slachtoffers. (2014, 17 December). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section RE-VANDAAG; Baard, L. (2015, 21 January). Beslag op alle panden van stuntcou-
reur. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG; Fonds legt beslag op monster-
truck en laat die rijden. (2015, 3 February). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section
RE-VANDAAG.
250
Baard, L. (2015, 9 January). Haaksbergen wijst alle bezwaren en aansprakelijkheid
truckdrama af. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
251
Baard, L. (2015, 9 January). Haaksbergen wijst alle bezwaren en aansprakelijkheid
truckdrama af. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG.
252
Talens, H. (2015, 18 February). Vergunning uit de losse pols verleend. Twentsche
253
254
Gerritsen moet spreken. (2015, 19 February). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section
RE-VANDAAG.
255
disappointed a lot of people as he made it clear that he would not withdraw

the permit. On the contrary, the municipality would grant the exact same
permit, even with today’s knowledge. “According to mayor Gerritsen,
[the fact that] the show ran differently could not have been reasonably
foreseen.”256 The mayor also made it clear that he was not going to resign.
“It is better to act than to resign. We have learned lessons: from now on,
multiple actors will take a look at a permit. In addition, I will see
every permit.”257
While the Dutch Safety Board was conducting its research, media atten-
tion fluctuated as the media were drawn, for instance, not only to the
appeal process and the emergency fund, but also to the problems that had
plagued, and in some instances continued to plague the municipality. The
municipality was facing financial difficulties and its budget had been placed
under the control of the province.258 Moreover, the local audit office had
recently published a report which was very critical of the way in which the
local civil service was operating. The local audit office concluded, amongst
other things, that there were power struggles and communication
problems within the municipality.259
On 20 May 2015, the Dutch Safety Board published its rapport. The
board criticized the mayor, the municipality, Stichting Sterevenementen,
and the driver: all had failed in their job to ensure a safe event would take
place. The Dutch Safety Board did acknowledge that mayors have the
authority to give their civil servants a mandate to grant permits, but the
Dutch Safety Board stressed that with that authority comes a responsibility
for mayors to check whether their civil servants have the knowledge and
expertise to do their job. The mayor of Haaksbergen had failed in this
responsibility. The civil servant responsible for granting the permit had
failed to check the content of the event’s programme and the safety
measures involved. Moreover, Stichting Sterevenementen should have
been proactive. Instead, the organization had assumed that the stunt team
256
Gemeente Haaksbergen veegt bezwaren tegen vergunning monstertruck van tafel. –
‘Vergunning stuntshow deugt wel.’ (2015, 11 March). Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
257
Gemeente Haaksbergen veegt bezwaren tegen vergunning monstertruck van tafel. –
‘Vergunning stuntshow deugt wel.’ (2015, 11 March). Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
258
Staal, T. (2014, 4 October). Te klein voor groot ongeluk. Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section SM-SPECTRUM.
259
Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VANDAAG; Staal, T. (2014, 4 October). Te klein
voor groot ongeluk. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section SM-SPECTRUM.
would know what to do to ensure the audience’s safety at the event and
the organization had also assumed that the stunt team would notify the
organization if Stichting Sterevenementen needed to do something
regarding the safety of the audience (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid
2015a). Lastly, the board concluded that the stunt team should have
stopped the event considering the risks involved (Onderzoeksraad voor
Veiligheid 2015b). The board’s criticism was harsh as the board concluded
that “administrative and organizational neglect” characterized the permit
procedure in Haaksbergen (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015a, p. 5).
Moreover, the municipality perceived Stichting Sterevenementen’s annual
event as innocent entertainment. This perception combined with the
neglect resulted in an incorrect risk assessment of the event. The board’s
investigation showed that particularly small municipalities faced similar
problems as in Haaksbergen because civil servants’ lack of knowledge and
expertise hampered their ability to make a proper risk assessment
(Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015a). The board also concluded that
municipalities felt pressured to approve events without bothering citizens
and organizations too much with bureaucratic red tape and that this
pressure resulted in rather superficial permit procedures where risks were
not properly assessed (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015b).
Following the report, the mayor faced increasing blame levels as ques-
tions were raised whether the mayor should resign considering the fact
that he was politically responsible.260 The mayor, however, was adamant
that he had not neglected the permit procedure and that he still would
grant the permit.261 “We might have done things differently, better. But
the fact remains that according to us, the safety was weighed and acted
upon accordingly: a certain distance to the public had been observed, bike
rack barricades had been placed. The accident could just not have been
foreseen.”262 Moreover, he acknowledged being politically responsible,
but refused to resign though he was willing to face the municipal council
to defend his actions.263
260
COMMENTAAR – Positie van burgemeester staat ter discussie – Lessen van
Haaksbergen. (2015, 21 May). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section B-VANDAAG.
261
‘Ik niet geïnteresseerd? Dat zie ik anders.’ (2015, 21 May). Twentsche Courant
Tubantia, Section RE-VERHAAL VAN.
262
Tubantia, Section RE-VERHAAL VAN.
263
Colijn, J. (2015, 21 May). ‘Vergunning afgegeven op automatische piloot’; Rapport:
Burgemeester afstandelijk. De Telegraaf, Section Nr, p. 15.
On 27 May 2015, the municipal council convened to discuss the Dutch

Safety Board’s report. Prior to this meeting, a number of opposition
parties had informed the media that they were very critical of the mayor’s
performance. In fact, the Gemeenschappelijke Groepering Haaksbergen
(GGH) was considering a motion of no confidence for the mayor as well
as all the aldermen since all of them wanted to give the permit again. In
contrast, the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) would limit
the motion of no confidence to the mayor. Both parties, however, made it
clear that they first wanted to hear the mayor and aldermen’s response
during the meeting before deciding whether or not to submit a motion of
no confidence.264
The mayor was the first to take the floor during the council meeting.
During his speech, he apologized for the very first time.265 Even so, he did
not concur with all of the Dutch Safety Board’s findings. The mayor, for
instance, considered the recommended improvements for the permit
procedure as one of the many improvements needed in the municipality
considering its recent (financial) malfunctioning. He also stressed that the
permit procedure had already been changed and that the Safety Board’s
recommendations would help to further improve the permit procedure
(Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c, minutes 10.36–13.32). Moreover,
although he did not explicitly state that the permit would be given again,
he did say that the municipality had rejected the Board of Appeal’s advice
and so it was now up to a judge to determine whether the municipality’s
decision to reject the advice was correct or not (Gemeente Haaksbergen
2015c, minutes 4.59–5.50).
Councillors, however, made it clear that they did not approve of the
mayor’s continuing support of the permit (see e.g. Gemeente Haaksbergen
2015c, minutes 22.16–23.50).266 They thought that the mayor’s actions
were focussing too much on the legal and formal aspects of the permit
procedure and that he lacked the capacity to properly reflect upon his own
264
Tubantia (2015, 22 May). Gerritsen verder onder vuur na rapport. Twentsche Courant
265
De Telegraaf (2015, 29 May). ‘Schadeclaim truckdrama zo snel mogelijk regelen’;
Nieuwe hoop slachtoffers na vertrek burgemeester. De Telegraaf, Section Nieuws-Regio-NL,
p. 17; Tubantia (2015, 28 May). Aftreden onvermijdelijk. Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section NIEUWS.
266
Staal, T., & Baard, L. (2015, 28 May). Boetedoening burgemeester. Twentsche Courant
Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG.
actions.267 The mayor’s attempt to present the changes in the permit pro-
cedure in the larger context of the need to improve the municipality’s
overall functioning did not go down well. In response to this attempt, one
councillor stated that the knowledge that the municipality’s performance
needed to improve should have resulted in the mayor being more closely
involved in the municipality’s operations that affected the citizens’ safety
instead of keeping his distance (Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c, minutes
54.27–55.15). All political parties told the mayor to use the break to
“consider his position”268—which he did. Following the break, the mayor
announced his resignation.269

Of the four actors prominently involved in the blame games (the mayor,
the municipality, the monster truck driver, and Stichting Sterevenementen),
the mayor received most of the blame. Figure 4.4 shows the four actors’
blame levels and blame responses. In Fig. 4.4, a 0 indicates that no media
attention was paid to an actor; a 1 indicates that there was media attention
but the actor was either not blamed or did not respond to blame; and a 2
and higher reflects the blame levels and blame responses as described in
Chap. 2. To explain this blame game, the same outline will be followed as
in the previous two cases. First, the extent to which actors tried to shift
blame to others will be addressed. Second, the role of inquiries will be
investigated. And, third, a possible explanation for the outcome of this
blame game will be provided.

Occasionally, actors tried to shift blame away. The mayor initially claimed
that Stichting Sterevenementen had not informed the municipality about
267
268
Rouwenhorst, E. (2015, 28 May). ‘Raad toont zo begrip voor slachtoffers.’ Twentsche
Courant Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG.
269
Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG; ‘Schadeclaim truckdrama zo snel mogelijk
regelen’; Nieuwe hoop slachtoffers na vertrek burgemeester. (2015, 29 May). De Telegraaf,
Section Nieuws-Regio-NL, p. 17.
Fig. 4.4 Blame levels 10

9
and blame responses of 8
7
the four actors 6
5
(Resodihardjo et al. 4
3
2018, pp. 10–12). 2
1
Reprinted with 0
permission of Boom
15
15
4
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4
5
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mayor response mayor blame level
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municipality response municipality blame level
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driver response driver blame level
8
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15
/1
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ep
ct
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pr
/Ja
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29
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Stichting response Stichting blame level

the monster truck stunt.270 When that claim turned out to be untrue, the
mayor stated that Stichting Sterevenementen had notified the municipality
“but that it was not clear what [the monster truck] would do exactly.”271
Stichting Sterevenementen quickly responded to the mayor’s attack by
stating that they had informed the municipality.272 Additionally, Stichting
Sterevenementen told the media that the organization relied on the stunt
team to inform them how much space the stunt team needed and that the
organization had followed the requirements as outlined by both the
municipality and the stunt team.273 The truck driver came up with a
possible explanation for the accident (problems with the fuel flow) while
stressing the importance of finding out what had happened. He blamed
the Public Prosecution’s Office, however, for mishandling the investigation
thereby making it forever impossible to really determine the cause of the
accident.274 He also claimed that Stichting Sterevenementen should have
arranged the liability insurance.275 All in all, attempts to shift blame to
others were made, but none of these attempts were successful.

The literature is rife with reasons why actors should establish an inquiry
following a crisis. Basically, actors can use it to manage the political fallout
of the crisis. In this case, however, none of the actors appointed an inquiry.
Instead, the Dutch Safety Board decided on its own that an investigation
was needed. Moreover, the Safety Board wrote its own remit.
This raises the question as to what extent actors involved in the blame
game could use the inquiry to their advantage. In this case, the advantage
was pretty slim and solely consisted of allowing actors to bump the topic
off the political agenda and deflect some questions from the media
(McConnell 2003; Elliott and McGuinness 2002). During the first council
270
Burgemeester Hans Gerritsen heeft vergunning nooit gezien. “Dat hoefde ook niet.”
Amper oog voor veiligheid. (2014, 1 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
271
Komst van monstertruck staat wel in aanvraag van vergunning. (2014, 2 October).
272
van monstertruck.’ De Telegraaf, Section Voorpagina, p. 1.
273
Verdriet, en vraagtekens bij de vergunning. (2014, 30 September). De Volkskrant,
Section Ten Eerste.
274
‘Het gas bleef hangen.’ (2014, 22 November). Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
275
Stuntrijder Mario Doornink is niet verzekerd. (2014, 29 November). Twentsche
meeting, the mayor referred to the inquiry, the Public Prosecution Office’s
investigation, and the Board of Appeal procedure to say that not all
questions could yet be answered—either because the information was not
yet there or because the law stated that one has to await the Board of
Appeal’s advice before saying anything (Gemeente Haaksbergen 2014b,
e.g. minutes 1.10.53–1.11.02).276 During that same meeting, the mayor
said that the investigations should not be hindered and that therefore
“you will understand that for now no more announcements will be made
about this process.”277 The council members concurred that it was too
soon to answer all the questions as information was lacking (Gemeente
Haaksbergen 2014b).278 As a consequence, the issue was temporarily
removed from the political agenda (council meetings), but remained on
the public agenda (the media). Outside of the council meeting, the mayor
rarely used this tactic. In an interview to discuss the appeals, for instance,
the mayor noted that nothing could be said about the link between the
permit and the accident until the Public Prosecution’s Office’s and Dutch
Safety Board’s investigations had been completed.279
Once the report was published, the topic was firmly back on the politi-
cal and media agendas. This redirection of attention was fuelled by the
Safety Board’s critical conclusions.280
All in all, this case quite deviates from what we would expect to happen,
based on the literature. There is one other thing in this regard that deserves
our attention: the role inquiries can play when they allow victims and
bereaved to talk about their experiences. Inquiries can thus act as a catharsis
for emotions and help people to find closure (Weller 1994; Howe 1999;
Maclean 2001; Elliott and McGuinness 2002; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010;
Brändström 2016). What deserves further investigation is the extent to
276
277
278
279
Staal, T. (2015, 11 March). ‘Gehandeld naar eer en geweten.’ Twentsche Courant
280
Tubantia, Section RE-VERHAAL VAN; Staal, T. (2015, 21 May). ‘Te veel stempelen.’
Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section RE-VERHAAL VAN.
which the citizens of Haaksbergen felt heard because venues were either
closed off to citizens or they did not lend themselves for emotional
catharsis. First, the topic had been temporarily removed from the municipal
council thereby making it impossible for citizens to use council meetings
to discuss the events. Second, the Board of Appeal is a legal forum where
there is no room for emotional displays (Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015a).
Lastly, the Safety Board had chosen to focus its investigation on permit
procedures in Haaksbergen and other municipalities and the extent to
which these permit procedures helped to ensure safety at events
(Onderzoeksraad 2015b). So this venue for catharsis and closure was also
closed off to citizens. In short, there was no formal venue where citizens
could tell their story and express their emotions. Further research is
needed to investigate this, but based on the disappointment expressed by
Haaksbergen’s citizens in the newspapers, one can wonder to what extent
this disappointment was fuelled by a combination of a mayor who was
becoming quite defensive (as will be addressed below) and the lack of a
venue to express their feelings. This combination could have resulted in
citizens feeling not heard and, which in turn, could explain the citizens’
disappointment.
4.3.3.3 The Conflicting Roles Mayors Need to Fulfil

Mayors are expected to fulfil various roles. They need to act, for instance,
as an administrator, a liaison, and a representative. They also need to
uphold law and order. Moreover, they are also expected to act as a paternal
(or maternal) figure for their citizens. The latter role is also known as
burgervader in Dutch and refers to the mayor caring for his citizens
(Sackers 2010; Karsten et al. 2010, 2014; Nederlands Genootschap van
Burgemeesters 2017; Jong 2017). The fact that mayors need to fulfil these
and other roles makes their job quite difficult. Not only do they need to
find a balance between these roles, they also need to be able to shift quickly
and smoothly from one role to another. Balancing and shifting between
these roles is never easy, especially when their roles are conflicting (Sackers
2010; Karsten et al. 2010, 2014; Nederlands Genootschap van
Burgemeesters 2017; Jong 2017). One of these conflicts could occur
between “the strictly, but fairly enforcing mayor and the [sympathetic/
compassionate] and engaging burgervader” (Sackers 2010, p. 91).
Research has shown that mayors experience conflicting roles particu-
larly in situations characterized by a combination of a crisis which severely
affected the local community and the need for the mayor to account for
the crisis and its management (Jong 2017; Nederlands Genootschap van
Burgemeesters 2017). This combination was also present in the monster
truck case (Nederlands Genootschap van Burgemeesters 2017; cf.
Meerenburgh and Van Duin 2015). It is thus not surprising that Gerritsen
had to balance conflicting roles. In his case, the following roles conflicted:
the mayor as representative of the municipality, the mayor as administrator,
and the mayor as a caring mayor (burgervader).
The mayor made it clear that “[h]is priorities (…) [consisted of] ‘being
there’ for the victims and the bereaved.”281 The mayor, for instance, visited
the victims and the bereaved and attended a memorial activity.282 He
therefore put a lot of effort in his role as a mayor caring for his community.
The citizens of Haaksbergen appreciated the way in which Gerritsen
fulfilled this role.283 People were less appreciative of the way in which the
mayor fulfilled his role of representative in the media. His media appearance
was deemed “quite unfortunate”—particularly when it came to his
comment that he had not known about the monster struck even though
the whole town had been plastered with posters announcing the arrival of
the monster truck.284 The mayor also had to retract his statement that the
municipality had not been informed that a monster truck would be at the
event.285 Gerritsen acknowledged that he found it quite difficult to shift
from a caring mayor to a mayor representing the municipality in the
media.286 He described himself “more as a burgervader (…), than as a
media strategist.”287
281
Louwes, W. (2014, 30 September). Gemeente doet eigen onderzoek naar toedracht
ongeval. Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
282
Louwes, W. (2014, 30 September). Gemeente doet eigen onderzoek naar toedracht
ongeval. Twentsche Courant Tubantia.
Veel deelnemers verwacht bij stille tocht. (2014, 2 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
Section EN-HAAKSBERGEN.
283
De ontreddering, die vergeet je nooit. (2014, 4 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
284
Bouwhuis, H. (2014, 1 October). Vijf voorlichters versterken Haaksbergen.
Communicatie verloopt echter verre van vlekkeloos. – Haaksbergen kan het niet alleen.
285
Komst van monstertruck staat wel in aanvraag van vergunning. (2014, 2 October).
286
287
Tooms, B. (2014, 16 October). Haaksbergen stelt de schuldvraag uit; Documenten
online. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland, p. 4.
As stated earlier, the mayor was appreciated in his role as a mayor caring
for his citizens.288 This appreciation continued even after his resignation.289
But as time went by, citizens started to get irritated with the mayor’s
attitude that even with today’s knowledge, the permit would be granted
again. Consequently, people felt as if their mayor had abandoned them290
and councillors were unhappy with the mayor in his role as administrator.291
Nowhere in the newspaper articles did the mayor explain why he con-
tinued to insist that the permit would be granted again even with today’s
knowledge. In some newspaper articles and the second council meeting,
however, there was some speculation that the possibility of insurance
claims played a role in the mayor’s continuing defence of the permit
(Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c).292 A number of newspaper articles did
draw attention to the pain people were feeling because the mayor had not
taken responsibility for what had happened. Had the mayor taken respon-
sibility, then this would indicate “that the municipal administration of
Haaksbergen understands that it seriously fell short.”293 After all, the may-
or’s “citizens expect a gesture that allows the community to move on.”294
Or, as one of the lawyers representing the injured and bereaved put it: “If
such a trauma [occurs], then people need someone to take responsibility
and to say sorry. Only if that does not happen, then they will sue. Now
288
De ontreddering, die vergeet je nooit. (2014, 4 October). Twentsche Courant Tubantia,
289
Rouwenhorst, E. (2015, 28 May). ‘Raad toont zo begrip voor slachtoffers.’ Twentsche
Courant Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG; Staal, T., & Baard, L. (2015, 28 May).
Boetedoening burgemeester. Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG.
290
COMMENTAAR – Reactie van burgemeester Gerritsen is teleurstellend – Lastig par-
ket. (2015, 12 March). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section B-VANDAAG.
291
292
COMMENTAAR – Reactie van burgemeester Gerritsen is teleurstellend – Lastig par-
ket. (2015, 12 March). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section B-VANDAAG.
Tubantia, Section TWENTE VANDAAG; ‘Schadeclaim truckdrama zo snel mogelijk
regelen’; Nieuwe hoop slachtoffers na vertrek burgemeester. (2015, 29 May). De Telegraaf,
Section Nieuws-Regio-NL, p. 17.
293
COMMENTAAR – Positie van burgemeester staat ter discussie – Lessen van
Haaksbergen. (2015, 21 May). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section B-VANDAAG.
294
Aftreden onvermijdelijk. (2015, 28 May). Twentsche Courant Tubantia, Section
NIEUWS.
people are angry about the mayor’s actions and his (…) insistence that the
permit was granted correctly.”295
In short, there was a clear conflict between the role of a caring mayor
and the role of administrator. Taking care of citizens and listening to their
experiences collided with the formal and legal attitude which the mayor
adopted based on his role as administrator. During the second council
meeting, councillor Oltwater said that the mayor “has shown to be a good
burgervader, (…) but a bad administrator and mayor.”296
The mayor’s defensive stance—even when faced with increasing blame
levels—can help explain why the mayor finally resigned. According to the
blame game literature, an appropriate blame game response fits the blame
level one is facing. If there is a mismatch, resignation could follow. In this
case, it becomes clear not only from the newspaper articles but also from
the audio recording of the second council meeting, that councillors were
also frustrated with the mayor’s continuing support for the permit
(Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c).297 Even though the mayor, while
speaking to the councillors during the second council meeting, no longer
explicitly stated that he would grant the permit again, he did say it was
now up to the administrative court to judge whether the permit should
have been granted or not (Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c, minutes
5.10–5.49). In other words, he still did not explicitly say that the permit
should not have been granted. Councillor Oltwater was the chair of the
local coalition party Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)—the same party that the
mayor was a member of—and he made his position regarding the permit
very clear “you cannot defend the indefensible on formal grounds”
(Gemeente Haaksbergen 2015c, minutes 23.27–23.32).
4.4 Conclusion
The three cases show that even within a single category of crisis (festivals
gone wrong), there is a huge variety in how blame games evolve, how
complex they are, how long they will take, and how they will be completed.
295
Slachtoffers en betrokkenen monstertruckdrama zien bevestiging in kritisch rapport
Onderzoeksraad – Wachten op gemeend sorry. (2015, 21 May). Twentsche Courant
Tubantia.
296
297
NRC Handelsblad (2015, 28 May). Burgemeester Haaksbergen weg na ongeval met
monstertruck. NRC Handelsblad, Section Binnenland.
The cases show that the existing blame game literature largely helps to
explain what happens during blame games. Actors, for instance, try to shift
blame, appoint inquiries, and may even say sorry in order to decrease the
level of blame they are facing. Yet at the same time, the cases show that the
blame game literature cannot explain everything. Currently, the blame
game literature ignores, for example, context (be it upcoming elections or
holidays) which affect the way in which a blame game evolves. Other
variables that have an impact include rules and regulations (loss of pension
if one resigns) and the attendance of rituals. In Chap. 5, I will therefore
present a more comprehensive overview of the variables that influence the
outcome of blame games.
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ementenorganisatie Haaksbergen. Retrieved October 12, 2016, from https://
www.om.nl/vaste-onderdelen/zoeken/@89583/vervolgt-chauffeur/.
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strandrellen op 22 augustus 2009. Rotterdam: Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond.
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for reproduction). Bristol: The Policy Press.
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CHAPTER 5
Towards a Better Understanding of Blame

Games
My, perhaps naïve, assumption is that a better understanding of how blame

games work will help to better manage such games and thus create space
for learning. After all, blame games and learning are both intrinsic to the
accountability phase following crises. Too much emphasis on the blame
game, however, can result in actors being afraid to share their knowledge
of what actually happened. The fear, for instance, of being fired or pun-
ished just by acknowledging you made a mistake or knew of the mistake
will hamper the learning process as vital information is not shared. By
understanding how the blame game works, it should be possible to either
avoid it altogether or to handle it better—thus ensuring that blame games
become less dominant and the accountability stage is balanced as both
learning and blame games are present.
The aim of this book was thus to provide readers with knowledge on
why and how blame games start, how they evolve, and how these pro-
cesses are influenced by various factors such as blame responses, context
(holidays or upcoming elections), or regulations. To achieve this aim, I
not only provided a thorough overview of the blame game literature, but
added to this literature through explaining in detail the role of inquiries
following crises. This is important since numerous blame game publica-
tions merely state that it is a smart move to appoint one while ignoring the
fact that the investigation itself—and particularly the resulting report—
can have an impact on the blame game either because the inquiry is seen
as a whitewash (resulting in more blame), is used to blame others (a blame

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3_5
response), or determines who is actually to be blamed (possibly resulting

in (in)voluntary resignation or obligatory firing). It was therefore impor-
tant to describe the workings of inquiries in this book. In Chap. 4, I anal-
ysed three blame games following disastrous festivals. In Chap. 5, the
findings from the previous chapters will be combined to introduce a more
detailed overview of the factors affecting the blame game. I will conclude
this chapter with some thoughts on future avenues for research.
5.1 Factors Influencing Blame Games

The factors influencing the blame game are depicted in Fig. 5.1. Most
items in this figure will by now be familiar to the reader as they have been
extensively discussed in the previous chapters. Here I will suffice by stating
that Fig. 5.1 shows that following an incident, a framing contest starts in
which a consensus is reached whether the incident is a crisis, what the
causes were of this incident, and whether this crisis was a one-off event or
not. Who is going to be blamed and how much blame this actor will
receive depends on preventative strategies (where they in place and did
they work yes/no?) as well as the extent to which someone was responsi-
ble, what this actor’s reputation was prior to the crisis (an actor with a
weak reputation makes for an easy target), whether a similar crisis has hap-
pened before (if so, then that will lead to more blame), and the level of
avoidable harm (the higher the level, the more blame will be assigned).
New incident(s)/information
Preventive strategies:
- Policy strategies
- Agency strategies Blame response
- Presentational
Defining the situation Blame level strategies Blame game
- Rituals outcome
- Is it a crisis? - Context
Incident - What caused - Sub-blame games
the crisis? - Level of
- Is it perceived responsibility
as incidental? - Crisis history
- Reputation prior
to the crisis
- Level of avoidable
harm
Fig. 5.1 Factors influencing the blame game process (Resodihardjo et al. 2016,
p. 361). Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd
5 TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF BLAME GAMES 125
The occurrence of new incidents or new information coming to the fore,

can also have an impact on the blame level. Within the blame game litera-
ture, the assumption is that an adequate blame response will result in a
decrease of blame—adequate meaning a presentational strategy which fits
the level of blame one is facing. Low level of blames can be dealt with by
using quite defensive presentational strategies whereas high levels of blame
require more accommodative presentational strategies.
In this section, the focus is on the blame response as more needs to be
said about this part of the blame game process. Though the blame game
literature does have a lot to say about the blame response and how it
affects the blame game, the three cases (see also Resodihardjo et al. 2016)
show that there is more to blame responses than the literature currently
suggests. After all, the current blame game literature basically states that
once a blame game has commenced, presentational strategies can be used
to frame, manage, or influence the blame levels one is facing. The litera-
ture largely ignores, however, that presentational strategies can backfire,
that (non-)attendance at rituals might have an impact, that context mat-
ters, and that sub-blame games can temporarily draw attention away from
the original blame game thereby creating a moment of reprieve for those
under attack in the original blame game.
5.1.1 Backfiring Presentational Strategies

There is always the possibility that a presentational strategy will backfire.
But if you look at the three cases, two strategies seem to be more suscep-
tible to backfiring than others: letters and inquiries. In both the Love
Parade and the Sunset Grooves festival tragedies, actors (the mayor and
the police chief respectively) used letters to inform their subordinates
about what was going on. These letters were then leaked to the press
where they were discussed in detail—often in an extremely negative way.
It is not that the use of such letters is bad per se, but the leaking of the
letters and the subsequent dissection of these letters in the media show
that actors need to be careful with such written material. Do they really
want to send a letter knowing that it can be leaked to the press? And if so,
will the content of the letter be adjusted accordingly? A potential leak
might not be the only reason why actors might decide against letters: the
cases also show that employees prefer face-to-face contact. That means
that if actors do decide to opt for a letter, they should accompany that let-
ter with a meeting.
In the same two cases, there was another presentational strategy which
backfired to some extent: establishing inquiries. Inquiries are often
appointed following crises. On the one hand, because people want to
know what happened and inquiries can help to shed more light on the
disastrous events. On the other hand, inquiries help actors to manage a
crisis: they can show that they are taking action in response to the crisis,
they can at least temporarily ignore questions under the header of ‘the
inquiry should be able to do its job without any hindrance,’ and by the
time the inquiry publishes its report, the topic is most likely no longer of
interest (McConnell 2003). In the Sunset Grooves case, questions were
raised about the first inquiry into the event. The fact that the chair was one
of the police chief’s former district chiefs did not sit well with the media.
Even though it was not literally called a whitewash, the inquiry’s indepen-
dence was questioned. However, by the time the inquiry published its
report, the investigation had been relabelled as a quick scan and the qual-
ity of the report was no longer questioned though the sentiment was
expressed that a more thorough investigation was needed now that the
quick scan had been completed.
In the Love Parade case, the municipality had hired a law firm to con-
duct an investigation. The findings were then used to claim that the
municipality had acted correctly when approving the permit and that the
municipality had not been responsible for the safety of the festival goers on
the festival terrain. What is interesting about this inquiry is that the back-
firing happened in two steps. First, the fact that the municipality had asked
the law firm to suppress the publication of parts of the report was per-
ceived as government censure—though later on it was explained that it
had to do with privacy concerns. Second, when the Public Prosecution’s
Office published its interim report, it became clear that crucial parts of the
law firm’s report were incorrect. In fact, the Public Prosecution’s Office
was very critical of the municipality (as well as the other actors involved).
These two cases show that actors need to be careful when it comes to
appointing inquiries as the public might perceive these inquiries as a
whitewash and/or as an instrument to shift blame to someone else
(Resodihardjo 2006).
5.1.2 Rituals
Presentational strategies are aimed at changing the public’s perception of
the situation (Hood 2011): maybe the event was not that bad, maybe
other actors were more responsible than the one currently being blamed,
or maybe the responsible actor has taken sufficient remedial actions to the
extent that they should no longer be blamed. These are just a few exam-
ples of how presentational strategies can influence the public’s perception.
Rituals can affect the public’s perception as well, but that is not the
main reason why actors perform rituals—or at least one can hope so.
Instead, rituals are about showing empathy and compassion, offering sym-
pathy, making sure that the victims and bereaved feel that they are being
heard, and connecting public figures (such as mayors, politicians, and
Prime Ministers) with their citizens. Not organizing a ritual or not attend-
ing one could result in actors facing a lot of criticism (’t Hart 1993;
Bytzek 2008).
In all three cases, rituals were performed—ranging from memorial ser-
vices to silent walks together with citizens. In the Sunset Grooves case, the
mayor and police chief did not attend the silent walk. In that case, no one
criticized that decision—probably because the silent walk was for someone
who had been rioting. In the monster truck case, the mayor did attend the
rituals and his citizens appreciated the mayor in his role as caring for his
citizens. In contrast, the German mayor was not even welcome at, for
instance, the memorial and remembrance services. The fact that he did not
attend the rituals was not criticized, probably because attending the ritual
would actually be more problematic for the mayor than not attending it
considering the citizens’ anger towards the mayor. The mayor did explain,
though, that he did not attend the rituals out of consideration for the
victims and the bereaved.
As the Sunset Grooves case shows, not attending a ritual does not have
to result in any repercussions in the blame game. But the fact that there
was no critique following the German mayor’s absence does not mean that
there were no repercussions for the mayor. After all, because he was not
welcome at these rituals, he missed out on an important aspect of these
rituals: (re-)connecting with his citizens. A reconnection he dearly needed
considering how alienated the mayor was from his citizens.
5.1.3 Context
Context plays a crucial role in all three cases. In the monster truck case, for
instance, the media referred to the bad financial situation of the municipal-
ity and the critical report of the local audit office in which the work culture
at the municipality was criticized. Though these elements were not part of
the blame game, they were used by the media to paint a picture of a
municipality which was already facing huge problems before the disas-
ter struck.
In the Sunset Grooves case, upcoming elections and tenure played a
role in the blame game. Some local politicians were accused of using the
riot for political gain in the upcoming elections. The impact of length of
tenure on actors involved in the blame game was quite diverse: in the end,
the mayor could stay because he had been recently appointed. Because of
that, he was seen as less responsible for what had happened than the police
chief (who had worked in that position for many years). Plus, the mayor’s
recent appointment gave him the credibility needed to initiate the neces-
sary reforms in the police force.
In contrast, tenure did not play a role in the Love Parade. Media merely
stated that the Minister for the Interior Jäger had only been recently
appointed when the disaster happened. His length of tenure did not play
a role in the debate. What did play a role in the Love Parade case were
holidays and pension regulations. The former meant that it took a very
long time before the festival was discussed in the municipal council as
councillors were already or about to go on holiday when the disaster hap-
pened. The latter meant that the mayor could not use the most accom-
modative blame response: resignation. After all, if he resigned, he would
lose (a significant part of) his pension. Because of this regulation, he
needed to be voted out of office.
The examples provided here show that context does not necessarily play
a role in the blame game as the media can merely use such information to
paint a picture—as happened in the case of the monster truck disaster
(financial situation and local audit office’s report) and the Love Parade
(length of tenure of the Minister for the Interior). But sometimes, context
does have an impact—even if it just means that the accountability process
is delayed till everyone is back from holiday.
5.1.4
Sub-Blame Games
The last factor which needs to be incorporated in the blame game litera-
ture are sub-blame games. In this book, I define a sub-blame game as a
blame game spin-off which starts when statements or actions regarding
the original blame game result in a new blame game. This phenomenon
occurred in the aftermath of the Sunset Grooves festival. Actually, two
sub-blame games happened in that case. First, a representative of a local

populist party (Leefbaar Rotterdam) called the mayor the first Muslim
mayor of the Netherlands—this did not sit well with the other council-
lors. Second, a comment made by the National Ombudsman on the
police officers’ actions during the riot resulted in a blame game between
the National Ombudsman, the Public Prosecution’s Office, MPs, and
the Vice-Prime Minister. Basically, the Vice-Prime Minister publicly
stated that the National Ombudsman’s comment had been unwise. The
Vice-Prime Minister was then attacked for attacking the National
Ombudsman.
Interestingly, the effect of such sub-blame games on the original blame
game differs vastly. Whereas the first sub-blame game happened in the
same venue as the original blame game (the municipal council) and briefly
distracted attention from the original blame game, the second sub-blame
game ran parallel to the original blame game but in a different venue
(Parliament) though they shared one arena: the media.
A sub-blame game thus does not necessarily have an impact on the
original blame game. But if it does, it might have a huge impact. In this
case, it raises the question to what extent this sub-blame game helped or
hindered the mayor in the original blame game. Did it create some breath-
ing space for the mayor thereby giving him some time to reconsider his
blame responses before the original blame game continued? This is some-
thing worthy of investigation—which brings me to the next and last sec-
tion in this chapter in which I will briefly describe future avenues
for research.
5.2 Future Avenues for Research

As I stated in the introduction chapter, blame game research is gaining
traction as more and more academics study how blame games work. They
investigate various cases, using a diverse range of methods. So if blame
game research is becoming more popular, why bother with a section on
future avenues for research? This is done for two reasons: promoting the
methods used in this study and making an argument for including (the
role of) social media in the blame game research.
For this research, a codebook was made based on Hood et al. (2009).
Using this codebook, two coders independently coded newspaper arti-
cles and then compared their coding—thus creating a dataset. Researchers
can then opt to use these datasets in two ways. First, these datasets can
be used to run statistical analyses to investigate whether current assump-
tions in the literature (that higher blame levels should ignite more
accommodative blame responses from those being blamed and that a
higher blame response should result in a decrease in the levels of blame
one is facing) work or not. Second, these datasets in combination with
documents such as minutes of meetings can be used to conduct qualita-
tive research. The qualitative research can help to explain how blame
games work.
I am not saying that this approach is without any problem. As with any
coding, there is always some text which is difficult to code: should it be
blame level X or Y? And should we code a blame response as A or B? But
the high intercoder reliability (respectively 75.4% for the Sunset Grooves
case, 81.3% for the Love Parade case, and 91.2% for the monster truck
case—with an agreement after discussion reliability of 95% or higher)
shows that overall the codebook works.
The upside of this method is that it allows for a mixed method approach
which truly helps to further our understanding of how blame games work.
Moreover, it enables researchers to structurally compare cases as the same
theories and codebook are used to study the cases. It would therefore be
wonderful if multiple cases from various countries could be studied. After
all, one could imagine that a factor such as context in Japan or China
might contain elements which do not play a role at all in the Netherlands
or Germany.
The second avenue to explore in blame game studies is social media.
Social media and its role in blame games is already investigated to some
extent (Schwarz 2012) and social media can be investigated using the
methods described above. Instead of newspaper articles, though, you
would be coding tweets.
Although I have not investigated this and I am strictly speaking here as
an informed reader of newspapers, I have noticed that there is rarely a
crossover in the Netherlands between social media and traditional media
and political venues such as municipal councils or parliament. Instead,
MPs often refer to traditional media (be it TV or newspapers) when asking
questions in parliament.
Weaver (whose work has informed a lot of blame game research), how-
ever, recently published an article about the impact messages on social
media are having on generating blame. In his article, he argues that
“Twitter messages have the multiple advantages of being free and succinct
and lacking gatekeepers and therefore more likely to be picked up by

mainstream media” (Weaver 2018, pp. 265–266). Considering the impact
tweets are having on the public and political debate in the United States
of America (Ott 2017; Weaver 2018), it is interesting to investigate to
what extent twitter and other social media are changing the landscape of
blame games.
References
times: Exploring staged responses and the impact of blame management strate-
gies in two examination fiasco cases. European Journal of Political Research,
48(6), 695–722.
Ott, B. L. (2017). The age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the politics of debase-
ment. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 34(1), 59–68.
Resodihardjo, S. L. (2006). Wielding a double-edged sword: The use of inquiries
at times of crisis. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
14(4), 199–206.
94(2), 350–363.
Schwarz, A. (2012). How publics use social media to respond to blame games in
crisis communication: The Love Parade tragedy in Duisburg 2010. Public
Weaver, R. K. (2018). The nays have it: How rampant blame generating distorts
American policy and politics. Political Science Quarterly, 133(2), 259–289.
Index1
A C2000, 55, 57, 57n24, 58

Act of God, 5, 13 malfunctioning, 55, 57, 71, 74, 84,
90, 94
mobile phone network, 71, 74, 84
B mobile phones, 92
Blame attribution radio, 74, 84, 90
avoidable harm, 5, 17, 124 Context
reputation, 6, 17, 23, 25, 124 elections, 6, 118, 123, 128
Blame strategies holidays, 6, 118, 128
agency strategies, 19, 20 pension, 8, 128
anticipatory strategies, 19, 21, 124 recently appointed, 59, 128
pass the buck, 5 tenure, 128
policy strategies, 19
presentational strategies, 15, 17, 19,
21–26, 100, 125–127 E
proactive strategies, 19–21 Elections, 6, 96, 118, 123
scapegoat, 22 Emergency council meeting, 56, 67
staged retreat, 7, 25, 27
F
C Financial support for victims and
Communication system bereaved
communication devices, 94 emergency fund, 86, 105
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17531-3
134 INDEX
Financial support for victims and O

bereaved (cont.) Ombudsman, 60, 61, 83
financial fund, 83
insurance, 105, 112
insurance company, 83, 86, 91, 92, P
105 Pension, 8, 71, 76, 80–82, 92,
liability, 92, 105, 112 99–100, 118, 128
state fund, 83 Perceptions
Framing, 5, 7, 11–27, 124 causal perceptions, 7, 12–14
risk perceptions, 7, 12–14
Problem definition, 5, 12, 14–16, 40
H
Hierarchical relationship, 69, 70
Holidays, 6, 51, 67, 80, 118, 123 R
Resignation, 5, 6, 16, 19, 22, 48, 64,
68, 72, 79–81, 99, 110, 116,
I 117, 124, 128
Inquiries Risk management, 20, 103
catalytic inquiries, 34, 40–42 Risk society, 12, 22
influencing, 37–39 Rituals, 99–100, 118, 125–127
reasons to appoint, 34–36, 112, 113
terms of reference, 34, 35, 37–41
whitewash, 25, 67, 123, 126 S
Sub-blame game, 56, 60, 125,
128–129
M
Mayor
burgervader, 100, 114, 115, 117 T
role conflict, 114, 115, 117 Tenure
role of, 8, 100, 114, 115, 117 credibility, 59, 128
length of tenure, 8, 68, 69, 128
recent appointment, 59, 128
N
Negativity bias, 7, 12–14

RESOHARDIJO Crises, Inquiries, and The Politics of Blame

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Crises, Inquiries and

the Politics of Blame

Crises, Inquiries and

ISBN 978-3-030-17530-6 ISBN 978-3-030-17531-3 (eBook)

Cover illustration: Pattern © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com

Over the years, numerous people have provided feedback at confer-

2 Framing and Blaming 11

3 Inquiries Following Crises 33

4 Three Festivals Gone Wrong 47

5 Towards a Better Understanding of Blame Games123

Sandra L. Resodihardjo is Assistant Professor of Public Administration

Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-­

On 20 September 2018, a horrible accident took place in Oss, the

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT)) which should have kept an eye on these

and the ministry knew to be incorrect—on another alleged stint related

produced the stint had to file for bankruptcy.11 In December, TNO

requires a willingness to share information about mistakes that have been

In the next chapter, theories on blame games will be addressed. The

In Chap. 4, I draw and extend on existing publications (Resodihardjo

Before we delve deeper into how blame games work, it is important to

2.1 Perceptions and Framing

© The Author(s) 2020 11

perceptions are informed, amongst other things, by people’s negativity

process is profoundly altering the American public’s awareness and

2.2 Attributing Blame

Who is going to be blamed is largely determined by the way in which the

1. Very Either benign neglect High and Muted Either low or as

Members of Parliament (MPs) request emergency debates—and the

2.3 How to Deal with Blame

Sager 2019). The use of standard operating procedures and protocols

therefore offers us a good idea of how actors can respond to blame. To

2.3.3 Using Which Strategy When

attack the appointing apology with

Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-­

McConnell, A. (2003). Overview: Crisis management, influences, responses and

Inquiries Following Crises

© The Author(s) 2020 33

Brändström 2016). And although inquiries may have an “aura of

3.1 Reasons to Appoint an Inquiry

3.2 Influencing Inquiries

(London, UK) in 1991, for instance, an inquiry was established headed by

3.3 The Independent Streak of Public Inquiries

be invited, and which parts of the proceedings will be public (Gosnell

and technically feasible as well as in line with existing government aims

strategies in two examination fiasco cases. European Journal of Political

Rhodes, G. (1975). Committees of inquiry. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Three Festivals Gone Wrong

© The Author(s) 2020 47

4.1 Sunset Grooves Festival

Prior to the festival, Tridee informed the municipality that following a

In response to the events, and as part of standard-operational-­

4.1.2 The Blame Game

could actually be applied because it would still remain quite difficult to

officers as suspects was a standard operating procedure following a police

Meanwhile, a new but linked sub-blame game developed. As stated

hand and a pub was severely damaged. The incident happened on a

4.1.3 The Blame Game Explained

police chief blame

4.1.3.1 Shifting Blame

4.1.3.2 The Use of Inquiries

Councillors considered the second inquiry’s report to be a thorough

4.1.3.3 The Police Chief

2 Framing and Blaming 11

3 Inquiries Following Crises 33

4 Three Festivals Gone Wrong 47

5 Towards a Better Understanding of Blame Games123

Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-

Fig. 2.1 Examples of presentational strategies located on a defensive-

In response to the events, and as part of standard-operational-

4.1.3.1 Shifting Blame

4.1.3.2 The Use of Inquiries

4.1.3.3 The Police Chief

4.2.3.1 Shifting Blame

4.2.3.2 The Use of Inquiries

4.2.3.3 Pensions and Rituals

4.3.3.1 Shifting Blame

4.3.3.2 The Use of Inquiries

4.3.3.3 The Conflicting Roles Mayors Need to Fulfil