[G.R. No. 4718. March 19, 1910.

SY JOC LIENG, SY YOC CHAY, SY JUI NIU and SY CHUA

NIU, plaintiffs, appellees-appellants, vs. PETRONILA
ENCARNACION, GREGORIO SY QUIA, PEDRO SY QUIA, JUAN
SY QUIA and GENEROSO MENDOZA SY QUIA, defendants,
appellants-appellees.

Bishop & O'Brien, for plaintiffs, appellees and appellants.

Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, M. Legaspi, and Ledesma & Sumulong, for
defendants, appellants and appellees.

SYLLABUS

Per Torres, J.:

1. ACTION TO ENFORCE RIGHT TO AN INHERITANCE: BURDEN

OF PROOF. — An action to enforce the right to an inheritance can not
properly be maintained by the descendants of a person in the capacity of
legitimate successors and heirs, when at the trial the claimants of such
inheritance do not prove the marriage of their ancestor nor that of the alleged
children of the later, nor the paternity and filiation of the claimants.
2. CHILDREN: LEGITIMACY; CONJUGAL PROPERTY. — The
marriage contracted in good faith, although it afterwards be declared null and
void, nevertheless, produces civil effects with respect to the spouse who
acted in good faith and the children begotten in such marriage; the latter are
considered by law to be legitimate, the same as though they had been born of
parents lawfully married, and the deceived husband or wife is fully entitled to
the enjoyment of one half of the property acquired during the conjugal
partnership afterwards dissolved by the annulment of the marriage.
3. PERSON CONTRACTING MARRIAGE IN BAD FAITH NOT
ENTITLED TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY. — The husband or the wife who
acted in bad faith is not entitled to one-half of the community property that
otherwise would have fallen to his or her share, which half of the property is
conveyed by operation of the law to the innocent husband or wife, the one
who acted in bad faith being deprived of it.
4. EFFECT OF ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE. — The annulment of the
marriage by the courts abolishes the legal character of the society formed by
the putative spouse, but it can not destroy the juridical consequences which
the marital union produced during its continuance.
 5. ACTION TO ENFORCE HEREDITARY RIGHTS, BROUGHT AFTER
PROMULGATION OF CIVIL CODE. — The right to inherit while the
predecessor in interest is living, is a mere expectancy, a potential right, and
not until the decease of the person whose succession is concerned can the
heredity right be deemed to have arisen or to be duly acquired; therefore an
action concerning hereditary rights, brought subsequent to the promulgation
of the Civil Code, must be tried and decided in accordance with the provisions
thereof.
6. CHINESE RESIDENTS OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LAW
APPLICABLE TO DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES. — The Chinaman who
obtained from the Government of the Islands permission to reside therein, and
who continued to live in the Islands for more than fifty years, and engaged in
trade and traffic in the products of the soil, married a native woman,
established himself in a home of his own, acquired real estate, and declared
in various public documents that he was a resident of the Islands and a
property owner, undeniably acquired the character of a resident in these
Islands domiciled therein, in accordance with the laws in force prior to the
enactment of the Civil Code, and therefore the questions raised in a litigation
in which his estate is claimed, must be tried and decided in conformity with
the laws in force in these Islands, to which the Chinaman who solicited
permission to reside and gained residence therein, submitted, and for the
further reason that the greater part of the property left by him is real estate.
7. EXISTENCE OF FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROVED AS A
QUESTION OF FACT. — When in a litigation the application of a foreign law,
for example the law of China, is sought, it is necessary to prove before the
courts of the Islands, in a satisfactory manner, the existence of such a law as
a question of fact; and when proof of such a law is lacking, it is improper to
apply unknown laws to suits pending before the courts of the Islands.
8. JUDGMENT NOT SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
REVERSED. — A judgment not sustained by the result and weight of the
evidence adduced at trial should be reversed, inasmuch as the final decision
of the suit must be consistent with the facts alleged and satisfactorily proven
at the trial.
Per Johnson J., dissenting:
9. HUSBAND AND WIFE; DOUBLE MARRIAGE; GOOD FAITH; OF
CONJUGAL PROPERTY. — S, a Chinaman, in 1847 married a Chinese
woman in China, in accordance with the laws and customs of China. In 1852,
without the first marriage being dissolved, he married another woman in the
Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws and customs of the Philippine
Islands. The second wife at the time of the marriage was ignorant of the
existence of the first wife. As a result of the first marriage two children were
born, and of the second marriage five children were born. After the death of S,
who had accumulated property during the existence of the second marriage,
his estate was duly distributed between the second wife and the children of
the second wife, by the courts of the Philippine Islands. Later, the children of
the first marriage, and their descendants, brought an action in the courts of
the Philippine Islands, demanding a portion of the estate of S; Held, That,
inasmuch as the second marriage was entered into in good faith on the part of
the second wife, the first marriage being legal, that each wife was entitled to
one-half of the property acquired during the second marriage; that for the
purposes of distribution of the said property, the waives were each regarded
as legitimate in law, and that the children of each marriage succeeded to the
interest which their respective mothers obtained from the common husband.
10. LEGITIMACY; HUSBAND AND WIFE. — Where a man marries a
second wife while a first is still living, the second wife having no knowledge of
any existing impediment to such marriage, and entering into the marriage
relation in good faith, such second wife, for the purpose of participating in the
conjugal property, will be regarded in law as a legitimate wife.
11. LEGITIMACY; CHILDREN — Children born of a second marriage,
entered into in good faith on the part of the wife, before the first marriage has
been dissolved or annulled, for the purpose of inheriting the mother's interest
in the conjugal property, will be regarded as legitimate. Legitimacy depends
upon the lex fori or the lex. The law of the place of birth, as a general rule,
governs legitimacy.
12. NULLIFICATION OF MARRIAGE; EFFECT OF SUCH
NULLIFICATION. — Article 1417 of the Civil Code is not applicable to a case
where a man or woman has a legitimate wife or husband and children and
marries a second wife or husband. It was not the intention of the wise Spanish
legislators to give said article an interpretation which would prejudice a prior
legal wife and legitimate children. It was not the intention of the Spanish
legislators to punish the first wife and children by giving all of the property to
the second wife. The first legitimate wife and children, who committed no
wrong, should not be punished by depriving them of their legitimate interest in
their husband's and father's estate. The wise legislature of the Spanish
Government, assisted by the pure motives and high ideals of the Holy Roman
Catholic Church, never intended that article 1417 should receive the
interpretation contended for in the majority opinion. Property, under the facts
in the present case, should be distributed in accordance with law 1, title
13, partida 4.
13. LAWS GOVERNING RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION. — The right of
succession to property inheritance is determined, as to personal property, by
the laws of the residence of the parties, and as to real property by the laws of
the location of the property.
14. PROBATE COURTS; PROBATION OF ESTATES. — A decree of a
probate court ordering a will to be executed or an estate to be distributed,
does not amount to a judgment binding on those who were not parties to such
proceedings. Parties interested in an estate and who were not made parties to
the probation of such estate, may bring an action to secure their interest
therein.
15. INTEREST UPON SHARES OF AN ESTATE. — Persons who have
possession of money or property in good faith, which of right belong to others,
are not liable to pay interest upon such money or property, or rent for the use
and occupation of the same, except from the date of a judicial demand.
TORRES, J  : p

On the 4th day of December, 1905, the said Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc
Chay, Sy Jui and Sy Chua Niu filed an amended complaint against the said
defendant, alleging: That in or about the year 1823 one Sy Quia,
subsequently known in these Islands as Vicente Romero Sy Quia, was born in
China, and in or about the year 1847 was married in the city of Amoy to Yap
Puan Niu, of which marriage the following male children were born, to wit: Sy
By Bo and Sy By Guit, they being the only legitimate heirs of the said Vicente
Romero Sy Quia; that in or about the year 1882 Sy By Bo died intestate in
China, leaving as his only surviving children and legitimate heirs the plaintiffs
Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Jui Niu; that in or about the year 1880 the other child of
Sy Quia, Sy By Guit, also died instestate in China, leaving as his only
surviving children and legitimate heirs the other plaintiffs, Sy Joc Lieng and Sy
Chua Niu; that in or about the year 1891 Yap Puan Niu died intestate in
China, leaving her surviving husband, Sy Quia, and her grandchildren, who
are the plaintiffs in this case; that in the year 1894 Vicente Romero Sy Quia
died intestate in this city of Manila, leaving his surviving grandchildren, the
plaintiffs, as his only legitimate heirs.
That Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired during his life-time a large
amount of property, consisting of personal and real property in the Philippine
Islands, mostly located in the city of Manila, amounting to P1,000,000
Philippine currency; that on or about the 3d of August, 1900, the defendants
illegally, without any rights, and in the absence of the plaintiffs herein, took
possession of all the said personal and real property left by the said Sy Quia,
deceased, and since then have managed and administered the same,
alleging to be owners thereof; that since the said 3d day of August, 1900, the
defendants and each of them have converted and are converting part of the
property of the said Sy Quia, deceased, to the use and benefit of each of
them, and a large part of the said property, consisting of real and personal
property unknown to the plaintiffs, they being in possession thereof as
owners, exercising over them acts of ownership, and converting them to their
own use; that it has been impossible for the plaintiffs to discover, ascertain,
and have knowledge of each and all the items of real and personal property
belonging to the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, at the time of his
death, nor the amount of personal and real property converted by the
defendants, except such as is described in the accompanying document
marked "Exhibit A," which is a part of the complaint; that the property
described in said document is a part of the estate left by the deceased Sy
Quia at the time of his death, aside and apart from the personal and real
property converted by the defendants, who are, and each one of them is, in
possession and custody of all the deeds, instruments, contracts, books, and
papers relating to the title and conversion of the said real and personal
property, which titles and the descriptions thereof could but be proven without
the sworn statements of the defendants and of each one of them; that the
plaintiffs are informed and believe that the said real and personal property
belonging to the estate of the said Sy Quia, and which is now held and
controlled by the defendants, has a value of approximately P1,000,000,
Philippine currency.
That the plaintiffs are the only descendants and legitimate heirs of the
deceased are the only Sy Quia, they being entitled to the possession of all the
property of his estate, as well as of the real and personal property converted
as aforesaid, and the defendants having appropriated the same, with all the
rents and profits thereof, it is impossible for the plaintiffs to ascertain and
discover the true amount of the said rents and profits, which aggregate
several thousand pesos, all of which said property is in danger of being lost,
to the irreparable damage of the plaintiffs, unless and except a receiver is
appointed to take charge of the preservation and custody of the same in order
to protect the interests of the said plaintiffs, and enable the court to determine
the actual value of the real and personal property of the estate at the time of
the death of the said Sy Quia, as well as the value of the real and personal
property subsequently converted by the defendants, together with the rents
and profits of the whole estate, converted by the defendants to their own use
and benefit; wherefore it is necessary that said defendants be required to
render detailed accounts of the real and personal property and rents and
profits of the estate, and that it be ascertained by the sworn statement of the
said defendants what the actual value of the real and personal property of the
said estate, with the rents and profits, thus converted and held by them, is.
They accordingly prayed that defendants be directed to render under
oath a complete and detailed account of all the property left by Sy Quia at the
time of his death, of the administration, custody, control, converted and
disposal thereof, of the conversion of the same, and of the rents and profits of
the original property, as well as of the property thus converted, including the
said accounting both such properties with the rents and profits; that, upon the
giving of the necessary bond, a receiver be appointed to administer the
original property, as well as the property converted, during the pendency of
the present litigation, the said complete and detailed account under oath as
aforesaid to be submitted to the court, covering the original property as well
as the property converted, with all rents and profits, and that thereupon a
receiver be appointed to take charge and control of the administration of the
whole of said property.
They further prayed that it adjudged and decreed that the defendants
are the only descendants and heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia from
and since the time of his death, and that they are the only legitimate owners of
the real and personal property left by him, and of the whole of said property
converted by the defendants, and that they are entitled to the possession of
the whole of the said property and the rents and profits accruing therefrom;
that it be decreed that the defendants have not and never had any right, title
or interest to the said property, nor to the rents and profits thereof, the same
being held by them as mere trustees for the benefit of the plaintiffs and each
of them, further praying for any other relief which the court may deem just and
equitable, and for the costs of this action.
ANSWER
The defendants, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, and Juan Sy
Quia, answering the foregoing complaint, specifically deny paragraphs, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint, which relate to the paternity and status of the
plaintiffs, and to the death of their grandmother and parents, and also deny
generally all and each of the allegations contained in paragraph 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the complaint, relating to the succession and
actual condition of the estate of the deceased Sy Quia, except as otherwise
expressly admitted as true in the said answer.
As a special defense and in opposition to the complaint, the defendants
allege that prior to the year 1852 Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was an
infidel known only by the name of Sy Quia, he having resided in the Philippine
Islands for many years prior thereto; that on June 8, 1852, the said infidel
Chinaman Sy Quia was converted to the Christian religion, and was baptized
in the parish church of San Vicente, Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands,
under the name of Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as shown by his
certificate of baptism marked "Exhibit 1," and made an integral part of the
answer; that on June 9, 1853, the Christian Chinaman Vicente Ruperto
Romero Sy Quia contracted canonical marriage in accordance with the laws
then in force in these Islands, with the defendant Petronila Encarnacion, a
native of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as shown by his certificate of marriage marked
"Exhibit 2," which is made an integral part of the answer; that the said Vicente
Sy Quia and his wife, Petronila Encarnacion, fixed their residence and
conjugal domicile in these Islands until the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership by the death of the husband on January 9, 1894; that at the time
of their marriage Vicente Romero Sy Quia had no property, and brought no
property into the marriage, but that the wife brought to the marriage a small
capital which was the foundation of the subsequent fortune acquired by the
spouses by their labor and industry, and by the labor and industry of the
children, five in number, named Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan,
all of whom have always been in continuous possession of the status of
legitimate children, in lawful wedlock begotten of the said Vicente Romero Sy
Quia and Petronilla Encarnacion, according to the copies of the certificates of
baptism marked "Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7," to be considered as an integral
part of the answer.
That on January 9, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died intestate in the
city of Manila, and after the necessary legal proceedings under the legislation
then in force, his surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan,
and his grandchild Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother, Maria
Romero Sy Quia, deceased, were declared by a decree of the Court of First
Instance of the district of Quiapo, dated January 26 of the said year, to be the
heirs abinstate of the said deceased, as shown buy a copy of the said decree,
marked "Exhibit 3," as an integral part of the answer, Apolinaria Romero Sy
Quia, one of the children recognized as heirs of their deceased father, having
died on the 1st of May, 1900, leaving as her only legitimate heir her surviving
mother, Petronila Encarnacion.
That since January 9, 1894, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia died, the
defendants have been in quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession as
owners in good faith and with a just title, of the property which constitutes the
estate of their deceased father, they never having been heretofore disturbed
therein by the plaintiffs or any of them, notwithstanding the fact that the said
plaintiffs were here in the Philippine Islands, and all the property included in
the inventory made at the time of the partition of the state of the deceased Sy
Quia, was acquired by him subsequent to the year 1853, when he married the
defendant Petronila Encarnacion; that a great portion of the real property
included in the said inventory was acquired by Petronila Encarnacion after the
death of her husband, and that in the title deeds of a considerable portion of
the property bought during the lifetime of Sy Quia, Petronila Encarnacion
appears as the vendee, wherefore the defendants Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy
Quia, and Petronila Encarnacion, prayed the court that they be acquitted of
the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs, and that they, the
defendants, be granted such other and further relief as might be just and
equitable.
 The other defendant, Gregorio Sy Quia, answering the complaint,
denied all and each of the allegations therein contained, and further
specifically denied that Sy Quia had married in or about the year 1847 at
Amoy, China, the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu, and that the said Sy Bi Bo
and Sy By Guit were the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Sy
Quia, also that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy
Chua Niu were the grandchildren and legitimate heirs of the deceased Vicente
Romero Sy Quia; that as a special defense he alleged that the deceased Sy
Quia, many years prior to 1852, while a non-Christian Chinese subject,
definitely fixed his residence and domicile in the Philippine Islands, subjecting
himself to the laws then therein in force; that in the year 1852 Sy Quia was
baptized, having been converted to the Catholic faith, on the 11th of June of
that year, the ceremony taking place at the parish church of San Vicente, he
being then named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, and on June 9 of the
following year he contracted marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in
accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church, and in conformity with the
laws then in force in the Philippine Islands, as shown by the church
certificates marked "Exhibits A and B."
That Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion since their marriage
continuously resided in the Philippine Islands until the 9th of January, 1894,
when the husband died intestate, they having had since their marriage five
children, among them Gregorio, who subscribes this answer, according to
canonical certificate Exhibit C; that the deceased Sy Quia brought no property
into the conjugal partnership, but Petronila Encarnacion did bring with her the
small capital of 5,000, with which, through their labor and industry at first, and
subsequently by the labor and industry of their children, they had acquired the
large amount of property existing at the time of the death of the husband, said
property so acquired being located in the Philippine Islands; that on the 23d of
January, 1894, by an order of the Court of First Instance of the district of
Quiapo, the surviving children of Sy Quia, named Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro,
and Juan, and Sy Quia's grandchidren, Generoso Mendoza, representing his
(Generoso's) deceased mother, Maria Romero Sy Quia, were declared to be
the heirs abintestate of the said Sy Quia, as shown by a copy of the said
decree, marked "Exhibit D," the defendants having taken possession from that
date of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, they having continued so in
possession in the quality of owners, with just title and good faith, adversely,
publicly, quietly and peacefully, until the plaintiffs presented their complaint to
the court; that on the 1st day of May, 1900, Apolinario Romero Sy Quia died a
spinster and intestate, leaving as her only legitimate heir her mother, Petronila
Encarnacion; that the plaintiffs at the time of the death of Vicente Romero Sy
Quia had knowledge of his demise, and had notice that the defendants had
petitioned to the court for a declaration, which they obtained, to the effect that
they were the heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased; and that
at no time were the plaintiffs or their parents recognized or considered by the
said Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia as his descendants, heirs or relatives;
wherefore defendant prayed that judgment be entered declaring that the
plaintiffs had no right or interest to or in the estate of the deceased Vicente
Romero Sy Quia, and that the defendants are the only legitimate heirs of the
said Sy Quia, taxing the costs against the plaintiffs.
The last of the defendants, Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, answering the
complaint on the 18th January, 1906, alleged that he denied all and each of
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 16, inclusive, of the complaint,
and that he also specifically denied that the deceased Sy Quia, whose
Christian name is Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, had married at Amoy,
China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, in or about the year 1847, or at any time
previous or subsequent thereto; that the said Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were
the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Sy Quia; that the plaintiffs
Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Jui Niu, and Sy Chua Niu were the legitimate
descendants or heirs of the deceased Sy Quia.
As a special defense, defendant alleged that the Chinaman Sy Quia
came to the Philippine Islands as an immigrant a long time prior to 1852,
fixing his residence and domicile therein, and subjecting himself to the laws
then in force in this country; that in the said year 1852, Sy Quia having been
converted to Christianity, was baptized in the parish church of San Vicente,
Ilocos Sur, and named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as shown by the
canonical certificates exhibited by the defendants, and marked "Exhibits 1 and
A," which are made a part of this answer; that on June 9, Vicente Ruperto
Romero Sy Quia was married by the Church to Petronila Encarnacion in
accordance with the canonical laws, as shown by the certified copies of the
marriage certificate, marked "Exhibits 2 and B," introduced by the other
defendants; that Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion established
themselves and fixed their conjugal domicile in the Philippine Islands, where
they continued to reside until the 9th of January, 1894, when the marriage
was dissolved by the death of the husband in Manila; that the said spouses
since their marriage had five children, of whom Apolinaria died a spinster, and
Maria, who had married, died leaving a child, the defendant Generoso
Mendoza, the grandson of the deceased Sy Quia, the said Generoso
Mendoza and the other children of the deceased Sy Quia, named Gregorio,
Pedro, and Juan, having survived; that Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of
his marriage owned no property, while Petronila Encarnacion brought to the
conjugal partnership a small capital, amounting to P5,000, which was the
foundation of the large fortune subsequently acquired by them through their
labor and industry, subsequently augmented with the aid of their own children.
 That on the 9th of January, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died, and
after the necessary legal proceedings under the law of civil procedure then in
force in these Islands, the Court of First Instance by a decree dated the 26th
of the said month and year, declared that the surviving children, Apolinaria,
Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and his grandchild Generoso Mendoza,
representing his mother Maria, deceased, were the heirs of the deceased Sy
Quia, intestate, as shown by Exhibits 8 and D, introduced by the other
defendants; that on May 1, 1900, the oldest daughter, Apolinaria, died
intestate and single, leaving as her only heir her mother Petronila
Encarnacion; that since the death of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia the
defendants had been in quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession
of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, having held the same adversely,
with good faith and just title; and that they have never been disturbed by the
plaintiffs in such possession, notwithstanding the fact that they, the plaintiffs,
were in the Philippine Islands at the time of the death of Vicente Romero Sy
Quia, and had knowledge of the fact that the defendants had applied to the
Court of First Instance for and secured a declaration to the effect that they
were the heirs of the deceased Sy Quia; and that neither the plaintiffs nor the
said Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit had ever been recognized or considered by the
deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia as his descendants, heirs or relatives,
they never having been in possession of the legal status of children or
legitimate descendants of the said Sy Quia; wherefore this defendant prayed
that judgment be rendered in favor of all the defendants, acquitting them of
the complaint, and directing that the plaintiffs pay the costs.
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT.
The plaintiffs on the 31st of January, 1906, presented by way of reply to
the answers of the various defendants an amendment to the original
complaint, denying generally and specifically all and each of the material
allegations set out in the answers of the defendants and alleging that the
pretended marriage between Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila
Encarnacion was not a lawful marriage, but a false and fraudulent one,
without any force, efficacy, or legal validity, the certificate of marriage
presented by the defendants not being a true and correct certificate of
marriage, the same being false, fraudulent, and without any force, efficacy, or
legal validity, for the reason that on June 9, 1853, Vicente Romero Sy Quia
was and thereafter continued to be the lawful husband of one Yap Puan Niu,
until the year 1891, when she died, and that the marriage of Sy Quia with the
said Yap Puan Niu, since 1847 and until her death in 1891, was continuously
in full force and effect, Sy Quia not having married again after the death of the
said wife; and that Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, the alleged
legitimate children of Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion,
were not and never had been the legitimate children of Sy Quia, and that they
were not and never had been his legitimate heirs and descendants, the
certificates of baptism produced by the defendants, and marked "Exhibits 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7," not being true nor proper, but false and fraudulent, and of no
force, efficacy, or legal validity, the said children not being the legitimate
descendants of the deceased Sy Quia. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended
complaint are a repetition of similar paragraphs contained in the original.
ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The defendants, Generoso Mendoza, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy
Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, filed their answers to the
amended complaint on the 7th and 13th of February, 1906, denying all and
each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the amended
complaint, stating that they ratified each and all of the allegations, denials and
defenses contained in their previous answer, which they reproduced therein,
and that they renewed their prayer that judgment be rendered acquitting them
of the said complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs.
On June 19, 1906, counsel for Petronila Encarnacion notified the court
in writing of the death of the said Petronila Encarnacion, who died in this city
on the 6th of the said month, and as counsel for the other defendants, Pedro
and Juan Sy Quia, moved the court that in accordance with section 119 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, an order be made directing that the action be
proceeded with in the name of the administrator of her estate, Pedro Sy Quia,
which motion was granted without any objection on the part of the plaintiffs'
attorney, on June 21, 1906.
On August 20, 1906, it was stipulated between counsel for both parties
that by order of the court the deposition of several witnesses then designated
by the plaintiffs be taken at Amoy, China, before the consul, vice-consul, or a
consular agent of the United States in the said city, during the days and in the
manner agreed upon, in accordance with section 362 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the defendants being authorized to take the deposition of such
witnesses as they might desire to present in the manner agreed upon.
On November 8, 1906, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court of the
death of one of the plaintiffs, Sy Jui Niu, at Amoy, China, on or about the 28th
of July of the said year, and she having died intestate, the court on November
8, appointed C. W. O'Brien as special administrator of her estate, and said
counsel thereupon asked the court to allow the action to be continued by him,
and, by a subsequent petition filed on the 13th of the same month, the
administrator C. W. O'Brien, appointed as aforesaid, filed a written
appearance as such administrator of the estate of the deceased Sy Jui Niu.
On a petition filed on the 17th of November, 1906, counsel for both
parties informed the court that the documents presented by the defendants,
and marked "Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and A, B, and C," which are
certificates of baptism, marriage, and burial, should be considered as original
and authentic documents, so as to avoid the necessity of presenting the
originals themselves, which were bound in book form, together with other
documents relating to persons who had no connection with this litigation.
On the 4th of January, 1907, the defendants presented a motion to the
Court of First Instance, asking that the depositions taken before the consul of
the United States at Amoy, China, as given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs,
named Li Ung Bing, Sy Peng, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kay Tit,
Yap Chong, Sy Boan, Sy Kong Len, and Sy Hong Oan, whose testimony the
plaintiffs attempted to introduced in this action, be not admitted, defendants'
motion being based on the ground that the said depositions contained a
formal defects concerning the manner in which the oath was administered to
the witnesses.
In a petition filed on the same date, January 4, the defendants
reproduced their former motion, alleging as a further ground in support thereof
that the certificates by the officer who took the said depositions did not comply
with the essential requisites provided by law, and after due notice to the
plaintiffs, a hearing was had upon the said petition on January 7, 1907. After
the recital of the evidence introduced by both parties, and after the documents
exhibited by them, together with the depositions taken at Vigan of various
witnesses for the defendants, and of the depositions taken at Amoy, China,
had been united to the record, the Court of First Instance on the 26th of
February, 1908, rendered a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joc
Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C. W. O'Brien, the latter as guardian of
Sian Han, and the defendants Gregorio Sy Quia, Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy
Quia and Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, and the heirs of the deceased
Petronila Encarnacion, represented by one of the defendants, Pedro Sy Quia,
as the administrator of the property, were the heirs of the property of the
estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, now deceased, consisting of one-half of
the property distributed by the order of the Court of First Instance of the
district of Quiapo of the 3d of August, 1900, in the following form: To Sy Joc
Lieng, one-ninth; Sy Yoc Chay, one-ninth; Sy Chua Niu, one-ninth; C. W.
O'Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, one-ninth; Pedro Sy Quia, one-ninth;
Juan Sy Quia, one-ninth; Gregorio Sy Quia, one-ninth; Generoso Mendoza Sy
Quia, one-ninth; and the heirs of Petronila Encarnacion, represented by Pedro
Sy Quia as the administrator of the latter's estate, one-ninth; the heirs of the
said Petronila Encarnacion, represented by the administrator of her estate,
being the owners with the right to possession of the other half of the property
left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death.
That the defendants, Gregorio, Pedro, Juan, and Generoso, and Pedro
Sy Quia as the administrator of the property of his mother Petronila
Encarnacion and as a representative of the latter's heirs, render a statement
of the property which was distributed among them under and by virtue of the
order of the Court of First Instance, of the 3d of August, 1900.
That the said defendants and each of them render an accounting of the
rents and profits of all the property respectively received by them from the
dates when they were delivered to them, it being understood that if upon
making the inventory of the property it appears that the portion thereof
assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not exceed one-half of
all the property left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia, at the time of his death, it will
not be necessary to render an accounting of the rents and profits of the
portion to her thus assigned.
That a receiver, to be selected later, be appointed upon the giving of a
sufficient bond, the amount of which will be hereafter fixed, to take charge and
possession of all the property known as aforesaid, it being understood that if
upon making a list of the said property it appears that the part thereof
assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not exceed one-half of
all the property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his
death, the said receiver shall only take possession of one-half of the property
assigned to the other persons who have accounted for them. The Court of
First Instance made no special order as to costs.
To this decision of the trial court counsel for the defendants, Pedro Sy
Quia, by himself and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion,
Juan Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and Generoso Mendoza, duly excepted, and
by a motion presented to the court asked that the said judgment be set aside
and a new trial granted, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and because the decision of the
trial court was contrary to law, the findings of fact being plainly and manifestly
against the weight of the evidence. Upon notice to counsel for plaintiffs, a
hearing was had upon said motions, which were subsequently over-ruled by
the court. Defendants having duly excepted to the order of the court overruling
the same, and upon filing their bill of exceptions, asked the court to unite to
the same all of the evidence taken and introduced by both parties, with the
documents and pleadings presented during the course of the trial, the
transcript of the stenographic notes containing the testimony of the witnesses,
and the depositions taken at Vigan and Amoy, which said bill of exceptions
defendants asked the court to approve and certify to the Supreme Court, with
all of the said evidence which was made an integral part thereof.
By an order entered on the 28th of March, 1908, the court upon
certifying the bill of exceptions, directed that the execution of the judgment be
not stayed in so far as it required the defendants to submit a statement
showing the property received by them, and to render an account of all the
rents and profits, upon giving a bond satisfactory to the court, to secure the
fulfillment of the judgment in case the same be totally or partially affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
The trial court in deciding the motion for the appointment of a receiver,
and after hearing both parties, made an order on the 17th of March, 1908,
appointing Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver of the property in question, upon the
giving of a bond in the sum of P400,000, to be approved by the court, and in
case that the person thus appointed did not accept, the appointment would be
set aside, and a stranger duly qualified substituted. To this order of the court
the defendants Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Quia duly excepted, and on the 27th
of March, 1908, there was united to the proper files the personal bond for
P400,000 given by the receiver.
By another order made on the said 17th day of March, the court in
deciding the motion that a time be fixed within which the defendants should
report to the court whatever property belonging to the deceased Vicente
Romero Sy Quia was distributed among them, directed that the defendants
Juan Sy Quia, Generoso Mendoza and Pedro Sy Quia, the latter by himself
and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, submit a
statement of the property distributed among them under and by virtue of the
order of the 3d of August, 1900, on or before the 23d day of March, 1908, and
that Gregorio Sy Quia submit a similar statement on or before the 31st day of
the said month and year.
Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia excepted to this order of the court
dated March 17 as aforesaid, requiring them to submit a statement of the
property they had received, and asked the court to approve and to have
united to the original bill of exceptions, the additional one duly presented by
them, and notwithstanding the objection of counsel for plaintiffs, the court by
an order dated April 4, 1908, certified the supplementary bill of exceptions;
and considering that the appointment of Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver was
made at the suggestion of the defendants in open court, at which time the
amount of the bond was fixed with the knowledge of the defendants, also the
order of the court directing that a statement of the property received by the
defendants be submitted to the court within a specified time, the court ordered
that the execution of the judgment be not stayed in so far as the latter order of
the court was concerned, and the original bill of exceptions, together with the
supplementary one, was duly forwarded to the clerk of this court in connection
with the appeal taken and allowed.
The plaintiffs, upon being notified of the said judgment of the court,
excepted thereto, and requested in writing that the court modify its decision
and conclusions of law by declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc
Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C. W. O'Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, were the
only heirs of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased; that they were entitled to all
the property left by the latter, and distributed under the order of the court of
the 3d of August, 1900; that Petronila Encarnacion, deceased, and her
children and heirs had no interest in the said estate of Sy Quia; that they were
not the heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that the receiver
appointed by the court be authorized to take possession of all the property left
by the said deceased, especially the property which was distributed by the
decree of the court of the 3d of August, 1900, together with the rents and
profits, and that the said judgment be modified, awarding the plaintiffs the
costs of the action, and directing that defendants submit an accounting of the
property in litigation.
This action has for its purpose primarily to recover from the present
possessors the property left at the time of his death in this city by the Christian
Chinaman, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, the plaintiffs alleging that three of them
are the grandchildren and one of the great-grandson of the deceased Sy Quia
by his lawful marriage in his own country with their deceased grandmother,
Yap Puan Niu. So that the marriage of the said Sy Quia with this woman in
China is practically the fundamental basis of the action brought by the
plaintiffs for the recovery of the inheritance against the defendants, who
appear to be the children of the deceased Sy Quia by his marriage in these
Islands with the native, Petronila Encarnacion.
Does the record show that the Chinaman Sy Quia removed from Vigan,
Philippine Islands, to his native town or village of Am Thau, Amoy, China, in
1847, and then married in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of his
native country, Yap Puan Niu?
Plaintiffs having failed to present at the trial the matrimonial letters
which should have been exchanged between the contracting parties at the
time the said marriage was performed, according to the ancient laws and
customs of the Celestial Kingdom, and there being no allegation in the
complaint as to the day and month of the common calendar year, or of the
Chinese calendar year, when the said marriage took place, there is no ground
on which to base the conclusion that such an important act in the life of Sy
Quia has been duly established by authentic documents, nor is his alleged
voyage to China from the port of Manila for the purpose of contracting such
marriage, satisfactorily proven thereby, for the plaintiffs have likewise failed to
introduce in evidence the passport, required by the legislation then in force,
which should and would have been then issued to Sy Quia in order to enable
him to leave this country and return to his own. (See superior decree of
December 20, 1849.)
Seven witnesses, named Sy Peng, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy
Kai Tit, Yap Chong, and Sy Boan, whose respective ages are not less than 71
nor more than 80 years, in their testimony or depositions before the vice-
consul of the United States at Amoy, having promised to tell the truth, affirmed
through an interpreter that they were present at the ceremony of the wedding
of the said Sy Quia with the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Quia, who
was in these Islands, having been expressly called to China by his father for
the purpose of marrying the said Yap Puan Niu, accordingly returned to his
native town or village of Am Thau, and, after being married to Yap Puan Niu,
remained in the said village three of four years with his wife, by whom he had
two children, Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the latter having been born one year
after the birth of the former.
To overcome the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, the
defendants presented nine witnesses, to wit: Felix Milan, Aniceto Singson,
Norberta Feril, Remigio Tongson, Estefania Crisologo, Alejandra Singson,
Benita Encarnacion, Paulino Revilla, and Silveria Damian, whose respective
ages were not less than 71 nor more than 87 years, except Aniceto Singson,
who was only 66 years of age, who testified, some of them in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and the others before the justice of the peace of
Vigan by virtue of a commission, that they knew Sy Quia when he was an
unmarried resident of the city of Vigan, for six or seven years according to
most of the said witnesses, and for five years according to others, prior to his
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, they having known him when he was a
clerk and dry goods salesman for another Chinaman by the name of Jose
Gloria Lecaroz, a resident of Manila, the witness Revilla stating that he was
gobernadorcillo in 1852, when Sy Quia, after being converted to the Christian
religion, was baptized in the church of San Vicente, the priest of which, who
was his (Revilla's) uncle, being frequently visited by the said Sy Quia for the
purpose of the latter's instruction in the new religion, and that Sy Quia upon
being baptized was named Vicente Ruperto Romero, after his godfather
Romero, who was at that time the clerk of the court; and Silveria Damian
further testified that to the best of her recollection Sy Quia arrived in Vigan in
the year 1848, stopping at her house, Sy Quia being a friend and countryman
of her husband, who was also a Chinaman, and that she knew that Sy Quia
was then a bachelor, that he was baptized some years later, and on the
following year was married to Petronila Encarnacion. Silveria Damian, her
husband and other witnesses in the case attended the wedding.
It will be seen therefore that the record contains strikingly conflicting
evidence, that is to say, the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is directly in
conflict with that adduced by the defendants for while the witnesses for the
plaintiffs asserted that Sy Quia was at Am Thau, Amoy, in 1847, and
contracted marriage in that year with Yap Puan Niu, with whom be continued
to live for about three or four years thereafter, during which time the children
Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were born; the witnesses for the defendants on the
other hand affirmed that Sy Quia was at the time in Vigan, and that he did not
leave that city during the six or seven years, according to most of the
witnesses, and during the five years, according to the others, which
immediately proceeded his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in 1853.
In order to determine whether the weight and preponderance of the
evidence is with the plaintiffs or in favor of the defendants, in accordance with
the provisions of section 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes
necessary to examine and analyze each of the declarations of the respective
witnesses presented at the trial, and ascertain the result of their various
declarations taken as a whole, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, with due regard to the nature
of the facts as to which they testified, their degree of intelligence, and the
manner in which they testified.
The presence of Sy Quia in Vigan, and his presence at the same time
at Am Thau, Province of Amoy, China, for a period of four years, to wit, from
1847 to 1850, two facts which are directly inconsistent with each other, might
have been satisfactorily established by the testimony of witnesses, but the
only proof of the fact of the marriage alleged to have been contracted by Sy
Quia at the said Chinese town in 1847 could only have consisted of the
matrimonial letters or cards which should have been exchanged between the
families of the two contracting parties in the manner referred to by the witness
Li Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American Consulate, who was called by the
plaintiffs themselves, and whose testimony in this respect is uniformly
corroborated by Nicolay in his book entitled "Historia de las Creencias," by
Ratzel in his book entitled "Las Razas Humanas," by Cantu in his work
entitled "Historia Universal," and by the authors of the "Spanish American
Encyclopedic Dictionary." These matrimonial letters, once they have been
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties, constitute the essential
requisite required by the laws of that country in order that a Chinese marriage
may be considered duly solemnized, and at the same time are the best proofs
of its having actually taken place.
The party obliged to exhibit these letters can only be relieved from the
necessity of so doing by proving that the same have been lost or
dissappeared, for in the absence of such proof (there being none of this
character in the record), they must be produced at the trial in order to
establish the fact of the marriage alleged to have taken place, and only in the
cases expressly excepted by law can any other proof, such as the testimony
of witnesses, be allowed, but the letters themselves must be produced as
evidence of the contract to which they relate, in accordance with the
provisions of section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The failure to produce the said matrimonial letters which, according to
some of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, were exchanged between both
families prior to the celebration of the marriage of Sy Quia with Yap Puan Niu,
and the lack of proof that they had been destroyed or lost, give rise to the
legal presumption that the marriage was not performed; and such
presumption can not be overcome by the testimony of witnesses, some of
them incompetent, while the testimony of others is conflicting, not to say
contradictory, in itself, as well as highly improbable; for this is a most
important contract, which, according to the ancient laws and customs of
China, must be evidenced by such letters or cards, and the fact that these
letters have not been produced shows that the marriage never took place; if
they actually exist they should be exhibited, for it is a well-known rule that
where evidence is willfully suppressed, it is presumed that it would be adverse
to the party presenting the same, if produced. (Sec. 334, par. 5, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
Entering upon an analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the
plaintiffs, it will be noticed that Sy Peng stated that upon the death of Sy Quia,
the women of his house extended their sympathy, as customary, to his widow
in China. This, however, is not true, because it appears in the record as a
proved fact that Yap Puan Niu died in 1891, while Sy Quia died in this city in
1894. Lim Chio affirmed that Sy By Bo, the alleged son of Sy Quia, had two
children by his wife, one of them being Sy Yoc Chay. This is not true, because
Sy Yoc Chay was only an adopted son. The witness Yap Si Tan testified that
Yap Puan Niu lost a natural child, whose name she did not remember, and in
his place adopted Sy Yoc Chay as her son. This fact is not testified to by any
of the other witnesses, who simply said that the adoption had been made by
Sy By Bo. The witness Yap Chio, 72 years of age, who testified that he had
been present at the wedding of Sy Quia with Yap Puan Niu, must have been 8
years old at the time. The other witness, Sy Kai Tit, who was 71 years of age,
and who, according to himself, was about 12 years old at the time, stated that
he had taken part in the investigation made as to the status and condition of
the bride, Yap Puan Niu, having assisted Sy Quia's parents and the mediator
in the investigation. Another witness by the name of Sy Boan testified that Sy
Quia, when he died in this city, was survived by his wife, Yap Puan Niu, who
was still living in China, this being in direct contradiction with the established
fact that Yap Puan Niu died before Sy Quia. This witness further said that
when Sy Quia returned for the second time to China, in order to attend his
parents' funeral, his alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, was still living, his testimony
in this respect being in contradiction with that of the other witnesses, Lim
Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chio and Sy Kai Tit.
The testimony of these witnesses, most of whom have seriously
contradicted themselves upon important points in the course of their
examination, and some of them, considering the fact that were very young in
1847, having told a very improbable story, claiming that they had assisted Sy
Quia's parents in bringing about the latter's marriage, can be given no
credence by the courts to sustain a finding that Sy Quia actually married Yap
Puan Niu, much less so the marriages of Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit who are
alleged to be the legitimate children of the said Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu,
and the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, the mother of Sian Han, a grandson of Sy By
Bo and a great-grandson of Sy Quia, for the reason that there were not
introduced in evidence at the trial the matrimonial letters that must have been
exchanged before the celebration of these marriages, all of these witnesses
having simply said that they attended the wedding of Sy Quia and Yap Puan
Niu, that their said sons were also subsequently married and each had two
children, and that Sy By Bo adopted Sy Yoc Chay in place of one of his
deceased children. From the testimony of these witnesses, taken as a whole,
it is impossible to arrive at the truth and to lay the foundation of a just
judgment in accordance with the law.
The witness Sy Hien, who claims to be a younger brother of Sy Quia,
and was a witness for the plaintiffs, among the many conflicting statements
made by him, as may be seen from his testimony, said that his certificates of
marriage, which presumably consisted of similar matrimonial letters or cards,
were kept in his own town, and that he was unable to state the difference in
age between himself, who was 59 years old, and his brother Sy Quia, who,
had he lived, would to-day be about 80 years old, unless he was permitted to
examine a certain book kept in his own home in China (p. 116 of the record).
His testimony clearly shows that such matrimonial letters are duly preserved
and that the date of birth of the members of a family is noted or entered in a
book kept in the paternal residence, in like manner as the death of such
members of the family is recorded by mortuary inscriptions on tablets, as
practice which is very natural among people who live in civilized communities
and cities with a civilization of their own and who, like the Chinese,
notwithstanding their remarkable backwardness with reference to more
advanced and cultured races, generally speaking are not barbarians and do
not live a nomad or savage life.
The mortuary inscriptions upon one of the tablets presented in evidence
at the time of taking the evidence of some of the witnesses who were called
by the plaintiffs for the purpose of establishing that the deceased, Sy Quia,
had in his lifetime married Yap Puan Niu, an English translation of which
appears in the records, are not conclusive or supplementary proof of the said
marriage, because they are absolutely false and contrary to the actual facts
with reference to Sy Quia, for the latter was still alive in 1891, when he was
presumed to be dead according to the said inscriptions, he having actually
died in January, 1894; therefore the said mortuary tablet, and the inscriptions
appearing thereon, can not serve to corroborate the testimony of the
witnesses who testified to the celebration of the marriage, because such
tablet and inscriptions are glaringly false, the fact that the witness Sy Peng
said that this tablet, together with others, was taken by him from the temple or
sanctuary of Sy Quia's family at Am Thau, to be introduced as evidence in this
action, to the contrary notwithstanding. The falsity of the inscription of Sy
Quia's death, when he was still alive, made upon a tablet which was evidently
prepared with remarkable haste and temerity, is borne out by the witness Li
Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American consulate, who claimed to be
familiar with the laws and customs of his country, for, according to him, where
Chinese die out of China no inscription is made at the place of their former
residence in China, upon such tablets, of the fact of their death; and as it is a
fact, admitted by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia died in Manila and was buried in
La Loma cemetery, there is no doubt that the tablet in question was
fraudulently prepared and fabricated to supply the lack of documentary proof
as to the so-much-talked about marriage in China which is the fundamental
basis of plaintiffs' claim.
In the administrative proceedings that Sy Quia must have instituted for
the purpose of securing the necessary permission to marry Petronila
Encarnacion, and at the investigation which, after the obtaining of such
permission, must have been conducted by the ecclesiastical court of the
bishopric of Vigan, he, Sy Quia, necessarily must have declared that he was
single, as evidently he did, according to the testimony of the witness Roman
Gray, 72 years of age, then a clerk of that court, whose testimony under oath
is supported by that of other witnesses, two of them being of the same race as
Sy Quia, and in view of the result of the said proceedings and investigation,
conducted as aforesaid, the parish priest of the said city of Vigan was
authorized to marry Vicente Sy Quia to Petronila Encarnacion, the certificate
of marriage reciting the fact that there was no impediment whatever to the
performance of the marriage.
Without the aforesaid permission of the Governor-General, sought and
obtained in accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the superior decree of the
20th of December, 1849, the vicar-general of the bishopric of Vigan would not
have admitted the testimony given by the witnesses in the investigation for the
purpose of proving that Vicente Sy Quia was single and free to marry, nor
could the parish priest have performed the marriage ceremony without first
securing the necessary authority from the court of the vicar-general in the
name of the bishop.
Therefore the result of those proceedings and the canonical certificate,
evidencing the marriage of Vicente Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion,
corroborate the testimony of the witnesses for the defendants to the effect that
Sy Quia was single and had resided for many years in that city before he
married Petronila Encarnacion, and that he could not have spent four years at
Am Thau, province of Amoy, China, during that period, as alleged.
 With reference to the validity and efficacy of the canonical certificates
and the certified copies thereof introduced here in evidence, we adhere to and
follow the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of the United States vs.
Nicolas Arceo (11 Phil. Rep., 530), No. 4539, wherein this court said:
"The canonical entries in parochial books have not lost the
character of public documents for the purpose of proving such acts as
are therein related, inasmuch as, since the changed of sovereignty in
these Islands, no legal provision has been promulgated to destroy the
official and public character that the said entries had under the former
regime.
"Parish priests continue in the legal custody of the parochial
books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such legal custodians
they may issue literal copies in the form of certificates of the entries
contained therein, in like manner as custodians of archives."
To strenghten the proof introduced by the plaintiffs as to Sy Quia's
marriage to Yap Puan Niu, an attempt was made to establish that the said
Yap Puan Niu had been twice in Manila, the last time in 1886; that on these
two occasions she stopped for five or six months at the house of Sy Tay, Sy
Quia's brother, and that Sy Quia frequently called on her at the said house;
but, notwithstanding the testimony of some witnesses who testified to this
effect, particularly Sy Hien, who claimed to be one of Sy Quia's brothers, and
who testified long after Sy Quia's death, we have in the record the sworn
statement to the contrary by the Chinese woman, Ana Quang Su, the wife of
the said Sy Tay, who positively testified that upon the two occasions that the
said Yap Puan Niu stopped as a guest at the house of her husband for a
period of five or six months, she had never seen Sy Quia call on her, Yap
Puan Niu, and that the said Yap Puan Niu never went out of the house but
remained at home as was customary with Chinese women, adding that she
would have known if it had been otherwise, because said Yap Puan Niu
occupied a room adjoining hers in the same house, the witness being always
at home, further saying that her husband Sy Tay supported the said guest,
Yap Puan Niu, and paid for her transportation both ways between Manila and
China, and that Sy Joc Lien and Sy Yoc Chay, who on successive dates
came to Manila from China, also stopped at her, the witness's house, where
they lived at the expense and under the orders of her husband Sy Tay. The
testimony of this witness is of the utmost importance, and has not been
impugned or discredited in any way in this case.
The witness, Roman Gray, above referred to, affirmed that while he
was clerk of the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, which position he had held since
1850, he met the Chinaman Sy Quia when the latter went to his court for the
purpose of being baptized as a Christian, stating that the said Sy Quia several
years thereafter, in 1853, presented a petition for permission to marry,
whereupon the necessary proceedings were instituted, in which said
proceedings two Chinese witnesses and Sy Quia himself stated under oath
that Sy Quia was single and free to marry, and a decree was subsequently
entered authorizing the performance of the marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion, the witness further stating that he had read the proceedings but
that in 1898 the papers were destroyed by the insurgents, who removed
everything from the place where the archives were kept and occupied the
premises for some length of time.
Aside from what has been said before, there is no other evidence in the
record to show that the plaintiffs, particularly Sy Chua Niu, Sy Joc Lieng and
Sy Yoc Chay, were ever recognized as legitimate grandchildren and adopted
grandchild, respectively, and that Sian Han is the great-grandchild of the said
Sy Quia, nor is there any proof to show that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng and Sy
Chua Niu have been continuously in possession of the legal status of children
of the said Sy By Guit, and the said Sy Yoc Chay as the adopted child of Sy
By Bo, and Sian Han as the grandchild of the said Sy By Bo, who, as well as
Sy By Guit, is said to be the legitimate son of Sy Quia by his wife, Yap Puan
Niu.
Further, there is no evidence to the effect that Sy Quia had ever
provided for the support of Yap Puan Niu, nor that Petronila Encarnacion at
any time delivered money, as alleged, to Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay by
reason of their heredity income, inasmuch as the delivery of the sum of
P4,000 to the said Sy Joc Lieng, entered in a book kept by Sy Tay, as per the
copy of the entries appearing on page 300 of the book marked "A. S.," is no
proof of the payment of a part of the inheritance, and without any express
declaration on the part of Petronila Encarnacion, an entry in a book kept by
the firm of Sy Tay could not be binding upon the said Encarnacion, this, aside
from the fact that the entries do not show the reason why this sum of P4,000
was charged to the account of Petronila Encarnacion and credited to Sy Joc
Leing; and, even if we admit as true the statement of the witness Emilio
Medina that in his presence, the said Sy Joc Lieng received an additional sum
of P2,000 from Petronila Encarnacion there is no evidence to show why this
sum was paid to and received by the said Sy Joc Lieng; the witness himself
said that the receipt made out at the time set forth that the money was for
commercial purposes.
It likewise appears from the record that the plaintiffs, who now seek to
be recognized as the grandchildren, and Sian Han as the great-grandchild of
the deceased Sy Quia, incidentally attempting to recover the property which
the said Sy Quia left at the time of his death, have not shown by competent
documentary proof that Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were in fact the children of
Sy Quia by his wife Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Yoc Lieng and Sy Chua Niu are the
children of Sy By Guit; that Sy Yoc Chay is the adopted child of Sy By Bo, and
Sian Han the son of Sy Jui Niu, who was the daughter of the said Sy By Bo,
for the parentage and affiliation of the said parties, as well as the marriage of
Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay, and the marriage of
Sy Jui Niu, should have been established by means of the documents in
which such facts are customarily recorded, as stated by Sy Hien, one of the
witnesses for the plaintiffs and who also was alleged to be a brother of Sy
Quia; the testimony of witnesses, the most dangerous and risky of evidence,
not being sufficient to sustain a finding that the court erred in its estimation of
the facts, since the preponderance of the evidence must be fixed precisely
where the judge believes the truth lies, taking into consideration the facts
which were sought to be established, together with the nature of the same
and the circumstances of the case; and it should be noted that for the lack of
documentary evidence it is impossible to determine on what date Sy Quia was
actually married, if he was married at all, to Yap Puan Niu; and considering as
a whole the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs as to the stay and residence
of the said Sy Quia in the city of Vigan, Philippine Islands, during the three or
four years when it is alleged he was at Amoy and there married, it can not be
said that the preponderance of the evidence lies with the plaintiffs.
It further appears from the record that while the body of the deceased
Vicente Romero Sy Quia was lying in state at the house where he died, in
January, 1894, for the purpose of performing the ceremony of robing a
descendant of the deceased with the nine silk suits which had been prepared
for the corpse in accordance with the Chinese custom, and although Sy Hien,
a brother of the deceased, was in charge of the ceremonies, it did not occur to
him to dress Sy Yoc Chay in these garments, he, Sy Yoc Chay, being the son
of Sy By Bo, and if the said Sy Hien thought that this would not be proper for
the reason that Sy Yoc Chay was merely an adopted son, it is significant that
Sy Joc Lieng, who was also present or at least in the house, was not dressed
in the said nine suits, but the same were worn by Tomas Sy Quia, the eldest
son of Gregorio, who for this purpose was expressly taken out of the college
where he was at the time, as testified to by several witnesses, among them
Macario Pavila, a resident merchant of Pangasinan, who chanced to be at the
house on that occasion. The statement of Sy Hien to the effect that he did not
remember the said ceremony, is not worthy of credit in view of the positive
testimony of the defendants Pedro and Juan and of the witness Pavila, who,
together with several Chinese, among them Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng,
witnessed the same. The latter's statement that he was not present at the
ceremony on account of his having temporarily left the house in order to carry
out certain instructions received by him, can not be believed, for, if it is a fact
that he was proper person to wear the said nine silk suits according to the
customs of his country, the master of the ceremony would have suspended
the same until he, Sy Joc Lieng, returned to the house; but instead of this the
eldest son of Gregorio Sy Quia was brought, it is alleged, from the college
where he was, his father Gregorio being at the time in Vigan, for the
investiture of the nine robes before they were placed upon the corpse. From
all this it may be inferred that Sy Yoc Chay, who denied that the said
ceremony took place, and Sy Joc Lieng, were not, as a matter of fact, the
grandsons of Sy Quia, as Sy Hien, a brother of the deceased, who conducted
the ceremony well knew, and that the only descendant to be designated in
accordance with traditional customs of the Chinese was Gregorio Sy Quia, the
eldest son of the deceased, and, in his absence, the latter's eldest son,
Tomas Sy Quia, which designation was accordingly made.
In addition to the foregoing considerations it should be stated that the
sworn statement by Vicente Romero Sy Quia before the civil and
ecclesiastical authorities of the city of Vigan in the proceedings which were
instituted in 1853 in connection with his marriage in the parish church of that
city, the continue possession for a period of many years of the status of a
single man enjoyed by him and recognized and accepted by the whole
community of the capital of the Province of Ilocos Sur, the belief on the part of
his townsmen and neighbors that he was in fact a single man, all these facts
corroborated, as they are, by the uniform testimony of the witnesses for the
defendants, and unexplained silence on the part of his alleged wife, Yap Puan
Niu, who might have asserted whatever rights she may have had as the
legitimate wife of Sy Quia before the tribunals of this country, if she really had
any, completely overcome and destroy the improvised parol evidence as to be
pretended marriage of Sy Quia in China, the performance of which was for the
first time alleged in December, 1905, after Sy Quia's death and the demise of
the latter's brother, Joaquin Martinez Sy Tiong Tay, who, having sheltered in
his house the woman Yap Pua Niu on the two occasions aforesaid, as well as
the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng since these latter landed in the
Philippines, might have testified to the existence of the marriage, thus
supporting the plaintiff's claim to the Sy Quia estate.
It is admitted by the plaintiffs in this case that two of them, Sy Yoc Chay
and Sy Joc Lieng, and the woman Yap Puan Niu, when they came to this
country stopped at the house of the said Sy Tiong Tay, who provided for their
support and maintenance, gave employment to the first two in his own
business and paid for the transportation of the woman to Manila and back to
China on the two occasions when she came to this country; and,
notwithstanding the truth and certainly of these facts, the plaintiffs,
nevertheless, did not even endeavor to show that the said Sy Tiong Tay had
defrayed all these expenses by order and on account of his brother Sy Quia, a
fact which would appear from the entries in the books kept by him as a
merchant, if such payments were really made in behalf of the said Sy Quia.
The plaintiffs introduced in evidence a certain book alleged to belong to the
firm of Sy Tay for the purpose of establishing a certain payment made by
Petronila Encarnacion to the said plaintiffs. They, however, were unable to
produce any book to show that the expense incurred by the Sy Tay for the
maintenance and support of the said plaintiffs and of the woman, Yap Puan
Niu, as well as the latter's traveling expenses were paid by and on account of
Sy Quia.
They were unable to explain the reason for these disbursements made
by Sy Tay for the benefit of two of the plaintiffs and their alleged grandmother,
notwithstanding the fact that death had forever stilled the lips of the two
brothers, Sy Tay and Sy Quia, plaintiffs having confined themselves to
attributing to him whom they believe to be the wealthier of the two brothers,
who unfortunately can not now speak, the paternity and percentage of a
family which is not proved to be his.
This court, in the strictest administration of justice and in conformity with
the law, can not admit that plaintiffs have proved four marriages and three
generations, since the evidence introduced by them in support of these facts
only consists of the testimony of witnesses, most of whom have made
conflicting statements and some have contradicted themselves, as for
instance the brother of Sy Quia, Sy Hien, whose testimony is absolutely
unworthy of credence, and other witnesses have told improbable stories and
testified as to things which are not likely to occur in the natural and ordinary
course of human events.
Even assuming that Sy Quia before he became a Christian actually
married Yap Puan Niu in 1847, as alleged, and that his second marriage in
1853 with a Christian woman, by whom he had five children and with whom
he lived contentedly in these Islands since the marriage until he died, covering
a period of forty-one years, while the first marriage was still in full force and
effect, was null and void, he, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having therefore
married twice in violation of the law, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, would not be
entitled to the relief sought by them in their complaint.
There is not the slightest evidence in the record which even tends to
indicate that Sy Quia, at the time of his marriage at Vigan in 1853 with
Petronila Encarnacion, brought any property or money into the conjugal
partnership. The fact that he did not is not surprising, as he was then a mere
clerk in the employment of another Chinaman by the name of Jose Gloria,
who was a resident of this city, with a salary of P200 per annum, as per the
testimony of Silveria Damian, an aged woman, whose husband was also a
Chinaman and worked for the same man that Sy Quia did and for the same
salary; while, on the other hand, there is evidence in the record to the effect
that Petronila Encarnacion, who belonged to a wealthy family of Vigan,
brought to the marriage, as a gift from her parents, the sum of P5,000, which,
together with their common labor and industry, was the basis of the fortune
accumulated by both husband and wife in the course of years.
Therefore, even assuming that the second marriage which was
contracted by Sy Quia at Vigan was void, while a former marriage alleged to
have been performed at Amoy, China, was still in full force and effect, and
upon which the plaintiffs in this case base their contention, the second
marriage, however, produced civil effects under the laws here in force in
1853, the time when it was performed. These laws are as follows:
Law 3, title 3, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
"Further, if people marry advisably, knowing that such impediment
existed, and that for this reason they should not have married, the
children which may be born will not legitimate; but if only one of the
contracting parties, and not both, was cognizant of the existence of such
impediment, the children will be legitimate, for the ignorance of one of
the contracting parties excuses them, and no one can say that they are
not legitimate children."
Law 1, title 13, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
"And even if it should happen that between those who are married
manifestly in facie ecclesia such impediment exists which would require
that the marriage be set aside, the children which may be born to them
before the contracting parties knew that the impediment existed, will be
legitimate. And this would also be the case if neither of the contracting
parties knew that the impediment existed, as well as if only one of them
had knowledge thereof, for the ignorance on the part of one of them
would make the children legitimate. But if after knowing with certainty
that the impediment existed between them, they should have children,
any that should be born subsequent thereto will not be legitimate. But, if
while such impediment exists without the knowledge of both parties or of
either of them, they should be accused before the judges of the Holy
Church, and before the impediment is duly established and final
judgment entered, children be born to them, such children as may be
born while the doubt exists, will be legitimate."
The Civil Code has merely reproduced with certain modifications the
provisions of the old legislation in force in 1853 as to the civil effects of a void
marriage where both parties married in good faith, as well as where only one
of them acted in good faith, for whether one or both married in good faith, the
marriage will produce civil effects only in favor of the innocent spouse, and of
the children born of this void marriage.
If in all the acts of life good faith is to be presumed unless the contrary
is proven, it can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion acted in good faith
when she married Vicente Romero Sy Quia in 1853, since there is no
evidence in the record to the effect that she knew before or after her marriage
that the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia was married in China to another
woman.
The marriage contracted by a Christian Chinese at the time when Sy
Quia was married in the Philippine, was proceeded by such formalities, and
so many requisites had first to be complied with, that it was difficult, not to say
impossible, that in the natural and ordinary course of things the marriage
could have been performed if there were any impediment at all thereto. In the
case of Sy Quia, not only for many years was he considered in the city of
Vigan by the community at large as a bachelor, his name appearing as such
in the municipality census, but it must be fairly assumed that when he
instituted the proceedings before the civil authorities, and ecclesiastical
proceedings in the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, in order to secure permission
and authority to marry in accordance with the various decrees then in force,
among them the decree of the 20th of December, 1849, he must have
positively said then that he was a bachelor, and this fact must have appeared
from the summary investigation conducted by the ecclesiastical authority of
Vigan for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he was a bachelor and
free to marry, and when at last the parish priest of Vigan was authorized to
proceed with the marriage ceremony, there is little room for doubt that
Petronila Encarnacion, as well as her family, relying upon the result of both
proceedings, and upon the license or authority granted by the government,
and the authority given by the vicar-general in the name of the bishop, for the
performance of the marriage, they consented thereto in the best of good faith,
particularly Petronila Encarnacion, to the latter's union to Vicente Romero Sy
Quia in lawful wedlock.
If, on the contrary, it were true that Sy Quia had married in China many
years before, there is no doubt that he acted in bad faith by deceiving his wife
Petronila Encarnacion, as well as the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of this
country, perjuring himself. And upon the assumption that the marriage with
Petronila Encarnacion was void by reason of the existence of a prior
undissolved marriage, the second marriage, nevertheless, produced its civil
effects in favor of the deceived spouse, and of the children born to them, who,
notwithstanding the nullity of the second marriage, are in the eyes of the law
legitimate, as though they had been born of parents lawfully married.
Therefore, assuming that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acted in bad faith by
concealing the fact of his first marriage at the investigation made by the
authorities for the purpose of determining whether or not he was a bachelor
and free to marry, one of the civil effects produced by the marriage thus
rendered void was the Sy Quia thereby absolutely forfeited all this rights and
interest to one-half of the conjugal property appearing in the instrument of
partition. Exhibit A. F., and by operation of law all the property which would
otherwise have belonged to him, became the property of his wife, Petronila
Encarnacion, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code applicable to
the came in conformity with rule 3 of the transitory provisions.
Law 16, title 17, Partida 7, with reference to this subject, provides:
"Notorious wickedness is committed by mean who knowingly
marry twice while their first wife is living, and the same may be said of
women who marry twice knowing that their first husband is still alive.
Because such marriages give offense to God, and bring about great
damages and dishonor to those who are deceived, and they should be
careful to marry well and property, as directed by the holy Church, for
they would otherwise be married to persons with whom they would later
live in sin, and while they endeavor to be happy in their marriage, and
have children, the first wife or first husband appears when least
expected and disrupts the marriage, and on account of this rupture many
women are dishonored and ruined forever, and men are disgraced in
many ways. We therefore command that everyone who should
knowingly enter into such a marriage, in any of the manners specified in
this law, be hence banished to some island for five years, and that he
forfeit whatever he may own at the place where the marriage was
performed, and that it be given to his children or his grandchildren, if he
has any, and if he has no children or grandchildren, one-half of such
property should go to the person deceived, and the other half to the
king's chamber; and if both parties knew that one of them was married,
and willfully married him or her, then both shall be banished, each to a
separate island, and the property of either of them who may have no
children should go to the king's chamber."
Article 1417 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"The conjugal partnership expires on the dissolution of the
marriage or when it is declared void.
"The spouse who, by reason of his or her bad faith, caused the
annulment, shall not receive any share of the property of the
partnership."
This article embodies and reproduces under different aspects the
provisions contained in articles 72, 1333, subsection 3, 1371, 1378, and 1429
of the same code, and a mere reading of this article, together with the
provisions of law 16 of the Partidas above quoted, will show the difference
between the two. It will be noticed that the code contains more favorable and
less strict provisions on this subject than the law of the Partidas, wherefore, in
accordance with rule 3 of the transitory provisions of the said code, the
intestate succession of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia should be
governed and regulated by the new code, which was in force on January 9,
1894, the date of Sy Quia's death.
True, article 72 of the said code is included in title 4, the application and
enforcement of which in these Islands was suspended under the former
sovereignty; but there is no doubt that article 1417 and the other sections
cited are now in force, said article 1417 providing that the spouse who by
reason of his or her bad faith causes the annulment of the marriage, shall not
receive any share of the property of the conjugal partnership.
It should be borne in mind that on account of the unexplained silence of
Yap Puan Niu during her lifetime, and the silence of the plaintiffs during Sy
Quia's lifetime, the conjugal partnership constituted in 1853 between Sy Quia
and Petronila Encarnacion was dissolved in 1894 by the death of the
husband, and only then, when the Civil Code was already in operation, would
their presumptive heirs have acquired a right to claim the inheritance, for the
right to expectancy, and not until after the deceased of the person whose
succession is in concern can such a right be said exist or to be duly acquired.
See the preamble to the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down by the
supreme court of Spain on the subject in its judgment of the 24th of June,
1897, where the court said:
"That upon the settlement and distribution of the estate of a
person who dies subsequent to the promulgation of the Civil Code, any
action for the recovery of the property of the estate should be governed
by the provisions of the said code, in conformity with the first rule and the
one preceding the last, of the transitory provisions, because the rule as
to nontroactivity of the new law only applies to rights acquired under the
former legislation; and it is a well-known fact that heredity rights exist
only after the demise of the decedent; and the trial court having so
decided, it did not infringe the provisions of laws 11 and 12, title
13, Partida 6, and the general provision of the transitory rules for the
application of the Civil Code."
However, as a matter of fact the action instituted by plaintiffs in 1905,
claiming the property left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, is based
especially upon the alleged nullity of the second marriage on account of the
existence of the former performed in China. Therefore, the rights claimed by
the plaintiffs should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code which has been in operation since 1889 and under which the rights
now asserted by the plaintiffs might have sprung and been acquired by them,
this assuming that the alleged first marriage was actually performed in China
and that the claimants were in fact the issue of the said pretended marriage of
Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu.
Since the 9th of June, 1853, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia married
Petronila Encarnacion, the conjugal partnership commenced to exist between
the two spouses. All the property acquired by them up to the time of the
dissolution of the said partnership on account of the death of Sy Quia on
January 9, 1894, belonged to this partnership. (Law 1, title 3, of the Fuero
Real; laws 1, 3 and 4, title 4, books 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion; and
arts. 1393, 1401, 1403-1407, Civil Code.)
During Sy Quia's lifetime the validity of his marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion, as has been said before, was never questioned, no one having
indicated any defect which rendered the same void. It was only after his death
that the plaintiffs ventured to attack the validity of the same by claiming that
they were his legitimate heirs and as such entitled to his estate.
The Laws of the Partidas above cited, as well as the Civil Code, both
recognize as a fact that a marriage contracted in good faith, by one at least of
the parties to the same, produces the same civil effects as a valid marriage
with reference to the innoncent spouse and the children born of such
marriage, even though the same be subsequently declared null and void.
It can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion married Sy Quia in the
best of good faith, there being not the slightest proof to the contrary so far as
the record shows. Therefore, being innocent, she must be held to have
acquired all the rights to which a wife is ordinarily entitled, and neither she nor
her children can be made to suffer the consequences of the nullity of such
marriage, this, assuming that the marriage was void; nor can they in any
event be made to suffer the consequences of the bad faith of her husband Sy
Quia.
The nullity of the marriage, once declared by the courts, may deprive
the partnership created by the marriage of the alleged spouses of its
otherwise legal character, but can not destroy the legal consequences of the
marital union while it existed. Consequently the children are considered
legitimate, and the innocent spouse is unquestionably entitled to one-half of
the conjugal property acquired during the marriage.
From the legal provisions above cited, especially the sections of the
Civil Code referred to, it necessarily follows that the half of the conjugal
property to which Vicente Romero Sy Quia would have been otherwise
entitled, on account of the alleged nullity of his marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion and of his bad faith in contracting the same, was forfeited by him
and by operation of the law passed to the other spouse, Encarnacion; and the
plaintiffs, in their alleged capacity as legitimate descendants of the said Sy
Quia, deceased, can not now claim the said property, as the decedent, by the
express provisions of the law, absolutely forfeited his right to the said half of
the property acquired during the marriage. Such marriage must be considered
null and void if it is true, as alleged by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia's marriage
with Yap Puan Niu was still in full force and effect when he married Petronila
Encarnacion.
Counsel for plaintiffs now ask this court to modify the judgment
appealed from and to declare that the said plaintiffs are the only legitimate
heirs of Sy Quia and consequently entitled to his entire estate, together with
all rents and profits, for which judgment should be entered in their favor with
costs. In support of their contention they have assigned various errors as
committed by the trial court, among them that the court erred in finding as a
conclusion of law that the said Sy Quia was a subject of the Chinese Empire
and that his estate should be distributed in accordance with the laws of China.
It is an admitted fact that Sy Quia was a native Chinaman and therefore
a foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or 1840, when he was 12
years of age. He having resided in these Islands since then and until January,
1894, when he died, that is to say, for a period of more than 53 years, having
obtained for this purpose the necessary license or permission, and having
been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native woman in the city of
Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the Province of Ilocos and later in
this city of Manila, with the intention of residing here permanently, engaging in
business generally and acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that by
virtue of all these acts he acquired a residence and became definitely
domiciled in these Islands with the same rights as any nationalized citizen in
accordance with the laws in force in these Islands while he lived here and until
his death.
It should be noticed that, as the laws have no retroactive effect, in order
to determine what rights Sy Quia had actually since he removed to the
Philippines in 1839 or 1840, it will be necessary to resort to the laws in force
at that time; and the provisions of the Civil Code promulgated in November,
1889, could not affect in the least rights thus acquired by virtue of this long
residence in these Islands. Article 3 of the Civil Code is as follows: "Laws shall
not have retroactive effect unless otherwise prescribed therein." This provision
is in accordance with the provisions of law 15, title 14, Partida 3.
The legislation then in force on the subject of naturalization and
residence of foreigners in the Philippine Islands will be found in the following
laws. Law 1, title 11, book 6 of the Novisima Recopilacion, is as follows:
"We permit that the subjects of other kingdoms (provided they are
Catholics and friendly to our Crown) who may desire to come here to
practice their trade or profession may do so, and we command that if
they do now practice some trade or profession and live twenty leagues
inland from any port, they shall be forever from the payment of taxes,
and shall be likewise exempt, for a period of six years, from the payment
of municipal taxes and from the performance of any ordinary or
extraordinary services, as well as from holding office as members of
municipal councils at the place where they may reside; and they, life
other residents, shall be permitted to use the common pastures and
enjoy all the privileges accorded to the latter; and we hereby command
the authorities to provide them with house and lands, if necessary. And
 other foreigners, whether they have any trade or profession, provided
they have lived in this kingdom for a period of ten years in a home of
their own, and have been married to native women for a period of six
years, shall be admitted to all the offices of the republic except to those
of magistrate, governor, mayor, alderman, warded, treasurer, revenue
collector, secretary of city council, or any other government position of
trust. As to these offices, as well as to all ecclesiastical offices, all
existing laws shall continue in full force and effect, etc."
And law 3 of the same title and book of the Novisima
Recopilacion provides:
"There shall be considered as denizens, in the first place, all
foreigners who obtain the privilege of naturalization and those who are
born in these kingdoms; those who residing therein who are born in
these kingdoms; those who residing therein may be converted to our
holy Catholic faith; those who, being self-supporting, establish their
domicile therein; those who walk who ask for and obtain residence in
any town thereof; those who marry a native woman of the said kingdoms
and are domicile therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who
married a native man, she thereby becomes subject to the same laws
and acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who establish
themselves in the country by acquiring real property; these who have a
trade or professional and got there to practice the same; also those who
practice some mechanical trade therein or keep a retail store; those who
hold public or honorary offices or any such position whatsoever which
can only be held by natives; those who enjoy the privilege of the
common pastures and other privileges usually accorded to other
residents; those who shall reside on the said kingdoms for a period of
ten years in a home of their own; and also those foreigners who,
accordance with the common law, royal orders and other laws of the
kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired residence therein,
they being obliged to pay the same taxes as the natives for the legal and
fundamental reason that they also participate in their privileges, etc."
Article 18 of the Code of Commerce of May 30, 1829, which was in
operation until 1888, is as follows:
"Foreigners who have become naturalized or have acquired
residence in Spain in the manner provided by law may freely engage in
commerce with same rights and under the same conditions as natives of
the kingdom."
Although the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was not
extended to the colonies, with the exemption of section 28 thereof,
nevertheless, it is only proper to call attention to the provisions of the said
decree in so far as they have any bearing upon the case at bar, in view of the
provision of laws 1 and 2, title 1, book 2, of the Compilation of the Laws of the
Indies, which direct that the laws of Castile shall be observed in all cases not
otherwise covered by said laws. Section 2 of the said royal decree of 1852 is
as follows:
"Foreigners who have gained or obtained a residence, in
accordance with the laws, shall be considered Spanish subjects."
Section 3 provides that all other foreigners who reside in Spain without
having taken out naturalization papers, or otherwise gained a residence
therein, shall continue to be foreigners. And section 12 provides:
"Those persons shall not be legally considered as foreigners,
under any circumstances, who have failed to register as such in the
registry of transients or domiciled persons kept by the civil authorities of
the provinces or with the consuls of the respective nations."
It is proven and undeniable fact that Sy Qua resided on the Philippines
for more than fifty years, he having only absented of immediately returning to
the Islands; and it is also a fact that in various documents and public
instrument executed before notaries public, which have been introduced in
evidence marked as "Exhibits 1, 2, and 3," said Vicente Romero Sy Quia has
uniformly stated that he was a resident of the district of Binondo, having
declared in one of the said documents that he was a freeholder. Of the
Chinaman Vicente Romero Sy Quia on account of his continuous residence in
these Islands for a period of more than fifty years, and by virtue of the fact that
he had permanently established himself in this country, living in a house of his
own, with his wife and children, and having acquired real estate therein, did
become a domiciled denizen under the laws then in force, even if it be held
that the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was applicable to these
Islands by virtue of the provision contained in the Laws of the Indies, the legal
status of Vicente Romero Sy Quia has not changed, because the provision of
the said decree do not in any way affect the rights acquired by him; and the
supreme court of Spain in a judgment of the 30th of April, 1861, in construing
this provision of the law, declared and held that the purpose of the royal
decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was not to promulgate a new law, but
merely to condense and embody in one single act the various provisions then
in force with reference to foreigners, and to preserve the fuero de
extranjeria (the rights which foreigners had in certain cases to invoke their
own laws) in the same manner as it existed before. In another judgment of the
29th of August of the same year the same year the said supreme court of
Spain held that under the provisions of law 3, title 11, book 6, of the Novisima
Recopilacion, there should be considered as domiciled denizens of Spain all
foreigners who, being self-supporting, established their domicile in the
country; the double inscription in the registry, as required by the royal decree
of the 17th of November, 1852, being no obstacle thereto.
Many years prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code in these Islands,
there was published in the Official Gazette of this city on September 18, 1870,
the decretal law of the 4th of July of the said year relating to foreigners,
section 2 of which provides:
"Foreigners who, in accordance with the laws, shall become
naturalized or gain residence in any town of the Spanish provinces
beyond the seas, shall be considered as Spanish subjects."
After dividing into three different classes the foreigners who should
come into and establish themselves in the provinces beyond the seas,
classifying them respectively as domiciled, transient and immigrant foreigners,
the said section provided that — "Domiciled foreigners are those who have a
regular residence and have lived for three years in any province or who may
have registered as such residents in the registry of domiciled persons kept for
this purpose," etc.
Section 7 of the said decree provides as follows:
"Any foreigners residing in the provinces beyond the seas, in
order to be considered as such foreigner under the laws of the country,
shall register in the registry of foreigners to be kept for this purpose by
the civil supreme authorities and by the consuls of their respective
nations.'
The above-quoted sections of the said decree are in harmony with
similar sections contained in the decree of the 17th of November, 1852,
which, as has been said, was never extended to these Islands — with the
exception of section 28 thereof relating to the settlement of the estates of
deceased foreigners. The doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain
with reference to the interpretation and proper construction of the said decree
is not, therefore, inconsistent with the provisions of the decree or law of 1870,
also relating to foreigners.
True that prior to 1870 there existed in these Islands no registry of
foreigners and that even the civil registry was not then in operation, the
provisions of titles 4 and 12 of the Civil Code relating thereto having been
suspended by telegraphic order of the 29th of December, 1889. It is also true
that no registry was kept by the foreign consulates and that there was no
Chinese consul here at that time. However, if the Chinaman Sy Quia had
really intended to preserve his nationality and the protection of the laws of this
country, he would have registered in the registry which was kept by the
Government here after the publication in these Islands of the said decree of
1870; and under the theory of the law a foreigner, in order to have the right to
invoke the laws of his own country, must register in the proper registries as
such foreigner; if Sy Quia did not see fit to so register at any time prior to his
death in 1894, we must presume that he did not do so because he desired to
preserve the rights which he had acquired as a resident of Manila.
 Continuous and permanent residence in the country for a period of
years, and the rights thereby acquired as a denizen of any town, were always
taken into consideration by the Spanish legislators in determining the rights of
a foreigner residing in Spanish territory. The constitution of 1812 provides in
section 5 that there shall be considered as Spanish subjects:
"2. Foreigners who have obtained from the Cortes a certificate of
naturalization; and, 3. Those who have otherwise gained residence in
accordance with the laws of the country and lived as such residents for a
period of ten years in any town of the kingdom."
A similar provision is contained in section 1 of the constitution of 1845,
paragraph 4 of which is as follows:
"Spanish subjects are those who, not having otherwise obtained a
certificate of naturalization, have, nevertheless, gained residence in any
town of the kingdom."
It becomes necessary to refer to the Spanish laws which were
applicable or in operation in these Islands at the time that Vicente Romero Sy
Quia gained residence and acquired the status of a domiciled denizen of the
municipality of Vigan and subsequently of this city of Manila, for the reason
that they were the only laws regulating his personal rights.
In addition to what has been said for the purpose of demonstrating that
Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired the legal status of a domiciled resident of
these Islands, we should not forget to say that the Chinese residents of these
Islands under the former sovereignty, and particularly at the time that Sy Quia
gained a residence in this Archipelago; were governed by the Laws of the
Indies and other special laws, some of them quite ancient; although they had
no consul or any other representative of the Chinese Government, they,
nevertheless, had a gobernadorcillo who was elected by their most prominent
citizens, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. They were
governed by laws different from the general laws of the country and paid a tax
different from that which was paid by the natives and foreigners, and, upon
their landing for the purpose of establishing themselves in the Islands, they
had to obtain what was known as a resident's license and secure passports
and permits whenever they desired to leave the Islands, and not only had they
to obtain such permission from the Government, but also from their native
wife, if they were married. It should be noticed also that they were not
permitted to land in Manila without first obtaining a permit from the
Government, and that they had to state before the Chinese immigration
authorities whether they came here as mere transients, or visitors for a period
of three months, which could be extended if they really intended to establish
themselves in the country. For this purpose certain proceedings were
instituted before the immigrant was given the said resident's license. This
license entitled them to more liberty and privileges in their business journeys
and excursions through the provinces than the other transients who merely
had permission to stay here three months. All this may be verified by
reference to the decrees of the 31st of August, 1839; 16th of September,
1840; 13th of December, 1843; and 20th of December, 1849.
It should be noticed further that section 19 of the said decree of the
16th of September, 1840, provided that the children always follow the status
of their father and pay the same taxes, except the children of Chinese, who
according to the decree of the 2d of May, 1786, were considered as
Chinese mestizos. These decrees may be found in the work entitled
"Legislacion Ultra Marina," by Rodriguez San Pedro, vol. 2 pp. 471-483, and
vol. 8, p. 401.
The foregoing will clearly show that Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained
residence in these Islands under the laws of the Novisima Recopilacion.
Therefore the questions raised by those who now claim to be his descendants
should be decided in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines to
which Sy Quia submitted himself from the time he applied for a resident's
license and abstained from registering in 1870 as a foreigner. Most of the
property left by him being real, the same is subject to the laws of the country
in which it is located.
In support of what has been said with reference to the special laws
governing in the Philippines concerning Chinese, we will cite the decision in
case where a Chinese Christian by the name of Bonifacio Lim Tuaco
requested that the children of Chinese married to native women, whether pure
natives or half-castes, pay the same taxes as their further and be permitted to
wear the same costumes the latter up to the age of 25. The Spanish
Government, inspired by the traditional spirit of the ancient special laws
relating to Chinese residents in these Islands, after consulting various heads
of departments and obtaining the opinion of the Philippine council, denied the
said petition in a royal order of the 24th of February, 1880, which
communicated to the Governor-General of these Islands and published in the
Official Gazette April 17, 1880.
The plaintiffs in this case have invoked certain provisions of the
Chinese laws as one of the grounds of the action by them instituted and now
contend that the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, should be
distributed in accordance with the laws of that country. Even disregarding the
fact that the plaintiffs should have, but have not, alleged in their complaint, as
one of the facts constituting their cause of action, the existence of a law
passed and promulgated in China, the existence of which law, being foreign,
should have been alleged in the complaint, the fact remains that there is
absolutely no evidence in the record as to the existence of the Chinese laws
referred to by plaintiffs in their subsequent pleadings, the evidence of this
character introduced by them consisting of books or pamphlets written in
Chinese characters and marked "Exhibits AH, AI, AJ, and AK,' which they
claim contain a compilation of the laws of China, being useless and of no
value.
It may be that contain, as plaintiff claim, the laws of China, but we have
no Spanish translation of them, they being in the Chinese language, and
written with characters which are absolutely unknown to this court and to the
defendants. Further, the plaintiffs have not prescribed by section 292 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and, finally, there is no evidence that these four
books or pamphlets were printed by authority of the Chinese Government or
that they have been duly authenticated by the certificate of competent
authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of the nation to which
they belong. For this reason the said books or pamphlets can not, under any
circumstances, be considered as documentary proof of the laws of China.
Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
"Books printed or published under the authority of the United
States, or of one of the States of the United States, or a foreign country,
and purporting to contain statutes, codes, or other written law of such
State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of
such State or country as evidence of the written law thereof, are
admissible in the Philippine Islands as evidence of such law."
Section 301 of the same code provides:
"A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State or
country, attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State or country, is admissible as evidence
of such law or writing."
Section 302 provides as follows:
"The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of the United States or of any State of the
United States, or foreign country, as are also printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the United States or of such
State or country, or proved to be commonly admitted in such courts."
The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform on this
subject. For the purposes of this decision however it will be sufficient to refer
to the judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 26th of May, 1887,
where in it is said:
"Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence
must be satisfactory established as any other fact.'
If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do not
satisfactory establish the existence of certain Chinese laws invoked by the
plaintiffs, not only because such pamphlets or books lack the aforesaid
formalities and requisites, but further because there is no evidence as to the
nature of the laws contained in those books or pamphlets and the subjects
with which they deal; on the other hand, the two witnesses whose testimony
was introduced for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of the laws
which, according to the plaintiffs, are contained in the said books, were unable
to say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH contains an exact
copy of the original. And the Chinese consul of this city, Sy Int Chu, after
stating that he had never made a regular study of the laws of his country,
simply consulting the same in connection with his official reports, admitted
that he had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged compilation,
the books not being duly certified, adding that he could not say whether the
book marked. "Exhibit AH" was an exact copy of the original.
The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as to the
written and unwritten laws of China, does not show, as required by the Code
of Civil Procedure, that he knew such laws or that he was acquainted with the
nature of the laws alleged to be contained in the said books. He merely
confined himself to expressing his own opinion with reference to the two
classes of laws. He, not being an expert on the subject throughly conversant
with the laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which laws of
China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he testified, can not
even be accepted as a partial evidence that the said four books really contain
the written and unwritten laws of China.
From the foregoing facts and provisions of law referred to we conclude:
First. That it has not been duly established in this case that the
Chinaman Sy Quia, married in 1847 at Am Thau, Amoy, China, the woman
Yap Puan Niu, or that the plaintiffs are the descendants of the said Sy Quia,
for the reason that the marriage of Sy By Bo, Sy By Guit and Sy Jui,
respectively, the affiliation and parentage of the latter and of Sy Chua Niu and
Sian Han, and the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay have not been proven.
Second. That, even assuming that Sy Quia actually married Yap Puan
Niu in 1847, and that the second marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in 1853
is, therefore, void, Sy Quia having contracted this second marriage in bad
faith by concealing the fact that his former wife was still living, his half of the
property of the conjugal partnership between him and his second wife, who
married him in good faith, was forfeited by operation of law in favor of his said
second wife, for although the law recognizes civil effects to a void marriage, it,
nevertheless, deprives the party who married in bad faith of his share in the
community property acquired during the existence of the marriage up to the
time of its annulment.
Third. That, as a consequence of the foregoing conclusion and under
the same hypothesis, the plaintiffs, as the descendants of Sy Quia by his first
marriage, have no right to claim Sy Quia's share in conjugal property acquired
during his second marriage with Petronila Encarnacion for the reason that by
the express provision of the law the half of the said conjugal property which
would have otherwise belonged to the husband was transmitted to Petronila
Encarnacion, together with the other half of the said property to which she
was rightfully entitled under the law as the deceived wife.
Fourth. That, under the same hypothesis that the marriage of Sy Quia
with Petronila Encarnacion is void, his former marriage not having been
dissolved when he married the said Petronila Encarnacion, the children by the
second marriage are, nevertheless, legitimate, this being one of the civil
effects of as marriage contracted in good faith, as in this case, at least on the
part of one of contracting parties, Petronila Encarnacion.
Fifth. That Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having become a regularly
domiciled denizen under the laws above cited by reason of his long residence
in this country for more than fifty years and by reason of the further fact that
he married a native woman, established himself in this city with a home of his
own, acquired real property and engaged in business generally, most of the
property left by him at the time of his death real property, the questions raised
by plaintiffs' petition must be determined in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself when he came to the Islands
and secured a residence therein, and not in accordance with any other foreign
or unknown law.
Sixth. that, aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear form
the record what are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case,
there is no proof of the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the
plaintiffs, nor is there anything to show what the books or pamphlets
introduced by them in evidence contain any specific laws of the Celestial
Empire.
The foregoing disposes explicitly or implicitly, affirmatively or otherwise,
of all the questions raised by the various assignments or error submitted by
both parties; and in our opinion it is not necessary to dispose of each of them
in detail in view of the conclusion at which the court has arrived in this most
important litigation.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the judgment of the trial court, appealed from by both parties, should be
reversed, and that we should, and do hereby, absolve the defendants of the
complaint upon which this action was instituted, without any special order as
to the costs of both instances. The bond given by the receiver, Gregorio Sy
Quia, is hereby discharged and the petition heretofore made for the
appointment of a new receiver is hereby denied. It is so ordered.
Carson and Elliott, JJ., concur.
 Mapa, J., concurs in the result.
 (Sy Joc Lieng v. Encarnacion, G.R. No. 4718, [March 19, 1910], 16 PHIL 137-
|||

284)

[G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918.]

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA

INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant.

Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.

Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as
guardian, and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; PROBATE; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE. — Where a will is

duly probated after publication pursuant to Section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective
against all persons. The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far
away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date
appointed for the probate of the will does not render the order of probate void
for lack of due process.
2. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION TO SET PROBATE ASIDE. — Under Section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure a court has the authority upon timely
application of any interested party to set aside the probate of a will and grant
a rehearing, where a proper case for the exercise of this power is made to
appear in the application.
3. ID.; AMERICAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. —
The authority expressed in Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
probate of the will of a citizen of another state or country is applicable to the
case of a citizen of a State of the American Union domiciled in the Philippine
Islands.
4. STATUTES; INTERPRETATION; PUNCTUATION AND
CAPITALIZATION. — It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and
 capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute
and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words.
5. ID.; ID.; EPIGRAPH. — The epigraph, or heading, of a section of a
statute, being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the
section, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the
body of the text.
6. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF PROBATE; INTRINSIC VALIDITY.
— While the probate of a will is conclusive as to compliance with all formal
requisites necessary to the lawful execution of the will, such probate does not
affect the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. With respect to the latter
the will is governed by the substantive law relative to descent and distribution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL OF AMERICAN CITIZEN. — The intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will of a citizen of one of the American States, proved
under Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is governed by the laws of
the State of which he is a citizen.
8. CITIZENSHIP; AMERICANS RESIDENT IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
— When a person who is a citizen of the United States and therefore also a
citizen of the State in which he was born or naturalized becomes a resident of
the Philippine Islands, he cannot acquire a new citizenship here; and he must
be assumed to retain his State citizenship along with his status as a citizen of
the United States.
9. EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE. — The courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
States of the American Union, although they may take judicial notice of the
laws enacted by Congress.

DECISION

STREET, J  : p

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a

naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a
will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of
which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic
instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been
proved under Section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground
that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois,
United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with
the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
"Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he
is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law
of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands."
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three
weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due
publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916,
witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March
16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to
probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and
John T. Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the will annexed. Shortly
thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor Johnson was
appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one
hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company;
to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75
per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month,
if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five
children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an
understanding of the case are these: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden,
May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United States and lived
in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was
married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the
Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result of
relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba
Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. This child was
christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon
October 16, 1898.
 After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the
United States he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November
20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from
him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A
little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and on January
10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he
appears to have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence
in this case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his father,
mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her
grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased
returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and continued to live until
his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with
Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized
May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized
December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to
the deceased by Simeona Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been
probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in
her behalf and noted an exception to the order admitting the will to probate.
On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order
of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917,
this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present
appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the
petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of
the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are
four in number and may be stated, in the same sequence in which they are
set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a
resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property
in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to
the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks
essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills. The fourth proposition above
stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must be
considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third
and fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more
fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the
contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions:
"(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to the
petitioner;
"(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be
set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois
and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State."
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems
arising in this case in the order last above indicated. Upon the question, then,
of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of
the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as
prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect and
that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal
requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the
argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made
the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in
the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily
interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court
should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the
future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by
representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the
probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the
Philippine Bill which declares that property shall not be taken without due
process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate
of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the
proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very
nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the
character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding
where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case
where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his
property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and
the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
 In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands
at the time of the testator's death; and it was impossible, in view of the
distance and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to
appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It
was nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute
constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs.
Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact
that, under the laws of California, the petitioner had a full year within which
she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was stated
as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by
statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in O'
Callaghan vs. O' Brien (199 U.S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States. This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington,
and it was alleged that a will had been there probated without the notice of
application for probate having been given as required by law. It was insisted
that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. This contention was, however, rejected and
it was held that the statutory right to contest the will within a year was a
complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the
due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps
all of the States of the American Union, contain no special provision, other
than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of
any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly
allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a general
nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in
Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
"Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a
reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken."
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this
section indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a wide
latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to
be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal
service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
 In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that
the provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to promote its object
and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the
intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of Section 113;
and we hold that the word "party," used in this section, means any person
having an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position
to be concluded by the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the
section cited, at any time within six months from March 16, 1916, and upon
showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate
proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that the order
admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient
proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would
have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no
doubt true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period
of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to
contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect
from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the
making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and
the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on
June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and
excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis
case, above cited, the proceedings in the court below were conducted in such
manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by
which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from
the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though the
period within which the application should have been made was short, the
remedy was both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916,
admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and
void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from
appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in
question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system of
procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in Section 113
is a matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is
another matter which may be properly discussed at this juncture. This relates
to the interpretation to be placed upon Section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is
applicable only to wills of aliens, and in this connection attention is directed to
the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by
an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section
is not capitalized. From this it is argued that Section 636 is not applicable to
the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion
that, by the most reasonable interpretation of the language used in the
statute, the words "another state or country" include the United States and the
States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not
limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and
capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute
and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words.
Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading, of a section, being nothing more than
a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of
limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if
Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States
and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the
courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as
to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated
at the outset of this discussion, which raises the question whether the order of
probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the
petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and
that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate
recites, among other things:
"That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil
H. Johnson was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of
Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was executed in
conformity with the dispositions of the law of the State of Illinois."
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the
execution of the will the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that
the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last
point the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator
was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should
be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the
United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the applicant
should have resided at least five years in the United States and for one year
within the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers
is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be
presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby
becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, in its opening
words, that all persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the
probate of this will does not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois
at the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is
he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but
became and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the
Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be
considered that the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in
their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of
that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. And how
is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the
allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive
as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of
matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of
the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the
acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The
proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all
of them the probate is conclusive. (Castaneda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426;
Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vano, 8 Phil.
Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montanano vs. Suesa, 14
Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will
which has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be
annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed
irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in
the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never
been called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be
procured by fraud, relief could be granted in some other proceeding; and no
such question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were
alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the case. In Austria
vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that
relief might be granted in case the probate of a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will
was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the
testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an unassailable
basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the face of the judgment is
concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had not
contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the
admission of the will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts
were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs.
Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no principle of law better settled than
that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied
to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314;35 U.S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect
to any fact which must have been established before the court could have
rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its
knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction;
and there is no difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised in
matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court
therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the
propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those
facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express
ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its
aspect as an attack upon the order of probate for error apparent on the face of
the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it being
asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially on the question of the
citizenship of the testator — are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a
moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is
not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the
trial court are unsupported by the proof adduced before that court. The only
proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by appeal,
and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order admitting
the will to probate. The present proceedings by petition to set aside the order
of probate and the appeal herein is from the order denying this relief. It is
obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not
possible to review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based.
To permit this would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case
from the point of view of the petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence
submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of the
petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court
was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition
contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment,
aside. In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that
the petition was filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by Section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The
evidence adduced upon this point in the trial court consists of the certificate of
naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the
oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof
that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States,
and inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the
trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a
boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands.
Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his
discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to
the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as
the State of his permanent domicile; and on the contrary the certificate of
naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of
Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of
citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by
virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen
of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator,
even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and
change his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of
these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his
citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the
United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine
Islands to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship in the State of
their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves
it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he
immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United
States is a citizen of the State wherein he resides. The effect of this provision
necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another
loses his citizenship in the State of his original abode upon acquiring
citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State
citizen ship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy
to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in
the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the
mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
 
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as
showing that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in
the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with
the circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such
citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine
Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of
the necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the
allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify any relief
whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in
conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial
court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on
the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that
the will was properly executed by examining Section 1874 of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under Section 275 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the
courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the
legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate
to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the
multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any
such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we
think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union
whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action
litigated in the Philippine courts.
 Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in
taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is
not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state
any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from
what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such
supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture
as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set
aside, even upon application made within six months under Section 113 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that
the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms
that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The
affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the
subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might
tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was
not properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which
cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands; and
it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she
cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law
governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is
sufficient to say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity
of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the
due execution of the will. ( Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 625, 614; Sahagun
vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vano, 8 Phil.
Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that
any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to
the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point
and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of
Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general
provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall
be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it
may be situate."
 From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition
submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to
warrant the setting aside of the order probating the will in question, whether
said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error
apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based
upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the
petition. And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal
defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief
sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So
ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
 
|||  (In re: Johnson, G.R. No. 12767, [November 16, 1918], 39 PHIL 156-175)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 32636. March 17, 1930.]

In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A. W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSINS
HIX, oppositor-appellee.

C. A. Sobral, for appellant.
Harvey & O'Brien and Gibbs & McDonough, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE, SECTION 781, AS AMENDED, APPLIED; RIGHT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL FROM DISALLOWANCE OF A
WILL. — The special administrator of an estate is a "person interested in the
allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," within the
meaning of section 781, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and so
 may be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of a
will.
2. ID.; ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
SECTIONS 300 AND 301, APPLIED. — The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do
not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The requirements of
sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 633,
APPLIED. — The due execution of a will alleged to have been executed in
another jurisdiction must be established. Where the witnesses to the will
reside without the Philippine Islands, it is the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE. — Where it is desired to establish the
execution of a will in another jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that the
testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the Philippine Islands.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 637, 638,
AND 639, APPLIED. — Where it is desired to prove the probate of a will in
another jurisdiction and the appointment in that jurisdiction of an administrator
for the estate of the deceased, the moving party must comply with the
provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
requesting a hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have
been proved and allowed in another jurisdiction.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J  : p

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals

from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee
contends that the appellant as a mere special administrator is not authorized
to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to
have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in
the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so
should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of
the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De
Leon [1925], 47 Phil., 780).
 It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in
that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there
was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West
Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as
certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There
was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the
laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only
evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside
from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses
subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law
of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to
the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 633).
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his
domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence
introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and
the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by
attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for
the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as
part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these
documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and
testament of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on
June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in
vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L.
Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and
filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929,
 the clerk of court of Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed Claude W.
Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the
application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February
20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated
on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make
the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary
administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply
with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to
have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is
no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have
been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8,
1925, in the State of West Virginia. The present proceedings do not call for
any specific pronouncements on the validity or invalidity of this alleged
divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 
|||  (Fluemer v. Hix, G.R. No. 32636, [March 17, 1930], 54 PHIL 610-613)

[G.R. No. 42538. May 21, 1935.]

WILLAMETTE IRON & STEEL WORKS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. A.

H. MUZZAL, defendant-appellant.

Sidney C. Schwarzkopf and Eduardo D. Enriquez for appellant.

John R. McFie, jr., for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CORPORATIONS; CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; LIABILITY OF

STOCKHOLDER FOR OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY HIS
CORPORATION. — Upon the facts stated in the opinion of the court, Held:
That the defendant, a former resident of the State of California, now residing
 in the Philippine Islands, is liable for obligations contracted by a California
corporation of which he was a stockholder at the time said obligations were
contracted with the plaintiff-appellee in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The herein defendant is chargeable with notice of the
law of California as to the liability of stockholders for debts of a corporation
proportionate to their stock holdings, in view of the fact that he was one of the
incorporators of the Meyer-Muzzal Company in the year 1924 and was still a
stockholder in that company in the year 1928. The defendant cannot now
escape liability by alleging that the California law is unjust and different from
the inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGN LAWS; EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A FOREIGN LAW. — The testimony of an
attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, under oath, who quotes verbatim
a section of the California Civil Code and states that said section was in force
at the time the obligations of defendant to plaintiff were incurred is sufficient to
establish the fact that the section in question was the law of the State of
California on the dates referred to. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a
foreign law.

DECISION

GODDARD, J  : p

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Zamboanga, the dispositive part of which reads:
"In view of the considerations above stated, judgment is hereby
entered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant, for the first cause
of action, to pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,837.34, with interest thereon at
the rate of 6 per cent per annum from March 11, 1929, until paid, and to
pay also the amount of P1,590.63, for the second cause of action, with
interest thereon at 7 per cent per annum from April 8, 1929, until paid.
The defendant is further ordered to pay the amount of P500 as
reasonable attorney's fees in prosecuting this action, and to pay the
costs of these proceedings."
This case involves the liability of the defendant, a former resident of the
State of California, now residing in the Philippine Islands, for obligations
contracted by a California corporation of which he was a stockholder at the
time said obligations were contracted with the plaintiff-appellee in this case.
 The section of the Civil Code of California under which the plaintiff
seeks to recover reads:
"SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities
contracted or incurred during the time he was a stockholder as the
amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the
subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the
corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its
stockholders, for the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in
such action the court must (1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or
debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a several judgment must
be rendered against each, in conformity therewith. If any stockholder
pays his proportion of any debt due from the corporation, incurred while
he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further personal liability
for such debt, and if an action has been brought against him upon such
debt, it must be dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the costs, or such
proportion thereof as may be properly chargeable against him. The
liability of each stockholder is determined by the amount of stock or
shares owned by him at the time the debt or liability was incurred; and
such liability is not released by any subsequent transfer of stock."
The defendant-appellant makes the following assignments of error:
"I. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant was the
holder of 1,432 share of the capital stock of the Meyer-Muzzal Company.
"II. The lower court erred in finding that plaintiff has proven the
existence of the foreign law involved in this action.
"III. The lower court erred in enforcing the law of California.
"IV. The lower court erred in rendering judgment against the
defendant."
As to the first assignment of error the witness Stanley H. Hermann, a
certified public accountant, testified that he knows that the Meyer-Muzzal
Company is a corporation and further testified as follows:
"I became acquainted with the corporation by reason of being
employed by it in October, November and December of 1929 as a
certified public accountant and auditor to personally examine the
company's books of account, stock and other records of the company for
the purpose of certifying, if possible, to the correctness of a statement of
the financial condition of the company on March 31, 1929.
xxx xxx xxx
"8. Please state, if you know, whether or not one A. H. Muzzal
was a stockholder of Meyer-Muzzal Company on November 5, 1928 and
December 22, 1928, and if he was, please state the number and value of
the shares of capital stock of Meyer-Muzzal Company subscribed and
 owned by said A. H. Muzzal on November 5, 1928 and December 22,
1928?
"A. Yes, Mr. A. H. Muzzal was a stockholder of the Meyer-Muzzal
Company on the dates specified. Fourteen hundred thirty-three shares of
the capital stock of Meyer-Muzzal Company of the par value of $10 each
were subscribed and owned by said A. H. Muzzal on November 5th,
1928 and on December 22nd, 1928, and said shares were issued to and
standing in the name of A. H. Muzzal on the books of said company at
said times.
"9. If, by reason of the loss, destruction and/or disappearance of
the stock and other corporate records of the Meyer-Muzzal Company
since the time you had occasion to examine them, you have been
unable to make reference thereto in answering the questions asked of
you in this deposition, please answer each and all of said questions by
reference to any documents or working sheets which you may have
prepared upon the occasion of your examining and/or auditing the books
of account, stock and other records of the Meyer-Muzzal Company.
"A. By reference to my working papers which I made at the time I
examined the books of account and stock records of Meyer-Muzzal
Company in October, November, December, 1929, and which working
papers are in my possession, I find and can state accordingly that these
working papers show that the stock and other records of said Meyer-
Muzzal Company recorded in regard to the matter contained in
questions No. 6, No. 7 and No. 8 and I can state accordingly from my
examination of said records and by reference to my working papers that
I know who the stockholders of Meyer-Muzzal Company were; that the
amount of the subscribed capital stock of said Meyer-Muzzal Company
on said dates was 5,000 shares of the par value of $10 each, and that A.
H. Muzzal was a stockholder of the Meyer-Muzzal Company on the
dates specified and that fourteen hundred thirty-three shares of the
capital stock of Meyer-Muzzal Company of the par value of $10 each
were subscribed and owned by A. H. Muzzal on November 5, 1928 and
on December 22nd, 1928 and said shares were issued to and standing
in the name of A. H. Muzzal on the books of said company at said
times."
The above sufficiently establishes the fact that the defendant was the
owner of 1,433 shares of stock of the corporation Meyer-Muzzal Company
when it contracted the obligations alleged in the complaint.
As to the second assignment of error Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-
at-law of San Francisco, California, since the year 1918, under oath, quoted
verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated that said section
was in force at the time the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff were
incurred, i. e., on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence
sufficiently established the fact that the section in question was the law of the
 State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of
our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence
of a foreign law.
"The foreign law is a matter of fact . . . You ask the witness what the law
is; he may from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say
what it is." (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice
Denman in a well known English case where a witness was called upon to
prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he
referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as
controlling, Jones on Evidence, Section Edition, Volume 4, pages 3148-3152.)
Aside from the testimony of Attorney Bolton Ragland's Annotated Civil Code
of California was presented as evidence. This book contains that State's Civil
Code as adopted March 21, 1872, with the subsequent official statute
amendments to and including the year 1929.
In the third and fourth assignments of error the appellant argues that
since the law of California, as to the liability of stockholders of a corporation, is
different from and inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law the courts
here should not impose liability provided in that law upon a resident of these
Islands who is a stockholder of a California corporation. The herein defendant
is chargeable with notice of the law of California as to the liability of
stockholders for debts of a corporation proportionate to their stock holdings, in
view of the fact that he was one of the incorporators of the Meyer-Muzzal
Company in the year 1924 and was still a stockholder in that company in the
year 1928. Exhibit 10 of the plaintiff is a certified copy of the articles of
incorporation of Meyer-Muzzal Company in which it appears that that
company was incorporated on August 22, 1924, and that the incorporators
were A. H. Muzzal, Leo W. Meyer and James Rolph, Jr., "all of whom are
residents and citizens of the State of California." The defendant cannot now
escape liability by alleging that the California law is unjust and different from
and inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs in both instances
against the defendant-appellant.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Diaz, JJ., concur.
 (Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal, G.R. No. 42538, [May 21, 1935], 61
|||

PHIL 471-476)

[G.R. No. L-2248. January 23, 1950.]

 In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines. VICENTE ROSAL
PARDO, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor

Florencio Villamor for appellant.
J. Perez Cardenas for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS; THIRTY-FOUR

YEAR'S RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES. — Thirty-four years' residence
in the Philippines and mingling and dealing by reason of work with people who
use Tagalog in their daily intercourse lends credence to applicant's claim that
he has acquired a good working knowledge of that language.
2. EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; CERTIFICATION OF SPANISH
CONSUL ABOUT SPANISH LAWS. — That Filipinos are eligible to Spanish
citizenship in Spain, is a matter within judicial notice. Moreover, authentication
or certification of the nationality laws of Spain by the Consul General of Spain
in the Philippines is competent proof of Spanish laws to that effect.
3. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; WHEN STRICT OBSERVANCE
OF RULES OF COURT NOT OBLIGATORY. — By reason of the provisions
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, literal adherence to the latter which include
rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding in naturalization. While
said proceeding under the Philippine law is judicial in character, and strict
compliance with the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would
be essential, yet when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the
premises, it is only necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and
a decision reached on a fair consideration of the evidence on satisfactory
proof.
4. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN LAW ON RECIPROCITY. —
Evidence of the law of a foreign country an reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice
by section 41 of rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable
action if, in the light of all the circumstances, the court is satisfied of the
authenticity if the written proof offered.

DECISION
TUASON, J  :p

Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 and

residing in the Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman and
where he is at present employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800,
has been adjudged by the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled to become
a Filipino citizen. That the appellee is unable to speak and write any of the
principal Filipino languages is the first ground of appeal by the Government.
The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood
in that language. Lino Gutierrez, a respectable citizen who has intimately
known the applicant for 27 years, having had business relations with him,
confirmed the applicant's testimony. And the trial judge, who has heard the
applicant translate into Tagalog, "He venido residiendo en Filipinas por el
período de 36 años," appears to have been satisfied with the correctness of
the translation (which was not transcribed.) The fact that the applicant arrived
in the Philippines when he was only 10 years old and has lived here for 44
years continuously except for a few months' visit in Spain, mingling and
dealing by reason of his work with people who use Tagalog in their daily
intercourse, lends credence to his testimony that he has acquired a good
working knowledge of that language. At one time, according to the evidence
he owned or managed two stores successively on the Escolta, and lately he
has been a foreman and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.
The portion of the applicant's testimony which is copied in appellant's
brief should not be taken isolatedly and at face value. This testimony is
obviously an extravagant understatement of the reality, typifying an extreme
modesty which is thought by some to be a virtue. We do not believe that this
statement represents appellant's sincere conviction of its literal meaning.
The other assignment of error goes to the sufficiency of the evidence on
whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens of that country. The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the
Consul General of Spain in the Philippines, stating that in accordance with
articles 17 and 25 of the Spanish Civil Code, among other Spanish legislation,
Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in Spain. Article 17 provides that
foreigners who have obtained a certificate of naturalization and those who
have not obtained such certificate but have acquired domicile in any town of
the Monarchy are Spaniards. No discrimination being made in these
provisions, they apply to persons of any nationality.
As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force
in the Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters
known to judges of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and
may be judicially recognized by them without the introduction of proof.
(Section 5, Rule 123.) Moreover, in a number of decisions mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate
General of Manila has been held to be competent proof of that law. (Yap vs.
Solicitor General, L-1602, 46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], p. 250; 1 Leelin vs.
Republic of the Philippines, L-1761; 2 Yee Bo Mann vs. Republic of the
Philippines, L-1606, 46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11], 201; 3 Jose Go alias
Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe
Fernandez, L-1563.) 4
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
April 28, 1950

TUASON, J.:

This case is again before the court, this time on a motion for
reconsideration.
In our decision we say: "As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is
'the basic code in force in the Philippines,' articles 17 et seq. thereof may be
regarded as matters known to judges of the Philippines by reason of their
judicial functions and may be judicially recognized by them without the
introduction of proof." (Section 5, Rule 123.)
The court is supposed to know that the Civil Code is the Code of Spain,
and this judicial knowledge embraces all its provisions, including those which
have ceased to be in operation in the Philippines. This court has said that it is
not, by reason of an opinion expressed by an expert witness, precluded from
advising itself as to the common law of England. (Bryan vs. Eastern and
Western Asso. Co., 28 Phil., 310.) If the court may take cognizance of the
common law of England, there is perhaps at least as much reason that it may
do so of the Spanish citizenship law, which was our own citizenship law until
Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippines and which is a part of
the code that is still the major branch of law of our country although the said
part is no longer applicable here.
In the matter of the application of Rafael Roa Yrostoza for
naturalization, L-1394 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11], 179), 1 we said that
"There was no proof that Spain had a law which grants Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens of that country," and returned the case to the
court of origin with instruction to reopen the hearing and give the parties new
opportunity to establish or disprove the existence of such law. We have to
confess that the remand for further proceeding was unnecessary. Oversight is
the explanation, made possible by the failure of either party to direct our
attention to the articles of the Civil Code of which we have been, in the
present case, apprised by the applicant.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered we also say that in a number
of decisions, which we cite, mere authentication of the Chinese naturalization
law by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila has been taken as
competent proof of that law. The Solicitor General takes exception to this
passage, in the following observation:
"With regard to the second question under consideration as to
whether the certification of the supposed naturalization laws of Spain
made by the Spanish Consul General constitutes competent proof of that
law, this court cites in support of its opinion the cases of: Jose Leelin vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 1 G.R. No. L-1761; Bienvenido Yap vs. The
Solicitor General 2 G.R. No. L-1602; Yee Boo Mann vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 3 G.R. No. L-1606; and Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs.
Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez, 4 G.R.
No. L-1563. We have carefully gone over these cases and we beg leave
to point out that in each of them this court did not rule that the mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila constitute competent proof of that law, but
that the question as to whether or not the copy of the Chinese Nationality
Law presented in said cases were properly authenticated and admissible
in evidence to prove reciprocity, as required in section 4 (h) of the
Revised Naturalization Law, has become academic because of the
admission made by counsel for the oppositor (Republic of the
Philippines) to the effect that in another case, there has been presented
a copy of the naturalization laws of China duly authenticated in
accordance with the Rules of Court."
The decisions referred to seem to have been misread. In Yap vs.
Solicitor General, L-1602 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], p. 250), 2 the
document admitted, Exhibit E, purported to be "a copy of the Chinese law of
citizenship, where it appears that Filipinos can acquire Chinese citizenship by
naturalization." There was nothing in that decision which would show that the
certificate or authentication was made by a Philippine diplomatic or consular
representative in China. In Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. L- 1761, 1 we said that "in previous cases, a translation of the Chinese
Naturalization Law, made and certified to be correct by the Chinese Consulate
General in Manila, was admitted and considered sufficient evidence to
establish that the laws of China permit Filipinos to become citizens of that
country." In Yee Boo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1606 (46 Off.
Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11], 201), 3 the petitioner introduced in evidence a
translation of the Chinese Naturalization Law, certified to be correct by the
Chinese Consul General in Manila. The court held in that case that the
objection to the evidence "is of no moment, since this court has already
 accepted it as fact in previous naturalization cases that the laws of China
permit Filipinos to naturalize in that country." And the court disposed of Lock
Ben Ping vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1675 (47 Off. Gaz., 176), 1 on the
strength of the pronouncement, just quoted, in the Yee Boo Mann decision.
If it be true, as the Solicitor General notes, that in the Yap case the ratio
decidendi was that "there has been presented a copy of the Naturalization
Laws of China duly authenticated in accordance with the Rules of Court," then
the decision recognized as a fact the existence of a law of China under which
Filipinos may be naturalized. Of this fact the court properly assumed judicial
knowledge in the cases that came up before it soon after. 2
We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul
of the applicant's country does not conform to the requirement concerning the
certification and authentication of such law (sec. 41, Rule 123). But the case
at bar and the cases cited therein as precedents are not governed by the
Rules of Court. Rule 132, entitled "Applicability of the Rules," provides that
"These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient." By reason of this provision, literal adherence to
the Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a
proceeding like that under consideration. While naturalization proceeding
under the Philippine law is judicial in character, and strict compliance with the
process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would be essential, yet
when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it is only
necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached
on a fair consideration of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly,
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice
by section 41 of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable
action if, in the light of all the circumstances, the court is satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
|||  (Pardo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-2248, [January 23, 1950], 85 PHIL 323-330)

[G.R. No. L-11622 . January 28, 1961.]

 THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner, vs. DOUGLAS FISHER and BETTINA
FISHER, and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-11668 . January 28, 1961.]

DOUGLAS FISHER and BETTINA FISHER, petitioners, vs. THE

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. SUCCESSION; FOREIGNERS WHO MARRIED IN THE

PHILIPPINES; LAW DETERMINATIVE OF PROPERTY RELATIONS OF
SPOUSES. — The decedent was born in the Philippines in 1874 of British
parents. In 1909, he married another British subject in Manila. In 1951, he
died in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he and his wife established
their permanent residence. The spouses acquired real and personal
properties in the Philippines. Query: What law governs the property relation of
the spouses? Held: Since the marriage took place in 1909, the applicable law
is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the new Civil
Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere
to the nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where
one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the
administration, disposition, and ownership of their properties. In such a case,
the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in determining the
property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the
two articles in that Art. 124 expressly provides that it shall be applicable
regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or
abroad, while Art. 1325 is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
What has been said, however refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case both spouses are foreigners who
married in the Philippines. In such a case, the law determinative of the
property relation of the spouses would be the English law even if the marriage
was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. (See IX
Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, p. 202).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PROVE FOREIGN LAW; EFFECT OF. —
In the present case, however, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in
the decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the
marriage has not been proven. In the absence of proof, the court is, therefore,
justified in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as the
Philippine law, viz: in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the
contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. Hence, the
lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining
the hereditary estate by the decedent.
3. ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY OF ART. 16 NEW CIVIL CODE. — Article
16 of the new Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) which provides that in testate
and intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others,
is to be determined by the national law of the decedent, is not applicable to
the present case. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which
incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or
contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses.
Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this term
properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is legally
entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution.
4. TAXATION; ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAXES; EXEMPTION OF
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTIES; PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
GRANTING EXEMPTION. — Petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court
in exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the personal
intangible property belonging to the estate in virtue of the reciprocity proviso
of Section 122 of the national Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section
13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code. To prove the pertinent
California Law, counsel for respondents testified that as an active member of
the California bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws
of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the
witnesses cited 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal Revenue
Code as published in the Deering's California Code. And as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by the
respondents. Held: Section 41, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
manner of proving foreign laws before Philippine courts. Although it is
desirable that foreign laws be proved in accordance with said rule, this Court
held in the case Willamete Iron and Steel Works vs. Muzzal, 61 Phil., 471,
that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign
law." In that case, this Court considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of
San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of the
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time
the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. In line with this view, the Tax Court, therefore, did not
err in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents'
witness.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECIPROCITY EXEMPTION BETWEEN STATE OF
CALIFORNIA AND PHILIPPINES. — Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on
intangible personal properties if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not resident of that
foreign country. On the other hand , Section 13851 of the California Law
exempts the payments of inheritance tax if the laws of the country in which the
decedent resided allow a similar exemption from legacy, succession, or death
taxes of every character. It is clear from these provisions that the reciprocity
must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every
character, in the case of the Philippines law, and to legacy, succession, or
death tax of any and every character, in the case of the California law.
Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt
any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity
does not work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in
both laws. Since in the Philippines two taxes are collectible from the
decedent's estate (inheritance and estate taxes) and in California, only
inheritance tax, reciprocal exemption of the inheritance tax in both countries,
leaving payable the estate tax in the Philippines, will not work as that would
violate the California law that authorizes exemption only when there is in the
other country an exemption from legacy, succession or death taxes of every
character. Held: There could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be
total or none at all.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEDUCTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW CANNOT BE
CLAIMED UNDER RECIPROCITY PROVISO. — The amount of $2,000.00
allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and
not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is
reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
7. ID.; ID.; WHEN ASSESSED VALUE CONSIDERED AS FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF PROPERTY. — It is contended that the assessed
values of the real properties situated in Baguio City, as appearing in the tax
rolls 6 months after the death of the decedent, ought to have been considered
by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to Section 91 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however that in accordance
with said proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair
market value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair
market value only when evidence to the contrary has not been shown. In the
present case such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner
which was sustained by the Tax Court.
8. ID.; ID.; SHARES OF STOCK; VALUE OF SHARES, HOW
DETERMINED. — Respondents contend that the value of the shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., a domestic corporation, should be
fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco
(California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were
the held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. The
argument is untenable. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of
taxation, being located in the Philippines, and considering that they are sought
to be taxed in this jurisdiction, their fair market value should be fixed on the
basis of the price prevailing in this country.
9. ID.; ID.; INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED DURING LIFETIME OF
DECEDENT; WHEN MAY BE ALLOWED AS DEDUCTION; DOMICILLARY
ADMINISTRATION DISTINGUISHED FROM ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATION. — It would appear that while still living, the decedent
obtained a loan of $5,00 from the Bank of California National Association,
secured by a pledge on his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local
probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate
and because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal
property which the Tax Court held to exempt from inheritance tax. Held: The
action of the lower court must be sustained. The approval of the Philippine
probate court of this particular indebtedness of the decedent is necessary.
This is so although the same has been already admitted and approved by the
corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domicillary
administration. It is true that there is in the Philippines only an ancillary
administration in this case but the distinction between domicillary or principal
administration and ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one
administration from the other, for the two proceedings are separate and
independent. The reason for the ancillary administration is that, a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of
the country in which it was granted. Hence, Rule 78, Secs 1, 2 and 3 of the
Rules of Court requires that before a will duly probated outside of the
Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before
the Philippine courts, in much the same manner as wills originally presented
for allowance therein. And the estate shall be administered under letters,
testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and disposed
of according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses
of administration (Rule 78, Sec. 4, Rules of Court.)
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF DEDUCTION ALLOWED ESTATE OF
DECEDENT. — Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as
 a deduction, springs from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1),
of the National Internal Revenue Code which provides that no deductions
shall be allowed unless a statement of the gross estate of the nonresident not
situated in the Philippines appears in the return submitted to the office of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable
the revenue officer to determine how much of the indebtedness may be
allowed to be deducted, pursuant to letter (b), number (1) of the same section
89 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows only deduction to the extent of
that portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the
estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated
differently. if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire
assets wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted.
11. ID.; ID.; OVERPAYMENT OF TAXES; LIABILITY OF
GOVERNMENT FOR INTEREST OF AMOUNT REFUNDABLE. — In case of
overpayment of taxes, the National Government cannot be required to pay
interest on the amount refundable, in the absence of a statutory provision
expressly directing or authorizing such payment.

DECISION

BARRERA, J  : p

This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary

estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable
thereto.
Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23,1909 to
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, another British subject) died on February 22,
1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., whereto he and his wife moved and
established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will
executed in San Francisco on May 22,1947, and which was duly probated in
the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his
wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties
acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines, described and
preliminarily assessed as follows:
Gross Estate  
  Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio,  
  covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 P43,500.00
Personal Property  
   (1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao  
    Estate at P10.00 each 1,770.00
  (2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao  
    Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at  
    P0.38 per share 79,800.00
  (3) Cash credit with Canacao  
    Estate, Inc. 4,870.88
  (4) Cash with the Chartered Bank of  
    India, Australia & China 851.97
      —————
  Total Gross Assets P130,792.85
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. In due time, Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our
court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate,
who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with
the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at
their values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was
made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver of the
Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. which the estate
then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said return, the
Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal
properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of
land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of
P52,200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by
the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00
and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the estate the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and
P10,875.25 for inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these
assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed an amended
estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation made at the
time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the
right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in
the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from P0.38 per share, as
originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00
to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by the
ancillary administrator on the market quotation of the stock obtaining at the
San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of
Stevenson, that is, as of August 22, 1951. In addition, the ancillary
administrator made claim for the following deductions:
Funeral expenses ($1,043.26) P2,086.52  
Judicial Expenses:    
  (a) Administrator's Fee P1,204.34  
  (b) Attorney's Fee P6,000.00  
  (c) Judicial and administration    
    expenses as of August 9, 1952 1,400.05 8,604.39
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio    
  real properties (O. R. No.    
  B-1 686836) 652.50  
Claims against the estate:    
  ($5,000.00) P10,000.00 P10,000.00  
Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2    
  to 22, 1951 22.47 10,022.47
        ————
    Sub Total   P21,365.88
In the meantime, on December 1,1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson
assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and
Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second
amended estate and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared
the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22,
1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross
estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal
Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No.
71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector", August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from
the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last
return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had
overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly
overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the
claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the
recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was
forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one- half
(1/2) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property
as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property
should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue
Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said
Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the proviso of
section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the
California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an
exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for
purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the
spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. should be appraised at
P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39."
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner,
assigned four errors allegedly committed by the trial court, while the
assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, hereinafter called respondents, made
six assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following
main issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the
decedent, one-half (1/2) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as
the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal
partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso
embodied in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting
exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00
allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code, in relation to section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in
Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions:
P8,604.39 for judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral
expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,022.47 representing the
amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime;
and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on
the amount it claims to have overpaid the government and to be refundable to
it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied well-known doctrine in
our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting
parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as
to the properties acquired during their marriage. The application of this
doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector
of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New
Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be
determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of the decedent
husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that
English laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that
what obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein
all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong exclusively to
the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of
the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate
proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is to be
determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the marriage of the
Stevensons in the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article
1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which
became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-
called nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where
one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the
administration, disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In such
a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a
difference between the two articles in that Article 124 1 of the New Civil
Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the
marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, while Article 1325 2 of
the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed
marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both
spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa, 3 in his
Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
"La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las
capitulaciones otorgadas en España y entre españoles. El 1.325, a las
celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges es
 español. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se
casan en España, o dos españoles en el extranjero, hay que atender en
el primer caso a la legislacion del pais a que aquellos pertenezcan, y en
el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10
de nuestro Codigo." (Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation
of the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if the
marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners.
But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that
allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the properties
acquired during the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a
mere allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of
any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the absence of
proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls
"processual presumption", in presuming that the law of England on this matter
is the same as our law. 4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil
Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of
the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does
not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property relation
between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional
rights and this term, in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of
property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for
distribution. It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as
distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by the
specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil
Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the
lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining
the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in
exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares
of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to
Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground
that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not
been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted
by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of
by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the United
States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the
state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate
and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the latter only
exempts the payment of inheritance tax.
 To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel
for herein respondents, testified that as an active member of the California
Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State
of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
article 4, sections 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue
Code as published in Deerings's California Code, a publication of the
Bancroft-Whitney Company, Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation
of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibit "V- 2" by the
respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. 5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of
proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it
desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in
the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works vs. Muzzal, 61 Phil., 471, that "a
reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section
41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign
law". In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of the California Civil
Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations
were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court
in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer
or death taxes, between the State of California and the Philippines.
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part,
provides:
". . . And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under
this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at
the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the
time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of
every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis
supplied.)
 On the other hand, section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law,
insofar as pertinent, reads:
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. —
Intangible personal property is exempt from the tax imposed by this part
if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a Territory or
another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which
then imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible
personal property of its own residents, but either:
"(a)Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any
character in respect to intangible personal property of residents of this
State, or
"(b)Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible
personal property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other
State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the non-
resident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible
personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United
States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must
be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every
character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or
death tax of any and every character, in the case of the California law.
Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt
any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity
does not work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in
both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-
resident with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its
settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of
California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal
Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of
the United States, but does not provide for any exemption on the basis of
reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in
the instant case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is non-
resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will be
subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of
the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of
California, but with intangible personal properties there, be entitled to the
exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been
exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because
he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other
hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not
thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California
because under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California, he
is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect
thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We
do not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair situation to the
detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore, find and declare
that the lower court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment of
the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54
O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from
payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
It will be noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent
provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California was not there
squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the determination of the
case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express
provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would
apply only if the law of the other grants an exemption from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character, there could not
be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of
P4,000.00 based on the U. S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being
claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case
(supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax
Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which
reciprocity cannot be claimed under the proviso of section 122 of our National
Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of
land situated in Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed values, as
appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought to
have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to
section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out,
however, that in accordance with said proviso the properties are required to
be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall
be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to the contrary has
not been shown. After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that
such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was
sustained by the tax court, for as the tax court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,254 square meters were
valued by the administrator of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance
tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of
 said properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court can take judicial
notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very
much lower than the true and fair market value of the properties at a
given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in 1952
the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no
showing that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden
increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as
a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more, the counsel for
plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to purchase
the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts
we believe and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real
estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in
the premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents
contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of the market quotation
obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that
the certificates of stocks were then held in that place and registered with the
said stock exchange. We cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs
of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in the
Philippines, as respondents themselves concede, and considering that they
are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our
government's taxing authority, their fair market value should be fixed on the
basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that
the said shares of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock
Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison
Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid
for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in
this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before
this court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold
that the value of a share in the said mining company on August 22, 1951 in
the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents.
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each
share of stock at P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the estate in its
preliminary return. Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the
fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right
to have the properties of the estate declared at their fair market value as of six
months from the time the decedent died.
 On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the
allowance or disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and
respondents have appealed.
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to
support the allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:
(1) Administrators fee P1,204.34
(2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
(3) Judicial and Administrative expenses 1,400.05
    ————
  Total Deductions P8,604.39
An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing
items were considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their
approval by the probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had
also been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate
court would not have approved said items were they not supported by
evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax
Court had before it the pertinent order of the probate court which was
submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the
Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the probate
court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses were actually
incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this finding
of fact which, under Republic Act No. 1125, we are not at liberty to review
unless the same is not supported by any evidence. For the same reason, we
are not inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the
additional amount of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved by
the court a quo for lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of
realty taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City,
which respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find that this
claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful review
of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of
the estate, viz:
(1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34
(2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
(3) Judicial and Administration expenses  
  as of August 9, 1952 2,052.55
    ————
  Total P9,256.89
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05
for judicial and administration expenses approved by the court, making a total
of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at by the Tax Court
for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference between the
total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39
as found by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for
realty taxes.
An evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses in the final computation. This amount has
been expressly allowed by the lower court and there is no reason why it
should not be.
 
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to
section 89(b) (1) in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89
(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have
been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an
indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof,
they offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court
in California by the Bank of California National Association, which it would
appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of
$5,000.00 secured by a pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The
Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local probate court had
not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and because it
constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property which
the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing
the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of
this particular indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is so although
the same, it is averred, has been already admitted and approved by the
corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary
administration. It is true that we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary
administration in this case, but, it has been held, the distinction between
domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary administration serves only
to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two proceedings are
separate and independent. 8 The reason for the ancillary administration is
that, a grant of administration does not, ex proprio vigore, have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we have the
requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can
have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in
much the same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein. 9
And the estate shall be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of
administration granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as
probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of administration. 10 In
other words, there is a regular administration under the control of the court,
where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of
administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized.
Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own probate court, in the
settlement and distribution of the estate situated here, subject to the
proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts have no control.
We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the
Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a
deduction, springs from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of
the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
"(d) Miscellaneous provisions. — (1) No deductions shall be
allowed in the case of a non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines
unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the heirs, as the case
may be, includes in the return required to be filed under section ninety-
three the value at the time of his death of that part of the gross estate of
the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non- resident
Stevenson not situated in the Philippines appears in the three returns
submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to
determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted,
pursuant to letter (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the Internal
Revenue Code which provides:
"(b) Deductions allowed to nonresident estates. — In the case of
a nonresident not a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting from the
value of that part of his gross estate which at the time of his death is
situated in the Philippines —
"(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That
proportion of the deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
of this section 11 which the value of such part bears to the value of his
entire gross estate wherever situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of that
portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the
estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated
differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire
assets whenever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be
deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of the
value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, or that there exists no
 such properties outside the Philippines no part of the indebtedness can be
allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court
disallowing the deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of
P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that.
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the
conjugal partnership property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to
the estate and inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance
tax, there existing no complete total reciprocity as required in section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate
tax;
(c) for the purpose of estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be
appraised at P0.325 per share; and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the
determination of the net estate of the deceased Stevenson.
In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Respondents' claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any
actually results after a recomputation on the basis of this decision, is hereby
denied in line with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. St.
Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that "in the
absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing
such payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National
Government cannot be required to pay interest."
WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not
inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ ., concur.
 
 (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, G.R. No. L-11622, L-11668, [January
|||

28, 1961], 110 PHIL 686-711)

 [G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. March 29, 1974.]

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,

Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. March 29, 1974.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp.

Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-
appellant, vs. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING,
FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No.
1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
INC., movant-appellee.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for
private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.

DECISION

BARREDO, J  :p
 Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to
"declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo)
subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court
from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina
A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those
enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as
Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining
manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and
also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to interfere,
meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate
of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and
branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court
on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly
directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966
denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967
denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing
petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the same respondent
court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the
respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will
executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
"FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be
first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy
said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any
other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to
 the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All
rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as
he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not
sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have
the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and
sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots. 
aisa dc

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton

Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have
gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that
no bond or other security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the
probate court, in the administration of my estate, other than that
necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and
appraisement of my estate and list of claims." (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings
No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles
Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions
thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred
to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he
filed a motion on the same date as follows:
"URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE
PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING
WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru
his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
 1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and
testament, a copy of which is attached to the petition for probate of the
same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles
Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to manage, control use and
enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a
provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: 'I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.'
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner
was engaged in the business of buying and selling personal and real
properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent.
"5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze
the business of petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase
and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all
these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N.
Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue
the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had
been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957." (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
"It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N.
Hodges, that the business in which said petitioner and the deceased
were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named
and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or authorized
to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957."
(Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor
another motion thus:
 "MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES,
LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE
FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE
EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.
"Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his
undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee
named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the
properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever
situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of
said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or
special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to
lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple
title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. . . . . 
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties
left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein
Executor, as Legatee, has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of
the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C. N. Hodges was
and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even
before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C. N.
Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the business of
buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable
Court.
 3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C. N. Hodges
had been buying and selling real and personal properties, in accordance
with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the
herein Executor to have all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages
made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances
leases and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the
Hon. Court and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages
in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and
within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be
approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly
accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be accounted for,
especially the amounts received.
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by the Executor, be
approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages, in consonance with the wishes of
the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with
authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967."
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14,
1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for
the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed
in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City, December 14,1957."
(Annex "H", Petition.)
 On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as
Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
"Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor
of the deceased, renders the following account of his administration
covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which
account may he found in detail in the individual income tax return filed
for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of
net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities,
as well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached
and made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed
that the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges the
assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual
income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex
"A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with
the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959."
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in
its order worded thus:
"Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor,
the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual
income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex
"A" is approved.
SO ORDERED.  cd

City of Iloilo, April 21, 1959."

(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959
and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise
accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14,
1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same, dated
July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-
quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account
just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-
appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in
the record to be disputable:
"Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first 'Account
by the Executor' of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement
of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges'
as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that
the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an 'individual income tax return' for calendar
year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of
the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges." (P 91, Appellee's Brief.).
xxx xxx xxx
"Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second
'Annual Statement of Account by the Executor' of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges' as of December 31, 1959 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an 'individual
income tax return' for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said (state as having earned income
of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate or Linnie Jane Hodges." (Pp. 91-
92, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
"Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third 'Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year 1960' of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges' as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him
and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
'individual income tax return' for calendar year 1960 on the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the aid estate as having
earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges."
(Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
"In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her 'heirs' (see p. 2, Green
 ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately
omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's
name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records 'in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in
the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
"As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he
was administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax
return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule 'M' of such return, he answered
'Yes' to the question as to whether he was contemplating 'renouncing
the will'. On the question as to what property interests passed to him as
the surviving spouse, he answered:
'None, except for purposes of administering the Estate,
paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of
the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate
to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid.'
"Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death,
he executed an 'affidavit' wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he
stated in Schedule 'M' of his estate tax returns as to his having
renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
"As appointed executor, C. N. Hodges filed an 'Inventory' dated
May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership with
Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated
expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as
executor was 'one-half of all the items' listed in said balance sheet." (Pp.
89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking
pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and
orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more
comprehensive and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised
by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in
regard thereto.
 
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in
the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962,
when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer,
Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges
in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the
aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:
"URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-
entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to
act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated
June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges
was stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment,
but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of
the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex 'A'.
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal properties
that may remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges,
the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs. That there
are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which
need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as
that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or
ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the
heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal
partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be
liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge
of the existence of the last will and testament of Charles Newton
Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament
of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his
office, and will be presented in due time before this Honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that,
an Administratrix be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to
perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses,
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in
Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
 7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration, because the last will and testament of deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime,
unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix
is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost,
damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty
(30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the
said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines,
the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve
the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to
act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum
which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully
prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers and
duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable
bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno." (Annex "O",
Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus:
"For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
counsel for the Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the Court
finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both
spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of
Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of
respondent Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a
representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had)
arrived from the United States of America to help in the administration of the
estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the
estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow — Record on Appeal) only to be
replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe
Hodges, who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of
the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with instructions from
the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of
Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines", (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed
in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of
Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the
same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a
separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-
administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued
the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe
Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will,
Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time
or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike — ". Accordingly, it became
incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the
conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon
the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be
determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers
and sisters And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should
be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State
she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made
official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that as far as he
was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse —
'except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges' and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the
deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for
resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the
death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the
lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in
consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.  cdt
 Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise
perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned
orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is
of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by
petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the
other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had
been agreed upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of
the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said
agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing
when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific
terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of
September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal,
reading thus:
"The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss
Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained in the motion filed
by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said
charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal
Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
"After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in
behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that
everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was
resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply
due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore
the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court ordered the
parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before
September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the
parties and their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon
between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and
Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
"In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his
manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED."
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards,
except that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of
October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as
follows:
"On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors
and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco street, Iloilo city, to
take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own
locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27,
1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral
damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order
be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said
office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place
thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the
clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the
opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
"A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of
even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she
was compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to
comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo
dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should remain
in status quo as to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
"To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to
interrupt the operation of the office of both estates, the Court aside from
the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal
arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for
Administratrix Magno.
"After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open
all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
city in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and
deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow
morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could
operate for business.
"Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated
September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint
account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N.
Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the estate of C. N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of
P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A, Magno as her compensation
as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
 (d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the
PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have
in her possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also
directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the
accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N.
Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
"Once the estates' office shall have been opened by
Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it
without previous consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED."
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all
collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in
a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-
called modus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to
show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14,
1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp.
83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
"3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges,
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as
the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs.
William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who
claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties
entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this
Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of
money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two
estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates
would be administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership
of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent (75%) of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935,
 CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates."
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two
estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly
are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the
issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages
313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent
Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her
lawyers, etc., as follows:
"Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal R.
Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964
asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which
Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services to protect and
defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and
the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the
attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It
is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retainers fee of said lawyers, said
fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the
retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the
estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is
premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are
representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964
asking that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been
presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the
opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate
wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable
counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator.
As a matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between
the PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp.
1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm
has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges,
in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to
the reply to the opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former
for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp.
1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp.
1307).
"Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964
stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties
to submit memorandum in support of their respective contentions. It is
prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter
manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the consideration
by the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB
in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp.
1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965
approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement
annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue
or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the above
purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered
to countersign the same." (pp. 6518-6523, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and
motion dated January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965
which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to
enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and administrator in these
special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or
comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In
support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never
delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge
Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late
Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January
13, 1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr.,
the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge Rovira and
deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606,
Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for
reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated
January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the
personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated
between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests to
the prejudice of the other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to
the estate;
"5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp.
6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto
he considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765,
Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
"Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the
pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada,
herein before mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January 4,
1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been filed
with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of
Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated
and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion
dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149-1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has
been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other
lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual services rendered.
However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which
provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for
actual appearances, reimbursement for expenditures and contingent
fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers have
already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-
1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
 "WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby
declared null and void.
"The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was
filed by the attorneys for the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby
approved.
"The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby
directed to be needed to implement the approval of the agreement
annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case
may be.
SO ORDERED."
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of
independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court,
acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by
it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on
appeal herein:
"Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for
registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965,
filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of Ozaeta,
Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty.
Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and
considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court
believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A.
Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED." (P. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably, this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as
administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his
name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was not an
isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
"After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno
to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by
C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions
for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges first Joe
Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel,
Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken
over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting these
motions itself. The first such attempt was a 'Motion for Approval of
Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages'
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the
appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2)
cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D.
R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another
motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale
again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again
approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been
opened, a flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed similar motions
for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations of
mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307
alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court
approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina
A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4,
1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds
of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion
dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive
landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed
concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges
the lower court has had to constitute special but separate expedientesin
Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for
the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of
February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed
a 'Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and
Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII,
pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
'1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed
'Contracts to Sell' real property, and the prospective buyers under
said contracts have already paid the price and complied with the
terms and conditions thereof;
 '2. In the course of administration of both estates,
mortgage debtors have already paid the debts secured by chattel
mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled
to release therefrom;
'3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly
by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator
in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo city
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
 
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City.
'4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not
reduce the assets of the estates so as to prevent any creditor
from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend.'
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
'WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this honorable court approve the
aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages.'" (Pp. 113-117,
Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in petitioner's reply brief.
 Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part
of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its
other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green
Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas,
President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay
Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had
contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as
Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
"Considering that in both eases there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the
administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix
of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two
estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates
or either of them.
SO ORDERED."
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when
respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other
appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on
Appeal, the respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime
pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and
preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
"Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve
payment of overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and
are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration
chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate
estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate
estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay
as shown by the bills marked Annex 'A', 'B' and 'C' of the motion.
SO ORDERED." (Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell'
executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him
before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also
on appeal herein are the following:
 1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal,
approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the
installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on
February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay
the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion
Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on
March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on
May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February
10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas
Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero
and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively,
pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and
November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion
Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966,
August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to
sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958,
respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
 9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on
March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29,
1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had
cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the
installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on
March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7,
1950, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had
cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the
installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., in so far as it
approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees
Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on
December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate
"promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and
January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after
her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court
approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the
concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the
subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-
150 of its brief as appellant thus:
"The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited
assignments of error have already been discussed previously. In the first
abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already
explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself,
superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of
sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of
this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final
deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A.
Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now therefore
final."
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more
fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963,
over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges
and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
"URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY
TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C . N . HODGES OF ALL
OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C . N. HODGES EXISTING
AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND
INCOME THEREFROM
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
Joe Hodges, through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled
proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate
the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters
Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p.
30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of
the following allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by
Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
 
'That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (p. 44, Rec.
Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
'As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated December
11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties lift by the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter.' (p.
46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
 (5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory
and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P.
Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things.
'That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein account, be given notice,
as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased,
in accordance with the last will and testament already; probated
by the Honorable Court.' (pp. 77-78. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the 'Annual
Statement of Account' submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel
Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other
things:
'That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein account, be given notice
as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable
Court.' (pp. 81-82, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the 'Annual
Statement of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960' submitted
through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
'That no person interested in the Philippines be given
notice, of the time and place of examining the herein account,
as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable
Court.' (pp. 90-91, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C. N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of
Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this
Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno.
'Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in
the latter case because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go
to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.'(p. 100.
Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued
to Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of
December 25, 1962.
 'With full authority to take possession of all the property of
said deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be
situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the
preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or Special
Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court.'
(p. 102. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of
Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a
motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963
for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
order:
'. . . se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar
escrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por
contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles
Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada
contrato este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la
misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de
bienes reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de
cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
'Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser
sometida para la aprobacion de este Juzgado.'(p. 117, Sp. Proc.
1307).
[Par. 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September 16, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney
for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, alleges:
'3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in full,
payments for those 'contracts to sell' entered into by C. N.
Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been
demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
 '4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of
sale executed by the Administrative and by the co-administrator
(Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with the
terms and conditions of the respective 'contracts to sell' executed
by the parties thereto.'
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September
16, 1963 are all registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has
been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
'For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come
First Served Basis.
Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has
paid and still is paying sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested
during the hearings before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6,
1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets
belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges situated in Philippines cause of the aforesaid election by C. N.
Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of all of
said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last
Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting
of her administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least
fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and
the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon
family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays
that this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:
 (1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all
of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into
her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of
and character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid
issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity
of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as the
undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of a
majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the
estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any
compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein
petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator,
pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court,
and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard
due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the
following:
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO
SET FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE URGENT MOTION FOR AN
ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS
ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF
OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges
that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys,
an 'Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of
the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of The Assets of The Conjugal
Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All of The Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom' (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an
amicable agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs
of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute
over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by
appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp.
905-906, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration
to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges,
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as
the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs.
William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who
claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered
into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money
were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates
and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates would be
administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership
of one-hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a 'Motion to Resolve' the
aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for
hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs
was absent in the United States, this Honorable Court ordered the
indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly carry out its duties and
obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of the
following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who claim
to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive
control of all of the assets in the Philippines of both estates
including those claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same
until ordered to do so by this Honorable Court on September 7,
1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone
may decide how the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges should
be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and how much they
may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks
issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant
to their fee agreement approved by this Honorable Court in its
order dated March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns
over possession of the records and assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L.
Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal
checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks
prepared by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C.
N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse
the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes
reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court,
particularly those of January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the mandate
contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to
the PCIB, it has
'full authority to take possession of all the property of the
deceased C. N. Hodges.
'and to perform all other acts necessary for the
preservation of said property.' (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims
the right to the immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the
properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other
assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which
existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December
25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his name alone.
The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the name
of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N.
Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, on December
25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom
since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly
appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death,
this Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno
simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p.
102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N.
Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed Special
Administrator (p. 13, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1,
1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1307);
(ii) Special Administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p.
102, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed
Harold K. Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S.
P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A.
Magno, Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-
36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on
January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who at that time was
still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of
Avelina A. Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges
and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of
C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this
Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine
Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take
possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone
only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N.
Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22,
1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of
the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from
Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the
PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in
substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally
became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of all
of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this
Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18,
1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672); which shows on its
face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as 'Administratrix
of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of
the Estate of C.N. Hodges';
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for
the heirs of C. N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for
the Higdon family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
"Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on
January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as of January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-
1000, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on
March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no
report or accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special
administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the
accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss
Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina
A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00.
'for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges'
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1,
1964, at
 'a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an
employee of both estates.'
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the
orders of this Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all
records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the
date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of
the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the
possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-Administratrix
of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or
Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the
reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate
of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss
Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the
PCIB access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated
September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered
Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street
and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. the PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable
Court is again in physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the
aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss Magno continues
to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to
use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within
the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that
C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid
assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death
taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963
and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the
records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
 18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings
No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in
fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and
exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the
sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully
petitions that this Honorable court.
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest
possible date with notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession,
with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB
as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid
issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop
interfering with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the
PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-
208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August
31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo
and others allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of
C. N. Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and
equitable in the premises."(Annex "U", Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official
Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the
late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
 '1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from the State of
Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and
properties in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma,
United States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal
estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges
spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31 and
December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc.
No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said
spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and
had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they
retained until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the
City of Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present
issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in full
hereunder:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband during
his natural lifetime.
"THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make and changes in the physical properties of
said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or
special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to
lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple
title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any
of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near
the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and
sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
 "FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
'Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon.'
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of
Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "B". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she used in
the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, pre-
deceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of her
death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N.
Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to
as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate
the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
(Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate
without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1,
1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges
in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p.
30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity
of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws,
because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine
laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law"
of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary
law (Philippine law — see paragraph 2, supra) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables
(personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property (also
Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with
regards immovable (real properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi
Doctrine", as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the
 case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E.
Christensen", G.R. No. L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963,
Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and
to the successional rights to her estate insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are
concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should
govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma
and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are
those within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court in the two
above-captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community
estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between
them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957,
one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses
constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles
Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as
partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of
the conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is
the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her
heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to
Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her
Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or
emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to
use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the
one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N.
Hodges. Clearly, therefore the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges capable of
inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half
(1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on
May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that
the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable
legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect
this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said
one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil
Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or
seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses,
(1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way
of inheritance and legitime), plus all "rents, emoluments and income"
accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C. N.
Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he
pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her
estate, except only with regards certain properties "owned by us, located
at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on
our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited
above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife,
was entitled to the entirety to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of
the successor are transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus,
title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges
immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of
this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how
the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her
estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed
all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own
name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while
the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December
25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession
and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and
sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders of this Honorable
Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled
that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing
while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of
the following fact, alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11,
1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
'That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
 issued the following order:
'As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated December
11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor,
Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems.
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among
other things,
'That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein account, be given notice, as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by
the Honorable Court.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp 77-78;
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified
"Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among
other things,
'That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein account, be given notice as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable
Court.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis
supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified
"Annual Statement of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960'
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
'That no person interested in the Philippines be given
notice, of the time and place of examining the herein account, as
herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable
 Court.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis
supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie
Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of
her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the
spouses. The entirety of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized,
as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the
conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in
connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1)
declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as
sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus,
although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and
juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the
Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death of
C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph,
provides as follows:
'At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
'Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon.'
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue
and remainder", at least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which
remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted
provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit because said
provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should
not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs
to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance
from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a
usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership to her estate.
In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary provision,
the Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full
ownership of the property bequeathed by the will, not mere
usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al.,
vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly
provide that no charge, condition or substitution whatsoever upon
the legitime can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the
provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code,
the legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the
deceased spouse. Consequently, the above-mentioned provision
in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the
legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2
of the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire
conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution
provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870),
namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph
four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of
C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de
Crisologo, et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G.R. No. L-13876.) At most,
it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative
conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir
(1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept
the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of
these conditions apply, to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the
substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will
is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa,
commenting on these kinds of substitution, meaningfully stated
that: ". . . cuando el testador instituye un primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este, nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que
estas segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a tener
efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que
el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. . . .". (6
Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is
designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir
dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention
of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie
Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie
Jane Hodges' Will is void.
 (d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution
in the Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the
entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and was registered in him
exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets
constituted his estate. Therefore —
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as
substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is
covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be
affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is
to file their claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should
be entitled at the present time to full custody and control of all the
conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist
under separate administration, where the administratrix of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object
and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges
estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and
reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed
exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses
Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively
to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate
accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses
located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income"
above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable
of distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is
entitled to full and exclusive custody, control and management of all said
properties; and
 7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or
participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed
just and equitable in the premises."(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on
December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
"COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court
most respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
Hodges were American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having
amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a
last will and testament (the original of this will now forms part of the
records of these proceedings as Exhibit 'C' and appears as Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of
Iloilo, at the time survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and
several relatives named in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly
filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to
probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may
have any claims against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges, has already
been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 34-
40) and the reglementary period for filing such claims has long ago
lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the
Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this
Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already
admitted to probate contains an institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated or located, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
 THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of
said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best,
and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or
special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to
lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple
title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any
of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near
the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above
provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and
sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or
sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest
that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly
the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had
she or he survived.'
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already
above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over
all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested
remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her relatives
named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the
admission to probate of her last will and testament, but during the
lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges,
with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred
upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the
estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and
sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-
estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, pursuant to her last will and testament, are her
named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma
Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two
being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American
citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957, she was the co-owner (together with her husband Charles
Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal
properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are
now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by
the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under the
control and supervision of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the
interests of husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there
has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, both
interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of 'rents,
emoluments and income', the entire estate having been continually
devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the
combined conjugal estate was earning 'rents, emoluments and income'
until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any
more charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature,
and her estate kept on earning such 'rents, emoluments and income' by
virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed
for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles
Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23,
1957, while it may have earned exactly the same amount of 'rents,
emoluments and Income' as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other
dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until the death of
Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they exist
today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion
 more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be
exactly determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the
combined conjugal estate as they existed on the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 — one-half of these assets belong
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the 'rents, emoluments
and income' of all these assets — again one-half of these belong
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of
charges disbursements and other dispositions made by Charles
Newton Hodges personally and for his own personal account from
May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his
behalf since December 25, 1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar
as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the
liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate, and
distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
moved and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the
factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon,
Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs
under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as
the only persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges in accordance with the system enunciated in paragraph
14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from
the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to
whom they properly belong and appertain."
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965
aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion
and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a
motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
 "1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of
the supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her 'Motion
for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
"2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are
matters pending before this Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable
Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno
that Charles Newton Hodges 'through . . . written declarations and
sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
his life-estate and usufruct over the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges';
b. That 'Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to
the Estate of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal
Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents,
Emoluments and Income Therefrom';
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix
of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all
facts involved therein being matters of record, and therefore require only
the resolution of questions of law;
"3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may
have could be very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges;
"4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and
two administrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome
upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly
because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected
and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect
and hold;
"5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects
and inconveniences not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with
it," (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the
relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex
U, prayed that:
 "1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to
the administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
"2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order
Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
"3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1307) closed;
"4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for
declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the
matters hereinabove set forth are resolved."(Prayer, Annex "V" of
Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion,
the respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:
"O R D E R
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated
April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order
Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this
motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections
to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters
pending before this court such as (a) the examination already ordered by
this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn
public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate
and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion
for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the
assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the
aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing
acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
 These matters, according to the instant motion, are all prejudicial
involving no issues of facts and only require the resolution of question of
law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion
dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the
executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada
in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of
accounts submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty.
Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement
of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960
which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is
stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of
C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that
administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27,
1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed asking that the motion be
denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of
heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and
reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of
documents which are in the possession of administratrix Magno can be
made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963
(as well as the other motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been
consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence
with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one
that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5
and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and
granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and
September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are
premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane
Hodges was C. N. Hodges;
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning
the determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this
stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion
for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges; that the claim of
any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the
administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are
claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1612, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of
the PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of
the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of
the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to
declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of
the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to
her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix
Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated
December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made
by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent
conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated
December 14, 1967 only approved the conveyances made by C. N.
Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to
declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the
lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges;
that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and
reply of the PCIB as well as those in the opposition and rejoinder of
administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be
well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official declaration
of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no
disposition of her estate.
 WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is
hereby DENIED."
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this
order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
"It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957
was based on the fact that.
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir
instituted insofar as her properties in the Philippines are
concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late
Charles Newton Hodges rights over said properties which, in sum,
spell ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, 'not
only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
"Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion
was granted by this Honorable Court 'for the reasons stated' therein.
"Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only 'all
the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by' the late
Charles Newton Hodges, but also all 'the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages . . .' be approved and authorized.
This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, 'for the
reasons stated' in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only
approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late
Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized 'all subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges." (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges had already been factually, although not legally, closed with the
virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of
all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957,
Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said
motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no
justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or
modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to
above, was set for hearing.
 In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was
filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on
August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate
testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for
resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by
respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal)
together with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232,
id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 pp. 455-456,
id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds
executed by petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as
the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The other of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the
deposit of all collections in a joint account and the same order of
February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial
of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the
payment of attorney's fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc.
and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing
appellee Western Institute of Technology to make payments to either
one or both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order
of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier,
Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with
the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and
pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said
approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record
on Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and
Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow
Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero,
Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and
Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands involved in the
 approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed
either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with
different matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons,
as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there
are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner
has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in
connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight
(LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all
of them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the
Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:
"I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING
HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY
HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL
WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES AND
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED
BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS
IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and
P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO
CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID
APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
CAUSING EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED
UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF
THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION
CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR,
MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN
SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL &
INDUSTRIAL BANK.
 LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND
CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON
NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING
THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN
THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN
THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED
THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO
SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION
OF PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT
AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON
OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE
ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR
LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED
HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S
FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL
ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER
ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS
ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED
HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL
EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO WHO IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
 
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO
THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE."(Pp. 73-83, Appellant's
Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration
of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt
was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed
as administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her
place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed
replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect
(see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently,
Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for
the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a
motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been
filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal
motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already
been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband.
Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent
Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution
of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said
petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have
been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the
fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges
representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not
possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges
estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
 PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged
tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering,
however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and,
moreover, their final results herein below to be stated and explained make it
of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by
the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged
impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the
existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very
appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is
a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three
appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause
the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and
consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without
taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and
time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of
such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy
of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not
a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of
appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is
possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the
given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the
longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of
the same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal
with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved
or determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving
the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded
availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental
issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and
render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of
them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of
certiorari and prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its
main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate of Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court
exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing
after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of
respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted
order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert
and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the
provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done
in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the
contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal
declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the
consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to
be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent
Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that
such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent court's order of
December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said
order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and
distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most
important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of
probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making
orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned,
like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees and
legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights
and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin
or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal
complications and consequent litigations similar to those that have developed
unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein
all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already
actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the
satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties
are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to
issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that
the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered
terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed
definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as
automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions and
responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court
to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal.
Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
"SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs."
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of
distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration,
allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but
logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper
and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and
not of the court.
". . . it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make
a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p.
397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37
Off. Gaz., 3091.)" (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p.
86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
"Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or
testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing
delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the
indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased." (Santiesteban vs.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts,
pleadings and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for
the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was
issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading
to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27,
1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the
motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law
contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much
relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all
the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges"
(after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general
advance authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the
last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the
order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in
the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court
predicated the order in question did not pray for any such adjudication at all.
What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges)
is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it
significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to
sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines — during his
lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing
more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular
portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only
during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending
the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in
said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section
2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial
implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or
distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected
thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation,
when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be
prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B,
1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined
to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully
persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot
be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the
will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have not been
disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court
subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the
contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of
appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier,
it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases
(Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of
heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this
connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of
estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on
pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C.
N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the
order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and
distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno
filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should
correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges
bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to
full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the
same time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death
should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely
given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly
dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in
his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as
suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or
diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law
over what would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly
contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so
adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other
words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his
motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial
court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have
been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife None of them could
have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will.
And it may be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the
motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to
send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to
the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said
motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but
merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to
either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in
accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be
allowed under the broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his
own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial
court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because
of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested
parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated
differently, if the orders of May 21, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really
intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no
hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018,
September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99
Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere
formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and
distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be
drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial
court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and
distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased
filed their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in
that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
 "En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la
encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni
adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten
la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del
Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido
nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza
podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada
heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion
del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado
hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan
exentos de esta formalidad los administradores que son legatarios del
residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para
responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que
la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
"POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber
lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo
que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa
Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon
Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose
Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla,
Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador,
declarando, ademas, que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al
remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus
coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a,
11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la
administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del
testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a
Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del
alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al
principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes,
conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este
auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por
terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA."
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be
but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied
upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature
as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its
issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing
could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of
accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, Annexes I, K and M,
respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given
notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an
absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers
and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally
permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew
or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did
not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in
the records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore
the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru
counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants
and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even
promised that "proper accounting will be had — in all these transactions"
which he had submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby
implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As
alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:  cdtai

"Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first 'Account
by the Executor' of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement
of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges'
as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that
the combined e tax return' for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges."
(p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
"Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second
'Annual Statement of Account by the Executor' of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement of Net worth of Mr. C. N Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges' as of December 31, 1959 annexed
thereto. C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an 'individual
income tax return' for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
 personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-
92, Id.)
"Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third 'Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor for the year 1960' of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the 'Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges' as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an 'individual evenly between him and
the estate income tax return' for calendar year 1960 on the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges."
(pp. 92-93, Id.)
"In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her 'heirs' (see p. 2, Green
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately
omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's
name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records 'in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think
or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges'."
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his
wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of
his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the
basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much
thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to
her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred
to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such
payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his
co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these
proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under
the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending
the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other
heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be
warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well
be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
 It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the
motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned
statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed
and filed the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent
Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it
was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at
the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall
be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was
Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that
his understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could
somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty.
Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy
Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which
is made in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the
oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
"1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957,
ordering the probate of the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated. However, in the
petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the
name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally
omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon, who are his wife Aline Higdon and
son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of
deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and
that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon Court to insert the names of
Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon,
in the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957." (pars. 1 to 3
Annex 2 of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real
attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are
documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer,
which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the
right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United
States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer)
and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M,
Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
 "2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election
between (1) the provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11)
dower, courtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes () No
"2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will
and electing to take dower, courtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( )
No.
"3. According to the information and belief of the person or
persons filing the return, is any action described under question 1
designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No"
(Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests
passing to surviving spouse" the following:
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying
debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interest of
the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid." (Annex 4, Answer —
Record, p. 263)
 
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
"I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time
the United States Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all
right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as
shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said
return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a
part hereof.
"The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm and I do
hereby ratify and confirm the declaration made in Schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part
to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate
of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to
absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income
taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957."
(Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as
evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the
purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their
existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our
conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of
May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering
they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of
the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen
any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of
Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in
fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards
the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask
the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that
her whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the
contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof
upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of
his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the Court
in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil. 908, at pp. 913-914:
"Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said land
continued to be conjugal property in the hands of the defendant Lasam.
It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and
this court in construing this provision in connection with section, 685 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of
November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of
the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the
affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego). (Alfonso vs.
Natividad, 6 Phil. 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De
la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs.
Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476;
Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 586;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
"In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the
case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that
court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration
of the community property. Attention was called to the fact that the
surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the
death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any
fraud committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged
with its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he
had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high
degree of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact
that he was the owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal
estate which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no more
acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was
administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward
 or a judicial administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of
Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to prescription,
provides that 'this chapter shall not apply . . . in the case of a continuing
and subsisting trust.' The surviving husband in the administration and
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the
highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any
portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes
upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No liquidation was
ever made by Lasam — hence, the conjugal property which came into
his possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains
conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He should have
made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the conditions of
title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession
'under a claim of title exclusive of any other right'. For a trustee to make
such a claim would be a manifest fraud."
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced
that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be
inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing
future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner,
would necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the
provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may
be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate
court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be
that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way they are
understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to
consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges
immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89,
is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no
more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for
their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the
estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account
of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are
objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the
trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal
inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket
approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is definitely
preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested
by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not
cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and
stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in
the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to
the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in
the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as 'Annex
A'." Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records
before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in
these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal
kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be
the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to
dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his
death, such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore,
there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed
of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that
he had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the
death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of it is
Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such
estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to
be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has
ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito
Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective
by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point,
PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said
respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB
has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete
stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at
the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been
liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus
commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the
estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and
all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the
properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly
segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB
would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a
claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an
administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who
normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the
establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an
ordinary action should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to
pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on
the one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the
estate, on the other.
 
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it,
the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third
party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the
present cases, what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by
the estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including
the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the
trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves,
more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often
mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the
parties is something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not
all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges
depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that
respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said
issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root
orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true
significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not
the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon
the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his
wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the
present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was
the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May,
1957 up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than
five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the
proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any
effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand,
there are enough indications, as already discussed, that he had intentions of
leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly
to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not
terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal
properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the
other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready
ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-
heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving
a premium for such procrastination, and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the
administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the
properties in question, which would necessarily include the function of
promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and
segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be
considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which
her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests
of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the
protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the
decedent, and from this point of view, it may be said that even if PCIB were to
act alone, there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the
other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the
priority among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that
the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone
but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that
the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has
less. Taking both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as,
according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the
estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means
that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates
should be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their
segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted
because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless,
intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance.
Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what
Hodges was duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of
an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It
goes without saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an
executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last
sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of
spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of
sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former
rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which
are now embodied in the rule just cited.
 Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was
already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's
will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same
was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from ought that
appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate
not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges
himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice
of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of
any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who
are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had
Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this
problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that
the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB
or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the
properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what
would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act
conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact
that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary
disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given
effect. To a certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking,
Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under
Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under
Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2)
refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by
Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein
because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate
or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct
to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in
question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil
Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it
is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will
"so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857, Id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default
is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes
for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from
his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously
with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by
him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during
his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely
dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the
usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code,
that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership
thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as
there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the
whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no
legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under
Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the lifetime of Hodges as the
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs.
Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and
904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges'
share of the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate,
the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should
be applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article
16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could
consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other
fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil
Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition
(Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs.
Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed
nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States
of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her
residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of
the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State
which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her
share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof.
Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had
renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven
by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the
genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions.
Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas
provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would
be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in
these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the
simple reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court
below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before
Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave
importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to
render an intelligent, comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there
is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of
Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by
respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other
conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is
not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned,
these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the
trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of
ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to
her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with
the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and
taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be
proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any
degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by
Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties
which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed
of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special
Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of
what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is
basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions
of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
legitime whereas Magno claims the negative — it is now beyond controversy
for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions
actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at
least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of
PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should
only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an
admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less,
irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the
applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement
of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should
proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that
respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues
which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1)
whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his
inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had
been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas
on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared
above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of
properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general
appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from
reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their
pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield,
as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific
evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their
respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues.
In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further
evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate
proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed
squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in
the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be
less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it
may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as
to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here
also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable
laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the
undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases
should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said
law provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either
the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After
nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this stage and in the
state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than
real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim
that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be
less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what
are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first
instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in
dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in
instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned
do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41,
1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
"It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed
in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1985, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern.
To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.
84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol.
2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National
Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the
book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under
the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested
by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract
from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the
records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have
presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding
succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that
case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
"Upon to other point — as to whether the will was executed in
conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does
not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced
in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law
of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt
was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section
1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr
& Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have
assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion
mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice,
among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the
United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the
Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our
courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious
laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such
authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The
proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the
issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred
in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such
error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition
does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois
is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the
assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no
question based or such supposed error. Though the trial court may have
acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of
Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made
within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was
wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in
question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in
the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits
by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject,
and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tend
to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
 It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment."
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have
any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for
granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are
as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the
presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point.
Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of
both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be
applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually
and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any
consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other
words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the
estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-
appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not
now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July
31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
"Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that 'intestate
and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found', while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses
being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also
Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the
Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and applying
therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-
16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well
as to immovables situated in the Philippines."
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
 "The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges, was an American citizen. There is also no question that
she was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise
no question that she had her domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above cited
orders of the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], Sec. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
"Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
'Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.'
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the
national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of
Texas, as governing succession 'both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions . . .'. But the law of Texas, in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to
immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as
well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas
points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated
and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen"
(G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that
Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well
as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal
or community property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into
two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own
property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the
 conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles Newton
Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights.
There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of
the Civil Code provides:
"If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the
other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the
testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died
within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of
the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the
hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband
and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of
the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding
paragraph."
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by an
fideicommissary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge,
condition, or substitution (Art. 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that
in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own
conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled
to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
 
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at
issue."
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the
following appears:
"Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the
Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res
adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine,
Philippine law governs the successional rights over the properties left by
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the
Hodges properties pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p.
21, petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.
 d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the
Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited
by the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his
deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles
Newton Hodges, the substitution provision of the will of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-
25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole
ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned
such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such ownership
and such was the status of the properties as of the time of his death (pp.
29-34, petition)."
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in
the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the
laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the
application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the
corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on
succession should control. On that basis, as We have already explained
above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is
no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her
will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of
PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is
untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of
Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely (1) that the
provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on
substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the
orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had
already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free
portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which
poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda
does PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in
the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And
since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute
admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to
rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65,
citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug.
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more
than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not
Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members
of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is
imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by
Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates
without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his
intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own
share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death
of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether
these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as
intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his
wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11,
1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of
properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of
the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own
share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to
the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative
transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of
such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical
changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes
Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with
the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and
sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must
naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB
could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically
ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will,
under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically
upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the
scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of
Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of
adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in
appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are predicated
mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated
unto himself all the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal
partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of
December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of
Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the
various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in
accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution
holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the
best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be
administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it
should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental
reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to
the respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which
need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent
Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many
of said orders, PCIB further claims that either the matters involved were not
properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure
followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing
separately with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to
liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated
from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that she was
therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these
appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a
matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that
should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that
the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by
allowing the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the
various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has
to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be
able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be
legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the
pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the
substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable
proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In
other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual
circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to
adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in
rights already being exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to
do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the
applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on
account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to
administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the
existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates
to function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court
ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely
barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein
involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this
decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that
the respective administrators therein "act conjointly - none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature
deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering
all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges'
estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position
which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the
other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this
date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due
regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has
filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged
failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what
appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more
complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of
the assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion
thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error Numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of
August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving
properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as
Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect,
the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the
order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27,
1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in
the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N.
Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the
estate of C. N. Hodges; . . . (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB
to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to
allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized representative
of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions
of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N.
Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying,
among others, the notion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965
last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is
in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972
modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more
importantly, with what We have said the trial court should have always done
pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In
fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this
decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders
provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what
We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two
estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed.
Accordingly, the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby
overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly
deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the
Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit
additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the
payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as
constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement
of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for
services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the
administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per
the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp.
231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966, (pp. 455-
456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and
LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the
agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L.
Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First
Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the
Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to
prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain
cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more
specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 — ", (pp. 126-129, id.) and
directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks
may be needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the
motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to
countersign the said check or checks as the case may be." (pp. 313-320, id.),
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of
February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to
the lower court's order of October 27,1965, already referred to above, insofar
as it orders that "PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in
favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight
assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges
for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were
authorized were in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We
have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way
the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately
resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that there are properties constituting
the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It
follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to
hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own
services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting
amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end
had the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she
had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the
reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb
the discretion exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We
have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate
in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the
professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon
require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for
legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to
both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as
counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the
nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate.
Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing
estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests
involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her
estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is
a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations of
the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of
Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two
estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees
stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would
correspond to Hodges' estate. And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and
other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they
appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their
attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in
these appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the
expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, amy be paid without
awaiting the determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
 
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under
discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein the
vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed
administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally
common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, Thus it should not be wondered why both Magno
and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact,
such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both.
The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather
insubstantial. Besides should any substantial conflict of interest between them
arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very
well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No.
1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We
cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage the estate and the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should
correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges
have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate
has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except
those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been
paid. 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small
amount of attorney's fees although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the
counsel of an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility,
reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the
situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity
thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to
said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and
LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXXVI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of
various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but
executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts
to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23,
1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated
on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G.
Iyulores, executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala,
executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on
April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958;
the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador
S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barriod,
executed on February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pruficacion Coronado, executed
on August 14, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November
27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959; and the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that,
inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have
dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of
the properties respectively covered by said sales that he executed the
aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the
implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator
of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Basically, the same theory is involked with particular reference to five other
sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees
were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, namely those in favor
of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western
Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell
executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the
quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that
PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 11* all
proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the
death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate
and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and
sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds,
whether in cash or property, have been subsequently conveyed or assigned
subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos, with the result
that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death,
they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters.
The deeds here in question involve transactions which are exactly which are
exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in
the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed by
Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first
blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of
plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would
necessarily have tremendous repurcussions and would bring about
considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued
already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the
Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation
involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-
observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what should
substantially correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third
parties are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer
any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making.
What is more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the
probate court for approval, and from already known and recorded actuations
of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on
their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their
transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of
one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in
question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court
had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her acts
as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either
conjoinly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of
Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed
precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned
orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal
infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said
sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be
only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her
death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory
submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous,
varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB
claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict
with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds
of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those
corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually
under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to
liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the
only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to
in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have
the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges,
definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell'
after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his
wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the
provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very
orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957
and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial
court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27)
which according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and
selling personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the
last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if
Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so
by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of
such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order
itself for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB
contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the
aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to
sell" upon which the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges
before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons
already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed
pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges;
hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court
may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are
not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in
nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of
rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the
impugned orders are not disturbed.
 In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the
assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-
fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and
conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of
error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments
in accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the
others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S.
Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by
PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of
the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture
is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds
in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already
held above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal
properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would
inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate.
From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not
it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made
by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and,
whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate
were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the
government because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since
there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that
they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the
instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXLX to XL,
XLVII to XLLX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under those assignments of error two issues which
according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds
executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the
performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial
court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it
(PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself,
while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the contending claims
of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in
effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective
contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees
concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of
PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total
stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding
appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB
and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that
is decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the
contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these
incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs
who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the
ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments
of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they are
hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders
of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate
certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and
otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates
and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees,
suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was
within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against
orders favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled,
said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was
in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments
on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965
and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from
PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of
the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it
made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all
your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would
"appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account
up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311,
Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after
alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue
installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that
it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending
resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this
motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted
in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either
of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant — can pay to
both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around
said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not
served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard,
considered and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its
hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different
from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is
contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of
the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a person other
than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had
contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration.
We must assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court
had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the
other hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion
three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record
reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same
points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on
A.). Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not within the
general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at
this point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions WE have already
resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add,
perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the priority of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeals by PCIB,
that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property
executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be
taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the
cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in agreement
that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provision of the rule
just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission
clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of
herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the
said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not
controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere
unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines,
2nd paragraph) the pactum commissorium or the automatic rescission
provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has
been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manres 263, 2nd
ed.), neither of which have been shown to have been made in connection with
the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error Number
LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that
the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied,
what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no
less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is
perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made
together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal
aspects.
That instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton
Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him
by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed
on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and
administration wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have
and to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the
condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d)
and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27,
Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate
order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the
business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real
properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased
was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had
been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as
Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only
part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered
that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken, . . . all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding
statements of account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his
motions, he always made it a point to urge that "no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." All said accounts were invariably approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or by
Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be noted, despite the
provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership
was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said
husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of
my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which
provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be
promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's
share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and
identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no
indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears
therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net
worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges
repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the
conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally between
himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he
also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns for
each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income,
thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct
from his own.
 2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its
order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers,
Roy Higdon, then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for
the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon
may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really
interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he
expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's
brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to
the United States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had
renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which
attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged
affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he
even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and
renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his)
estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since
her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day,
upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was
appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix
of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last
will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and
that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged
or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-
Special Administrator and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of
the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate
together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to
be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been
proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the other,
under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the
conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into
and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did
Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for
which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and
independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus,
PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely,
conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise
acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton
Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact
any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her
own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealt with some of the properties, appearing in the
name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of
the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon
submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who
was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the
businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and
intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally
its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications
arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual
statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in
the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore,
Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the
estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court
with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's
orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has
been doing, as detailed earlier above, to set aside. Additionally, PCIB
maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary
substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and
may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as
the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the
decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA
95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her
share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was a
citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles
900 and 872 of the Civil Code.Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction
against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time, PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the
trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for
specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes
and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties
which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly, pursuant to
corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are
being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly
predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two
estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial
court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally
adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were
no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges
as executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the
point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs.
Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct
of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing
directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is
that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence,
the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the
conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event,
Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his
wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and
sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues
just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27,
1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the
estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in the name
of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs.
Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of
by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters
share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances
relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court
intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold
that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what
is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet
reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of
the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed
Hodges to dispose portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication,
which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no
possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors
and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently
extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported
renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the
spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously
disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died,
to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to
remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds
thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be
part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently
disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the
pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under
them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for
the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that
could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may
not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the
difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of
Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a
legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the
other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might
ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of
Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related
to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any
other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs.
Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand,
Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by
said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters
as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter
would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his
lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof
at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit
only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged
to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple
case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of
Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of
which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of
his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by
law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on
(1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that
Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can
be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance
from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of
the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a
final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the
first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate,
however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the
terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during
his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by
PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be
her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her
husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to
conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed
therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her
brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix
thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels,
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the
determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the two
administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of
September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of this
decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning
payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration
and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with our holding that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion,
the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find
justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant
PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and
administration expenses in question. 
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions
made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in
the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a
distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell
executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those
premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards
the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees
constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate,
pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will,
on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties
covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties
may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being
no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to
anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding
procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as
discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural
and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that
any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any
of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason
for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and
AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers
hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket
fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on
pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment
is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and
(2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of
the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957,
minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of
third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to
remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of
the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties
by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be
declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said
estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as
amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of
September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings
1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should
act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment
and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each
other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this
judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the
presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share
thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the
trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein
adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672,
without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for
its removal as administrator 12 ; and this arrangement shall be maintained until
the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby
reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding
 complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that
may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are
directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice
hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall
nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15)
days from the respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
 (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-
|||

27896, L-27937, [March 29, 1974], 155 PHIL 228-400)

[G.R. No. L-54204. September 30, 1982.]

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN

SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD,
HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES,
REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C.
ABORDO, respondents.

Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
Jose A. Rico for private respondent Abordo.

SYNOPSIS

Restituta C. Abordo filed a complaint for "death compensation benefits"

before the National Seamen Board, for the death of her husband, who died in
the course of employment with petitioner company, as Second Engineer in a
vessel of Singaporean Registry. Abordo claims that she is entitled to
compensation based' on Singaporean laws while petitioners contend
otherwise since respondent Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. Petitioners offered Abordo
P30,000.00; benefits under Singaporean law were greater. The respondent
Board decided in favor of the respondent Abordo On appeal, the Ministry of
Labor affirmed the decision. Petitioner company came to this Court on
certiorari praying that the decision of the Seamen Board, affirmed by the
Ministry of Labor, he nullified for basing been rendered without jurisdiction and
for making an award beyond the maximum allowable. The records show,
however, that the "Employment Agreement" between Abordo's husband and
petitioner company provides that compensation shall be paid under Philippine
Law or the law of the registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater.
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that
the Employment Agreement is clear as to which law to apply; and that since
respondent Board under Article 20 of the Labor Code has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relative to employer-employee
relationship involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment, it is assumed
to be familiar with pertinent Singaporean laws relative to workmen's
compensation.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAWS;

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT; TERMS AND CONDITIONS ARE BINDING ON
THE PARTIES. — In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between
petitioners and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that the death
compensation claimed shall be paid under Philippine law or the law of registry
of petitioners' vessel whichever is greater. Since private respondent was
offered P30,000.00 only by petitioners, Singaporean law which granted
greater benefits was properly applied in this case.
2. ID.; LABOR CODE; NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD; ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ALL CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS INVOLVING FILIPINO SEAMEN. — Article 20,
Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Thus, ills safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore
maritime laws relative to workers' compensation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOARD MAY APPLY RULE ON JUDICIAL NOTICE. —
The National Seamen Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, in
administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure- particularly of
 evidence-applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply" (Oromeca Lumber Co
Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA ll88).
4. ID.; ID.; RULE ON CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
PROVISIONS THEREOF. — Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor."

DECISION

RELOVA, J  :p

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June
20, 1979 of the National Seamen board, and the decision dated December
11, 1979 of the Ministry of Labor be nullified and set aside, and that "if
petitioners are found liable to private respondent, such a liability be reduced to
P30,000.00 only, in accordance with respondent NSB's Standard Format of a
Service Agreement. "
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent
Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he
died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner
NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a
vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of
his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay
and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits
and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo,"
filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the
amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co.
(PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively,
should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand,
petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this
case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay
private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death
benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim
should apply in this case. LexLib
 The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979,
ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following:
"I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the deceased) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral
expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's
fees.
"It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National
Seamen Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision."
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979,
the Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows:
"Motion for reconsideration fixed by respondents from the Order
of this Board dated 20 June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant,
jointly and severally, the amount of Thirty-four thousand and two
hundred ten dollars ($34,210.00) representing death benefits, funeral
expenses and attorney's fees.
"The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband
of complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by
respondents and served as such in the vessel 'M.T. Cherry Earl' until
that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic
stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her complaint filed
before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due
her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered, which is
Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the
questioned Order. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.
"In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue
that the law of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering
that their responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of
the existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever
presented and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered
to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25
which, they maintained, should apply in thus case.
"The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the
law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
"After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter, we rule
in the affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion
which, to our mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the
 regular court of justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question of
evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which this
Board, being merely a quasijudicial body, is not strict about.
"It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in
the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a
long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be
alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in
this case. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this
matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or
quasijudicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-
settled also is the rule that administrative and quasijudicial bodies are
not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this
Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims
for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of
employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall
be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered
policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like
us to.
"WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied
and the Order of this Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution
issue immediately."
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse
Management Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C"
of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:  LLpr

"In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in

the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct
and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned,
but not any other time, the EMPLOYER will provide employee with free
medical attention, including hospital treatment, also essential medical
treatment in the course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at
his point of origin, If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE
to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as
determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and
provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful
act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's
Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater." (Italics
supplied)
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners
and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid
under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is
greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered
P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this
case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental
Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is
familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking
judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the case of Virjen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L-41297), the
respondent Board promulgated a decision, as follows:
"The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the
following that the late Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent as
Ordinary Seamen on board the M/V 'Singapura Pertama,' a vessel of
Singapore Registry; that on September 27, 1973, the deceased Remigio
Roldan met an accident resulting in his death while on board the said
M/V 'Singapura Pertama' during the performance of his duties; that on
December 3, 1973, the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. paid to the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00
representing Workmen's Compensation benefits and donations of the
company; that the amount of P4,870 was spent by the respondent
company as burial expenses of the deceased Remigio Roldan.
"The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board
in connection with the particular case, is whether or not under the
existing laws (Philippine and foreign), the complainant Natividad Roldan
is entitled to additional benefits other than those mentioned earlier. The
Board takes judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the respondent having
admitted in its memorandum) of the fact that 'Singapura Pertama' is a
foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it is the policy of this Board that
in case of award of benefits to seamen who were either injured in the
performance of its duties or who died while in the course of employment
is to consider the benefits allowed by the country where the vessel is
registered. Likewise, the Board takes notice that Singapore maritime
laws relating to workmen's compensation benefits are similar to that of
the Hongkong maritime laws which provides that in case of death, the
heirs of the deceased seaman should receive the equivalent of 36
months wages of the deceased seaman; in other words, 36 months
multiplied by the basic monthly wages. In the employment contract
submitted with this Board, the terms of which have never been at issue,
is shown that the monthly salary of the deceased Remigio Roldan at the
time of his death was US$80.00; such that, 36 months multiplied by $80
would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of P7.00 to $1.00, the
benefits due the claimant would be P20,160. However, since there was
voluntary payment made in the amount of P6,000 and funeral expenses
which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a maximum of
P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from P20,160
and the difference would be P13,960.00.
 "WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping
and Marine Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the
amount of P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
The Board also orders the respondent that payment should be made
through the National Seamen Board."
The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly
having been rendered without jurisdiction and for awarding compensation
benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the ground of res
judicata. This Court in its resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December
12, 1975, respectively dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the
motion for reconsideration in said G.R. No. L-41297.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that
the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is
familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's
compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and,
"in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly
of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca
Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.  Cdpr

For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
 
 (Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. L-54204,
|||

[September 30, 1982], 202 PHIL 810-817)