“Consilium Autem Domini

In Aeternum Manet”
Bonaventure and Aquinas on the Eternal Multiplicity of the Divine Ideas

By Br. Evagrius Hayden, O.S.B.

Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception

ST 821 Aquinas and the Masters of the Medieval University
Prof. Dr. Gregory LaNave, Ph.D.

Saturday, April 21, 2018

 Prooemium
“But the counsel of the Lord stands for ever;
the thoughts of his heart from generation to generation” (Ps. 32:11).1

In these words from the Psalm the divine ideas are described for us according to four aspects,

namely their exemplarity, their unity, their multiplicity, and their eternity. According to St.

Augustine, the divine ideas are the exemplary forms according to which all things are made,

residing within the divine mind.2 God forms all things according to these ideas in his own mind in

much the same way that an artisan forms his artifacts according to his own creative concepts. 3 And

yet, just as an artisan “takes counsel,” as it were, with the artistic concepts in his own mind by

looking to them as archetypes or exemplars prior to applying them to his artifact, so can God be

said to “take counsel” with the eternal and unchanging ideas within his own mind prior to creating

things according to them. Insofar as he perfectly knows these eternal ideas with utter certitude and

orders them towards their proper ends in creation, they can be called the “counsel of the Lord,” 4

while insofar as God looks to these divine exemplars within his own mind from eternity, they can be

called the counsels that “stand for ever” (Ps. 32:11), since it is written, “all things were known to the

1 “Consilium autem Domini in æternum manet; cogitationes cordis ejus in generatione et generationem” (Ps. 32:11).
M. Tweedale, ed., Vulgata Clementina (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1946) All translations from Latin are mine.
2 “sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae uel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae
formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae diuina intellegentia continentur.
et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest
et omne quod oritur et interit.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, Sancti
Augustini Hipponensis Opera omnia - Electronic Computer Database, n.d. q. 46.
3 See Augustinus Hipponensis, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, Sancti Augustini Hipponensis Opera omnia -
Electronic Computer Database, n.d. I.17.
4 And yet, when we predicate “counsel” of God, we must deny all the imperfection and discursion that is ordinarily
entailed in that word. “consilium attribuitur deo quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis
provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in deo locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc
deo non attribuitur.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Opera Omnia Iussa Impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita
(Rome: Polyglotta, 1888) I.II. q. 14, a. 1, ad. 2; “cum dicit, consilium autem, ponitur stabilitas dei, quia consilium
suum stat, et cogitatio sua perseverat . . . de consilio, cum est in nobis, dicit inquisitionem; cum autem dicitur de
deo, importat ordinationem respectu omnium ad debitum finem.” Thomas Aquinas, In Psalmos Davidis Expositio,
ed. Robert Busa S.J. and Enrique Alarcón (Parma, 1863), www.corpusthomisticum.org ps. 32, n. 10.

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Lord God, before they were created” (Sir. 23:29), 5 and again, “O eternal God, who art the knower

of hidden things, who hast known all things before they come to pass” (Dan. 13:42).6

But, one cannot say that God creates or knows diverse things by just one eternal idea. For the

very distinctions among creatures are caused by God according to his own ideas, and God knows

them through his divine ideas in their very singularity and distinction. Hence, Augustine says, “it

remains that all things are made by reason, yet not the same reason for a man as for a horse; for to

think this is absurd. Thus, individuals are created by proper reasons.” 7 If every creature thus

possesses its own proper idea in the mind of God, it is manifest that there is a multiplicity of divine

ideas. Hence, the psalmist speaks here in the plural of God’s thoughts, “the thoughts of his heart”

(Ps. 32:11).

But, a difficulty arises if, as the psalmist says, there are a multiplicity of thoughts or ideas

within the mind of God. For, the wisdom of God by which he knows all things is the very same as

his being,8 and therefore his knowledge and ideas will also be the same as his being. How then can

God be said to have multiple thoughts or ideas without at the same time multiplying his being and

thus constituting many Gods? Augustine seeks to resolve this by grounding the unity of the divine

ideas in the unity of the Word of God, in whom these ideas are located. For, the living Word of

God is “full of all the living and unchanging accounts of all things, and all are one in him just as he

is one, from one, with whom is one.”9 It is this unity of the divine being, and thus of the divine ideas
5 “Domino enim Deo antequam crearentur omnia sunt agnita : sic et post perfectum respicit omnia” (Sir. 23:29).
Tweedale, Vulgata Clementina.
6 “Exclamavit autem voce magna Susanna, et dixit : Deus æterne, qui absconditorum es cognitor, qui nosti omnia
antequam fiant” (Dan. 13:42). Ibid.
7 “restat ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare.
singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De div. quaest. 83 q. 46. “Reasons” and
“Ideas” have the same meaning for Augustine; they both refer to the exemplary forms of things in the mind of God.
8 “deo autem hoc est esse quod est potentem esse aut iustum esse aut sapientem esse et si quid de illa simplici
multiplicitate uel multiplici simplicitate dixeris quo substantia eius significetur.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De
Trinitate, Sancti Augustini Hipponensis Opera omnia - Electronic Computer Database, n.d. lib. VI, cap. 4.
9 “id quod est intellegere, hoc uiuere, hoc esse est unum omnia tamquam uerbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid et
ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei plena omnium rationum uiuentium incommutabilium, et omnes unum

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themselves that the psalmist indicates when he refers in the singular to the heart of God, “his heart”

in which the divine thoughts reside. And since this heart is one, just as God is himself one (Dt. 6:4),

so also will the divine ideas be one.

St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, having received this paradoxical

teaching of St. Augustine on the divine ideas, seek to give a developed account for their multiplicity

that is nonetheless reconcilable with the unity of God’s being, and also with God’s eternal

knowledge of creatures. In this paper I will examine both of their accounts to see if they succeed in

that enterprise, and which of their arguments is the more potent. My argument will take the form of

a disputed question where in the first part I will give objections for the fittingness of both

Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s account of the divine ideas. After that, in the second part I will give

my main response in which I will attempt to lay out and to apply the principles for determining

which is the better position. Finally, in the third part I will make a detailed comparison of the

objections and try to account for and resolve their differences as far as possible. For the position of

Bonaventure, I have chosen to focus primarily on his commentary on the Sentences of Peter

Lombard and his Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, while also looking at his

Breviloquium, and his Collationes In Hexaemeron.10 For Aquinas, I have used for the most part his

commentary on the Sentences, his Summa Theologica, and his Summa Contra Gentiles.11

in ea sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum.” Ibid. lib. VI, cap. 10.
10 See Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae (Florence:
Quaracchi, 1885); Bonaventure, “Quaestiones Disputatae De Scientia Christi,” in Opuscula Varia Theologica,
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae V (Florence: Quaracchi, 1891), 1–44; Bonaventure, “Breviloquium,” in Opuscula
Varia Theologica, vol. V, Opera Omnia (Florence: Quaracchi, 1891), 201–291; Bonaventure, “Collationes In
Hexaemeron,” in Opuscula Varia Theologica, vol. V, Opera Omnia (Florence: Quaracchi, 1891), 327–454.
11 See Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium In Libros Sententiarum (Parma, 1856), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ I.
d. 35, d. 36; Aquinas, ST I., q. 15; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Lavergne (Nîmes: Giraud, 1853) I.
cap. 54, 65, 66; It should be noted that there is also a substantial treatment of the divine ideas in his De Veritate.
This work is worthy of reference, however, since the Sentences commentary is the primary source of comparison
with Bonaventure, and due to space constraints, I have opted to leave it out of the overall comparison. See Thomas
Aquinas, “De Veritate,” in Quaestiones Disputatae (Typographia Pontificia Petri Marietti, 1898) q. 3; What
Aquinas’s teaching in the De Veritate adds onto the teaching already present in the Summa and the commentary on
the Sentences, is that it “develops his account on the basis of a distinction between species quo and species quod in

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 I. Objections
First, I will look at the position of Bonaventure and examine whether his position is fitting

regarding three of the elements mentioned above, namely the unity of the divine ideas, their

multiplicity, and finally their eternity. After that, I will apply these same three elements to the

position of Thomas Aquinas to see whether his account is fitting.

Objection 1: That Bonaventure’s Account for the Unity of the Divine Ideas is Fitting

Bonaventure begins his discussion on the unity of the divine ideas in his commentary on the

Sentences, distinction 35, wherein he says that God knows things by their likenesses which he has in

himself, and these likenesses of the things known are called ideas. 12 They are the ratio cognoscendi,

or the account of knowing, according to which God has knowledge of things, and yet the difference

between how God knows and how we know is that our ratio cognoscendi is the likeness impressed

upon our mind from the truth of the thing known that is outside, while in God it is just the opposite;

the ratio cognoscendi is itself the first truth and the thing known is the expressed likeness of that

first truth.13 For, it is on account of the ratio cognoscendi in God being the first truth that it will be

the most expressive,14 and thus the likeness that is expressed from that first truth will be the highest

and most perfect expression of it.15 Because of the perfect expressiveness of the first truth that is in

the process of understanding.” Vivian Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and
Synthesis (Brill, 1996), 200.
12 “Deus cognoscit per ideas et habet in se rationes et similitudines rerum quas cognoscit, in quibus non tantum ipse
cognoscit, sed etiam aspicientes in eum: et has rationes vocat Augustinus ideas et causis primordiaies. Ad
intelligentiam autem obiectorum inlelligendum, quod idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae.” Bonaventure, In Sent. I.
d. 35, a. un., q. 1, corp. Likeness is here to be taken insofar as one thing is similar to another simply and through
itself, and not through some third term in which both things participate. For a detailed discussion of Bonaventure’s
doctrine of divine ideas, see Carl A. Vater, “Divine Ideas: 1250–1325” (Dissertation for Doctor of Philosophy,
Catholic University of America, 2017), 56–115.
13 “Sed aliter est in nobis, aliter in Deo. In nobis quidem ratio cognoscendi est similitudo, cognitum est veritas . . . In
Deo autem est e converso, quia ratio cognoscendi est ipsa veritas, et cognitum est similitudo veritatis, scilicet ipsa
creatura.” Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 1, corp.
14 “Et quia ratio cognoscendi consistit in ipsa veritate prima, ideo ratio cognoscendi in Deo est summe expressiva.”
Ibid.
15 “Similitudo vero expressionis est summa, quia causatur ab intentione veritatis, ut visum est, quae est ipsa
expressio.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un. q. 1, ad. 2.

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God, thus Bonaventure identifies the ratio cognoscendi in God, namely the first truth, and the

cognitum, namely the expressed likeness or idea.16 Hence, for Bonaventure, the idea that is known

by God and the account or ratio for knowing that idea are wholly the same.

Bonaventure picks up again the question of the divine ideas in his Disputed Questions on the

Knowledge of Christ, repeating almost exactly the same argument that was laid out in the Sentences,

distinction 35, but then building upon it. Because of the perfection of the divine intellect, it being

pure act, thus, just as the divine power is sufficient to cause all things, so also is the divine truth able

to express all things,17 and this perfect expression of all things will be an immanent and eternal

expression. But, since expression is assimilation, thus that which is expressed will be, once again,

wholly the same as the divine intellect. As he concludes, “the divine intellect, eternally expressing

all things by its own highest truth, eternally has the exemplar likeness of all things, which are not

other than itself, but are what it is essentially.” 18 If one were to reduce Bonaventure’s argument for

the unity of the divine ideas to a categorical syllogism, it would be the following: That which is

perfectly expressed is wholly the same as and imminent to that which it expresses. But, the divine

ideas are the perfect expression of first truth. Therefore, the divine ideas are wholly the same as and

imminent to the first truth. And since the first truth is one, thus the divine ideas are really one.19

16 “Et quoniam omne id quod summe exprimit, perfectissime assimilat cognitum assimilatione competente cognitioni,
ideo patet quod ipsa veritas ex hoc, quod facit cognoscere, est similitudo expressiva et idea.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un. q.
1, corp.
17 “Quia enim ipse intellectus divinus est summa lux et veritas plena et actus purus; sicut divina virtus in causando res
sufficiens est se ipsa omnia producere, sic divina lux et veritas omnia exprimere.” Bonaventure, “De Scientia
Christi” q. 2, corp.
18 “divinus intellectus, sua summa veritate omnia aeternaliter exprimens, habet aeternaliter omnium rerum
similitudines exemplares, quae non sunt aliud ab ipso, sed sunt quod est essentialiter.” Ibid. q. 2, corp.
19 “idea in Deo dicit similitudinem, quae est ratio cognoscendi; illa autem secundum rem est ipsa divina veritas, sicut
supra monstratum est; et quia illa est una, patet quod secundum rem omnes ideae unum sunt.” Bonaventure, In Sent.
I. d. 35, a. un., q. 2, corp.

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 Objection 2: That Bonaventure’s Account For the Multiplicity of the Divine Ideas is Fitting

Just after showing that the ideas are really one in distinction 35, question 2 of the Sentences,

Bonaventure nevertheless grants that they are many according to reason. For, the likeness of the

exemplar ideas towards the exemplata is an extra-generic likeness, so that the ideas are not limited

or determined by the exemplata themselves.20 And thus, nothing prevents the exemplar idea being

one with regard to what the divine idea is, namely the ratio cognoscendi and the first truth, while the

exemplata remain many with regard to that towards which the divine idea is, namely the creatures

which are the objects of divine knowledge.21 For, just as one form can be assimilated by many

things differing according to matter, or by one light many and varied species of color are expressed,

so also is the one exemplar in the mind of God many with regard to the things it exemplifies.22

The reason why Bonaventure says that the notion of idea when applied to God can be called

many is because it signifies the divine essence in relation to creatures, 23 and in fact lies more on the

side of the creatures known by God, according to the mode of understanding. 24 And since the

knowing God is one while the known creatures are many, thus, with regard to what it is, the ideas

are one thing, though with regard to their mode of understanding they are called many.

20 “Alia est similitudo simpliciter extra genus; et haec, quia ad hoc genus non arctatur, qua ratione est huius, ea ratione
est illius, et qua ratione est huius secundum partem, eadem ratione secundum totum; et talis similitudo est divina
veritas et idea in Deo.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 3, ad. 2.
21 “quia forma dicit ut ad alterum, sicut similitudo, quando dicuntur plures formae, non ex hoc notatur, quod in ideis
sit pluralitas secundum rem sive secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum id ad quod sunt.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 3,
ad. 1; “sicut ratio cognoscendi est una, et tamen plura cognita distinctissime repraesentat secundum proprias
conditiones; sic divina cognitio quantum ad modum cognoscendi, qui est in ipsa, est una et simplex, non distincta;
sed in comparatione ad obiectum distincte cognoscit.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 3, ad. 4.
22 “sicut unum secundum formam potest assimilari pluribus secundum materiam diversis, sic in proposito una realis
similitudo potest esse omnium cognoscibilium. Et potest poni exemplum in luce aliquo modo, quae una secundum
numerum exprimit multas et varias species colorum.” Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 3, ad. 2.
23 “Intelligendum igitur est, quod hoc nomen idea significat divinam essentiam in comparatione sive in respectu ad
creaturam. Idea enim est similitudo rei cognitae, quae quamvis in Deo sit absolutum, tamen secundum modum
intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 4, corp.
24 “idea sive ratio cognoscendi plus se tenet secundum rationem intelligendi ex parte cogniti.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q.
4, ad. 2.

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 In question 3 of the De Scientia Christi, Bonaventure repeats the arguments laid out in the

Sentences, but expands them by referring to the perfect act of divine truth which makes it most

capable of expressing all things. For, God knowing himself as the first truth thus expresses himself

completely and in many ways, since, unless he expressed himself in every possible way, he would

not be the highest expression.25 That he can express himself in many ways is on account of two

reasons: God is related to all things as pure act is related to potency and thus can express himself by

any admixture of act and potency; God is outside every genus and thus not limited to expressing any

one of them but able to express them all just as something one in form is able to be assimilated to

many according to matter.26 The multiplicity of God’s self-expression, however, is still only said

with respect to creatures, insofar as these ideas do not signify multitude according to what they are,

that is the first truth, but connote it with regard to that towards which they are, namely the creatures

as known.27 The multiplicity then of the divine ideas in God is like a source of light that is identical

with its illumination, or the light rays coming forth from it, yet remaining within it. The first divine

truth is light, and the expressions of that first truth are luminous beams that nevertheless remain

within, which point and lead towards that which is expressed externally.28

25 “Ponit etiam aliud, videlicet, ut sit expressio secundum omnem modum. Nam si ex aliquo respectu non habet
exprimere , non exprimeret summe.” Ibid. I. d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, corp.
26 “Et quoniam divina veritas potentissima est ad res omnes totaliter exprimendas, sicut divina virtus ad res omnes
totaliter faciendas; ideo Deus cognoscit se ipso ut veritate exprimente res multimodas et totaliter. Potens est autem
divina veritas, quamvis sit una, omnia exprimere per modum similitudinis exemplaris, quia ipsa est omnino extra
genus et ad nihil coarctata; ipsa etiam est actus purus, cetera autem respectu eius sunt materialia et possibilia.”
Bonaventure, “De Scientia Christi” q. 3, corp.
27 “Quoniam ergo rationes ideales nominant ipsas expressiones divinae veritatis respectu rerum, ideo plurificari
dicuntur non secundum id quod significant sed secundum id quod connotant, non secundum id quod sunt, sed
secundum id ad quod sunt sive ad quod comparantur.” Ibid. q. 3. corp.
28 “Huius autem simile non perfecte reperitur in creatura; sed si intelligeretur per impossibile, quod lux esset sua
illuminatio et irradiatio; dicere possumus, quod eiusdem lucis et luminis essent plures irradiationes, . . . Sic et in
proposito intelligendum est quia ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respectu rerum sunt quasi
luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecae, quae determinate ducunt et dirigunt in id quod exprimitur.” Ibid. q. 3,
corp.

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 We can reduce the above arguments to two syllogisms: 1) Perfect self-knowledge expresses the

knower completely, imminently, and in many ways. But, God, as first truth, knows himself

perfectly. Therefore, God expresses himself completely, imminently, and in many ways. But, the

divine ideas are the perfect imminent expression of first truth. Therefore, the divine ideas express

God in many ways. 2) Creatures are many. But, the divine ideas signify the divine essence according

to reality, yet with a certain connotation towards creatures according to reason. Therefore, the

divine ideas signify unity according to reality, but connote multitude according to reason. The first

of these syllogisms argues for the multitude of divine ideas from the side of God’s multiform self

expression, the second argues that the multitude of the ideas is according to reason from the side of

creatures. In both cases, Bonaventure concludes that the multitude of the ideas is connoted from the

side of creatures according to reason, whereas from the side of the divine essence they are signified

as being really one.

Objection 3: That Bonaventure’s Account for the Eternity of the Divine Ideas Is Fitting

As we saw above, the divine ideas can be called many insofar as they connote multitude from

the side of creatures. But, to what extent can they be called eternal? Bonaventure says that the

connotation of the multitude of ideas, when it refers to the existence of things, can only be said of

them with regard to time and not from eternity. But, insofar as one refers simply to the connotation

of the ideas without reference to existence, then they can be called many even from eternity, insofar

as the relation of the ideas to the things connoted of them is in habitu, and it is of things as they will

be, but that are not yet.29 Thus, he concludes that, even though one might connote the ideas as being

many from eternity insofar as they connote a future multitude of creatures, they nevertheless do not

29 “pluralitas est in ideis ratione connotatorum. Sed de connotatis est loqui dupliciter: aut in quantum sunt, aut in
quantum sunt connotata. In quantum sunt, sic sunt solum ex tempore; in quantum autem connotantur, sic possunt
connotari et aeternaliter et temporaliter: aeternaliter, quando respectus importatur ut in habitu.” Bonaventure, In
Sent. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 3, ad. 3; Cf. ad. 4.

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posit a real multitude in things except within time. The ideas are able to connote a multitude from

eternity because, as he says, “the idea does not connote the ideata according to actual existence, but

only according to potency,” and thus the multitude of ideas is not limited to those things that

actually exist, but embraces all that will be but do not yet exist, and those that can be but will never

exist.30 And, since God knows all of these, he therefore has ideas of them all from eternity. He

concludes therefore that the multitude of ideas is said with regard to “the immensity of divine truth

in expressing and knowing all that is possible for God, and this is one according to act and reality.”31

In the De Scientia Christi, question 1, Bonaventure builds on this notion of God’s eternal

knowledge of all possibles by showing that his knowledge of understanding extends to infinitely

many things.32 For, “to know” does not actually concern something really existing outside the mind,

and thus God’s eternal knowledge of possibles is said to be in him in act, yet in the mode of a

habit.33 Thus, by knowing habitually all things that are able to be known, whether they are beings

existing in act or just in potency, God will thus know infinitely many things from eternity.34

Bonaventure adds in his Breviloquium how God has perfect knowledge of singulars from

eternity, arguing once again from God’s perfection.35 For, since God knows most perfectly, “thus he

knows all things most distinctly under all conditions which things have, or are able to have, and thus

30 “Idea autem non connotat ideatum secundum actualem existentiam, sed solum secundum potentiam. Et quia Deus
potest facere infinita, quamvis nunquam faciat nisi finita, ideo ideae vel rationes cognoscendi sunt in Deo infinitae
quia non tantum sunt entium, vel futurorum, sed omnium Deo possibilium. Nihil enim potest Deus, quod non actu
cognoscat.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 5, ad. 2.
31 “multitudo idearum non est rerum diversarum, sed dicit immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo et
cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile, et hoc quidem secundum rem et actum est unum.” Ibid. I. d. 35, a. un.,
q. 5, ad. 3.
32 “Cognitio vero intelligentiae est infinitorum, pro eo quod Deus intelligit non tantum futura, verum etiam possibilia;
possibilia autem Deo non sunt finita, sed infinita.” Bonaventure, “De Scientia Christi” q. 1, corp.
33 “ideo, quia ipsum scire non concernit neque connotat aliquid actuale exterius, ideo dicit ibi actum per modum
habitus.” Ibid. q. 1, corp.
34 “Unde quia scibilia non tantummodo sunt entia actu, sed etiam in potentia; cum non sit inconveniens ponere infinita
in potentia, non est inconveniens ponere infinita actu a Deo scita.” Ibid. q. 1, corp.
35 Just as he argued from God’s perfection to the multiplicity of the divine ideas.

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he knows future things to be future, and present things to be present.” 36 And, since God is most

simple, thus he expresses all things eternally by one divine truth. 37 And yet, the ideas are still called

many, even though they really express only one divine truth, for the term “idea” is properly said with

regard to the things known according to an account of reason, 38 which things are many either as

already existing, or else as able to exist in God’s power.

From the foregoing, we can summarize Bonaventure’s arguments for the eternity of the divine

ideas into three different syllogisms: 1) What is said without respect to existence in time, can be said

to be from eternity. But, the possible existence of multiple things in the power of God is said

without respect to time. Therefore, the possible existence of multiple things in the power of God

can be said from eternity. But, the term ‘idea’ designates by connotation God’s knowledge of the

possible existence of the many ideata in the power of God. Therefore, multiple ideas can be said to

be in God from eternity. 2) Infinity is a multitude. But, all that is possible is infinite. Therefore, all

that is possible is a multitude. But, God’s eternal knowledge is of everything that is possible.

Therefore, God’s eternal knowledge of everything is a multitude. 3) That which knows most

perfectly, knows most distinctly and according to all possible determinations. But, God, being pure

act, knows most perfectly. Therefore, God knows most distinctly and according to all temporal and

existential determinations. But, where there is distinction there is plurality, and where there is

knowledge of all temporal determinations there is futurity and thus knowledge of things as not yet

36 “quoniam primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum et summum, cognitionem habet simul simplicissimum et
perfectissimum: quia perfectissimum, ideo cognoscit omnia distinctissime sub omnibus conditionibus, quas res
habent vel habere possunt; et propterea futura scit esse futura, et praesentia praesentia.” Bonaventure,
“Breviloquium” pars 1, cap. viii.
37 “Quia vero simplicissima est, ideo omnes similitudines illae sunt unum in ipsa. Unde sicut Deus una virtute omnia
producit ex tempore secundum omnimodam rerum integritatem, sic una veritate omnia exprimit sempiternaliter.”
Ibid. pars 1, cap. viii.
38 “Hae autem rationes vel ideae, licet sint una veritas et lux et essentia, non tamen dicuntur esse una ratio vel idea.
Ratio enim vel idea dicitur ut ad alterum secundum rationem intelligendi. Nominat enim similitudinem cogniti,
quae realiter tenet se ex parte Dei, licet secundum rationem intelligendi dicere videatur aliquid ex parte ideati.”
Ibid. pars 1, cap. viii.

10
existing, but this is knowledge from eternity. Therefore, God knows a distinct plurality of ideas

from eternity.

The first of these syllogisms concludes to the eternity of the divine ideas from the fact that

knowledge of possibles in general abstracts from time, the second concludes to the eternal plurality

of the divine ideas from the fact that God’s knowledge of possibles is infinite, and the third

concludes that the eternal plurality of ideas will be known distinctly from the fact that God’s

knowledge is perfect. Each conclusion, then, builds on the previous one, though using different

attributes of God’s knowledge as the middle term.

Contrary Objection 4: That Aquinas’s Account for the Unity of the Divine Ideas Is Fitting

After having examined the fittingness of how Bonaventure’s reconciles the eternal unity and

multiplicity of the divine ideas, now we will look at the position of Aquinas, first regarding the unity

of the divine ideas, then their multiplicity, and finally their eternity.39 In his commentary on the

Sentences, Aquinas says that anything which names the divine essence alone is signified as one. 40

But, if we add on a certain relation of reason in our understanding, then it can be signified as many,

such as if we consider the divine essence together with the account of being known by God

according to his own imitability.41 Thus, although the multitude on the side of creatures is a real

multitude, the multitude of the ideas on the side of God will only be according to reason or

understanding, since relations of reason do not constitute any real distinction but only according to

reason. And such a multitude that is not real but only according to reason does not derogate from

the real unity of the divine essence,

39 For in depth commentary on the texts of Aquinas mentioned in this objection and those following, see Boland,
Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, 200–214; John F. Wippel, Thomas
Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, The Etienne Gilson Series 16 (Toronto: PIMS, 1993), 3–39; Gregory T. Doolan,
Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (CUA Press, 2008), 84–110.
40 Aquinas, In Sent. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.
41 “distinctio autem idealium rationum est secundum operationem intellectus divini, prout intelligit essentiam suam
diversimode imitabilem a creaturis.” Ibid. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; Cf. ad. 2.

11
 In the Summa, Aquinas develops the argument by adding an epistemological consideration.

Here, he argues that just as there are two things in the mind of the artisan, namely the concept

which is understood, on the one hand, according to which he makes his artifact, and on the other,

the intelligible species by which he understands, so also are these found in God. For, the divine

essence is the intelligible species by which he knows all things, and the divine ideas are the concepts

which are understood.42 And both are in fact the divine essence, but the first is the divine essence

simply speaking, as that by which he knows, while the second is the divine essence as known

according to one or another of his perfections. And, since the divine essence and the divine

perfections are not really distinct,43 thus, having many concepts of the divine essence, that is,

knowing it as it is imitable in various ways, does not diminish from the real unity of the intelligible

species, which is the divine essence.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas develops this argument even further, explaining in detail

how the divine essence can be considered by God as imitable in a contracted way by a creature. For,

the divine essence contains all the noble attributes of things conjoined perfectly according to being,

and yet they remain separable by reason. But, the divine intellect is able to understand separately

such attributes. Thus, the divine intellect is able to understand the perfections of the divine essence

separately according to reason. And the forms of creatures are a kind of perfection. Therefore, the

divine intellect is able to comprehend the perfection proper to each by understanding in what way it

imitates his own essence, and in what way each falls short from his own perfection. 44 And, in this

42 Aquinas, ST I. q. 15, a. 2, corp. ibid. I. q. 15, a. 2, ad 2.

43 “respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus creatis, sed in deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi
quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a deo.” Aquinas, ST I. q. 15, a. 2, ad. 4.
44 “Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo
eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque: . . . Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina,
inquantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus propriam
cognitionem de omnibus habere potest.” Aquinas, SCG I. cap. 54, n. 4-6.

12
sense, the divine essence is the proper account or idea of individual things, insofar as it is

understood according to its particular perfections as imitable in different ways by creatures.

Contrary Objection 5: That Aquinas’s Account for the Multiplicity of the Divine Ideas Is Fitting

Aquinas’s argument for the multiplicity of the divine ideas in his commentary on the first book

of the Sentences is spread across two distinctions, namely 35 and 36. According to Aquinas, God

knows all things through first knowing his own simple being, 45 and then secondly knowing all other

beings insofar as their being is caused from him and thus like unto him. 46 But, both the common

and proper modes of the being of things are caused by God, as well as their material and formal

aspects.47 Thus, God knows all things with regard to their common and proper modes of being, as

well as their form and individuating matter. 48 Therefore, it follows that God has proper knowledge

of multiple things in their singularity through first knowing himself. But, since God, being the first

cause, is the likeness of all things, since every agent makes effects like unto itself,49 thus, God knows

individual things by first knowing himself as being like unto them, that is, as being imitated by

them.50 But this is precisely the definition of a divine idea, namely “the divine essence insofar as it is

45 “Si ergo consideretur intellectum primum, nihil aliud intelligit Deus nisi se; quia non recipit species rerum, per quas
cognoscat; sed per essentiam suam cognoscit, quae est similitudo omnium rerum.” Aquinas, In Sent. I. d. 35, q. 1, a.
2, corp.
46 “Deus non habet cognitionem de rebus aliis a se, nisi inquantum sunt entia: quia enim esse suum est causa essendi
omnibus rebus, inquantum cognoscit esse suum, non ignorat naturam essentiae inventam in rebus omnibus.” Ibid. I.
d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, corp.
47 “ipse non est causa rerum quantum ad esse ipsorum solum commune, sed quantum ad omne illud quod in re est.”
Ibid. I. d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, corp.
48 “et sic oportet quod cognoscat omnes proprias naturas et proprias operationes rerum.” Ibid. I. d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, corp.
“cum Deus cognoscit res per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum, eodem modo cognoscit res quo modo esse
rebus tradidit. . . Sed quia nos ponimus Deum immediate operantem in rebus omnibus, et ab ipso esse non solum
principia formalia, sed etiam materiam rei; ideo per essentiam suam, sicut per causam, totum quod est in re
cognoscit, et formalia et materialia; unde non tantum cognoscit res secundum naturas universales, sed secundum
quod sunt individuatae per materiam.” Ibid. I. d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, corp.
49 “Omne autem quod ab aliquo per se agente producitur, oportet quod secundum hoc quod ab ipso effectu est, ipsum
imitetur; quia, ut probat philosophus, simile agit sibi simile, tam in his quae agunt per voluntatem quam in his quae
agunt per necessitatem. Unde secundum id quod aliquid a Deo producitur, secundum hoc similitudinem in ipso
habet, et secundum hoc est idea ipsius in Deo, et secundum hoc a Deo cognoscitur.” Aquinas, In Sent. I. d. 36, q. 2,
a. 3, corp.
50 “cum Deus de singulis rebus propriam cognitionem habeat, oportet quod essentia sua sit similitudo singularium
rerum, secundum quod diversae res diversimode et particulariter ipsam imitantur secundum suam capacitatem.”

13
the exemplar imitated by a creature” or “the divine essence . . . according to a determinate mode of

imitation.”51 Thus, since God is the exemplar of creatures, or is capable of being the exemplar of

creatures in diverse ways, there will be a multitude of divine ideas in one divine essence.52

In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas begins his argument for the multiplicity of the ideas not

from God’s knowledge of his effects, as in the Sentences, but rather from his intention for the order

of the universe. He argues that, since God has a proper and per se intention of the universal order,

he will thus also necessarily intend all the particulars that fall under the universal order as parts. 53

Therefore, God will have in his mind the proper accounts and ideas of all individual things.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas uses the same argument from God’s causality that we

saw him use above in the Sentences,54 as well as the argument from God’s universal intention that he

used in the Summa,55 however, each of these arguments are developed differently in this work than

in the other two. From the fact that God is the first cause of things regarding their being, he argues

that it is necessary that his knowledge be most perfect, most superior, and most practical, 56 and

since all of these entail knowledge of singulars, and since singulars are multiple, it thus follows his

knowledge will be of multiple singulars. He develops the argument from God’s universal intention

by looking at the motion of the universe, rather than its order, for, since God is the first mover of all

things, he will thus have the most universal intention of the whole as well as the particular intentions

Ibid. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, corp.

51 “Unde cum hoc nomen idea nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina
essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum.” Ibid. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, corp.
52 “exinde sequitur quod secundum respectum ad plures res quae divinam essentiam diversimode imitantur, sit
pluralitas in ideis, quamvis essentia imitata sit una.” Ibid. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, corp.
53 “si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi.
Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur,
sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius.
Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium rerum.” Aquinas, ST I. q. 15, a. 2, corp.
54 “Unde, cum hoc sit secundum quod Deus intelligit proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque
creatura ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sint plures vel distinctae nisi secundum
quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi.” Aquinas, SCG I. cap. 65, n. 3.
55 Ibid. I. cap. 65, n. 4.
56 Ibid. I. cap. 65, n. 5, 6, 7.

14
according to which he moves individual things, and he cannot have this without having knowledge

of a plurality of things in their utmost particularity.57

Contrary Objection 6: That Aquinas’s Account for the Eternity of the Divine Ideas Is Fitting

Aquinas speaks of the eternity of God’s knowledge of singulars in the Sentences commentary in

the responses to two objections, one in distinction 36 specifically on the ideas, and the other in

distinction 37 on how God is present everywhere. In the first response, he argues that, since relations

of reason do not depend on their opposite term to exist,58 and since the relation of God to creatures

is one according to reason, thus, that God possesses a relation of reason to creatures does not

depend on the existence of creatures. And therefore he concludes, “although creatures were not

from eternity, nevertheless the divine intellect was understanding his own divine essence from

eternity as imitable in different ways by creatures.”59 In the other response given in distinction 37, he

argues that all things are in God as effects are in their principle. And since God knows himself, he

thus knows his own effects as being in himself. But, since one thing is in another according to the

mode of the one containing, thus things are in God according to his own proper mode, which is

eternal. Thus, God’s knowledge of all his multiple effects, whether singular or universal, will be

eternal,60 and so also will the divine ideas corresponding to them be eternal.

57 Ibid. I. cap. 65, n. 8.

58 This premise is assumed here, though proven elsewhere by Aquinas. Cf. Aquinas, “De Veritate” q. 21, a. 1, corp.
59 “quamvis relationes quae sunt Dei ad creaturam, realiter in creatura fundentur, tamen secundum rationem et
intellectum in Deo etiam sunt; intellectum autem dico non tantum humanum sed etiam angelicum et divinum; et
ideo quamvis creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint, tamen intellectus divinus ab aeterno fuit intelligens essentiam suam
diversimode a creaturis imitabilem; et propter hoc fuit ab aeterno pluralitas idearum in intellectu divino, non in
natura ipsius.” Aquinas, In Sent. I. d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 2.
60 “Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut motus rationem ex termino accipit, ita et relatio. Cum autem dicitur Deus esse in
rebus, importatur relatio Dei ad creaturas secundum egressum divinae operationis in eas, quia aeternae non sunt,
nec esse in eis aeternum esse potest. Sed cum dicitur res esse in Deo, importatur relatio creaturae ad Deum, non
secundum exitum ab ipso, sed magis secundum adunationem creaturarum ad principium; et quia principium est
aeternum, ideo etiam et scire aeternum, et res ab aeterno in Deo. Deus enim est in rebus temporaliter per modum
rerum, sed res ab aeterno in Deo per modum Dei; quia omne quod in altero est, est in eo per modum ejus in quo
est, et non per modum sui.” Ibid. I. d. 37, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

15
 Aquinas does not deal directly with the question of the eternity of the divine ideas in the

Summa, but he does deal with it indirectly when treating of God’s knowledge of non-existent things

in question 14. There he argues that something that does not yet exist actually can still exist in a

certain way in God’s power. And, since God knows his own being from eternity, thus he knows

from eternity all things that are able to come forth from him, and yet he distinguishes between the

knowledge by which he knows the particulars that actually exist, did exist, or will eventually exist,

which he knows with the knowledge of vision, and those things that could exist but never will,

which he knows by the knowledge of understanding. 61 And, from what he says in question 15 on the

ideas, it can be inferred that God has ideas of the many things that he knows from eternity.

Aquinas deals indirectly with the eternity of God’s ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles in

question 66, on God’s knowledge of non-existent things. Like in the Summa and in the Sentences,

most of Aquinas’s arguments here begin from the fact that all things are in God as in their cause and

principle from eternity. But he adds to the previous discussions on the relations of reason in God,

and the mode of things existing in God from eternity, a discussion on God’s eternal knowledge of

his power and perfections,62 as well as a much more developed argument for God’s presential

knowledge and instantaneous vision of all things in time, whether past, present, or future from his

own standpoint of eternity.63 He makes the same distinction as in the Summa between God’s

knowledge of things that actually come to exist at some point in time, which he knows through

vision, and his knowledge of things that will never exist in time, which he only knows in his own

power through understanding.64 But all of these God knows through his divine ideas, insofar as he

61 Aquinas, ST I. q. 14, a. 9, corp.

62 Aquinas, SCG I. cap. 66, n. 4.
63 Ibid. I. q. 66, n. 7-8.
64 Ibid. I. cap. 66, n. 9-11.

16
knows his own essence as it is able to be represented by things which will never be, or else as it is

represented by things in time which draw their being from him as from their exemplar.65

Aquinas’s arguments can thus be summarized into three syllogisms: 1) God knows multiple

relations of reason between himself and creatures, which are the divine ideas. But, relations of

reason do not depend on their opposite term for existence, and what does not depend on another for

existence is said eternally in God. Therefore, there are multiple divine ideas in God from eternity.

2) Effects are in their cause according to the mode of the cause. But, the multiplicity of things are

in the eternal God as effects. Therefore, the multiplicity of divine ideas are in God from eternity. 3)

God’s presential knowledge is eternal. But, God knows all things with his divine ideas according to

his presential knowledge. Therefore, God knows all things by his divine ideas from eternity.

II. Response
I respond that the eternal multiplicity of the divine ideas is better reconcilable with God’s unity

and simplicity if one begins with an understanding of the divine ideas as being the perfections of the

divine essence as known according to an account of imitability, as Aquinas argues, rather than only

seeing the divine ideas as being the perfect expressed likenesses of first truth, as Bonaventure

argues. It seems that Bonaventure was led to take this as his starting point for understanding the

divine ideas based on his definition of truth when he says, referencing Anselm, “truth is expressive

light in intellectual knowledge.”66 Based on this intra-intellectual idea of truth, together with his

understanding of Augustine’s De Trinitate where he says the Word is “full of all the living and

65 “Nam sua essentia est repraesentabilis per multa quae non sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. Ipsa etiam est similitudo
virtutis cuiuslibet causae, secundum quam praeexistunt effectus in causis. Esse etiam cuiuslibet rei quod habet in
seipsa, est ab ea exemplariter deductum.” Ibid. I. cap. 66, n. 12.
66 “veritas est lux expressiva in cognitione intellectuali, secundum quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Veritate quod
‘veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis.’” Bonaventure, “De Scientia Christi” q. 2, ad 9; As DeHart
comments, “Bonaventure grounded truth not, like Aquinas, in the identity of knower and known, i.e.
Peripatetically; truth rather consists, Platonically, in the mental observation of objective likenesses.” Paul DeHart,
“Improvising the Paradigms: Aquinas, Creation and the Eternal Ideas as Anti‐Platonic Ontology,” Modern Theology
32, no. 4 (July 29, 2016): 7.

17
unchanging accounts of all things”67 that it is to be interpreted to mean that “he who denies that the

ideas exist, denies that the Son exists,”68 moved Bonaventure to identify the eternal expression of the

divine ideas with the eternal procession of the Word. 69 For, the Father in generating the Word

expresses in him all things which he is able to express, and likewise expresses all the things that are

made through the Word.70 This is because God, in knowing himself, represents himself by a

likeness equal to himself, which likeness is the Word, representing both the Father, and all the

multiplicity of things that the Father is able to do. 71 The difference then is that Bonaventure seemed

to see the ideas as corresponding to God’s complete and eternal expression of the Word, 72

representing all the possibilities that lie in the productive power of the Father, whereas Aquinas saw

them more as corresponding to God’s reflective self knowledge of the eternally actual perfections of

the divine essence, representing all the possibilities that lie in the productive power of the divine

67 Augustinus Hipponensis, De trin. lib. vi, cap. 10.

68 “Et hinc habet ortum illud quod consuevit dici, quod qui negat ideas esse, negat Filium Dei esse.” Bonaventure, In
Sent. I. d. 6, a. un., q. 3.
69 See Vater, “Divine Ideas: 1250–1325,” 60 et seq; “The totality of these similitudes [the ideas] constitute the
simultaneous articulation of God’s comprehension of his own infinite power. Thus the truth about God is
‘expressed’ in God’s mind in the form of this multitude; because the divine power is infinite, the multitude of
similitudes is likewise infinite. And, finally, because the eternal Son or Word is the direct expression of God’s self-
knowledge, then the ideas, too, are eternally expressed in the eternal utterance of the Word.” DeHart, “Improvising
the Paradigms,” 7.
70 “Pater enim ab aeterno genuit Filium similem sibi et dixit se et similitudinem suam similem sibi et cum hoc totum
posse suum; dixit quae posset facere, et maxime quae voluit facere, et omnia in eo expressit, scilicet in Filio seu in
isto medio tanquam in sua arte." Bonaventure, “Collationes In Hexaemeron” I.13; “Verbum ergo exprimit Patrem et
res, quae per ipsum factae sunt, et principaliter ducit nos ad Patris congregantis unitatem.” Ibid. I.17.
71 “cum intellectum aequetur intelligenti, intelligit quidquid est et quidquid potest: ergo et ratio intelligendi aequatur
intellectui, quae similitudo eius est. Haec autem similitudo Verbum est . . . Si ergo haec similitudo aequalis est, ergo
Deus est, et a Deo originata repraesentat originantem et quidquid Pater potest: ergo repraesentat multa.’’
”Bonaventure, “Collationes In Hexaemeron” III.4; Gregory LaNave states that, “the second person—whom
Bonaventure prefers to identify as the Word—is the principle for any expression of God outside himself, in the
finite realm. Said differently, the principle of creation is the Word of God, and this Word is the exemplary cause of
all that is.” Gregory F. LaNave, “God, Creation, And the Possibility of Philosophical Wisdom: The Perspectives of
Bonaventure and Aquinas,” Theological Studies 69 (2008): 823; Likewise, “the divine essence existing as the
exemplary forms of creatures is just the divine essence as expressive of the whole power of God; that is to say, it is
the second person of the Trinity, the Word, who is in fact necessary.” Junius Johnson, “The One and the Many in
Bonaventure Exemplarity Explained,” Religions 7, no. 12 (December 8, 2016): 10.
72 Although at times he says the divine idea, as exemplar and the “ratio cognoscendi,” is only “appropriated to the
Son, as wisdom” (“secundum quod exemplar dicit ratio cognoscendi, sic commune est toti Trinitati et appropriatur
Filio, sicut sapientia.” Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 6, a. un., q. 3, ad 4,) nevertheless, this fact is under emphasized in
his theology of the divine ideas.

18
essence as a whole.73 The one then saw the ideas as being more personal in origin, pertaining to the

dynamic expression/procession of the Word from the Father,74 the other as being more essential in

origin, pertaining to the static and fully actualized perfections of God’s essence. 75 Which one of

these positions of Bonaventure or Aquinas is the more true can be seen from the following

argument:

The divine ideas are said with respect to God’s ability to create things distinct from himself,

since, as Augustine says, they are the forms according to which all other creatures are formed. 76

However, since creation is the causing or production of being in another by God, and since God’s

being is his essence, then the act of creation belongs properly to the divine essence and not to any

person of the Trinity more than another. 77 Thus, the perfections of being found in creatures

originate principally from the divine essence. As such, the likenesses of perfection by which

creatures are assimilated to God have their term in the divine essence itself and not in the

appropriations, notions, relations, or processions of the divine persons. Therefore, the divine ideas in

God, which designate the exemplarity on the side of God of the perfections found in creatures, are

properly in the divine essence and not properly in the Word, except insofar as he is the divine

73 For a comparison of Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s views on the matter, see Etienne Gilson, Illtyd Trethowan, and F.
J. Sheed, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. (Paterson, N.J.,: St. Anthony Guild Press;, 1965), 145–146.
74 “The teaching of St. Bonaventure . . . above all puts before the mind with remarkable insistence the productivity of
the act by which God establishes the ideas. Like St. Thomas, he considers them eternally actual, but he represents
them to us chiefly as eternally announced, spoken or expressed by the thought of God. The knowledge which God
has of the ideas shares in the productivity by which the Father engenders the Son.” Ibid., 145.
75 “St. Thomas is more inclined to consider the pure act in the aspect in which it appears to our thought as a total
realization of itself; in this static and infinite energy it is the static aspect in which he is chiefly interested.” Ibid.;
The reason why Aquinas grounds the divine ideas in God’s essence is that truth is grounded in the being of a thing,
which in God is the same as his essence. “ The way God knows anything is always the same, by knowing his own
essence; such knowledge is always necessary; and in accordance with Aquinas’s most basic metaphysical
assumptions, what is known, i.e. what makes knowledge true, is ultimately the act of existence (esse) of the
known.” DeHart, “Improvising the Paradigms,” 4; For further insight into Aquinas’s reason for defining the ideas
according to the divine essence rather than according to the Word, see Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint
Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, 245–248.
76 Augustinus Hipponensis, De div. quaest. 83 q. 46.
77 Aquinas, ST I. q. 45, a. 6, corp.

19
essence. From this it follows that the proper distinction between the ideas is to be understood

according to the distinctions of reason within the divine essence that lie between the essential

perfections of the God-head, and not according to the real distinctions between the persons of the

Trinity, nor according to those notional distinctions that are appropriated to the person of the Word,

insofar as they are appropriated to him. And, since multitude is constituted by distinction, thus the

multitude of the divine ideas is constituted from the relative distinctions of reason between the

multiple perfections of the divine essence.78 We can see then from the foregoing that the proper

definition of the divine ideas will be said with regard to the divine essence insofar as it is known by

the whole Trinity as able to create things other than itself, while only by appropriation and

consequentially can the ideas be defined according to the eternal expression or procession of the

Word, insofar as God’s wisdom and knowledge of himself is appropriated to the person of the

Word.

III. Responses to Objections

In the responses to the objections, since I make a detailed comparison between the two authors

on specific points, I have found it useful to order the responses according to their common theme

rather than according to author. Thus, first I address objections 1 and 4 on the unity of the divine

ideas, then I address objections 2 and 5 on their multiplicity, and finally I address objections 3 and 6

on their eternity.

78 “nomen ideae principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad creaturam, et ideo pluraliter dicitur in
divinis, neque est personale. Sed nomen verbi principaliter impositum est ad significandam relationem ad dicentem,
et ex consequenti ad creaturas, inquantum deus, intelligendo se, intelligit omnem creaturam. Et propter hoc in
divinis est unicum tantum verbum, et personaliter dictum.” Ibid. I. q. 34, a. 3, ad 4.

20
 Response to Objections 1 and 4: On the Unity of the Divine Ideas

Bonaventure’s argument for the unity of the ideas in the Sentences, distinction 35,79 is very

similar to Aquinas’s argument in the Summa,80 and, in fact, both can be reduced to the essential

attribute of God’s perfection. They both begin by making the same distinction in God’s knowledge

between the thing known and that by which it is known. For Bonaventure, this is the “expressed

likeness” or the cognitum on the one hand and the “expressive likeness” or ratio cognoscendi on the

other hand. For, Aquinas it is the concept or verbum on the one hand, and the intelligible species on

the other. They also seem to have a similar understanding of the operation which accounts for the

distinction between that which is known and that by which it is known. This operation is referred to

simply as “expression” by Bonaventure, while for Aquinas it is generally called “procession.” 81 And,

on account of God’s perfection in his operations and his pure act, thus they both equate in God that

which is known and that by it is known, and therefore conclude to the real unity of the divine ideas,

Bonaventure in this question, while Aquinas in a previous article. 82 But, they differ slightly in what

middle terms they use to argue from God’s perfection to the unity of the ideas, Bonaventure taking

up the perfect imminent expressions of the ideas within God, and Aquinas taking up the perfect

79 Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 35, a. un. q. 1.

80 Aquinas, ST I. q. 15, a. 2.
81 It should be noted that Aquinas calls this act “expression” at times as well, just like Bonaventure: “Sed quia deus
uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum eius est expressivum non solum patris, sed etiam creaturarum. Et
sicut dei scientia dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva; ita verbum dei eius
quod in deo patre est, est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum.” Ibid. I. q. 34, a. 3,
corp. He also speaks of the Word being “expressive of all that is in God, not only of persons, but also of creatures.”
“Quia enim nos non possumus omnes nostras conceptiones uno verbo exprimere, ideo oportet quod plura verba
imperfecta formemus, per quae divisim exprimamus omnia, quae in scientia nostra sunt. In deo autem non est sic:
cum enim intelligat, et seipsum etiam et quicquid intelligit per essentiam suam, uno actu, unicum verbum divinum
est expressivum totius quod in deo est, non solum personarum, sed etiam creaturarum: alias esset imperfectum.
Unde dicit Augustinus: si quid minus esset in verbo, quam in dicentis scientia continetur, verbum imperfectum
esset.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Evangelium Iohannis (Taurini, 1952), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ cap. 1,
lect. 1. Thus, although the Word expresses all the creatures able to be made in God, nonetheless, the divine ideas
are not properly distinguished according to this expression, for Aquinas, but according to the modes of imitation in
the divine essence.
82 Aquinas, ST I. q. 14, a. 2, corp.

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essential identity of the intelligible species and the concept in the mind of God. From these different

middle terms, namely imminent expression and essential identity, they conclude to the same thing,

that the ideas are really and essentially one. Their difference in procedure here can be reduced, it

seems, to their variant understandings of the divine ideas, which, as we showed, are compatible so

long as one sees the essential definition as being proper, and the expressive definition as one of

appropriation to the Word.

Response to Objections 2 and 5: On the Multiplicity of the Divine Ideas

Both Bonaventure and Aquinas agree that the divine ideas are one according to reality, insofar

as they signify the divine essence, but that they are many according to reason insofar as they are

referred to creatures by connotation. The multitude though of the divine ideas does not contradict

their unity, since it is by separate accounts that they are called many and one. However Aquinas and

Bonaventure differ in the way that they explain the multitude of the ideas according to reason.

Bonaventure argues that, from God’s utter perfection, it follows that his imminent self expression

will be total, complete, and thus multiform. But, in this, Bonaventure seems to leave out a step, for

multitude does not follow directly from perfection or completeness. In order to show that the ideas

are a multitude according to reason, it is necessary to take “distinction” as the middle term of the

argument, since multitude only follows from distinction. Thus, to prove the multiplicity of the ideas,

Bonaventure should have argued that, since God expresses himself according to distinct express

likenesses, and since multitude follows on distinction, thus the express likenesses in God, that is the

divine ideas, are a multitude. 83 However, he does not take this step, possibly on account of his

seeming identification of the expression of the ideas with the procession of the Word in whom there

83 Bonaventure comes close to using this argument in his Breviloquium, however when he uses the middle term there,
he is proving that God has eternal knowledge of singulars, not that the divine ideas are a plurality. Cf. Bonaventure,
“Breviloquium” Pars I, cap. 8.

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is no distinction. Thus, he tries to jump directly from the perfection of God’s self-expression to the

multitude of the ideas, yet without bringing in the middle term of distinction.

Aquinas, on the other hand, seems to give a better account since he grounds the multitude of

the divine ideas in the distinct knowledge that God has of his own perfections as they are able to be

participated by creatures. For, since multitude follows on distinction, thus God’s ideas of himself as

distinctly imitable by creatures is a multitude. Aquinas is able to make this argument because of his

Aristotelian understanding of abstraction, wherein the intellect is able to consider perfections

separately, distinctly, and even in a partial mode insofar as they are separable according to account,

even though they are inseparable, united, and complete according to being. In this way, God’s

united perfections can be considered by him as distinct ideas according to reason, yet without

considering under the same account all of the other perfections and degrees of perfection which are

united within him according to being. As distinct ideas, they are thus a multitude, and as partial

accounts of God’s complete perfection, they designate degrees of possible participation in the divine

essence.

Insofar then as Bonaventure and Aquinas agree on how the multitude of ideas does not

contradict the unity of the divine essence, since they both make the point that the ideas are really

one though many according to reason, we can conclude that their accounts are sufficient for

reconciling the apparent paradox. However, since Bonaventure seems not to supply the proper

middle term for arriving at how the ideas can be a multitude according to reason, while Aquinas

does seem to do so successfully, we can also conclude that the account of Aquinas surpasses

Bonaventure’s.

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 Response to Objections 3 and 6: On the Eternal Multiplicity of the Divine Ideas

It appears that Bonaventure and Aquinas both agree on the same middle term to be used to

prove that there are many divine ideas from eternity, this middle term being the possibility of things

in the power of God. However, while Aquinas takes the eternal power of God as his starting point

to then prove that the multiplicity of ideas is eternal, Bonaventure, in proving the same thing, is at

pains in his Breviloquium to further ground God’s eternal power in his perfection. This is consistent

with his thought, given that he seems to see the multiplicity of the ideas as following immediately

from God’s perfection, and not by means of his distinct knowledge, as Aquinas does.

There is another slight difference in the way that Bonaventure and Aquinas apply the middle

term of God’s eternal power to prove the eternity of the ideas. We see Bonaventure speaking of the

ideas as “connoting” from eternity the futurity of creatures according to potency and “in habit.”

Likewise, he speaks of the ideas as “expressing” from eternity “all that is possible for God.” 84

Aquinas does not use the language of “connotation” or “expressing” in the context of proving the

eternity of the divine ideas as Bonaventure does, and yet he essentially argues from the same

principles, that things are in God as in their principle and that they are said with regard to his

power,85 and that they are thus in him from eternity. These differences though in their mode of

procedure can be reduced once again to their different definitions of the divine ideas, as noted

above.

Another difference to point out is that Bonaventure seems to be more focused on how we can

name the ideas as eternal, given his more frequent use of the terminology of the “connotation” of

the future existence of creatures, whereas Aquinas seems content to simply answer the question

84 Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 5, ad. 3.

85 Aquinas, In Sent. I. d. 37, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

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whether they are multiple from eternity.86 Bonaventure thus brings in a terminological precision by

focusing early on in his work on the relative connotation or naming of the multiplicity of the ideas

from eternity, something which Aquinas will do as well, but not so precisely and so early on in the

context of the divine ideas.87

An aspect that they both seem to adopt in their arguments with equal force is the fact that

God’s eternal knowledge of all things exceeds all time. Aquinas calls this God’s “presential

knowledge” since he sees past, present, and future as all present to him at once, while Bonaventure

just speaks of God’s knowledge as “embracing” all things whether they are past, present, or future.

The argument then for the eternity multiplicity of the ideas from God’s presential or atemporal

knowledge seems to be practically identical, with the only difference being a nominal one.

An interesting development in Aquinas that we do not see as clearly in Bonaventure in the

context of the divine ideas is the distinction between God’s knowledge of “vision” by which he

knows all things that come into existence at some point in time, and his knowledge of

“understanding” by which he knows those things that could come into existence but never will.

Bonaventure does indeed speak of God’s knowledge of these two different things, 88 but he does not

clearly distinguish it into two different kinds of knowledge as Aquinas does.

We can conclude that Aquinas and Bonaventure mostly agree in how to go about resolving the

problem of the eternal multiplicity of the ideas, and that their slight differences can be attributed

86 “connotation” is when a name denotes an effect in a creature on account of a relation to the creature implied in the
name. “Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex creaturis contingit deum nominari tripliciter. Uno modo quando nomen
ipsum actualiter connotat effectum in creatura propter relationem ad creaturam importatam in nomine, sicut creator
et dominus.” Ibid. I. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.
87 “Nos autem dicimus secundum modum praedictum, quod ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus in verbo dei, per
quod omnia facta sunt, res visibiles sunt productae. Quae rationes, et si realiter idem sunt, tamen per diversos
respectus connotatos respectu creaturae differunt secundum rationem. Unde alia ratione conditus est homo, et alia
equus, ut dicit Augustinus in libro LXXXIII quaestionum. Quaestionum. Sic ergo saecula aptata sunt verbo dei, ut
ex invisibilibus rationibus idealibus in verbo dei, visibilia, id est omnis creatura, fierent.” Thomas Aquinas, Super
Epistula Ad Hebraeos (Taurini, 1953), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ cap. 11, lect. 2.
88 Cf. Bonaventure, In Sent. I. d. 35, a. un., q. 5, ad. 2.

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either to different terminology and emphasis, or else reduced to their different definitions of the

divine ideas, as shown above.

Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to manifest the different ways in which Bonaventure and Aquinas

each dealt with the paradox of the divine ideas as handed on to them by Augustine, in particular,

how they reconciled their unity, multiplicity, and eternity. In the first part I laid out each of their

positions in the form of objections by listing the various arguments they use in support of their

views, trying to let each one speak for himself. In the second part, I responded to their positions in

general and attempted to give an account of their fundamental difference, focusing in particular on

their definition of the divine ideas, and sought to give an argument as to which of these definitions is

the more fitting. I concluded in the end that Aquinas’s definition is more proper than Bonaventure’s,

since it emphasizes the relation of the ideas to the divine essence, though Bonaventure’s definition,

emphasizing more the relation to the Word, is worthy as well, so long as one understands it as a

definition by appropriation to the Word, and not the proper essential definition of the divine ideas.

Finally, in the third part, I attempted to respond to the particular objections laid out in the first part,

manifesting to what extent Bonaventure and Aquinas are saying the same thing, and to what extent

they disagree, and reducing those disagreements to their diverse definitions of the divine ideas. Any

comparative study between thinkers who hold apparently contrary positions always requires an in

depth scrutiny of their fundamental principles in order to truly see how they disagree and why.

While there are indeed differences in the fundamental assumptions of Bonaventure and Aquinas

regarding the divine ideas, as we have seen, their similar conclusions and modes of procedure

should teach us, if anything, not to let these differences overshadow the great harmony between

these twins of medieval thought, alike in their search for knowledge and in their love for God.

26
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