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Process industries have a potential for the occurrence of Statistical analysis of 489 major accidents from 1985 to
major accidents. These accidents can have severe adverse 2001, in the European Union revealed that the petrochemical
effects on human health and the environment and they can industries ranked second (17%), after the general chemicals
cause extensive damage to equipment and buildings. During (32%) in the number of accidents, and 70% of the major acci-
major process upsets, central control rooms are among the dents took place when the plants were in normal operation
most stressful workplaces in the world. Therefore, Human status [4]. Analysis of 1,129 reported accidents in nine gas
Reliability Analysis and Dynamic Decision-Making Styles refineries in Iran from 2001 to 2007, revealed that the more
(DDMSs) play an important role in safety management in than 94% of accidents had human error as one of the key
these industries. This study employs the intelligent Adaptive causal factors rather than systemic failure [5]; moreover,
Neuro Fuzzy Inference System model associated with two results show that the human error is involved; in over 90%
questionnaires along with Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis of failures in the nuclear industry [4,6,7], over 80% of the fail-
Method to analyze the Human Reliability Influencing Factors ures in the chemical and petrochemical industries, over 75%
(HRIFs) and DDMSs of the control room operators and to marine casualties [8,9], and over 70% of aviation accidents
determine the efficiency of operators as well as their domi- [10]. Statistics mentioned shows that the causes of many acci-
nant and efficient decision-making styles. Nine influencing dents in process industries, directly or indirectly were related
factors on human reliability and five DDMSs are evaluated to human error. In addition, studies revealed that a signifi-
and the correlation between the HRIFs is investigated. Effi- cant number of worker’s behaviors were unsafe, which is
ciency of the operators, according to the HRIFs, is determined one of the main causes of accidents in the process industry
and they are ranked. Next, the most dominant and efficient [11]. Therefore, it can be concluded that the human reliabil-
of the DDMSs among the operators was identified. Finally, ity, plays a major role in the safe performance of individual
an intelligent algorithm for determining the efficiency of a and subsequently in the safe operation of the process indus-
control room’s operators is developed. VC 2015 American Institute tries [12]. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is an analysis
of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 192–199, 2016 technique based on human performance studies and consid-
Keywords: human reliability analysis; decision making; ers many Human Reliability Influencing Factors (HRIFs) in
efficiency prediction; process industry order to predict human performance in contributing to acci-
dents, error, and risk of tasks [13,14].
Dynamic Decision-Making Style (DDMS) is interdepend-
INTRODUCTION ent decision-making process that takes place in an environ-
The petrochemical industries must safely manage the ment that changes over time either due to the previous
processing of hazardous materials or disastrous used during actions of the decision maker or due to events that are out-
process, potentially disastrous accidents can occur [1]. The side the control of the decision maker [15,16]. There are a lot
increasing scale of process plants handling ever-increasing of tasks in the control rooms of petrochemical industries
quantities of highly explosive and flammable materials cre- with such conditions [1] in which operators must gather
ates the potential for large scale accidents if the facilities are more information and are forced to take action at the same
not properly designed and safely operated [2,3]. time. Information obtained and decisions made are con-
stantly changing during their shiftwork. The accuracy of deci-
This work was supported by Student Research Center of Hamadan
sions of the operators are crucially important in terms of
University of Medical Sciences. safety, because failure in their decisions may cause deviation
and flaws in the normal chemical operations and eventually
C 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
V may lead to catastrophic events. The petrochemical
Response
HRIFs Questionnaire
1. Does the noise in the control Never Little Somewhat Very
room makes you uncomfortable?
2. Do you have any pain or fatigue Never Never Somewhat Very
in your eyes during the weekday?
3. How would you evaluate the No Low Moderate High
current workload level?
4. Is it possible to adjust height of No Rarely Often Yes
your work station for doing different
tasks and operations?
5. Are there situations where you have No Rarely Often Yes
to violate safety rules due to working pressure?
DDMSs Questionnaire
1. Applying of creativity and innovation
2. Applying rules and regulations
3. Time pressure
4. Work pace
5. Need for planning
Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2016 193
Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha value of the questionnaire of the HRIFs.
Figure 1. Overview of the proposed intelligent algorithm. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
familiarity with working rules and regulations, (9) The con- tionnaire analysis guidelines. All statistical analysis was car-
trol limits, (10) Power rate, (11) Need for planning, (12) ried out using SPSS 16 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) and MINITAB
Complexity of the inputs data, (13) Uncertainty, (14) Involve- at 5% significance level.
ment degree with others, (15) Need for reason and logic in
doing assignments, (16) Preference to use several methods, PROPOSED INTELLIGENT ANFIS ALGORITHM
and (17) Involvement of others. The flow chart in Figure 1 shows the steps of the pro-
The participants are asked to judge the degree of impor- posed methodology.
tance of each factor, relying on their experience in dealing The following sections describe the details of every step.
with the emergency situations. Degree of importance of each
factor is from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest and 7 indi- Input-Output Selection and Data Collection
cates the highest importance. ANFIS is used to estimate the HRIFs according to the deci-
Finally, after the participants complete the questionnaires, sion-making styles. The inputs for ANFIS are the data col-
DDMS of the each person is determined according to ques- lected with the questionnaire survey and to ensure robust
194 June 2016 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2)
Table 3. The frequency of demographic characteristics of control room operators.
Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2016 195
Table 5. Dominant dynamic decision-making styles (DDMSs) according to HRIFs.
Table 7. Relationship and correlations between HRIFs. Figure 2. .Minimum MAPE obtained from ANFIS training for
the operators. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
Risk Human Human issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Risk Degree and Error Error
Degree and Human and Stress and Skill
HRIFs Skill Level Error Factors Level
and long experienced industrial experts. These categories
PCC* 0.85 0.89 0.79 0.88 were considered as input variables (IV). In addition, nine
P-Value 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.031 factors influencing the HRA were considered as output varia-
bles (OV). Factor analysis results reveal the following inputs:
*Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
Input variable 1: Effectiveness on the system, Preference
to use logical reasoning, Applying of creativity and inno-
vation, Applying rules and regulations.
Table 6 shows significant relationships between HRIFs Input variable 2: Time pressure, Excessive workload,
and demographic characteristics. The statistical analyses were Work pace.
conducted with the Kruskal–Wallis test and results indicate Input variable 3: Lack of familiarity with working and the
that education degree variable have a significant relationship rules and regulations, Control limits, Power rate, Need for
with human error (P 5 0.011) and job satisfaction planning.
(P 5 0.028), age variable have a significant relationship with Input variable 4: Complexity of the inputs (data), Uncer-
risk degree (P 5 0.029) and skill level (P 5 0.041), job experi- tainty, Involvement degree with others
ence have a significant relationship with job satisfaction Input variable 5: Need for reason and logic in doing
(P 5 0.034) and skill level (P 5 0.026). The relationship assignments
between HRIFs and other demographic characteristics of Input variable 6: Preference to use several methods,
operators were not significant (P > 0.05). Involvement of others
The relationship and correlation between the HRIFs by
means of Kruskal–Wallis test and Pearson Correlation Coeffi- In the training phase, in general, 24 overall structures of
cients (PCC) were investigated (Table 7). The results indicate ANFIS are considered for each of OVs. Since the parameter
that there is significant relationship between factors of risk of effectiveness clustering possessing a value between (1,
degree and skill level, risk degree and human error, human 0.1), to get the lowest relative error, this numerical range
error and stress factors, skill level and human error (P < searched at steps of 0.1. Generally for each of the 24 overall
0.05). The PCC and P-values between these factors are structures of the proposed ANFIS, 819 runs were done and
shown in Table 7. The strongest relationship is related to risk at the end, the best structure of the ANFIS, which had the
degree and human error. lowest Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), was chosen.
The results of ANFIS training error is shows in Figure 2.
ANFIS Result
ES of Operators
Input and Output Variables for the ANFIS Tool in Algorithm By implementation of the ANFIS for each nine OVs, a
In the present study, based on closeness and similarity numerical value is obtained for each operator. According to
rate of the factors and also to avoid of the scattering and bet- the mentioned method for calculation of operators’ ESs in
ter understand the results, the 17 factors influencing the the previous section, by having an output and the output
DDMS were classified into six categories using Factor Analy- obtained from ANFIS and follow-up the mentioned steps,
sis Method and expert opinions that consists of 13 academics numerical value of the ESs are calculated (Table 8).
196 June 2016 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2)
Table 8. Efficiency values of operators obtained from ANFIS according to output variables (OV).
Operator N DDMS OV1 OV2 OV3 OV4 OV5 OV6 OV7 OV8 OV9
1 H 1.00 0.71 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.54 0.58 0.71 0.59
2 H 1.00 0.66 0.56 0.46 0.43 0.68 0.58 0.82 0.37
3 H 1.00 0.69 0.45 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.41 0.83 0.51
4 H 1.00 0.70 0.59 0.50 0.52 0.70 0.74 0.71 0.56
5 H 1.00 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.64 0.74 0.71 0.56
6 H 1.00 0.72 0.52 0.53 0.71 0.64 0.59 0.71 0.65
7 H 1.00 0.76 0.54 0.42 0.65 0.74 0.58 0.71 0.69
8 H 1.00 0.66 0.64 0.51 0.74 0.89 0.73 0.72 0.56
9 H 1.00 0.69 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.75 0.41 0.83 0.63
10 H 1.00 0.72 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.65 0.58 0.55 0.70
11 H 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.46 0.68 0.64 0.74 0.55 0.63
12 H 1.00 0.68 0.68 0.52 0.58 0.70 0.57 0.55 0.71
13 H 1.00 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.50 0.75 0.58 0.83 0.56
14 H 1.00 0.69 0.50 0.53 0.40 0.68 0.58 0.55 0.56
15 H 1.00 0.63 0.54 0.53 0.70 0.73 0.59 0.83 0.61
16 H 1.00 0.67 0.54 0.43 0.63 0.73 0.58 0.79 0.56
17 H 1.00 0.63 0.37 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.40 0.83 0.62
18 H 1.00 0.71 0.54 0.44 0.57 0.68 0.58 0.55 0.63
19 H 1.00 0.65 0.55 0.46 0.51 0.68 0.58 0.55 0.47
20 H 1.00 0.55 0.49 0.69 0.51 0.56 0.73 0.79 0.61
21 H 1.00 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.71 0.56
22 H 1.00 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.57 0.61 0.58 0.72 0.56
23 H 1.00 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.39 0.63 0.41 0.71 0.63
24 H 1.00 0.55 0.61 0.45 0.57 0.46 0.58 0.55 0.51
25 H 1.00 0.67 0.57 0.45 0.67 0.69 0.57 0.73 0.62
26 H 1.00 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.74 0.56 0.56
27 H 1.00 0.75 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.72 0.68
28 H 1.00 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.70 0.58 0.56 0.62
29 H 1.00 0.58 0.53 0.51 0.39 0.65 0.59 0.72 0.46
30 H 1.00 0.62 0.53 0.45 0.56 0.73 0.59 0.84 0.69
31 I 1.00 0.72 0.60 0.53 0.56 0.71 0.74 0.56 0.70
32 I 1.00 0.75 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.91 0.41 0.84 0.72
33 I 1.00 0.72 0.48 0.57 0.38 0.71 0.42 0.72 0.38
34 I 1.00 0.68 0.52 0.46 0.65 0.74 0.59 0.56 0.64
35 I 1.00 0.73 0.61 0.62 0.55 0.72 0.59 0.57 0.68
36 I 1.00 0.63 0.43 0.47 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.72 0.66
37 I 1.00 0.76 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.75 0.42 0.84 0.63
38 I 1.00 0.78 0.62 0.50 0.48 0.80 0.74 0.56 0.68
39 I 1.00 0.61 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.64 0.74 0.84 0.56
40 I 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.48 0.38 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.47
41 I 1.00 0.73 0.59 0.63 0.55 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.60
42 I 1.00 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.64 0.59 0.80 0.63
43 I 1.00 0.66 0.48 0.54 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.63
44 I 1.00 0.69 0.51 0.61 0.54 0.79 0.59 0.56 0.72
45 H-I 1.00 0.75 0.51 0.33 0.46 0.68 0.59 0.72 0.63
46 H-I 1.00 0.54 0.47 0.54 0.48 0.73 0.59 0.72 0.64
47 H-I 1.00 0.69 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.67 0.59 0.72 0.67
48 H-I 1.00 0.59 0.34 0.53 0.37 0.81 0.59 0.84 0.66
49 H-I 1.00 0.56 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.57
50 H-I 1.00 0.64 0.51 0.64 0.54 0.76 0.74 0.56 0.56
51 H-I 1.00 0.71 0.46 0.57 0.46 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.57
52 H-I 1.00 0.56 0.46 0.32 0.36 0.46 0.42 0.57 0.57
53 H-I 1.00 0.74 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.79 0.59 0.72 0.60
54 H-I 1.00 0.70 0.46 0.48 0.36 0.55 0.59 0.84 0.61
55 F 1.00 0.69 0.55 0.57 0.37 0.69 0.74 0.57 0.64
56 F 1.00 0.65 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.71 0.58 0.73 0.57
57 F 0.50 0.53 0.41 0.86 0.83 0.55 0.52 0.71 0.85
58 I-F 1.00 1.00 0.26 0.59 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.68
59 I-F 1.00 0.44 0.63 0.45 0.59 0.49 0.26 0.43 0.80
60 I-F 0.59 1.00 0.78 0.58 1.00 0.86 0.57 0.69 0.69
61 F-D 0.67 0.38 0.53 0.43 0.44 0.66 0.51 1.00 0.70
62 D 0.69 0.86 0.86 0.47 0.76 0.39 0.51 0.40 1.00
Table 9. Average efficiency of the operators for each of the output variables (HRIFs).
Output Variables OV1 OV2 OV3 OV4 OV5 OV6 OV7 OV8 OV9
Average Efficiency 0.98 0.65 0.52 0.69 0.51 0.54 0.68 0.61 0.62
Figure 4. Total ranking of operators obtained from ANFIS. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
198 June 2016 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2)
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Process Safety Progress (Vol.35, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2016 199