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The VOC and Japanese Rice in the Early Seventeenth

Century

Yao Keisuke

Itinerario / Volume 19 / Issue 01 / March 1995, pp 32 - 47

DOI: 10.1017/S0165115300021161, Published online: 22 June 2011

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0165115300021161

How to cite this article:

Yao Keisuke (1995). The VOC and Japanese Rice in the Early Seventeenth Century.
Itinerario, 19, pp 32-47 doi:10.1017/S0165115300021161

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32

The VOC and Japanese Rice in the

Early Seventeenth Century
YAO KEISUKE
(University of North Kyushu)

Introduction
According to traditional scholarship, Sakoku or the national seclusion of
Japan in the early seventeenth century was primarily carried out with the
intention of prohibiting Christianity.1 It is generally agreed that the seclu-
sion ofJapan was completed through a series of edicts, the so-called Sakoku-
rei (which were issued between 1633 and 1639 by the Bakufu (the Tokugawa
Shogunal government). Through these edicts the Christian religion was
forbidden in Japan. Japanese trading activities abroad were also prohibited
through the issue of Kai-kin or maritime prohibitions. Finally the Portuguese
trade from Macao was terminated.2 It is generally believed that the seclusion
of Japan was brought about as a means to gain better control of the Japanese
people. In the final analysis the closure of Japan had a double meaning:
the political meaning, the prohibition of Christianity, and an economic
meaning, the restriction of trade.
In recent studies, however, it has been pointed out that in the period
of seclusion Japan was not wholly isolated. Japan had during the Sakoku
period four outlets to foreign countries, which are commonly known as
the Yotsu-no-kuchi (four mouths): Nagasaki serving China and the Dutch,
Tsushima serving Korea, Satsuma serving Ryukyu and Matsumae on the
island of Hokkaido, where the route to the North started.3 Three characteris-
tics constituted the Tokugawa Shogunate structure or Baku-Han Taisei (Sys-
tem of Shogunate and clan): Heino-Bunri (the disarmament of peasants),
Kokudaka-sei (the economic system based on rice) and Sakoku-rei (the system
of seclusion edicts).4 The seclusion of Japan was not only aimed at gaining
control of the people. It also was advanced by the Tokugawa shogunate
for the purpose of controlling the domestic economy.5 In this connection
the importation of luxury goods, such as Chinese raw silk, and the export
of precious metals, chiefly Japanese silver, have been closely studied.0
Yet it seems to me that two points have been overlooked. The import
restrictions on silk were connected with the domestic economic system and
affected not only the activities of merchants in large cities such as Edo and
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 33

Osaka but also the finances of the Daimyo (feudal lords), especially in the
southwest of Japan, who were, without exception, engaged in trade. The
maritime prohibitions which rendered Japanese overseas activities im-
possible indeed resulted in a decline of trade of the Daimyo but this trade
was never totally exterminated.

1. The Economic Meaning of the Closure of Japan

A special economic system reigned in Japan from the beginning of the
seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, the so-called
Kokudaka-seV In this system, rice played a central role as it was used as the
basic economic measure for administration. The Daimyo collected the land
tax from their peasants in rice and also paid the salaries of their vassals in
rice. The power of a Daimyo was determined by the output of rice in his
domain and his wealth was measured by the quantity of collected rice. The
Daimyo, however, had to send most of the collected rice to the economic
centre of Japan, Osaka. They had to convert the rice of dieir domain into
cash at Osaka, because the Bakufu forced them to spend enormous sums
of money in Edo and Osaka during their court voyages to Edo, Sankin Kotai
(the alternate attendance), and in addition forced them into service for
public works, Otetsudai Fusin. Thus, the newly centralized feudalism of early
modern Japan was supported by a special economic system, which strongly
administered the domestic economy.
This centralized domestic economy was not achieved before the 1670s.8
In other words, it did not appear immediately after the edicts of seclusion
in the 1630s. As we have seen the Daimyo could not participate in the
overseas trade anymore after the edicts were issued. The traditional idea
that the Daimyo were isolated from international trade after the promulga-
tion if the seclusion ofJapan is, however, a false one. There were, economi-
cally speaking, two kinds of Daimyo. Traditionally the finances of the Dai-
myo in the eastern part of Japan had a different character from those in
of the Daimyo in the west, who depended not only on land tax in their
domain but also on trade. From the middle of the sixteenth century to the
beginning of the seventeenth century, the Daimyo in Kyushu had close
commercial relations with Chinese, Portuguese and Spanish merchants.
Some of these Daimyo also sent rice and wheat to foreign markets through
Nagasaki. Kato Kiyamasa, the lord of Kumamoto exported his collected
wheat to the Spanish in the Philippine Islands.9 It was much easier and
profitable for this ruler to export this commodity overseas than all the way
to the central market of Osaka which is situated far from Kyushu.
Yet this kind of foreign trade by the Daimyo ran against the policy of
economic centralization with which the Tokugawa Shogunate tried to unify
the country. The Bakufu had to prohibit the Daimyo from selling their
rice to foreign markets in order to achieve a centralized administration.
34 YAO KEISUKE

One of the aims of the seclusion policy was thus the gaining of control
over the western Daimyo in Kyushu who used to depend on foreign trade.
As a result the seclusion of Japan did not only prohibit Japanese overseas
activities, it also prohibited the export of rice.
As early as 1609 the Bakufu started to develop a policy for overseas trade.
Privileged merchants from the large cities were permitted to participate in
the Chinese silk trade with the Portuguese from Macao. This was the so-
called Ito-wappu or pancada.10 Japanese merchants who wanted to send a
junk abroad were told to apply for special permits with the Bakufu. Their
ships were termed Shuin-sen (red-seal ship)." These measures were aimed
at reducing the advantage of the Portuguese in the Chinese silk trade to
Japan.
Yet there was more to it. By the establishment of the Shuin-sen trade
system the Bakufu intended not only to gain control over the supply of
Chinese silk but also wished to control the overseas activities of the Daimyo.
From then on the Daimyo had to ask for the permission of the Bakufu
when he wanted to send a ship abroad. In addition to this the Shogun
forbade the Daimyo of West Japan to have ships of more than 500 koku
(about 50 tons).12 Because these ships, on account of their small size, would
not be seaworthy, the Daimyo had no other option left than to invest in
large commercial vessels that were fitted out by private merchants. This
Shuin-sen system was replaced by even stricter formalities in 1631."
Finally in 1635 Japanese merchants were totally prohibited from engaging
in overseas trade.1'1 In the same year the Daimyo were once more forbidden
to build large ships, as seen in the revised Buke Shohatto (the laws for military
households).15 The Daimyo, however, somehow found a way to continue
their trade: they started to export rice. At the beginning of the seventeenth
century the trading in rice had not only an economic but also a strategic
meaning in East Asia. Rice was after all the staple food for soldiers.

2. The Prohibition of Export of Weapons and Provisions

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) started its operations in Japan in
1609. It was welcomed by Ieyasu who was seeking a competitor to the
Portuguese in the Chinese silk trade. For the same reason, the English
company was also admitted to open a factory in Hirado in 1614. Because
the Dutch did not have access to the Chinese silk market they used the
factory in Hirado for privateering purposes from 1615 to 1620.16 When in
1619 the English and Dutch companies concluded a treaty of defence
against the Catholic ruler of the Iberian countries in order to intensify
their privateering, they became a menace not only for the Iberians but also
for the Japanese authorities, whose domestic economy depended to a large
degree on the Portuguese trade.
On 14 September 1621 the Bakufu consistently issued three articles to
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 35

the Dutch and the English chiefs in Hirado.17 First of all the English and
Dutch were forbidden to take Japanese people abroad. Secondly, an em-
bargo on the export ofJapanese harquebuses, swords, pikes, bows, artillery
and munitions was declared and thirdly, privateering against Japanese,
Chinese and Portuguese ships within the Japanese waters was interdicted.
From the end of the sixteenth century Japan had been exporting a large
number of fire weapons to other countries in Asia. These weapons were
very popular because their excellent quality was proven during the Japanese
invasion of Korea. After the end of the civil war in Japan in 1616 many
harquebuses were sold abroad: this declaration shows that at the beginning
of the 1620s the English and Dutch factories exported from Japan not only
weapons but also provisions and ammunitions. The Dutch factory started
to export Japanese rice as early as 1616.18 In 1618 the VOC exported 200
balen (about 6,160 kilograms) of it.19 According to the books of the Dutch
factory in the 1620s this rice was bought from local Japanese merchants
from Hirado (Table 1).

Table 1
The Sellers of Rice to the Dutch Factory (1624-1625)

Name of merchant Baal Guldens (f)

Sackobijdonne 3,457 10,894:13:12

Jaffioijedonne 2,289 7,289:10:10
Sackobijdonne en Jaffiobijedonne 11,991 37,720:03:12
Canseijmondon ne 1,625 5,241:11:04
Sansodonne 3,618 11,836:17:08
Shingrodonne 547 1,585:06:04
Ithasinseijmondonne 1,750 5.742:03:12
Others 1,700 5.578:02:08
Total 26,977 87,888:09:06

Source: Negolie Groolboeken 1624/26, ARA, N.FJ. 975

Note: 1 baal = about 40 maten = about 30.8 kg.

These merchants in Hirado paid for the import goods of the company widi
rice. In the early 1630s the Dutch factory was forced by die lord of Hirado
to buy rice from him directly and was prohibited from buying other rice
shipped from outside of Hirado.20 Most of the rice bought by the factory
was destined for export but some of it was used as victuals for the crews of
the ships.
36 YAO KEISUKE

Table 2
The Uses of Purchased Rice by the Dutch Factory (1624-1625)

Use Baal Gulden (/)

export commodity 18,554 60,407:29:06

victuals 266 881:02:08
sold in Japan 30 99:07:08
additional 8,127 26,500:00:00
Total 26,977 87,888:09:06

Source: Negotie Gwotboeken 1624/26, ARA, N.F.J. 975

Note: 1 baal = about 40 maten = about 30.8 kg.

In 1626 the factory bought 800 balen (about 24,64 tons) of rice from the
lord of Hirado.21 Yet during the Japanese trade embargo, which originated
from a dispute between Japanese traders in Taiwan and Pieter Nuyts, the
local Dutch governor at Formosa in 1628, the Dutch factory was prohibited
from buying wood, cannons and rice.22 After the embargo had been lifted
due to much effort and the support of the lord of Hirado, die Dutch factory
came into closer relations with this nobleman and bought his collected
rice in exchange for imported goods.

Table 3
The Accounts of the Lord or Hirado in the Dutch Books

Year Rice (/) Amount of account (/)

1626 26,250:00:00 89,297:17:04

1627 0:00:00 33,798:09:12
1628 0:00:00 106,090:18:12
1634 0:00:00 71,371:15:06
1635 19,605:10:00 75,268:18:08
1636 45,368:11:10 103,997:16:00
1637 19,836:00:00 70,465:17:00
1638 3,471:06:00 100,248:14:15
1640 0:00:00 108,779:02:04
1641 0:00:00 67,330:05:00

Source: Negotie Orootboeken 1624/26-1640/41, ARA, N.F.J. 975-985.

THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 37

In 1636 the lord of Hirado had an account of 103,997 gulden, 16 stuiver

with the company. He paid 45,368 gulden, 11 stuiver, 10 penning, 43.6 percent
of the amount, in rice.23 In the same year he exported 10,465 balen (about
322.32 tons) of rice.24
But the more the export of rice was developed, the more the Japanese
authorities regarded it as a serious matter. In 1635 when the chief of the
Dutch factory requested permission for the export of rice, it had to be
agreed upon by the Nagasaki Bugyo (magistrate of Nagasaki) and the rice
had to be taken over in the presence of the magistrate.25 This means that
the Tokugawa Shogunate gradually strengthened its control over the export
of rice. When Francois Caron, a staff member of the Dutch factory, asked
the Nagasaki Daikan (local governor of Nagasaki) the same year about the
possibility of lifting the embargo on rice exports he was advised that he
should not mention it.26 The export of rice was becoming a serious matter.
The anxiety of the Japanese authorities appeared most directly in the
conversation between Sakai Tadakatsu, the president of Roju (the council
of Elders) and Nicolaas Couckebacker, die chief of die factory, in Edo in
July 1639. Sakai said:

The inspector, who secredy went round die country, announced

to us, that the Dutch export more rice from Japan dian they need
for their ships.27

He recognized that the Dutch company bought more rice than was neces-
sary for the provision of their ships out ofJapan. This utterance shows that
the Shogun himself was worried about the political and strategic position
of Japanese rice in East Asia.
On account of the series of Sakoku edicts promulgated in the 1630s the
government of the Shogun Iemitsu was liable to be reproached for having
an aggressive and military character. On the other side, die Bakufu was
faced widi the danger of being involved in wars started by others abroad
and carefully wished tot avoid this. It is well known diat during the Chinese
civil war between the Ming Loyalists and die just-established Ch'ing dynasty
in the 1640s the messengers of die Ming Loyalists came several times to
Japan asking for military help.28 After a long and considerate discussion
die Bakufu finally rejected diis for fear diat Japan would become involved
in the Chinese civil war. In response to die utterance of the governor, the
lord of Hirado proposed diat even if the Company shipped not more than
1,000 balen (about 30.8 ton) of rice a ship he could still condnue to export
enough quantities of rice.20
On 24 June 1641, the Dutch factory in Hirado was forced to move to
Deshima in Nagasaki. As a result die factory lost a potent provider of rice.
In addition to that, on 14 August of diat year, Maximiliaen Le Maire, the
chief of the factory, was informed what kinds of ardcles the foreigners were
prohibited from expordng by order of die magistrate of Nagasaki. They
38 YAO KEISUKE

were n o t allowed to export gold, goldwork, copper, copperwork, coins, all

kinds of Japanese weapons, rice, beans, wheat and so on. 30 Here the Japanese
authorities recognized that rice and other provisions were as dangerous
for national security as weapons and military information.
But the export of rice was continued after that because the factory was
able to find a supplier other than the lord of Hirado. Finally in 1668, at
the same time as the embargo was imposed on the export of silver, the
Bakufu prohibited the export of twelve commodities and the import of
twelve other articles." Among the commodities, which were prohibited
from being exported was rice. Quite remarkably, o n e person was only
allowed to transport the limited quantity of 3 to (about 35.6 kilogram).
Such a concrete limitation o n rice transport was never imposed by Japanese
authorities before. This limitation implied that the Bakufu now was able
to control the export of rice in Nagasaki. Since the beginning of the
Tokugawa Shogunate, Nagasaki had been under the direct supervision of
the Bakufu. But the realities of trade were beyond total control until the
1660s. In 1672, four years after the restriction on export and import, the
Bakufu imposed an all-embracing system of trade for the first time. 52
The export prohibition included not only commercial goods b u t also
weapons, knives, maps, pictures of ships, ship models, pictures of soldiers
and drawings of family crests." Clearly this proclamation was not only aimed
at controlling the domestic economy but also sought to prevent military
participation in the international events of East Asia and the leakage of
military information out of Japan. Here the principal Bakufu politics seem
to have gained their definitive shape.

3. The Export of Rice and the VOC

Shortly after the establishment of a trading factory at Hirado, the VOC
started to export rice. Details about this trade can be found in three different
serial data acquired from the Hirado factory archives: the so-called Negotie
Journalen (journals), the Negotie Grootboeken (ledgers) and the Facturen (in-
voices) ." These sources not only show the quantity and the prices of the
rice export but also the places of destination. The first Negotie journalen
and Negotie Grootboeken date from 1620. In that year Hirado factory exported
7,226 balen (222.56 tons) of Japanese rice.35 From 1634 onwards all trans-
actions and annual exports can be checked.
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 39

Table 4
The VOC Export of Japanese Rice

Year Baal Gulden (/) Amount of export (/)

1634 7,450 33,291:03:12 750,226

1635 7,245 34,547:07:08 861,765
1636 18,335 109,281:05:00 2,901,037
1637 8,900 55,430:04:06 3,539,005
1638 8,550 50,952:00:05 4.649,096
1639 12,000 62,668:13:00 6,756,727
1640 1,400 7,968:12:00 3,943,079
1641 2,735 16,145:16:06 3,440,697
1642 250 2,080:10:00 1,175,958
1643 230 1,724:05:00 2,418,326
1644 730 3,437:02:00 2,035,492
1645 1,630 6,905:11:00 2,419,979
1646 1,540 4,456:08:01 1,578,193
1647 2,270 5,016:00:00 1,334,332
1648 5,048 11.642:02:12 1,489,493
1649 6,971 11,831:08:11 1,245,259
1650 4,351 13,040:03:08 1,228,470
1651 8,400 26,334:00:00 1,745,963
1652 9,900 • 29,664:04:08 1,664,258
1653 7,930 27,249:19:13 1,812,044
1654 8,825 36,576:03:12 1,178,698
1655 8,350 33,166:17:08 1,536.459
1656 16,025 63,072:12:12 2,050,258
1657 8,170 30,875:09:08 1,494,518
1658 4,020 16,112:03:13 2,080,560
1659 200 1,681:10:00 1,990,283
1660 350 3,890:05:00 1,681,183
1661 2,000 13.286:14:00 2,271,736
1662 300 1,080:00:00 2,140,044
1663
1664
1665 50 105:00:00 2.378.489

Source: Facturen 1633/34-1664/65, Negotie JoumaUn 1633/35-1664/65, ARA, N.FJ. 762-787,

834-859. The quantitative Figures are quoted from O. Nachod, Die Beziehungen der Niederliin-
dischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im 17. Jahrhundert (Leipzig 1897).
Note: 1 baal = about 40 maten = about 30.8 kg.
40 YAO KEISUKE

Table 5
The Ports of Destination of VOC Exported Rice

Year Formosa Batavia Tonkin Malacca

(baal) (baal) (baal) (baal)

1634 500 6,950 0 0

1635 1,245 6,000 0 0
1636 12,075 6,260 0 0
1637 3,400 5,500 0 0
1638 - - - -
1639 - - - -
1640 1,400 0 0 0
1641 2,735 0 0 0
1642 250 0 0 0
1643 230 0 0 0
1644 730 0 0 0
1645 1,620 0 0 0
1646 1,540 0 0 0
1647 1,000 1,270 0 0
1648 5,028 20 0 0
1649 6,971 0 0 0
1650 4,100 251 0 0
1651 8,400 0 0 0
1652 9,720 0 180 0
1653 7,880 0 50 0
1654 8,825 0 0 0
1655 8,350 0 0 0
1656 7,725 7,300 1,000 0
1657 8,020 150 0 0
1658 4,020 0 0 0
1659 0 200 0 0
1660 30 320 0 0
1661 1,000 500 0 500
1662 0 300 0 0
1663 - _ _ -
1664 - - - -
1665 0 0 0 50

Source: Facturen 1633/34-1664/65, Negotiejoumalen 1633/35-1664/65. ARA. N.F.J. 762-787,

834-S59.
Note: 1 baal = about 40 malm = about 30.8 kg.
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 41

From these sources it may be established there were two peaks in the export
of Japanese rice. One occurred in the second half of the 1630s. In 1636
the factory exported some 18,33 balen of rice (about 564.72 tons).*6 This
amounted to 7.5 per cent of the annual rice production of the domains
of the lord of Hirado. Another peak occurred during the 1650s. This implies
that the export ofJapanese rice continued to develop after the VOC factory
was moved to Deshima in 1641 until itfinallyended in 1665. It would seem
that the Sakoku-rei, the seclusion edicts of the Bakufu, initially had little
effect on the export ofJapanese rice by the company and that the advance-
ment of this trade depended on external factors such as a demand for
Japanese rice which lasted at least until 1660.
From the Facturenv/e may secure the destinations of Japanese rice exports
from 1634 onwards (Table 5). In those days most ships returning from
Japan sailed to Formosa, but the cargoes of those ships were not only bound
for Formosa but also for other destinations such as Batavia, Malaka and Ton-
kin.
In the 1630s Japanese rice was mainly transported by the VOC to Batavia.
After the establishment of the central renda-vous Batavia in 1619 the Dutch
needed a supply of rice to feed the inhabitants of the city and the troops
stationed at Batavia castle. Because of the unstable political situation in
Java, rice had to be imported from elsewhere.37 In the beginning Batavia
still depended on the import of rice from Siam. Although the Dutch suc-
ceeded in securing royal permission to export 1,000 last (1,967 tons) of
Siamese rice in 1632, Batavia was still troubled by an insufficient supply.58
The Dutch authorities needed to import large quantities of rice until 1646
when the Company was able to conclude a peace treaty with the Kingdom
of Mataram, which also guaranteed a stable supply of rice.30
After 1640 the export destination of Japanese rice purchased by the
Dutch was changed to Formosa (Taiwan). In 1636 the Hirado factory already
exported some 12,075 balen (about 371,91 tons) of Japanese rice only to
this island and continued to do so until 1644.40 In 1624 the Dutch had
established the castle of Zeelandia on the south-west coast of Formosa. This
settlement developed into an important center for the VOC's trade in East
Asia because it was conveniently located for the purchase of Chinese silk
from the Chinese merchants who transported it there from the mainland.
In 1624 the Dutch company imported only 2,847.5 catties of Chinese silk
in Japan, but ten years later, in 1634, it brought 64,530 catties and the next
year, in 1636, this quantity was even doubled to 132,039 catties."1
But in spite of the rapid extension of colonial rule in Formosa, the Dutch
could not collect enough foodstuffs there for their garrison. In those days
forty percent of the expenses of the Dutch factory in Formosa were spent
on provisions, which all had to be imported from elsewhere.42 It may be
said however, that rice was a basic necessity for the company not only for
military purposes but also for the maintenance of commercial activities in
East Asia. Hans Putmans, the Governor of Formosa, issued orders in 1636
42 YAO KEISUKE

to promote the cultivation of rice in Formosa and to build storehouses.43

For the time being the VOC had to continue purchasing rice from
elsewhere. One important supply region was mainland China. Parallel to
the development of commercial transactions between the VOC and Chinese
merchants the importation of Chinese rice also increased as may be seen
in the diary of the Castle of Zeelandia.44 Several visits of Chinese rice
carrying junks are mentioned every year from the end of the 1620s onwards
and in the second half of the 1630s Chinese rice was brought mainly from
the island of Lieh-hsu, adjacent to Xiamen. As was the case in Batavia, rice
was also imported by the VOC ships from Siam, the prime rice basket of
South East Asia.45
The third source of rice importation was Japan. In the diary of Zeelandia
we can see that there were two ways in which the company could acquire
Japanese rice: with its own ships from Hirado, but also with Chinese junks
from Nagasaki. These Chinese junks exported on average 100-150 balenoi
rice together with Japanese copper and other commodities to Formosa.46
Part of this Japanese rice was, in turn, re-exported by Chinese junks from
Formosa to the mainland. Thus Formosa was not only a port of destination
for Japanese rice but was also a distributing center. According to the books
of the Dutch factory in Japan the export ofJapanese rice for Formosa (500
balen) ended in 1661 when castle Zeelandia was besieged Xand captured
by the Ming loyalist Cheng Ch'eng Kung, alias Koxinga.47 Thereafter the
company continued to export some 50 balen of Japanese rice for Batavia
until 1665.48 Thereby the export of Japanese rice by the VOC came to an end.

4. The exported rice and the finances of Daimyo

As explained above, the company initially bought rice directly from Japanese
merchants. At a later stage rice was purchased from the lord of Hirado.
When in 1641 the Dutch factory was moved from Hirado to Deshima it
became impossible to continue direct trade with the lord of Hirado as may
be witnessed in the books of the factory. In 1642, the year after the removal
to Deshima, the rice export dropped sharply to 250 balen (about 7.7 tons)."
A recovery to more than 1,000 balenvras not achieved until 1645. Japan
witnessed a prolonged famine in these years, and the head of the Deshima
factory reported that the lord of Hirado had a hard time repaying his
enormous debts to the VOC. When the governor of the lord of Hirado
made an excuse for being behind with his master's repaying in 1641 Johan
van Elseracq, the chief of die Dutch factory, wrote in his diary that:
It is certain that die lord is so impeded with debt, that the interest
on this debt comprises a large part of his income. As a result it
will not be easy to attain redress. He daily takes away his servants'
income, so diat diey fall into poverty and perish.50
This enormous debt, which brought such a desperate crisis to the household
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 43

of the lord of Hirado, originated not only in the famine of Kan'ei-era, but
also in the change of economic circumstances around the Daimyo, due to
the attempts by the Bakufu to attain a centralized economy.
The Dutch factory originally had been forced by the lord of Hirado to
buy only his rice in 1631." But in 1634 the situation changed. On 2 Novem-
ber of that year Nicolaas Couckebacker wrote in his diary that:
His excellency has been inclined to repay his debt, but due to the
extreme expenses in Miaco this year and the extraordinary costs,
which unavoidably await him because his son will be married next
spring, he will not be able to carry this out fully. Accordingly he
has ordered to pay 2000 Tael cash this year to redress part of his
debt.52
In 1634 the lord of Hirado was required to make heavy expenditures for
military service in Kyoto and for the marriage of his son. He consequently
had to convert most of his collected rice into money at the central market.
In 1635 the lord of Hirado reopened the export of rice again but he
could not monopolize the sale any more. The Dutch factory could also
purchase rice from private merchants. It shows that the sales channel of
rice of the lord of Hirado was gradually forced to change from the local
market to the central market. After the Dutch factory had moved to Deshima
the lord of Hirado could not do business with the factory any more but
he was still indebted to the Company for 36,016 gulden, 5 penning." He
paid 7,515 gulden, 9 stuiver in cash and 2,850 gulden in rice of 1,000 balen
in 1644 twice, but he could not clear his debts altogether.54 His finances
were so closely tied up to the central market that the rice supply from
Hirado disappeared from the books of the Deshima factory from 1644
onwards. In 1649 the Company at long last discharged the lord of Hirado
from his outstanding debt, a figure of 25,650 gulden, 11 stuiver, and 5 pen-
ning.i:i
In the second half of the 1640s, the Company found a new supplyer of
rice. The VOC began to export rice from Higo, the middle province of
Kyushu, after 1648.56 It continued to do so until 1661 and in thirteen years
a total amount of 64,618 balen (about 1,990.23 ton) rice was exported,
nearly one tenth of the yearly income of the lord of Higo.
It is known that the lord of Higo was engaged in the Nagasaki trade not
only through his agents of merchants in Nagasaki but also through his
trade officers, who were assigned in Nagasaki.57 This trade continued after
the edicts of the closure of the country in the 1630s. The lord of Higo had
no account in the books of the Dutch factory. This means that he did not
transact with the Company directly, but he sold the collected rice to mer-
chants in Nagasaki, who were his agents. It is not impossible that the Dutch
factory also exported rice of Higo before 1648.
From 1653 to 1656 the Dutch factory also exported rice from other lords
of Kyushu: Chikuzen, Chikugo and Hizen, but not in such quantities as
44 YAO KEISUKE

Table 6
The Source of Exported Rice by the Dutch Company

Year Higo Chikuzen Hizen Chikugo Hirado others

(baal) (baal) (baal) (baal) (baal) (baal)

1634 0 0 0 0 0 7,450
1635 0 0 0 0 7,025 220
1636 0 0 0 0 10,465 7,870
1637 0 0 0 0 8,900 0
1638 0 0 0 0 8,010 540
1639 0 0 0 0 1,600 10,400
1648 4,028 0 0 0 0 1,020
1649 0 0 0 0 0 6,971
1650 0 251 0 0 0 4,100
1651 8,400 0 0 0 0 0
1652 9,720 0 0 0 0 180
1653 3,170 0 2,500 2.000 0 260
1654 7,000 0 0 1,500 0 325
1655 7,150 0 850 0 0 350
1656 12,200 0 0 3,500 0 325
1657 8,000 0 0 0 0 170
1658 4,000 0 0 0 0 20
1659 0 0 0 0 0 200
1660 150 320 0 0 0 200
1661 800 0 0 0 0 1,200

Source: Facturen 1633/34 - 1664/65, Negotie Joumalen 1633/35 - 1664/65, ARA, N.F.J. 762-
787, 834-859.

from the lord of Higo. They seem to have fulfilled only a supplementary
function. It is evident that there was some room for the lords of Kyushu
to participate in the trade with the Dutch indirectly. There were two domes-
tic reasons for this. The local market of Nagasaki was not yet fully absorbed
into the central market.58 Nagasaki, after all, was not only one of the local
markets in Japan, but was also connected with foreign markets in East Asia.
Several merchants in this city were so influential that they were concerned
with the finances of the Daimyo and foreign trade.
Furthermore, the Bakufu did not completely gain rule of the Daimyo of
Kyushu until the 1660s when the political situation of East Asia had changed
and the Bakufu could control the finances of Daimyo completely. Conse-
quently it is said that during the Kanbun period (1661-1672) the centralized
distributive machinery of the domestic economy of the Tokugawa period
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 45

was at long last completed. In 1668 the Bakufu prohibited the export of
twelve articles and the import of twelve articles at the same time as it
imposed an embargo on the export of silver.59 These measures are con-
sidered instruments to control the domestic economy. Indeed in the same
year the Bakufu investigated the stocks of some kinds of commodities, rice,
wheat, beans, wine, fish oil and so on, in order to gain control of distribution.
Moreover they investigated contraband in the ports of various Daimyo.60
By these economic policies, aimed at arranging the central market and its
distributive machinery, the seclusion of Japan was made complete at last.

Conclusion
The study of the national seclusion of Japan is without doubt the most
important theme in the history of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The seclusion
of Japan was not only the result of domestic administration but also a
countermove for the dramatic changes in the political situation of East
Asia in the early seventeenth century. Until the sixteenth century there was
a traditional order of international politics in East Asia, which was centred
around the Ming court in China. From the second half of the sixteenth
century to the first half of the seventeenth century two historical develop-
ments occurred and broke this traditional order. One was the decline of
the Ming dynasty, another was European expansion into East Asia. The
effects of the former extended to all surrounding countries. It also caused
the invasion of Japan into Korea and finally resulted in the civil strife in
China. On the other hand, European expansion created conflicts between
the Catholic and protestant powers and gave rise to local antipathy against
Christianity, drivingjapan and Korea into seclusion. In this political confu-
sion rice acquired importance as a food commodity and gained a strategic
character. This became most apparent in Japan, where at the beginning
of the seventeenth century an anti-Christian government was founded at
the end of a fierce civil war. The system of Kokudaka sei emerged out of
this confusion and should be studied in relation to the economy of East Asia.
46 YAO KEISUKE

Notes

1 Iwao Seiichi gave a dear definition of Sakoku in 1963. Iwao Seiichi, 'Sakoku', Iwanami
koza Nihon rekishi X (Tokyo 1964). See also C.R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan,
1549-1850 (London 1951); J. Elisonas, 'Christianity and the daimyo', The Cambridge History
of Japan IV (Cambridge 1991) 369.
2 Iwao Seiichi, ibid,; Iwao Seiichi, Japanese Foreign Trade in the 16th and 17th Centuries',
Ada Asiatica 30 (1976). In recent studies Arano Yasunori used Kai-lun (maritime prohibi-
tions) instead of Sakoku.
3 Arano Yasunori, 'Taikun gaiko taisei no kakuritsu' (Establishment of diplomatic system
of the Taikun), Kato Eiichi and Yamada Tadao eds., Sakoku, of Koza Nihon Kinseishi II
(Tokyo 1981); Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Azia (Early Modern Japan and
East Asia) (Tokyo 1988).
4 Sasaki Junnosuke, 'Bakuhansei kokka ron' (Theory of state of the Bakuhan system) in:
Hara Hidesaburo a.o. eds., Taikei Nihon kokkashi III (Tokyo 1975).
5 Nakata Yasunao, Kinsei Taigai kankei no kenkyu (A Study on foreign relations in the early
modern period) (Tokyo 1985).
6 Nakata Yasunao, ibid.; Takase Koichiro, Kirisitanjidai no kenkyu (A Study on the Christian
Age) (Tokyo 1976). These studies on the relations between seclusion and commerce are
surveyed and introduced by Kato Eiichi, 'Development of Japanese Studies on Sakoku
(Closing the Country): A Survey", Ada Asiatica 22 (1972).
7 Sasaki, ibid.; Cambridge History of Japan, ibid.
8 Nakai Nobuhiko, 'Kinsei toshi no hatten' (Development of Cities in Early Modern Japan),
Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi XI (Tokyo 1963); Nakamura Tadashi, 'Shima bara no Ran to
Sakok' (The Shimabara Rebellion and Seclusion), Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi X (Tokyo
1975).
9 Moriyama Tsuneo, 'Toyotomi-ki kaigai boeki no ichikeitai' (A form of foreign trade in
die Toyotomi-regime), Tokai Daigaku Bungabaku Kiyo 8 (1966).
10 Takase Koichiro, ibid.; Iwao Seiichi, Japanese Foreign Trade in the 16th and 17th
Centuries', Ada Asiatica 30 (1976).
11 Op. cit.; Iwao Seiichi, Shuinsen boekishi no kenkyu (A Study of the History of the Red-seal
Ship) (Tokyo 1958).
12 Hayashi Akira, Tsuko Ichiran VIII (Tokyo 1913) 543-545.
13 Nagazumi Yoko, 'Hirado Oranda shokan' (Dutch Factory in Hirado); Nagazumi and
Takeda Mariko, Hirado Oranda Shokan. Hirado Igirisu Shokan (Tokyo 1981); Yamamoto
Hirobusi, Kan'eijidai (Kan'ei era) (Tokyo 1989).
14 Buke Genseiroku, in: Isii Ryosuke eds., Kinsei hosei shiryo so-sho II (Tokyo 1959).
15 Gotoke Reijo, in Isii Ryosuke eds., ibid., I, 3-4.
16 Kato Eiichi, 'Rengo Oranda Higashi Indo Kaisha no Senryaku-Kyoten toshite no Hirado'
(Hirado as a strategic point of the United Dutch East India Company), Nihon Zenkindai
no Kokka to Taigai-kankei (Tokyo 1987).
17 Copy missive van Leonaert Camps uyt Firando aen gouverneur generael Coen in dato
15 October 1621, ARA, V.O.C. 1075, fol. 86r.
18 Factuyre van de coopmanschappen contant silver, enz., ARA, V.O.C. 1063, fol. 476v-481r.
19 Facture van de goederen en coopmanschappen, door Jacques Specx oppercoopman in
Japan. ARA, V.O.C, 1068, fo. 396-398.
20 Copie missive van Cornells van Nijenrode in dato 21 Maert anno 1631, ARA, V.O.C.,
1103, fol. 124-129.
21 Negotie Journaal anno 1624/26, ARA, N.FJ. 830.
22 Dagregister gehouden te Edo door WillemJansz. van Amersfoort anno 1632, ARA, N.FJ.
273, dato 5JuIy.
23 Negotie Journael anno 1636, ARA, N.FJ. 836.
24 op. ciL
25 Dagregister anno 1633/39, ARA, N.FJ. 54, dato 25 November anno 1635.
26 ibid., dato 2 December anno 1635.
THE VOC AND JAPANESE RICE IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 47

27 Dagregister anno 1639/41, ARA, N.FJ. 55, dato 7 July anno 1639.
28 Ishibara Michihiro, NUum Kisshi no Kenkyu (A study on the Chinese Missions asking to
send armed forces) (Tokyo 1945).
29 Dagregister anno 1639/41, ARA, N.FJ. 55, dato 7 July anno 1639.
30 ibid., dato 14 Augustus anno 1641.
31 Hayashi Akira, ibid. rV, 267-269.
32 Hayashi Akira, ibid. IV, 289-299.
33 Hayashi Akira, ibid. IV, 267-269.
34 M.H.P. Roessing, Het ArchieJvan de Nederlandse Factorij injapan 1609-1860 ('s-Gravenhage
1964).
35 Negotie Journael anno 1620-24, ARA, N.FJ. 829.
36 Negotie Journael anno 1636, ARA, N.FJ. 836.
37 Nagazumi Akira, 'Oranda no Higashi Indi Keiei Shoki ni okeru Boeki no Yakuwa ri'
(The Role of Trade in the Early Management of Dutch East India), Toyo Cahuko 39-2
(1964).
38 op. cit-
39 Nagazumi Akira, Oranda Higashi Indo Kaisha (The Dutch East India Company) (Tokyo
Shuppansha 1971) 114-116.
40 Factuur anno 1635/37, ARA, N.FJ. 763. Facturen anno 1640-1644, ARA, N.FJ. 764-768.
41 Kato Eiichi, 'Unification and Adaptation, the Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies'
in: L. Blusse and F.S. Gaastra eds., Companies and Trade (Leiden 1981).
42 Nakamura Takashi, 'Taiwan ni okeru Ranjin no Nogyo-Shorei to Hattatsu' (The Dutch
promotion and development of Agriculture in Taiwan), Shakai Keuai Shigaku 7-3 (1937).
43 Nakamura Takashi, "Oranda no Taiwan Keiei' (The Dutch administration in Taiwan),
Tenri Daigaku Gahuko 43 (1964).
44 J.L. Blusse a.o., DeDagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan 1629-16641 ('s-Gravenhage
1986).
45 For example, in 1644 the Dutch in Formosa requested 150 lasten (about 296.4 tons) of
Siamese rice to the factory in Siam. JA. van der Chijs a.o., Dagregister gehmtden int Casteel
Batavia VIII ('s-Gravenhage 1903) 145.
46 Blusse, Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia.
47 Factuur anno 1661, ARA, N.FJ. 785.
48 Factuur anno 1665, ARA, N.FJ. 787.
49 Negotie Journaal anno 1641, ARA, N.FJ. 841.
50 Dagregister anno 1633/1639, ARA, N.FJ. 53, dato 2 November anno 1634.
51 Copie missive van Cornells van Nijenrode in dato 21 Maert anno 1631, ARA. V.O.C.
1103, fol. 124-129.
52 Dagregister anno 1633/1639, ARA, N.FJ. 53, dato 2 November anno 1634.
53 Negotie Journaal anno 1641, ARA, N.FJ. 841.
54 Negotie Journalen anno 1642/43-1643/44, ARA, N.FJ. 842-843.
55 Negotie Journaal anno 1648/49, ARA, N.FJ. 849.
56 Factuur anno 1648, ARA. N.FJ. 772.
57 Takeno Yoko, Han Boeti-shi no Kenkyu (Study of clan-trade) (Tokyo 1979).
58 Mori Yasuhihro, Daimyo Kin'yushi^ron (A Study of the History of aimyo Finance) (Tokyo
1970).
59 Hayashi Akira, ibid. IV, 267-269.
60 Nakai Nobuhiko, ibid.