NOTES: The post-Stalin Thaw and the bid for Peaceful Co-Existence

The Death of Stalin

 By 1953 had imposed his system of control across satellite states of Eastern Europe
o Part of consolidating Soviet domination and the USSR’s position in the Cold
War.
 But, on the international stage, his final years marked by foreign policy failures:
Berlin Blockade, NATO, Yugoslavia’s defection from COMINFORM.
 His death raised the possibility of a new relationship between superpowers and a
relaxation of Cold War tensions.

De-Stalinisation
 Politburo endorsed ‘collective leadership’ to prevent another period of one man rule:
Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Khrushchev
 1953-1955 collective leadership attempted to reform the Stalinist Soviet system by:
o ending ‘personality cult’ politics
o reforming the secret police
o arresting and executing Beria (he wanted to be Stalin’s hard-line successor)
o following a ‘new course’ in economic policy, with greater emphasis on the
production of consumer goods

Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, 1956

 20th Party Congress: high point of de-Stalinisation
 Denounced Stalin’s reign of terror, attacked Stalin for:
o Promoting a cult of personality
o Purges and persecution to consolidate his personal rule
 IMPACT:
o USA regarded as a sign that real change was taking place in the USSR
o Created expectation of reform in the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe
o De-Stalinisation had the potential to affect the USSR’s foreign policy and was
therefore significant for the development of the cold war

The role of Khrushchev in shaping superpower relations

 1955-1958 outmanoeuvred his rivals and emerged as the clear leader of the USSR
 “Peaceful co-existence with a definite competitive edge”
o believed that the superpowers had to accept each other’s existence and called
for peaceful economic competition between socialism and capitalism
 Appalled by the idea of nuclear attacks
 Softer and more constructive tone than Stalin towards the west
 At the same time as a committed communist, pursued competitive ideological and
military policies
 Boasted falsely that the Soviet Union was producing missiles ‘like sausages’
o Intended to convey the impression of Soviet superiority in military technology
 Prepared to undertake high-risk ventures to test the USA’s resolve and secure
advantages for the USSR, example:
o Berlin Crisis 1958-9
o Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Peaceful Co-existence
 Malenkov called for a ‘New Course’ in foreign policy which focussed on peaceful co-
existence with the west
 Malenkov was convinced that a capitalist-communist war was not inevitable
 Initially Khrushchev opposed the ‘New Course’, but after his opponent had been
removed, he adopted the same policy under the banned of ‘Peaceful Co-existence’

Why did the Soviet Union pursue ‘Peaceful Co-existence’?

 Soviet leadership believed in the inevitable triumph of communism over capitalism
sooner or later. The USSR could bide its time and avoid any damaging conflicts
o “Peaceful co-existence between different systems of government is possible
but peaceful co-existence between different ideologies is not”
 Confident that the USSR’s economic output would soon overtake the west
 Greater sense of security and made them more willing to negotiate, after recognising
each’s consolidated spheres of interest in Europe
 Economic and military implications of the nuclear arms race provided a reason for a
more constructive USA-USSR relationship

Examples of Peaceful Co-existence

 End of the Korean War 1953:
o Soviet leadership moved rapidly at bringing the fighting to an end
o Abandoned Stalin’s hard-line approach and was influenced by Soviet concerns
about the economic impact of prolonging the war
o Signed armistice along the 38th parallel in 1953
 Cuts in the Red Army:
o Khrushchev reduced forced partly to convince the West of his peaceful
intentions. Second half of 1950’s, Red Army was reduced from 5.8 to 3.7
million men
o Other reasons: save military costs and was convinced that nuclear weapons
afforded the USSR better protection
 Austrian State Treaty 1955
o Removed all foreign troops and guaranteed Austria’s independence as a
neutral state – first occasion since 1945 that Soviet troops had willingly left
any part of Europe
 Soviet Withdrawal from Finland 1956
o Further evidence that the USSR desired a more constructive relationship
o Porkkala (Soviet troops removed) had little strategic value and Finland
pledged to remain neutral and outside of NATO
 1953 settled border disputes with Turkey and Iran
 Formally recognised Israel
 1955 restored relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia

Hungary 1956
 Anti-Stalinist communist Imre Nagy was premier of Hungary
 Protestors calling for:
o Multi-party democracy
o Free press
o Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact
  Nagy agreed and declared Hungary a neutral country
 USSR viewed this as an open revolt, 4th November, Red Army tanks entered Budapest
 By 11th November, Janos Kadar replaced Nagy and imposed centralised one-party
control, arresting 35000 protestors and executing 300 leaders of the uprising
 Hungary exposed the problems with Khrushchev’s approach to the Eastern Bloc: he
encouraged limited reform but then lead to demands that threatened to destroy the
Eastern Bloc. This exposed the dictatorial nature of Soviet control
 Hungary exposed the weakness of the USA. Hungarian protestors had been
encouraged by messages of support from Eisenhower and Dulles on ‘Radio Free
Europe’ assuming they would receive US military assistance. But the West refused to
stop the Red Army’s brutal suppression of the rising

Conclusion of the Hungarian Uprising

 Nagy’s decision to seek neutral status undermined the USSR’s defensive barrier in
Eastern Europe
 Soviet military action demonstrated the USSR’s determination to preserve its sphere
of influence on its Western borders
 The USSR concluded that the USA was unlikely to intervene in the ‘Soviet’ part of
Europe

Eisenhower and Dulles

 Eisenhower becomes president in 1953
 Attacked Truman for being ‘soft’ on communism and rejected containment as ‘futile
and immoral’
 Dulles spoke about ‘rolling back’ communism
 Both in office adopted ‘New Look’ policy, which emphasised hard-line Cold War
diplomacy

The impact of the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian rising on the West
 Revealed limitations of the ‘New Look’ policy
 Western reaction was restricted to strong condemnation of Soviet actions and
America taking in 25000 Hungarian refugees
 Political and military realities meant that the USA could not intervene as Eastern
Europe was part of the Soviet sphere of influence and could trigger a nuclear war with
the USSR if they did anything
 Hungary revealed that the USA could not ‘roll-back’ communism in Eastern Europe.
 Containment remained the only possible American policy

Why did Eisenhower want better Relations with the USSR?

 In public, he stressed ‘New Look’, but in private he was prepared to act pragmatically
to improve relations with the USSR
 He was aware of the dangers of a nuclear conflict
 Concerned about military spending was too high. Better relations with the USSR
would decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war and the government would reduce
military spending
 Intelligence gathered by U-2 spy planes suggested that the USSR was behind in the
Arms race. This gave the USSR the upper hand in negotiations with the USSR
  ‘New Look’ went hand in hand with better relations because, by strengthening the
USA’s position, Eisenhower hoped to force the USSR to negotiate rather than risk
war

Key Features of ‘New Look’ Policy

 Massive Retaliation: 1954 Dulles announced policy of “massive retaliatory
power”. The USA would make greater use of nuclear threats and place less
reliance on conventional weapons.
 Brinkmanship (to the verge of war without getting into war): Massive
retaliation formed part of Dulles’ wider policy of ‘Brinkmanship’. Instances in the
1950’s were:
o 1953 the US warned China that if the Korean War was not brought to a
speedy conclusion, it would use nuclear weapons. An Armistice was
signed shortly after.
 Increased use of Covert Operations: from 1953, the US made regular use of these.
o 1953 CIA operation to ensure pro-western Iranian Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi was installed as Shah of Iran. Success of this operation gave
America an ally on the USSR’s border
o 1954 CIA-backed coup against the left-wing Guatemalan President Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman
o Development of U-2 spy planes to aid intelligence gathering
 Domino Theory 1954: The theory maintained that if Vietnam succumbed to
communism, it would be followed in turn by Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya,
Indonesia and the Philippines.
o Concerns prompted the formation of SEATO (the South-East Asian
Treaty Organisation): a military alliance between the USA and the
countries of South East Asia
o SEATO had limited impact in the region as its establishment angered
China
 Eisenhower Doctrine 1957: designed to halt communist penetration of the Middle
East and stop the Middle East oil supplies from falling into hostile hands.
o Committed US economic and military support to protect the independence of
any state in the region, which was threatened by armed communist aggression.

The ‘Geneva Spirit’ and Conference Diplomacy 1954-61

 Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War led a renewal of superpower conference
diplomacy
 Process was assisted by Khrushchev’s pursuit of peaceful co-existence and
Eisenhower’s belief in the benefits of face-to-face meetings
 Overall, this improved US-Soviet relations, but failed to tackle important issues such
as the future of Germany and the Arms Race

Geneva Conference April-July 1954

 First indicator of success of superpower diplomacy
 USA, USSR, Britain and France met to discuss Korea and Indochina
 No progress made on a Korean peace treaty, but a settlement was negotiated on the
Indochina War (1946-54). USA refused to sign but promised not to undermine:
o Ceasefire declared and French troops were to be withdrawn
o Laos and Cambodia to be established as independent states
 o Vietnam was temporarily divided, Ho Chi Minh and Viet-Minh in the North
and Bao Dai in the South (later replaced by Ngo Din Diem in 1955)
o The country was to be reunited through free elections by 1956. However,
Ngo Din Diem cancelled the scheduled elections. Ho Chi Minh was predicted
to win. During 1958-9 communist guerrillas began a military campaign
against Diem’s unpopular and corrupt government. In 1960, anti-Diem forces
became the National Liberation Front (NLF, so called Vietcong).
Eisenhower provided large-scale economic aid to South Vietnam.

Geneva Summit, July 1955

 First East-West summit of the Cold War.
 Involved the Big Four
 Meeting helped shape superpower relations by establishing good working
relationship between the two superpowers and by restarting face-to-face
diplomacy, which had ceased after the Potsdam Conference of 1945
 However, agreement could not be reached (FAILURE):
o Germany: Soviet proposals to neutralise Germany were rejected by the west
because of concerns that this would increase Soviet influence in central
Europe and undermine FRG’s (West Germany) pro-west stance. The west also
refused to recognise East Germany (GDR). On the issue of German
reunification, the west pressed for free elections but the USSR wanted
negotiations between the GDR and the FRG. Soviets feared that a united
Germany would join the Western alliance against the Soviet Union
o European security arrangements: USSR wanted to replace NATO and the
Warsaw Pact with a collective security system. The West viewed this as a
communist scheme to dismantle NATO
o ‘Open Skies’ initiative: Eisenhower suggested that in order to prevent
surprise attacks and verify arms agreements, both superpowers should be
allowed to take aerial photographs over the other’s airspace. Khrushchev
rejected this proposal as an espionage plot

Khrushchev’s US visit and the Camp David Summit, September 1959

 Camp David was significant because it was the first summit involving only the
USA and USSR
 Took place following the death of anti-communist Dulles, a fact that led Khrushchev
to conclude that a deal between the superpowers might be possible.
 The meeting built on the relationship established in Geneva. Leaders agreed to hold a
full summit in 1960 to resolve and settle disputes peacefully
 However, leaders were unable to agree on important matters such as Germany and
disarmament.

Paris Summit, May 1960

 Less successful due to Khrushchev and Eisenhower adopting a harder line. The West
was fearful that the US would give ground to the Soviet Union on key issues such as
Germany. Khrushchev was under pressure from China who accused him of adopting
‘soft’ policies towards the west.
 Neither side was particularly keen to negotiate.
 U-2 spy plane incident of May 1960 led to the collapse of the summit
Vienna Summit, June 1961
 New stage in superpower relations: Kennedy in office and Khrushchev attempted to
capitalise on his inexperience, humiliation of the Bay of Pigs Fiasco, by adopting an
aggressive stance:
o USSR would continue to support ‘wars of national liberation’
o West should recognise the sovereign status of East Germany
o The Berlin question (escape routes from East Germany to West Germany)
should be settled on Soviet terms within 6 months
 The only constructive result: agreement to ensure a neutral and independent Laos.

End of the Thaw

 Hardening of US-Soviet relations: U-2 incident and disagreements over the German
Question

The U-2 incident, 1960

 US U-2 spy plane shot down by a Soviet missile and the pilot, Gary Powers, was
captured.
 Initially, US claimed that the aircraft was a weather research plane that strayed off
course (LIED)
 Soviet leader demanded an apology, Eisenhower finally admitted the truth and
announced that U-2 flights would end but refused to issue an apology and angered
Khrushchev
 Impact: Boosted USSR’s standing in a tough stance, also to reassure the Chinese
leader
o Deteriorating of Sino-Soviet relations as Mao strongly opposed peaceful co-
existence with the west

The German Question, 1958-61

 West Germany joined NATO in 1955, USSR feared that a rearmed FRG would press
of reunification. USSR responded by creating the Warsaw Pact 1955
 Hallstein Doctrine 1955: West Germany would regard diplomatic recognition of the
GDR as an unfriendly act. Relations were hampered as this implied the acceptance
of the division of the country
 West Berlin imposed problems to the USSR since it was a capitalist enclave in a
communist state:
o An escape route to the west. From 1951-61 over 4 million defected from East
Germany via West Berlin
o Major source of Western intelligence about the Soviet Bloc
o A centre for pro-US radio propaganda transmitted across Eastern Europe
 By late 1950’s, Khrushchev was under pressure to resolve the German question. In
1958, Western powers rejected East-West German talks, East German regime wanted
USSR to guarantee their security since the West refused to recognise the GDR, and to
halt the mass defections to the West

Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-9

 Khrushchev attempted a Soviet solution:
o West Berlin should become a demilitarised ‘free city’
 o East-West talks on a German peace treaty
o Access routes to Berlin would be handed over to East Germany
 Western powers rejected the demands and Dulles stated that NATO would retaliate if
western access to Berlin was denies

Third Berlin Crisis: Berlin Wall, 1961

 Kennedy insisted that the US would not be driven out of Berlin and announced
increases in the armed forces
 Khrushchev did not want a war over Berlin, but could not allow the exodus of East
Germans to continue
 August 1961, USSR surprised the West by building a wall that would prevent the free
movement between East and West Berlin
 Initially, Kennedy considered a limited nuclear first strike against the USSR, but later
dropped as there was no direct threat to West Berlin. USA accepted the division
 Symbolised East-West hostility and became the enduring image of the Cold War
(links to Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’)

Fourth Berlin Crisis, October 1961 (Checkpoint Charlie)

 US diplomat, General Lucius Clay, could not enter East Berlin as he refused to show
his passport
o Broke an agreement allowing free passage without passports for superpower
personnel
o Clay responded by providing US military patrol to escort the diplomat to East
Berlin
 US tanks stationed at Checkpoint Charlie, the chief crossing point between East and
West Berlin
o 27th October: 33 Soviet tanks entered East Berlin, 10 at Checkpoint Charlie
facing US tanks
o Intense stand-off ensured US garrison in Berlin, NATO and Strategic Air
Command were put on alert
o Khrushchev authorised to return fire if attacked
 Kennedy contacted Khrushchev and proposed a joint staged removal of forces
o After 16 hours ‘nose to nose’, tanks on both sides withdrew, one by one

Why did the Cold War continue? Why did Peaceful Co-Existence Fail to end the Cold War?
 US-Soviet ideological hostility continued: Khrushchev rejected the notion of
ideological peaceful co-existence
 The accelerating Arms Race, conducted in secret, promoted fear and suspicion on
both sides
 Decolonisation and ‘end of empire’ (GLOBALISATION) opened up new areas for
superpower competition and conflict.
 China’s criticism of ‘peaceful co-existence’ put pressure on Khrushchev to adopt a
harder line with the West (Paris Summit and U-2 incident)
 US-Soviet failure to resolve specific divisive issues such as the future of Germany