Environmental Ethics and the Rights of

Future Generations
Bryan G. Norton*

Do appeals to rights and/or interests of the members of future generations provide

an adequate basis for an environmental ethic? Assuming that rights and interests
are, semantically, individualistic concepts, I present an argument following Derek
Parfit which shows that a policy of depletion may harm no existing individuals,
present or future. Although this argument has, initially, an air of paradox, I show
that the argument has two intuitive analogues-the problem of generating a morally
justified and environmentally sound population policy and the problem of temporal
distance. These problems are shown both to resist solutions in individualistic terms
and to embody difficulties similar to those raised by Parfit. Since utilitarianism and
modem deontology are individualistic in nature, they cannot provide the basis for
an adequate environmental ethic and they do not rule out policies such as that of
depletion, which is clearly unacceptable environmentally. I dose with an explor-
atory but generally pessimistic assessment of the possibility that rights and interests
can be reconstrued as nonindividualistic.

I. INTRODUCTION

Human use ofthe environment often seems to presuppose that the Earth and
its resources are ofmerely instrumental value. Environmentalists, however, are
alarmed at the extent to which this attitude has supported the exploitation and
destruction of beauty, integrity and even the very productivity of natural
systems. This alarm raises a strong, intuitive feeling that, while the use of
nature is unavoidable and unobjectionable, there is something wrong with
destructive overuse. According to this intuitive ethic, human beings ought not
to overexploit nature, but should protect its ongoing, holistic integrity. Can
this intuitive ethic be given rational and theoretical support by an appeal to
traditional forms of reasoning such as utilitarian calculations or to deontologi-
cal considerations conceming human obligations?
Many writers on environmental ethics have suggested that these forms of
traditional ethical reasoning are sound, but they must be broadened to include
appeals to interests of, and/or obligations toward, broader classes than cur-

• Division ofHumanities, New College ofthe University ofSouth Florida, Sarasota, FL 33580.
Norton is on leave from 1981 to 1983 in order to work as a research associate on the endangered
species project at the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, College
Park, MD 20742. This paper has been greatly improved in response to criticisms of earlier versions
by Douglas Berggren, J. Baird Callicott, Holmes Roiston, 111, and Mark Sagoff. Work on the
paper was partially funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

319
320 ENVIRONMENTAL ETH/CS Vol.4

rently existing human individuals. Since the consumptive interests of a large

and growing human population are leading to the destruction of nature, there
must be some counterpoise to those interests. Some writers attack the central
assumption that nature lacks intrinsic value and argue that animals, plants,
species, and ecosystems have interests or rights. Such claims, however, have
been shown to resist theoretical understanding. Worse, it can be argued that,
even if attributions of rights to nonhumans are accepted as meaningful and
theoretically supportable, they fai! to support a comprehensive environmental
ethic. 1
Other writers either argue or assurne that one need not attack the anthropo-
centric value system, which treats nature as valuable only instrumentally, in
order to provide the needed counterpoise. Rather, they suggest that exploita-
tion of nature violates the interests or rights of members of future generations
of humans. In this paper, I assess the usefulness of such appeals. I argue that,
if construed in the usual individualistic manner, these interests and rights do
not provide a comprehensive and theoretically sound support for the intuitive
idea that the ongoing, holistic integrity of nature ought to be preserved.
Simply put, my argument depends upon the individualistic nature of rights
and interests. Attempts to assign rights or interests to future human beings
suffer from a debilitating circularity. One cannot recognize a future individual
as the holder of an interest or a right until the individual as such can be
identified. Unfortunately, these individuals can be identified only after many
environmental decisions, especially those governing population policy, have
earlier been made. Consequently, individual interests and rights can be as-
signed only after such decisions have already been made. They cannot, then,
guide those decisions.
When I say that interests and rights are individualistic in nature, I am
making a semantic point about the standard modern usage ofthe terms interest
and right. Any reference to interests, rights, or duties presupposes an identifi-
able individual who has that interest or right. This is not to assurne that only
human individuals can have rights or interests. For example, corporations can
be said to have rights. Notice, however, that this is also taken to require the
legal fiction that corporations are "persons" before the law. My point is quite
minimal: all interests and rights must be assignable to an individual, and all
individuals must be identifiable. The test for identifiability is, in turn, that the
individual must be the possible denotatum of a singular referring expression.
This technical test can be applied as follows: x is an individual if x can be
uniquely specified by adefinite description such as "the person who was named
'John Smith' on July 30, 1981" or "the person who would result if y and z

1 Kenneth Goodpaster, "From Egoism to Environmentalism," in Kenneth Goodpaster, and

Kenneth Sayre, oos., Ethics and Problems olthe 21st Century (Notre Dame and London: Notre
Dame University Press, 1979), pp. 21-55, and Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and
Nonhuman Rights," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 17-36.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERA TIONS 321

mated at 8 P.M. on July 30, 1981." In the conclusion of this essay, I suggest
that this is not merely an arbitrary linguistic convention, but rather rests on
important theoretical considerations. My main purpose is to evaluate appeals
to individual rights and interests as a basis for an environmental ethic. Having
done this I conclude with abrief survey of the possibility of construing rights
and interests collectively.

11. PARFIT'S PARADOX

As a first step, I present an argument following Derek Parfit which raises

problems concerning the cogency of references to future individuals. In spite
of the fact that the argument may on first impression appear only to exploit
technical tricks, I believe it is representative of deep-Iying confusions about the
possibility of making policy decisions on the basis of not-yet-existent individu-
als. In later sections of the paper I support this claim. My purpose here is only
to present the argument as persuasively as possible on its own terms.
I must make one initial clarification. There is a distinction between possible
or potential individuals and future individuals. 2 The class of possible people
is a very large class encompassing all possible unions of sperm and eggs. 3
Future people, on the other hand, are people who will, in fact, exist at some
subsequent time. It might be argued that even possible people have rights, for
instance, a right to life. 4 Edwin DeLattre has argued that this assumption leads
to theoretical absurdities. 5 If possible people had a right to existence, then they
would all have it equally. Hence, every avoidable failure of conception would
involve the violation of a right to exist. Given that my purpose in this paper
is to consider the use of rights of future generations to construct an environ-
mental ethic, such reasoning would tend to increase, not limit population and
would thus provide an impetus in the wrong direction.
Existence might, however, be considered aprerequisite for other rights. 6 On
this view, possible people would not have a right to life, but would have other
rights hypothetically. That is, they have rights now, on the condition that they
exist at some point in the future. 7 I believe, however, that such hypothetical

2 This point is made by many wl;ters. See, for example, Oerek Parfit, "Rights, Interests and

Possible People," in Samuel Gorovitz et al., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 369-70.
3 Note that the sense of possibility involved is ambiguous. Use of logical possibility would lead
to a larger dass than would temporal possibility. An even more restrictive sense would limit
possible unions to those which are in our power to effect. Parfit seems to employ this restricted
sense.
4 R. I. Sikora argues that individuals can have obligations to possible people in "Utilitarianism:

The Classical Principle and the Average Principle," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 5 (1975): 413.
5 Edwin OeLattre, "Rights, Responsibilities, and Future Persons," Ethics 82 (1972): 255.
6 Ibid., p. 256.
7 See Oaniel Callahan, "What Obligations 00 We Have to Future Generations?" American
Ecclesiastical Review 144 (1971): 270. Callahan's discussion of a community as linking past,
present, and future suggests a manner in which such an obligation might be supported.
322 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol.4

rights of possible people are indistinguishable from the rights of future people.
These hypothetical rights become operative only when the possible person in
question is born. But this is equivalent to saying that x has rights only if xis
a future person. This point can be explained using the concept of possible
worlds. On the model described, x has hypothetical rights in all possible
worlds. But these rights are contingent upon x existing in some given world.
This simply means that x has (actual) rights in all possible worlds in which
x exists. This is equivalent to: if x exists in world w, then x has rights in world
wand if there is some other world, w~ and x does not exist in w~ then x has
no rights in w~. It follows that hypothetical rights of possible individuals are
indistinguishable from the rights of future individuals.
We can now return to the main question. Is there a concept of the rights
offuture generations according to which individuals currently have rights that
impose obligations on present individuals? Can one base an ethic of environ-
mental preservation on this? Criticisms of such rights are based on two,
separable grounds-their futurity and their referential ambiguity. The futurity
objection, offered by Richard DeGeorge, is as follows: "Future generations by
definition do not exist now. They cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer
or subject of anything, including rights."a But this futurity objection is uncon-
vincing. One can respond that future people have hypothetical rights in the
present. These are the rights they will have when they in fact exist. Ifwe believe
that an individual has a certain hypothetical right and if we also have strong
evidence that the individual will exist, how can the hypothetical right in
question be ignored?9 Since a person's date of birth is morally irrelevant,
canons of impartiality demand that future individuals be accorded rights equal
to those of present individuals, provided of course that they are brought into
existence. DeGeorge's argument is inconclusive because it concentrates on
irrelevant temporal differences.
My line of attack concentrates rather on the concept of future personhood
which, I believe, is necessarily incoherent in the context of environmental
preservation. This incoherence can be introduced by "Parfit's Paradox."lO
Parfit describes two social policies, which he calls high consumption and low
consumption.

If we choose High rather than Low Consumption, the standard of living will be
higher over the next century. This effect implies another. The people who will
8 Richard DeGeorge, "The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations," in Ethics and
Problems 0/ the 21st Century, p. 95.
9 I williater question the cogency ofsuch claims about future people. DeGeorge, however, does
not question them.
10 See Derek Parfit, "Energy Policy and the Further Future" to appear in Douglas MacLean
and Peter G. Brown, eds., Energy and the Future, forthcoming (currently available as Center for
Philosophy and Public Policy Working Paper no. EP-2, 23 February 1981). Also see Trudy
Govier, "What Should We Do About Future People?" American Philosophical Quarterly 16
(1979): 110.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 323

live more than a century from now would be different on the two policies. Given
the effects of two such policies on the details of our lives, different nlarriages
would increasingly be made. More simply, evell in the same marriages, the
children would increasingly be conceived at different times. As we have seen, this
would in fact be enough to make them different children....

Return next to the moral questions. If we choose High Consumption, the

quality of life will be lower more than a century from now. But the particular
people who will then live would never have existed if instead we have chosen Low
Consumption. Is our choice of High Consumption worse for these people? Only
if it is against their interests to have been born. Even if this makes sense, we can
suppose that it would not go as far as this. We can conclude that, if we choose
High Consumption, our choice will be worse for no one. 11

This argument may appear to have an air ofsleight ofhand about it. Indeed,
its being dubbed a "paradox" suggests that it is a minor conceptual anomaly,
rather than a cogent, substantive point. Nevertheless, the argument deserves
serious consideration.
Three consequences follow from Parfit's argument:

(1) No one is harmed by a policy of high consumption.

(2) No future person's rights are infringed by a policy of High
Consumption.
(3) Rights of future generations are an inadequate basis for an
environmental ethic.

Consequence (1) is Parfit's conclusion. Consequence (2) follows from (1) to-
gether with the principle that rights must be possessed by some actual individ-
ual. Ifrights must be possessed by some individual and ifno harm has occurred
to any individual, then no rights have been infringed upon by a policy of
depletion. If (2) is true, (3) seems to follow. High consumption is precisely
what an ethic of environmental protection is intended to forbid. If an environ-
mental ethic cannot rule out such a policy by invoking infringements of rights,
it is surely inadequate.
It might be responded that Parfit's results become effective only after two
or three generations. But a policy of depletion would undoubtedly affect the
immediately subsequent generation, and be ruled out because it would infringe
upon their rights. This response does not help. Suppose one generation, while
pursuing a policy of depletion, causes levels of radioactivity which sterilize all
living beings. All would agree that, if this consequence resulted from informed
actions, the generation in question would have done wrong. Yet by a simple
extension of the above reasoning, no future individual would havebeen

11 Pafftt, "Energy Policy and the Further Future," working paper, p. 9.

324 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Val. 4

harmed. While one might object on the grounds that the sterilizing infringes
upon the rights of present people to reproduce, this objection would be giving
up the original goal of developing an environmental ethic based upon the rights
of future generations.

III.THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Surprising arguments such as Parfit's paradox are often only anomalies

which dissolve when a minor confusion is exposed. The purpose of the next
three sections is to show that Parfit's paradox is, however, indicative of sub-
stantive difliculties. Garrett Hardin's classic argument that individuals acting
from self-interested motives will destroy a common resource can be treated as
a paradigmatic model of environmental problems. In the next two sections I
argue that neither deontological reasoning nor utilitarian reasoning can fully
support proscriptions against behavior which destroys the commons, even
when such reasoning is expanded to take into account the rights and/or
interests offuture individuals. The first argument (section 4) shows that neither
form of reasoning can support an environmentally sound population policy.
A more general argument (section 5) shows that the aggregation of rights and
interests of individuals, even future individuals, cannot support the central
intuitive tenet of environmental ethics.
In order to begin, I reproduce in some detail Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of
the commons" argument. Hardin defines a class of "no technical solution
problems." A technical solution is defined as "one that requires a change only
in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the
way of change in human values or ideas of morality."12 But, Hardin argues,
the tragedy of the commons has no such solution:

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to
alle It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as
possible on the commons. . . .
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "what is the utility to me of adding
one more animal to my herd? This utility has one negative and one positive
component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since
the herdsnlan receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal,
the positive utility is nearly + 1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created
by one more animal. Since however, the etfects of overgrazing are shared by all
the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman
is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman con-
cludes that the only sensible course for hirn to pursue is to add another animal

12 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons,:!~~~~!~_Q~~l:_l~~~ _

Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 325

to his herd. And another: and another.... Hut this is the conclusion reached by
each and every rational herdsman sharing the commons. Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels hirn to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom
of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 13

The herder's choices can signify individuals' choices to use any particular
resource. I must note in passing, however, that Hardin's analogy can be
applied indifferently to a single population, to a bounded environment, and to
the ecosystem as a whole. This point proves important later.
Whatever environnlentally damaging behavior is involved or whatever the
scope of the damage, there is a common structure to the set of problems
portrayed by Hardin's scenario. The threatened resource is always embedded
in the holistic functioning of a larger and highly integrated system. When that
system is functioning normally, such a resource will be produced at a more or
less regular rate. If, however, exploitation exceeds a certain level, the entire
system may break down.
If, as Hardin believes, the tragedy cannot be avoided by technical solutions,
a change in moral values and in the basis on which individual decisions seem
to be necessary. If this is the case, then there must be some normative basis
for criticizing the actions of individual herders (and, by analogy, all freely
acting human beings) when their individually motivated actions collectively
approach the threshold of exploitation which leads to the irreversible destruc-
tion of the resource. The question I pose is whether traditional methods of
ethical reasoning are sufficient to do this.

IV. THE POPULATION POLICY PROBLEM

Hardin applied his argument to the problem of determining a human popu-

lation policy, concluding that as long as reproductive choices are left to uncon-
strained individual decisions, population growth will expand disastrously.
Hardin recommends collective action as necessary to control individual repro-
ductive choices. Note that Hardin's complete argument contains three distinct
elements. The first element-the description of the tragedy attendant upon
individually motivated decisions-is merely factually predictive. A second
element involves Hardin's moral judgment that the predicted tragedy is im-
moral. Separable from both these elements is his remedy. My concern here is
with the second element. To what extent can traditional categories of ethical
analysis support Hardin's judgment that the tragedy is immoral? Hardin him-
self never raises this question, as he assurnes that "no technical solution
problems" must be resolved by ethics. This is a fair assumption. But if, as I

13 Ibid., p. 1244.
326 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol.4

am arguing, Hardin's problem is representative of a class of environmental

problems that are unique in certain respects, it may turn out that traditional
ethics cannot provide a basis for criticism here. Is there a population policy
which can be generated from purely deontological (rights-based) or purely
utilitarian principles which would proscribe the behavior of these individuals?
Insofar as utilitarianisnl and deontology are based on individual interest,
they must generate proscriptions from such interests. If the solution to the
tragedy of the commons is not technical but moral, any utilitarian or deonto-
logical ethic must show that some individual interests are illegitimately trans-
gressed in Hardin's scenario. But Hardin's reasoning is abstract in the sense
that it applies equally to all herders. No individual interests are given any
advantage. If, then, utilitarian or deontological ethical systems are to proscribe
the herders' behaviors, they must somehow do so on the basis that such
behaviors faH to consider future interests and rights. If present behaviors soon
lead to an interruption of production, then utilitarianism will be able to gener-
ate an argument against their conduct. But this is often not the case in environ-
mental situations.
Hardin is silent on this point. Therefore, I now errlbellish his scenario. A
pasture is known to be able to sustain overgrazing for approximately twenty-
five years before it shows serious deterioration. This embellishnlent is consis-
tent with accepted scientific facts. Natural and/or humanly modified resource
systems are often resilient enough to withstand abuse for considerable periods
of time before cumulative effects cause a breakdown. Acting in self-interest,
each herder should continue to add animals, as the chances of still being alive
and herding on that piece of land a quarter of a century later are considerably
less than one. Summing individual utilities, all should continue to add animals.
The chances of any one herder suffering the consequences of these actions can
be diminished by the probability that this herder will be dead or will have
found another occupation. Utilitarianism instructs individuals to act so as to
maximize happiness. If it is in the interests of each individual to add animals,
then it will be in the interest ofthe group for all to add animals, as the members
of the current group will most likely not suffer the negative effects of their
behavior. That is, if each individual's interest is served by an action which
harms no other individual in the reference group, then there is no utilitarian
objection to the action.
Thus, if there is a significant lag time before the negative effects of exploita-
tion are feIt, the aggregate interest of the present users will be to exploit it until
it is destroyed. This result is weIl known in resource economics. 14 If present

14 Colin W. Clark, "The Economics ofOverexploitation," Science 181 (1974): 630. Clark cites,

for empirical support, J. Crutchfie1d and A. ZeHner, Economic Aspects 0/ the Pacijic Halibut
Fishery (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing Office, 1963), pp. 19-20. Also see Colin W.
Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics (New York: John Wiley, 1976), and Danie1 Fife, "KiHing the
Goose," Environment 13 (1971): 2~27.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 327

profits can be maximized by exploiting a resource to extinction and ifthere are

other profitable ventures in which the profits can be invested, it will be in the
self-interest of the users of a resource to exploit even to the point of resource
destruction. When the exploitation of the resource is no longer profitable, the
users transfer their efforts to another business venture.
At this point, it is necessary to become more precise in the application of
Hardin's analogy. The pasture can represent one small productive unit in
nature or a productive ecological community (a large area such as a river basin
or continent), or, ultimately, the ecosystem as a whole. If one chooses a limited
resource or area, it is likely that the collective utilities of the users will be
maximized by continuing the exploitation. Two powerful forces together imply
this conclusion. Resource economics, intending to maximize the profits of an
ongoing corporation, makes no reference to the death of individuals. Since a
corporation can persist even when all present owners are no longer alive, a
purely economic reason would follow strictly from principles designed to
maximize profits through virtually indefinite time. But when these purely
economic considerations are augmented by personal considerations concern-
ing impending death, there is a powerful individual, self-interested motivation
to take present profits when possible.
Thus, as long as there is a significant lag time before exploitation leads to
resource destruction there is a powerful double incentive toward overexploita-
tion. At this level of applying Hardin's analogy, the aggregated utility to
present users will most likely support exploitation to the point of resource
destruction. The utilitarian who wishes to criticize the actions of individual
herders has two options. Either one must object to applications ofthe principle
to limited parts of the environment or one must expand the reference class of
individuals counted in the utilitarian calculus.
On the former option, the utilitarian will respond that the justification of the
resource destruction follows only because the analogy has been too restricted.
If the entire ecosystem were the proper analogue to the pasture, the herders
could not base their decision to exploit on the possibility of transferring their
efforts elsewhere after the resource is destroyed. If the entire ecosystem is the
analogue to the pasture, the herders will have to envision the possibility of
leaving the Earth and finding another hospitable environment-a most un-
likely possibility. But this response by the utilitarian is unrealistic. Individuals
accept responsibility for their own actions, not for the collective actions of all
individuals. Individuals encounter only small parts of the world. When they
exploit aresource, they regard their conduct as impinging on that particular
resource and cannot conceive the collective effects of human action upon the
entire ecosystem. Since utilitarianism has the effects of individual actions as
its units of aggregation, and since individual actions impinge on limited areas,
the global results are necessarily ignored. Each individual, judging particular
effects, calculates that it is in his or her interest to exploit. An aggregation of
328 ENV/RONMENTAL ETH/es Vol.4

such calculations constitutes the collective good of the group, even though it
leads to exploitation on a larger and larger scale. As long as the reference class
of affected individuals is limited to those now existing and as long as the
negative effects of present exploitation of the global ecosystem are significantly
deferred, the utilitarian calculus will support further exploitation and the
tragedy of the commons will inexorably follow. The first response assumes an
unrealistically cosmic attitude on the part of self-interested utilitarians. As
long as there is a significant time lag, it will be in the interest of each individual
to overexploit. But a utilitarian system aggregates individual goods, and the
good of the whole group is a function of the good of its individual members.
Therefore, it is in the collective good of present individuals to exploit. 15 Hence,
the utilitarian's first response is not a real option. It depends upon and co1-
lapses into the second option. The utilitarian can criticize the actions of indi-
vidual herders only by considering the effects of exploitation upon future
individuals.
The utilitarian may appeal to the utilities of the children of the present
herders, claiming that the tendency to "discount" future utilities is unfair to
them. But this claim requires some justification. Perhaps all the herders can
use part of their increased profits to send their children to law school or
medical school so that they are not dependent on the pasture. When so pressed,
the utilitarian may point out that, whether or not the children are herders, they
will still want to eat. Some members of each succeeding generation must be
herders in order that others can survive. But suppose the herders simply decide
not to have any children, lest they impose upon themselves obligations which
interfere with their rational self-interests. Why is this wrong on utilitarian
principles?
If utilitarians are to resolve the tragedy of the commons problem, the
reasons given must be utilitarian. The situation is, by hypothesis, one where
the interests of the present generation are at odds with those of future ones.
The question is whether future generations will count in the utilitarian cal-
culus. But before the utilitarian calculus can be applied, the question of "who
counts equally?" must already be resolved. So no utilitarian argument can be
given for enlarging the class of individuals considered. Perhaps the utilitarian
will claim that, since the future generations of humans will obviously be
capable of suffering deprivation and pain, it is obvious that they should be
counted. Indeed, it may even be considered analytic or self-evident that future
cases of suffering must count. But it has not yet been established how many
future generations there are to be, if any. Unless the utilitarian can show that

\ 15 One might think that an application ofrule utilitarianism, whereby one calculates the elfects
lof all individuals following a particular rule rather than the effects of individual actions, would
'Iavoid this result. It does not. Unless the effects are expanded to include effects on future as weIl
as present individuals, the result is the same. Since the negative effects of following a rule of
Ilexploita~io~~re deferred, the effects of following such a rule will be to increase the utilities of aIl
present Indlvlduals. ----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERA TIONS 329

there is an obligation to produce future generations, the utilitarian herders can

argue that they have no obligation to have children. Unless utilitarianism
implies a reproductive policy ensuring the production of future generations,
there can be no utilitarian obligation to show concern for the future.
This raises the question, first posed by Narveson in 1967, ofwhat reproduc-
tive policy is implied by utilitarianism. Narveson noted an ambiguity in utili-
tarian theory arising from two possible interpretations of the phrase "produce
the greatest amount of happiness on the whole."16 On one interpretation,
called the "greatest total happiness" formulation, it is assumed that there is
a certain mental state called "happiness" and that everyone's obligation is to
produce as much as possible ofthis state. Against this, Narveson distinguished
the "greatest average happiness" formulation on which the obligation is to
make as many existent individuals as happy as possible. 17 The greatest total
happiness formulation implies that, as long as a child will be more happy than
not, and as long as such a child does not cause more unhappiness among other
existing humans than its own excess of happiness over misery, then that
child should be produced. The greatest average happiness principle does
not seek to maximize abstract pleasure, but rather implies an obligation to
act in such a way as to maximize the average utility of people who in fact
exist.
Neither of these alternatives provides any comfort to the defenders of a
utilitarian environmental ethic. The obligation to protect the happiness of
future generations cannot rest on obligations to individuals, because the indi-
viduals in question do not yet exist and will not exist unless the present
generation decides to produce them. Therefore, future individuals cannot be
included in computations of the highest average utility. The decision whether
to produce them must be guided by an average of the utilities produced by the
relevant reference class. But if the present generation fails to produce them
they cannot, of course, count as part of the reference class. So no obligations
to produce future generations eventuate from the greatest average happiness
principle.
Applications of the total happiness view seem to fare even worse. If the
present generation accepts a responsibility to produce as much total happiness
as possible, this will necessitate producing as many individuals as possible, as
long as each individual has an excess of happiness over misery. This will lead
to obligations to overpopulate. 18 Perhaps, however, individuals need not at-
tempt to maximize happiness in the short run (i.e., in the very next generation).
Suppose they attempt to maximize happiness in the long run and appeal to the
scientifically supportable prediction that overproducing in one generation will
destroy the resource base. They might calculate the level of population that

16 Jan Narveson, Moralityand Utility (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 47.
17 Jan Narveson, "Utilitarianism and New Generations," Mind 76 (1967): 62.
18 See J. Brenton Stearns, "Ecology and the Indefinite Unborn," Monist 56 (1972): 617.
330 ENV/RONMENTAL ETB/es Vol.4

will maximize happiness on a sustainable basis and generate a third utilitarian

population principle which I will call "the scientifically informed total happi-
ness view."
The scientifically informed view seems to be a reasonable interpretation of
a utilitarian population principle, but the situation is more complex than it
seems. The fact that the scientifically informed view yields intuitively plausible
results does not constitute a theoretical justification of it. All that has been
concluded so far is that one interpretation of the utilitarian principle does not
entail a population policy with counterintuitive and environmentally disas-
trous results. This conclusion, though welcome, does not constitute an element
in a utilitarian-based environmental ethic. On the contrary, the choice of this
version of the utilitarian principle was determined by an intuitively plausible
environmental ethic. Ifthe scientifically informed population principle is to be
an element in a utilitarian environmental ethic, it must be not merely consis-
tent with the utilitarian principle, but entailed by it. The scientifically informed
view could be made an element in a utilitarian-based ethic in three ways: (a)
it could be argued for as the only self-evident interpretation of the utilitarian
principle; (b) it could be argued that it is the best interpretation (Le., adopting
this interpretation will maximize happiness); or (c) one could criticize all
alternatives to it as inadequate for various reasons. I consider each alternative,
in turn.
(a) The claim that the scientifically informed total happiness interpretation
is self-evidently superior suffers from difficulties common to claims of self-
evidence. They carry the day only with those who already agree with them.
But how does one convince Narveson and other seemingly rational supporters
of the greatest average happiness formulation who have advanced reasonably
convincing arguments for a competing interpretation?
(b) Nor can it be argued that if one properly calculates what will lead to the
greatest happiness, the result will be the scientifically informed interpretation.
For, once again, the circularity shown above undermines this argument. In
order to perform a utilitarian calculation, one must already have ascertained
the relevant reference class, and this is precisely the point at issue between
Narveson's greatest average principle and the total happiness principle.
(c) It might be argued that both the greatest average view and the nonscien-
tific interpretation of the greatest total happiness formulation suffer counterin-
tuitive results which are avoided by the scientifically informed total
formulation. The latter should be chosen for this reason. For example, one
might criticize both competitors for failing to result in an intuitively plausible
environmental ethic. But the scientifically infornled view can also have some
counterintuitive implications. Imagine a situation where the population of the
world is stable and somewhat smaller than the maximal sustainable carrying
capacity. Even on the scientifically informed interpretation individuals have an
obligation to maximize happiness in the long run and there will be a societal
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERA TIONS 331

obligation to increase the birth rate. That society will be obliged to urge
individuals to have more children against their personal choices and this will
be considered objectionable by many.19 Thus, even this alternative has unfor-
tunate consequences. Any seeming advantages accrue mainly from the present
context. It seems to help utilitarianism formulate an ethic capable of criticizing
the self-interested herders. If the context is shifted to a concern for individual
rights in matters of reproduction, it is rather the greatest average happiness
view which avoids counterintuitive results.
To choose an interpretation of a principle because it yields the desired results
in a particular situation is to use the principle in an ad hoc manner. Since none
of the interpretations of the utilitarian principle yields a population policy
consistent with all our common intuitions, some context-independent argu-
ment must be developed to support the desired one. The difficulties with
arguments of type (a) and (b) show how hard it would be to formulate such
an independent argument. Lacking reasons to prefer the scientifically informed
view, the existence of that principle shows only that there are formulations of
the utility principle consistent with an intuitively plausible environmental
ethic. But mere consistency is not enough. The utilitarian principle should
entail the intuitive environmental ethic.
Deontology fares no better than utilitarianism. I have already argued, fol-
lowing DeLattre, that assigning rights to life to possible members of future
generations is both theoretically incoherent and practically self-defeating. Nor
is it coherent to appeal to rights to life of only actual future individuals to guide
present procreative decisions. In order to determine who these individuals are,
one already has to know which procreative decisions will in fact be made. But
these decisions are exactly the questions under consideration. Since the exis-
tence of these rights depends on those decisions, these rights cannot serve as
a guide in making them.
Alternatively, one could deny rights to life for future individuals, settling
only for the rights of future individuals not to be harmed, provided they do
come to exist. Individuals who contemplate reproducing, then, need only
concern themselves to produce no individuals who will have miserable or
grossly diminished life possibilities. If present individuals desire to have many
children, no harm is done anyone until an individual is born who cannot be
supported at a reasonable level from the available resources. To make this

19 This result will be considered even more objectionable where there is no claim that the urged
population increase will benefit currently existing individuals or those who will come to exist in
the natural course of future events. The sacrifice here demanded of individuals is not, then, similar
to cases where underpopulation promotes economic stagnation and positive misery. Whether or
not it would be objectionable to demand a sacrifice of individuals for the sake of existing or
projected society in such cases, it is sure1y more objectionable to demand sacrifices of present
individuals in order to increase the abstract amount of happiness by creating individuals who
would, lacking the sacrifice, not exist and not in any way detract from the happiness of actual
individuals if they never did exist.
332 ENV/RONMENTAL ETB/es Vol.4

point concrete, suppose that the present generation has asolid, scientifically
supported prediction that when population level n is reached, the resource-
bearing capacity of the Earth will be overtaxed and a decline in the standard
of living will follow within a few decades. To avoid harming any future
individual, present individuals need only calculate that point at which no nlore
children should be born and to make a pact to sterilize themselves then so as
to avoid anyone suffering as a result of the collapse of the commons.
However unfortunate this decision might be judged, it does point up a
crucial difficulty for deontological approaches to environmental ethics. Given
that appeals to a right to life for future individuals cannot be apart of an
environmental ethic, a deontological ethic cannot proscribe overreproduction
and overconsumption unless some actual future individuals are harmed. But
the same individuals who decide whether to overconsume and overreproduce
also decide who is to exist. If they act from self-interest limited only by an
obligation not to harm actual future individuals, they can manipulate repro-
ductive schedules to allow themselves anything they want, provided they
painlessly preclude the existence of future individuals who would be harmed
by their present activities.

v. THE DISTANCE PROBLEM

It has been shown that utilitarians and deontologists face seemingly insur-
mountable problems in supporting an appropriate population policy. In this
section, that particular result is generalized by showing that there are serious
difficulties of principle in any attempt to generate from purely individualistic
elements an ethic which will protect the holistic integrity of an ongoing system.
When various writers have discussed rights of future generations, they
almost universally have been puzzled by the following question. If there are
obligations to (and corresponding rights of) future generations, how far into
the future do they extend? I call this "the problem of temporal distance. "20
Note that there is an analogous problem with regard to the rights of nonhu-
mans as a basis for environmental ethics. Once one agrees to consider the rights
of some nonhumans, the question arises as to how far down the phylogenetic
scale these obligations reach. I will call this the "problem of phylogenetic
distance." These problems develop in similar ways. Both problems anse after
it is recognized that there are important moral concerns about the treatment
ofthe environment. Those concerns cause one to wonder whether the mistreat-
ment of the environment is due to decisions which calculatemorality on the
basis of the rights and interests of currently existing humans only. It is then
proposed, in each case, that better decision making will result if the moral
reference class is expanded.

20 See, for example, M.P. Golding, "Obligations to Future Generations," The Monist 56 (1972):
98, and Callahan, "What Obligations Do WeHave?" pp. 273-78.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 333

The new claimants, it is thought, can provide a counterpoise to the seenl-

ingly insatiable demands of an expanding and consumptive present population
ofhumans. The new claimants, however, must be ascribed rights and interests
on the only analogy available-that of the rights and interests of present
human individuals. As one leaves the class of present individuals either for
future humans or for present nonhumans, one seems to step onto a slippery
slope. The justification for including future individuals' rights and interests is
that temporal considerations are morally irrelevant. But once that point is
granted, there seems no way to avoid expanding the moral reference class on
and on to a bewilderingly endless and indefinitely expanding class of claimants.
The situation with nonhuman rights is similar. Once one denies that being
human is necessary for having morally relevant interests and rights, it is
difficult to know where to stop. Consequently, one finds claims that all animals
have rights, that all living things are morally considerable, and even that
"being in existence" is sufficient to imply moral status. 21 Once the existing
moral reference class is opened up, it is difficult to close it again without
drawing an arbitrary line. Narveson examines a related line ofreasoning about
applying ethical concepts to future individuals:

Ifwe take [the view] ... that we ought to maximize human happiness, no matter
where or when those humans may be and counting each equally, reflection may
drive us toward the [conclusion that we owe future generations everything]. For
presumably, there is a vast number of generations to come, perhaps an infinite
number. Surely ifwe make vast sacrifices now, we can leave a heritage which will
make a nontrivial contribution to the well-being of all future generations; if this
is so then, because there are so nlany, this benefit summed over all generations
will outweigh any possible sacrifice. So what we owe the future is Everything. 22

Once rights claims or interest claims are carried to their logical conclusion,
the scrambling begins. Present human life comes under attack, and this seems
an unacceptable conclusion. So a new set of problems arises. It is now neces-
sary to rank interests into priority classes so that, while present humans must
"take into account" seenlingly indefinite demands, they nlay give priority to
their own needs without chauvinism, either anthropocentrism or "presen-
tism."23 All this is somewhat bewildering and has, not surprisingly, the effect
of paralyzing rather than guiding decision making. Present human beings find
their own legitimate needs in conflict with those of other claimants. While

21 See Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Mora1ly Considerable," Journal 0/ Philosophy 75

(1978): 308-25 as well as W. Murray Hunt, "Are Mere Things Morally Considerable?" Environ-
mental Ethics 2 (1980): 59-65. Hunt responds to Goodpaster's thesis that allliving things are
morally considerable, by arguing that Goodpaster does not go far enough! Hunt suggests that
"being in existence" is the least arbitrary condition on moral considerability.
22 Jan Narveson, "Future People and Us," in Brian Barry and R.I. Sikora, eds., Obligations to
Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 41-42.
23 See Peter Singer, "Not For Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental

Issues," in Ethics and Problems 0/ the 21st Century, p. 194 ff.

334 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Val. 4

human beings seem bound by a rule of impartiality toward all moral individu-
als, self-interest demands a whole series of questionable rules whereby present
human beings may be given preference over later humans or present nonhu-
mans without violating canons of impartiality. Hence, one encounters refer-
ences to hierarchies of value for the lives of moral individuals and vague
suggestions that rights and obligations diminish with distance, either temporal
or phylogenetic. Such positions generate more problems than they solve.
1 now develop the problem of temporal distance into a more formal argu-
ment. My argument can be stated in the form of a dilemma, both horns of
which lead to unacceptable options. Either the advocates of rights of future
individuals assign a special status to immediately successive generations, dis-
counting the claims of the farther future, or they avoid such discriminations
and insist upon equal rights for all future individuals.
Advocates of rights of future individuals have often opted for the first
alternative. 24 But this alternative suffers from two serious problems. First,
there is the problem of arbitrariness. Rights of future individuals are plausible
because, it can be argued, the time when an individual exists is morally
irrelevant. A difference in treatment of two individuals, a and b cannot be
justified merely because b exists at a time subsequent to a. The persuasiveness
ofthis argument, however, depends upon its generality. There seems no nonar-
bitrary way to apply this line of reasoning to a in the next generation while
withholding its application to b in a distant generation.
Second, an ethic based on the rights of only immediately successive genera-
tions will not generate long-term obligations to protect the ongoing, holistic
ecosystem. Imagine a society which badly needs nuclear energy to encourage
a sagging economy and which has solved the immediate safety problems of
nuclear production, but has not solved the problem of radioactive waste dis-
posal. To make the example concrete, suppose that there exist no containers
for storing wastes which can be guaranteed safe for Ionger than 100 years.
Under these conditions, the ethic under discussion would fail to proscribe the
production of such wastes, which would certainly show its inadequacy as an
environmental ethic. Indeed, it is easy to generate plausible examples of
present behaviors which create "ecological time-bombs." Any act which has
irreversible effects in the distant future provides such an example. It is often
relatively easy to forestall bad consequences for some shorter time, while
recognizing that disastrous results will follow later. Recognition of the rights
of only immediately successive generations would simply involve postponing
further the negative results of present activities. But no true environmentalist
will be happy with an ethic that bequeaths to the future a world which is
moving inexorably toward disaster, even if steps have been taken to forestall

24 Golding, "Obligations to Future Generations," p. 98, and Callahan, "What Obligations Do

We Have?" p. 278.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERA TIONS 335

this for a couple of generations. Thus, appeals to the rights of immediately

successive generations do not protect the ongoing integrity of the ecosystem.
Perhaps the rights in question must apply equally to all future individuals.
Undoubtedly, there is an intuitive plausibility to the claim that present genera-
tions can surmise what the necessities of life will be for a very long time and
can seek to pass on to the next generation an environment capable of sustaining
life, one which holds open as many options as possible. This will allow future
people to fill in the details of their lives in ways that please them most,
consistent with their being able to pass a similar environment on to their own
children. The intuitive plausibility of this claim is not in question. What is in
question is whether appeal to the rights of future individuals is a reasonable
means to conceptualize and support this claim.
If the rights of future generations can support an environmental ethic only
if rights are ascribed equally to all future individuals, it must be possible to
identify either (a) which individuals will exist or (b) what rights will be had
by any individuals which could exist. But Parfit's paradox and nlY elaboration
of it show that (a) is impossible. Choosing (b), however, amounts to abandon-
ing the traditional concept of rights. As I argued in the introduction to this
paper, rights have traditionally been taken to be rights of identifiable individu-
als.
My purpose in this and the preceding section has been to develop a case for
believing that Parfit's paradox is symptomatic of substantive and intuitively
understandable difficulties. The deontological and utilitarian attempts at an
environmental ethic have all failed for analogous reasons. Being individualistic
in nature, those attempts must proscribe actions as harmful to individuals.
Lacking some obligation to produce individuals, a utilitarian or deontological
environmental ethic will have to cite harms to identifiable individuals stretch-
ing into the indefinite future as the reason for preserving the productivity of
nature. Yet policies which preserve or which harm productivity alter the
identities of individuals. To recognize this fact is just to recognize that Parfit's
concems about individual reference will pervasively affect any attempts to
work out, in detail, an ethic which takes individual harms and benefits as its
atomistic building blocks and which attempts to generate an ethic which
protects the holistic integrity of an ongoing system into the indefinite future.

VI. NONINDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Parfit's argument and my elaboration of it may lead the reader to question

my original premise, that deontology and utilitarianism are necessarily individ-
ualistic. The response may be to suggest a conceptual alteration, thereby
allowing rights for generations as a whole or for other sorts of future collec-
tives, rather than reserving rights just to individuals. But the individual nature
of rights is not merely a semantic convention. It is deeply rooted in widely held
336 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol.4

theoretical beliefs of the modern liberal tradition in ethics. In that tradition,

moral rules adjudicate individual interests. All harms and benefits apply to
individuals. Utilitarians calculate by considering the consequences of conduct
as measured by an aggregation of individual happiness. The act or rule which
leads to the greatest aggregated happiness to individuals is to be chosen over
any competitors.
The situation is slightly more complex, historically, in the case of deon-
tology. Immanuel Kant, for example, sometimes emphasized the abstract
nature of rights and obligations, claiming that they are generalized representa-
tions based upon rules laid down by reason. Rights of individuals would, on
that view, be instances ofthe abstract, generalized rights supported by reason.
But the Anglo-American liberal tradition has given little credence or even
discussion to this view of rights and obligations. Writers in this tradition have
chosen to interpret rights on a contractual model. That is, each individual is
seen as a morally equal, self-interested, rational competitor for societal goods.
Each chooses, in concert with fellow competitors, a set of rules for behavior
which all take to be maximally protective of their interests. On this construal
of deontology, rights and obligations are no less individualistic than utilitarian
interests.
Either utilitarian or deontological individualism supports the conceptual
individualism set out in this paper. 25 Both treat ethicaljudgments as adjudicat-
ing claims made by self-interested individuals. Utilitarians argue that the
adjudication process is essentially one of aggregation. That act or policy should
be chosen which allows the greatest number of interests to be nlet. Deontolo-
gists cite a set of rules which all rational and self-interested individuals would
choose as adjudicating conflicts between the interests of individuals.
Both theories are genetically and therefore essentially individualistic. Both
generate rights and/or legitimate interests out of individual interests. This
explains the strength of the conceptual point on which the argument of this
paper rests. Utilitarianism depends upon aggregating the interests of individu-
als while deontology depends upon adjudicating them. One cannot do either
without identifying both the individuals and their interests. Perhaps I have not
said enough to discourage attempts to construe interests, rights, and obliga-
tions as somehow independent of individuals. Some have suggested that future
rights be construed as rights of entire generations, not reducible to individual
rightS. 26 If this suggestion amounts to no more than a transfer of individual

25 A powerful conceptual argument for maintaining the individual nature of rights appears in

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978),
p. 90 ff.
26 This unorthodox meaning is adopted, without significant explanation or argument, by Rich-
ard Wemer, in "Abortion: The Moral Status ofthe Unbom," Social Theory and Practice 3 (1975):
201-23. This view, however, is subjected to devastating criticisms by Jan Narveson in "Semanties,
Future Generations, and the Abortion Problem: Comments on a Fallacious Case against the
Morality of Abortion," Social Theory and Practice 3 (1975): 472 f.
Winter 1982 THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERA TIONS 337

rights from human individuals to some collective or corporation referred to as

a generation, it seems an unattractive possibility. First, there are serious diffi-
culties in individuating generations. Generations are never discrete entities in
the total population. Further, difficulties similar to those detailed in this paper
will apply if generations are considered no more than collections ofindividuals,
because the size and composition of generations will be determined by present
choices.
But other possibilities exist. Perhaps the inadequacies of individualistic
ethical reasoning here will lead to aresurgent interest in Kantian abstract
principles. Indeed, Rousseau's ethical categories, where the General Will (the
interests of an organic community not reducible to individual interests) is
sharply distinguished from the will-of-all (the aggregated interests ofindividu-
als), may be revived as an important possibility in modern ethics. But if it is,
this development will signal a significant shift in contemporary ethical
thought. Whether the terms individual interest and individual right will .be
altered to encompass the new forms of obligations involved is an unimportant
semantic point. I believe it will be preferable to recognize new forms of general-
ized obligations toward the integrity of environmental systems which imply no
corresponding individual rights or interests. But meanwhile the important
substantive point is that I have shown purely individualistic ethical systems to
be incomplete in that they do not support all of our intuitively feIt obligations
conceming environmental protection. Further, I have shown, in this and in a
previous essay in this journal, that little is to be gained by retaining the
individualistic conception of rights and interests as the sole means of express-
ing moral concerns while trying at the same time to expand the relevant
reference group to embrace new categories of individuals. 27

27 See Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights."