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The Effects of Audit Committee Attributes on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

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Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, ISSN 1548-6583
May 2014, Vol. 10, No. 5, 507-514
D DAVID PUBLISHING

The Effects of Audit Committee Attributes on Fraudulent

Financial Reporting∗

Khairul Anuar Kamarudin, Wan Adibah Wan Ismail

Universiti Teknologi MARA, Kedah, Malaysia
Maliah Alwi
Kolej RISDA, Melaka, Malaysia

This study aims to examine the relationship between audit committee attributes (audit committee independence,
financial expertise, meeting frequency, gender diversity, and ethnic composition) and the propensity for fraudulent
financial reporting. The sample includes 116 fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms listed on Bursa Malaysia from
2005 to 2010. The finding of this study indicates that audit committee independence is positively associated with
fraudulent financial reporting. The higher the proportion of independent or outside directors on the committee, the
higher the possibility of financial fraud, and vice versa. The results also show that the expertise of members of the
audit committee is negatively associated with corporate fraud. This suggests that when audit committee members
are financially literate, they are more competent to curb fraudulent financial reporting. However, the findings for
frequency of audit committee meetings, gender, and ethnicity show that there is no relationship between these
variables and corporate fraud. The result of this study is robust after controlling for other firm-specific effects.

Keywords: audit committee independence, financial literacy, fraudulent financial reporting

Introduction
Financial reports prepared by managers are the most important medium of communication about a
company’s financial position and performance. Users of financial statements, such as financial analysts and
investors, usually depend on the financial information provided by the company to make a decision, and may
do so ignorant of the fact that the statements contain fraudulent information (Tillman, 2009). To curb and
mitigate the reporting of fraudulent information, several mechanisms, collectively called corporate governance,
are installed in corporate organizations. The board of directors is responsible for monitoring a company’s
activities on behalf of the shareholders. The board is also expected to mediate conflicts of interest between
shareholders, who are the owner, and managers, who are the agents managing the company’s day-to-day
operations. As such, Fama and Jensen (1983) mentioned that the duties of boards are to oversee the
effectiveness of management in order to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and to avoid any activities that will
damage the company’s performance.
∗
Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Accounting Research Institute and the Research
Management Institute at the Universiti Teknologi MARA and the Ministry of Education, Malaysia.
Khairul Anuar Kamarudin, research fellow and senior lecturer, Accounting Research Institute and Faculty of Accountancy,
Universiti Teknologi MARA. Email: khairul659@kedah.uitm.edu.my.
Wan Adibah Wan Ismail, senior lecturer, Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Teknologi MARA.
Maliah Alwi, lecturer, Faculty of Business Management, Kolej RISDA. 

 
508 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING

The revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2007 emphasizes the role and
responsibilities of the board of directors and requires the board to establish an audit committee. The audit
committee plays an important role in monitoring and overseeing the financial matters of a company. Thus, any
effort made or steps taken by management to engage in manipulation of earnings or misappropriation of assets
should be detected and stopped by the audit committee. At least three members of the audit committee in a
company should be independent and non-executive directors. The board of directors also clarifies the audit
committee’s duties and authority by providing terms of reference for the committee. An independent audit
committee member appointed by the board is someone who has no personal or financial relationships with the
company and its top executives. An organization that has a fully independent audit committee would be able to
reduce the manipulation of earnings (Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2007). An independent audit committee is
more effective than is a committee without independence in performing its duty to prevent any misconduct by
the top executives in the organization (Persons, 2009). The MCCG also highlighted that at least one of the
committee members must be expert in financial matters. An audit committee that has members with financial
expertise is able to perform better in the organization (Rahmat, Iskandar, & Saleh, 2009). An independent audit
committee with financial expertise enhances and improves the quality of financial disclosure (Felo & Solieri,
2009). In addition, audit committees are also required to frequently have meetings with external auditors. In a
study that uses a set of data from 1998 to 2005, Liu and Zhuang (2011) found that the minimum number of
audit committee meetings commonly held by organizations is four times a year. The audit committee of larger
firms tends to hold meetings more frequently than does the audit committee of smaller firms (Yin, Gao, Li, &
Lv, 2012).
Current studies on audit committee effectiveness also focus on the importance of gender diversity in the
committee. With the evolution of global challenges, the demand for females to function on the board is
increasing. A female audit committee member is argued to have better due care in performing the committee’s
task. It is often held that females are more risk averse in that every action must take into account the associated
cost and effect. Audit committees that have at least one female director function in a different way than do
all-male audit committees, and it has been found that female directors attend meetings more frequently than do
male directors and more assiduous in their duties (Huang & Thiruvardi, 2010).
In Malaysia, it is also interesting to study the effect of different ethnicity on the audit committee. According
to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Chinese firms that have a Malay director on the board have high voluntary
disclosure and a smaller number of earnings manipulations than do Chinese firms which have only Chinese
directors. Family firms form most of the companies listed in Malaysia and have their own style, culture, and
tradition (Claessens, Djannklov, & Lang, 2000). However, in a study that associated ethnicity and financial
reporting, the personal behavior of Bumiputra directors seems to have no effect in mitigating the manipulation of
earnings (Rahman & Ali, 2006). Therefore, this study also includes the examination of audit committee
corporate ethnicity. The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship between an audit committee’s
attributes and the propensity for corporate fraud.

Hypotheses Development
Audit Committee Independence
Companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are required to have an audit committee that includes independent
non-executive directors. The greater the number of independent directors there are on the audit committee, the

 
 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 509

greater the monitoring on the management (Helland & Sykuta, 2005). Audit committees, which were composed
entirely of independent directors, reduced earnings manipulation by the firm (Saleh et al., 2007). Furthermore,
Felo and Solieri (2009) indicated that lack of an independent audit committee enhances the probability of
company management aggressively manipulating financial reporting. The monitoring process improves by
having an independent audit committee exercising the function of the committee to oversee financial matters in
order to ensure the quality of financial reporting (Siagian & Tresnaningsih, 2011). An independent audit
committee has a negative association with fraudulent financial reporting; hence, a high proportion of
independent, non-executive directors on the audit committee will lead to the low financial reporting fraud
(Beasley, 1996). Therefore, the hypothesis stated in an alternate form is as follows:
Ha1: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence and corporate fraud.
Audit Committee Financial Expertise
A person with a background in accounting and who is financially literate and has working experience in
corporate finance is considered as having financial expertise (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). Financial expertise in
the committee can assist the committee’s role in preventing financial fraud (Huang & Thiruvardi, 2010). An
audit committee that has financial and accounting knowledge enhances the prospect of a company having better
performance and is able to help the company to prevent fraud and financial distress situations (Rahmat et al.,
2009). An audit committee that has financial knowledge and competence is able to reduce manipulation of
earnings by emphasizing the monitoring system (Choi, Jeon, & Park, 2004). Additionally, if the company has a
high proportion of financially literate directors on the audit committee, the likelihood of fraudulent
misstatement is low (Mustafa & Youssef, 2010). Thus, we posit our next hypothesis as follows:
Ha2: There is a negative relationship between audit committee expertise and corporate fraud.
Audit Committee Meetings
The effectiveness of audit committees can be assessed through the frequency of meetings held. The
committee must hold at least four meetings a year, as required by the MCCG. The more frequent the meetings
held by the audit committee, the more effective the committee becomes (Song & Windram, 2004). Abbott,
Parker, and Peters (2004) posited that by meeting at least four times a year, the audit committee enhances a low
restatement of financial reporting. Farber (2005) indicated that a firm that is involved in fraud has weak
governance and a low number of audit committee meetings. There is an inverse relationship between fraudulent
financial statements and the number of meetings (Owens-Jackson, Robinson, & Shelton, 2009). In order to
provide effective supervision on financial information disclosure, the committee needs to have more frequent
meetings (Rahmat et al., 2009). Therefore, this study hypothesized as follows:
Ha3: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of audit committee meetings and corporate
fraud.
Audit Committee Gender Diversity
The gender diversity in an audit committee is also an important characteristic. Different genders have
different attitudes and ethical conduct in performing their duties. It has been found that females are more ethical
in performing their duties than males (Bilic & Sustic, 2011). The presence of women on the board enhances the
ability of the business to run healthily and a female presence is considered as a complement to the male
directors. Additionally, audit committees that have both genders represented can perform more effectively than
committees that have a single gender (Halpern, 2000). Although the evidence about the relationship between

 
510 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING

fraud and gender is very limited, it is suggested that in the management process, men are more likely to be
overconfident than women. Thus, the tendency for men to commit fraud is greater than the same tendency in
women (Schrand & Zechman, 2012). Moreover, the presence of female board members on the audit committee
positively influences the number of meetings held and enhances the reporting quality of financial statements.
Thus, this leads to our next hypothesis:
Ha4: There is a relationship between females being present in the audit committee and corporate fraud.
Audit Committee Ethnic Diversity
Cultural effects are also considered important, especially as Malaysia has many races that act as important
players in various industries. Cultural values are important factors, especially in order to understand the belief
and behavior of an individual. In Malaysia, there are many different cultures and the development of
accounting is influenced by these cultures (Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000). Additionally, the race of the directors
has no impact on the manipulation of earnings (Rahman & Ali, 2006). The increase in ownership structure and
the involvement of Bumiputera in the firm lead to individualistic behaviors in Malays. The practice of
corporate governance is better in Bumiputera-owned firms than in Chinese-owned firms (Yatim, Kent, &
Clarkson, 2006). Furthermore, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) showed that individualistic behavior is more likely to
be found in Chinese than in Malays. Malays are considered as having low individualism, suggesting that they
are comfortable working with others who have the same beliefs, behaviors, and are of the same race. Thus, the
alternate hypothesis for audit committee ethnic diversity is as follows:
Ha5: There is a relationship between audit committee ethnicity and corporate fraud.

Research Design
This study covers a 6-year period, from 2005 to 2010. The sample of fraudulent firms was identified from
revelations of fraud and lawsuits brought by the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia, a similar
procedure to that employed by Kamarudin, Wan Ismail, and Wan Mustapha (2012). For the control sample of
non-fraudulent firms, matching procedures using year, industry, and total assets were undertaken. Firms from
the financial industry were excluded due to the difference in the rules and regulation as well as the nature of the
business. After eliminating some firms for incomplete observations, 116 companies were selected, comprising
58 fraudulent firms and 58 non-fraudulent firms. The detailed composition of the sample by industry is reported
in Table 1.

Table 1
Sample by Industry
Fraudulent firms (N = 58) Non-fraudulent firms (N = 58)
Industry
Frequency % Frequency %
Construction 6 10.3 6 10.3
Consumer product 9 15.5 9 15.5
Hotels 1 1.7 1 1.7
Industrial product 15 25.9 15 25.9
Infrastructure project company 1 1.7 1 1.7
Plantation 1 1.7 1 1.7
Property 8 13.8 8 13.8
Trading and services 15 25.9 15 25.9
Technology 2 3.5 2 3.5

 
 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 511

Table 1 presents the frequencies of fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms by industry. The industrial product
and trading and services industries have the highest percentage (25.9%) of fraudulent firms, followed by the
consumer product industry (15.5%), property industry (13.8%), construction industry (10.3%), and technology
industry (3.5%). The hotels, infrastructure project company, and plantation industries appear to have the lowest
percentage of frequency, that is, 1.7%.
Data were gathered from annual reports from the website of Bursa Malaysia. The variables include audit
committee variables and financial variables such as firm size, leverage, and performance. We then estimate the
logistic regression on the following regression:
FER = β 0 + β1 AC _ IND + β 2 AC _ EXP + β 3 AC _ MEET + β 4 AC _ GEN
+ β5 AC _ EC + β 6 SIZE + β 7 LEV + β8 PER + ε
where FFR is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a fraudulent firm and 0 if otherwise; AC_IND is
the percentage of independent non-executive directors in the total number of audit committee members;
AC_EXP is the percentage of the audit committee that has financial expertise in the total number of directors on
the audit committee; AC_MEET is the number of meetings held during the financial year; AC_GEN is a
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if there is a female presence in the audit committee and 0 if
otherwise; AC_EC is the proportion of Malay directors in the total number of directors on the audit committee;
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debts over total assets; PER is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for a company with a positive profit after tax and 0 if otherwise; and ε is an
error term.

Findings
Correlation Analysis
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of all independent variables. The correlation values for all the
variables are less than 0.800, suggesting that there is no problem of multicollinearity. The result also shows that
audit committee independence is correlated with audit committee financial expertise. On the other hand, audit
committee financial expertise is also correlated with audit committee ethnicity.

Table 2
Correlation Matrix
AC_IND AC_EXP AC_MEET AC_GEN AC_EC SIZE LEV PER
**
AC_IND 0.272 -0.015 -0.134 0.035 -0.162 0.016 -0.054
AC_EXP 0.272** -0.103 -0.162 -0.193* -0.097 -0.046 -0.045
AC_MEET -0.015 -0.103 -0.058 0.040 -0.004 0.106 -0.146
AC_GEN -0.134 -0.162 -0.058 -0.136 0.107 -0.086 -0.004
*
AC_EC 0.035 -0.193 0.040 -0.136 0.016 -0.108 -0.144
SIZE -0.162 -0.097 -0.004 0.107 0.016 -0.057 0.182
LEV 0.016 -0.046 0.106 -0.086 -0.108 -0.057 -0.343**
**
PER -0.054 -0.045 -0.146 -0.004 -0.144 0.182 -0.343
* **
Notes. and represent significance at the levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively. The Spearman rank correlation is in the upper
diagonal and the Pearson correlation is in the lower diagonal. 

 
512 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING

Empirical Analysis
Table 3 presents the regression estimates of the logistics regression. Three analyses were included:
(1) estimation on the independent variables; (2) estimation controlling the firm-specific factors; and
(3) estimation controlling the industry and year effects. From the analysis, the study finds that audit committee
independence (AC_IND) is positively associated with corporate fraud. The coefficient for AC_IND is
significant at the level of 0.05 in all three estimations, suggesting thus that firms involved in financial reporting
fraud have a higher tendency to hire a greater number of independent directors for their audit committees than
do other firms. This study is contradictory to evidence documented by Beasley (1996) and Uzun, Szewczyk,
and Varma (2004), who found a negative relationship between audit committee independence and corporate
fraud. In the Malaysian context, the evidence shows that the higher the proportion of independent directors on
the audit committee, the higher the fraud incurred in the companies. This can be explained in two ways. First,
this phenomenon may be caused due to independent outside directors having little knowledge of company
affairs. They fail to oversee the company, and this situation worsens when the independent outside directors
have multiple directorships, which is common in Malaysia. A second explanation is that firms involved in
fraudulent financial reporting may prefer to have more independent directors, because investors perceive that as
a sign of good corporate.

Table 3
Logistics Regression Analysis on the Influence of Audit Committee Attributes on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: Various Estimation Procedures
Controlling for firm-specific Controlling for industry and
Basic model
Variable factors year effects
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
Intercept -0.167 0.871 -3.019 0.432 1.610 0.779
AC_IND 1.033** 0.019 1.264** 0.013 1.447** 0.014
AC_EXP -1.366 0.278 -1.937 0.228 -3.289* 0.068
AC_MEET 0.066 0.669 0.058 0.756 0.103 0.624
AC_GEN 0.607 0.227 0.684 0.235 0.776 0.221
AC_EC -0.216 0.722 -0.717 0.342 -0.884 0.284
SIZE 0.421 0.316 -0.081 0.898
LEV 2.632* 0.057* 3.389** 0.034
***
PER -1.912 0.000 -2.689*** 0.000
Industry effects Included
Year effects Included
Obs. 116 116 116
Nagelkerke R square 0.080 0.380 0.453
Hosmer and Lemeshow test 0.172 0.554 0.488
* ** ***
Note. , , and represent statistical significance at the levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively.

This study finds no evidence linked to audit committee financial expertise (AC_EXP), audit committee
meetings (AC_MEET), audit committee gender (AC_GEN), and audit committee ethnicity (AC_EC). Audit
committee expertise has marginal significance (at the significance level of 0.10) and a negative relationship
with fraudulent financial reporting. The coefficients for other tested variables, AC_MEET, AC_GEN, and
AC_EC, are not significant (p > 0.10), showing no relationship between these variables and fraudulent financial
reporting.

 
 EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 513

For the control variables, this study finds that firm leverage (LEV) has a positive significant relationship
with corporate fraud, while performance (PER) documents a negative relationship with fraudulent financial
reporting. The firm size (SIZE), however, has no significant relationship with fraudulent financial reporting.
These results suggest that firms involved in fraudulent financial reporting are highly leveraged and perform
poorly. The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that the variables tested explain 8% of change in FFR, and the Nagelkerke
R2 increases as additional control of firm-specific factors and industry and year effects were included. The
Hosmer and Lemeshow values are more than 0.05, implying that the model’s estimates fit the data at an
acceptable level.

Conclusion
The effectiveness of the audit committee in Malaysia in curbing fraudulent financial reporting is
questionable, as there are increasing reports of such cases. This study examines the relationship between audit
committee attributes and the propensity for fraudulent financial reporting. Our findings suggest that there is a
positive relationship between audit committee independence and corporate fraud. This is consistent with a
study conducted by Abdullah, Yusof, and Mohamad-Nor (2010), who found that the presence of an
independent audit committee is significant to the revelation of misstated financial statements. Other audit
committee attributes, such as expertise, gender, and ethnicity, have no relationship with corporate fraud.
Analysis of the control variables shows that firms with high leverage and low financial performance are highly
associated with fraudulent financial reporting. In sum, this study provides recent evidence regarding the
influence of audit committees on fraudulent financial reporting. The evidence will give some insight to
governing bodies, particularly the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, on the influence of audit
committees on curbing fraudulent financial reporting. Future studies need to address several issues such as
greater sample size and longer periods.

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