No.

36 – DECEMBER 2010
Irene Panozzo
Abstract
(*)
Will South Sudan make it?
2011 will be a momentous year for
Sudan, North and South alike. The
forthcoming referendum in the
South, scheduled for January 9th,
must be considered a watershed in
Sudan’s history. If the secession
2011 will be a momentous year for Sudan, North and South option wins and the North accepts
alike. The forthcoming referendum in the South, scheduled for the vote outcome, Southern Sudan
January 9th, must be considered a watershed in Sudan’s history, will go ahead with its independence
process. But the challenges an
as whatever happens on that day and in the following weeks will independent Government of South
strongly influence the course of the future of the two regions and Sudan will have to answer are
the relationship between them. many and multifaceted.
A landlocked and underdeveloped
Most analysts and observers view secession of the South as country, divided internally along
highly probable. However until the ballots are cast and the votes ethnic, political and military lines,
counted, the possibility that the unity option may win in some South Sudan will have to fight a
long and uphill struggle to avoid
way must be kept in consideration. If this is the case, Sudan will becoming the next failed state in
remain united but the National Congress Party (NCP) and the the continent. The Southern
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) will still have to put Sudanese political and military
in place post-referendum arrangements 1 to govern North-South leadership, both in government and
relations. This scenario does not exclude instability, since many opposition, should look at the
coming months and years, and at
Southerners may feel that such a referendum outcome does not the challenges ahead, with a great
represent their will and may cast doubts on the integrity of the sense of responsibility and a
referendum as a whole. long-term approach. The same
goes for Khartoum’s leadership: if
If the secession option wins and the NCP accepts the vote the South secedes, the North will in
outcome, Southern Sudan will go ahead with its independence any case be part of the problem or
process. After the final results are declared, which should hap- its solution.
pen no later than 30 days after the vote, post-referendum ar-
rangements – which, as of mid-December, are still being negoti-
ated between the parties – will begin to be implemented. Actual Irene Panozzo is a Lecturer at the
independence cannot be declared before July 2011, when the University of Trieste. In 2011 she will
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) interim provisions are be a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Fellow
at the University of Durham, UK
due to end 2 .
At that point, a new independent state would be born. Would an
independent Southern Sudan be a viable state? Or would it
risk becoming the newest failed state in the continent soon after

1
For details on post-referendum arrangements negotiations, see
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Negotiating Sudan’s North-South future,
Africa briefing, no. 76, 23 November 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org. (*) The opinions expressed herein
2
See A. VERJEE, Race against time: the countdown to the referenda in are strictly personal and do not
Southern Sudan and Abyei, Rift Valley Institute, October 2010, necessarily reflect the position of
http://www.riftvalley.net, p. 15. ISPI.
2 ISPI - Analysis

achieving independence? What are the main challenges that the government of a newly independ-
ent South Sudan may be obliged to face? How would relations with the North and with other coun-
tries in the region influence South Sudan in practice? These are some of the questions that this
analysis will attempt to answer.

A landlocked, oil-dependent South Sudan

An independent South Sudan will have no access to the sea. It will thus depend on other coun-
tries’ infrastructures for importing and exporting any goods, namely on those of North Sudan to
reach Port Sudan on the Red Sea, and on Ugandan and Kenyan infrastructures to reach the Indian
Ocean ports. This is not a new problem in itself, as the region has always had to deal with the limits
that its geography poses. But it could become a more serious issue should the relationship with
North Sudan deteriorate for any reason: large parts of South Sudan are better and more closely
connected to the North than to the rest of the region, and trade and economic activity would be
negatively affected by a break-up in the relations between the two Sudans.
The South’s dependence on foreign infrastructures becomes particularly relevant as far as the
region’s oil sector is concerned. Southern oil, which is responsible for about 98% of Government
of South Sudan (GoSS) revenues, is refined in the North and then reaches Port Sudan through a
pipeline that runs mainly across Northern territory. As of today and for some years to come, there
are no alternative ways to refine and export the region’s oil. China, the main single foreign investor
in the Sudanese oil sector, has started exploring the possibility of building a new pipeline from
South Sudan through Uganda and Kenya to the latter’s northern port of Lamu, to allow Juba to
become independent from North Sudan’s oil infrastructures. But no project has been formalised
yet, let alone launched 3 .
Finding an agreement on Southern oil exploitation is thus vital for both Juba and Khartoum: in
recent years Sudan’s national budget has depended on oil revenues to the tune of around 60%,
largely derived from exploitation of the Southern provinces’ “black gold”. Moreover, oil exports are
the main source of Sudan’s foreign reserves, which are needed to pay off foreign debt arrears,
another important post-referendum issue which the NCP and the SPLM are negotiating. Both gov-
ernments are have a strong interest in keeping the oil flowing, while at the same time reassuring
foreign investors - China, India and Malaysia in particular - that their interests in Sudan will not be
targeted once the South becomes independent. It is thus no surprise that oil is the only post-
referendum issue partly agreed upon so far: on December 6th Sudan armed forces (SAF) and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) signed a framework agreement on securing oilfields and
related infrastructures in the South 4 .

Between underdevelopment and foreign investments

South Sudan is still a highly underdeveloped region. Its social and development statistics place it at
the bottom of the international tables. The region is approximately 625,000 km2 in size, twice the
size of Italy, and its basic infrastructures are inadequate, especially as regards connections (per-
manent roads, for example) and social facilities (such as hospitals, health centres and schools).

3
Dr. Lual Deng, Minister of Petroleum in the Government of national unity and a leading SPLM figure, defined the pro-
posed South Sudan-Uganda-Kenya pipeline as “not economical and expensive”, adding that “under peaceful conditions
we will continue to use existing facilities”. South Sudan Kenya pipeline is “uneconomical” says oil minister, in «Sudan
Tribune», 5 July 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com.
4
Sudan’s North & South sign agreement on securing oilfields, in «Sudan Tribune», 6 December 2010,
http://www.sudantribune.com.
ISPI - Analysis 3

At the same time, the region has become the new frontier of foreign investments in recent
years, not only for the big oil companies or other multinational corporations (such as South Africa’s
MTN or Qatar’s Zain in the telecom sector) but also for many medium and small-size business
owners, who have brought capital from East Africa, Asia and the Middle East with them. Things are
thus changing very rapidly, mainly in Juba where much construction is underway. With most of the
new buildings using permanent, expensive materials, this is a signal that the local and business
communities are betting on peace and further investment and development.
Foreign investments, though helpful, would not suffice to give an independent South Sudan stability
and a functioning government. The few institutions that have been created since 2005 have lim-
ited capacity and are thus quite weak. Moreover, an independent state would need new institu-
tions and administrative departments that the region has not required so far: borders would need to
be controlled, taxes collected, embassies abroad opened and so on. It would be a tremendous
challenge, especially for a government that has been marred by rampant corruption since its in-
ception. In recent years South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, has launched an anti-
corruption campaign, formed an anti-corruption commission and had an anti-corruption bill passed
by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA). Though determined in his fight, the president
has not succeeded in his efforts, and corruption remains an unresolved curse which negatively
affects the performance of government and administration.
Directly connected with this, an independent South Sudan would necessarily have to cope with the
lack of human capacity. The region lacks an adequate number of skilled administrators, teachers,
doctors, nurses and other professionals in most sectors. The Southern Sudanese with higher edu-
cation have studied either in the North or abroad. Few, it would seem, are ready to return and
serve in a country plagued by corruption, that does not offer competitive salaries and where living
conditions seem far more difficult than elsewhere.

Political and military divisions in the South

The SPLM is without doubt the dominant political force on the Southern stage. But it is definitely
not the only one, nor is it free of internal divisions, which might become problematic should the
South become independent.
2010 has not been an easy year for the party-state. Withdrawals and boycotts in the North during
the April general elections, and the focus on the referendum with a clearer emergence of pro-
secession stances within the SPLM leadership, have weakened the party in the North. At the same
time, the elections in the South proved to be a serious challenge. The more dangerous threats to
the SPLM’s tenure did not come from other parties such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment - Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), a splinter group led by the former foreign minister Lam
Akol who was the only candidate to challenge Salva Kiir for the presidency of South Sudan. In fact
they came from within the party: the SPLM leadership had to face the dissent of those members
who wanted to run for election but were excluded by a formally un-appealable political bureau deci-
sion, then chose to present themselves as independent candidates. The vote was marred by
irregularities, intimidations and violence. The whole issue raised serious questions about the
SPLM’s ability and willingness to go beyond slogans and to actually create a democratic regime,
accepting and respecting all the limits which that would pose.
The election results, especially those of the governorship contests, sparked off a new crisis in
some states. While in Western Equatoria, Joseph Bakosoro was the only independent candidate to
win the governorship by beating the incumbent and SPLM candidate Jemma Nunu Kumba, in the
states of Unity and Jonglei the confrontation continued even after the polling stations closed, with
allegations of widespread fraud by both independent candidates, the former Government of Na-
tional Unity (GNU) State Minister for Petroleum Angelina Teny, and the former SPLA general
George Athor Deng respectively. After some days of tension, Teny conceded defeat in Unity
4 ISPI - Analysis

state. Not so Athor, who decided to mutiny with some troops, clashing with SPLA soldiers and thus
becoming a thorn in the flesh of the party, both politically and militarily.
Salva Kiir seems to be well aware that political divisions in the South, which often involve impor-
tant elements of potential military confrontation, are dangerous and likely to further weaken a pos-
sible independent state. This is probably the main reason why, in mid-October, he convened
Southern Sudanese political parties, civil society and religious leaders for a five-day conference in
Juba, the outcome of which was an agreement to form a broad-based post-secession interim gov-
ernment charged “with the duty to conduct (a) population census and general elections for a con-
stituent assembly which shall promulgate the permanent constitution” 5 .
Before the meeting, Kiir offered an amnesty to all those officers who had rebelled against the gov-
ernment before or after the April elections. While George Athor reportedly appreciated the offer but
did not go to Juba and is still negotiating a deal with the party leadership, some of the other rebel
leaders did accept the amnesty and have rejoined the SPLM. This also means that their forces,
which in some cases had been absorbed into the Sudan Armed Focres (SAF) after fighting with
Khartoum’s backing against the SPLA during the war, have now become part of the Southern
army. This is, for example, the case of Maj. Gen. Gabriel Tanginye, a former militia leader who
had been accused of causing incidents and violence in Malakal in 2006 and 2008. The risk that the
recent agreements might prove to be just a tactical move on either side, and thus collapse at the
earliest convenience, is unfortunately real. It does not relate to Tanginye’s or Athor’s forces only: in
late November the NCP stated that the other Southern armed groups which were deployed in the
South after 2005 as part of its component in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) would not be reinte-
grated into the SAF if the South secedes 6 . If so, what will happen to them?
There is another element to consider: both Athor and Tanginye come from Jonglei state, which in
early 2009 was the epicentre of violent clashes between pastoralist groups that left more than a
thousand people dead in around four months. The violence was labelled as tribal clashes be-
cause of cattle raiding, and involved mainly Murle and Lou Nuer groups. It has not exploded since,
in the 2010 dry season, so it may just have been a protracted, deadly episode. But capitalising on
local animosities or hostilities and fuelling wider conflicts has often been one of the main patterns in
Sudan’s wars.

Contested boundaries
Another reason for possible instability and even conflict is the issue of boundaries and borders,
starting with the very one dividing the North from the South. If the South votes for independence,
the 2010 km long boundary between the two regions will become an international border between
two states. Finding an agreement on the drawing of the boundary has been difficult, and the de-
marcation has not yet been completed. Divergences on this may continue to create uncertainty and
instability.
But there is another interconnected issue that both governments will need to settle: how the new
border may affect local communities’ livelihoods, how people in the borderlands will react to the
demarcation, and the potential impact of this on local and national political developments 7 . The

5
South Sudanese agree on post-secession elections, Reuters, 18 October 2010, http://www.reuters.com/africa.
6
Ncp refuses to reincorporate its JIUs back into SAF, in «Sudan Tribune», 22 November 2010,
http://www.sudantribune.com.
7
A recently published report by D.H. JOHNSON, When boundaries become borders. The impact of boundary-making in
Southern Sudan’s frontier zones, Contested borderland series, Rift Valley Institute, 2010, www.riftvalley.net, explains in
detail the historical background and the political, economic and social elements that contribute to making some parts of
the border potential flashpoints. See in particular the first part of the report, pp. 15-84.
ISPI - Analysis 5

possible new international border would complicate and – as many fear – limit or even prevent ac-
cess to traditional transhumance routes as well as to land and pastures, already reduced by a de-
cline in rainfall and the expansion of the oil industry and mechanised farming. Any local conflicts
might oblige both the NCP and the SPLM to react and answer their respective constituencies’ de-
mands and grievances, with the risk of dragging them into a wider conflict.
For this reason, it will be particularly important to see how Khartoum and Juba will manage the
stalemate in the Abyei area. The question of Abyei sums up many of the unresolved and divisive
issues of the other potential flashpoints along the present North-South boundary. As of mid-
December, it appears quite evident that the Abyei referendum will not be held in January 2011 and
that the parties have not yet agreed on an alternative political solution to the deadlock. An exacer-
bation of local and national conflict on Abyei is thus possible, if not probable. The extent of this and
its implications for other parts of the border remain to be seen.
An independent South Sudan will also have to manage challenges originating from the region’s
international borders. The boundaries with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) were set by international treaties between
colonial powers and inherited in 1956 on Sudan’s independence. As an independent government,
the GoSS will have to relate to its neighbouring countries as a full partner in bilateral relations, fac-
ing any unresolved border issues 8 . The most serious security challenge along Southern Sudan’s
international border is the presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the DRC and the CAR.
Though officially a Ugandan internal problem, the GoSS might decide to try to mediate between
Joseph Kony and Kampala again, to avoid being further destabilised in its westernmost areas.

The Nile waters

In any case, an independent South Sudan would probably not have problems in establishing
friendly and stable relations with its neighbours. Juba has already stated that it will apply for
membership of the East African Community (EAC), the regional organisation formed by Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda.
Relations with Sudan’s northern neighbour Egypt could be more problematic. Since the colonial
period, successive Cairo governments have continued to oppose any proposal or call for Southern
Sudan’s separation from the rest of the country. Egypt’s fears mainly concern the managing of the
Nile waters, on which the country depends. As part of a united Sudan, the South is still bound to
the 1929 and 1959 agreements which gave Cairo and Khartoum almost total control of the Nile
waters. But as an independent country, South Sudan may wish to freely choose how to use the
great amount of water that flows within its borders for purposes of national interest. South Sudan’s
independence would thus give birth to another riparian state, whose warm relations with Ethiopia
and East African nations would generate further worries for Egypt, which is already on quite tense
terms with the other Nile basin countries regarding their requested renegotiation of the colonial-era
treaties in order to achieve a more equitable utilisation of the Nile waters, which Cairo vehemently
opposes.

Conclusion
As we have seen, the challenges that an independent Government of South Sudan will have to tackle
are many and multifaceted. The Southern Sudanese political and military leadership, both in govern-
ment and opposition, should look at the coming months and years, and at the challenges ahead, with a

8
Ibid., pp. 85-110.
6 ISPI - Analysis

great sense of responsibility and a long-term approach. The same goes for Khartoum’s leadership:
if the South secedes, the North will in any case be part of the problem or its solution.
The international community – not only the UN, the USA
and the EU but also regional bodies such as the African La ricerca ISPI analizza le dina-
Union, the EAC and the IGAD and the big Asian investors, miche politiche, strategiche ed
firstly China and India – has a great responsibility too and economiche del sistema interna-
should not divert its attention from Sudan after the ref- zionale con il duplice obiettivo di
informare e di orientare le scelte
erendum. Even if the vote goes ahead without problems,
di policy.
and in the event that secession is chosen and the two re-
gions split peacefully, Southern Sudan will still need sup-
I risultati della ricerca vengono
port, cooperation and assistance in several sectors, as well divulgati attraverso pubblicazi-
as continued and focussed political pressure on the differ- oni ed eventi, focalizzati su te-
ent stakeholders within and outside its new borders, in matiche di particolare interesse
order to prevent the derailing of a process which will nec- per l’Italia e le sue relazioni in-
essarily be both long and uneven. ternazionali e articolati in:

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Centrale
9 Programma Europa
9 Programma Mediterraneo e
Medio Oriente
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Orientali
9 Programma Sicurezza e
Studi Strategici

9 Progetto Argentina
9 Progetto Asia Meridionale
9 Progetto Cina e Asia
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