POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and
legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the
judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise
this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

2. Actual Case: The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.
Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to
assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. (Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP, 589 Phil. 387 (2008).

3. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite

legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can
decide the constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only when an
actual case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. (Philconsa vs.
GPH, November 29, 2016)

4. There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the
Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the
challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and
convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened
injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a
result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are
languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention
in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in
resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be released
soonest, if not on time.

There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC
(Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee). Petitioners Edago et al. correctly
invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre. There, We dismissed the novel theory
that people should wait for the implementing evil to befall on them before they could
question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of
the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
 ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act." (Inmates of New
Bilibid vs. Secretary, June 25, 2019)

5. The Petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with the "Judiciary Support Fund." Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary
Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how
the funds will be used. None of the petitions properly present an "actual case or
controversy," which deserves the exercise of our awesome power of judicial review. It is
our duty not to rule on the abstract and speculative issues barren of actual facts. These
consolidated petitions, which contain bare allegations, do not provide the proper venue to
decide on fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation. (In the
Matter of: Save the Supreme Court, January 21, 2015)

6. Petitioners' hypothetical illustration as to how SEC-MC No. 8 "practically encourages

circumvention of the 60-40 ownership rule" is evidently speculative and fraught with
conjectures and assumptions. There is clearly wanting specific facts against which the
veracity of the conclusions purportedly following from ·the speculations and assumptions
can be validated. The lack of a specific factual milieu from which the petitions
originated renders any pronouncement from the Court as a purely advisory opinion
and not a decision binding on identified and definite parties and on a known set of
facts. Firstly, unlike in Gamboa, the identity of the public utility corporation, the capital of
which is at issue, is unknown. Secondly, preferred shares usually have preference over the
common shares in the payment of dividends. Thirdly, petitioners fail to allege or show how
their hypothetical illustration will directly and adversely affect them. That is impossible
since their relationship to the fictional corporation is a matter of guesswork. (Roy vs.
Herbosa, November 22, 2016)

7. Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. (Philconsa vs. GPH,
November 29, 2016)

8. The CAB and the FAB cannot be implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be
enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law is duly passed by
Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution. The CAB and the
FAB are preparatory documents that can "trigger a series of acts"  that may lead to
the exercise by Congress of its power to enact an organic act for an autonomous
region under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. The CAB and the FAB do not
purport to preempt this Congressional power. (Philconsa vs. GPH, November 29, 2016)

9. On the other hand, the MOA-AD as an agreement did not provide for the enactment
of subsequent legislation to implement its provisions. In fact, its provisions were
 immediately implementable after its signing warranting the timely intervention by this
Court to rule on its constitutionality. (Philconsa vs. GPH, November 29, 2016)

10. Petitioners allege that the premium hike, through the assailed issuances, violates their
rights as workers whose welfare is mandated to be protected under the Constitution. They
further allege that the issuances are grossly unjust to the working class and were issued
beyond the scope of constitutional powers. Thus, petitioners' allegations present violations
of rights provided for under the Constitution on the protection of workers, and promotion of
social justice. They likewise assert that respondents Social Security Commission and Social
Security System acted beyond the scope of their powers. This Court, however, notes that
petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated workers' constitutional
rights such that it would warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and
rely on the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to being legally
entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security System contributions. (KMU
vs. Aquino, April 2, 2019)

11. A case is deemed moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
due to a supervening event. The lack of an actual or justiciable issue means that there is
nothing for the court to resolve and will be in effect only rendering an advisory opinion.
(David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705)

12. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All
the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police,
on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’
contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial
review. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705)

13. Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has
erased the conflicting interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent's
Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has to
the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when respondent filed that
Manifestation. A ruling on the issue of respondent's right to registration would be nothing
but an advisory opinion. The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a
"self-starting capacity." This court cannot, through affirmation or denial, rule on the issue
of respondent's right to registration because respondent no longer asserts this right.

14. It is true that this court does not always refuse to assume jurisdiction over a case that has
been rendered moot and academic by supervening events. Courts assume jurisdiction over
cases otherwise rendered moot and academic when any of the following instances are
 present: (1) Grave constitutional violations; (2) Exceptional character of the case; (3)
Paramount public interest; (4) The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; or (5) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. None of these
circumstances are present in this case. Thus, there is no more reason to go into its
substantive issues. (Republic vs. Moldex, February 10, 2016)

15. Locus Standi. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. (In the
Matter of: Save the Supreme Court, January 21, 2015)

16. For the exercise of judicial review, the governmental act being challenged must have had
an adverse effect on the person challenging it, and the person challenging the act, must have
"standing" to challenge, i.e., in the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel, he
must have a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.."
(Jumamil vs. Café, September 21, 2005)

17. In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they
are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have a
personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be
shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their
dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is
erroneous to assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners
since there were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely because of the
prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of rather than
an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison
records is immaterial in determining whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by the
IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance of
the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to show that respondents have
prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby. (Inmates
of New Bilibid vs. Secretary, June 25, 2019)

18. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is
beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest"
and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. (David vs. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705)

19. The difficulty of determining locus standi  arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
 representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from
any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or
‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. (David vs. Arroyo, 522
Phil. 705)

20. Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely
to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the
constitutional question raised. (In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court, January 21,
2015).

21. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases. (In the Matter of: Save the Supreme
Court, January 21, 2015).

22. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is
laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary. (In the Matter of:
Save the Supreme Court, January 21, 2015)

23. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." (Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7, 2010)

24. When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is
a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. (David vs. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705)

25. Petitioner Chavez justifies his standing by alleging that the petition involves the
enforcement of the constitutional rights of freedom of expression and of the press, and
to information on matters of public concern. As a citizen of the Republic and as a
taxpayer, petitioner has already satisfied the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality
on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has shown in a number of prior cases, climaxing
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. (Chavez vs. Gonzales, February 15, 2008)

26. In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino

Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify
that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public
funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a
resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their
invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants
them standing. (Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP, 589 Phil. 387 (2008).
27. For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are
illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The Court retains
discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.

28. A taxpayer's suit is likewise proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of the Congress. (Padilla vs. Congress, July 25, 2017)

29. In the case of taxpayers’ suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. More
particularly, the taxpayer must establish that he has a personal and substantial
interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
its enforcement or that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
case, or is entitled to the avails of the suit. (Public Interest Center vs. Roxas, January 31,
2007)

30. Insofar as taxpayers’ suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not." We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the afforecited cases.
The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barriers which the respondents tried to take advantage
of. (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5, 1994)

31. (Application of Res Judicata/Litis Pendentia in separate cases filed by different

taxpayers). Petitioners do not deny that the first complaint and the petition for mandamus
("first set of cases") and their complaint subject of the present petition involve the same
causes of action, are founded upon the same set of facts, and are taxpayers’ suits.
Nevertheless, they argue that the first set of cases and the present case do not have identity
of parties since they were not among the petitioners in the former.

A taxpayer’s action has been defined as follows: A taxpayer's bill is essentially a class
bill and can be filed only in the common interest of all the taxpayers of the
municipality, to prevent the wrongful expenditure of the money of the municipality or the
wasting of its assets.’ Schlanger v. West Berwick Borough, 261 Pa. 605, 608, 104 A.
764. ‘A class bill, as its name implies, is a bill by several members of a class, on behalf
of themselves and all others in the class, and no relief can be granted upon it, except upon
a ground which is common to all the members of the class. Accordingly, in a suit brought
by citizens and taxpayers to determine a public right or a matter of public interest, all
citizens and taxpayers are regarded as parties to the proceedings by representation and are
bound by the judgment rendered therein. (Public Interest vs. Roxas, January 31, 2007)
32. For a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be
questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.

33. (The member of Congress must be capable of performing his task as legislator).
Senator De Lima's averment of her locus standi  as an incumbent member of the legislature
similarly lacks merit. Insofar as the powers of the Congress are not impaired, there is no
prejudice to each Member thereof; and even assuming arguendo that the authority of the
Congress is indeed compromised, Senator De Lima still does not have standing to file the
present petition for mandamus because it is not shown that she has been allowed to
participate in the Senate sessions during her incarceration. She cannot, therefore, claim that
she has suffered any direct injury from the non-convening of the Congress in joint session.
(Padilla vs. Congress, July 25, 2017)

34. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. The legal standing of each
member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, where this Court pronounced that: The legal standing of the Senate, as an
institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. In said case, 23 Senators,
comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to
nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was
authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989. (Umali vs. JBC,
July 25, 2017)

35. We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to
have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by
a member of Congress (citation omitted). In such a case, any member of Congress can have
a resort to the courts. (Umali vs. JBC, July 25, 2017)

36. An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, but the
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate
an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.

37. There are three instances when a person who is not a real party in interest can file a case
on behalf of the real party: One, is a representative suit under Rule 3 section 3 of the Rules
of Court where a representative files the case on behalf of his principal:
 Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of a case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor
or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.

A class suit is a specie of a representative suit insofar as the persons who institute it
represent the entire class of persons who have the same interest or who suffered the same
injury. However, unlike representative suits, the persons instituting a class suit are
themselves real parties in interest and are not suing merely as representatives.

Lastly, there is a citizen suit where a Filipino can invoke environmental laws on behalf of
other citizens including those yet to be born. This is found under Rule 2 Section 5 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which state: SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any
Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn may
file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. (Segovia vs.
Climate Change, March 7, 2017, Leonen Concurring Op.)

38. In this case, PHAPi is not a hospital or medical clinic, but only an association of - as its
name denotes - private hospitals. As such, PHAPi is not directly subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. (RA) 10932,2 and consequently, does not stand to suffer a real and
apparent threat or injury so as to demonstrate its locus standi to file this petition. To be
sure, while it claims that it represents the interests of its member hospitals, records
are bereft of any showing that it was specifically authorized to file this case on their
behalf. Hence, PHAPi's conveyed interests, through the distinct manner of argumentation
in the petition, can only be attributed as its own. (Private Hospitals vs. Medialdea,
November 6, 2018)

39. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has
failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its
fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to
elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is
alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted
that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his
alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. (IBP
vs. Zamora, August 15, 2000)

40. Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, such as a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties. In any case, the Court has discretion to
relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised.
(Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP)
41. Earliest Opportunity. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality
of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court
below. The Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that
issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued at the early stage of
the trial proceedings below.

42. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved
to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of
unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate
such moves in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain
questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted
upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account the early stage of the trial proceedings
below, the instant petitions are patently premature. (Arceta vs. Mangrobang, June 15, 2004)

43. In Umali vs. Guingona, the issue of constitutionality was only posed by petitioner in
his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. It was certainly too late
to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.

44. Furthermore, through a second motion for reconsideration of a decision, which was not
only final but already the subject of an entry of judgment, he now wishes to overturn a
precedent by belatedly raising an alleged constitutional issue, which was not fully
litigated when he first filed his Petition. Any constitutional issue should be raised at the
earliest opportunity, or in pleadings filed before a competent court which can rule on it. If
the constitutional issue is "not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial,
and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." The issue on
constitutionality was belatedly raised in this case. (Laya vs. CA, January 10, 2018, Leonen,
dissenting op)

45. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions. The constitutional question raised must
be the very lis mota of the case. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 

46. Lis Mota – the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial
review – means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although
properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the
application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the
case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This
requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

47. In the case of PPI vs. Fertiphil, the case was primarily instituted for collection and
damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals that the action was founded on
the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special assessment.
Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis
mota of the case is present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on the
constitutionality of LOI 1465.

48. As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not
resolve the constitutionality of a law (Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy
 of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.

49. Mandatory Notice. The purpose of the mandatory Notice is to enable the Solicitor
General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law
or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the
mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and
not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used
in the true, there is no room for constnlction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.

50. The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court
in Luther v. Borden. Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was
the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US
Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty
in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the
circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other
words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the
legislative and executive (political) branches of the government.

51. In Colgrove v. Green, Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket"
to describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which
they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US
Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in
Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring
statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."

52. While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it
has sought to come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v.
Avelino, this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, the Court
held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

53. Doctrine of Purposeful Hesitation. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are
advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or
the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a
becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its
validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and
with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

54. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
 that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.

55. Doctrine Transcendental Importance. In 1949, the Court introduced a legal concept that
will later underpin most of the cases filed directly before us - the doctrine of
transcendental importance. Although this doctrine was originally used to relax the rules
on locus standi or legal standing, its application would later be loosely extended as an
independent justification for direct recourse to this Court.

We first used the term "transcendental importance" in Araneta v. Dinglasan.

Araneta involved five consolidated petitions before the Court assailing the validity of the
President's orders issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 671, or "An Act Declaring a
State of Total Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing
the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency." Petitioners
rested their case on the theory that Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to
have any force and effect. The main issues for resolution in Araneta were: (1) whether
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force; and relatedly, (2) whether the executive
orders issued pursuant thereto were valid. Specifically, the Court had to resolve the issue
of whether Commonwealth Act No. 671 (and the President's Emergency Powers)
continued to be effective after the opening of the regular session of Congress.

In overruling the objection to the personality or sufficiency of the interest of petitioners in

bringing the actions as taxpayers, this Court declared that "[a]bove all, the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." Thus, and similar
with Angara, direct recourse to the Court in Araneta is justified because the issue to
be resolved there was one of law; there was no dispute as to any underlying
fact. Araneta has since then been followed by a myriad of cases where transcendental
importance was cited as basis for setting aside objections on legal standing.

It was in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority when, for the first time, it appeared that the
transcendental importance doctrine could, apart from its original purpose to overcome
objections to standing, stand as a justification for disregarding the proscription against
direct recourse to the Court. Chavez is an original action for mandamus filed before the
Court against the Public Estates Authority (PEA). There, the petition sought, among
others, to compel the PEA to disclose all facts on the PEA's then on-going renegotiations
to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. On the issue of whether the non-observance of the
hierarchy of courts merits the dismissal of the petition, we ruled that: x x x The principle
of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is
not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The
instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
56. The function of judicial review, as observed by Justice Laurel in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission, reflects the adoption of the American type of
constitutional government "where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department." In the event therefore that the decision rendered may
give rise to doubts and perplexities, there is comfort and assurance in the thought expressed
by the same eminent jurist in another leading case of Villena v. Secretary of
Interior: "Familiarity with the essential background of the type of government established
under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices that go
with the system, should offer the necessary explanation." One of such practices is the
manner in which the dispositive portion of a decision in a suit contesting the validity of a
legislative or executive act is worded. It was noted that Justice Holmes had a penchant for
the double negative. A favorite phrase of his was that the statute "was not unconstitutional."
That is of the essence of judicial review. For one of its basic postulates is the presumption
of validity. The burden of proof is thus on the person assailing the action taken by a
coordinate branch. There is no need therefore of an affirmative finding as to its being
constitutional. It suffices that it has not been shown to be otherwise. It is likewise by virtue
of such presumption that Justice Malcolm correctly asserted: "To doubt is to sustain."
Scholars in the field of constitutional law have even gone further. They maintain that when
the Supreme Court or some members thereof whose votes are crucial deem the question
raised as a political and not judicial resulting in the dismissal of the action, there was, even
then, a manifestation of the power of judicial review at work. The Court, by ruling that it
was without jurisdiction, allowed the political branches to have their way. In that sense, to
use a favorite phrase of Thomas Reed Powell, the Court was silently vocal and not silently
silent. In Javellana, the Court assumed jurisdiction, but only two of the ten members then
were of the view and so voted that the 1973 Constitution is not in force. There is no affront
to logic, it would seem, for us to dismiss the petitions and accordingly rule that "there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."

57. What is the ruling in Javellana v. Executive Secretary? Rightfully, it is ranked by

eminent jurists and academicians abroad as one of the most significant manifestations of the
exercise of the function of judicial review. Apparently, this awesome and delicate power
has implications still not adequately grasped. By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme
Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a coordinate department, challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding. The decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of
rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is controlling.

58. Symbollic Function: The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
(Salonga vs. Cruz Paño)

59. Operative Fact Doctrine. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must
be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no
effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes
no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the
levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the
 Civil Code, which provides: Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.

60. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue

burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional
law itself. (League of Cities vs. Comelec, August 24, 2010).

61. Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive
measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the
passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by
the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in
good faith, may have to be recognized as valid. In the present case, however, there is no
such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03. To justify the application of the doctrine of operative fact as an
exemption, San Roque asserts that "the BIR and the CTA in actual practice did not observe
and did not require refund seekers to comply with the120+30 day periods." This is glaring
error because an administrative practice is neither a law nor an executive issuance.
Moreover, in the present case, there is even no such administrative practice by the BIR as
claimed by San Roque. (CIR vs. San Roque, October 8, 2013)

62. The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further explicated by
this Court in Rieta v. People.

63. Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a “legislative or executive
measure,” meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the
passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by
the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in
good faith, may have to be recognized as valid. In the present case, however, there is no
such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03. (CIR vs. San Roque, October 8, 2013).