TEAM CODE: TC-14

INTRA UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

__________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ ________________

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
__________________________________________________________________________
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. _________ OF 2019

UNDER ARTICLE 32
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

ALL INDIA MUSLIM ASSOCIATION ....PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDICA ....RESPONDENT

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
__________________________________________________________________________

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

LIST OF ABBREVIATION 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS 4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 7-15

PRAYER 16

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. NO. NUMBER

2. & AND

3. BOM BOMBAY HIGH COURT

4. V. VERSUS

5. HON’BLE HONOURABLE

6. ORS. OTHERS

7. ANR. ANOTHER

8. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

9. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

10. ART. ARTICLE

11. UOI UNION OF INDIA

12. KER KERELA HIGH COURT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

2

2.INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

S.NO. CASES PAGE NO.

1. Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali 8,14
2. Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India 9
3. Koolsom Bee Bee v Aga Mahomed Jaffer 10
4. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir 11
5. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay 12
6. Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Acharya 13
Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Ors
7. Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors. 13
8. Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary 14
Education
9. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay 14

Books
1. M.P. Jain- Indian Constitutional Law- 7th Edition.
2. V.N. Shukla- Constitution of India- 12th Edition.
3. Commentary On The Constitution Of India; Vol 1; 9th Edition.
4. Durga Das Basu- Shorter Constitution of India-13th Edition.
5. Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol 10.
6. Mulla- Principles of Mahomedan Law- 22nd Edition.

Websites
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.jstor.com
3. www.scconline.com

Statutes

1. Constitution of India, 1950.

2. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application Act), 1937.
3. Muslim Women (Protection and Rights upon Divorce Act), 1986.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3

3.STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA EXERCISES JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE
OVER THE MATTER UNDER ARTICLE 321 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.

1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

4

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1)Indica is a secular and democratic republic, with the majority of its population comprising of
Hindus and the Muslims, among the minority.

2)The Constitution of Indica professes freedom of religion. Secularim has been reiterated to be
one of the basic features of the Constitution of Indica, in various cases.

3)The practise of Triple Talaq had generated many debates in the legal as well as the political
circles, with demands to declare the practice unconstitutional. A contradictory opinion being
that the practice has constitutional protection as it is a ‘personal law’.

4)Amid all this the Government of Indica, brought ‘The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
on Marriage) Bill, 2019 which was passed in both houses of the parliament and received the
assent of the President and thereby, became a Law.

5)Section 3 of the said Act rendered the practice of Triple Talaq void and Illegal.
Section 4 of the Act laid down the punishment for a Muslim husband pronouncing Triple Talaq.

6)The act has now been challenged in the Supreme Court of Indica over its constitutionality by
the petitioner.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

5

5.STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER TRIPLE TALAQ IS PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

INDICA?

1.1 WHETHER THE EXPRESSION ‘LAW IN FORCE’ USED IN ARTICLE 13(1) INCLUDES
‘PERSONAL LAW’

1.2 WHETHER THE COURTS CAN EXAMINE THE VALIDITY OF PERSONAL LAWS?

2. WHETHER ADHERENCE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW COMES WITHIN RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM AND THEREFORE PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDICA?

2.1 WHETHER ESSENTIAL PRACTICES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS AS PROVIDED
IN ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

2.2 WHETHER THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IS INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH THE

RELIGION OF ISLAM?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

6

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
________________________________________________________________

1. WHETHER TRIPLE TALAQ IS PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.
___________________________________________________________________________
It is most humbly submitted before this honourable court that the practice of Triple Talaq or
Talaq-e-biddat is a part of the Muslim personal law
The principles stated in the Holy Quran were applied to facts in practice by the Prophet.
Consequently, what was said or done or agreed to by Prophet became another immutable
primary source of Muslim Law.
It is the foundational principles which are the basis of Muslim Personal Law and like any other
religion, they are peculiar to Islam and cannot be challenged on the ground of being violative
of Part III of the Constitution of India.
It is further submitted that it is not the role of the Courts to interpret Muslim Personal Law but
rather hold which interpretation is correct. Under Muslim Personal Law the religious heads or
imams are called upon to decipher the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith in particular
conflicts.

2.WHETHER ADHERENCE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW COMES WITHIN

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THEREFORE PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

Adherence to Muslim Personal Law is protected under Art. 25 of The Constitution Of Indica
as the personal law of Islam is inextricably interwoven with the religion of Islam, both are
inseparable entities derived from the divine revelations of Allah and his messenger, therefore
it satisfies the test of essential practice under Art. 25. Furthermore, laws and the scriptures of
Islam cannot be interpreted by the courts and the legislature and the rules of the Mahomedan
Law do not allow that. Moreover, the concerned practice in the present case has been associated
to and is accepted by the Hanafi school of Islam. Its history can be traced back to 1400 years.
Furthermore, laws and the scriptures of Islam cannot be interpreted by the courts and the
legislature and the rules of the Mahomedan Law do not allow that.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

7

7.ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1.THAT TRIPLE TALAQ IS NOT PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 13

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.

It is most humbly submitted before this honourable court that the practice of Triple Talaq or
Talaq-e-biddat is a part of the Muslim personal law. It must be understood that the concept of
Talaq-ul-biddat or irregular Talaq itself is based on the limit of three Talaqs placed on the man.
It is recognised in the Hanafi school of law though considered an “undesirable” form of talaq
or divorce. As per Sunnah, one of the sources of Islamic Law,

“Marriage in its essence is an act of chastity established by the law [per se] not admitting of
dissolution; in order therefore, to remove the tie, it is necessary to adhere strictly to the formula
(sigheh) prescribed for the purpose.”2

The principles stated in the Holy Quran were applied to facts in practice by the Prophet.
Consequently, what was said or done or agreed to by Prophet became another immutable
primary source of Muslim Law.

1.1 THAT THE EXPRESSION ‘LAW IN FORCE’ USED IN ARTICLE 13(1) DOES NOT
INCLUDE ‘PERSONAL LAW’.

It is submitted before the court that “Laws in force” used in article 13(1)3 of the Constitution
of Indica excludes the scope of personal laws. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in State of

2
Sharayya, p. 311 as quoted in Muhammadan Law, Vol. 2, p. 437
3
13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the
territory of India the force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of
India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such
law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

8

Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali4 had observed that the framers of the Constitution wanted to
leave the personal laws outside the ambit of Part III of the Constitution as they were aware that
these personal laws needed to be reformed in many material particulars and they did not wish
that the provisions of the personal laws should be challenged by reason of the fundamental
rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and accordingly they did not intend to include
these personal laws within the definition of the expression “laws in force.” Therefore, personal
laws do not fall within Article 13(1) and consequently cannot be challenged on the ground of
being violative of Part III of the Constitution of India.

The very presence of Art. 445 in the Constitution recognizes the existence of separate personal
laws, and Entry No. 5 in the Concurrent List gives power to the Legislatures to pass laws
affecting personal law. The scheme of the Constitution, therefore, seems to be to leave personal
law unaffected except where specific provision is made with regard to it and leave it to the
Legislatures in future to modify and improve it and ultimately to put on the statute book a
common and uniform Code.

This view has also been confirmed by this Hon’ble Court in Ahmedabad Women Action Group
v. Union of India6. In view of the position that provisions of personal laws cannot be challenged
by the reason of fundamental rights, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court cannot consider the
constitutional validity of the principles of Muslim Personal law relating to Triple Talaq in one
sitting, i.e. Talaq-e-biddat.

Additionally, it is submitted that personal laws do not derive their validity on the ground that
they have been passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority. The foundational
sources of personal law are their respective scriptural texts. The Mohammedan Law is founded
essentially on the Holy Quran and sources based on the Holy Quran and thus it cannot fall
within the purview of the expression “laws in force” as mentioned in Article 13 of the
Constitution of India, and hence its validity cannot be tested on a challenge based on Part III
of the Constitution.

4
Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84
5
44. Uniform civil code for the citizens The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
throughout the territory of India
6
Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9

As averred above, it is these foundational principles which are the basis of Muslim Personal
Law and like any other religion, they are peculiar to Islam and cannot be challenged on the
ground of being violative of Part III of the Constitution of India.

1.2 THAT THE COURT COULD NOT EXAMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE
PERSONAL LAWS

It is humbly submitted that it is not the role of the Courts to interpret Muslim Personal Law but
rather hold which interpretation is correct. Under Muslim Personal Law the religious heads or
imams are called upon to decipher the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith in particular
conflicts. The imams resolve these conflicts not by deciding what is the correct course of action
suo moto but by reading the sources, i.e. the Holy Quran and the Hadis, and deciphering what
is the correct interpretation of the same. The role of the Court, not being a body necessarily
well versed in the intricacies of the faith or vested with the trust and authority of its followers,
is not to interpret the teachings of the Holy Quran and the Hadiths. The role of the Court is to
look at the interpretations offered by scholars and imams and decide which is the correct one
to apply to a given case. Herein, the Court’s role is no different from the application of any
general or secular law. Inherent self imposed restrictions against what is described as judicial
legislation would apply more vigorously to the matter of personal law.

In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir7, A two-Judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled that “Part
III of the Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws of the parties”.

The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, in Narasu Appa Mali’s Case8 has clarified that Article
13 of the Constitution of India does not provide for “personal laws”. It has been clarified that
the words “a custom or usage” in Article 13(3) cannot subsume personal laws. A Custom or
usage is distinct from Personal Law and many a times, exceptions to personal laws. This is
further supported by the fact that Entry 5 in List III expressly mentions the phrase, “personal
law” which implies first, that the omission in Article 13(3)(a) was conscious and secondly, that
the intention of the Framers was to leave it to the legislature to reform personal laws and not
subject them to scrutiny by the judiciary. Further, Section 112 of the Government of India Act,

7
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir 1981 3 SCC 689
8
Supra, note 3.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

10

1915, one of the models that were before the Constituent Assembly in the drafting of the present
Constitution used both the phrases custom and usage and personal law separately. Some of the
member25 of the Constituent Assembly suggested that the personal law should be given
immunity from state regulation on account of sanctity of religion attached to it.9

Moreover, if personal laws were open to scrutiny under Article 13, both Article 17 and Article
25(2) (b) would be rendered redundant. This is because the evils that these Articles aim to curb
would anyway be remediable as a violation of fundamental rights.

Further, as the Court stated in Koolsom Bee bee v Aga Mahomed Jaffer10 “it would be wrong
for the Court on a point of this kind [i.e. in relation to personal law] to attempt to put their own
construction on the Quran in opposition to the express ruling of commentators of such great
antiquity and high authority.

Just as the Court may have access to experts when hearing civil or criminal cases, and
particularly under the Waqf Act 1995 as amended in 2013, they would have access to experts
in Islamic law when dealing with questions of Muslim Personal Law. They need not address
questions by novel reasoning of their own.

It is therefore submitted that since Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon the personal
laws of the parties, this Hon’ble Court cannot examine the question of constitutional validity
of the impugned principles of Muslim Personal law, i.e. Triple Talaq in one sitting.

9
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol VII, at540-541, Mr. Mohammad Ismail Sahib has of the view that a secular
state should not interfere with personal law of the people, which was part of their faith, their culture, and their
way of life. Further, Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad advocated for personal law as a matter of faith, he also argued that
even British who enacted uniform civil and criminal codes, never tried to scrap the personal law
10
Koolsom Bee Bee v Aga Mahomed Jaffer 1896-97 24 IA 196

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

11

2. THAT ADHERENCE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW COMES

WITHIN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THEREFORE PROTECTED
UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.
________________________________________________________________

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that adherence to Muslim Personal law
is protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of Indica as it is inextricably interwoven with
the Islamic faith and henceforth stands the essential practice test.

2.1 ESSENTIAL PRACTICES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS AS PROVIDED IN

ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

It is most humbly submitted that even though the rights conferred in Art. 25 11 are subject to
various limitations, none of these limitations apply to the essential and integral part of a
religion.

It is most humbly submitted that the Holy Quran provides a comprehensive way of life for each
Muslim and it is nothing but the direct word of Allah himself and any modification/dilution in
the text of this Holy Book would amount to erasing the very basis of the entire religion of
Islam, which is not permissible in view of the protection guaranteed by Article 25 of the
Constitution of India. If such casual denunciation of the verses of the Holy book is permitted,
then soon the religion of Islam would cease to exist.

In the case of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay12 the court struck down
the Bombay Prevention and Excommunication Act, 1949 which constituted for prevention of
excommunication. It was observed that the said enactment infringed the right of the Dawoodi
Bohra community guaranteed under 25(1) of the Indian Constitution.

11
Article 25 in The Constitution Of India 1950
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated
with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus
12
MANU/SC/0072/1962MANU/SC/0072/1962

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

12

It was also observed by the court that, “A community has a right to insist that those who claim
to be within its fold are those who believe in the essentials of its creed and that one who asserts
that he is a member of the denomination does not, at least, openly denounce the essentials of
the creed, for if everyone were at liberty to deny these essentials, the community as a group
would soon cease to exist.”
It was also observed that “laws providing for social welfare and reform were not intended to
enable the legislature to "reform" a religion out of existence or identity.”

It is most humbly submitted the Hanafi school recognizes Talaq-e-biddat and it has been a
practice of the Hanafi school for over 1400 years.13
Also, the Hadiths are the primary source of the Hanafi school and the practice of Talaq-e-
Biddat has been recognized in various Hadiths as has already been submitted to the Court.
In light of this case it is pertinent to note that the Hanafi school followed by majority of
Muslims of the Indican community have the right to follow their personal law and determine
what constitutes as a core practice to their religion as guaranteed to them under Article 25 of
The Constitution Of Indica.

Furthermore, the rules of interpretation of Mahomedan Law do not allow interpretations of the
Quran in opposition to its express rulings of Mahomedan commentary of great antiquity and
high authority.
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Personal Laws of Islam are not
subject to the limitations as provided under Article 25(2)14 of the Constitution of Indica as they
are interwoven with the religion of Islam as stated above and come under the essential practices
of a religion.

In Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Ors15. the
court observed, that “The protection guaranteed Under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

13
Munir, Muhammad. "Triple "Ṭalāq" in One Session: An Analysis of the Opinions of Classical, Medieval, and
Modern Muslim Jurists under Islamic Law." Arab Law Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2013): 29-49.
14
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any
law
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated
with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus
15
MANU/SC/0218/2004

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

13

is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but extends to acts done in pursuance of religion
and, therefore, contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship
which are essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or essential part of
religion has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical
background etc. of the given religion. Essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon
which a religion is founded. Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to
follow a religious belief. It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices the
superstructure of religion is built. Without which, a religion will be no religion. Test to
determine whether a part or practice is essential to the religion is-to find out whether the nature
of religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that part or
practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief,
then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. There cannot be additions or
subtractions to such part. Because it is the very essence of that religion and alterations will
change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential parts is what is protected by
the Constitution.”
In Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors.16, this Court dealt with customs
based on religious faith which dealt with families of priests of a temple called the Maa
Kamakhya Temple. After discussing some of the judgments of this Court, a Division Bench of
this Court held: “It is well established that social reforms or the need for Regulations
contemplated by Article 25(2) cannot obliterate essential religious practices or their
performances and what would constitute the essential part of a religion can be ascertained with
reference to the doctrine of that religion itself.”

In the case of Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education17(the Kerala High
Court held that the CBSE dress code proscribing hijabs was unconstitutional as wearing of
hijab by Muslim women is an ‘essential part’ of their religion.

2.2 THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IS INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH THE RELIGION
OF ISLAM AND HENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESSENTIAL PRACTICE DOCTRINE.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that adherence to Muslim Personal Law
is a cultural issue which is inextricably interwoven with religion of Islam. Thus, it is the issue

16
MANU/SC/0722/2015
17
MANU/KE/0470/2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

14

of freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion guaranteed
under Article 25 of the Constitution of Indica.
18
It has been observed in the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay that
“Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much part
of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines.”
The Second Law Commission of India reported in 1855 "as a British legislature cannot make
Mohammedan or Hindu religion so neither can it make Mohammedan or Hindu law.19

It is further submitted before the Court that there are four sources of the Mahomedan law,
namely, (1) the Koran; (2) Hadis, that is, precepts actions and sayings of the Prophet Mahomed,
not written down during his lifetime, but preserved by tradition and handed down by authorized
persons; (3) Ijmaa, that is, a concurrence of opinion of the companions of Mahomed and his
disciples; and (4) Qiyas, being analogical deductions derived from a comparision of the first
three sources when they did not apply to the particular case.20
"In Islam", says James Bryce, "Law is Religion and Religion is Law, because both have the
same source and equal authority, being both contained in the same divine revelation.”21
This further confirms the fact that the religion of Islam is clearly and explicitly intertwined
with the Muslim Personal Law, as the sources of these are the actions, teachings and sayings
of the Messenger of Allah himself.

It is further submitted that, the Holy Quran mandates every follower of Islam to obey Allah
and the Messenger [i.e. the Apostle of Allah (PBUH)]. (Surah-Al-Nisa 4:59, Surah-Al-Anfal
8:20). Further, the Holy Quran also clarifies that when Allah and his Messenger have decided
a matter, the believers cannot defer from the said decision, in fact if the believer ignores the
said decision and follows a course of his own choice, he is said to have strayed away in manifest
error. (Surah-Al-Ahzab 33:36).

It has also been stated in the Holy Quran that the believer is bound to accept the command of
the Messenger and is bound to avoid whatever the Messenger forbids. (Surah-Al-Hashr 59:7).

18
MANU/MH/0122/1953
19
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84 at 9
20
Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla Principles of Mahomedan Law, 30 (22 ed. 2017).
21
James Bryce, 2 Studies in History and Jurisprudence 237 (1901) ; cf. Said Ramadan, Islamic Law : Its Scope
and Equity 15-16, 27-30, 42-47 (1961 )

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

15

Any deviation from such a Quranic injunction would be going against the ipsissima verba of
Almighty himself and such an act would be going against the very integral practice of Islam
and would be disregarding the precise directions of Allah and also his messenger, Prophet
(PBUH), which is nothing but a sin and as per the Holy Quran (Surah-Al-Ahzab 33:36), such
an action would show that the believer has strayed away from the religion in manifest error.
Thus, it is an integral part of the religion of Islam that all Muslims must abide by the decision
of Allah and his Messenger, and when the Messenger has directed the followers to do a certain
thing they are duty bound to do it.

Therefore if the Legislature were to cause interference in the practice of adherence of personal
Laws of the Muslims they would be abridging their rights guaranteed under Article 25 of
Constitution of Indica.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

16

8.PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, the cases cited, issues raised, arguments advanced
and authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, that it may be graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:

• That Triple talaq does not come within the ambit of Article 13 of the
Constitution.
• Adherence of personal laws is protected under Article 25 of The Constitution.
• That the Muslim Women(protection and Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 is
unconstitutional.
• To award all costs of the petition to the petitioner.

And pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the favor of petitioner to meet the ends
of equity, justice and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly submitted.

Counsel on behalf of the petitioner

Dated:22nd August,2019.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER