Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124

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Journal of Eurasian Studies

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / e u r a s

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its role and place in

the development of Eurasia
Rashid Alimov
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Beijing, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: This article analyses the role and place of the SCO in the development of interstate inter-
Received 18 April 2018 action in the Eurasian space, as well as the condition of and prospects for the main areas
Accepted 18 July 2018
of multifaceted cooperation within the Organisation. The author further analyses the char-
Available online 7 August 2018
acteristics of the SCO partnership system as a model of interstate interaction that can provide
an institutional platform for broad regional economic cooperation within the context of
Keywords:
the new realities of Eurasian development, the implementation of member states’ nation-
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
al development strategies, the linking of efforts to align integration processes within the
Eurasian Economic Union
One Belt One Road initiative EAEU, and the implementation of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative with the potential
ASEAN to form an overarching partnership between countries of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.
Silk Road Economic Belt Copyright © 2018, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
Greater Eurasian Partnership hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

The modern system of international relations remains
in a state of imbalance as it passes through a stage of pro-
found transformation and painful evolutionary development.
Globalisation has emerged in recent decades as the main
trend in international relations and continues to deepen the
intertwining of relations between countries and regions of
the world. The rapid development of modern technolo-
gies in areas of transport, communications, and information
delivery and transmission is contributing to the creation of
a cohesive global community of states united by, among
other things, common development challenges.
Along with the obvious benefits these processes bring,
their negative features are also becoming more pronounced.
Hotbeds of tension are no longer only local in nature, but
carry influence far beyond their particular region. The deep-
ening of trade and economic ties and the interdependence
of capital markets exert reciprocal influence on the dynam-
ics of economic processes in various regions of the world.
Corresponding author. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat, 7
Ritan Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China.
E-mail address: rashid.alimov@outlook.com.
Given the systemic nature of interdependence, shifts in de-
velopment modalities in one part of the world inevitably
cause repercussions in the others.
Regionalisation, the steady process of building qualita-
tively new forms of interaction between the states
comprising the world’s macro-regions, has emerged as
another fundamental trend in the development of global
order. Ever more countries are striving to form a system of
stable ties with their neighbours, thereby enhancing their
own potential while also facilitating the solution of press-
ing regional problems. Such regionalisation has taken
increasingly diverse forms, including classic examples of re-
gional integration that include the establishment of
supranational regulatory systems, more flexible models of
cooperation in a range of areas that proceed at different
speeds and at different levels, and new mixed type models
of partnership. The goals and objectives of such partner-
ships are determined primarily by the need to address
pressing regional problems and by participants’ common
desire for dialogue and a search for approaches to achiev-
ing mutually beneficial, sustainable development of the
entire region (Leonova, 2013; Lukin, 2016).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2018.08.001
1879-3665/ Copyright © 2018, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
In the Greater Eurasian macro-region, the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation is one of the most outstanding
examples of this new hybrid or mixed model of interstate
regional partnership. Established in 2001 to meet the ob-
jective of ensuring regional security and stability, the SCO
has since continued along its own evolutionary path, grad-
ually developing multifaceted multilateral cooperation. The
dynamics of the SCO’s development are driven primarily by
vital necessity, and by multilateral agreements and the
shared national interests of SCO member states. The SCO
does not aspire to attain some specific target level of in-
teraction, but rather moves systematically along a path of
finding a common denominator in solving pressing region-
al problems. One thing is obvious – the SCO holds enormous
potential in each of a number of unique parameters, and
the ongoing search for new opportunities determines the
direction of its further development. Still, the SCO is rela-
tively young and, as the history of other international
associations suggests, it exhibits the characteristic signs and
problems of any young and growing organisation.
The expert community often expresses scepticism re-
garding the level of cooperation among SCO member states,
most frequently claiming that the Organisation is nothing
but a type of club for its various heads of state or a con-
ference hosting their annual meetings that does not pursue
any specific objectives (Aris, 2018). Experts also deprecate
the SCO’s model of decision-making through consensus,
claiming that it is sluggish and ineffectual. Some sceptics
believe that the countries comprising the SCO are too dif-
ferent, that their political systems, economies, belief systems,
and civilisational approaches are too diverse (Imanaliev,
2017). This, they argue, greatly complicates dialogue, the
search for common ground, and the ability to achieve mu-
tually beneficial solutions to problems based on a shared
vision – and that the level of internal disagreement is only
increasing and leading to an accumulation of unresolved
issues.
Nevertheless, while continuing to address shared polit-
ical and security objectives, searching for optimal
mechanisms for expanding economic ties, and deepening
cultural and humanitarian contacts, the SCO continues to
develop gradually – primarily as a partner-type organisation
based on member states’ similar approaches to the devel-
opment of such a partnership. Overall, the experience of
the SCO is arguably the first in history of building an
equal partnership among states of different sizes and with
varying degrees of influence, different economic and po-
litical potentials, and diverse cultural and civilisational
features.
1. Existential bases of the SCO model of cooperation
According to the classic ideas of political realists in the
theory of international relations, international politics are
a struggle for power between states based on compelling
national interests (Snyder, 2004, p. 55). This theory often
proves true in political practice, particularly as the most
powerful countries have increasingly come to dominate
transnational regional entities and groups. Although deci-
sions engineered by the dominant state often run counter
to the national interests of other member states, they are
115
positioned before the public as collective decisions. More
powerful states therefore employ mechanisms for compen-
sating the weaker states as a way to maintain the internal
balance and, essentially, the long-term stability of the
organisation.
In this context, and despite criticisms from the ranks of
the expert community, it is difficult not to agree that the
SCO model of cooperation is an extremely important
achievement in the practice of international relations. A fun-
damentally important feature of the SCO is that it is one of
the few multipurpose international organisations built from
the outset as a multilateral partnership. This universal part-
nership model is enshrined in the SCO Charter as one of the
international association’s fundamental features.
It is important to emphasize that partnership within
the SCO differs from a traditional alliance. Military-political
alliances involve a very high degree of political interde-
pendence as well as some separateness because such
alliances usually imply a readiness to mobilise in opposi-
tion to someone else.
The SCO is not a classic example of economic integra-
tion in which maximum unification is achieved by delegating
a significant part of sovereign prerogatives to suprana-
tional bureaucratic institutions (Alimov, 2017).
Transparency and the lack of an identified opponent are
inseparable features of the SCO partnership model. The SCO’s
consensus model of decision-making emphasises the ab-
solute equality of all participants regardless of their potential
or opportunities. Only when the views, opinions, and ap-
proaches of the member states crystallise and become
unified does the SCO reach a decision. Thus, it is fair to con-
sider the SCO an example of a consensus-based partnership
organisation.
Thanks to these features of interactions within the SCO,
the Organisation provides an example not only of how states
of different sizes, levels of influence, organisational para-
digms, and cultural and national traditions can coexist, but
also of how they create favourable conditions for combin-
ing considerations of both objectives and values, of the
productive establishment and development of a dialogue
between civilizations, and of establishing a culture of com-
munication aimed at reaching a joint and mutually beneficial
result (Alimov, 2017).
Given the multilateral nature of equal participation in
decision-making, the search for mutually beneficial solu-
tions will always be difficult and will require time and effort
at the negotiating table. The resilience of the SCO model
depends on the ability of member states to identify points
or zones of converging interests. Of course, this takes time,
and often, the inability to reach a decision acceptable to all
is an indication that conditions are not yet ripe.
Despite this, there can be no doubt that Eurasia now has
a system for regional interaction based on the principles and
approaches formulated and enshrined in the joint docu-
ments of the SCO.
One of the most important results of the SCO summit
in Astana in June 2017 was the accession of India and Pa-
kistan as full-fledged SCO members. Both countries became
unconditional signatories to all SCO documents and
committed to making a constructive contribution to
strengthening and developing cooperation within the
116 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
framework of the Organisation. By bringing together four
nuclear powers (India, China, Russia, and Pakistan) – half
of the world’s nuclear club – the SCO format has become
an additional supporting element of the system for main-
taining global strategic stability.
With eight member states, the SCO has become a cor-
nerstone of the Eurasian continent. The Organisation is a
powerful transcontinental structure stretching from the
Arctic in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south, and
from Lianyungang, China in the east to Kaliningrad, and
Russia in the West.
2. Security and economics
The SCO was originally conceived as a multifaceted struc-
ture with three levels of cooperation serving as its primary
pillars. These include cooperation (1) in politics and secu-
rity, (2) in trade and economic activity, and (3) in the
development of cultural and humanitarian ties. The SCO sets
as its ultimate goal the development and prosperity of the
peoples living on its territory.
In light of growing security threats – especially
international terrorism, increasingly active extremist
organisations, a rising number of transnational criminal
structures, and an increase in drug production and traffick-
ing – the SCO has made cooperation on regional security a
top priority.
The high level of cooperation on security within the SCO
and the stable overall situation in the Organisation’s region
of responsibility make it possible to concentrate on the sec-
ondary task of developing trade and economic cooperation.
Admittedly, this remains more an area for possible future
efforts than one of practical reality at present. At the same
time, circumstances dictate a growing need to focus on this
line of joint endeavour within the SCO framework. For a
number of reasons, it is much more difficult and time-
consuming to harmonise the economic interests of the SCO
member states than it is their political and security inter-
ests. However, the search continues for the optimal forms,
methods, and mechanisms of interaction, including on eco-
nomic matters, and the economic agenda increasingly
includes the question of launching integration processes
within the SCO framework.
The latest SCO Summit was held on 9–10 July 2018 in
Qingdao, China, opening a new page in the Organisation’s
development. The event underscored the SCO’s growing role
and importance in global affairs.
At the same time, with the world undergoing major
reconfigurations and the global economy subject to growing
instability and uncertainty, expectations are high that the
SCO will take a more active role and produce tangible results.
In this regard, critics often point to the lack of economic co-
operation within the Organisation.
Indeed, the SCO member states collectively possess an
enormous market, a significant portion of the world’s
mineral resources, and a powerful industrial base that are
key to successfully implementing joint trade and econom-
ic projects. The relevant international documents that the
Organisation has adopted play no small part in the close and
stable economic ties it has formed since its founding.
The SCO legal framework includes 122 documents
related to the economy. These facilitate interaction
between the parties on trade, banking, financial and in-
vestment activities, manufacturing, agriculture, transport,
telecommunications, customs, and the development of
tourism. These documents, however, represent only 7% of
the overall SCO contractual and legal framework. The
Organisation must make substantial efforts to ensure that
the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion of the SCO Member States adopted in 2003 and the List
of Measures for further development of project activities
within the SCO in 2017–2021 will, in practice, help member
states to carry out measures supporting and developing their
national economies, and to reduce the risk of the spread of
global crises and their negative impact on socio-economic
well-being.
The SCO member states have also signed a number of
international agreements and approved program docu-
ments on banking and financial activities and the
development of business, agriculture, and tourism. The
Organisation is also considering the creation of an SCO De-
velopment Bank and a Special Account that would provide
financial support for project activities.
With the accession to the SCO of India and Pakistan –
two authoritative Asian states – the Organisation has become
the world’s largest trans-regional association in terms of the
total area, population, and economic potential of its member
states. Gloomy forecasts on the eve of the expansion pre-
dicted that the work of the SCO would become excessively
complex. Now, exactly one year later, it is gratifying to see
that the expansion of the SCO through the accession of India
and Pakistan has not only consolidated the practical achieve-
ments of the Organisation, but also ensured the steady
growth of its authority and influence in both the region and
the world. The arrival of the new and powerful states opens
the door wide to new opportunities for the SCO. And,
given the continuing fragility of international relations, these
opportunities provide additional support for the further de-
velopment of the inexhaustible potential of the “Shanghai
Eight” in all areas of its activities, including in the interna-
tional arena.
At the same time, given the scale of cooperation within
the SCO, the new partners must work very hard to inte-
grate fully into the Organisation. The SCO has approximately
30 different mechanisms that have evolved over the years
and the founding states have painstakingly structured their
work as they have reached each relevant agreement. The
SCO makes all of its decisions through consensus. Adapt-
ing to these previously established formats and working
methods of interaction is not an easy task, one that often
requires more than the usual effort and time. This applies
both to coordinating a common position on the
Organisation’s international agenda, and to supporting the
national projects of its member states.
This past year of joint work as the “Big Eurasian Eight”
has shown that the Organisation is capable of evolving in
response to the requirements of the time, to new develop-
ments, changing realities, and objective needs. The SCO has
clearly been expanding the economic aspect of its work in
recent years. The summit in Qingdao confirmed this trend.
The Organisation is actively developing cooperation on trade
 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
and investment, transport, infrastructure, agriculture, and
customs services.
In addition, the SCO is home to cutting-edge manufac-
turing clusters, including high-tech and science-intensive
centres, and its member states possess the full spectrum
of mineral wealth, making it possible to organise any type
of production cycle – from the extraction of raw materials
to their processing with a high degree of added value. The
Concept of cooperation of the SCO member states in the field
of environmental protection, approved by the Council of
Heads of State, is an important step in the development of
cooperation in the field of environmental management.
The economies of the SCO member states influence one
another due to their geographic proximity, and their re-
gional economic agreements and joint programs within the
Organisation’s framework are the foundation of their pro-
gressive joint development.
In concrete economic terms, the SCO as a whole ac-
counts for almost one-fourth of global GDP, and average GDP
within the SCO rose by 4.84% in 2016, or almost twice the
global average. The SCO member states are steadily increas-
ing their gold and foreign exchange reserves that now
amount to almost 4 trillion USD. This provides a sound eco-
nomic foundation by guaranteeing the fulfilment of foreign
debt obligations and providing support for national cur-
rencies. As much as 11% of all direct foreign investment in
the world in 2016 took place in the “Shanghai Eight,” con-
tributing to the creation of almost 600,000 new enterprises
(excluding China, for which statistics were unavailable).
These indicators appear rather modest, however, when con-
sidering that almost one-half of the world’s population lives
on the territory of the SCO. The SCO is also actively devel-
oping the tourism industry.
Time will show the extent to which results will meet ex-
pectations. The SCO is clearly a young organisation searching
for its development path in a world brimming with chal-
lenges and threats. Yet, it has managed to make a worthy
place for itself on the world’s political map in what, by his-
torical standards, is a short period. The SCO Summit in
Qingdao has opened a new era in the development of the
Organisation. The member states must preserve and
strengthen their mutual trust and unity to continue to play
a key role in international relations – no matter what
changes they might undergo in the years ahead.
3. SCO and the idea of Greater Eurasia
Because the SCO member states comprise the core of the
Eurasian continent, their mutual relations and interac-
tions will define the nature of the further development of
this vast territory for years to come. Given the format of
communication established within the SCO, its joint expe-
rience, and existing agreements, the Organisation is the
largest (in both territory and population) and therefore a
key Eurasian platform for international cooperation. The SCO
lies at the centre of large-scale economic initiatives that
experts believe will be crucial to determining the path of
Eurasia’s future development. In this context, the academ-
ic community increasingly uses the term “Eurasian design”
to mean the building of a new system of regional interac-
tion based primarily on the goals, principles, and conceptual
117
guidelines of the integration process within the frame-
work of the Eurasian Economic Union, the implementation
of the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative, and the cre-
ation of a Greater Eurasian Partnership involving the ASEAN
countries.
The idea of linking or coupling efforts to implement these
large-scale undertakings is widely discussed. The main dif-
ficulty is that they are very different conceptually, and this
greatly complicates efforts by the expert community to find
optimal mechanisms for adapting and merging them. In ad-
dition, specialized research institutes would have to calculate
and project the impact that specific steps to deepen re-
gional economic interaction and integration would have on
all involved.
Given the multilateral nature of cooperation in imple-
menting these initiatives, the most important elements are
political coordination, the harmonising of national inter-
ests based on multilateral discussions on a whole range of
areas aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions, and
determining the strategy and concrete steps of joint
activities.
The academic community has held a wide-ranging dis-
cussion since 2013 concerning prospects for building a
new Eurasia. Active discussion of the proposed initiatives
includes the question of ways to link and couple them.
Various aspects of Eurasian cooperation are analysed, taking
into account direct and indirect disagreements between
countries of the region, the geopolitical plans of the re-
gion’s major players, and challenges to development. Many
articles by experts examine how the divergent political
and economic interests of SCO member states create chal-
lenges to developing cooperation within the Organisation.
Experts have identified the following main challenges that
the SCO will face in building new forms of economic
cooperation.
The first challenge is the competition between Russia and
China in Central Asia and their competing initiatives within
the EAEU for promoting strategic national interests on the
one hand and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative on
the other. Because the implementation of the OBOR strat-
egy and the EAEU integration process are essentially
designed to strengthen the regional influence of Beijing and
Moscow respectively, some argue that the two countries’
economic interests are at odds with each other and that any
linking or coupling of the two projects is therefore impos-
sible (Daily FT, 2017; Marantidou & Cossa, 2014).
The second challenge is the possible loss of efficiency
resulting from the expansion of the SCO, as developing
common approaches to regional economic objectives would
become significantly more complicated. The addition of
new members could deepen differences and disagree-
ments on regional issues of security and economic
cooperation, including the forms or methods of providing
support.
Third, bringing India and Pakistan, along with the deep
tensions between them, into the SCO could significantly
hamper its functioning.
Fourth, the competition between India and China could
have a negative impact on interactions within the SCO and
lead to the blocking of initiatives and the halting of nego-
tiation on agreements.
118 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
Fifth, it is necessary to consider the interests of the
smaller SCO countries in order to maintain a balance within
the Organisation.
Sixth, the Afghan factor continues to exert a destabiliz-
ing influence on the region, preventing the creation of stable
conditions for economic development (Kulintsev, 2016).
In this regard, the debate continues on the role and place
of the SCO in the design of a Greater Eurasia. Key ques-
tions include the following: (1) Considering the challenges
listed above, is it possible in practice to incorporate into the
SCO agenda concrete work on promoting integration within
the framework of the EAEU and combine it with measures
for implementing the OBOR initiative? And (2) Can current
SCO structures really be used for these purposes? In this
context, it seems advisable to identify areas of true common
interest or opportunities for linking SCO member states’
efforts at developing regional economic cooperation.
4. The SCO and prospects for forming a Greater
Eurasian Partnership
Given the steady transformation of its economic land-
scape, the Eurasian continent is becoming the flagship of
processes by which sub-regional integration efforts combine
to form a regional “integration of integrations” – in this case,
focused primarily on the interests of the countries of Greater
Eurasia themselves. These processes are now becoming in-
tertwined: often, they either run in parallel or else individual
elements coincide. However, forming a single, harmoni-
ous, and interconnected system remains a goal for the future.
The first priority is achieving broad-based political agree-
ment, which requires participants in these processes to
exercise political will.
At the same time, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
and the system of economic cooperation within the frame-
work of the One Belt, One Road concept continue to develop,
ASEAN countries are putting forward proposals in South-
east Asia, and India is promoting its own program for
cooperation in South Asia.
The principal development challenge is achieving not
competition, but synergy between the various Eurasian proj-
ects, as this best serves the interests of all the powers on
the continent. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s propos-
al for a Greater Eurasian Partnership calls for developing
cooperation within the framework of flexible integration
structures (TASS Russian News Agency, 2016). At the same
time, such cooperation can be built effectively within the
framework of flexible and open integration structures that
encourage competition in scientific pursuits and a variety
of technical approaches, and that allows participating coun-
tries to fully realise their competencies and potential (TASS
Russian News Agency, 2016).
Eurasian partnership is envisioned as not merely estab-
lishing new ties between states and economies. It calls for
changing the political and economic landscape of the con-
tinent and bring peace, stability, prosperity, and a
fundamentally new quality of life to Eurasia (Putin, 2017).
Thus, the Greater Eurasian Partnership calls primarily for
building a macro-regional system of stable political and eco-
nomic cooperation, and for cultural and civilisational
interaction based on the deepening of ties between differ-
ent parts of the Eurasian continent. At the same time, it
apparently does not insist on the signing of some sort of
single collective agreement. Rather, at the initial stage, the
partnership should be based on building a system of co-
operation between states and partner regional organisations
and associations, a search for areas of shared interests, and
the development of substantive areas of mutually benefi-
cial joint undertakings.
The presidents of the EAEU member countries decided
to support the proposal to hold talks with China on part-
nership and cooperation. That could eventually serve as the
basis for forming a new, large-scale trade and economic part-
nership with the participation of the EAEU, China, the SCO
countries, and ASEAN. At the same time, the project to link
the EAEU and the SREB could become a unifying factor of
trade and economic integration throughout the Eurasian
continent, including South and Southeast Asia.
At present, the process of linking the integration pro-
cesses within the framework of the EAEU and SREB is the
most important and substantive component of the process
of forming a Greater Eurasian Partnership – a process that
has, essentially, already begun. The first step is the conclu-
sion of a comprehensive agreement on trade and economic
cooperation between the EAEU and China. In October 2017
the EEC Trade Minister Veronika Nikishina and China’s Min-
ister of Commerce Zhong Shan announced in Beijing that
the text of the agreement was ready for signing (Eurasian
Economic Commission, 2017).
In this context, it seems worthwhile to begin consulta-
tions between the EAEU, SCO, and ASEAN on forming new
approaches to the network of cooperation between region-
al organisations that would take the interests of all of the
region’s states into account on an equal basis and make it
possible to avoid counterproductive competition between
different integration initiatives in Eurasia.
In addition, it is of fundamental importance that the con-
ceptual paradigm of the Greater Eurasian Partnership be
further developed and improved. Obviously, it should be
based on cooperation on politics and security, and on eco-
nomic and humanitarian aspects. Both ASEAN and the SCO
have established political coordination, the documents of
the two organisations invariably reflect consolidated posi-
tions on important regional and global themes, and the
approaches and vision for solving political problems are
spelled out. At the same time, both ASEAN and the SCO
employ a consensus model of decision-making, creating a
certain ideological similarity in the functioning of both
organisations and suggesting a favourable outlook for the
development of a political dialogue.
The problem of security, although more complex, remains
open for discussion. Maintaining regional stability is made
more complex by the smouldering conflicts in Eurasia and
the Asia-Pacific region. The situation demands, if not the
resolution of long-standing conflicts, then at least a con-
tinuation of the status quo. This primarily concerns problem
zones and disputed territories, the presence of which
impedes the full-scale implementation of the region’s
economic potential, the emergence of new agreements
for joint development, and the general promotion of
megaprojects. Such zones could become areas of joint de-
velopment, not only by the two countries immediately
 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
involved, but by all the states in the vast region that show
an interest.
It is also important to coordinate efforts in the fight
against the terrorist threat. The countries of the SCO and
ASEAN have an interest in solving this vital challenge because
they experience the grave consequences of terrorist activ-
ity first-hand. This area, with the involvement of the CSTO,
could become one of the pillars of the Greater Eurasian Part-
nership and contribute to the formation of a broad
international anti-terrorism coalition.
Joining efforts to create a transit corridor linking South
and Southeast Asia with Central Asia – with branches to EU
and Middle Eastern borders – is the economic undertak-
ing holding the most promise for reaching agreement. All
states have an interest in this, and concrete work along these
lines has already begun within the framework of the SCO
and in the context of the implementation of the One Belt,
One Road initiative. The SCO Agreement on the Creation of
Favourable Conditions for International Road Transport is
open to third countries and a number of them have already
expressed interest.
Increased cooperation on the basis of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding between the SCO and ASEAN
Secretariats will also contribute to rapprochement between
the two organisations. That document gives priority to,
among other things, interaction in the areas of counterter-
rorism, drugs and narcotics control, arms smuggling, money
laundering, and trafficking in persons (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, 2005). It also provides for coop-
eration in the areas of economics and finance, tourism,
environment and natural resources management, social de-
velopment, and energy.
5. The compatibility of SCO member states’ initiatives
and development strategies
Economic integration in the EAEU is aimed at compre-
hensive modernisation and cooperation, and at increasing
the competitiveness of national economies and creating con-
ditions for stable development with the goal of improving
living standards for the populations of member states.
However, the EAEU is foremost an international organisation
of regional economic integration that has international legal
standing and is established by the Treaty on the Eurasian
Economic Union. The EAEU ensures freedom for the move-
ment of goods, services, capital, and labour, and pursues a
coordinated or unified policy in individual economic sectors.
It is important to note that the EAEU member states are
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian
Federation (Eurasian Economic Union), and that all EAEU
countries are part of the so-called “SCO family,” enabling
them to use SCO mechanisms in the common interest. This
obviously makes it necessary to start discussion within the
SCO on the subject of launching integration processes in one
form or another, as it is the determining factor in the work
of the EAEU. The dialogue could be based on the provision
of the SCO Charter stating the intention of member states
to create favourable conditions for the gradual realisation
of the free movement of goods, capital, services, and tech-
nologies. This intention was reaffirmed in the Declaration
of the SCO Heads of State in Astana on 9 June 2017.
119
The Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative to create a
global transport and investment infrastructure actually com-
bines two projects – the Silk Road Economic Belt and the
21st-century Maritime Silk Road.
The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) is a project to create
a single Eurasian economic and trade space and a trans-
continental transport corridor. The SREB sets out to achieve
five main tasks: strengthening regional economic integra-
tion, building a single trans-Asian transport infrastructure,
eliminating investment and trade barriers, increasing the
role of national currencies, and deepening cooperation in
the humanitarian sphere. According to Chinese represen-
tatives, 67 states representing 63% of the world’s population
could participate in the SREB over the planned 30 years of
its implementation (TASS Russian News Agency, 2017a).
The implementation of the SREB program actually speci-
fies three levels of work in the area of regional security, the
development of trade and economic relations, and the deep-
ening of cultural and humanitarian ties between the project’s
participants. Thus, the levels at which the SREB will be
implemented clearly coincide with the three levels of mul-
tifaceted cooperation within the framework of the SCO.
The response to criticism from experts regarding the ap-
parent rivalry between the EAEU and the OBOR was signing
in May 2014 of an agreement between the Russian and
Chinese heads of states formally linking the EAEU and OBOR.
That agreement also designates the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation as the platform for all discussions of that
linkage.
In an interview with TASS, Chinese President Xi Jinping
reiterated that Russia and China are not competitors in
forming a new system of regional economic relations. In par-
ticular, he noted:
“The two countries are cooperating intensively on linking
One Belt, One Road and the EAEU, negotiations are un-
derway to conclude an agreement on trade and economic
cooperation between China and the EAEU, and a list is
being drawn up of joint projects that will open up broad
horizons for developing bilateral trade and economic co-
operation, greatly facilitate mutual trade and investment,
present unique opportunities for the two countries’ busi-
ness communities to interact to achieve an efficient
movement of production, technology, capital, and
markets, and bring the benefits of economic globaliza-
tion and regional integration to all the countries of
Eurasia” (TASS Russian News Agency, 2017b).
The Chinese leadership has also reached an agreement
on linking the EAEU with the infrastructure projects of other
countries. In particular, these include the Mongolian Steppe
Road project for modernizing the trans-Mongolian section
of the Chinese-Russian railway, the South Korean Eur-
asian Initiative for unifying the railways of North and South
Korea and connecting them to the Trans-Siberian Railway,
and the Kazakh Bright Path program (TASS Russian News
Agency, 2017a).
6. Transport routes of the One Belt, One Road concept
The Roadmap for implementing OBOR emphasises that
“political coordination” provides an “important guarantee”
120 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
of the project’s ultimate prospects. Second, along with the
task of joining with the countries of the region to build a
Eurasian Land Bridge, the Roadmap sets the “priority” and
“vital” goal of ensuring not just transportation lines, but also
a systemic “interconnected infrastructure” and calls for par-
ticipants to coordinate “their plans for building infrastructure
facilities and technical systems standards.” It also intro-
duces the concept of “network communications” for
integrating not only railways, highways, and waterways –
including the associated road and port infrastructure – but
also the pipeline network for the transportation of energy
resources, as well as the cross-border network of fibre-
optic lines.
Trade and investment are the foundation of the whole
project. In particular, participants declare their intention to
liberalise trade regimes across the board. To this end, plans
are in place to hold discussions with the countries of the
One Belt, One Road project on the creation of free trade
zones and the joint promotion of such measures as the elim-
ination or reduction of tariff restrictions, and the unification
of customs and other regulatory trade procedures. The same
applies to investment, which the Roadmap’s authors are pro-
posing to make the “engine of trade,” extending industrial
and agricultural production as widely as possible.
The Roadmap calls for moving beyond cooperation in
finance and monetary policy to full-format “financial inte-
gration.” The goal is to create a system of “currency and
investment stability,” provide access to “credit informa-
tion,” and expand currency swaps.
Humanitarian cooperation will expand in the fields of
education, culture and art, tourism, healthcare, youth policy,
science and technology, as well as in interaction through
party and parliamentary structures and nongovernmental
organisations (Uyanayev, 2015).
Thus, the Roadmap for the joint construction of the One
Belt, One Road project implies the coordination of politi-
cal efforts, the development of cooperation on infrastructure,
free trade, and commercial integration, and the deepen-
ing of ties between people. In terms of possibilities for
practical implementation, the SCO platform possesses
optimal mechanisms for launching a broad negotiation
process, and the fact that a number of countries partici-
pate in both the SCO and EAEU makes prospects for such
a dialogue more favourable. First, the SCO has well-
established mechanisms of political coordination that can
ensure negotiations are held at the senior and uppermost
levels. Second, the Organisation has its own mechanisms
and institutions for ensuring regional security. China is in-
corporated into those structures, as are India and Pakistan
due to the expansion of the SCO. Third, the status of ob-
server country and that of SCO dialogue partner make it
possible for those states to participate in developing joint
measures in the fields of trade, finance, investment, customs,
banking, and transport.
According to some experts, the convergence of efforts for
building a new paradigm of economic cooperation in Eurasia
could substantially facilitate the implementation of India’s
International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)
(Hillman, 2017). Far from conflicting with other projects,
the INSTC dovetails nicely with China’s OBOR megaproject
and Russia’s integration project in the region, and also con-
tributes to economic cooperation between the countries of
the “SCO family” which at the moment apart from member
states also four observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran,
and Mongolia), and six dialogue partners (Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey, and Sri Lanka).
The INSTC envisions a multimodal transport corridor
stretching 7200 km from India to Russia and linking the
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea. Goods will be
transported from the Jawaharlal Nehru and Kandla ports in
Western India to the Bandar Abbas port in Iran, and then
by road and rail through Baku to Moscow, St. Petersburg,
and beyond. In the future, a second route could run along
the western coast of the Caspian Sea and utilise the new
railway connecting Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, in-
tegrating it into the transnational corridor system
(Geo-Politica, 2017).
According to the developers, the transnational corridor
– to be built with international participation – will reduce
the cost and time required to transport cargo between such
cities as Mumbai, Bandar Abbas, Tehran, Baku, Aktau,
Moscow, and St. Petersburg. The assumption is that this route
will become an engine of trade in a region experiencing rapid
integration and development.
7. The International North–South Transport Corridor
India is also proposing an agreement to build a road
linking Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal, and is dis-
cussing the possibility of concluding a partnership
agreement with the EAEU.
In 2015, Kazakhstan embarked on the implementation
of its Nurly Zhol (Bright Path) economic development strat-
egy, and Astana and Beijing have already reached agreement
on linking their efforts (Legal Information System of
Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016).
That project seeks to stimulate the country’s economy
by allocating resources from the National Fund for prefer-
ential business lending, invigorating the banking sector,
attracting new investment, organizing and conducting EXPO
2017, building rental housing, developing the transport in-
frastructure of Astana, and constructing a new terminal at
the Astana airport. Plans are also in place to develop the
transport infrastructure of Kazakhstan, the industrial in-
frastructure of special economic zones, and the tourism
infrastructure, as well as to build high-voltage lines along
the routes Ekibastuz–Semey–Ust-Kamengorsk and
Semey–Aktogay–Taldykorgan–Almaty.
The main transport projects are roads along the follow-
ing routes: Western China–Western Europe, Astana–Almaty,
Astana–Ust-Kamengorsk, Astana–Aktobe–Atyrau, Almaty–
Ust-Kamengorsk, Karaganda–Jezkazgan–Kyzylorda, and
Atyrau-Astrakhan.
There are also plans to create industrial and tourism
zones, develop the energy and utilities infrastructures, and
build socially significant facilities.
Kyrgyzstan is methodically implementing its National De-
velopment Strategy for 2013–2017, devoting particular
attention to developing the mining, energy, tourism, agri-
cultural, transport, and financial sectors, and to businesses
based on new and environmentally friendly technologies.
The strategy contains specific infrastructural measures to
 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
enable Kyrgyzstan to overcome its “transport deadlock” and
join the ranks of the transit countries. The country plans
to build railways to spur economic development in the
regions and to provide access to mineral deposits on Kyrgyz
territory.
The National Development Strategy through 2030 of the
Republic of Tajikistan envisages developing the agricultur-
al sector, industry, and energy and infrastructure, as well
as diversifying exports, improving the quality of and access
to social services such as water supply, sanitation, health-
care, social welfare, and environmental protection, increasing
the country’s energy potential – including ending the current
electricity shortage and increasing electricity exports, boost-
ing agricultural productivity, and restoring and developing
irrigation systems. The Strategy prioritises energy securi-
ty and the efficient use of electricity, overcoming the current
communication impasse and transforming Tajikistan into
a transit country, food security, providing citizens with access
to quality food, and expanding employment (Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of
Tajikistan, 2016).
Uzbekistan is successfully implementing its Action Strat-
egy for 2017–2021 aimed at achieving the economy’s further
reform, structural transformation, and diversification. Mea-
sures are being taken to accelerate the launch of the modern
high-tech production of competitive products based on the
advanced processing of raw materials and semi-finished
products (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat,
2017).
The Program for the Development and Modernization
of Engineering, Communication, and Road Transport Infra-
structure for 2015–2019 is implementing measures to
refurbish some sections of the railway and also build new
ones, construct new, electrified railway lines, build train sta-
tions, and introduce high-speed passenger trains. The
Program for the Development of Telecommunication Tech-
nologies for 2013–2020 has begun the construction of
modern, fibre-optic broadband access networks.
All of these demonstrate that the goals of the various na-
tional economic development strategies dovetail in many
areas with the EAEU integration process, the implementa-
tion of the OBOR and approaches that SCO member states
are taking to regional economic development.
This is first because they emphasise cooperation on
transport and the development of each country’s transit
potential, implying the formation of an interconnected
regional infrastructure. The need for such an integrative
component will increase as cooperation in this area deepens,
and the intensification of trade flows across the territory
of the SCO will require that conditions for their unim-
peded movement across customs borders be created to
lower the cost of producers delivering those goods to
consumers.
Although, as mentioned earlier, the subject of internal
SCO integration is raised with increasing frequency at various
SCO venues, no focused consideration of the issue has yet
begun. It is obviously a very complex subject requiring
careful study. Rather than taking the classic approach, these
integration processes will more likely follow models worked
out through in-depth analysis and that allow for integra-
tion at different speeds and to different degrees, depending
121
on the particular features of the national economies of the
member states.
8. Prospects for integration within the SCO
As mentioned above, the SCO is not a classic example
of integration. At the same time, the Organisation’s statu-
tory documents contain provisions by which the SCO could
follow this path.
The classic integration scenario suggests a gradual move-
ment from the simplest form – a free trade area (FTA) to
the highest form of economic integration – a common
market. World Trade Organisation experts have pointed out
a modern trend towards an increase in regional trade agree-
ments, with the number growing by 60% over the last 5–8
years. These agreements include both provisions for stan-
dard FTA’s and the so-called “FTA+” format – that is,
supplementary economic integration agreements. The
number of such FTA+ agreements increased fivefold during
the first decade of the 21st century (Likhachev & Spartak,
2013).
A free trade area is a form of economic integration by
which countries agree to remove restrictions on mutual
trade. Those states freely exchange goods and services, but
independently establish customs tariffs on trade with third
countries.
According to the President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev,
“The growth of mutual trade could contribute in the future
to the creation of an SCO free trade area.” “Here, our coun-
tries can move forward step by step,” he said, “starting with
the study of projects of interest to them in areas of eco-
nomic cooperation” (TASS Russian News Agency, 2017c). At
the SCO summit in Astana, Chinese President Xi Jinping
called for moving “step by step to form institutions for re-
gional economic cooperation” and proposed signing an
agreement on facilitating trade within the SCO (TASS Russian
News Agency, 2017c).
The creation of a network of free trade agreements with
third countries is a key trade policy priority of the EAEU.
Such agreements are an effective tool for obtaining prefer-
ential conditions for access to foreign markets, expanding
exports, and attracting investments – which is necessary for
integrating enterprises of the EAEU states into the global
production chain and thereby increasing their competitive-
ness. In addition, this network of preferential agreements
reduces the risks to international trade associated with po-
litical factors (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015).
Such agreements involve the harmonisation of customs
administration, technical regulation, and sanitary norms, the
reaching of agreement on the liberalisation of trade in ser-
vices, procedures for establishing companies and protecting
investments, and regulating the movement of labour. Ap-
proximately 40 states and international organisations have
already expressed an interest in cooperating with the EAEU
(RIA Novosti, 2016).
China is also pursuing an active policy of liberalising trade
relations with countries in the region. The Central Asia Re-
gional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) is being
implemented and involves, in addition to China and the
Central Asian countries, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Azerbaijan (all of which are part of the “SCO family”). Plans
122 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
call for accelerating the implementation of CAREC strate-
gy in such areas of cooperation as trade policy, energy, and
the formation of an “economic corridor” in Central Asia
based on the project for a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan
railway. All of this is part of the SREB format.
Ultimately, from such interregional initiatives emerge the
prerequisites for the formation of international regions as
a new nexus in the global system of trade, one based not
only on competition, but also on cooperation with other
centres of international economic relations.
It is important to bear in mind that all SCO countries –
that is, member states, observer states, and SCO dialogue
partners – are involved in these projects at different levels
and in different formats.
At the same time, given the varying degrees to which
production is developed in the various SCO countries, con-
cerns about the creation of an FTA are justified. A number
of countries openly fear that the appearance of an FTA
could lead to an uncontrolled influx of inexpensive Chinese
goods, and that is fraught with the undermining of nation-
al economies. For example, the entire combined market of
the EAEU contains approximately 180 million people –
fewer than an average Chinese province or administrative
region and roughly comparable to the population of
Pakistan.
As Eurasian Economic Commission Trade Minister V.
Nikishina points out, the economies of the EAEU coun-
tries are clearly not yet ready for a free trade regime with
China – at least in the short term. At this stage, therefore,
the plan under consideration involves establishing a com-
prehensive trade and economic partnership with China, an
agreement having a broad agenda and providing for the
option of concluding more in-depth agreements on non-
tariff and simplified mutual trade activities in the future.
A long-term plan calls for additional discussion of duties
and tariffs (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2016).
Moreover, the SCO has not reached a consensus on when
to start cooperating and negotiating with the EAEU, and
countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have thus far
refrained from participating in integration processes. On the
other hand, seven of the eight SCO member states are either
members of the EAEU, have free trade agreements with
EAEU countries, or are negotiating such agreements.
Thus, it is clear that a steady process of building new
types of trade relations has taken shape in the region. Ob-
viously, as this process progresses, a system of trade
agreements will link all SCO countries in one way or another,
requiring a harmonisation of those arrangements and in-
evitably compelling the Organisation to create an integration
structure of some form or another.
The situation might develop in any one of a number of
different ways. In the short term, as negotiations with
China on linkage shift to the supranational level under the
auspices of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the
EAEU member countries have an opportunity to formu-
late a unified position on participation in the SREB, as
well as a common framework for trade relations with China.
That will make the EAEU attractive to other Central
Asian states such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who have
admittedly weak positions in their bilateral dialogue with
China.
It is also important to bear in mind that the EEC cur-
rently has authority concerning only the trade and technical
regulations aspects of the SREB. Thus, that dialogue does
not address two important elements of the project: invest-
ment and transport. The parties also plan to create
“institutions for comprehensive interaction.” “Common
formats for projects of common interest” should appear in
the fields of agriculture, industry, energy, transport and com-
munications, and infrastructure (Edovina & Korostikov, 2016).
The SCO framework already includes mechanisms for co-
operation on transport and investment that could be used
to develop common approaches, as well as to involve Ta-
jikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan in the collaborative
effort.
Another option is to formulate a “mixed” agreement
between “SCO family” countries with the participation of
the EAEU (the EEC voicing the united position of its
members) and China on the linkage of broad issues of re-
gional economic cooperation. In this case, the EAEU would
retain the status of the main negotiator with China and other
non-EAEU member states of Central Asia on issues of trade
and technical regulations, while the SCO could address other
cooperative efforts on investment, transport, and security.
Certain questions remain undecided: the limits of inte-
gration, the extent of the authority of national and
supranational regulatory bodies, strategies for expanding
EAEU membership, interaction between the EAEU and the
SCO and other state and integration blocs. All of this ne-
cessitates the development of a sound model for the
development of Eurasian economic integration and the sys-
tematization of its key principles and priorities.
9. Transport as a factor in deepening centripetal
regional trends
To build a new economic reality in Eurasia, it is essen-
tial that the SCO achieve progress in the field of transport.
This area of SCO cooperation dovetails with the OBOR set
of initiatives, helps strengthen EAEU integration initia-
tives, and is consistent with the priorities of the national
economic development strategies of the SCO member states,
observer states, and dialogue partners. Because vehicular
transportation is an inherent part of all branches of the na-
tional economy, interaction in this field drives the
development of multilateral transport cooperation between
all SCO countries.
The high rate of urbanisation in SCO countries coupled
with the vast geographic area they cover make it neces-
sary for them to have a fairly extensive and ramified network
of roads. The eight SCO countries have an estimated 12.5
million km of roads, or 18% of the total length of all roads
in the world. That system of roads enables SCO countries
to increase their annual volume of overland freight ship-
ments. For example, the six SCO member states alone
shipped approximately 42 billion tons of goods overland in
2016 (calculated by the author based on data of the rele-
vant agencies of the SCO member states). Obviously, the
statistics from India and Pakistan will increase this figure
manifold.
The Agreement between the Governments of the SCO
Member States on the Creation of Favourable Conditions for
 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
International Road Transport serves as the international legal
framework within the SCO for the development of trans-
port infrastructure and improvement of freight transport.
The agreement entered into force on 20 January 2017.
It creates a legal basis for parity conditions for road
haulers and lays a uniform foundation for their profession-
al activities within the territory of the SCO.
Various types of multilateral licensing systems for road
transport are in use around the world. However, the new
multilateral road transport licensing system for moving
goods by road from the Pacific Ocean (Lianyungang, China)
to the Baltic Sea (St. Petersburg, Russia) based on the SCO
Agreement is unique in its own way. It opens significant
opportunities for the construction of new and the recon-
struction of existing international roads, thereby contributing
to the expansion of the entire range of trade and econom-
ic relations, the increase of investment and the formation
of a modern and ramified system of transport routes
throughout the SCO.
The Agreement will also stimulate the further facilita-
tion of formalities and procedures in the issuance of visas
as well as border, customs, transport, phytosanitary, and vet-
erinary control in carrying out international road transport.
According to the Agreement, the parties grant carriers the
right to carry out international road transport on their re-
spective territories using vehicles registered on the territory
of any one of the parties.
The right to carry out international road transport is
granted by a single-entry permit – issued by the relevant
authorities of that carrier’s country – that is valid in all the
territories of the signatories to the Agreement. This exempts
the carrier from fees and charges related to owning or using
vehicles and to the use or maintenance of roads in those
states.
International road transport will be carried out along six
routes passing through the territory of SCO countries. Four
such corridors pass through the territory of Kazakhstan, five
through China, two through Kyrgyzstan, three through
Russia, and one each through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
It is important to note that these routes closely match
the main routes of the historical Silk Road: the northern
route through Kazakhstan and Russia; the central route
through Central Asia; and the southern route through India,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. All of the coun-
tries hold the corresponding status in the SCO. In essence,
this underscores the concrete contribution the Agreement
makes to the development and implementation of the Silk
Road Economic Belt project.
To ensure the effective, harmonious, and consistent ap-
plication of the provisions of the Agreement, the transport
ministries of the SCO member states established the Joint
Commission for the Creation of Favourable Conditions for
International Road Transport.
In accordance with Article 23 of the Agreement, after its
entry into force, any state wishing to join may do so by trans-
ferring an instrument of accession to the depositary.
This openness, whereby states outside the geographic
area of the SCO can accede to the Agreement, has gener-
ated a great deal of practical interest from a number of Asian
and Eastern European countries such as Belarus, Mongo-
lia, and Turkmenistan.
123
It is our opinion that this openness towards participa-
tion in the Agreement creates major opportunities for the
countries of the “SCO family” as well as for states that have
no official status with the Organisation. The benefits and
advantages derive primarily from the establishment of stable
transport and communication links and expanded trade and
economic relations with the significant natural and human
resources of the combined SCO countries, in addition to enor-
mous transit potential. Countries planning to join the
Agreement gain the opportunity to be one of the first to par-
ticipate in the large-scale process of forming a modern
regional system of transport connections.
The intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in and
Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters signed in Tashkent
in 2007 will facilitate the implementation of the Agree-
ment on Road Transport. In accordance with that document,
the parties are currently taking measures to simplify customs
procedures for goods and the movement of vehicles through
the territory of SCO member states, and to recognize the
types of identification, forms, and other documents used
by the customs agencies of the signatory countries to this
Agreement.
Along with these agreements, the SCO has also adopted
other political and legal documents aimed at developing road
transport and increasing the transit potential of the member
states of the Organisation. Two such policy documents are
the SCO Development Strategy until 2025 adopted at the
Ufa summit in 2015 and the Action Plan for its implemen-
tation that was signed at the jubilee summit in Tashkent
in 2016.
These documents provide for the expansion of the
network of international logistics centres and the forma-
tion of a network of industrial clusters along transport
arteries, the improvement of international road routes, in-
cluding the acceleration of the construction and
reconstruction of sections of roads within international
transport routes, as well as the introduction of innova-
tions and intelligent transport systems on the territory of
the SCO.
A number of important documents concerning the
economy and transport were adopted on 3 November 2016
at a meeting in Bishkek of the Council of Heads of Govern-
ments (Prime Ministers) of the SCO member states. The most
important document was the List of Events for Further De-
velopment of Project Activities in the Framework of the SCO
for 2017–2021. Section 7 of the List is devoted entirely to
cooperation in the field of transport. In particular, it spells
out the obligations of the SCO countries for improving in-
ternational road routes, including by implementing and
monitoring the realisation of selected projects. These include
the construction and reconstruction of sections of road in
international transport routes, as well as the creation of new
multilateral and mutually beneficial cooperation projects
in the SCO framework with the goal of advancing the de-
velopment of transport infrastructure.
With a view to developing the network of roads, the
heads of government also decided to expedite the prepa-
ration of a draft SCO Road Development Program – on which
experts of the member states are currently working. The
program should be a logical continuation of the intergov-
ernmental Agreement on Road Transport and serve as a
124 R. Alimov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 114–124
powerful tool for increasing the competitiveness of the SCO
countries in the transport services market and the subse-
quent development of trade and economic relations between
the states of the region and with the countries of Eastern
Europe, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.
10. Conclusions
Deep transformative processes are obviously unfolding
in this historic Eurasian region. Asia’s strengthening posi-
tion as a driver of the global economy will only reinforce
the trend towards the building of a regional system of
economic interrelations aimed primarily at increasing the
competitiveness of industries in the region and reducing
the costs of delivering their final products to markets.
Countries’ intertwining participation in trade agree-
ments, the further crystallisation of integration efforts, and
the involvement of yet more countries in integration pro-
cesses will strengthen current centripetal trends and the
formation of a common Eurasian space. The necessary in-
stitutional basis for this will gradually mature as the form
and mechanism of cooperation develop and improve within
the frameworks of both the SCO and EAEU, ultimately con-
tributing to a further deepening of interaction with the
countries of Southeast Asia.
Of course, this process will require time and effort, but
the overall trend in this direction has clearly begun.
Conflict of interest
None.
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