Battery Storage Guidance Note 2jk PDF

Battery storage guidance note 2: Battery energy
storage system fire planning and response

BATTERY STORAGE GUIDANCE NOTE 2:
BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM FIRE PLANNING AND RESPONSE
First edition
February 2020
Published by
Energy Institute, London
The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003
Registered charity number 1097899
The Energy Institute (EI) is the chartered professional membership body for the energy industry, supporting over 20 000 individuals
working in or studying energy and 200 energy companies worldwide. The EI provides learning and networking opportunities to support
professional development, as well as professional recognition and technical and scientific knowledge resources on energy in all its forms
and applications.
The EI’s purpose is to develop and disseminate knowledge, skills and good practice towards a safe, secure and sustainable energy system.
In fulfilling this mission, the EI addresses the depth and breadth of the energy sector, from fuels and fuels distribution to health and safety,
sustainability and the environment. It also informs policy by providing a platform for debate and scientifically-sound information on energy
issues.
The EI is licensed by:

−− the Engineering Council to award Chartered, Incorporated and Engineering Technician status, and
−− the Society for the Environment to award Chartered Environmentalist status.
It also offers its own Chartered Energy Engineer, Chartered Petroleum Engineer, and Chartered Energy Manager titles.
A registered charity, the EI serves society with independence, professionalism and a wealth of expertise in all energy matters.
This publication has been produced as a result of work carried out within the Technical Team of the EI, funded by the EI’s Technical Partners.
The EI’s Technical Work Programme provides industry with cost-effective, value-adding knowledge on key current and future issues
affecting those operating in the energy sector, both in the UK and internationally.
For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org
The EI gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions towards the scientific and technical programme from the following companies:
BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd Qatar Petroleum

BP Oil UK Ltd Repsol Sinopec
Centrica RWE npower
Chevron North Sea Ltd Saudi Aramco
Chevron Products Company Scottish Power
Chrysaor SGS
CLH Shell UK Oil Products Limited
ConocoPhillips Ltd Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Ltd
DCC Energy SSE
EDF Energy TAQA Bratani
ENI Total E&P UK Limited
E. ON UK Total UK Limited
Equinor Tullow Oil
ExxonMobil International Ltd Uniper
Innogy Valero
Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd Vattenfall
Nexen CNOOC Vitol Energy
Ørsted Woodside
Perenco World Fuel Services
Phillips 66

However, it should be noted that the above organisations have not all been directly involved in the development of this publication, nor
do they necessarily endorse its content.
Copyright © 2020 by the Energy Institute, London.

The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003.
Registered charity number 1097899, England
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or transmitted or translated into a machine language without the written
permission of the publisher.
ISBN 978 1 78725 173 1
Published by the Energy Institute
The information contained in this publication is provided for general information purposes only. Whilst the Energy Institute and the
contributors have applied reasonable care in developing this publication, no representations or warranties, express or implied, are made
by the Energy Institute or any of the contributors concerning the applicability, suitability, accuracy or completeness of the information
contained herein and the Energy Institute and the contributors accept no responsibility whatsoever for the use of this information. Neither
the Energy Institute nor any of the contributors shall be liable in any way for any liability, loss, cost or damage incurred as a result of the
receipt or use of the information contained herein.
Hard copy and electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, https://publishing.energyinst.org.
Documents can be purchased online as downloadable pdfs or on an annual subscription for single users and companies.
For more information, contact the EI Publications Team.
e: pubs@energyinst.org
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword �� 5
Acknowledgements�� 6
1 Introduction�� 7
1.1 Audience�� 7
2 Overview of battery fires�� 9

2.1 Typical facilities and application of the guidance�� 9
2.2 Battery energy storage types�� 11
2.3 How battery fires start or are initiated�� 12
2.3.1 Lead-acid �� 12
2.3.2 Lithium-ion (Li-ion) �� 13
2.4 How battery fires behave�� 13
2.4.1 Lead-acid �� 13
2.4.2 Li-ion �� 13
2.5 Battery fire effects on facility and surroundings�� 15
3 Pre-fire planning, fire response and aftermath�� 17

3.1 Pre-fire planning�� 17
3.2 Immediate site personnel actions �� 18
3.3 Combustion products�� 18
3.4 How should battery fires be extinguished?�� 20
3.5 Risks to firefighters�� 21
3.6 Post battery fire issues �� 22
3.7 Aftermath of fire �� 22
3.7.1 Safety issues�� 22
3.7.2 Environmental issues�� 23
3.7.3 Dealing with burnt and unburnt cells �� 23
Annexes
Annex A Glossary of terms, acronyms and abbreviations�� 25

A.1 Glossary of terms �� 25
A.2 Acronyms and abbreviations�� 26
Annex B References�� 27
3
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLE

Page
Figures
Figure 1 General arrangement of a facility within a dedicated building (NB: ‘process’

principles apply to other facility types shown in Figures 2 and 3)�� 9
Figure 2 ‘Banks’ of batteries�� 10
Figure 3 Outdoor (cabinet style) battery bank�� 10
Figure 4 Typical ISO container type facility �� 10
Figure 5 General failure mechanism of Li-ion batteries that may result in fire/explosion �� 13
Figure 6 Vigorous, sparking stage of combustion of a pack of consumer
Li-ion batteries (Picture credit: Department of Fire Protection
Engineering, University of Maryland)�� 14
Figure 7 Batteries in Figure 6 undergoing more intense flaming and explosive
combustion, ejecting burning material (Picture credit: Department of
Fire Protection Engineering, University of Maryland)�� 14
Figure 8 Battery container fire, Belgium 2017�� 15
Figure 9 Battery containing warehouse fire at Hawaii wind farm �� 16
Table
Table 1 Summary of battery types, chemistries and potential hazards�� 12
4
FOREWORD
Battery storage is expected to play an important role in the energy transition, allowing the
storage of electrical energy from renewables for later use, and helping to balance grid load.
At the time of publication, 4.8GW of battery storage has been given planning consent in the
UK, but a further 12GW may be needed by 2021.
Battery energy storage system (BESS) fire is a key risk that battery storage facility operators
should manage. At the time of publication, there have been several fires involving battery
storage facilities (some of which are explored in this publication), and research is ongoing
(such as at the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) in the UK) into how battery fires behave.
Given the speed at which battery storage facilities are expected to be built over the next few
years, EI members see the need for 'just in time' guidance to aid first responders (including
firefighters) to help prepare how to respond to a BESS fire.
This publication provides guidance on how to respond to BESS fires. It represents the 'current
state' of knowledge (in 2019), but also identifies gaps in knowledge. The guidance covers
primarily non-domestic battery installations, although the guidance may also generally
be applicable to smaller, domestic-scale incidents. It provides an overview of the fire risk
of common battery chemistries, briefly describes how battery fires behave, and provides
guidance on personnel response, managing combustion products, risks to firefighters,
pre-fire planning, and fire-aftermath.
Although much of this guidance is generally applicable to other battery chemistry types, this
guidance is of particular relevance to fires involving Lithium-ion (Li-ion) chemistries, except
where otherwise noted.
The guidance is intended for operating companies, to help plan and understand fire risk and
response, and first responders, including firefighters.
The information contained in this document is provided for general information purposes
only. Whilst the EI and the contributors have applied reasonable care in developing this
publication, no representations or warranties, expressed or implied, are made by the EI or
any of the contributors concerning the applicability, suitability, accuracy or completeness of
the information contained herein and the EI and the contributors accept no responsibility
whatsoever for the use of this information. Neither the EI nor any of the contributors shall
be liable in any way for any liability, loss, cost or damage incurred as a result of the receipt or
use of the information contained herein.
The EI welcomes feedback on its publications. Feedback or suggested revisions should be

submitted to:
Technical Department
Energy Institute
61 New Cavendish Street
London, W1G 7AR
e: technical@energyinst.org
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Battery storage guidance note 2: Battery energy storage system fire planning and response,
was developed by Paul Watkins, (ENRg Consultants), on behalf of the EI Energy Storage
Working Group. During this work the working group consisted of the following individuals:
Jacob Allinson RWE

Jonathan Buston HSL
St. John Deakin EDF Energy
Taylor McKenzie Scottish Power
Simon Garlick SSE
Frank Gordon (Vice-Chair) Renewable Energy Association
Stuart King (Chair) Energy Institute
Piero Maggio EDF Energy
Lee Reed Centrica
Project management and editing were carried out by Kishan Kansara and Stuart King (EI).
The EI thanks the following contributors who reviewed the project deliverables:
Daniel Rawdin SSE

Gareth Hinds NPL
Nicky Herbert BEIS
Charlie Pugsley London Fire Brigade
Affiliations correct at time of contribution.
6
1 INTRODUCTION
In the UK's energy networks, a wide range of battery facilities is currently used or envisaged
to either generate or store electricity to assist in balancing supply and demand. Various
battery technologies and configurations are utilised. For example, batteries can be used for
generating electricity, and BESS may be co-located alongside power generating facilities,
e.g. wind, solar, or gas. The size and nature of BESS can differ and may be housed in
purpose-built structures, or even International Organization for Standardization (ISO) style
shipping containers. Like many other energy facilities, there is a risk of fire through abnormal
operation or fire incident escalation. Whilst prevention of fires involving batteries should be
the primary focus, if fire does break out then site owners and fire responders should better
understand how to respond to it, by understanding the key information needed to adequately
plan their response, and understand where there are currently gaps in this information.
The focus of this publication is fire response for incidents involving BESS (typically commercial,
MW scale facilities). This publication excludes detailed guidance for domestic battery usage
and energy storage applications, or battery storage in mobile applications, such as portable
electronic equipment, electric vehicles and other transport applications, predominantly
because the environments in which a fire is occurring (a house, hospital or office, for
example), the number of batteries involved, and the personnel and organisations involved,
will likely be very different to that of commercial BESS. However, where possible and due to
the increasing use of battery technologies in domestic applications and potential for fires,
key fire response principles are reiterated, and reference is given to other useful and more
detailed information.
This publication primarily focuses on Lithium ion (Li-ion) battery technology (see Table 1),
not because it is particularly hazardous but because it is the most common technology at
the time of publication. This publication also recognises other commercial battery types
including lead-acid, flow batteries and high temperature batteries, referring to these where
appropriate. Generally, much of the guidance in this publication will be applicable to other
chemistry types.
This publication includes brief guidance on how battery fires are started, how they behave
once they are initiated, and what hazards they present, in terms of the effects on personnel,
facilities and the surroundings in which they are placed. Finally, it aims to prompt organisations
dealing with potential battery fires to think about the main fire response issues and be aware
of emergency planning needs as well as any gaps in knowledge at this present time.
This publication deals predominantly with the hazards from batteries. Of course, a battery
fire is likely to have originated from, or to have spread to, other elements, and the guidance
touches upon these where appropriate – however, it is beyond the scope of this publication
to provide detailed guidance on fire response more generally.
1.1 AUDIENCE
This publication provides guidance to fire service personnel and industrial firefighters who
are concerned with fires involving BESS, and how to deal with immediate and post-incident
consequences. It also provides guidance for site owners and developers, and proposes
questions and information that should prompt informed and relevant risk assessment and
emergency planning for sites utilising currently available battery technologies.
7
This publication is intended to help all audiences understand the risks and mitigations that
are appropriate. However, it is not simply intended to be a document for first responders on
how to respond to a BESS fire. It is relevant to anyone who needs to be aware of suitable fire
incident mitigation measures and response strategies. While care has been taken to provide
accurate and up-to-date information, this document is for guidance only and users are
recommended to take professional advice on the development of appropriate risk reduction
measures for the range of battery types and facilities discussed in this publication.
8
2 OVERVIEW OF BATTERY FIRES
2.1 TYPICAL FACILITIES AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDANCE
The types of industrial facilities that this publication focuses on can be represented by
Figure 1. They typically consist of banks of batteries or 'units' (Figure 2) which are fed by
incoming surplus electricity via transformers. Electricity is stored in the batteries and can be
instantaneously returned to the local area power grid as required. Batteries may be housed
in a dedicated building with more than one floor (as in Figure 1), in discrete cabinets
(Figure 3) or even in ISO-style shipping containers, shown in Figure 4. Air conditioning may
also be provided as standalone or integral units. As well as batteries and transformers, there
may also be associated facilities such as switch rooms, inverters, and control rooms. In a
typical large-scale BESS, there may be in the order of 100 000 individually manufactured
Li-ion cells.
In addition most, if not all, facilities will have a battery management system (BMS) for the
control and monitoring of battery modules and to manage the power flow through the battery
modules during operation. This will monitor individual modules or cells to prevent thermal
runaway and possible fire. Fire suppression systems appropriate to the battery technology in
use may be provided according to the facility's fire hazard management strategy.
2. The battery units. 4. Transformers. These ‘step

Roughly the size of a 3. Air conditioning units. up’ and ‘step down’ the voltage
briefcase, the batteries are Industrial sized units help to to match what’s needed by the
stored across two floors keep the building cool. grid or batteries.
5. Electricity out. The

electricity stored in the
batteries is
1. Electricity in. Power comes in
instantaneously returned
via a transformer when there is
to the local grid when it’s
more power than needed in the
needed via underground
local network.
cables.
Figure 1: General arrangement of a facility within a dedicated building (NB: 'process'

principles apply to other facility types shown in Figures 2 and 3)
9
Figure 2: 'Banks' of batteries
Figure 3: Outdoor (cabinet style) battery bank
Figure 4: Typical ISO container type facility
10
2.2 BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE TYPES
As there are many different battery chemistries and usage configurations, with ongoing
advancements in technology responders should understand what might be faced in an
accident scenario.
The lead-acid battery, akin to a car battery, has been for many years the predominant type
of electrochemistry used for large scale electricity storage, both in the UK and worldwide.
However, lead-acid technology is now generally only used in uninterruptible power supply
(UPS) type installations (and even then not exclusively). At the time of publication, the Li-ion
family of batteries are now frequently in use and are expected to increase in dominance within
the next five years. Most (if not all) storage installed in the last few years is Li-ion based. An
overview of common battery types used for commercial mid-scale and large-scale storage
systems may be found in EI Battery storage guidance note 1: Battery storage planning. See
also Table 1.
Virtually all modern (in 2019) battery storage facilities will use Li-ion battery technology. Other
types, such as lithium metal batteries, are unlikely to be used in battery storage facilities since
they are non-rechargeable. However, as fire responders may be used to other battery types
and how to deal with fires involving them, responders should consider how fire response
might differ. Therefore, any reference to other battery types in this publication is made simply
to highlight this.
Put simply, a battery is a sealed container holding cells where two chemical reactions
occur – one reaction that gives off electrons, and another that takes in electrons. Making
a connection between the battery terminals allows electrons to flow between the two
reactions, delivering current. Anodes (-, giving electrons) and cathodes (+, taking electrons)
are placed in an electrolyte that conducts electricity. Each can comprise various substances,
the nature of which may affect the energy capacity, power delivery and stability of a battery.
Most facilities of the type described in 2.1 utilise Li-ion batteries which have a range of
different cathode materials, including (but not limited to) lithium iron phosphate (LFP) and
lithium nickel manganese cobalt (usually NCM, occasionally listed as MNC). A Li-ion cell is
generally one where the lithium-ion moves from a carbon-based anode to a metal oxide
cathode through an electrolyte of a lithium salt in a solvent. Due to the higher energy density
and increasingly lower cost of NMC/MNC batteries, they are increasingly being used over
LFP batteries and are generally predominant. Responders should, therefore, expect NMC
chemistry as the norm.
Some facilities utilise other types of cell such as high temperature (e.g. sodium sulfur), and
flow machines (vanadium- or zinc-containing) may also be encountered. However, these are
rare in the UK. A brief summary of hazards is given in Table 1.
11
Table 1: Summary of battery types, chemistries and potential hazards
Type of battery Chemistry/characteristics Potential fire hazards

Li-ion Rechargeable. Several types Thermal runaway (caused by
including LFP, NMC/MNC and damage, production quality,
lithium polymer (Li-Po), all temperature, etc.) can lead to
with differing energy densities fire or explosion and release of
and performance. No metallic toxic materials
lithium. Contains flammable
electrolyte
Lead-acid Lead and lead sulfate electrodes Largely recyclable. Low power
with sulfuric acid-based density and toxic materials.
electrolyte Explosion risk if overcharged
due to build-up of hydrogen
Lithium metal Non-rechargeable, wide range Catastrophic failure can lead to
of chemistries (most common fire or explosion and release of
is Li/MnO2) with lithium metal toxic materials
electrode and flammable
electrolyte
Flow batteries Electrolytes are stored outside Generally low fire risk
the electrochemical cell, and
flow through the cell during
the charging and discharging
process
High temperature High energy and power density. Cell temperature of approx.
(for example, Cell temperature of approx. 300 °C and potentially high fire
sodium-sulfur) 300 °C mitigated by insulation risk, mitigated by insulation
2.3 HOW BATTERY FIRES START OR ARE INITIATED
The following relates to how battery fires start or are initiated, and how they behave during
a fire.
2.3.1 Lead-acid
Hydrogen (flammable) and oxygen (a supporter of combustion) are usually produced when
lead-acid batteries are being charged. Generally, the quantity of gas is small for individual
batteries but will be greater for large banks. As the battery reaches full charge, the rate of
hydrogen and oxygen production increases. If the battery is overcharged, a lot of gas can
be produced, greatly increasing the risk of fire or explosion. Moving a vented battery may
release the gases into the atmosphere around the battery. A source of ignition – such as a
flame, a spark, a hot object, electrical equipment – may cause mixtures of these gases to
ignite and explode.
12
The main precaution against fire and explosion for facilities with lead-acid batteries is to
ventilate the enclosure adequately so that an explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen does
not form or persist. Guidance on calculating ventilation requirements can be found in UK
Health and Safety Executive publication INDG139, Using electric storage batteries safely and
BS EN IEC 62485-1, Safety requirements for secondary batteries and battery installations.
General safety information.
2.3.2 Li-ion
Li-ion batteries containing lithium-based cathode combinations have the potential to catch
fire if they overheat or are physically damaged. Overheating can occur if the batteries
are subject to external heating (perhaps as a result of nearby battery or inverter failure).
If damage occurs, they can short circuit, generating localised high temperatures in the
process. In turn, the batteries can start to decompose rapidly and ignite in a process of
thermal runaway. Overheating may also be caused by rapid discharge, overcharging,
manufacturing defects, or poor design. The exact cause of documented incidents
has often been hard to establish. Figure 5 illustrates the general mechanism by which
lithium-containing batteries can catch fire.
Electrolyte Flammable gas/

Battery Battery
decomposes, Overpressurisation electrolyte ignites
heats up bursts
produces gas
Figure 5: General failure mechanism of Li-ion batteries that may result in fire/explosion
2.4 HOW BATTERY FIRES BEHAVE
2.4.1 Lead-acid
An explosion involving unvented gases from a battery can destroy the battery and eject
dangerous fragments and corrosive chemicals; often the electrolyte is a sulfuric acid
compound. If the battery is one that is valve regulated, then gas pressure can build up if
charged for too long or too quickly. As the pressure relief valves release the gases, there is a
possibility of explosion and fire if there is an ignition source in the vicinity. If the battery is in
a plastic case, this can also act as a significant fire load.
2.4.2 Lithium-ion (Li-ion)
Overheating of Li-ion cells typically results in a self-accelerating reaction called thermal

runaway, where internal temperature and pressure rise at a quicker rate than can be
dissipated. Subsequently, a cell produces significant amounts of heat, off-gassing, smoke
generation, and can ignite, causing vigorous flaming which in turn can affect adjacent
batteries. Cells may explode violently as part of the combustion process. Fire can flare up
intensely and affected cells can rupture, releasing their contents and further fuelling the
fire. As Li-ion batteries contain flammable electrolyte, the combustion process can rapidly
accelerate. The spread of fire from one battery pack to adjacent battery packs can, however,
be significantly reduced by good battery design, how cells are housed and contained, and
appropriate spacing between individual battery packs.
13
It should be noted that the scaling effects of combustion between small consumer batteries
and large industrial cells are largely unknown – although the combustion process is similar,
the larger batteries and/or higher energy density and differing chemistries can result in
extremely large and damaging fires, see Figure 8.
Figure 6: Vigorous, sparking stage of combustion of a pack of consumer Li-ion

batteries (Picture credit: Department of Fire Protection Engineering, University of
Maryland)
Figure 7: Batteries in Figure 6 undergoing more intense flaming and explosive

combustion, ejecting burning material (Picture credit: Department of Fire Protection
Engineering, University of Maryland)
There is no clear consensus on the exact types or quantities of potentially harmful chemicals
or combustion products given off by a typical battery fire, including Li-ion batteries. Like other
battery chemistries and 'ordinary' cellulosic materials fires, it should be assumed that there
may be irritating, corrosive and/or toxic gases produced as part of the combustion process.
Such combustion products can present a hazard to personnel and nearby populations. Refer
to 2.5 for examples of how combustion products may appear, and 3.3 concerning what
precautions should be taken.
14
2.5 BATTERY FIRE EFFECTS ON FACILITY AND SURROUNDINGS
At the time of publication, there have been only a few well publicised isolated fire incidents
involving large scale grid-connected and/or containerised Li-ion battery facilities. Several
others have been seen (including in South Korea and Arizona, USA) but not yet analysed.
In November 2017, one fire incident in Belgium at an energy company's 6 MW test facility,
utilising batteries from four different manufacturers, involved the total loss of one battery
container (amounting to 1MW). It is supposed that the fire was the result of a fault with
an auxiliary system, not due to a failure in the battery itself. Damage to two neighbouring
containers was said to be light but repairable, suggesting that containerised battery fires
can be isolated to the container of origin with correct layout and spacing. Fire detection and
extinguishing systems were provided for some of the containers. Published photographs of
the incident (Figure 8) showed vigorous flaming and plumes of smoke, both light and dark in
colour being released from the affected container (it is possible the light smoke was a mixture
of combustion gases and steam being vented upon activation of the active fire protection).
Media reports at the time showed the concerns of residents and businesses in the area at
the potential toxicity of smoke that had been released during the incident, and the local
authorities requested residents to keep their windows and doors closed. Subsequently,
according to local air quality measurements, 'normal results' were obtained and it was said
that there was no more 'risk to health or the environment'.
Figure 8: Battery container fire, Belgium 2017
Another fire at a wind farm's battery storage facility in Hawaii was said to involve 12 000
lead-acid batteries, although some reports suggested lithium-containing cells. Post-incident,
it was said that the battery technology was of a type employing 'chemical capacitors' that
match Li-ion battery performance. Subsequently, it was established that it is likely lead-acid
batteries were involved, and this illustrates the confusion that can arise regarding which
battery types are present at such facilities. Responders should be aware of this. Previous fires
at the facility had burnt out without serious damage but the latest incident did not, even
though fire extinguishing dry powder had been stockpiled and used initially to contain the
fire, without success. Fire crews entered the warehouse type building, filled with densely
packed rows of battery racks more than seven hours after the fire began and were faced
with thick smoke, toxic fumes and other hazards. Eventually, it was considered unsafe to
commit crews to the building. Carbon dioxide (CO2) was also used to attempt to extinguish
the fire but this strategy proved ineffective; both 'dry' agents failed to knock down the fire
sufficiently. Eventually, a defensive firefighting strategy of using water jets to contain the fire
15
and prevent it from spreading was adopted. Jets were not aimed directly at the fire, to avoid
large amounts of contaminated firewater runoff as well as electrocution risk. The fire was
active for around 13 hours and took 36 hours to be fully extinguished. Damage to the facility
was estimated at $30 million and portions of the building collapsed, although no injuries
were reported.
Based on such incident reports, it is apparent that although the effects on buildings and their
contents (batteries, inverters/transformers, cabling and services) can be severe with large
scale losses, fires at large scale battery storage facilities are primarily a risk to property. Some
sites will be unmanned, and others will not be. However, any indoor facility, or containerised
solution with an ability to enter it, will usually have personnel present at some point for
maintenance purposes; any case where entry is possible should be fire risk assessed for
life safety issues. This risk may be reduced in the case of outdoor cabinet type installations
where personnel are not usually expected to be present. It is not possible to give an accurate
indication of what percentage of facilities will have personnel on-site. However, life safety risks
generally arise when control staff are exposed to fire, heat and/or fire products, if firefighters
enter the building to deal with fires, or if they or the general population are exposed to toxic
combustion products in the immediate vicinity.
Major accident hazards to the environment can occur as a result of firefighting operations,
particularly if water is used to combat fires involving batteries, and fire authorities and
front-line responders should recognise this (and indeed they appear to do so).
Figure 9: Battery-containing warehouse fire at Hawaii wind farm
16
3 PRE-FIRE PLANNING, FIRE RESPONSE AND AFTERMATH
3.1 PRE-FIRE PLANNING
It has not always been possible for fire responders to accurately pre-plan for battery fire
incidents, due to the relatively new technologies employed and their rapid development.
Furthermore, there has been little incident experience. A crucial factor for pre-fire planning
and during fire incidents appears to be the battery technology employed, since this will
dictate the most appropriate firefighting actions to be taken, including extinguishing media
to be used and presence of hazards during operations.
The response to a fire on a battery storage project will differ, depending on the battery chemistry,
the site location and local environment and method of installation. For installations with good
spacing between containerised units, it may be prudent to let the fire burn itself out, but for
installations such as those located within buildings where fire escalation is a realistic prospect,
fire quenching using an extinguishing material will be a better course of action. The products
of combustion and the effect of water or other extinguishing media on battery and other
electrical materials should be assessed and information should be given in emergency response
plans or 'pre-fire plans'. An acceptable pre-fire plan format can be found in Model code of safe
practice part 19: Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations.
Critically, the pre-fire plan should include a means for containment of water, or other
materials used for extinguishing the fire, but avoiding run-off into the local environment.
The standards for lead-acid battery rooms generally include sufficient primary and secondary
containment (bunding) to contain battery electrolyte and this is also recommended practice
for flow battery systems. However, such bunding is unlikely to be of sufficient volume to
contain all applied firewater.
The pre-fire plan should address the following:

a. The battery type(s) that are present – e.g. lead-acid, Li-ion, or other (e.g. lithium
metal, flow or high temperature).
b. Number of batteries, capacities and overall capacity of battery banks, with plans of
which containers contain batteries, and which are ancillary equipment.
c. Which battery certifications apply (e.g. UL 1973, IEC 62133).
d. Details of construction of the battery facility – e.g. containerised, non-containerised,
warehouse type (with internal details of battery racking, layout and hazard geometry).
e. Details of the structural fire withstand of the building/facility.
f. Details of any installed incident detection systems (fire and gas detection, including
type and speed of response).
g. Details of any passive fire protection (PFP) installed which offers fire resistance to
enclosures.
h. Details of any installed active fire protection (AFP), e.g. water-based (sprinkler or
water spray/mist), or dry agent (dry powder/chemical or CO2), with appropriateness
of protection/agent for battery technology used.
i. Secondary containment measures (i.e. bunding, and capacity to contain battery
waste/electrolyte as well as applied firewater).
j. Tertiary containment measures – i.e. bunding or retention to contain applied firewater
and prevent from migrating offsite or into groundwater.
k. Arrangements for warning offsite populations and for 'in-place' sheltering.
l. Arrangements for air quality monitoring for prolonged battery fire incidents.
m. Considerations for post-incident monitoring, clean-up and disposal of burnt and
unburnt cells.
17
In all cases, a specific pre-fire plan should be developed which addresses the issues in a. to
m. The pre-fire plan should be a concise aide-memoire highlighting the necessary facility
shutdown and isolation actions and the fire response thereafter. Ongoing potential hazards
should be included. The pre-plan can be provided as part of an emergency response pack or
'grab bag' that can be easily retrieved at a safe location at the incident. Such grab bags will
usually contain high visibility tabards for responders (including facility personnel acting as site
emergency controllers), facility maps, plans, and other pertinent information. It should be
borne in mind that some facilities will be unmanned, and this information may not necessarily
be present unless specifically provided for arriving fire service personnel.
Pre-fire plans should be regularly exercised with cooperation between facility operators,
control staff, fire services and local authorities. The effectiveness of the pre-plan should be
reviewed during drills, but equally if an incident occurs. Plans should be assessed before,
during and after an emergency response to establish if they are valid and contain the
right information and actions. If the facility is altered in any way (for example, if battery
capacity is upgraded or new equipment comes online) then the plan should be reviewed and
updated. Any lessons learned from battery fire event response, including process control and
firefighting actions, should be considered and be disseminated to interested parties, e.g. via
a safety bulletin. Lastly, particularly as battery storage is an emerging industry, pre-fire plans
should be reviewed and updated periodically to ensure they reflect industry good practice,
and in light of new knowledge and experience or incidents that have occurred elsewhere.
3.2 IMMEDIATE SITE PERSONNEL ACTIONS
Personnel working at a facility where a fire involving batteries has started should follow the
established emergency procedures and pre-fire plan for the facility. Immediate priority should
be given to the evacuation of non-essential personnel in order to avoid the direct effects of
the fire, including flame, smoke and toxic combustion products. In some cases, facilities will
be unmanned and there will be fire incident detection that will raise the alarm upon sensing
these. If installed, AFP systems should activate to begin to suppress and contain the fire.
Evacuation of the compartment of fire origin is essential, not only to escape fire and smoke,
but also to due to the danger posed by dry fire protection media (especially CO2, which is an
asphyxiation risk). Priority should be given to rapid call out of the fire services for ongoing
incident assessment and fire containment.
Fire responders dealing with battery fire incidents should quickly determine the type,
number and capacity of the batteries or battery banks, since this will determine the most
effective incident response strategy and allow assessment of the likely type of fire protection/
suppression system installed (often different battery suppliers will use different systems,
typically water or a gas agent for Li-ion), if provided. In any case, a pre-fire plan should have
been established and reviewed with the facility owners before an incident. Specific details to
be reviewed are described in 3.1.
3.3 COMBUSTION PRODUCTS
Outside cabinet installations that include vents or chimneys (that are usually designed to
prevent pressure build-up) may also be designed to minimise the number of combustion
products within or vent them to a relatively safer location, and hence, significantly reduce the
risk of personnel exposure to combustion products.
18
Batteries in containers and inside buildings both present the potential for a build-up of
combustion products, leading to a potential for deflagration.
In any case, staff or personnel should not be exposed to combustion products from a battery
fire if the detection and alerting systems are properly designed and installed.
Facility staff or control room personnel may be the first to be exposed to combustion products
arising from a battery fire. Ideally, and if likely to be endangered, personnel should evacuate
immediately to an upwind location. In general, a BMS should isolate the facility automatically
from the grid supply, and there will normally be properly located hardwired emergency
shutdown switches in safe locations that shut down and isolate, allowing staff to 'hit and
go'. However, it is recognised that site personnel may need to carry out process control
actions such as shutdown and isolation prior to fire service arrival, if this has not been carried
out automatically or has been unsuccessful for any reason. In such cases, and if personnel
must remain in the control room/location, then heating, ventilation and air conditioning
(HVAC) system air intakes should be closed or isolated and switched to recirculation in order
to prevent the ingress of potentially debilitating smoke. Windows should also be closed.
Non-essential personnel should be evacuated immediately. Remaining personnel should
monitor for the presence of fire and combustion products and evacuate immediately, if likely
to be in danger, or if in doubt.
As part of pre-fire planning (see 3.1) facility personnel should already have established
lines and methods of communication with others nearby, including the public. An offsite
emergency response plan should have been developed which includes provision for alerting
nearby populations e.g. via broadcast radio messages. In many cases, such provision will be
agreed with local authorities and fire services, as members of the public may need to be
advised to evacuate or close windows and shelter in their homes or business premises. All
measures should be agreed beforehand and tested during regular emergency exercises as
appropriate.
Generally speaking, and due to the nature of combustion products, fire responders should
wear self-contained breathing apparatus and stay upwind of the fire during the initial incident
assessment. An initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 metres (330 feet) should be
considered, and increased if necessary. If present, medical personnel should be made aware
of the materials involved and they should also take precautions to protect themselves.
In terms of fire suppression and ongoing incident control, it will be essential to determine
whether any installed fire protection is active and functioning and whether it is being, or has
been, effective. It may be prudent to assume that it has not and that further active control
measures may need to be taken. In any case, application of firewater should be minimised,
limited to that required to contain the fire to the container/compartment of origin. In practice,
this may mean adopting a controlled burn (CB) strategy so that the affected battery storage
burns out with minimal impact on personnel, the environment and nearby property. If a CB
strategy is adopted then air pollution monitoring should be requested and ongoing measures
to safeguard offsite populations should be implemented, such as 'shelter in place'. Measures
for achieving this should be agreed in advance of incidents through pre-fire planning and
consultation with environmental authorities.
Adjacent battery storage facilities should be shielded from the effects of fire if possible. Flat
fan spray water curtains are an acceptable method of containment, if deployed carefully, and
will provide some removal of radiant heat up to a height of approximately 7 metres, although
these will not be completely effective. Water monitors ('cannons') should also be considered
to cool exposures directly or provide water curtains for radiant heat removal.
19
Responders should also be aware of the potential risk of multiple explosions and/or rapid
'flare-ups' of combustion involving the battery inventory, with the attendant risk of burning
projectiles which may further spread fire and result in incident escalation. The likelihood of
such risks can depend on the level of internal safety mechanisms designed into a facility, but
caution should be taken in any case. As such, fire responders should also keep a safe distance
from any enclosure doors. If an enclosure has a chimney structure built-in, the explosion risk
may be minimised.
It should be borne in mind that the application of firewater may allow contaminated run-off
and other combustion products to escape the compartment. It is essential to develop a plan
for tertiary containment and fire containment without placing responders at undue risk. If a
water-based system (e.g. a sprinkler system) has been operating to control the fire, then there
may be uncontained firewater run-off already present inside the facility and possibly migrating
from affected containers or buildings. A plan should be developed for management of fire
water run-off alongside firefighting operations, bearing in mind that additional fire control
measures (primarily application of firewater in the case of Li-ion batteries) will increase this
need. Refer to CIRIA 736 Containment systems for the prevention of pollution: Secondary,
tertiary and other measures for industrial and commercial premises.
If the battery inventory on fire is housed within a larger structure (e.g. a warehouse type or
multi-compartment building) then responders should not enter the building for the purposes
of offensive firefighting operations unless pre-planned in advance, or it has been deemed
safe to do so through a process of dynamic risk assessment (DRA). See 3.5.
Due to the propensity of lead-acid batteries to generate explosive mixtures of hydrogen and
oxygen, eject corrosive electrolytes and fragment under fire conditions, responders should
not enter enclosures without first determining safety to do so. Compartments or closed
spaces should be adequately ventilated prior to entry, but the introduction of air into a
compartment may also increase the risk of explosion if flammable vapours inside are brought
within the flammable range by doing so.
3.4 HOW SHOULD BATTERY FIRES BE EXTINGUISHED?
The choice of extinguishing medium and how it is applied will be governed by the battery
technology employed and how a facility is constructed. As battery storage facilities typically
employ Li-ion cells, water extinguishing systems and equipment can be used to extinguish
fires. This is unlike other disposable and non-rechargeable battery types containing metallic
lithium, where the lithium metal is also violently reactive with water and where dry
extinguishing agents (dry powder or CO2) are sometimes used.
Battery facilities will usually have been designed and constructed with the level of fire
detection and active or passive suppression as appropriate to the nature of the facility – thus
enabling rapid response and minimising the need for manual firefighting operations by local
authority or industrial fire responders. The geometry of a facility, degree of enclosure, layout,
cable specification, and grouping of combustible cables, will affect the effectiveness of
installed fire protection. Recent guidance issued by international commercial property insurer
FM Global based on the results of a series of small- to large-scale fire tests has demonstrated
that potential fire consequences in energy storage systems (ESS) can be mitigated effectively
through a combination of automatic sprinkler systems and careful ESS rack spacing, with the
latter being particularly essential. (FM Global, Development of sprinkler protection guidance
for Li-ion-based energy storage systems).
20
In any case, installed systems should be given the opportunity to control and extinguish the
fire. However, it should be borne in mind that installed systems may not always meet their
design intent and fail to extinguish high-energy battery fires completely. Dry agents will not
provide sufficient cooling for deep seated fires and subsequent flare-ups or reignition should
be expected. Under most circumstances, a defensive firefighting strategy of containment
and cooling to prevent escalation to nearby buildings and facilities is prudent. Cooling of
structures and exposures should be maintained for as long as is required to prevent incident
escalation and 'damp down' the affected facilities, balanced against the creation of additional,
potentially contaminated run-off. It may be advisable to use heat sensitive imaging to assist
in identifying persistent hot spots.
It should be recognised that in many cases a controlled burn-out of the battery facility or
enclosure(s) will be the most appropriate action, since this will minimise the potential for
contaminated firewater run-off where water is used as the extinguishing medium – applied
either via installed systems or by water branches. In terms of combustion products, it should
be assumed these are toxic and so effective cordons/safety distances should be observed,
with all responders donning self-contained breathing apparatus if in the vicinity of fire control
operations. If the fire is prolonged, then appropriate air quality monitoring should be carried
out. In-place sheltering of local persons (e.g. residents and businesses) should be advised
until local air quality is deemed safe.
In responding to a fire, attempts should be made to review battery cell temperatures of the
assets or any other asset metrics. This data will be key to understand just how many modules
are affected. The real time temperature data may only be available for a short period of time
before any backup battery runs out. There may also be the ability to check offline data to
determine which cell failed and where this is located in the facility. This will help fire fighters
identify where the source of the initial battery fire was.
3.5 RISKS TO FIREFIGHTERS
The main risks to firefighters arising from battery fires are: the potential for rapid, flaring
combustion and explosion from cells that are involved in fire or are affected by nearby
batteries already combusting, and electric shock.
The likelihood of combustion risks materialising is significantly reduced in batteries that are
designed to self-contain fire risks. Batteries that do not yet show signs of combustion may
catch fire or explode without warning as they may already be overheating through faults
directly or indirectly caused by a fire. Physical damage to batteries during, or prior to, an
incident may increase this risk. During fire and fire suppression, there may be generation of
large volumes of toxic and flammable gases. Explosion risk and potential for injury will be
increased inside small compartments or areas that are confined/semi-confined. Batteries of all
types contain corrosive and/or flammable electrolytes that will be ejected.
Although batteries would have been isolated from the grid, they may still hold residual charge.
This should not pose an electric shock risk when firefighting with water, but, particularly
if the fire has damaged electrical protection, this poses a risk to firefighters if they touch
exposed cables.
21
3.6 POST BATTERY FIRE ISSUES
The main issues that should be considered following a battery fire, and once the initial
combustion has subsided, include the following:
−− Residual heat in battery inventory. This can allow fire to flare up, further batteries to
explode or affect nearby batteries and potentially escalate fire. Time to reignition, if
it occurs, can be within a matter of hours or even days and the inventory should be
monitored for some time. A fire watch should be considered.
−− Potential or 'stranded' energy in batteries that have not combusted, or if burnout
has been incomplete.
−− Battery waste – cells that are burnt or unburnt. There will be a mixture of plastic,
metal and other hazardous wastes including corrosive and toxic substances such as
electrolytes.
−− Spilt material including a mixture of battery waste and contaminated firewater or dry
powder utilised during fire response.
−− Residual fumes and toxic gases that may linger for hours or days after the fire event.
Such issues should be addressed in pre-fire planning as part of ongoing potential hazards
information.
3.7 AFTERMATH OF FIRE
3.7.1 Safety issues
Even after successful control or extinguishment of a battery fire, there will be hazards to fire
responders, site personnel and off-site populations. These may include:
−− continued smoke and toxic gas emissions;
−− potential or 'stranded' energy, as in 3.6;
−− potential for further fire and explosion or generation of flammable/toxic gases;
−− presence of toxic, combustible and corrosive substances (mainly damaged batteries
and spilt electrolytes/cathode and anode materials);
−− electrical hazards associated with unburnt cells and/or racks;
−− electrical hazards associated with exposed live cables, and
−− dangers due to structural collapse.
Appropriate safety distances should be maintained following fire extinguishment for a time
until it is certain that toxic fumes and/or flammable gases no longer present a hazard to
nearby populations. Li-ion battery fires produce hydrogen fluoride (HF) and phosphoryl
fluoride, both toxic gases1; there will also be combustion products from all the various other
1 'HF is a toxic, corrosive, light weight gas that can penetrate some types of protective gear. A new study however
indicate[s] that protective gears protect much better against [hydrogen fluoride] penetration than previously
thought. Firefighters may be hesitant to approach a burning [electric vehicle] without wearing a chemical suit…
[T]he amount of [hydrogen fluoride] measured in the smoke plume during their fire tests was above the safe
threshold… but the [hydrogen fluoride] concentration near the firefighter closest to the burning vehicle was below
the same threshold. However, smoke concentration experienced by firefighters is highly scenario dependent and
for a confined space it may be much higher. Fire tests have also found that applying water mist to [li-ion] fires
increases the production of [hydrogen fluoride] significantly during the application process, although the total
amount of [hydrogen fluoride] produced during the fires did not change' RISE report 2019: 50, Fire safety of
lithium-ion batteries in road vehicles.
22
components (e.g. plastics) – carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, smoke, particulate matter, etc.
In practice, this may involve taking flammable gas detection measurements (LEL) at points
around a facility as well as referring to results of local air pollution monitoring. Responders
should be aware of the hazards of coming into contact with, and stepping through, post-fire
battery waste (corrosive and toxic) and so should always wear appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE). Hazmat guidance should be followed, and the manufacturers of cells may
need to be consulted for information and material safety data sheets (MSDS) for certain
battery compounds or decomposition by-products.
It is difficult to say with certainty how long after the fire extinguishment before the danger
of reignition or off-gassing has passed. Research into electric vehicle batteries by The Fire
Protection Research Foundation showed that off-gassing and reignition occurred 22 hours
after battery fire event (Best practices for emergency response to incidents involving electric
vehicles battery hazards: a report on full-scale testing results). The Kahuku wind farm
lead-acid battery fire smouldered for 36 hours. Therefore, the timescales involved are likely
to be measured in terms of days, rather than hours.
3.7.2 Environmental issues
The primary concerns regarding potential for harm to the environment are smoke and
toxic gases, battery waste and contaminated firewater run-off (water runoff may be highly
toxic, likely containing HF). Steps such as monitoring local air quality, containing both AFP
systems, and manual firefighting operations, water application, and correctly dealing with,
and disposing of, post-fire battery waste, are essential and should, wherever possible, be
pre-planned.
Li-ion battery firewater run-off has been shown to have elevated levels of fluoride and
chloride. 'According to German regulations, these concentrations are too high to be released
directly into the environment, meaning that the run-off water must be sent to a wastewater
treatment plant' (RISE report 2019: 50, Fire safety of lithium-ion batteries in road vehicles).
Water run-off will also pick up other contaminants from non-battery elements being burned,
as well as fire suppression systems, etc. Run-off is covered to some extent in FM Global,
Development of sprinkler protection guidance for lithium ion-based energy storage systems.
It should be recognised that, as battery technology advances, there may be substances

or decomposition products present within cells or given off as they combust that may be
unknown at present and require special consideration. Throughout the planning stages for a
battery storage facility, these substances should be reviewed so that potential environmental
hazards can be factored into fire response. Both cell manufacturers and environmental
authorities may be consulted on such issues.
3.7.3 Dealing with burnt and unburnt cells
Local environmental legislation and arrangements should be followed when considering the
disposal of fire-involved batteries. In terms of immediate clean-up, it is advisable to segregate
burnt and unburnt cells as far as possible. This may be difficult: at the time of publication,
details are emerging of the 19 April 2019 Phoenix, Arizona battery fire, and how 'the parties
had to invent a painstaking technique to safely remove the burned up battery cells from the
otherwise functional batteries surrounding them' (Green Tech Media).
23
Prior to cleanup, and particularly before collection and disposal of batteries is attempted,
it should be verified that residual heat has dissipated, to avoid further thermal runaway
or heated batteries affecting cells that have not reacted or are seemingly undamaged. It
is possible that cells appearing undamaged might have started to degrade and may be
unstable.
Currently, there is no definitive guidance or standard on post-fire precautions, clean-up or

salvage for battery installations. Generally, however, any substances and/or electrolyte from
leaking batteries that are in liquid or gel state, and any non-combustible material such as
earth, sand or vermiculite used to absorb them, should be contained. Shipping or 'meta'
containers may be used to store leaking cells or contaminated absorbent material until it can
be safely disposed of in line with local procedures for batteries and hazardous waste. Again,
any unreacted cells should be stored separately, preferably in the open air in an area at least
15 m away from large battery inventories, structures or any other potential fire exposures. It
is advisable to store 'unreacted' cells in smaller, discrete quantities to minimise fire incident
size in case of ignition and subsequent fire. Such storage can be regularly monitored, if
possible, for signs of self-heating – e.g. using thermal imaging cameras.
24
ANNEX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A.1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
anode Negatively charged electrode of an electrical device, such as a

primary cell, that supplies current.
battery An assembly consisting of one or more cells, in which chemical
energy is converted into electricity and used as a source of
power (see also 'cell'.)
cathode Positively charged electrode of an electrical device, such as a
primary cell, that supplies current.
cell A single unit that converts chemical energy into electrical
energy.
combustion The process of burning involving the rapid chemical combination
of a substance with oxygen or other supporters of combustion.
The process usually results in the production of heat and light
and is often characterised by flaming and the generation of
combustion products.
combustion products End products when fuels remain after the process of
combustion. Thus, these are released and scattered into the
atmosphere or other environmental receptors such as the
ground and watercourses. Often visualised as smoke, but there
may also be invisible combustion products (e.g. gases) or solid/
liquid products.
controlled burn[out] An operational strategy where the application of firefighting
media such as water or foam is restricted or avoided, to
minimise damage to public health and the environment.
electrolyte Chemical medium that allows the flow of electrical charge
between the cathode and anode e.g. the lithium salt in a
solvent, present in a Li-ion cell.
HAZMAT Abbreviation for 'Hazardous Materials'. May include materials
(such as flammable or poisonous substances) that would be
a danger to life or to the environment if released without
precautions.
lithium ion A type of rechargeable battery in which lithium ions move from
(Li-ion) [battery] the negative electrode to the positive electrode during discharge
and back when charging.
pre-fire plan A document with agreed procedures and actions to be taken
in the event of fire. A typical plan contains details of process
control and fire response strategies, resources required and
incident potential hazards to assist responders in managing a
fire incident.
25
A.2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BMS battery management system

CB control burn
CO2 carbon dioxide
DRA dynamic risk assessment
ESS energy storage system
HVAC heating ventilation and air conditioning
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LEL flammable gas detection measurement
LFP lithium iron phosphate (a type of lithium ion cell chemistry)
Li-ion lithium-ion
MSDS material safety data sheet
Li-po lithium polymer
MW megawatts
NCM/MNC lithium nickel manganese cobalt (a type of lithium ion cell chemistry)
PFP passive fire protection
PPE personal protective equipment
UPS uninterruptible power supply
26
ANNEX B
REFERENCES
Energy Institute (EI)

https://publishing.energyinst.org/
Battery storage guidance note 1: Battery storage planning
Model code of safe practice part 19: Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage
installations
Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA)

https://www.ciria.org/
CIRIA 736, Containment systems for the prevention of pollution: Secondary, tertiary and
other measures for industrial and commercial premises
FM Global
https://www.fmglobal.com/
Development of sprinkler protection guidance for lithium ion-based energy storage systems
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

https://www.hse.gov.uk/
INDG 139, Using electric storage batteries safely
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

https://www.iec.ch/
BS EN IEC 62485-1, Safety requirements for secondary batteries and battery installations.
General safety information
IEC 62133, Secondary cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes –
Safety requirements for portable sealed secondary cells, and for batteries made from them,
for use in portable applications
Research Institutes of Sweden (RISE)

https://www.sp.se/en/Sidor/default.aspx
RISE report 2019: 50, Fire safety of lithium-ion batteries in road vehicles
UL
https://www.ul.com
UL 1973, Batteries for use in light electric rail (LER) applications and stationary applications
Various authors
Green Tech Media, The Arizona battery explosion is changing conventional wisdom on
safety, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizona-battery-explosion-
conventional-wisdom-safety
27
This publication has been produced as a result of
work carried out within the Technical Team of the
Energy Institute (EI), funded by the EI’s Technical
Partners and other stakeholders. The EI’s Technical
Work Programme provides industry with cost
effective, value adding knowledge on key current
and future issues affecting those operating in the
Energy Institute energy industry.
61 New Cavendish Street
London W1G 7AR, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7467 7100
e: pubs@energyinst.org
www.energyinst.org
9781787251731
ISBN 978 1 78725 173 1

Registered Charity Number: 1097899

Battery Storage Guidance Note 2jk PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Battery Storage Guidance Note 2jk PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Battery storage guidance note 2: Battery energy

storage system fire planning and response

The EI is licensed by:

For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org

BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd Qatar Petroleum

Copyright © 2020 by the Energy Institute, London.

ISBN 978 1 78725 173 1

Published by the Energy Institute

3 Pre-fire planning, fire response and aftermath������������������������������������������������������������ 17

Annex A Glossary of terms, acronyms and abbreviations������������������������������������������������ 25

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLE

Figure 1 General arrangement of a facility within a dedicated building (NB: ‘process’

Table 1 Summary of battery types, chemistries and potential hazards���������������������������������� 12

The EI welcomes feedback on its publications. Feedback or suggested revisions should be

Jacob Allinson RWE

Daniel Rawdin SSE

Affiliations correct at time of contribution.

2 OVERVIEW OF BATTERY FIRES

2.1 TYPICAL FACILITIES AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDANCE

2. The battery units. 4. Transformers. These ‘step

5. Electricity out. The

Figure 1: General arrangement of a facility within a dedicated building (NB: 'process'

Figure 2: 'Banks' of batteries

Figure 3: Outdoor (cabinet style) battery bank

Figure 4: Typical ISO container type facility

2.2 BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE TYPES

Table 1: Summary of battery types, chemistries and potential hazards

Type of battery Chemistry/characteristics Potential fire hazards

2.3 HOW BATTERY FIRES START OR ARE INITIATED

Electrolyte Flammable gas/

2.4 HOW BATTERY FIRES BEHAVE

2.4.2 Lithium-ion (Li-ion)

Overheating of Li-ion cells typically results in a self-accelerating reaction called thermal

Figure 6: Vigorous, sparking stage of combustion of a pack of consumer Li-ion

Figure 7: Batteries in Figure 6 undergoing more intense flaming and explosive

2.5 BATTERY FIRE EFFECTS ON FACILITY AND SURROUNDINGS

Figure 8: Battery container fire, Belgium 2017

Figure 9: Battery-containing warehouse fire at Hawaii wind farm

3 PRE-FIRE PLANNING, FIRE RESPONSE AND AFTERMATH

3.1 PRE-FIRE PLANNING

The pre-fire plan should address the following:

3.2 IMMEDIATE SITE PERSONNEL ACTIONS

3.3 COMBUSTION PRODUCTS

3.4 HOW SHOULD BATTERY FIRES BE EXTINGUISHED?

3.5 RISKS TO FIREFIGHTERS

3.6 POST BATTERY FIRE ISSUES

3.7 AFTERMATH OF FIRE

3.7.1 Safety issues

3.7.2 Environmental issues

It should be recognised that, as battery technology advances, there may be substances

3.7.3 Dealing with burnt and unburnt cells

Currently, there is no definitive guidance or standard on post-fire precautions, clean-up or

A.1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

anode Negatively charged electrode of an electrical device, such as a

A.2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BMS battery management system

Energy Institute (EI)

Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA)

Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

Research Institutes of Sweden (RISE)

ISBN 978 1 78725 173 1

You might also like

3 Pre-fire planning, fire response and aftermath�� 17

Annex A Glossary of terms, acronyms and abbreviations�� 25

Figure 1 General arrangement of a facility within a dedicated building (NB: ‘process’

Table 1 Summary of battery types, chemistries and potential hazards�� 12