Aa Mip

Table of Contents
MIP 1: Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI), External Atmospheric Corrosion, and Corrosion Under
Fireproofing (CUF)..................................................................................................................... 1
MIP 2: Wet H2S Cracking...................................................................................................................... 6
MIP 3: Brittle Fracture (Including LPG Storage Vessels)...................................................................9
MIP 4: Dead Leg Corrosion................................................................................................................ 12
MIP 5: High Temperature Hydrogen Attack......................................................................................15
MIP 6: Injection/Mix Point Corrosion.................................................................................................18
MIP 7: Elevated Temperature Sulfur/Naphthenic Acid Corrosion...................................................21
MIP 8: Caustic, Amine, Carbonate and Wet CO/CO2 Stress Corrosion Cracking.........................25
MIP 9: Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking......................................................................................31
MIP 10: Refractory Damage.................................................................................................................. 33
MIP 11: H2S/H2 Corrosion.................................................................................................................... 35
MIP 12: Corrosion Under Deposits...................................................................................................... 37
MIP 13: Elevated Temperature Cracking Of Cr-Mo Steels.................................................................40
MIP 14: Soil Corrosion.......................................................................................................................... 42
MIP 15: Sour Water Corrosion.............................................................................................................. 44
MIP 16: Alkaline (Amine/Caustic/Carbonate/Sulfinol/Sulfolane) Corrosion.....................................47
MIP 17: Polythionic Acid Stress Corrosion Cracking (PASCC).........................................................50
MIP 18: Furnace Tube Oxidation And Creep.......................................................................................53
MIP 19: Deaerator Cracking And Corrosion........................................................................................ 57
MIP 20: Corrosion At Pipe Supports.................................................................................................... 59
MIP 21: Corrosion By Acids (HCl and H2SO4)....................................................................................61
MIP 22: Thermal And Low Cycle Fatigue............................................................................................67
MIP 23: Ring Joint Flange Cracking.................................................................................................... 70
MIP 24: Degradation Of Non-Metallic Materials..................................................................................72
MIP 25: Hydrofluoric Acid Corrosion And Cracking..........................................................................74
MIP 26: Mechanical High Cycle Fatigue..............................................................................................78
MIP 27: Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking Of Copper Alloys......................................................80
MIP 28: Fuel Ash Corrosion................................................................................................................. 82
MIP 29: Flue Gas Corrosion................................................................................................................. 84
MIP 30: Carburization............................................................................................................................ 86
MIP 31: Hydriding Of Titanium............................................................................................................. 88
MIP 32: MEA/Flexsorb Reclaimer Corrosion.......................................................................................90
MIP 33: Phenol And NMP Corrosion.................................................................................................... 92
MIP 34: Cooling Water Corrosion........................................................................................................ 95
MIP 35: Steam Condensate Corrosion................................................................................................98
MIP 36: Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking Of Carbon Steel......................................................102
MIP 37: Liquid Metal Embrittlement................................................................................................... 104
MIP 38: Metal Dusting......................................................................................................................... 106
MIP 39: Zirconium and Hastelloy B2 Stress Corrosion Cracking In Sulfuric Acid........................108
MIP 40: Erosion And Corrosion-Erosion...........................................................................................110
MIP 41: Nitriding.................................................................................................................................. 112
MIP 42: Hydrogen Embrittlement....................................................................................................... 114
MIP 43: Embrittlement of Ferritic and Duplex SS.............................................................................116
MIP 44: Unidentified Uniform Corrosion...........................................................................................118
MIP 45: Unidentified Localized Corrosion.........................................................................................120
RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 1

MIP 1: Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI), External
Atmospheric Corrosion, and Corrosion Under
Fireproofing (CUF)
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
External atmospheric corrosion and corrosion under insulation (CUI) and corrosion under fireproofing
(CUF) are the most widespread types of corrosion in process plants. The three types of external
corrosion include:
1a) Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI)

CUI may occur when equipment or piping operates at temperatures between 25ºF and 250ºF
(-4ºC and 121ºC) if ingress of water (due to rain, steam tracing, leakages, cooling tower drift or
condensation) is possible under the insulation jacketing.
Local climate (i.e. high humidity, marine environment) may affect the extent of the problem. Also,
intermittent operating temperatures may aggravate the problem. Due to the hidden character of
CUI, it is difficult to detect. Low spots, vessels attachments on which water may collect or
connections protruding through the insulation jacketing (thereby providing a path for water to
enter the insulation) are the most susceptible areas for CUI.
A special form of CUI is chloride SCC of austenitic stainless steel in a marine environment or in
case of unintentional spraying with brackish or salt (fire) water. Chlorides may also be present in
the insulation itself, and can be leached out when wet, leading to SCC. This is covered in MIP 9.
1b) External Atmospheric Corrosion

Atmospheric corrosion problems on bare steel equipment will for a large extent coincide with a
poor appearance of the paint condition and can easily be detected. At several locations, external
corrosion can be more severe; at pipe supports (particularly if the line is insulated but cut away at
the support), at air-to soil interfaces and where piping in trenches is exposed to mud or water.
1c) Corrosion Under Fireproofing

Steel structures covered with concrete fireproofing may be subject to corrosion when water
penetrates to the steel. The corrosion will accelerate in highly industrialized areas with high SO 2
levels in the atmosphere. Corrosion can be very aggressive if a high chloride containing water is
used to mix the concrete fireproofing. The corrosion products can cause cracking and spalling of
the concrete. Corrosion has also occurred under intumescent fireproofing.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Coat piping and equipment to prevent water/corrosives from contacting the metal surface (this
applies to all three corrosion mechanisms).
· Use a pipe support detail which removes the crevice and provides access for painting and
inspection (see MIP 20). Corrosion under insulation, providing an adequate weather/vapor
barrier including sealing of attachments and nozzles will provide additional protection from
corrosive attack.
· Insure low chloride containing water is used to mix concrete fireproofing.
· QA to ensure correct coating (and insulation systems) are applied.
· Coat surface of fireproofing and seal tops of supports.

Available Technologies
· IP 19-1-1 (Paints and Protective Coatings) -- this applies to all three corrosion mechanisms
discussed here.
· IP 14-1-1 and 14-2-1 (Insulation System Design) -- this applies to corrosion under insulation.
· CE.16E.82, "Thermal Insulation for Design, Installation, and Inspection to Control CUI"
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
1a) Corrosion Under Insulation
Operations personnel identifies the insulated equipment/piping susceptible to CUI based on either
continuously or intermittently operating in the CUI temperature range 25º F to 250º F (-4 ºC to
121ºC).
Inspection personnel prioritizes susceptible piping/equipment and performs inspection.

Prioritization is based upon factors such as the condition of insulation jacketing, piping geometry
(i.e., low points), the presence of breaks in the insulation (i.e., small diameter connections
protruding through the insulation), proximity to cooling tower spray, evidence of rust staining, the
presence of water-retaining attachments, and whether the piping/equipment has been
coated/insulated appropriately to avoid corrosion under insulation.
1b) Atmospheric Corrosion

Inspection personnel visually identifies piping/equipment experiencing external corrosion and
requiring maintenance painting, paying particular attention to piping in trenches which may be
partially immersed in mud/water and pipe supports. Line may require lifting for adequate
inspection at supports.

Operations personnel identifies the fireproofed equipment/structural steel susceptible to corrosion
under fireproofing based on either continuously or intermittently operating in the temperature
range of 25ºF to 250ºF (-4ºC to 121ºC).
Inspection personnel prioritizes susceptible equipment/structural steel and performs inspection.

Prioritization is based upon factors such as: the presence of cracking in the fireproofing, whether
rust staining is visible and whether the equipment has been coated appropriately to avoid
corrosion under fireproofing.
1a) Corrosion Under Insulation
- Strip insulation and visually inspect
- Neutron backscatter (EE.25E.94)
- Pipe crawler (EE.25E.94)
- Eddy current technology (EE.25E.94)
- Real time radiography (EE.103E.90, EE.25E.94)
- Flash radiography (EE.27E.88, EE.75E.89)
- Conventional radiography (NDT Manual Section 6-5-1)
1b) Atmospheric Corrosion

- Visual inspection

- Potential measurement of steel beneath concrete (Guide to the Inspection of Plant Structures
and EE.78E.79)
- Strip fireproofing and visually inspect.

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Application and maintenance of appropriate coating and insulation (for CUI) systems.
· Correct design of pipe supports and insulation system details
· Sealing and coating of fireproofing
REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

· CUI Detection Strategy & Methods (EE.25E.94)
· API Piping Inspection Code API 570, 1st Edition, June 1993
· ER&E Piping Maintenance Guide, TMEE 010, Dec. 1990
· Guide to the Inspection of Plant Structures, EETD 0071
• CE.16E.82 “Thermal Insulation for Design, Installation, and Inspection to Control CUI”
• IP 14-1-1
• IP-19-1-1
• NACE Publication, “Corrosion Under Wet Thermal Insulation”

RBI PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT
(1a) Corrosion Under Insulation
Applies if metal temperature is between 25°F (-4°C) and 250°F (121° C). In general, the metal
temperature will be about the same as the process temperature for insulated equipment;
however, if the insulation is damaged and/or highly humid, rainy or windy conditions commonly
exist, a process temperature significantly above 250°F (121°C) can result in metal temperatures
low enough to cause CUI.
Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

A Non-coated equipment exposed to marine, cooling tower drift or
Possibility of Repeated Incidents sweating environments and greater than 15 years old.
B Non-coated equipment exposed to marine, cooling tower drift or
Possibility of Isolated Incidents sweating environments and greater than 5 years old.
C Non-coated equipment exposed to industrial environments and
Possibility to Occur Sometime greater than 10 years old.
D Coated equipment exposed to marine, cooling tower drift,
Not Likely But Possible sweating conditions or industrial environment and greater than 20
years old.
E Coated equipment exposed to marine, cooling tower drift,
Practically Impossible sweating conditions or industrial environment and less than 20
years old.
Note: If insulation is in poor condition, it may be appropriate to increase the probability level by 1.
· Age Adjustment: Does not apply.

· Inspection Adjustments: Removing the insulation and visually inspecting, radiographic
examination or eddy current inspection with an inspection frequency consistent with API 570
results in a reduction in the probability of up to 3 levels as follows:
- 1 level reduction for 10% inspection effort
- Up to 3 level reduction for 100% inspection effort
· Monitoring Adjustments: Does not apply
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum probability reduction is 3.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak

(1b) Atmospheric Corrosion

A Does not apply
Possibility of Repeated Incidents
B Does not apply
Possibility of Isolated Incidents
C Pressure equipment with severe rusting and significant
Possibility to Occur Sometime metal loss on the external surface
D Structures with severe rusting and significant metal loss
Not Likely But Possible on the external surface
E Coated or non-coated pressure equipment or structures
Practically Impossible displaying severe rusting but no noticable metal loss
· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

· Inspection Adjustments: Follow-up thickness measurements on severely rusted areas
displaying no significant metal loss results in a reduction in the probability of 1 level.
· Monitoring Adjustments: Does not apply.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in the probability permitted is 1.

· Expected Failure Mode: Leak or structural instability.

(1c) Corrosion Under Fireproofing

A Does not apply
B Fireproofing on pressure vessels showing visible signs of
Possibility of Isolated Incidents extensive cracking, concrete spalling and rust staining.
C Fireproofing on structures showing visible signs of extensive
Possibility to Occur Sometime cracking, concrete spalling and rust staining.
D Visible signs of cracking and rust staining.
Not Likely But Possible
E No visible signs of cracking or rust staining.
Practically Impossible
Note: This assumes that the visual inspection of the fireproofing is performed every 5 years
consistent with API 510 requirements.

· Inspection Adjustments: Removing the fireproofing and visually inspecting, radiographic
examination or performing a thickness scan from a non-fireproofed side if accessible every 5
years can result in a reduction of up to 3 probability levels.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction is the probability permitted is 3.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak or structural instability.

MIP 2: Wet H2S Cracking
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Wet H2S service is defined as continuous exposure to free water containing 50 ppm, or more, H 2S. Acidic
solutions and those containing cyanides are the most aggressive. This environment can produce the
following types of damage:
· Sulfide Stress Cracking (SSC). Straight transgranular cracking found in hard welds, hard HAZ's
or high strength (>90 ksi YS) materials (eg. B7 studs).
· Stress Oriented Hydrogen Induced Cracking (SOHIC). A stepped small blister and crack
combination running at a steep through-wall angle, usually adjacent to high residual welding,
stresses or concentrated stresses at notches, pits, or cracks.
· Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC). A stepped blister and crack combination running at a shallow
through-wall angle. Blistering is usually associated with small nonmetallic inclusions distributed
throughout the steel plate.
· Blistering. Surface bulges resulting from hydrogen trapped at laminations.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design or Operations personnel to identify equipment in Wet H 2S service.
· Materials Specialist/Inspection personnel recommends appropriate metallurgy for new equipment.
· Requirements for PWHT of pressure vessels and piping in Wet H2S service are met.
· Alloy cladding, duplex stainless steel or metallic and nonmetallic coatings are utilized for high and
medium risk Wet H2S service as defined in the Manual for Equipment in Wet H 2S Service when
new equipment is purchased.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel identifies equipment in Wet H2S service and identifies changes in operation
that could impact Wet H2S levels in equipment.
· Inspection personnel maintains list of Wet H2S exposed equipment.
· Inspection personnel categorizes, prioritizes, plans and performs inspections.
· Reinspections made as required.
· Abrasive blast surface and inspect with wet fluorescent (or wet visible over a white background)
magnetic particle (WFMP) technique (EE.85E.89, EE.102E.90)
· Acoustic Emission Testing (EE.36E.86, EE.37E.87)
· Eddy Current Testing (EE.117E.92, EE.101E.93)
· Shear Wave Ultrasonics (EE.117E.92)
· Inspection strategies for Wet H2S service are contained in Chapter 2 and Appendix A of the
Manual for Equipment in Wet H2S Service.
· Monitoring sour water H S and CN- levels for change and polysulfide injection effectiveness.
2
RCMM July-2020 MIP 2 Wet H2S Cracking · 7

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection personnel recommends repair techniques including weld procedures, heat treatments
and inspection requirements.
· Inspection recommends techniques to prevent or reduce the probability of Wet H 2S cracking.
· Fitness for Service Guide (TMEE 017) gives methodology for analyzing cracks and blisters and is
employed when appropriate .
· Polysulfide injection/water wash reduces CN- aggressiveness.
· PWHT reduces but does not eliminate potential for HIC or SOHIC. PWHT at 1150ºF (620ºC)
minimum recommended. If PWHT is to be done on equipment which has already been in
Wet H2S service, a 480-575ºF (250-300ºC) bakeout is recommended. Unnecessary PWHT
should be avoided because of the risk of causing further damage.
· Organic coatings
· Alloy overlays and striplining eliminate need to PWHT, although striplining is only recommended
for repairs.
· Detailed Descriptions are contained in the Manual for Equipment in Wet H 2S Service.

Exxon and Affiliates:
· TMEE-018, "ERE/EPRCO Manual for Equipment in Wet H2S Service"
· TMEE-010, "Fitness for Service Guide"
· EE.10E.88, "Evaluation of Non-Destructive Cracks Sizing Methods"
Industry Standards & Recommended Practices:
· NACE MR-0175-90 "Sulfide Stress Cracking Resistant Materials for Oilfield Equipment". This
standard provides materials recommendations and hardness limitations for a wide range of
materials to prevent sulfide stress cracking.
· NACE RP-0472-87 - "Methods and Controls to Prevent In-Service Cracking of Carbon Steel
Welds in P-1 Materials in Corrosive Refining Environments". This is a Recommended Practice
document providing specific hardness guidelines. This is currently being updated to include
hardnesses of weld heat affected zones (HAZ).

(2) Wet H2S Cracking (HIC, SOHIC, blister)

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C PF* ³ 90
Possibility to Occur Sometime
D 90 > PF* ³ 70
E PF* < 70
*Where PF is calculated as follows: PF = U + H + P

Where U is Unit factor: Where H is History Factor: Where P is PWHT Factor:
U H P
Cat Light Ends = Cracking and blistering Non-PWHT = 30
30 experienced = 40
Hydrotreating and Blistering only experienced = PWHT = 20
MEA Units = 20 30
Pipestills = 10 Shallowing cracking (no Grade 60 Steel Plus
deeper than 1/8 in.) or no PWHT = 10
previous inspection history =
20
Demonstrated no cracking or
blistering = 10

· Inspection Adjustments: Performing an inspection in compliance with the recommended
inspection level and frequency included in the Manual for Equipment in Wet H 2S Service and
finding no cracking results in a 1 level reduction in probability. If 2 consecutive inspections show
no cracking, the equipment item can be removed from consideration for Wet H 2S cracking .
· Monitoring Adjustments: If a program to inject polysulfide and wash water is in place to reduce
CN- and the stream is analyzed for CN- to verify the reduction, the probability level can be
reduced by 1 level.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: Based on the level of inspection performed and monitoring
conducted, a maximum reduction of 2 is permitted.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely, rupture possible

MIP 3: Brittle Fracture (Including LPG Storage
Vessels)
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Brittle fracture occurs in ferritic steels when a crack propagates with no appreciable plastic deformation. It
is normally rapid and catastrophic. For brittle fracture to occur, the stress intensity of a crack-like flaw
must be higher than the critical stress intensity for the material. In most cases, brittle fracture occurs at a
temperature below the transition temperature, the point at which the toughness of the material drops off
sharply. Strain age embrittlement can take place in steels of low Al content (<0.015 wt%) and can lead to
reduced toughness of the heat affected zone (HAZ) and surrounding base metal.
Critical Exposure Temperature (CET) is the lowest temperature that the equipment is exposed to a
significant stress. For pressure vessels, this is a pressure greater than 25 to 40% of the Design Pressure
and considers normal, upset, hydrotest and atmospheric conditions.
Minimum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT) is the minimum acceptable operating temperature based
on material brittle fracture resistance for the material, thickness and heat treatments. The MSOT can be
a single temperature or an envelope of temperatures, depending on stress.
Minimum Design Metal Temperature (MDMT) is a term defined in the ASME Code Section VII Div. to
define the acceptable operating temperature. It is equivalent to the MSOT.
Cr-Mo steels can be susceptible to temper embrittlement which will cause the MSOT to increase as a
result of extended exposures to elevated temperatures..
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design personnel establish the CET taking into account the possibility for low
temperature excursions. Consideration is given to start-up, shutdown, standby, atmospheric
conditions, hydrotest conditions, auto-refrigeration or shock chilling. It should also include
consideration of other equipment failure modes.
· Materials Engineer selects materials, weld procedures and heat treatments and specifies impact
testing requirements so that MSOT/ MDMT are equal to or lower than the CET.
· Materials/Mechanical Engineer performs assessment of equipment for brittle fracture as outlined
in "Fitness for Service Guide" Section 9.
· For repairs/alterations to existing equipment, Inspection/Fixed Equipment Engineer ensure that
the CET/MSOT and susceptibility to embrittlement are known. Follow appropriate procedures
described in "Fitness for Service Guide" Section 9.
· TMEE 017, "Fitness for Service Guide"
· IP 18-6-1, "Impact Testing for Materials"
· ASME "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code", Section VIII, Division 1
RCMM July-2020 MIP 3 Brittle Fracture · 10

DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection/Fixed Equipment Engineer to determine MSOT for vessels, tanks and piping as
appropriate.
· Operations personnel to determine lowest operating temperatures and corresponding pressures.
· Fixed Equipment Engineer to determine whether vessel meets requirements per Levels 1&2 of
the Fitness for Service Guide.
· Operations personnel and Fixed Equipment Engineer to determine whether Level 3 of Fitness for
Service applies (i.e. "Grandfather Clause" that the equipment has survived the most extreme
conditions of stress and temperature and that deterioration such as embrittlement or crack growth
cannot occur).
· If equipment does not meet Level 1, 2 or 3, Fixed Equipment Specialist performs a Level 4
assessment.
· Inspection personnel perform level of inspection appropriate to level of assessment and
reinspections for repairs.
· Wet magnetic particle testing for Detection of crack-like flaws.
· Hydrotest at 150% Design Pressure supported by acoustic emission testing. Hydrotest
temperature based on IP 5-1-3 or selected to extend MSOT envelope.
· Shearwave ultrasonics for crack sizing
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel to define special warm start-up procedures to ensure equipment operates
above MSOT.
· Operations personnel determine whether operating pressure can be reduced during lower
temperature operation.
· PWHT equipment to enhance toughness and reduce residual stresses and/or effects of strain-
age embrittlement.
· Qualify MSOT by hydrotest (supported by AET as described in fitness for Service Guide, Section
9).
· IP 18-6-1, "Impact Testing for Materials"
· ASME "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code", Section VIII, Division 1

· EE.99E.90, "Inspection, Assessment, Repair and Fabrication of Pressurized LPG Storage
Vessels"
· IP 18-6-1, "Impact Testing for Materials" - explained by EE.76E.88
· EE.10E.88, "Evaluation of Non-Destructive Crack Sizing Methods"
· API RP 653, "Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction"
· ASME VIII Division 1&2 "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"
· BS PD 6493, "Guidance for Some Methods for the Derivation of Acceptance Levels for Defects in
Fusion Welded Joints"

(3) Brittle Fracture (includes Temper Embrittlement)

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C Does not apply
D Does not meet brittle fracture guidelines in
Not Likely But Possible Section 9 of FFS Guide
E Meets Level 2, 3 or 4 assessment
Practically Impossible guidelines in Section 9 of in FSS Guide
Note: If equipment meets requirements of IP18-6-1 or Level 1 assessment
guidelines in Section 9 of FFS Guide brittle fracture is not a probable event.

· Inspection Adjustments: Does not apply
· Overall Adjusted Probability: Does not apply
· Expected Failure Mode: Rupture

MIP 4: Dead Leg Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Dead legs are lengths of piping in stagnant service (i.e. no flow). They may be due to extensions of
piping for support, either "live" (exposed to the process stream) or "dummy" (not exposed to the process
but open-ended so that moisture can accumulate). Dead legs also include piping with infrequent flow
such as by-passes or safety valve inlet lines. Dead legs are also caused by small diameter connections
such as vents and drains on main piping lines. Dead leg corrosion rates are often significantly higher
than those on the associated pipe, particularly at low spots. Pitting and/or under deposit corrosion is the
most common form of attack.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Do not use live piping extensions for support.
· Minimize use of dummy supports - use structural members.
· Design block valves between regular and intermittent process lines and depressure and purge
dead leg where practical or when allowed (not Safety Valves). This is particularly important
where the intermittent line is of a lesser alloy than the main equipment.
· Eliminate dummy supports and dead legs when no longer in service.
· NPQC personnel to ensure correct supports used and process dead legs challenged.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations/Inspection personnel to identify dead legs and dummy supports
· Inspection personnel to maintain list of dead legs
· Place on frequent inspection program - appropriate with RBI assessment and results of
inspections.
· Ensure Management of Change procedures identify creation of new dead legs as a result of
maintenance or changing process conditions
· HAZOP process with Inspection and Operations personnel to identify dead legs
· Radiography
· Scanning ultrasonics such as B-scan
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· For intermittent dead legs - depressure and purge line
· Seal all supports to avoid rainwater entrapment against live process equipment.
· Remove unnecessary dead legs
RCMM July-2020 MIP 4 Dead Leg Corrosion · 13

· EE.37E.80, "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Dead Legs in Refinery Piping"
· EEEEE 0007, "Materials Engineering Guide", Section III-S
· API 570 - Piping Inspection Code

(4a) Dead Leg Corrosion-Process piping dead legs including piping to safety valves

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C Corrosive dead leg as follows:
Possibility to Occur Sometime 1) dead legs where deposits and/or water can collect and cause
underdeposit corrosion
- sour water service where FeS scale can collect
- crude preheat train where BS&W can collect (normally
upstream of the desalter)
2) dead legs where corrosive condensate can form
- APS overhead
- Powerformer streams containing Cl- ions
- Hydrotreating effluent gas streams and stripper overheads
- Sour Water Stripper overhead
3) Steam traced dead legs
D Does not apply
E Non-corrosive dead leg as follows:
Practically Impossible - clean service such as ethylene and clean LPG
- hot oil circuits
- clean product lines
- lines that are drained or flushed to maintain clean conditions
· Inspection Adjustments: The following inspection adjustments can be made:
- 2 probability reductions are permitted if 100% inspection of the deadleg is performed.
- 1 probability reduction is permitted if 10% of the dead leg is inspected and metal loss is
considered to be comparatively uniform.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability is 2.

(4b) Dead Leg Corrosion-Small diameter connections (vents and drains)

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C Vents and drains in potentally corrosive conditions as
Possibility to Occur Sometime follows:
1) Uninsulated/bare small diameter connections on
insulated lines
2) Small diameter connections on the bottom of lines
where corrosive condensate can collect. Services
include:
- APS overhead
- Powerformer streams containing Cl- ions
- Hydrotreating stripper overheads
- Sour Water Stripper overhead
3) Alloy lines which can inadvertently contain carbon steel
small diameter connections, such as:
- carbon steel small diameter connections on 5 Cr line
in hot crude service
D Does not apply
E Does not apply
Note: Failure of small diameter connections that are in non-corrosive service is not considered a
probable event. Non-corrosive service for small diameter connections include:
- small diameter connections containing the same non-corrosive fluid as the connected
piping
- small diameter connections with insulation in good condition to prevent the condensation
of corrosive condensates. If insulation is in poor condition it will also be necessary to
evaluate for corrosion under insulation as detailed in MIP 1a.

· Inspection Adjustments: The following inspection adjustments can be made:
- 2 probability reductions are permitted if 100% of the small diameter connections are
inspected. This includes the use of radiography.
- 1 probability reduction is permitted if 10% of the small diameter connections are inspected
focusing on connections most susceptible to corrosion. This includes the use of radiography.

MIP 5: High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
High temperature hydrogen can affect carbon and low alloy steels operating at a high temperature and
hydrogen partial pressure. Hydrogen atoms react with carbides in the steel to form methane. Carbide
stabilizers such as Cr, Mo, W, V, Ti, and Nb can improve resistance to methane formation. The attack
takes the form of decarburization (both surface and internal), microfissuring, blistering and eventually
gross cracking. It commonly initiates at higher stress areas, both residual (e.g. non-PWHT welds) and
applied (e.g. nozzle to shell joint). Cold work decreases the time for attack. The Nelson Curves (as
described in API Publication 941), which have been modified over the years, show the limits for various
grades of steel as a function of temperature and partial pressure of hydrogen. H 2 partial pressure in
liquids is assumed to be the same as the vapor partial pressure.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Materials specialist to select alloy to meet Nelson Curves for all operating requirements. A 50ºF
(28ºC) safety factor above the maximum expected operating temperature is normally
recommended. The hydrogen attack resistance of C-Mo steels shall be considered equivalent to
that of carbon steel.
· PWHT will improve resistance to hydrogen attack but is not normally required.
· Inspection to do Positive Materials Identification (PMI) to ensure correct alloy is installed.
· IP 18-2-1, "Materials for Hydrogen Service"
· IP 18-3-4, "Casting Quality for Alloy Valves in Hydrogen Service and High Pressure Service"
· X-ray fluorescence (Texas Nuclear and Outukumpu) and emission spectroscopy (Spectro
Analytical ) for PMI
· RCMM Section VI-D, "Forms of Corrosion and Metallurgical Attack"
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection and Operations personnel to identify all C-½ Mo equipment in H 2 service and review
conditions for other materials in H2 service.
· Operations personnel to identify normal and maximum temperatures and partial pressures of H 2.
· Inspection of "B" range equipment as defined in EE.99E.84 normally expected. "A" range
equipment may be monitored as needed on a risk basis.
· Advanced ultrasonic backscatter technique (AUBT)
· Ultrasonic attenuation, backscatter and velocity ratio techniques
· Shear wave ultrasonics and radiography of welds
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Review best economic option for B-range equipment - inspect vs. replace since repair of damage
is difficult.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 5 H2 Attack · 16

· EE.58E.88, "Ultrasonic Methods for the Detection of Hydrogen Attack"
· EE.116E.91, "Ultrasonic Backscatter Inspection Method For the Detection of Hydrogen Attack"
· EE.95E.90, "The Usefulness of Cladding in Preventing Hydrogen Attack"
· IP 18-2-1, "Materials for Hydrogen Service"
· EE.125E.77, "Methane Blistering of Equipment in High Temperature Hydrogen Service"
· EE.99E.84, "Inspection of C-Mo and Other Steels For the Detection of Hydrogen Attack"
· EEEEE 0007, "Materials Engineering Guide", Section III-F

· API 941, "Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum
Refineries and Petrochemical Plants", 1990
· NACE Corrosion 78, "High Temperature Hydrogen Damage in Petroleum Refinery Equipment"
· Materials Engineering Guide Section III-F, "The Usefulness of Cladding in Preventing Hydrogen
Attack"

(5) High Temperature Hydrogen Attack

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C All materials operating above respective Nelson Curve
Possibility to Occur Sometime limits as defined in API Publication 941 and C-1/2 Mo
within B range conditions as defined in EE.99E.84.
D C-1/2 Mo within A range conditions as defined in
Not Likely But Possible EE.99E.84.
E All materials operating below but within 50°F of
Practically Impossible respective Nelson Curve limits as defined in API
Publication 941.
Note: If > 50 deg F below Nelson Curve limit, then this MIP is not applicable.

· Inspection Adjustments: Performing a detailed inspection using extensive advanced ultrasonic
backscatter technique (AUBT), spot AUBT on highly stressed components or extensive in-situ
metallography can result in a reduction of up to 2 probability categories. Extensive shear wave
UT examination of piping welds can result in a 1 probability category reduction.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 2 probability categories is permitted
depending on the level of inspection.

MIP 6: Injection/Mix Point Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Injection points are locations where water or chemicals (such as a corrosion inhibitor) are added to a
stream for process or corrosion control. Corrosion can occur downstream of an injection point right at the
injection point and usually within 2 changes of direction downstream of the injection point. Examples
where corrosion has occurred include:
· Water and chemical injection points
· Air into Merox
· Powerformer/Hydrofiner injection points
· Injection of water or ammonia into H2S rich streams
Mix points are pipe locations where two streams of differing composition and/or temperature are brought
together. In some cases, the corrosivity of the combined stream may be significantly higher than that of
either of the individual streams. Although ER&E has not recommended broad programs for the inspection
of mix points, affiliates may want to consider some additional inspection for those mix points which are
known to be subject to accelerated corrosion. An example is mixing of Cl hydrocarbons containing
chlorides from a Powerformer light ends with a FCCU light ends stream.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Design injection points with quills as described in RCMM
· Consider metallurgy upgrades to prevent localized corrosion 10 pipe diameters downstream of
corrosive injection or mix point.
· Provide corrosion-resistant sleeves inside highly corrosive mix points
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual Section VI-A-99 to 119
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations/Inspection personnel define injection and mix points
· Inspection personnel maintains a listing of injection and mix points which require periodic
inspection
· Perform inspection as called for in piping inspection plans. Use risk-based prioritization approach
if desired.
· Management of Change procedures to ensure new injection and mix points are added to program
· Inspection personnel confirms that high risk injection and mix points have been installed per
design through RT examination.
· API 570 - defines inspection requirements
· HAZOP with Operations/Inspection personnel to identify mix and injection points
· Scanning ultrasonics - e.g. B-scan
· Radiography
RCMM July-2020 MIP 6 Injection/Mix Point Corrosion · 19

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Upgrade injection points to quill-type design with recommended design details.
· Upgrade alloy at injection and mix-points appropriate for corrosion potential.

· EE.124E.92, Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-W
· EE.3TA.88, "Inspect Addition Points for Corrosion"
· EE.2TA.89, "Recent Experience with Corrosion Near Injection Points"
· API 570, "Piping Inspection Code"

(6) Injection/Mix Point Corrosion

A Does not apply
Possibility of Repeated
Incidents
B Does not apply
Possibility of Isolated
Incidents
C Injection and mix points designed without the proper use of alloy with any one
Possibility to Occur of the following characteristics to make them corrosive:
Sometime - Mixing of a liquid and vapor and vaporization of the liquid occuring at the
mix point resulting in accelerated corrosion
- Liquid water contained in either or both streams
- Temperature of the mixed stream is below the water dew point. This is
particularly important when the hotter stream contains water vapor that
condenses when mixed.
- The temperature difference between the 2 streams is > 300° F
(150°C). Also see MIP 22 on Thermal Fatigue.
- Corrosive injection points such as the injection of a concentrated amine
corrosion inhibitor
- Hydrogen treat gas injection points in hydrotreating units
D Does not apply
Not Likely, But Possible
E Injection and mix points that are properly designed including the proper use
Practically Impossible of alloy either solid or properly constructed liner, a proper quill design and the
use of a spray nozzle, if appropriate. If there are any questions regarding the
proper design details contact ERE or any one of the Affiliated Engineering
Offices for additional advice.

· Inspection Adjustments: Extensive radiography, scanning UT or UT thickness measurements
using a small grid conducted for 10 pipe diameters from the injection/mix point including the first
elbow downstream of the injection/mix points and performed at a frequency consistent with API 570
requirements can reduce the probability category by up to 2 levels.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 2 probability categories is permitted.

MIP 7: Elevated Temperature Sulfur/Naphthenic Acid
Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Crude oil and hydrocarbon fractions which contain reactive sulfur and/or naphthenic acid may be
corrosive to carbon and low/medium alloy steel at temperatures above 390ºF (200ºC). This occurs
primarily in the VPS, Coking units and the lower section of APS, VPS and Coking Units.
The reactive sulfur reacts with iron to form a uniform iron-sulfide scale. The reaction rate, starting at
500ºF (260ºC), is temperature dependent and controlled by the diffusion of sulfur and iron atoms through
the iron sulfide scale. After initial corrosion of bare steel at a high rate, the rate will slow down and the
scale will give some protection. The corrosion is generally uniform, but may be locally accelerated by
turbulence or temperature shocks which remove the protective scale.
Naphthenic acid is an organic acid that reacts at temperatures above 390ºF (200ºC) with steel to form
iron naphthanates which are oil soluble. The iron sulfide scale will give some protection but at localized
areas where the scale is removed by turbulence or erosion, severe localized corrosion may occur.
The reactive sulfur corrosion can interact at temperatures between 480ºF and 660ºF (250ºC and 350ºC),
resulting in corrosion that can be general or localized in nature. However, in most cases either sulfur or
naphthenic acid corrosion will dominate causing most of the metal loss. Localized corrosion of welds has
been known to occur.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design personnel defines crude slate and limits for reactive sulfur/ naphthenic acid, and
selects appropriate metallurgy in consultation with the Materials Specialist.
· Materials Specialist/Inspector monitors reactive sulfur and naphthenic acid concentration and
compares with actual metallurgy performance to establish more accurate corrosion rate
estimates.
· Materials Specialist adjusts limits on reactive sulfur and naphthenic acid concentration as
metallurgy performance permits.
· Materials Specialist recommends metallurgy upgrades if necessary to provide desired equipment
life.
· Crude characterization and monitoring based on CrudeCor IIII computer program.
· Ultraviolet or infrared spectroscopy to analyze for TRS and TAN.
· Upgrade metallurgy to low/medium alloy or austenitic stainless steel.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Materials Specialist identifies equipment/piping for monitoring.
· Materials Specialist/Inspector defines and conducts monitoring programs using corrosion probes,
hot UT probes, radiography and/or UT readings.
· Materials Specialist evaluates data and adjusts limits and specifies upgrading as needed.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 7 Sulfur/Nap Acid Corrosion · 22

· Weight loss corrosion coupons
· Electrical resistance corrosion probes
· Fixed hot UT probes
· On and/or off stream ultrasonic spot readings and area scanning
· Radiography
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Materials Specialist flags when operating or design windows are exceeded and initiates
correction by Operations personnel or timely shutdown inspection.
· Inspector specifies in-kind replacement or initiates metallurgy upgrading projects.
· Materials Specialist adjusts limits on reactive sulfur and/or naphthenic acid as needed to obtain
desired equipment life
· Materials Specialist identified TRS/TAN operating capability of equipment in plant for desired
equipment life
· Materials Specialist/Inspector initiates inspections or metallurgy upgrades as envelope
monitoring warrants.

· TMEE 019, "Crude Corrosivity Guide"
· None available

The RBI assessment shall be conducted for both sulfidation and naphthenic acid corrosion. It is only
necessary to list the one mechanism that represents the highest risk in the RBI assessment. Experience
has shown that in almost all cases either a sulfidation or naphthenic acid corrosion mechnaism dominates
the metal loss.
(7a) Sulfidation
Assessment of Probability of Failure

Using Past Inspection Data
(see Section 4.1.1 for Definitions/Details)
Unmitigated
ar/t Inspection Category Probability of Failure
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C

· Inspection Adjustments: Depending on the effectiveness of the inspection as defined in the
table below, the following reductions in probability can be taken:
Inspection Analysis of Inspection Reduction In

Effectiveness Extent of Inspection Data Probability
Category
High Extensive external UT thickness Statistical analysis of data Up to 4 levels
measurements or radiography on elbows and such as EVA or STATPIPE
other components that experience higher
corrosion rates. UT thickness measurements
on pipe straight sections and vessel shell
sections or a full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate UT external thickness measurements or Simple analysis such as Up to 3 levels
radiography on elbows and straight sections or averaging of thickness data
a partial 10% internal inspection
Low Spot UT thickness measurements or Simple analysis such as Up to 2 levels
radiography averaging of thickness data
· Monitoring Adjustments: If CrudeCor III.1 is not used to evaluate crude slates and expected
changes in corrosion rate, a 1 probability level increase should be taken.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability is 4 levels.

(7b) Naphthenic Acid Corrosion
Total Acid Number Limits for Common Materials
Carbon and 5 - 12% Cr 300 Series SS 300 Series SS
Low Alloy Steel with < 3% Mo with ³ 3% Mo
Probability Level Steel
A Does not Does not apply Does not apply Does not apply
Possibility of Repeated Incidents apply.
B > 1.0 Does not apply. Does not apply Does not apply
C 0.5 to 1.0 > 1.0 Does not apply Does not apply
D 0.2 to 0.5 0.5 to 1.0 > 2.0 > 4.0
E Does not 0.3 to 0.5 1.0 to 2.0 2.0 to 4.0
Practically Impossible apply.
Note: The limits for considering naphthenic acid corrosion are as follows:
- For carbon and low alloy steel - TAN below 0.2
- For Cr steels (5 to 12% Cr) - TAN below 0.3
- For 300 series SS with less than 3% Mo - 1.0
- For 300 series SS with greater than 3% Mo - 2.0

Inspection
Effectiveness Inspection Analysis of Reduction In
Category Frequency Extent of Inspection Inspection Data Probability
High < 1/2 the time Extensive external UT thickness Statistical analysis Up to 3 levels
to consume scanning or radiography on elbows, tees appropriate for
the remaining and other components that are known to localized corrosion
corrosion experience higher corrosion rates. such as EVA
allowance Selected UT thickness scanning or
radiography on pipe straight sections
and vessel shell sections or a full 100%
internal inspection.
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness scanning or Simple analysis Up to 2 levels
to consume radiography in areas of expected such as averaging
the remaining corrosion such as pipe elbows or a of thickness data
corrosion partial 10% internal inspection.
allowance
Low > 1 time to Spot UT thickness scanning or Simple analysis 1 level
consume the radiography such as averaging maximum
remaining of thickness data
corrosion
allowance
· Monitoring Adjustments: If CrudeCor III is not used to evaluate crude slates and expected
changes in corrosion rate, a 1 probability level increase should be taken.

MIP 8: Caustic, Amine, Carbonate and Wet CO/CO2
Stress Corrosion Cracking
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Stress corrosion cracking occurs in carbon and low alloy steel weldments in caustic (NaOH), amine
(MEA, DEA, Flexsorb), carbonate and wet CO/CO2 services. The cracking probability typically increases
with temperature and stress levels. Cracks are typically intergranular with caustic, amine and carbonate
cracking, while they are transgranular with wet CO/CO 2 cracking. Post weld heat treatment prevents the
problem. Short term temperature exposures such as steam cleaning or short term amine/caustic
exposure (carryover) can cause caustic and amine stress corrosion cracking. Cracking can occur in
steam desuperheaters if the injected water contains small amounts of free caustic. Most equipment in
amine service is also exposed to wet H2S (Ref. MIP 2). Amine stress corrosion cracking is more
prevalent than wet H2S cracking in lean amine services and wet H2S cracking is more likely in rich amine
service. Stress cracking is also a concern for carbonate service (such as catacarb units), particularly in
high pH, non-PWHT equipment where a vanadate inhibitor is not used.
Wet CO/CO2 cracking occurs in carbon and alloy steels with 7% or less Cr when P co+Pco2>0.13 bar (1.9
psig) and the gas is wet. Wet CO/CO2 cracking occurs at ambient temperature with crack severity and
crack growth rate increasing with temperature up to approximately 70°C (160° F). Above this
temperature the cracking tendency decreases. PWHT, alloys with more than 9% CR, and operating
above the dew point (dry gas) are effective in preventing wet CO/CO 2 cracking. Wet CO/CO2 cracking
primarily had been experienced in non-PWHT’d carbon steel equipment in Oxo-Alcohol Plants and
occasionally in FCCU and Flexicoker light ends.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· PWHT equipment in amine, caustic, carbonate and wet CO/CO 2 services.
· Use alloy where the streams are corrosive, 304LSS clad carbon steel or Duplex Alloy 2205 where
chlorides are also a concern.
· IP 18-4-1, "PWHT of Equipment Handling Alkaline Solutions"
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection/Operations personnel to identify equipment that can be exposed to caustic, amine,
carbonate or wet CO/CO2, either continuously or intermittently.
· Inspector to identify whether PWHT is necessary, has been performed and is maintained on
subsequent repairs.
· Prioritize according to risk and inspect vessels and tanks internally.
· Consider external inspection on higher risk vessels if unit operating plan does not permit internal
inspection.
· Wet fluorescent (or wet visible black powder over a white background) magnetic particle testing
(internal)
· Shearwave ultrasonics (external)
· Acoustic emission testing (external)
· Radiography (piping)
· Eddy current testing
RCMM July-2020 MIP 8 Alkaline Cracking · 26

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Upgrade by providing PWHT* (to a non-PWHT'd vessel/piping) or by changing metallurgy to
higher alloy or alloy lining.
· Materials Engineer recommends repair techniques including weld procedures, heat treatments
and inspection requirements.
· Water washing of equipment before steaming or heat treatment is recommended.
· H2 charged equipment will require bake-out prior to any weld repairs (in wet H 2S service, a full
PWHT is recommended prior to repairs if PWHT is required after repair)
*It should be noted there is a risk of propagating existing cracks when performing a PWHT on existing
vessel that has been in alkaline service.
· If cracks are detected externally, perform fitness for service analysis, to determine concerns with
existing cracks. An onstream inspection program must be established to insure cracks do not
grow to a critical unstable size.

· TMEE-018, "Manual for Equipment in Wet H2S Service"
· IP 18-4-1, "Post Weld Heat Treatment of Equipment Handling Alkaline Solutions"
· EE.67E.83, "MEA Stress Corrosion Cracking Further Defined"
· EE.15E.86, "Cause and Mechanism of SCC of CS in MEA Acid Gas Scrubbing"
· 87MATL135, "Stress Relief Recommended for DEA Units"
· EE.80E.88, "The Effect of Aminoalcohol Chemistry on SCC Propensity of CS in Acid Gas
Scrubbing Environments"
· EEEEE 007, "Materials Engineering Guide", Sections III-E and III-X
· EE.43E.86 Stress Corrosion Cracking Of Carbon Steel In Hot Potassium Carbonate/Bicarbonate
Solutions
· API RP945, "Avoiding Environmental Cracking in Amine Units"
· NACE-T-8-14 Survey, "SCC of CS in Amine Systems"
· Stress Corrosion Cracking of Mild and Low Alloy Steel In CO-CO 2 H2O Environments, Corrosion,
Vol. 32, No. 10, Oct. 1976, p 395
· Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Mild Steel And Low Alloy Steels In The H 2O-CO-CO2
System, Corrosion, Vol. 24, No. 12, Dec. 1968, p 427
· Carbonate Stress Corrosion Cracking of Carbon Steel In Refinery FCC Main Fractionator
Overhead Systems, Corrosion 90, Paper 206
· Stress Corrosion Cracking of Carbon Steeel In Carbonate Solution, Corrosion, Vol. 28, No. 8,
1973, p 313

(8a) Amine SCC

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C Carbon steel equipment in non-PWHT'd
Possibility to Occur Sometime condition and amine concentration above
2 wt % . This includes situations where
frequent carryover is possible.
D Non-PWHT'd carbon steel equipment in
Not Likely, But Possible DEA service at temperatures below
140°F* or rarely exposed to carryover of
solutions with greater than 2 wt% amine.
E Does not apply
Note: If the carbon steel equipment is PWHT'd this MIP does not apply. If a gunite,
appropriate polymeric or metallic lining is used to prevent amine SCC of non-
PWHT'd carbon steel equipment, this MIP does not apply; however, the lining
must be routinely inspected as required by MIP 24 on Non-metallic Materials.
* This assumes the vessel is not steamed out prior to water washing to remove
residual DEA.

· Inspection Adjustments: The use of internal MT examination during downtimes or external UT
onstream and finding no evidence of cracking can reduce the probability by 1 level.

(8b) Caustic SCC

A Does not apply
B Non-PWHT equipment operating at
Possibility of Isolated Incidents temperatures and caustic levels above
IP18-4-1 curve limits.
C Leak sealed flanges in boiler feed
Possibility to Occur Sometime water service. Non PWHT equipment
potentially exposed to periodic
carryover at temperatures and caustic
levels above limits in IP18-4-1.
D Does not apply
E Does not apply
Note: PWHT'd equipment or non-PWHT'd equipment operating below IP18-4-1
curve limits are not considered susceptible to caustic cracking.

· Inspection Adjustments: The use of internal MT during downtimes or external UT onstream and
finding no evidence of cracking can reduce the probability by 1 level.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability is 1, based on an effective
inspection for cracking.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely, rupture possible.

(8c) Carbonate SCC

A Does not apply
B Non-PWHT'd equipment in Catacarb
Possibility of Isolated Incidents service without an effective inhibitor
system.
C Does not apply
D Non-PWHT equipment in Catacarb
Not Likely, But Possible service with an effectively maintained
inhibitor system.
E Does not apply
Note: PWHT'd equipment is not susceptible to carbonate SCC.

· Inspection Adjustments: The use of internal MT during downtimes or external UT onstream
and finding no evidence of cracking can reduce the probability by 1 level.
· Monitoring Adjustments: If vanadate and iron levels are frequently monitored in Catacarb units
the probablity can be reduced by 1 level.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction in probability of 1 is permitted.

(8d) Wet CO/CO2 Cracking

A Does not apply
B Non-PWHT'd equipment in Oxo-
Possibility of Isolated Incidents Alcohol Plants in wet CO/CO2 service.
C Non-PWHT'd equipment in
Possibility to Occur Sometime FCCU,Fluid coker and Flexicoker light
ends exposed to wet CO/CO2 service.
D Does not apply
E Does not apply
Note: PWHT'd equipment in wet CO/CO2 service is not susceptible to cracking.

· Inspection Adjustments: The use of internal MT during downtimes or external UT onstream
and finding no evidence of cracking can reduce the probability by to 2 levels.

MIP 9: Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
The 18-8 grades of austenitic stainless steels (Types 304, 316, and their low-carbon and stabilized
grades, Types 304L, 316L, 321 and 347) are particularly susceptible to chloride stress corrosion cracking
(SCC). Factors which influence the rate and severity of attack are chloride concentration, temperature,
stress level, solution pH and oxygen concentration. Normally, chloride contents up to 50 ppm are
considered acceptable if no further concentration is possible. Frequently, chlorides in the process stream
are the cause of attack, but chlorides from other sources are also possible. These include, chloride-
bearing cooling water above 130ºF (55°C), which can lead to cracking of stainless steel heat exchanger
tubing in crevices where chlorides can accumulate (e.g., where tubes are rolled into a tube sheet), under
insulation with chlorides from water leaks or storm-driven water salts, and at heat exchanger baffles or
under films/deposits where chlorides can concentrate to a higher level than in the bulk solution. Cracking
is unlikely at temperatures below 130ºF (55ºC) unless applied stresses and chloride concentrations are
high.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Eliminate or reduce chloride concentration:
- Hydrotest/flushing water limited to 250 ppm maximum chlorides.
- When salt containing fire water is used on 300 series stainless steel, remove the water-
soaked insulation and wash the equipment with fresh water before startup.
· In design for chloride-containing services, do not use 300 series stainless steels. Consider
alternative materials:
- High nickel alloys (Incoloy 825, Alloy 20, and Inconel 625)
- Ferritic alloys (E-Brite 26-1, Seacure, AISI 405)
- Duplex alloys (2205, 2507)
- Titanium
- Monel
· Selection of alternative alloys, EE.119E.77
· Reducing stress level (bolting)
· Solution annealing of heat exchanger U bends, EE.121E.82
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection when Chloride SCC is suspected.
· Shear wave ultrasonic
· Eddy current
· Dye penetrant
· Acoustic emission
RCMM July-2020 MIP 9 Chloride SCC · 32

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Control of environment to reduce Cl and/or raise pH
· Shot peening to induce compressive stresses (EE.132E.80)

Exxon and Affiliates
· EXES 5-3-1B, "Pressure Testing of Unfired Pressure Vessels"
· EE.86E.74, "The Stress Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steel"
· ER&E Nondestructive Testing Manual
· Stress Corrosion Cracking in Refineries and Chemical Plants, EE.119E.77

· Materials Technology Institute Manual #1, "Guidelines for the Control of Stress Corrosion
Cracking of Nickel-Bearing Stainless Steels and Nickel-Base Alloys

(9) Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking

A Does not apply
Possibility of Repeated Incident
B 300 series stainless steel in the following services:
Possibility of Isolated Incidents - Uninsulated and uncoated and exposed to marine or
cooling water drift environment with metal
temperature above 130°F
- Insulated/uncoated and steam traced or insulated/
uncoated with insulation in poor condition
- Operating near boiling point resulting in
concentration of Cl¯ ions
- History of Cl¯ SCC failures
C Does not apply
D Coated 300 series stainless steel exposed to marine or
Not Likely But, Possible cooling tower drift environments
E Does not apply

· Inspection Adjustments: An inspection is not appropriate. Inspection is appropriate only to
determine the extent of cracking once cracking has occurred. Several inspection techniques
such as shear wave UT, eddy current, dye penetrant and acoustic emission can be used.
Hydrotesting can also be used to determine if through wall cracking has occurred.
· Monitoring Adjustments: If the pH is monitored and maintained above 9.0, such as in
recirculating MEA solution, the probability level can be reduced by 1.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability permitted is 1.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 9 Chloride SCC · 33

MIP 10: Refractory Damage
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Refractory linings installed mainly as thermal insulation and erosion protection are vulnerable to failure by
spalling, erosion, and cracking. This can occur immediately after start up if not installed or dried out
correctly, or after exposure to service.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process and Mechanical Design personnel select the optimum refractory material and lining
system design for the temperature, physical, and chemical properties of the service.
· Project group to take strict control of the:
- As purchased material quality
- Installation techniques
- Installers procedures, equipment operation, and application techniques
- Installation design, and application quality control
- Dry out design and practice
· Operations personnel maintains operating conditions within defined limits
· IP19-3-1 Gunite for Linings and Fireproof Coating
· IP19-3-2 Refractory Linings for Pressure Vessels and Piping
· ER&E Refractory Users Manual, EEEEE.10
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspector monitors refractory-lined equipment for hot spots during operation with either
temperature sensitive paint or periodic thermography.
· Hammer testing, visual inspection and core sampling during turnarounds
· Thermovision systems for onstream hot spot monitoring
· Hand held pyrometers for onstream hot spot monitoring
· Hammer testing for refractory
· Temperature indicating paint
· Inspection criteria defined in Refractory User's Manual
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Elimination of aggressive environments such as severe temperature cycling and/or exposure
· Upgrade the refractory to one better suited to operating conditions
· Upgrade the installation procedures and controls
· Refractory Users Manual
RCMM July-2020 MIP 10 Refractory Damage · 34

· Refractory Users Manual
· Refract-O-Grams
· FCCU/Maintenance Guide
· Powerformer Operating Guide
· IP 19-3-1, "Gunite for Linings and Fireproof Coatings" and IP 19-3-2, "Refractory Linings for
Pressure Vessels and Piping"
· None available

(10) Refractory Damage

A Erosion above recommended limits for velocity and
Possibility of Repeated Incidents solids loading. Cold standby operation on a routine
basis. Exposure to free water. Cyclic service at
temperatures above 600°F including effects of
weather on the shell. Any refractory attached to hot
wall steel (such as internal cyclones) that is not
hexmesh supported. Experience with failures on a
regular basis.
B Most other refractory systems not included in A
Possibility of Isolated Incidents unless service experience demonstates otherwise.
C
Possibility to Occur Sometime Does not apply
D
Not Likely, But Possible Does not apply
E
Practically Impossible Does not apply

· Inspection Adjustments: Visual inspection to determine extent of damage and need for
repairs. Routine thermography to identify hot spot and the need for temporary cooling or
downtime repairs can result in a 1 category reduction in the probability.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum probability reduction permitted is 1.
· Expected Failure Mode: Spalling, bypassing, or corrosion of refractory

MIP 11: H2S/H2 Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
When a hydrocarbon stream containing both hydrogen and sulfur compounds is exposed to either a
catalyst and/or temperatures above 700ºF (370ºC), much of the sulfur is converted to H 2S. The resulting
H2S/H2 stream can be very aggressive to carbon and low alloy steels depending on the temperature and
amount of H2S present. Key aspects of this form of corrosion include:
· Low alloy steels are comparable to carbon steel in terms of corrosion resistance
· Lighter hydrocarbons streams (such as naphtha) and units with furnaces tend to produce a higher
conversion of the sulfur compounds to H2S.
· The presence of ammonia increases the corrosion rate for alloy steels.
· For a given temperature and H2S level, the corrosion rate in a vapor stream will be significantly
higher than in a mixed liquid/vapor or liquid phase.
· The corrosion scales are non-adherent, voluminous and can lead to plugging of catalyst filled
reactors.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Materials have been properly selected by Process Design personnel to prevent H 2S/H2 corrosion
in those units subject to this form of degradation.
· Inspector to conduct PMI to ensure correct alloys are installed.
· Hydrotreating units are reviewed periodically by the Materials Specialist to ensure that materials
are still adequate for current H2S/H2 levels.
· The Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Corrosion Design Curves 5 A/B/C
· X-ray fluorescence analyzers such as the Texas Nuclear 9266
· Emission spectrographs such as the Spectro Analytical SpectroPort
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspector establishes and conducts a wall thickness monitoring program which meets the
requirements of API 570 to measure wall loss in the circuits subject to H 2S/H2 corrosion.
· A pressure vessel inspection program which meets the requirements of API 510 is in place to
monitor corrosion of vessels subject to H2S/H2 corrosion.
· Ultrasonic thickness gauging instrumentation
· Elevated temperature ultrasonic thickness gauging instrumentation
· Radiography
· STATPIPE
RCMM July-2020 MIP 11 H2S/H2 Corrosion · 37

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Alloy upgrading to more corrosion resistant materials such as stainless steel

· Refinery Construction Materials Manual Section II-D, "Fuels Hydrotreating"

(11) H2S/H2 Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C

Inspection Reduction
Effectiveness Analysis of In
Category Extent of Inspection Inspection Data Probability
High Extensive external UT thickness measurements Statistical analysis Up to 4
or radiography on elbows and other of data such as levels
components that experience higher corrosion EVA or STATPIPE
rates. UT thickness measurements on pipe
straight sections and vessel shell sections or a
full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate UT external thickness measurements or Simple analysis Up to 3
radiography on elbows and straight sections or such as averaging levels
a partial 10% internal inspection of thickness data
Low Spot UT thickness measurements or Simple analysis Up to 2
radiography such as averaging levels
of thickness data

· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction permitted is 4 probability levels.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 11 H2S/H2 Corrosion · 38

MIP 12: Corrosion Under Deposits
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Accelerated localized corrosion can occur under deposits that form in process equipment and piping.
Very aggressive corrosion is frequently observed under NH 4Cl deposits. Less aggressive, but still
accelerated corrosion can occur under other less acidic salts and scale that forms in process streams.
In general, corrosion under deposits observed in Refinery and Chemical Plants can be described as
follows:
Deposit Type Typical Locations Corrosion Severity

NH4Cl Hydrotreater Effluent Very aggressive
streams, FCCU (>> 100 mpy on carbon
fractionator tower top steel)
and APS overhead
Neutral salts Crude Preheat Train Most corrosive in areas
(e.g. NaCl) of water boiling (up to
100 mpy on carbon steel)
FeS scale Sour water streams Corrosion up to 50 mpy

on carbon steel
NH4HS Hydrotreater Effluent Mildly corrosive

(alkaline salt) streams (up to 10 mpy on carbon
steel)
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design or Operations personnel predict where NH4Cl and NH4HS deposits will form and
should incorporate a water washing system as required.
· Process Design or Operations personnel identify areas where neutral salts and scale deposition
are possible.
· Process Design personnel selects appropriate metallurgy with input from Materials Specialist.
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Corrosion Design Curve 26
· Use of alloy material (Type 410 SS (for salting), Type 304 SS, Alloy 800, Type 316 SS, Alloy
825, Duplex 2205, Duplex 2507, Superaustenitic Steels, Alloy 625, Hastelloy C276 provide
increasing resistance to underdeposit pitting)
· Installation of a water wash system that gives good water distribution on a continuous or
intermittent basis.
· Injection of dispersants to prevent deposition.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 12 Corrosion Under Deposits · 39

DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel confirm where NH4Cl and NH4HS deposits are occurring by monitoring:
- Temperatures in the effluent gas stream
- Pressure drop across exchangers to determine if plugging is occurring
· Water samples are taken on an as-needed basis and monitored for H 2S, NH3, Cl and pH.
· Inspector plans and performs inspections
· Use of calculated tags within the process control computer using temperature and sample data,
to provide indication where NH4Cl and NH4HS deposits are occurring.
· For downtime inspection of exchanger tubes:
- IRIS (UT inspection)
- Eddy current inspection
- Magnetic flux leakage inspection
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Operations should ensure that deposition does not occur within heat exchangers. If this is not
achieved, water washing should be considered.
· Alloy upgrading as needed.
· For salt deposit, reducing temperature below the water dew point.
· Water washing systems which provide a good distribution of water within the heat exchanger.
· Use of corrosion resistant materials.

· EE.3SA.93, "Safety Alert - Corrosion Concerns with Airfin Coolers in Hydroprocessing Units"
· EE.5E.78, "Handling Equipment Plugging Problems Due to Deposition of Salts"
· 95MATL 004, "Corrosion Under NH4Cl and NH4HS Deposits

(12) Corrosion Under Deposits

A Does not apply
B NH4Cl salt routinely forms in carbon
Possibility of Isolated Incidents steel equipment
C Carbon steel equipment experiencing
Possibility to Occur Sometime salt deposition on heat transfer
surfaces in the crude preheat train or
FeS accumulation in sour water
streams.
D NH4Cl salt formation not observed but
Not Likely, But Possible predicted to be possible during normal
operations
E NH4HS salt routinely forms in carbon
Practically Impossible steel equipment.

· Monitoring Adjustments: Use of both an effective water wash system and corrosion resistant
alloy (such as Incoloy 825) can result in a reduction of the probability by as much as 3 levels.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: If both an effective water wash system is in place and a corrosion
resistant alloy is used then the probability can be reduced by as much as 3 levels.

MIP 13: Elevated Temperature Cracking Of Cr-Mo
Steels
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Poor creep ductility and cracking can be a problem above 900ºF (480ºC) in coarse-grain weld heat
affected zones (HAZ's) 1 ¼ Cr - ½ Mo and 1Cr-½ Mo steels are significantly more susceptible to cracking
than 2 ¼ Cr-1Mo steels. High stress areas, including supports, hangers and fabricated fittings with
repairs, are more vulnerable to cracking. Creep cracking of poor quality longitudinal welds (containing
pre-existing weld flaws and peaking) in piping has also occurred.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Use controlled chemistry Cr-Mo for > 2" vessels and > ½" piping.
· Do not use 1¼Cr or 1Cr for vessels > 900ºF (480ºC).
· Materials Engineering Guide - Section III-G
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection/Operations personnel to identify all 1¼ Cr-½ Mo and 1Cr-½ Mo equipment running
900ºF (480ºC) for creep cracking.
· Inspector to identify and inspect longitudinally welded piping and fabricated fittings operating
above 480ºC (900ºF).
· Inspect inlets and outlets of Powerformer reactors
· Inspect a representative sample of attachment and circumferential welds on 1 ¼ Cr and 1 Cr
vessels operating above 900°F (480°C )
· Inspector to establish reinspection intervals
· Wet fluorescent or visible magnetic particle testing
· Shearwave ultrasonics
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· For repairs, remove creep damaged material by grinding at least 1/8" of metal from sides
adjacent to crack
· For thick sections, the effects of temper embrittlement may make weld repairs difficult. Heat
treatment at 1200ºF (650ºC) for 15 minutes minimum may be required.
· Materials Engineering Guide - Section III-G
RCMM July-2020 MIP 13 Cr-Mo Cracking · 42

· EE.70E.86, "2¼ Cr-1 Mo Plate and Forgings for Heavy-Wall Pressure Vessels"
· 87 MATL.362, "Inspection for Longitudinally Welded Cr-Mo Pipe and Nozzles"
· EE.63E.87, "Application of Cr-Mo Steels"
· EE.80E.89, "Inspection and Repair of Cr-Mo Equipment Operating Above 900º F"
· EE.102E.91, "Heavy Wall Cr-Mo Reactors, Reliability of Existing Reactors and Specifying New
Reactors"
Industry Standards & Recommended Practices
· API Publication 959, "Characterization Study of Temper Embrittlement of Cr-Mo Steels"
· API Operating Practices Committee Report, "Cracking Experiences with Cr-Mo Equipment
Operating Above 900F" - 1989
· API letter to refinery managers, 1974

(13) Elevated Temperature Cracking of Cr-Mo Steels

A Does not apply
B 1 1/4 Cr and 1 Cr equipment operating
Possibility of Isolated Incidents at temperatures above 900°F (480°C)
with following characteristics:
- Fabricated fittings
- Longitudinally welded pipe
- Nozzles on hot wall vessels
- Hot to cold wall transition at
nozzles on cold wall vessels
C Does not apply
D 1 ¼ Cr and 1 Cr equipment operating
Not Likely, But Possible above 900°F (480°C) but not listed in
B probability category above
E 2 ¼ Cr equipment operating above
Practically Impossible 900°F (480°C)
· Age Adjustment: If the equipment is less than 10 years old, the probability level can be
reduced by 1.
· Inspection Adjustments:
- For longitudinally welded pipe: Consult with Materials Specialist.
- For other equipment: Downtime MT inspection as recommended in EE.80E.89 and finding
no cracking can result in up to a 3 level reduction in probability.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum permitted reduction in probability is 3 levels
depending on age and inspection adjustments.
RCMM July-2020 MIP 13 Cr-Mo Cracking · 43

MIP 14: Soil Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Soil corrosion is a materials degradation/corrosion process affecting buried pipes and equipment. Main
elements/contributors to this type of corrosion are: mineral content, texture, permeability, electrical
resistivity, pH, aeration, micro-organisms, water table level and fluctuations, organic matter and the
presence of stray currents.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Proper material selection by Materials Specialist.
· Application of coatings and linings recommended by the Coating Specialist
· Installation and periodic checks of cathodic protection system if recommended by the Materials
Specialist
· Use of clean, high resistivity backfill material by the Construction Team
· Minimize the number of underground systems by Design personnel
· Use of non-corroding materials like GRP if allowed by design
· Application of cathodic protection per IP 19-5-1
· Application of coatings and linings per IP 19-1-1
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel identifies all buried lines and equipment.
· Inspector maintains a list of all buried piping and equipment.
· Inspector prepares/maintains an inspection plan based on categories, priorities and previous
inspection findings, and performs inspection.
· Potential measurements of cathodic protected systems
· Acoustic emission leak detection
· Pressure testing
· Ultrasonic wall thickness measurements (manual or automated with crawlers)
· Internal video inspection
· Visual inspection after excavation
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Materials Specialist may recommend the installation of a cathodic protection system
· Coatings Specialist recommends application/repair of linings and coatings
· Cathodic protection systems
RCMM July-2020 MIP 14 Soil Corrosion · 44

· Coatings and linings
· Clean high resistivity backfill material

· EE.19E.86, Detection of Leaks in Underground Lines With Acoustic Emission Testing
· EE.22E.88, Leak Detection in Tanks and Underground Piping
· IP19-1-1, Paint and Protective Coatings
· IP19-5-1, Cathodic Protection
· EEEEE003, Cathodic Protection Guide
· NACE RP 0169-92 Control of External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping
Systems
· NACE RP 0572-85 Design, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Impressed Current Deep
Groundbeds
· NACE RP 0275-75 Application of Organic Coatings to the External Surface of Steel Pipe for
Underground Service
· NACE RP 0375-75 Application and Handling of Wax-Type protective Coatings and Wrapper
Systems for Underground Pipelines
· NACE RP 0276-76 Extruded Asphalt Mastic-Type Protective Coatings for Underground Pipelines
· NACE RP 0285-85 Control of External Corrosion on Metallic-Buried, Partially Buried, or
Submerged Liquid Storage Systems
· NACE RP 0286-86 The Electrical Isolation of Cathodically Protected Pipelines
· NACE RP 0190-90 External Protective Coatings for Joints, Fittings, and Valves on Metallic
Underground or Submerged Pipelines and Piping Systems
· NACE RP 0193-93 External Cathodic Protection of On-Grade Metallic Storage Tank Bottoms

(14) Soil Corrosion

A Does not apply
B Coated or wrapped pipe or equipment without CP and
Possibility of Isolated Incidents soil resistivity < 10,000 ohms, uncoated pipe or
equipment with CP and soil resistivity < 10,000 ohms
or uncoated pipe or equipment with no CP.
C Coated or wrapped pipe or equipment without CP and
Possibility to Occur Sometime soil resistivity >10,000 ohms or uncoated pipe or
equipment with CP and soil resistivity >10,000 ohms
D Coated or wrapped pipe or equipment with CP and soil
Not Likely, But Possible resistivity < 10,000 ohms
E Coated or wrapped pipe or equipment with CP and soil

Practically Impossible resistivity > 10,000 ohms
· Age Adjustment: If piping is less than 10 years old the probability level can be reduced by 1.
· Inspection Adjustments: If the piping is routinely examined with an inspection pig the probability
can be reduced by 2 levels if no evidence of accelerated corrosion is observed
· Monitoring Adjustments: If the CP system is routinely tested for effectiveness, the probability
can be reduced by 1 level.

· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability permitted is 2.

MIP 15: Sour Water Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Sour water is water containing H2S and NH3, plus smaller concentrations of cyanides, thiocyanates,
carbonates, chlorides, phenols, caustic and other impurities depending upon the source of the water. The
primary corrodents are:
· Ammonium bisulfide (NH4HS) formed from NH3 and H2S
· Cyanide ions which, in the presence of H2S, are exceedingly corrosive to carbon steel, stainless
steel and many Ni-base alloys.
In the absence of cyanides, sour water forms a protective iron sulfide (FeS) film on steel surfaces which
reduces corrosion. However, in areas of high velocity/turbulence, the protective FeS film is continually
eroded away and higher corrosion rates occur. The corrosivity of carbon steel in sour water becomes
significant when NH4HS levels in the water exceed 2 wt. % and becomes severe when exceed 8 wt. %
When cyanides are present, the cyanide ions cause the dissolution of the protective FeS film giving high
corrosion rates. In some cases, nickel and titanium alloys may be required for adequate corrosion
resistance.
Sour water corrosion is typically a general type of corrosion whose corrosion rate can be locally increased
in areas of high velocity/turbulence (e.g., exchanger tube ends, return bends, elbows and tees).
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design or Operations personnel identifies equipment/piping in sour water service, sour
water velocity and the presence of cyanides.
· Materials Specialist recommends appropriate metallurgy. Typically, for hydrotreaters: If vol.%
H2S x vol. % NH3 in the vapor is greater than 0.4, alloy is required. For streams with CN - present;
use of an alloy for all levels unless measures to remove CN - (water wash and/or polysulfide
injection) are implemented.
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Sections II-D, II-H and II-L
· RCMM Corrosion Design Curve 12
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel analyzes sour water (cyanide content, H2S, NH3, chlorides and pH) and
provides data to Inspection personnel.
· Inspection personnel inventories and prioritizes equipment and piping, and performs inspections.
· Visual internal inspection of equipment
· Wall thickness monitoring program (UT inspection) for equipment and piping.
· Test coupons
· Corrosion probes
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 15 Sour Water Corrosion · 48

· Laboratory analyses

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection personnel recommends techniques to reduce corrosion rate.
- Materials upgrading
- Polysulfide injection/water wash
- Filming amine inhibitor injection
· Please contact ER&E Materials Engineering Section

· EE.12E.74: "A Study of Sour Water Corrosion and Deposit Formation"
· EE.13E.74: "Estimation of Corrosivity in Sour Water Condensates"
· EE.8E.75: "A Study of the Corrosion Behavior of Ni-base Alloys in
Sour Water Environments"
· EE.9E.75: "A Study of the Corrosion Behavior of Titanium in Sour
Water Environments"
• Refinery Construction Materials Manual
• Materials Engineering Guide (Section III-B)

(15) Sour Water Corrosion

A Carbon steel equipment in a stream with
Possibility of Repeated Incidents free CN- ions or NH HS levels above 8
4
wt% or a flow velocity above 20 fps
B Carbon steel equipment in streams with
Possibility of Isolated Incidents NH4HS levels between 2 and 8 wt%
C Carbon steel equipment in streams with
Possibility to Occur Sometime no free CN- ions and less than 2 wt%
NH4HS and velocities below 20 fps and
no deadleg inspection program.
D Carbon steel equipment in streams with
Not Likely, But Possible no free CN- ions and less than 2 wt%
NH4HS and velocities below 20 fps and a
deadleg inspection program
E Does not apply
Note: If alloy as described in the Hydrotreating Section of the RCMM is used this
MIP does not apply.

Inspection Analysis of Reduction

Effectiveness Inspection Inspection In
Category Frequency Extent of Inspection Data Probability
High < 1/2 the Extensive external UT Statistical Up to 3
time to thickness scanning or analysis levels
consume radiography on elbows, tees appropriate
the and other components that are for localized
remaining known to experience higher corrosion
corrosion corrosion rates. Selected UT such as
allowance thickness scanning or EVA
radiography on pipe straight
sections and vessel shell
sections or a full 100% internal
inspection.
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness Simple Up to 2
to consume scanning or radiography in analysis levels
the areas of expected corrosion such as
remaining such as pipe elbows or a averaging of
corrosion partial 10% internal inspection. thickness
allowance data
Low > 1 time to Spot UT thickness scanning or Simple 1 level
consume radiography analysis maximum
the such as
remaining averaging of
corrosion thickness
allowance data
· Monitoring Adjustments: Routine monitoring of NH3 and H2S levels in the sour water to confirm
levels are within acceptable range will permit a reduction in the probability by 1 level.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability permitted for all
adjustments is 3 levels.

MIP 16: Alkaline (Amine/Caustic/Carbonate/Sulfinol/
Sulfolane) Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
In general terms, alkaline solutions such as amines, caustic, carbonate, Sulfinol and Sulfolane are
considered to be non-corrosive. However, under certain conditions specific mechanisms cause the
corrosion rates to significantly increase.
Experience indicates that fresh amines, e.g., MEA, DEA, MDEA, Flexsorb SE, and Sulfinol are non-
corrosive. However, when they are loaded with acid gas they become less basic and more corrosive.
The acid gases dissolved in an amine solution will cause general and pitting corrosion of carbon steel.
The corrosion is increased by:
· Increased acid gas loading
· Increased temperature
· High velocity/Turbulence
· Decreased pressure leading to acid gas breakout (flashing)
· Heat stable salts (see MIP 32) /corrosion product buildup
Refinery and Checical Plant experience indicates that severe, localized caustic corrosion of steam traced
carbon steel piping in caustic service can occur. Locations where the steam tracing is in direct contact
with the pipe gives a local "hot spot" where severe corrosion occurs.
Carbonate solutions containing carbon dioxide as processed in Catacarb units are corrosive to carbon
steel. A corrosion inhibitor, potassium metavanadate, is used to protect carbon steel from excessive
corrosion or 304L SS is used in hotter rich streams.
Fresh Sulfolane is not corrosive to carbon steel. However, at temperatures above 460°F (240°C),
Sulfolane will decompose to form organic acids. When oxygen is 5 ppm or greater Sulfolane begins to
decompose to form organic acids at 350°F (180°C). Sulfolane with organic acids attacks carbon steel
causing general corrosion and pitting. Build up of corrosion products in the system can cause erosion-
corrosion. Organic acids are controlled by careful design of tube metal temperatures and using MEA or
DEA as corrosion inhibitors or selective use of Types 304/316 stainless steel. Organic acid formation is
addressed by preventing air leaks into the system, e. g. nitrogen pads on feed/storage tanks, deaerate
wash water, etc.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design or Operations personnel identify equipment/piping in
amine/caustic/carbonate/Sulfinol/Sulfolane service and the expected operating conditions
(temperature, concentration, acid gas loading, velocity, etc.).
· Materials Specialist recommends appropriate metallurgy and special design and operating
factors.
· Electrical tracing or steam tracing with the proper spacers is utilized.
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Section II-H
• Chemical Construction Materials Manual, Section II-D
· RCMM Corrosion Design Curves 15, 19 and 20A
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 16 Alkaline Corrosion · 52

DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel provides actual process operating conditions for equipment/piping including
steam temperature, tube metal temperature, concentration, acid gas loading and velocity.
· Inspector inventories, plans and performs inspections on piping and equipment on a periodic
basis.
· Materials Specialist identifies unit instrumentation which will signal onset of accelerated corrosion.
Operations/inspection personnel monitor instrumentation.
· Visual internal inspection of equipment
· Wall thickness monitoring program (UT inspection)
· Test coupons
· Corrosion probes
· For pipes > 4" a pipe crawler can be used to inspect for localized corrosion
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Materials engineer recommends techniques to reduce corrosion rates.
· Operations personnel control operation of tracing system.
· Operations personnel adjust conditions to ensure effective stripping in regenerators or corrosion
inhibitor addition
· Materials upgrading
· Inhibitor injection in amine and Sulfolane systems
· Consider using electrical tracing in place of steam tracing
· Velocity reduction or side stream filters
• Oxygen and tube metal temperature limits for Sulfolane sytems

• Chemical Construction Materials Manual, Section II-D
Industry
• Corrosion in Amine/Sour Gas Treating Contactors, CEP, March 1978
• Materials Experience in Sulfinol Plants, Paper No. 10, Corrosion 79

(16) Alkaline Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C

Effectiveness Analysis of In
High Extensive external UT thickness Statistical analysis Up to 3
scanning or radiography on appropriate for levels
elbows, tees and other localized corrosion
components that are known to such as EVA
experience higher corrosion rates.
Selected UT thickness scanning or
radiography on pipe straight
sections and vessel shell sections.
A full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate UT external thickness scanning or Simple analysis Up to 2
radiography in areas of expected such as averaging levels
corrosion such as pipe elbows. A of thickness data
partial 10% internal inspection.
Low Spot UT thickness scanning or Simple analysis 1 level
radiography such as averaging maximum
of thickness data
· Monitoring Adjustments: A reduction of 1 probability level is permitted, if the following

monitoring for amine and carbonate services is performed:
- In amine service, corrosion probe activity is monitored and the stream is analyzed for heat
stable salts and acid gases.
- In carbonate service, a vanadate inhibitor is injected and vandium and iron levels are
monitored and maintained within recommended limits.

MIP 17: Polythionic Acid Stress Corrosion Cracking
(PASCC)
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Polythionic acids are formed when iron sulfides react with air and water. Polythionic acids can cause
intergranular stress corrosion cracking of sensitized stainless steels. Sensitization occurs from Cr
depletion along grain boundaries due to carbide precipitation. It can occur during welding for Types 304
or 316 SS, or during high temperature operations; >750ºF (400ºC) for 304 SS and 316SS, >850ºF
(454ºC) for 304L and 347 SS. Type 321SS resistance to PASCC depends on heat treatment. The
solution annealing temperature must be no higher than 1832ºF (1000ºC) in order to achieve expected
resistance and be considered in a stable condition. Other austenitic alloys such as Incoloy 800 and
Inconel 600 can also sensitize and require protection. Stabilizing heat treatments can improve resistance.
See RCMM VI-D-116.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Avoid exposing sensitized austenitic stainless steels with sulfide scales to oxygen and water.
· Inspection personnel to identify austenitic stainless steel equipment susceptible to PASCC.
· Operations personnel to define special shutdown procedures using soda ash washing to
neutralize sulfide scale if air/water exposure required. Nitrogen purge equipment to prevent
exposure.
· Materials Specialist to select appropriate austenitic stainless steels for new equipment for
resistance to PASCC.
· Hydrotest austenitic equipment that has been exposed to sulfides with soda ash solution.
· Use soda ash solution for water cleaning sensitized austenitic components.
· Stainless steel furnace coils should be decoked prior to soda ash washing.
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Section VI-D
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection/Operations personnel identifies suspected equipment that has shown visual signs of
PASCC.
· Inspect suspected equipment focusing efforts on areas where cracking is most likely such as
welds and highly stressed areas. Inspection is performed to determine the extent of cracking.
· Liquid Penetrant
· Ultrasonics (including Shearwave)
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 17 Polythionic Acid SCC · 55

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· As for Prevention
· As for Prevention

· EE.78E.75, "An Evaluation of Austenitic Stainless Weld Overlay Resistance to Polythionic Acid
Attack"
· EE.11E.76, "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steels to Polythionic
Acid Attack"
· EE.13E.85, "Prevention of Polythionic Stress Corrosion Cracking"
· EE.83.85, "Preventing PASCC of Austenitic SS - An Update"
· EE.97E.77, "Fireside Deposits Don't Cause PASCC"
· EE.4E.82, "PASCC in Fluid Coking and Flexicoking Units"
· Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-D
· NACE RP 0170-85 "Recommended Practice for Protection of Austenitic Stainless Steel from
PASCC During Shutdown of Refinery Equipment"

(17) Polythionic Acid Stress Corrosion Cracking
This MIP applies only to units where iron sulfide scales can form at high temperatures and experience
has shown the PASCC can occur. This includes all hydrotreating units, FCCU's, Flexicoking, Fluid
Coking, lube extraction units and visbreaking units.

A Does not apply
B Welded Type 304, Type 316, Alloy 800, Alloy 600
Possibility of Isolated Incidents and Type 321 (unstable)
C Unwelded Type 304, Type 316, Alloy 800 and
Possibility to Occur Sometime Type 321 (unstable) at temperatures above 75°F
and Type 304L, Type 316L, Type 347and Type
321(stable) at temperatures above 850°F.
D Type 347, Type 321 (stable), Type 316L and
Not Likely But Possible Type 304L at temperatures above 750°F but
below 850°F
E Type 347, Type 321 (stable), Type 304L and
Practically Impossible Type 316L at temperatures below 750°F, and
300 series weld overlay

· Inspection Adjustments: No inspection adjustment is available. Inspection is appropriate only
after cracking has occurred to determine the extent of cracking and the need for repairs.
Hydrotest can also be performed to determine if through wall cracking has occurred.
· Monitoring Adjustments: If downtime soda ash washing procedures are followed and
monitored, the probability can be reduced by as much as 3 levels.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability permitted is 3 levels.

MIP 18: Furnace Tube Oxidation And Creep
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Furnace tubes exposed to high temperatures in an oxidizing flue gas (resulting from the burning of fuel oil
or gas with excess oxygen) will become oxidized. This will result in the formation of scale which, if it
flakes off, will expose further tube material, causing a progressive metal loss.
Furnace tubes may also be subject to creep when operating at the following temperatures:
· carbon steel above 800ºF (425ºC)
· C-½ Mo steel above 850ºF (455ºC)
· 1¼ Cr-½ Mo and 2¼ Cr-1 Mo steels above 900ºF (480ºC)
· 300 series stainless steels above 1100ºF (590ºC)
In many furnaces, it is believed that furnace tube oxidation is the life controlling process if there is no
internal corrosion mechanism, e.g., internal sulfidation of crude unit furnace tubes. Unless significant
tube wall thinning occurs as the result of corrosion from the outside or internal surface, operating stresses
will typically be insufficient to produce creep of furnace tubes.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Fired Heater Specialist to select appropriate alloys for the tubes per IP 7-1-1 and API 530
· Operations personnel to minimize flame impingement, and maintain controls on excess oxygen
· Corrosion Design Curve No. 8, "Elevated Temperature Oxidizing Conditions in Furnaces"
{Refinery Construction Materials Manual (RCMM)}
· IP 7-1-1, "Fired Heaters"
· API RP 530, "Recommended Practice for Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum
Refineries"
• PEAS REMLIF Computer Program
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Identification of vulnerable furnace tubes by Inspector
· On the run observation of flame patterns by Operations personnel
· On the run monitoring of tube metal temperatures (TMTs) by Operations personnel
· Stewarding of excess oxygen levels by Operations personnel
· At turnarounds, visual inspection, followed by ultrasonic thickness measurements by Inspector
· Hand held pyrometers/thermography systems for monitoring tube metal temperatures
· Furnace tube life prediction analysis method described in Section II-E of the POWERFORMING
Maintenance Guide
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 18 Furnace Tube Oxidation & Creep · 58

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Upgrading to higher alloys
· Maintaining better controls of the operation
· RCMM Corrosion Design Curve No. 8

· Powerformer Maintenance Guide
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual
· Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-J-1
· API 530, "Recommended Practice for Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum
Refineries"
· API 573, "Recommended Practice for the Inspection of Fired Boilers and Heaters"

(18a) Creep
Furnace tubes should be assessed for both creep and metal loss (including oxidation from the OD
surface). The risk assessment should be based on the degradation mechanism that results in the highest
level of risk. For furnace tubes exposed to internal corrosion it is necessary to also consider the
appropriate MIP for the relevant internal corrosion mechanism, e.g. H 2S/H2 corrosion.
Characteristics of Degradation
Probability Level Based on Operating Temperature REMLIF
Assessment
A 2 1/4 Cr tubes in a POWERFORMING Does not apply
Possibility of preheat furnace operating above
Repeated Incidents 1200°F (650°C)
B Furnace tubes in the following TMT > 100% life
Possibility of ranges: consumed
Isolated Incidents - Carbon steel operating above 950°F
- C-1/2 Mo operating above 1000°F
- Cr-Mo operating above 1100°F
- SS operating above 1300°F
C Between 80 and
Possibility to Occur Does not apply 100%
Sometime consumed life
D Furnace tubes in the following TMT Between 30 and
Not Likely, But ranges: 80% consumed
Possible - Carbon steel operating between life
800 and 900°F
- C-1/2 Mo operating between 850
and 1000°F
- Cr-Mo operating between 950 and
1100°F
- SS operating between 1100 and
1300°F
E Furnace tubes in the following TMT Less than 30%
Practically ranges: consumed life
Impossible - Carbon steel operating below 800°F
- C-1/2 Mo operating below 850°F
- Cr-Mo operating below 950°F
- SS operating below 1100°F
· Age Adjustment: If the equipment is less then 5 years old then a reduction in the probability by
1 level is permitted
· Inspection Adjustments: If downtime inspection for thickness of furnace tubes or cracking in
pressure vessels and piping is performed and no accelerated corrosion or evidence of cracking is
found, the probability can be reduced by 1 level.
· Monitoring Adjustments: If the tube or equipment metal temperature is measured and
controlled to insure it does not exceed operating limits, a 1 level reduction in probability is
permitted.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum permitted reduction in probability is 2 levels.

(18b) High Temperature Oxidation

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C
• Age Adjustment: No age adjustment is appropriate.


Effectiveness Inspection In
Category Extent of Inspection Data Probability
High Extensive external UT thickness Statistical analysis Up to 4
measurements or radiography on elbows of data such as levels
and other components that experience EVA or STATPIPE
higher corrosion rates. UT thickness
measurements on pipe straight sections
and vessel shell sections. A full 100%
Moderate UT external thickness measurements or Simple analysis Up to 3
radiography on elbows and straight such as averaging levels
sections. A partial 10% internal of thickness data
inspection
Low Spot UT thickness measurements or Simple analysis Up to 2
radiography such as averaging levels
of thickness data


MIP 19: Deaerator Cracking And Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
There is significant industry experience with cracking and corrosion of deaerators and other water
treatment/condensate handling equipment. Corrosion fatigue and stress induced corrosion (oxygen
pitting at high stress areas aggravated by low pH (<8.5) and chlorides) are prime mechanisms. Corrosion
fatigue cracks grow from pit bottoms. The cracks are transgranular and oxide filled. Cracks are typically
transverse across welds and heat affected zones. Fluctuating operations such as water hammer and
level variations can contribute, particularly with deaerators and waste heat boilers.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· PWHT at 620ºC (1150ºF) (carbon steel) to minimize residual stresses
· Smooth weld and joint profiles
· Use reinforcing pads at supports to spread loads
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection and Operations personnel to identify all deaerators, hot lime softeners, and steam
condensate vessels in plants.
· Inspector shall develop and execute inspection/reinspection plan (EE.5E.86)
· Sandblast and inspect with wet fluorescent or visible magnetic particle or eddy current
techniques. Some grinding to produce flush welds is required.
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel develop procedures to minimize the risk of water hammer and excessive
level fluctuation. Control O2 and pH in deaerators.
· During shutdown or standby, keep water oxygen free with scavengers.
· PWHT repairs at 620ºC (1150ºF) is desirable.
· Temper bead welding reduces hardness and improves toughness and helps reduce hydrogen
delayed cracking. Unlike PWHT, temper bead welding does not reduce residual stresses but can
be used when PWHT is impractical.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 19 Deaerator Cracking & Corrosion · 62

· EE.90E.84, "Progress Report on Deaerator Cracking and Corrosion"
· EE.5E.86, "Update on Deaerator Cracking and Corrosion"
· EE.2E.86, "New Guide to Boiler Water Treatment"
· EE.107E.86, "Deaerator Vessel Cracking and Corrosion Study Update"
· Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-L
· 1988 NACE T-7H-7 Task Group Report, "An Overview of Deaerator Cracking"
· NACE RP-590-90, "Recommended Practice for Prevention, Detection of Deaerator Corrosion and
Cracking"
· National Board Inspection Code -1992, "Non-mandatory Guideline on Deaerator Inspection"

(19) Deaerator Cracking and Corrosion

A
Possibility of Repeated Incidents Does not apply
B Deaerators with following attributes
Possibility of Isolated Incidents - Non-PWHT’d
- History of frequent startups and shutdowns
- History of water hammer and vibrations
- Poor boiler water treatment
+ O2 scavenger additions
+ pH below 8.5
- Poor weld profile on ID surface
C
D Deaerators with following attributes
Not Likely But Possible - PWHT’d
- History of continuous operation with few
shutdowns
- Smooth operation with water hammer or
vibrations
- Good boiler water treatment
- Good weld profile on ID surface
E
Practically Inpossible Does not apply
• Age Adjustment: Does not apply

• Inspection Adjustments: Performing an internal MT examination of the welds and finding no
cracks or excessive corrosion in the form of oxygen pitting can result in the following reductions in
probability:
- 100% MT examination of all welds provides a 2 level reduction in the probability
- 10% MT examination of all welds provides a 1 level reduction in the probability
• Monitoring Adjustments: Does not apply
• Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction permitted is 1 probability level.
• Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely, rupture possible
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 19 Deaerator Cracking & Corrosion · 63

MIP 20: Corrosion At Pipe Supports
REVISION: 2 (3/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Localized external corrosion of piping can occur at supports. For horizontal piping operating continuously
or intermittently at ambient temperatures, corrosion at the pipe support is the result of dirt/moisture
accumulation in the crevice formed by the pipe and the support. Metal loss is exacerbated by thermal
movement of the pipe which removes corrosion scales and exposes fresh metal to further corrosion.
Although corrosion at pipe supports is generally an aqueous corrosion problem, it is also possible with
carbon steel piping operating at elevated temperatures sufficient to produce external oxidation.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· New piping systems should be designed and fabricated per IP 4-2-2, "Pipe Supports", which
requires a steel bar or angle which provides point support of the pipe and a minimum of 13 mm
(½ inch) clearance from the support member or per local requirements.
· IP 4-2-2, "Pipe Supports"
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Piping circuits should be externally inspected on a periodic basis per API 570, "Piping Inspection
Code".
· At locations where there is an accumulation of dirt/scale/water at a pipe support, Inspectors
should follow-up to determine the extent of pipe corrosion. Since this may require lifting of the
pipe to provide access, extreme care should be taken if this is performed on-stream as the lifting
may cause failure of a heavily corroded pipe.
· Radiography
· Conventional straight beam ultrasonics
· Electromagnetic acoustic transducers (EMAT's) - these relatively new devices may have the
capability of detecting corrosion at the support point without line lifting as they can be coupled to
the top of a horizontal pipe, as described in EE.101E.93.
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Lines without the proper supports can be fitted with welded or "cold" welded cradles or saddles to
protect the pipe. Experience with cold welded saddles using non-metallic adhesives has proven
successful at some locations and minimizes the possibility of creating a crevice between the
saddle and pipe which can be a problem with welded and vented saddles.
· EE.14E.81 Evaluation of Adhesives for Bonding Wear Pads to Pipes
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 20 Corrosion at Pipe Supports · 64

· IP4-2-2 "Pipe Supports"
RBI ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Addressed by MIP 1b
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 20 Corrosion at Pipe Supports · 65

MIP 21: Corrosion By Acids (HCl and H2SO4)
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
(21a) HCl Corrosion
Chloride compounds present in crude oil can be broken down as they pass through the refinery, through
either thermal or catalytic decomposition, resulting in the formation of hydrochloric acid. As a gas, these
acids are not corrosive at typical process temperatures. However, at lower temperatures, HCl will readily
dissolve in condensed water and create a very corrosive medium.
Two areas of particular concern are the overhead system of atmospheric pipestills and downstream of
hydrotreating and reforming units. In the pipestill preheat train, MgCl 2 and CaCl2 are broken down and
form HCl, which is carried overhead in the pipestill tower and eventually condenses as the overhead
stream is cooled. NaCl does not break down to any appreciable extent. In naphtha and kerosene
hydrofiners, organic chlorides, which pass through the pipestill without decomposing, can be catalytically
broken down and lead to HCl formation in the reactor effluent system. In some cases, the source of the
chlorides has been chlorinated hydrocarbons used during production of the crude. In the
POWERFORMER unit, chlorination of the catalyst as part of the regeneration process can lead to acid
formation.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Operating targets for the desalter are defined and measured regularly by Operations personnel.
· Deficiencies in desalter operations are worked in a timely manner.
· The tube metallurgy in pipestill overhead and/or effluent system exchanger bundles is upgraded
when necessary to attain desired bundle lives.
· When allowed by Operations personnel, caustic is added to the crude at the appropriate levels to
prevent acid formation.
· The organic chloride level of incoming naphtha Hydrofiner feeds is periodically measured and
maintained below 5 ppm.
· Inhibitors are injected as required to control corrosion.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Corrosion probes in the pipestill overhead are used to monitor corrosivity on a regular basis.
· Water samples are taken at least weekly from pipestill overhead drums and periodically from
PF/HF separator drums and analyzed for chlorides, pH, and metals.
· A thickness monitoring program is in place for the piping in the pipestill overhead and PF/HF
effluent systems.
· Radiography or scanning ultrasonics are used to supplement the thickness monitoring program
when acid corrosion is indicated.
· Pipestill overhead exchanger bundles are inspected on a periodic basis.
· Linear polarization or electric resistance corrosion probes
· Automated C-scan ultrasonic instrumentation
· Eddy current and ultrasonic exchanger tube (IRIS) inspection technology.
· Radiography
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 21 Corrosion by Acids · 66

· Stream analysis

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· A corrosion inhibitor package for the pipestill including both a neutralizing amine and a filming
amine is utilized to control corrosion.
· A water wash system is considered if chlorides and/or pH are not within limits.
· If acidic corrosion is an on-going problem in reforming or hydrofining units, the use of coalescers
to remove acidic water is considered.
· A neutralizing corrosion inhibitor can be used in HYDROFINING/ POWERFORMING units to
control reactor effluent system corrosion.

· ER&E Desalter Handbook and Operating Guide
· ER&E Report EE.113E.91, "Pipestill Overhead Corrosion and Corrosion Control"

(21a) Corrosion by HCl Condensates
Corrosion By HCl Containing Condensates (e.g. APS overhead systems, Naphtha Hydrofiner effluent
stream and Powerformer cold effluent/regen streams )

A Does not apply
B Overhead chloride levels greater than 100 ppm.
Possibility of Isolated Incidents Organic chloride levels in naphtha feed to
hydrotreating unit above 5 ppm.
C Overhead chloride levels between 50 and 100
Possibility to Occur Sometime ppm.
D Overhead chloride levels between 20 and 50
Not Likely But Possible ppm
E Overhead chloride levels less than 20 ppm.
• Age Adjustment: Does not apply

• Inspection Adjustments: Local nature of metal loss makes inspection on exchanger tubes very
difficult. As a result, no reduction in probability is permitted for heat exchanger tubing. For vessel
shells or piping the following inspection adjustments are permitted:

Effectiveness Inspection Inspection Data In
Category Frequency Extent of Inspection Probability
High < 1/2 the Extensive external UT thickness Statistical Up to 3
time to scanning or radiography on analysis levels
consume elbows, tees and other appropriate for
the components that are known to localized
remaining experience higher corrosion rates. corrosion such as
corrosion Selected UT thickness scanning or EVA
allowance radiography on pipe straight
sections and vessel shell sections
or a full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness scanning or Simple analysis Up to 2
to consume radiography in areas of expected such as levels
the corrosion such as pipe elbows or a averaging of
remaining partial 10% internal inspection. thickness data
corrosion
allowance
consume radiography such as maximum
the averaging of
remaining thickness data
corrosion
allowance
· Monitoring Adjustments: Frequent monitoring for chloride levels and pH to ensure they are
maintained within control limits will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction permitted is 1 probability level.

DESCRIPTION:
(21b) Corrosion H2SO4
Sulfuric acid (H2SO4) is very corrosive to carbon steel at concentrations up to 70%. Above 70% H 2SO4,
concentration carbon steel is frequently the specified material of construction. The corrosiveness of 70%
or higher sulfuric acid to carbon steel is controlled by the stability of the ferrous sulfate film that forms on
the carbon steel surface. Diffusion or physical disruption of the ferrous sulfate from the carbon steel
surface is the process that determines the specific corrosion rate for carbon steel. Ferrous sulfate
diffusion and hence corrosion rate is increased as acid temperature and acid velocity increase. For this
reason carbon steel in concentrated sulfuric acid is generally limited to use at a maximum temperature of
125°F (50°C) at velocities of less than 3 fps (0.9 m/s). The addition of a hydrocarbon to concentrated
sulfuric acid decreases the ferrous sulfate solubility and hence the corrosion rate of carbon steel. A
minimum of about 0.35 moles of hydrocarbon per mole of acid is required before this effect is noted.
Physical disruption of the ferrous sulfate film can occur by turbulence at nozzles, elbows, tees, valves,
protuberances at welds, heat exchanger tube inlets, socket weld connections and along the top of piping
runs from entrained vapor. The accelerated corrosion rates at these locations have been reported to be 3
to 4 times the straight pipe, smooth flow corrosion rate and is frequently referred to as erosion-corrosion
or hydrogen grooving.
Acid dilution by water vapor adsorption, system mothballing, neutralization and cleaning of equipment in
preparation for internal inspection are special topics that should be reviewed by a Materials Specialist.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
• Carefully assess design/operating temperatures, acid velocity and corrosion allowance for
vessels and piping.
• Carefully review mechanical details for vessels and piping using existing national and industry
standards. If possible avoiding socket and threaded connections in favor of butt welds, avoid
weld protuberances and dress weld contours, use wear plates and provide particular attention to
the design details and placement of nozzles lines in vessels and tanks.
• Specify materials upgrades as justified but carefully consider alloy fabrication and the effect of
oxidizers on corrosion in reprocessed acid, particularly in closed loop recirculating type acid
systems.
• Ensure vessels and piping are free of mill scale or serious localized attack may occur.

DETECTION
Key Program Steps
• Concentrate external UT inspections in areas of potential flow disturbances such socket welds,
flanges, elbows, tees, weld protuberances, etc.
• Understand the mechanism of hydrogen grooving and identify locations where it is likely to occur.
Ensure these are included in piping and vessel inspection plans.
• Understand the mechanism of acid dilution and identify locations where it is likely to occur.
Ensure these are included in the piping and vessel inspection plans.
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
• Review affect of solar heating. If metal temperatures above 125°F (50°C) are likely consider
materials upgrades.
• Review heat tracing design and application. Overheating and hot spots must be avoided. If
metal temperatures above 125°F (50°C) are likely consider materials upgrades.
• Consult Materials Engineer for block valve and throttling valve materials selection.
• Review mechanism of hydrogen grooving and consider in piping design/layout and in vessel
design.
• Hydrogen pressure can increase rapidly from corrosion. Vent scab patches and provide pressure
relief for vessels and piping.
• Review mechanism of acid dilution. Review systems in intermittent service or equipment that is
vented to the atmosphere.
• Sulfuric acid dilution by water is exothermic. Acid mix points or acid dilution systems usually
require a materials upgrade. A nonmetallic, like PTFE or PFA, are frequently used at the mix
point and downstream.

• Refinery Construction Materials Manual
• Chemical Construction Materials Manual
• Corrosion of Carbon Steel by Concentrated Sulfuric Acid, S.W. Dean & G.D. Grab, Corrosion 84,
Paper 147
• Corrosion of Carbon Steel Tanks in Concentrated Sulfuric Acid Service, S,W. Dean & G.D. Grab,
Corrosion 85, Paper 298
• Corrosion of Steel In Concentrated Sulfuric Acid, B.T. Ellison, W.R. Schmeal, J. Elec. Soc., Vol.
125, P 524, 1978
• Materials For Piping in Sulfuric Acid Production Plants, M. Davies. Materials Performance, Sept.
1991, P 57
• NACE Publication 5A151 (1985 Revision) Materials of Construction for Handling Sulfuric Acid
• NACE Standard RP0294-94, Design Fabrication and Inspection of Tanks for the Storage of
Concentrated Sulfuric Acid And Oleum At Ambient Temperatures.

(21b) Corrosion H2SO4

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C

• Inspection Adjustments: Depending on the effectiveness of the inspection as defined in the
table below, the following reductions in probability can be taken.

Effectiveness Inspection Data In
Category Extent of Inspection Probability
High Extensive external UT thickness scanning Statistical analysis Up to 3
or radiography on elbows, tees and other appropriate for levels
components that are known to experience localized corrosion
higher corrosion rates. Selected UT such as EVA
thickness scanning or radiography on pipe
straight sections and vessel shell sections
or a full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate UT external thickness scanning or Simple analysis Up to 2
radiography in areas of expected such as averaging levels
corrosion such as pipe elbows or a partial of thickness data
10% internal inspection.
Low Spot UT thickness scanning or Simple analysis 1 level
radiography such as averaging maximum
of thickness data

· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 3 probability levels is acceptable.

MIP 22: Thermal And Low Cycle Fatigue
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Thermal fatigue is the fracture of metallic materials as the result of cyclic stresses which are generated by
the temperature cycling of the material. In many cases, fracture is related to constraint on a component
which prevents the component from expanding or contracting with a change in temperature. Failure can
also result from lack of adequate thermal flexibility in a piping system. Bi-metallic components which
undergo temperature variation can fail as a result of thermal fatigue because of the difference in thermal
expansion properties of the two materials involved. Thermal fatigue has been known to occur in furnaces,
boilers, bi-metallic joints in reactor inlet and outlet piping, expansion joints, gas turbines and valves
subject to frequent changes in temperature. Thermal fatigue has been observed in fabricated branch
convections (e.g. y-branch connections in Powerformer piping).
Low cycle fatigue is caused by mechanical forces which result in local or peak stresses above the yield
strength of the material. These can be cause by slug flow and fluid surge, such as water hammer. This
can result in failure after relatively few cycles.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Thermal fatigue is considered in the design and welding of bi-metallic components which operate
at elevated temperatures.
· Thermal sleeves are used for components particularly susceptible to thermal fatigue, such as
valves in cyclic POWERFORMING units.
· Hot lines are analyzed for thermal flexibility using PENGS, CAESAR II or other tools.
· POWERFORMING Maintenance Guide, EE.29E.94
· Design analysis tools such as ABAQUS, PENGS, CAESAR II, etc
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 22 Thermal & Low Cycle Fatigue · 73

DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Technical/Inspection personnel identify components susceptible to thermal fatigue such as
POWERFORMER valves.
· Inspector performs examination of components during downtime to detect the initiation of
cracking.
· Visual examination
· Penetrate testing
· Magnetic particle testing
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Mechanical Design personnel redesigns components to reduce stresses due to thermal cycling.
· Operations personnel adjusts conditions to reduce cycling.
· Inspector performs periodic inspection to detect cracking prior to failure.
· Design/analysis tools
· Penetrate testing

· EE.70E.78, "Guide to Thermal Stresses in Plant Equipment, Example Problems -- Part I"

(22) Thermal and Low Cycle Fatigue

A
Possibility of Repeated Does not apply
Incidents
B - Alloy 800 outlet pigtails on a steam reformer heater less than 18
Possibility of Isolated inches long with a sock-o-let designed coupling attachment
Incidents - PSA Vessesl in Hydrogen Recovery Units
C - Vessels that experience frequent thermal cycles from 600°F to ambient
Possibility to Occur - Hot to cold wall transitions such as following:
Sometime + slide valve transition
+ Powerformer reactor nozzle or Powerformer branch connections
- Expansion bellows operating above 1000° F
- Delayed coker equipment that is cycled, such as the drums and
associated piping
- Piping operating above 600° F for which no thermal flexibility analysis
has been performed
- Fabricated branch connections, e.g. y-branches in Powerformer piping
D
Not Likely But Possible Does not apply
E

· Inspection Adjustments: For thermal fatigue situations, downtime inspection for cracks and
finding no evidence of cracking can permit a 1 level reduction in probability. Expansion bellows
may require a focused visual inspection to insure its future integrity is not adversely effected. It
should be checked for cracks, gouges, weld strikes, permanent deformation (cold setting versus
design movements) and other flaws in order to reduce the probability by 1 category. However,
this adjustment is not appropriate for low cycle high stress conditions as experienced in slug flow
or fluid surge situations.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction permitted is 1 probability level.

MIP 23: Ring Joint Flange Cracking
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
There have been several experiences of solid or overlayed austenitic stainless steel flanges cracking. It
is believed to be caused by a combination of chlorides and high stresses due to sharp corners in the
groove and high bolt stresses.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Minimize use of solid and overlayed austenitic stainless steel ring joint flanges. Raised face
flanges are now considered acceptable for many high pressure applications.
· Use 1/8" (3 mm) minimum radius in groove to minimize stress riser
· Minimize roughness of groove machining - 63 rms maximum
· Use controlled bolting techniques to minimize stresses.
· Controlled bolting techniques for raised face flanges - Piping Maintenance Guide.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection to identify solid and overlayed SS flanges.
· Inspect joints at turnarounds.
· Liquid penetrant - heating flange to 150ºF (65ºC) helps define cracking since they are so tight.
· Ultrasonic inspection per 86 MATL 134
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Minimize risk of cracking by using controlled bolting procedures and thorough cleaning of flanges.
· Machine groove to 63 rms and 1/8" radius on corner after any repairs.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 23 Ring Joint Flange Cracking · 76

· EE.34E.79, "Investigation of Ring Joint Cracking
· Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-V
· API Recommended Practice 574, "Inspection of Piping, Tubing, Valves and Fittings"

Addressed by MIP 9 and 22
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 23 Ring Joint Flange Cracking · 77

MIP 24: Degradation Of Non-Metallic Materials
REVISION: 2 (3/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Non-metallic materials are used in refineries and chemical plants for numerous components including
gaskets, seals, valve packing, linings, piping and storage vessels. These materials are subject to
deterioration when exposed to high stresses, particularly at elevated temperature, and to certain
chemicals.
All thermoplastics have a tendency to creep under mechanical stress as a function of load, temperature
and time. Allowable stresses have been established for most plastics used in engineering applications for
a range of temperatures.
Thermoplastics can also degrade in specific environments through several mechanisms including direct
chemical attack, solvation and environmental stress cracking. Chemical attack, the breakdown of the
plastic's molecular structure, may occur in strong acids and other oxidizers. Solvation is the absorption of
liquid (often a hydrocarbon) by the plastic which can result in swelling and softening. Stress cracking
occurs with specific thermoplastic-environment combinations.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Non-metallic components are properly selected and designed by Process Design personnel
and/or the Materials Specialist.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Non-metallic components are inspected on a regular basis for cracking, swelling, softening and
other types of deterioration.
· FRP storage vessels in services where degradation may occur are periodically inspected using
acoustic emission per ASME Section V, Article 11, "Acoustic Emission Examination of Fiber-
Reinforced Plastic Vessels"
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· When a non-metallic component fails, the Material Specialist should consider a failure analysis to
determine the specific cause of failure.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 24 Degradation of Nonmetallics · 78

· EE.18E.79, "Plastics Handbook"

Depends on specific service and materials. Typically, non-metallic materials are not used for pressure
boundary components containing hydrocarbon or other potentially hazardous materials. Contact ERE for
details.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 24 Degradation of Nonmetallics · 79

MIP 25: Hydrofluoric Acid Corrosion And Cracking
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Hydrofluoric (HF) acid has a very low corrosion rate on mild steel, but as water content increases above
5%, corrosivity increases rapidly. High quality (HIC resistant) carbon steel and Monel are the materials of
choice in HF service (stainless steels corrode much more rapidly than carbon steels). Uniform corrosion,
pitting, and grooving occur rapidly on carbon steel when water has entered the system. HF readily
attacks silica containing materials (e.g., glass), wood, rubber, plastics (with the exception of Teflon and
Kel-F), and will attack slag in poorly welded carbon steel.
Exposure to HF can cause hard steels, welds, and weld heat-affected zones to undergo hydrogen
embrittlement cracking, and can cause steels to blister as a result of hydrogen buildup in laminations in
steel. Damage such as hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) and stress oriented hydrogen induced cracking
(SOHIC) can also occur in HF service. This damage is similar to the damage observed in wet H 2S
service (see MIP 2). Monel stressed by cold work or residual welding stress can crack in HF service,
particularly HF vapor. As a result, Monel welds require PWHT in HF service.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Designers with advice from Materials Specialists specify the quality of steels to be used,
and select proper materials in the design of the facility (e.g., Monel used as cladding in pumps
and valves; Kel-F and Teflon used as sealing material in pumps and instruments, and in valves
for trim and packing).
· Designers and Maintenance Engineers follow special construction and equipment specification
practices (e.g., post weld heat treat vessels and exchangers, use of heat treated bolts, use
seamless pipe, avoid threaded connections, avoid liquid traps/dead legs.
· Maintenance personnel are aware of special maintenance activity considerations such as use of
only approved for HF service greases, and special welding procedures top include PWHT and
slag removal.
· Materials and Design Practices exist to minimize HF corrosion under operating conditions.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· A thorough inspection program set up for piping and pressure vessels, with emphasis on
locations particularly subject to HF attack. For example, after HF introduction into the unit,
selective radiography of carbon steel welds, since HF will readily attack weld slag deposits.
On-stream ultrasonic thickness measurement of piping and vessels. Ultrasonic and WFMT
inspection for hydrogen blistering or cracking in vessels.
· Visual inspection by Process/Inspection personnel to identify problems (e.g., a valve packing leak
monitoring program to identify problem valves, identify leaking flanges via use of acid-indicating
paint).
· Monitoring of cooling water pH by Process personnel to detect HF leaks to cooling water in
exchangers.
· Inspection personnel prioritizes/inspects equipment during downtime for corrosion and cracking
inspection.
· Monitoring of hydrogen activity with hydrogen probes to establish potential for hydrogen cracking
and blistering.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 25 HF Acid Corrosion & Cracking · 80

· Computer enhanced UT inspection technology (e.g., P-Scan)
· Typical UT, radiography, WFMT, etc. techniques
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· As soon as possible after an operational upset (involving water entry), inspection of piping and
vessels that could have been affected to determine the extent of damage.
· Preventive maintenance to stop leaks, replace leaking valves or flanges, etc., which will continue
to worsen if left unattended.
· Through the monitoring of corrosion probes. Water pH, unit operation, etc., required operational
changes made to avoid corrosion.
· UOP Licensee Technical Information

· Materials Engineering Guide, Section III-H
· API 751, "Safe Operation of Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Units
· UOP Licensee technical information

(25a) Corrosion Caused by HF Acid

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C

table below, the following reductions in probability can be taken.
Inspection
Effectiveness Analysis of Reduction In
High Extensive external UT thickness Statistical Up to 4 levels
measurements or radiography on analysis of data
elbows and other components that such as EVA or
experience higher corrosion rates. STATPIPE
UT thickness measurements on
pipe straight sections and vessel
shell sections. A full 100% internal
inspection.
Moderate UT external thickness Simple analysis Up to 3 levels
measurements or radiography on such as
elbows and straight sections. A averaging of
partial 10% internal inspection thickness data
Low Spot UT thickness measurements Simple analysis Up to 2 levels
or radiography such as
averaging of
thickness data

· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 4 probability levels is permitted, only if a
highly effective inspection is performed.

(25b) Cracking Caused by HF Acid
Probability Characteristics of
Level Degradation
A Carbon Steel with hardness above Brinell 225 or
Possibility of Repeated Incidents Monel in the as-welded condition
B Does not apply
C Carbon steel with following characteristics:
Possibility to Occur Sometime - Brinell hardness between 180 and 225
- Sulfur level above 0.01 wt%
D Does not apply
E Carbon steel with Sulfur level between 0.002
Practically Impossible and 0.01 %

· Inspection Adjustments: Performing an inspection in compliance with the recommended
inspection level and frequency included in the Manual for Equipment in Wet H2S Service and
finding no cracking results in a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Monitoring Adjustments: If the stream is monitored with a hydrogen probe and no hydrogen
activity is observed, a 1 level reduction in probability is permitted.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: Based on the level of inspection performed and monitoring
conducted, a maximum reduction of 2 is permitted.

MIP 26: Mechanical High Cycle Fatigue
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Mechanical high cycle fatigue is the fracture of components due to cyclic stresses of a mechanical nature
at a maximum stress level normally below the yield strength of the material. In most cases, the stresses
involved are the result of vibration associated with rotating machinery, or process flow. Small diameter
components are most commonly affected by mechanical fatigue. Fatigue cracking usually occurs in
areas of high stress concentration such as at fillet welds or machined notches.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· The IP requirements for the bracing of piping components in vibrating service are complied with
during design and are understood by the Inspector.
· Small diameter piping connections which do not comply with the IP requirements are identified
through periodic visual examinations of piping circuits and repaired in a timely fashion.
· Periodic visual examination of piping circuits
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Visual examination for vibration, poor design/geometry
· Please contact ER&E Mechanical Engineering Section
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Correct bracing and design of connections
· Optimize profile of fillet welds
· For Weldors Only, Issue 39, EE.58E.87

· IP 3-18-1, "Piping Fabrication, Shop and Field"
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 26 Mechanical High Cycle Fatigue · 84

(26) Mechanical High Cycle Fatigue

A Visible hammering, excessive motion or history of fatigue
Possibility of Repeated Incidents failures
B Does not apply
C Vibrating service and design details that do not meet IP
Possibility to Occur Sometime requirements (such as inadequate bracing on small
diameter connections near rotating equipment or areas of
high stress concentration.)
D Does not apply
E Vibrating service but design details that meet IP
Practically Impossible requirements
Note: None of the listed adjustments apply. The only way to prevent fatigue failures is by reducing
vibrations or improving the design.

· Overall Adjusted Probability: Does not apply
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 26 Mechanical High Cycle Fatigue · 85

MIP 27: Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking Of
Copper Alloys
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Copper and copper alloys are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in stressed areas when exposed to
solutions containing ammonia or ammonium compounds with a pH greater than 8.5. This phenomenon
can occur at ambient temperatures. It is often referred to as "season cracking."
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design personnel/Materials Specialist to select the optimum alloy if ammonia is likely to
be present in the process.
· New equipment to be so stored as to prevent exposure to ammonia bearing environments.
· Operations personnel to avoid process changes that may result in ammonia carry over or could
lead to periods of static contact (e.g., in downtime situations) with ammonia.
· Please contact ER&E Materials Engineering Section or Materials Engineer in the Affiliate
Engineering Office
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Inspection identifies copper alloy equipment.
· Operations indicates whether exposure to ammonia or ammonium compounds is a concern.
· If problem is suspected, Inspection personnel examines highly stressed areas.
· Dye penetrant testing
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 27 NH3 SCC of Copper Alloys · 86

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Avoid exposure of copper alloys to streams containing ammonia at pH>8.5
· Please contact ER&E Materials Engineering Section or Materials Engineer in the Affiliate
Engineering Office

· EE.119E.77, "Stress Corrosion Cracking in Refining and Petrochemical Plants"
Industry
· MTI Publication No 15, “Guidelines for Preventing Stress Corrosion Cracking in the Chemical
Process Industries”

(27) Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking of Copper Alloys
Probability Characteristics of
Level Degradation
A
B
Possibility of Isolated Incidents Process contains NH3 and water with a pH greater than 8.5
C
D
E
If stream contains ammonia but has pH below 8.5, brass SCC is not a probable event.

· Inspection Adjustments: Downtime internal inspection of equipment using ET and finding no
evidence of cracking will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Monitoring Adjustments: Continuous monitoring of pH to ensure pH is maintained below 8.5
will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 1 probability level is permitted.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 27 NH3 SCC of Copper Alloys · 87

MIP 28: Fuel Ash Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Corrosion of metallic components in furnaces and boilers (including tubes, hangers and tubesheets)
occurs when heavy liquid fuels containing significant amounts of vanadium and sodium are burned. This
type of corrosion occurs when V/Na compounds having a low melting temperature are formed; the molten
compounds act as a flux which accelerates the rate of metal loss. Fuel ash corrosion usually occurs at
temperatures above 1200° F (650° C), when the V/Na rich compounds melt and form on metal surfaces.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Limits on sodium and vanadium in furnace fuels are well defined and periodically measured,
particularly for liquid fuels.
· Application of contoured refractory layers to tubesheets.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Furnaces which fire high sodium/vanadium fuels are given an internal, visual inspection at each
turnaround.
· Visual inspection
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 28 Fuel Ash Corrosion · 88

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· The metallurgy of furnace components are upgraded when fuels high in sodium and vanadium
must be fired.
· INCO alloy IN-657 (48 Cr-1.5 Nb-bal Ni) or comparable.

· RCMM Section, "Fireside Corrosion in Furnaces and Boilers", pp. VI-D-106 through VI-D-114.

(28) Fuel Ash Corrosion

A Na+V content greater than 150 ppm in the fuel oil and metal
Possibility of Repeated Incidents temperature greater than 1200° F
B Na+V content between 20 and 150 ppm in the fuel oil and
Possibility of Isolated Incidents metal temperature between 1200° F and 1550° F
C Na+V content less than 20 ppm and metal temperature
Possibility to Occur Sometime greater than 1550° F
D Na+V content less than 5 ppm and metal temperature greater
Not Likely But Possible than 1550° F
E Na+V content less than 5 ppm and metal temperature less
Practically Impossible than 1500° F
· Age Adjustment: If equipment is less than 5 years old then the probability level can be reduced
by 1 level.
· Inspection Adjustments: Onstream or downtime examination of tube supports and finding no
deposits will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 1 probability level is permitted.
· Expected Failure Mode: Distortion and cracking of tube supports.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 28 Fuel Ash Corrosion · 89

MIP 29: Flue Gas Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Initial condensation of sulfuric acid vapor (formed by the combination of sulfur trioxide from combustion
gas and water vapor) can be highly concentrated, and very corrosive. Furnace equipment on which this
condensation occurs (economizers, air pre-heaters, ducts, casings, and refractory) are susceptible to
significant corrosion/damage.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design personnel to take account of sulfur content of fuels, excess air levels, and
temperatures, to lead to an optimum design for furnace hardware which avoids condensation of
sulfuric acid.
· Mechanical Design personnel to select appropriate refractory systems.
· Consider the use of vapor barriers and surface coatings applied to furnace casings in areas
where castable linings are not used in furnaces firing high sulfur fuels.
· At shutdowns, neutralization will prevent continuing degradation during the outage.
· IP 7-1-1-, "Fired Heaters"
Key Program Steps
· Process personnel to monitor sulfur levels in the fuels.
· Process personnel to consider the use of dew point monitoring system for use onstream.
· At shutdowns, Inspectors assesses refractory condition, which might include the taking of
refractory core samples.
· At shutdowns, Inspectors to visually examine all exposed metal surfaces: tubes, tube supports,
casings, etc.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Equipment with limited access can be inspected with remote video inspection techniques.
· Hammer testing of refractories
· Infra-red thermography
· Hand-held contact pyrometers
· Air-cooled corrosion probes as described in 86 EEEL 1433
· EE.35E.86, "Mothballing Guide" (provides guidelines to prevent corrosion from acid condensates
during downtime)
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 29 Flue Gas Corrosion · 90

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel to maintain excess air levels at design basis, and to control fireside
surface temperatures at design or agreed levels.
· Operations personnel to avoid moves to higher sulfur level fuels.
· Adjust cold end temperatures by changing preheat.
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, page VI-D-106

· EE.72E.75, "Low Temperature Acid Flue Gas Corrosion"
· EE.127E.79, "Flue Gas Corrosion of Furnace Casings"
· EE.30E.80, "Report on Flue Gas Corrosion"
· EE.98E.82, "Acid Condensation in Combustion Flue Gases"
Industry Standards and Recommended Practices
· API Recommended Practice 573, "Inspection of Fired Heaters and Boilers

(29) Flue Gas Corrosion

A
Possibility of Repeated Does not apply
Incidents During Lifetime
B Carbon steel and sensitized stainless steel as
Possibility of Isolated FCCU regenerator overhead components that
Incidents During Lifetime could operate below the acid dewpoint.
C Components in furnaces that burn fuel oil with a
Possibility to Occur high sulfur content that could operate below the
Sometime During Lifetime acid dewpoint.
D Components that could operate below the acid
Not Likely But Possible dewpoint in furnaces that burn sour gas fuels with
a high sulfur content
E Components that could operate below the acid
Practically Impossible dewpoint in furnaces that burn sweet gas fuels
with a low sulfur content
· Age Adjustment: If equipment is less than 10 years old then the probability level can be
reduced by 1.
· Inspection Adjustments: Visual inspection at downtimes and finding no accelerated corrosion
· Monitoring Adjustments: Onstream monitoring of the acid dewpoint and controls to ensure the
equipment operates above the acid dewpoint will permit a 2 level reduction in probability
· Overall Adjusted Probability: A maximum reduction of 3 probability levels is permitted.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 29 Flue Gas Corrosion · 91

MIP 30: Carburization
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Carburization is a form of high temperature degradation which occurs when carbon from the environment
diffuses into an alloy, usually forming carbides in the matrix and/or along grain boundaries. Temperatures
generally in excess of 1000ºF (540ºC) are required with the 1500-2000ºF (815-1090ºC) range being the
most common. Almost all engineering alloys are susceptible with the austenitic stainless steels, both
wrought and cast, and the nickel base alloys being of greatest interest to the petrochemical industry.
Carburization occurs when the activity of carbon (Ac) in the environment is greater than the activity of
carbon in the alloy. Numerous thermodynamic models and programs are available to calculate the former
based on gas phase compositions while only few are available to calculate the carbon activity within a
given alloy. Conditions favoring carburization include a high gas phase carbon activity (Ac) (gases rich in
CO, CO2, methane, ethane) and a low oxygen potential (minimal O 2 or steam). Sulfur inhibits
carburization. Ethylene pyrolysis tubes represent the greatest potential for carburization within the
petrochemical industry with steam reforming, FLEXICOKING, and POWERFORMING presenting
substantially reduced concerns.
Carburized material suffers an increase in hardness and often a substantial reduction in toughness,
becoming embrittled to the point of being unweldable. The cast stainless steel tubes used in steam
cracking can reach carbon contents of 3-4% near the inside surface but continue to operate despite the
severely embrittled condition. Over time carburized tubes can exhibit internal creep damage due to the
increased volume of the carbides.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Reduce the carbon activity of the environment through lower temperatures and higher
oxygen/sulfur partial pressures.
· Select alloys with adequate resistance to carburization. These include alloys with either strong
surface oxide film formers (Si and Al) or strong carbide formers (Cr, Ti, Nb and W).
· Calculate PO2 and Ac to define susceptibility to carburization. Thermo-Calc (available on license
from the University of Stockholm) is one of the better programs available which will perform
thermodynamic calculations.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel identify equipment susceptible to carburization based on operating
temperatures, oxygen partial pressure and carbon activity (i.e. environments rich in CO, CO 2,
CH4, C2H6).
· Inspectors prioritize and perform inspection.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 30 Carburization · 92

· Cracking caused by carburization is detectable by penetrant, radiographic and ultrasonic testing.
· Several 'carburization' meters are available to detect lesser degrees of attack in austenitic
materials. These detect the increased magnetic permeability of the carburized layer, but are
affected by surface oxides which may also be magnetic. An instrument from Kubota is
recommended.
· Hardness measurements provide an indirect indication of carburization if access to the
carburizing surface is available.
· Several destructive techniques are available to measure carburization including optical and
electron microscopy as well as direct elemental analysis on either a micro or macro scale.
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· See "Prevention"
· See "Prevention"
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, pages VI-D-6 through VI-D-8, Nov. 1993
Industry:
· "High Temperature Corrosion of Engineering Alloys", George Y. Lai, pages 47 through 68
(30) Carburization

A
During Lifetime
B Temperature greater than 1500° F and reducing
Possibility of Isolated Incidents environment with low PO2 and high carbon activity
C Temperature between 1000° F and 1500° F and a
Possibility to Occur Sometime reducing environment with low PO2 and high
carbon activity
D Does not apply
E Does not apply
· Inspection Adjustments: Downtime inspection using a compliment of NDE techniques,
including magnetic permeability, UT for cracks, hardness and metallography and finding no
evidence of carburization, will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Monitoring Adjustments: Injection of a sulfur compound to inhibit carburization will permit a 1
level reduction in probability.
· Expected Failure Mode: Cracking leading to a leak and/or embrittlement of component
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 30 Carburization · 93

MIP 31: Hydriding Of Titanium
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Titanium is used for exchanger tubing, piping and other equipment in corrosive waters such as salt water
and sour water. At sufficiently high temperatures, however, titanium will pick up hydrogen (from
dissociation of acid in acidic solutions, and from dissociation of water in neutral or alkaline solutions) and
form internal hydrides, which cause embrittlement of the titanium. For this reason, titanium is not
recommended for use at temperatures above 71ºC (160ºF) in acidic solutions and 76ºC (170ºF) in
alkaline solutions. Titanium is acceptable in hydrocarbon services at temperatures in excess of 300 oF
(150oC).
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· The temperature limits on the use of titanium are understood and followed. (Fouling can cause
local high temperatures and should be prevented in exchangers operating near the service limit.)
· For severe services (i.e., those approaching the limits for titanium), the recommended grade of
titanium (ASTM Grade 12 with a 0.1% Fe maximum and a thermally-enhanced oxide film) is
utilized rather than commercially pure ASTM Grade 2 titanium.
· During downtime periods, titanium bundles should be handled carefully or not at all.
· Application of service limits
· Alloy selection
· Materials Engineering Guide III-I-1
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Titanium components operating above or near to the recommended temperature limits are
inspected at turnarounds for hydriding using eddy current techniques.
· Eddy current inspection as described in EE.117E.77, "Eddy Current Test for Identifying Hydriding
in Titanium"
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Control of cyanides through polysulfide injection.
· Contact ER&E Materials Engineering Section

· Materials Engineering Guide Section III-I-1, "Uses and Limitations of Titanium"
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 31 Hydriding of Titanium · 94

(31) Hydriding of Titanium

A
B Metal temperatures greater than 160 ° F, sour
Possibility of Isolated Incidents water service and titanium coupled to carbon or
stainless steel
C
Possibility to Occur Sometime Metal temperatures greater than 160°F
D
E

· Inspection Adjustments: Routine examination of samples for hydrides or eddy current
inspection and finding no evidence of hydriding will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Expected Failure Mode: Cracking leading to a leak
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 31 Hydriding of Titanium · 95

MIP 32: MEA/Flexsorb Reclaimer Corrosion
REVISION: 2 (3/96)
DESCRIPTION:
The reclaimer is used in Amine (MEA and Flexsorb SE) Regeneration Units to remove heat stable salts
and other degradation products which form during the regeneration of the amine. The degradation
products are partially removed with steam and caustic by releasing the fixed amine from heat stable salts
or organic acids. Some degradation products remain as sludge in the reclaimer and must be physically
removed.
General corrosion and pitting in the reclaimer is caused by one or a combination of corrodents described
below:
· The amine degradation products, and heat stable salts.

· Inadequately stripped lean amine solution causes corrosion in the reclaimer due to the remaining
acid gases flashing out of the amine solution.
· Caustic is added to the reclaimer to release the amine from the heat stable salts. If excess
caustic is added, then higher than expected corrosion rates can be expected. Also, near the
tubesheet "caustic gouging" can occur.
· Acidic sludges that form on the bottom of the reclaimer.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design or Operations personnel define and follow the reclaiming operation in
accordance with the recommended guidelines.
· Materials Specialist recommends appropriate metallurgy.
· Operations personnel check the following variables to confirm the reclaiming operation is working
as specified in the guidelines.
- Temperature and pressure of the steam
- Heat stable salt levels
- Liquid level
- Temperature of the process liquid
· Recommended reclaiming guidelines
· Use of alloy materials
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel follow defined reclaiming procedure.
· Inspectors monitor and carry out necessary inspections
· Sampling procedures
· Wall thickness monitoring program (UT inspection)
· Corrosion probes
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 32 MEA/Flexsorb Reclaimer Corrosion · 96

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Reclaiming operation is reviewed and revised to reduce corrosion rates.
· Inspectors recommend materials upgrading.
· Materials upgrading

· Amine Treating Process and Operating Information Manual
· "Effects of MEA Variables on Corrosion" - AIChE Safety in Ammonia Plants Vol. 9, 1967
Addressed by MIP 16
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 32 MEA/Flexsorb Reclaimer Corrosion · 97

MIP 33: Phenol And NMP Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Phenol and NMP (N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone) solvents are used to remove aromatic compounds from
lubricating oil feedstock to improve viscosity index, color and oxidation resistance. Each type of solvent
has unique corrosion-causing properties.
Two basic categories of corrosion compounds exist in NMP units: (1) those boiling higher than the solvent
(e.g., naphthenic acids and sulfur compounds), which concentrate in the extract and attack the extract
recovery section, and (2) those boiling at or below the boiling point of NMP (e.g., H 2SO4, HCl, H2S, and
C1-C4 carboxylic acids), which concentrate in the NMP solvent and cause corrosion at many locations. A
number of areas require special consideration:
· Impingement and condensation corrosion in the solvent recovery overhead system.

· Dilute aqueous solution corrosion in dehydrator towers.
· Extract system preheat furnaces and transfer lines corrosion.
There are several corrosion problems associated with phenol:
· Concentration of sulfur and organic acids leads to naphthenic acid attack and sulfidation
corrosion in the hot extract circuit.
· Acidic impingement and condensation corrosion in tower overhead circuits.
· Dilute (5-15% phenol) aqueous solutions are very corrosive to extract drier condensers.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Unit corrosion is best prevented through the use of proper materials to deal with the various
corrosion mechanisms in different parts of the process.
· Design for a velocity of less than 9 m/s (30 fps) in recovery overhead piping circuits.
· Maintain recovery tower overhead temperatures 30ºF (17 oC) above the dew point.
· Control solvent solution H2S, HCl or carboxylic acid contaminants through purging, caustic
addition, ZnO bed for H2S removal, leak detection and repair (chlorine entering via cooling water
leakage), or ion resin bed for acid removal.
· Use of alloy materials to prevent significant corrosion
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Corrosion probes monitored by Inspectors.
· Stream analyses by Operations personnel to identify impending problems.
· Comprehensive piping and pressure vessel inspection programs in place, with identification of
critical circuits and inspection sites, inspection planning and NDT by Inspectors.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 33 Phenol & NMP Corrosion · 98

· Ultrasonics for general thinning
· Radiography to monitor localized pitting, impingement, and naphthenic acid corrosion.
· IRIS/eddy current inspection of exchanger tubes
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel to eliminate/control contaminants in solvent through prehydrofining, feed
selection, purging, leak repair, caustic addition, etc.
· Operations personnel to maintain tower overhead temperatures to at least 17ºC (30ºF) above
dew point.
· Containment control
· Materials selection

· "Corrosion of Ferrous Materials of Construction in NMP Lube Treating Service", EE.45E.80
· "Mechanism of Corrosion in Baton Rouge EXOL N Plants", 83 MATL 745
· Exxon Nondestructive Testing Manual
· Exxon Construction Materials Manual
· "Materials of Construction for Phenol Treating Units", EE.72E.73

(33) Phenol and NMP Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C


High < 1/2 the Extensive external UT thickness Statistical analysis Up to 3
time to scanning or radiography on appropriate for levels
consume elbows, tees and other localized corrosion
the components that are known to such as EVA
remaining experience higher corrosion rates.
corrosion Selected UT thickness scanning or
to consume radiography in areas of expected such as averaging levels
the corrosion such as pipe elbows. A of thickness data
remaining partial 10% internal inspection.
corrosion
allowance
consume radiography such as averaging maximum
the of thickness data
remaining
corrosion
allowance
· Monitoring Adjustments: Specific monitoring, for each stream in the unit, will permit a 1 level
reduction in probability.

MIP 34: Cooling Water Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Factors influencing the corrosion of metals in water systems are the chemistry of the water, the presence
of solids in the water (e.g., sand, barnacles), the flow rate, the physical configuration of the system, the
water temperature, and the presence of bacteria. Most of the localized forms of corrosion (e.g., pitting,
under-deposit or crevice, impingement or velocity attack) can be found in water services. Corrosion of
carbon steel in sea water can be very severe.
Each type of cooling water system (i.e., open utilizing cooling towers, closed recirculating, or once-
through, where permitted) has unique factors influencing the corrosion of metals. Consequently, control
of cooling water corrosion at each plant requires a total system survey to develop a comprehensive
approach.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· For new facilities, Process Designers select the optimum cooling water system, materials of
construction, and water treatment. Good system design also includes following recommended
velocity ranges, eliminating crevice conditions, following maximum water outlet temperature
guidelines and avoiding galvanic couples.
· For new or replaced equipment, Inspectors, Operations and Engineering personnel to consider:
- Change of materials (e.g., admiralty brass for heat exchanger tubes, non-metallic pipe)
- Equipment precleaning and metal surface passivation
- Water treatment (e.g., pH control, corrosion inhibitors, biocides, antifoulants)
- Coatings or linings (e.g., coal tar epoxy, concrete lining)
- Cathodic protection
· Refinery Construction Materials Manual, new section on Cooling Water Treatment
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· As part of a comprehensive piping inspection program, locate inspection points for general and
localized corrosion; plan and perform NDT.
· Monitoring of corrosion probes, corrosion coupons, or test exchanger by Inspection personnel to
identify changes in corrosion rate.
· Inspect water side components of heat exchangers.
· Ultrasonics (e.g., IRIS, UT thickness), radiography, eddy current and flux leakage.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 34 Cooling Water Corrosion · 101

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· System cleaning, oil source (leakage) identification and removal, biological growth control, water
treatment monitoring and control, water return temperature control, and concentration cycle
control by Operations personnel.
· A preventive maintenance program of repair and replacement of corroded equipment, considering
new materials, coatings or lining, and cathodic protection as means to reduce further corrosion.

· Exxon Nondestructive Testing Manual
· Exxon Refinery Construction Materials Manual, Section II-K
· Betz Laboratories (and others) training and information manuals
· NACE publications

(34) Cooling Water Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C
· Age Adjustment: If the piping is less than 10 years old or the exchanger bundles are less than 5
years old, provided they are not in level A probability, then the probability can be reduced by 1
level.

Effectiveness Inspection Analysis of In
Category Frequency Extent of Inspection Inspection Data Probability
remaining experience higher corrosion
corrosion rates. Selected UT thickness
allowance scanning or radiography on pipe
straight sections and vessel
shell sections. A full 100%
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness scanning Simple analysis Up to 2
to consume or radiography in areas of such as averaging levels
the expected corrosion such as pipe of thickness data
remaining elbows. A partial 10% internal
corrosion inspection.
allowance
remaining
corrosion
allowance
· Monitoring Adjustments: Monitoring of pH, Cl¯ and other water quality parameters, plus a
corrosion coupon program will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.

MIP 35: Steam Condensate Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Steam condensate can cause severe corrosion to steel due to the presence of carbon dioxide (CO 2) and
oxygen (O2). Air leakage into the steam condensate system is the primary source of oxygen
contamination. Air leakage is the result of condensing steam producing a vacuum, and permitting in-
leakage at steam traps, condensate drains, threaded fittings, pipe leaks, etc.
Carbon dioxide (along with carbonate ions) is produced in the boiler by decomposition of bicarbonate ions
present in the boiler feed water. Carbonate further reacts with water in the presence of heat to form
hydroxide and more CO2. The carbon dioxide dissolves in condensed steam, and forms carbonic acid,
which corrodes steel. Another source of CO2 may be returned process condensate which in the case of
hydrogen plants can contain large quantities of CO 2 due to process leakage into condensate system.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Externally treat the boiler feed water to eliminate the bicarbonate alkalinity and thereby minimize
the CO2 potential.
· Avoid stagnant condensate systems by venting steam to lower pressure steam systems and by
sizing the system to avoid over-design. This will eliminate build-up of non-condensable gases
(such as O2 and CO2) due to under utilization and minimal introduction of steam. Over-designed
systems may also draw a vacuum which can suck in air and prevents corrosive condensates from
exiting.
· Design system to minimize oxygen in-leakage (avoid venting steam systems to the atmosphere
unless it always operates at a positive pressure, eliminate threaded joints, etc.).
· Design condensate systems to permit positive draining.
· Design condensate system to minimize turbulence.
· Alloys such as aluminum, stainless steel, and copper alloys are resistant to carbonic acid
corrosion and are economical for select or critical components in the condensate system.
· Inject volatile neutralizing or filming forming corrosion inhibitors.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Develop and institute a condensate sampling program which analyzes for pH, iron and copper (if
copper alloys are used in the condensate system) at several locations.
· Institute an inspection program which concentrates on areas of high turbulence and stagnant
areas (low points, under-utilized systems) where non-condensables can accumulate.
· Ultrasonic thickness inspection
· Radiography
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 35 Steam Condensate Corrosion · 104

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Review the condensate systems and eliminate/repair:
+ Dead legs where non-condensables can accumulate
+ Low spots where condensate can accumulate
+ Water leaks. Components that leak water under pressure will leak air under a vacuum.
· As was discussed above for over-designed systems, under-utilized steam systems (such as
occur during summer months or when heating demands are lower) should also be avoided. If the
design does not permit venting steam systems to a lower pressure steam system, other options
that can be considered are plugging tubes, or controlling condensate levels (covering or
uncovering the tube surface based on heat demand). These steps will eliminate build-up of non-
condensable gases (such as O2 and CO2) during periods of under-utilization when there may be
little introduction of steam. Under-utilized systems may also draw a vacuum which can suck in air
and prevents corrosive condensates from exiting.

· Section 9 (pages 9.1 - 9.5) in EE.2E.86, "New Guide to Boiler Water Treatment"
· Refinery Construction and Materials Manual, Steam Generation Section beginning on page II-K-
40.
· Refinery Construction and Materials Manual, Corrosion Design Curve 15 in CO 2 Bearing Water,
pages II-A-52 and 53.

(35) Steam Condensate

A History of leaks
B Condensate return from process
Possibility of Isolated Incidents heating and tank farms
C Corrosion in carbon steel stripping
Possibility to Occur Sometime section of deaerator vessel
D Condensate return from high pressure
Not Likely But Possible utilities
E Use of stainless steel and/or a

Practically Impossible corrosion rate of carbon steel less than
5 mpy
Or
Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C
· Age Adjustment: If the equipment is less than 10 years old, and is not in probability level A,
then the probability can be reduced by 1 level.


remaining experience higher corrosion rates.
corrosion Selected UT thickness scanning or
to consume radiography in areas of expected such as averaging levels
the corrosion such as pipe elbows. A of thickness data
remaining partial 10% internal inspection.
corrosion
allowance
remaining
corrosion
allowance
· Monitoring Adjustments: Monitoring pH, O2 levels and other water quality parameters will
permit a 1 level reduction in probability.

MIP 36: Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking Of
Carbon Steel
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Anhydrous ammonia causes stress corrosion cracking of as-welded carbon steels. Anhydrous ammonia
is defined as water content of less than 0.2% by mass. The water distribution coefficient favors the liquid
phase so vapor spaces of ammonia vessels may still be subject to stress corrosion cracking in ammonia
with greater than 0.2% by mass water.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Use carbon steel with tensile strengths below 70,000 psi.
· Specify post weld heat treatment.
· Materials Selection
· PWHT
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations identifies carbon steel equipment containing anhydrous ammonia.
· Inspection maintains prioritized list of susceptible equipment for inspection.
· Ultrasonic shear wave testing
· Acoustic emission testing
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Blend grind, or weld repair, existing cracks
· Post weld heat treat
· Thermal flame spray zinc on welds and highly stressed areas (requires careful control under
direction of materials engineer experienced with mitigation technique)
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 36 NH3 SCC of Carbon Steel · 108

· PIB Units - Inspection of Packaged Ammonia Refrigeration Units, Feb. 23, 1993, 94PPE7
· Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking, Dec. 17, 1986, 86CE1403
· A Review of Stress Corrosion Cracking of Steel in Liquified Ammonia Service, Materials
Performance, Dec. 86, p. 18
Industry
· MTI Publication No. 15. “Guidelines for Preventing Stress Corrosion Cracking In The Chemical
Process Industries.

(36) Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking of Carbon Steel

A Does not apply
B Carbon steel in as-welded condition and
Possibility of Isolated Incidents exposed to ammonia with no water
addition
C Carbon steel in as-welded condition in
Possibility to Occur Sometime vapor space above ammonia with water
addition
D Does not apply
E Carbon steel in as-welded condition and
Practically Impossible exposed to ammonia with water addition
Note: Carbon steel in PWHT’d condition is not susceptible to cracking in
anhydrous ammonia.

· Inspection Adjustments: Downtime or onstream inspection for cracking (MT and AET for
downtime inspection and UT for onstream inspection) and finding no evidence of cracking will
permit up to a 1 level reduction in probability.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 36 NH3 SCC of Carbon Steel · 109

MIP 37: Liquid Metal Embrittlement
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Liquid metal embrittlement occurs when a molten metal penetrates the grain boundaries of a susceptible
alloy, under stress, causing intergranular cracking. Cracking usually occurs at elevated temperatures; the
temperature must be high enough to melt the attacking metal. As a result, cracking is often the outcome
after a fire, or occurs during welding or heat treatment.
Specific alloy systems that are known to be susceptible to liquid metal cracking and the molten metals
that can cause cracking are:
Table 37.1
Metal Combinations Resulting In Liquid Metal Embrittlement
Molten Metals That Will

Alloy Cause Embrittlement
Austenitic stainless steel and zinc, aluminum, cadmium, lead
chromium bearing nickel alloys and copper
High strength steel (bolting) zinc, cadmium
Brass and aluminum mercury
In refineries and petrochemical plants, zinc is present in galvanizing and is a common pigment in paint
primers. Cadmium is present as plating on hardware. Aluminum is a common jacketing material for
insulation. And mercury was once common in instrumentation.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
As much as possible, shield susceptible metals from the potential attacking metals. For example,
galvanizing should not be used around stainless steel equipment. During a fire, molten zinc from the
galvanizing can cause damage.
· Selection of alternative materials
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· When liquid metal embrittlement is suspected, inspect for cracking visually or polish and etch
suspect areas. Attacked areas will etch differently to unattacked areas, and grain boundary films
from intergranular penetration will be observable at high magnifications.
· In-situ metallography
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 37 Liquid Metal Embrittlement · 110

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· See "Prevention"
· See "Prevention"

· Refinery Construction and Materials Manual, Section IV-D, Forms of Corrosion and Metallurgical
Attack
· 83 MATL 529, Corrosion of Aluminum by Mercury, Prudhoe Bay Field LNG
· MTI Manual No. 1, "Guidelines for Control of Stress-Corrosion Cracking of Nickel-Bearing
Stainless Steels and Nickel-Base Alloys", by C.P. Dillon and Associates and the Materials
Technology Institute of the Chemical Process Industries, Inc.

(37) Liquid Metal Embrittlement

A Temperature of attacking metal is
Possibility of Repeated Incidents above its melting point
B
Possibility of Isolated Incidents Does not apply
C
D
E

· Inspection Adjustments: When liquid metal embrittlement is suspected, visual and PT
inspection with follow-up using in-situ metallography as appropriate, can eliminate the concern if
inspection is thorough.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The probability of attack can be eliminated if an extensive
inspection is performed after a potential exposure.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 37 Liquid Metal Embrittlement · 111

MIP 38: Metal Dusting
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
A rapid and sometimes catastrophic form of carburization occurs in stainless steels, nickel and cobalt
base alloys in the temperature range of 1000 to 1500ºF (540-815ºC). Attack can occur as pitting or in the
extreme case as uniform metal loss. Metal dusting occurs in gas streams that are reducing, have a high
carbon activity and usually contain CO. It is prevented by sulfur in the process stream.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Determine gas compositions and carbon activity to predict attack.
· Use sulfur injection, increased steam or alonizing.
· Reduce surface temperatures with refractory or thermal barrier flame spray coatings.
· Use ceramic, instead of metallic, materials where possible.
· Control of environment
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations personnel track gas compositions and carbon activities.
· Inspectors keep prioritized list of susceptible equipment for inspection.
· Ultrasonic wall thickness measurements
· Radiography
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· See "Prevention"
· See "Prevention"
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 38 Metal Dusting · 112

· "Metal Dusting: A Study for the Exxon Advance Gas Conversion Process," EE.113E.92
Industry
· Metal Dusting of High Temperature Alloys, Werksroffe and Corrosion, Vol. 44, p. 89, 1993

(38) Metal Dusting

A Metal temperature between 1000° F
Possibility of Repeated Incidents and 1500° F and CO/CO2 ratio greater
than 0.5 in a reducing environment
B
Possibility of Isolated Incidents Does not apply
C
D
E

· Inspection Adjustments: Visual inspection and UT thickness measurements and finding no
evidence of metal loss will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Monitoring Adjustments: The injection of a sulfur bearing compound will permit a 2 level
reduction in probability.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 38 Metal Dusting · 113

MIP 39: Zirconium and Hastelloy B2 Stress Corrosion
Cracking In Sulfuric Acid
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Zirconium (UNS R60702) is subject to stress corrosion cracking in 64 to 69% sulfuric acid. Above 69% or
below 64% sulfuric acid, the corrosion mode is uniform. The presence of hydrocarbon in the acid
mitigates the cracking tendency.
Hastelloy B2 is subject to stress corrosion cracking in all sulfuric acid solutions in the hot worked or
welded condition. It is not subject to stress corrosion cracking if solution annealed and rapidly quenched
after hot working or welding. The stress corrosion cracking is caused by long range ordering of an
intermetallic phase (Ni3Mo). The long range ordering also reduces the room temperature and hot
ductility of Hastelloy B2. The chemistry changes (lower Cr & Fe) made to the original Hastelloy B2 to
improve its intergranular corrosion resistance increased the susceptible to ordering in Hastelloy B2. The
stress corrosion cracking of Hastelloy B2 is chemistry dependent so some heats of Hastelloy B2 may be
resistant to stress corrosion cracking.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
For Zirconium
· Post weld heat treat vessels at 800ºF (425ºC) for 1 hour minimum.
· Add hydrocarbon to the acid. Determine hydrocarbon amount experimentally.
For Hastelloy B2
· Specify Hastelloy B3 or solution anneal and rapidly quench Hastelloy B2.
· Contact ER&E Materials Engineering Section or a Materials Engineer in the Affiliate Engineering
Office
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operations identifies non-heat treated zirconium and Hastelloy B2 equipment in sulfuric acid
service within the critical acid composition range.
· Inspection schedules NDE examination
· Penetrant testing
· Shearwave ultrasonics
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· If inspection shows not stress corrosion cracking continue in service but contact your Materials
Engineering Section before welding or changing environments.
· See Prevention
· See "Prevention"
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 39 Zr & Hastelloy B-2 SCC in H2SO4 · 114
· BRCP - Lean Stage Project - Root Cause Investigation of Zirconium Cracking in the IPA Lean
Stage Environment, Dec. 16, 1990, 90PPE169.
Industry:
· Stress Corrosion Cracking of Zirconium and Its Control in Sulfuric Acid, Corrosion 92, Paper 154,
1992.
· The Mechanism and Control of Stress Corrosion Cracking of Zirconium in Sulfuric Acid, 12th
International Corrosion Congress, Paper 92, 1993.
· Stress Corrosion Cracking Of Nickel-Molybdenum Alloy, Paper 432, Corrosion 96

(39) Zirconium and Hastelloy B2 Stress Corrosion Cracking in Sulfuric Acid

A Non heat treated zirconium and
Possibility of Repeated Incidents Hastelloy B2 equipment in H2SO4
within the critical acid range
B Does not apply
C Non heat treated zirconium equipment
Possibility to Occur Sometime in 64 to 69% H2SO4 range with
hydrocarbon present
D Does not apply
E Heat treated zirconium and Hastelloy
Practically Impossible B2 equipment in sulfuric acid service

· Inspection Adjustments: PT and UT shear wave inspection and finding no evidence of cracking
will permit up to a 2 level reduction in probability.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 39 Zr & Hastelloy B-2 SCC in H2SO4 · 115
MIP 40: Erosion And Corrosion-Erosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
The impingement of a liquid droplets (in a vapor phase) or solid particles onto or across a metal or
refractory surface can cause accelerated loss of the thickness by mechanical removal of material through
the process of erosion. The rate of corrosion can be accelerated if particles or turbulence remove
protective surface scales, exposing fresh metal to further corrosion. This latter process is called
corrosion-erosion.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· Process Design to select optimum materials for the temperature, corrosivity and physical
properties of the service, taking particular account of the particle details and velocities, or of the
liquid/vapor ratios.
- Design for low velocity, non-turbulent flow conditions
- Select materials that do not depend on surface films for protection
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Materials Specialist and Process Design personnel review design velocity and materials for
compatibility.
· On the run assessment of metal and refractory thicknesses by radiography.
· Radiography
· Ultrasonics
· Thin layer activation
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· See MIP-10
· See MIP-10

· Exxon Engineering Technical Report EE.17E.82
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 40 Erosion and Corrosion-Erosion · 116

(40) Erosion and Corrosion-Erosion

A Unlined fluid solids transfer lines or
Possibility of Repeated Incidents internals with a velocity greater than
10 fps and lined cyclones with a
velocity greater than 60 fps
B Unlined equipment in process stream
Possibility of Isolated Incidents with a slurry content greater than 1 vol
%
C Flue gas with a velocity greater than
Possibility to Occur Sometime 100 fps
D Does not apply
E Flue gas with a velocity less than 100
Practically Impossible fps or a process with a slurry content
less than 1 vol%
· Age Adjustment: If the equipment is less than 5 years old, a 1 level reduction in probability is
permitted.
· Inspection Adjustments: Downtime visual inspection and finding no evidence of accelerated
metal loss will permit a 1 level reduction in probability.
· Overall Adjusted Probability: The maximum reduction in probability is 1 level.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 40 Erosion and Corrosion-Erosion · 117

MIP 41: Nitriding
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Materials in units processing significant amounts of ammonia at elevated temperatures may be subject to
nitriding, the absorption of atomic nitrogen produced by the decomposition of ammonia. Under certain
conditions nitriding results in the formation of a “white layer” (composed of porous iron nitrides, Fe 3N and
Fe4N which may have lubricating properties in certain conditions) which is poorly adhered to the
substrate. Under highly stressed conditions crack initiation can occur in this layer which can propagate
into the nitrided substrate. The cracks are arrested at the nitrided/core interface and further propagation
is unlikely due to the formation of a compressive layer at the surface. Spalling of the outer “white layer” is
the usual outcome of excessive Fe nitride formation.
Nitriding is a diffusion-controlled process and is rate-dependent on temperature, ammonia partial

pressure and the rate of ammonia decomposition. Nitriding becomes most severe at temperatures above
900°F (480°C). There is some evidence that nitrided steel acts as a catalyst for ammonia decomposition.
Concerns about nitriding are most common in chemical units such as Linear Paraffins - ENSORB and
steam cracking units.
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· For equipment operating at temperatures above 600°F (315°C) and which contain significant
ammonia levels, materials should be selected to resist nitriding. In general, alloys containing 30
to 80 percent nickel are resistant to nitriding.
· The nitriding resistance of austenitic stainless steels can be improved by preoxidation.
· Chemical Plants Construction Materials Manual Section II-D-55 through II-D-69 provides
information on nitriding and materials of construction to resist nitriding.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operating personnel identify susceptible equipment based on ammonia levels, temperature and
materials of construction.
· Inspectors maintain prioritized list of susceptible equipment for inspection.
· Since nitriding produces a significant increase in material hardness, it can be detected by
portable hardness measurements when access to the nitrided surface is available.
· Metallography
· Eddy current techniques should be capable of detecting a significantly nitrided material.
However, procedures must be developed using nitrided and non-nitrided materials for effective
use.
· Metallographic cross sections
· Portable hardness testers
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 41 Nitriding · 118

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· In services where nitriding conditions exist, mitigation involves upgrading to more resistant alloys.

· Chemical and Refinery Construction Materials Manuals

(41) Nitriding

A Carbon steel or stainless steel at
Possibility of Repeated Incidents temperatures above 900°F in strong
nitriding environment
B Does Not Apply
C Carbon steel or stainless steel at
Possibility to Occur Sometime temperatures between 600°F and
900°F in strong nitriding environment
D Alloys with more than 30% Ni and
Not Likely But Possible temperatures above 900°F in a strong
nitriding environment
E Carbon steel or stainless steel at
Practically Impossible temperatures between 400°F and
600°F or alloys with more than 30% Ni
and temperatures between 600°F and
900°F in a strong nitriding environment

· Inspection Adjustments: If eddy current or hardness testing is used and no evidence of
nitriding is found, a 1 level reduction in the probability is permitted.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely/rupture possible.

MIP 42: Hydrogen Embrittlement
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
There are four common manifestations of hydrogen embrittlement:
· Hydrogen from a corrosion reaction diffuses into a steel and causes cracking, usually in hard
regions under a tensile stress. Environments containing wet H2S or HF are the most common
causes of this form of cracking. (Refer to MIP No. 2 on Wet H 2S and MIP No. 25 on HF)
· Hydrogen formed by the breakdown of water or organic materials in a welding arc dissolves in the
molten weld metal and causes cracking on cooling. Susceptibility increases with strength level
and can occur in both ferritic and duplex steels. This type of hydrogen embrittlement is referred
to as 'delayed cracking' or 'cold cracking'.
· During electroplating, alloys which have a tensile strength above 160 kpsi can absorb hydrogen
and crack.
· Very hard steels can crack due to hydrogen embrittlement when exposed to water
PREVENTION
Key Program Steps
· For environments containing H2S or HF, refer to MIP No. 2 or 25.
· To prevent delayed cracking:
- avoid the use of high strength grades of steel
- employ low hydrogen welding consumables and maintain
cleanliness of weld preparations
- employ a post-weld bakeout (400°F) to remove hydrogen before cooling the weld to
ambient temperature
· Avoid electroplating of high strength steel parts. When these are necessary, carry out a bakeout
to remove hydrogen after plating.
· When steels may have absorbed hydrogen in service, employ a bakeout prior to welding.
· Low hydrogen welding consumables and welding procedures.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· For H2S and HF services, see MIP No. 2 or 25.
· Inspectors identify applications of higher strength grades of steels
· Inspectors approve suitable welding procedures for new equipment and for repair of existing
equipment.
· Inspectors check for hydrogen embrittlement cracks
· Preheat and bakeout procedures - "For Weldors Only"
· Magnetic Particle and Dye Penetrant Testing - "NDT Manual"
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 42 Hydrogen Embrittlement · 121

MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· See Prevention

· TMEE-017, "Manual for Equipment in Wet H2S Service"
· For Weldors Only
· Nondestructive Testing Manual

(42) Hydrogen Embrittlement

A Does not apply
B Does not apply
C Steels with a hardness greater than Rc

Possibility to Occur Sometime 44 in fresh water service or a hardness
greater than Rc 35 in salt water. Steel
welded without preheat and a C.E.
greater than 0.45
D Does not apply
E Does not apply

· Inspection Adjustments: Shear wave UT inspection for cracks and finding no evidence of
cracking will permit a 1 level reduction in probability. However, for hydrogen delayed cracking of
weldment, effective inspection may not be possible, resulting in no credit.
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely/rupture possible
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 42 Hydrogen Embrittlement · 122

MIP 43: Embrittlement of Ferritic and Duplex SS
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Ferritic and duplex stainless steels can display very poor toughness at room temperature and up to about
300°F (150°C) after aging at elevated temperatures for long periods of time. This reduction in toughness
occurs in ferritic stainless steels with 12 to 30 wt% Cr after aging at temperatures between 650 and
1000°F (340 and 540°C), while it occurs in duplex stainless steels aged at temperatures above 600°F
(300°C). This reduction in toughness in the ferritic stainless steels is accompanied by an increase in
hardness.
The reduction in toughness is attributed to the formation of an incoherent phase. In ferritic stainless
steels this phase can be dissolved and toughness restored if the component is heated to temperatures
above 1100°F (620°C). A low temperature heat treatment like this is not effective in restoring the
toughness of duplex stainless steels. A duplex stainless steel requires a solution annealing to restore
toughness.
PREVENTION
Key Program Step
· Avoid the use of ferritic steels in the 650 to 1000°F (340 to 540°C) temperature range for
pressure boundary components. Limit applications to internals and corrosion resistant cladding
· Avoid use of duplex stainless steels at temperatures above
600°F (315°C).
· Avoid pressurization/stressing of components with poor toughness at lower temperature until the
metal temperature is above the range where reduced toughness is experienced.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· Operators/inspectors identify equipment that could experience embrittlement
· Field hardness measurements may identify embrittled components
· Inspectors check for cracks in highly stressed areas
· Limited destructive testing (bend testing) will identify extent of embrittlement
· Magnetic particle testing (MT) for finding cracks
· Portable hardness testing
· Bend testing
MITIGATION
Key Program Steps
· Avoid use of ferritic stainless steels above 650°F (340°C) and duplex stainless steels above
600°F (315°C)
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 43 Embrittlement of Duplex & Ferritic SS · 123

· Refinery and Chemical Construction Material Manuals
· Exxon Chemicals Duplex Stainless Steel Specification 96 CENGT 2048
· Service Limits and Guidelines For 22 Cr Duplex Stainless Steel for Sweet and Sour Service,
EPR.45 PR.93
Industry:
· Development of Qualification Test For Duplex Stainless Steel Mill Products, Paper 302, Corrosion
91
· Practical Guide To Using Duplex Stainless Steels, Materials Performance, Jan. 1990, p 57

(43) Embrittlement of Ferritic and Duplex SS

A Does not apply
B Duplex stainless steel exposed to
Possibility of Isolated Incidents temperatures greater than 600°°F
(315°C)
C 12 to 30 Cr ferritic stainless steel
Possibility to Occur Sometime exposed to temperatures greater than
650°F (340°C)
D Does not apply
E Does not apply
Note: If startups and shutdowns are controlled to insure stresses are low
(below 25% allowable or 6 ksi) for temperatures up to 300°F (150°C),
failure is not possible and MIP 43 does not apply.
· Age Adjustment: If the ferritic stainless steel equipment is less than 10 years old a 1 level
reduction in probability is permitted. No age adjustment is permitted for duplex stainless steel.
· Inspection Adjustments: Downtime inspection for cracking and no evidence of cracking found
· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely/rupture possible.
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 43 Embrittlement of Duplex & Ferritic SS · 124

MIP 44: Unidentified Uniform Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION
Pressure vessel shells and piping can experience a uniform metal loss either internally or externally
without any identifiable corrosion mechanism. For example, uniform corrosion rates of over 10 mpy have
been observed in relatively clean product service. One could speculate on the cause of the corrosion
such as high levels of water contamination; however, in many cases the corrosion mechanism cannot be
identified.
In many cases where the corrosion is not identified it is possible to measure the metal loss and determine
if the metal loss is uniform by evaluating the inspection data. In the event the metal loss is uniform, it can
be managed using the strategies discussed below. MIP 44 should be used only if it is impossible to
determine with some reasonable certainty the cause of the metal loss. Using MIP 44 prevents a
reasonable estimate of the future corrosion rate if process conditions change.
PREVENTION
Key Program Step
· If corrosion mechanism is not identified it is very risky to prescribe an alloy change, inhibitor
program or other techniques to prevent the corrosion.
DETECTION
Key Program Steps
· For uniform corrosion, UT thickness measurements or radiography are both effective techniques.
· Inspection should focus on elbows in piping and other components that traditionally experience
higher corrosion rates.
· Highly effective inspection programs will incorporate the use of statistics to analyze the data, such
as STATPIPE or EVA.
· UT thickness measurements evaluated using STATPIPE or equal
MITIGATION
· See Prevention

· NDT Manual Section on UT thickness measurements and using radiography to measure
thickness
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 44 Unidentified Uniform Corrosion · 125

(44) Unidentified Uniform Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C


High < 1/2 the Extensive external UT thickness Statistical Up to 4
time to measurements or radiography on elbows analysis of levels
consume the and other components that experience data such as
remaining higher corrosion rates. UT thickness EVA or
corrosion measurements on pipe straight sections STATPIPE
allowance and vessel shell sections. A full 100%
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness measurements or Simple Up to 3
to consume radiography on elbows and straight analysis such levels
the sections. A partial 10% internal inspection as averaging
remaining of thickness
corrosion data
allowance
Low > 1 time to Spot UT thickness measurements or Simple Up to 2
consume the radiography analysis such levels
remaining as averaging
corrosion of thickness
allowance data

· Expected Failure Mode: Leak likely
Table of Contents July-2020 MIP 44 Unidentified Uniform Corrosion · 126

MIP 45: Unidentified Localized Corrosion
REVISION: 3 (10/96)
DESCRIPTION:
Pressure vessel shells and piping can experience localized metal loss either internally or externally
without any identifiable corrosion mechanism. Relatively high local corrosion rates in excess of 10 mpy
can occur. One could speculate on the cause of the corrosion; however, it is not helpful if there is no data
to substantiate the speculation.
In many cases where the corrosion mechanism is not identified, it is possible to identify the areas
experiencing metal loss and measure the rates of loss. For localized metal loss it is typically necessary to
scan areas for thickness measurements to insure locally thin areas are not missed and go undetected.
An inspection program for localized metal loss needs to include inspection techniques that cover the
entire surface. MIP 45 should be used only if it is impossible to determine with some reasonable certainty
the cause of the metal loss. Using MIP 45 prevents a reasonable estimate of the future corrosion rate if
process conditions change.
PREVENTION
Key Program Step
· If corrosion mechanism is not identified it is risky to prescribe an alloy change, inhibitor program
or other techniques to prevent the corrosion.
DETECTION
Key Program Step
· For localized corrosion, UT thickness scanning or radiography are both effective techniques.
· Inspection should focus on elbows in piping and other components that are known to experience
higher local corrosion rates.
· Highly effective inspection programs will incorporate the use of statistics to analyze the UT
scanning and radiographic information and coverage.
· UT scanning techniques including use of B and C-scan representations
· Radiography
MITIGATION
· See Prevention

Exxon and Affiliates
· NDT Manual Section on UT and using radiography to measure thickness
Table of Contents July-2020 MIPS Table of Contents

(45) Unidentified Localized Corrosion

Unmitigated
1/2 ³ ar/t High E
Medium E
Low D
No Inspection D
1/2 < ar/t £ 1 High E
Medium D
Low C
No Inspection C


High < 1/2 the Extensive external UT thickness scanning Statistical Up to 3
time to or radiography on elbows, tees and other analysis levels
consume components that are known to experience appropriate for
the higher corrosion rates. Selected UT localized
remaining thickness scanning or radiography on pipe corrosion such
corrosion straight sections and vessel shell sections. as EVA
allowance A full 100% internal inspection.
Moderate 1/2 to 1 time UT external thickness scanning or Simple Up to 2
to consume radiography in areas of expected corrosion analysis such levels
the such as pipe elbows. A partial 10% internal as averaging
remaining inspection. of thickness
corrosion data
allowance
Low > 1 time to Spot UT thickness scanning or radiography Simple 1 level
consume analysis such maximum
the as averaging
remaining of thickness
corrosion data
allowance

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Table of Contents

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 1

1a) Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI)

1b) External Atmospheric Corrosion

1c) Corrosion Under Fireproofing

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 2

Inspection personnel prioritizes susceptible piping/equipment and performs inspection.

1b) Atmospheric Corrosion

1c) Corrosion Under Fireproofing

Inspection personnel prioritizes susceptible equipment/structural steel and performs inspection.

1b) Atmospheric Corrosion

1c) Corrosion Under Fireproofing

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 3

REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 4

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply.

RBI PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 5

RBI PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply.

RCMM July-2020 MIP 1: CUI and CUF · 6

RCMM July-2020 MIP 2 Wet H2S Cracking · 7

REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RCMM July-2020 MIP 2 Wet H2S Cracking · 8

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

*Where PF is calculated as follows: PF = U + H + P

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 2 Wet H2S Cracking · 9

RCMM July-2020 MIP 3 Brittle Fracture · 10

REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RCMM July-2020 MIP 3 Brittle Fracture · 11

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 3 Brittle Fracture · 12

RCMM July-2020 MIP 4 Dead Leg Corrosion · 13

RBI PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

RCMM July-2020 MIP 4 Dead Leg Corrosion · 14

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 4 Dead Leg Corrosion · 15

RCMM July-2020 MIP 5 H2 Attack · 16

Industry Standards & Recommended Practices:

RCMM July-2020 MIP 5 H2 Attack · 17

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 5 H2 Attack · 18

RCMM July-2020 MIP 6 Injection/Mix Point Corrosion · 19

REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RCMM July-2020 MIP 6 Injection/Mix Point Corrosion · 20

Probability Level Characteristics of Degradation

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply

RCMM July-2020 MIP 6 Injection/Mix Point Corrosion · 21

RCMM July-2020 MIP 7 Sulfur/Nap Acid Corrosion · 22

REFERENCES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RCMM July-2020 MIP 7 Sulfur/Nap Acid Corrosion · 23

Assessment of Probability of Failure

· Age Adjustment: Does not apply.

Inspection Analysis of Inspection Reduction In