Philosophical Issues, 19, Metaethics, 2009

TOWARD A PLURALIST AND TELEOLOGICAL THEORY

OF NORMATIVITY

David Copp
University of California–Davis

This paper sets out the basic elements of a ‘pluralist’ and ‘teleological’
theory of normative judgment. The theory is cognitivist; it holds that
‘normative judgments’ are beliefs. It is a form of normative realism; it holds
that at least some normative beliefs are true. It is a form of naturalism; it
holds that the facts that make normative judgments true are metaphysically
and epistemologically ‘on a par’ in relevant ways with ordinary natural
facts, such as meteorological facts. Here I simply assume that cognitivism,
naturalism, and realism are not at issue. My central goal is to explain and
motivate the basic ideas of pluralist-teleology.
Pluralist-teleology sets constraints on the normative pluralism that
I have proposed in earlier work (Copp 2007c). It provides a unified
framework to use in applying my ‘standard-based’ schema for formulating
truth-conditions of normative judgments (1995, 2007a). It subsumes my
‘society-centered’ account of moral judgments (1995, 2007a) as well as
my account of judgments of practical reason or ‘self-grounded’ reason
(2007b). Unfortunately, it will not be possible to discuss these issues
here.
In section 1, I sketch the basic idea of the pluralist-teleology that I am
proposing. In section 2, I explain the pluralist viewpoint and introduce the
central idea of a ‘normative system’. In section 3, I discuss an objection.
In sections 4 and 5, in order to address the objection, I develop the
teleological aspect of the theory. In so doing, I explain the idea that
a normative system can have the ‘function’ of ameliorating a ‘problem
of normative governance’. In concluding, I consider the objection that
pluralist-teleology cannot account for judgments about what one ought to do
period.
22 David Copp

1. The Basic Idea

I take it that there are different kinds of normative judgment. Moral

judgments are normative, as are judgments to the effect that an action
is rationally required and judgments about the justification of belief. The
pluralism of the theory is intended to accommodate the different kinds of
normative judgment.
Michael Smith considers a kind of pluralism about reasons. On this
view, “To say that someone has a normative reason to  is to say that
there is some normative requirement that she ’s, and thus to say that her
ing is justified from the perspective of the normative system that generates
the requirement” (1994, 95). On this view, Smith says, there are “many
and varied . . . normative systems for generating requirements.” For instance,
“there may be normative reasons of rationality, prudence, morality, and
perhaps even normative reasons of other kinds as well.” The pluralism I
have in mind is a generalization of this pluralism about reasons. It holds
that all normative statuses are ‘generated’ by normative systems, including
kinds of goods, kinds of requirement, and so on. The pluralist holds that
we can provide truth conditions for normative judgments of a given kind by
specifying relevant properties of the corresponding normative system.
The teleology of the theory is a generalization of an idea proposed
by J. L. Mackie. Mackie says that, like Hobbes and Hume, he views
morality as a “device” needed to solve “the problem” faced by humans
because of “certain contingent features of the human condition” (1977, 121).
In particular, he says, “limited resources and limited sympathies together
generate both competition leading to conflict and an absence of what would
be mutually beneficial cooperation” (111). Call this the problem of “social-
ity.” Mackie views morality as a device that is geared to ameliorating this
problem.
This idea is not unfamiliar, but it is often associated with the idea that
morality is normative only to the extent that it would be practically rational to
adopt this device for a relevant purpose. According to my proposal, however,
the norms of practical reason themselves constitute a ‘device’ that is suited to
ameliorating a ‘problem of normative governance’. While morality is needed
to address Mackie’s problem of sociality, other normative systems are needed
to ameliorate other problems that arise for humans because of features of
the human condition. For instance, law plausibly is a normative system
needed, among other things, to help solve a problem of ‘security’ (see Copp
1999). Etiquette can be viewed as a device needed, very roughly, to enable
us to interact in ways we can find pleasing and comfortable (Copp 2007b,
343). According to pluralist-teleology, normative judgments of a given kind
are geared to a corresponding problem of normative governance, where a
suitable system of norms has the function of ameliorating this problem.
The truth conditions for normative judgments of a given kind are to be
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 23

specified in terms of relevant properties of the system of norms best geared

to ameliorating the relevantly corresponding problem.
This ‘constructivist’ picture raises many questions, of course. I will
address what seem to be the most important questions in the rest of the
paper.
A proper and complete assessment of pluralist-teleology would compare
its advantages and disadvantages with those of the alternatives. I will not
be able to engage in such an assessment here. Let me simply point to three
features of pluralist-teleology that I view as desirable. First, the theory is
cognitivist, naturalist, and realist. I believe we should aim to develop a theory
with all three of these features unless we find that there are insurmountable
problems doing so. Second, I find the pluralism of the theory to be intuitively
plausible. Normativity seems to me to be a diverse phenomenon, as I hope
to explain. Third, unlike some of its competitors, pluralist-teleology counts
moral judgments as normative even though it allows that rational immorality
is possible. It counts moral judgments as normative just as it counts
judgments about the requirements of practical rationality as normative. I
think these are three advantages of pluralist-teleology.
Pluralist-teleology is a generalization of Mackie’s account of morality as
a problem-solving device. But of course Mackie rejects moral realism in favor
of a kind of “error theory,” according to which nothing is right or wrong
(1977, 35). He is led to the error theory because he thinks that ordinary moral
judgments presuppose that there are “intrinsically prescriptive” normative
properties (40), and because he believes there are no such properties (17). He
views his device theory as deflationary and anti-realist, and so he takes it to
be compatible with the error theory. I have argued elsewhere, however, that
Mackie is mistaken to think that moral judgments presuppose the existence
of properties that are intrinsically prescriptive in the sense he had in mind
(Copp 2009). Once we abandon this idea, we can see Mackie’s device theory
as compatible with normative realism.

2. Pluralism and Normative Systems

Intuitively, there are many different kinds of reasons. There are reasons
for belief. There are also reasons for action, including moral reasons, aesthetic
reasons, and reasons of etiquette. And there are reasons to feel one way or
another.
One might think that a reason is a consideration that it would be
irrational to ignore in deciding what to do, but I think this is not correct. I
believe there are reasons of etiquette, but it can be rational to ignore reasons
of etiquette. Let me stipulate that a reason is a “practical reason” just in case
it is a reason that any rational person would take appropriately into account
in deciding what to do, if she believed she had this reason. It is a reason
24 David Copp

that it would be ‘irrational to ignore’. I have argued elsewhere that, roughly,

reasons to ‘serve’ our values are the reasons it would be irrational to ignore.
In this sense, the standard of practical rationality is the ‘values standard’,
which calls on us to serve our values. For continuity with terminology I have
used before, I will call reasons of this kind “self-grounded” (Copp 2007c).1
I believe, then, that some reasons for action, including reasons of etiquette,
are not practical reasons.
There are two importantly different ways to understand the idea that
there are different kinds of reasons. According to the first, the ‘relational
view’, something is a reason only in relation to a given normative system.2
On this view, reasons are reasons-of-a-kind. Self-grounded reasons would
be, roughly, reasons in relation to the agent’s system of values, and moral
reasons would be, roughly, reasons in relation to morality. On the relational
view, strictly speaking there are no reasons simpliciter just as there is nothing
that is large simply-as-such, independently of a relation to a comparison
class. According to the second view, the ‘unitary view’, all (genuine) reasons
are reasons simpliciter or unqualifiedly. Different kinds of consideration ‘give
rise’ to different kinds of reason, but the unitary view insists that the status
of a consideration as a reason does not depend on its being considered in
relation to any particular normative system. The idea that there are different
kinds of reason is therefore neutral between the unitary and relational views.
One way to support the unitary view would be to argue that all
‘genuine’ reasons justify action or choice from a single perspective, perhaps
the perspective of the rational deliberating agent. As Stephen Darwall
has suggested, genuine reasons are considerations that would “motivate
in rational deliberation” (2006, 304). And he suggests that only reasons
simpliciter “have genuine deliberative weight” (1997, 306). As I have said,
however, I think that certain kinds of reason might not motivate a rational
agent (Copp 2009). A rational agent might lack empathy and so might not
be motivated by the knowledge that there is a moral reason not to torture. It
might be replied that any genuine normative reason would motivate a rational
agent, and that other considerations are at best ‘reasons’ only in a manner of
speaking. On this understanding, however, the unitary view has the counter-
intuitive consequence that the fact that torture is wrong is no reason not
to torture people unless it is a necessary truth that any rational agent who
believed that torture is wrong would be motivated to some degree by this
belief not to resort to torture. Indeed, on this view, whether there are any
moral reasons depends on whether rational agents are necessarily morally
motivated. I think that rational immorality is possible, however, and I think
there are moral reasons for and against various courses of action, so I cannot
accept the unitary view on this understanding of what it involves.
Obviously I cannot here settle the debate between the relational and the
unitary views. But I shall proceed to develop the idea that all reasons are
relational to a normative system. I briefly return to the unitary view near the
end of the paper.
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 25

What, then, is a normative system? To begin, consider that there are any
number of abstract systems of ‘norms’ or ‘standards’. In the relevant sense,
a standard is a ‘content’ expressible by a literal utterance of an imperatival
sentence just as a proposition is a ‘content’ expressible by a literal utterance
of a declarative sentence. There is the proposition that we could express in
English in a standard context by a literal use of the sentence, “It snows in
winter.” And there is the standard we could express in English in a standard
context by a literal use of the sentence, “Do not torture!” This is the standard
that calls on us not to torture. It ‘corresponds’ to the proposition that torture
is wrong. The important idea is that we can view any set of standards as an
abstract system of norms.
In the relevant sense, however, a ‘normative system’ is not merely an
arbitrary abstract system. The rules and principles of a legal system and the
rules of courtly love are examples of normative systems in the relevant sense.
We have the capacity for ‘normative governance’, to use Allan Gibbard’s
expression (1990, 61–80), which depends on a capacity to recognize and
understand social norms and to comply with them, and a capacity for
complex practical reasoning that seeks to comply with them. Given this
capacity, an abstract system of standards can be recognized by people, and
be subscribed to by them in such a way that the standards play a role in
governing their lives. This is the phenomenon illustrated by legal systems,
systems of etiquette, and so on. These systems of standards constitute
normative systems in the sense I have in mind because of their place in
a way of life.
In the relevant sense, then, a normative system is a system of standards
that actually plays a role in people’s lives, having been endorsed or subscribed
to, or, as we will see, it is a system that could help us to cope with a problem
of normative governance were it to be endorsed or subscribed to in a relevant
way.
Normative pluralism holds, to a first approximation, that, as I said
before, all normative statuses are generated by normative systems. A given
system might require certain actions, or deem certain things choiceworthy,
or demand that we cultivate certain psychological traits. The pluralist holds
that the truth conditions for normative judgments of a given kind are to be
specified in terms of relevant properties of a relevantly corresponding system
of norms. For instance, a pluralist might suggest, it is true that belching in
public is rude in a given social context only if, and because, the system of
etiquette that has currency in that context contains or implies a standard
that calls on us not to belch in public.

3. From Pluralism to Pluralist-Teleology

It might be objected that, on the pluralist view, as I have explained it so

far, an arbitrary normative system could ground normative judgments and
26 David Copp

yield genuine reasons. Richard Joyce imagines, for example, that someone
declares a normative system in which everyone ought only to purchase things
made in Norway in the autumn and purports thereby to have made it the case
that there are duties of the Norwegian-autumnal-product kind (2006, 203).
Indeed, it might seem, since the Norwegian-autumnal-product normative
system exists abstractly anyway, the pluralist view is committed to there
being duties of the Norwegian-autumnal-product kind without anyone’s
declaring the system to be in force, provided only that people endorse
buying Norwegian autumnal products. Yet this is ludicrous. And it might
seem that the pluralist could not avoid the objection by restricting attention
to normative systems that people actually recognize as such and explicitly
subscribe to, or that actually could help us cope with problems we face
were they to be subscribed to. The Roman practice of gladiatorial combat
was ongoing, and its rules were subscribed to in one way or another by
participants. Joyce suggests that, even so, a participant might have no reason
at all to follow the rules. If a gladiator could save his life only by breaking
one of the rules, then, Joyce suggests, the gladiator “may legitimately ignore”
the rule (2001, 40–41). On the pluralist view, then, normativity comes too
cheaply.
To answer this objection, I want to invoke the teleological aspect of
pluralist-teleology. There are two basic ideas. First, humans face a family
of endemic problems, due to the interaction between their nature and the
circumstances in which they live. Second, the capacity of humans to deal
successfully with these problems depends on their subscribing to systems of
norms or standards. Our subscription to these systems enables us to deal with
the relevant problems. This is the basic fact that underlies all normativity. For
example, the function of morality is to ameliorate the problem of sociality.
The normative systems that have a relevant normative status, according to
pluralist-teleology, are abstract systems of rules that, when subscribed to and
complied with by enough of the people in their scope, enable us to deal with
such problems. The function of the various normative systems of this sort
that play characteristic roles in human life is to enable us to cope with these
problems. To explain this, I need to explain, first, what delineates the family
of ‘problems’ I have in mind, and second, the sense in which it can be the
‘function’ of a kind of normative system to enable us to cope with such a
problem.

4. Problems of Normative Governance

Given the circumstances of human life, human beings face a variety of

characteristic problems, including the problem of sociality. I will not attempt
to delineate in a precise way the kinds of problems I have in mind. But they
can be characterized as follows.
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 27

There are general facts about the circumstances of human life and
about our biological and psychological nature that, other things being equal,
interfere with our ability to achieve what we value, no matter what we value,
within a wide range of possible things to value. A problem of normative
governance is a problem of overcoming or ameliorating such a limitation
in our ability to achieve what we value where two further conditions are
met. First, our ability to cope with the problem is affected by our decisions
and choices. Second, the problem is better coped with when people are
governed by an appropriate system of norms or standards that they endorse
or subscribe to than would otherwise be the case. These are the problems I
call “problems of normative governance.” I provide four examples.
First is the now familiar problem of sociality. Humans are not self-
sufficient. Children need to be cared for by parents or by people playing a
parental role, and people who are elderly or ill might also need to be cared for.
Human beings have biological and psychological needs and cannot generally
meet these needs without interacting cooperatively with other people. We
have things that we value, and we generally cannot achieve, protect, or realize
these values without interacting cooperatively with other people. We are
vulnerable to interference from other people. For all of these reasons, we
need the cooperation of others to achieve what we value, no matter what we
value, within at least a wide range of things we might value. We also need
the existence of a minimum level of peace and stability in society. We need to
live peacefully and cooperatively together. Unfortunately, as Mackie points
out, people have conflicting interests, limited resources, and limited sympathy
as well as a tendency to pursue their own advantage, so there is always a
risk that peaceful cooperation will break down, or that conflict will develop,
or that “what would be mutually beneficial cooperation” will not emerge
(1977, 111). It seems obvious that this problem can be ameliorated if the
members of our society subscribe to a suitable system of norms calling for a
willingness to cooperate with others, for non-interference with others, and so
on, as appropriate. According to the kind of pluralist-teleology I advocate,
morality is just such a normative system. So the problem of sociality is a
problem of normative governance.
Second is the problem of autonomy. To be self-governing, we need to
govern our lives in accord with our values, but we have a tendency to seek
short-term or short-sighted advantages at variance with our values. Whatever
we value, within a wide range of things that we might value, this tendency
makes us less likely to achieve what we value than would otherwise be the
case. To be self-governing, we therefore need a kind of self-control that
dampens our susceptibility to temptations. I suggest that this problem can
be mitigated if we subscribe to the values standard, which calls for behavior
that serves our values.
Third is the problem of politeness. Our need to live in a society where
people are willing to interact cooperatively with others is one thing. But to
28 David Copp

achieve what we value, at least within a wide range of things we might value,
we need to be attractive to others as potential collaborators, to be able to
interact with others in ways that others will find pleasing and comfortable.
Societies have complex norms that call for behaviors that are not required in
the abstract to enable us to cooperate with others, but that are required to
facilitate our ability to interact cooperatively only because they are called for
by the culture. These complex norms are standards of etiquette, such as the
standard requiring people not to belch during a meal. If we do not comply
with these norms, and otherwise make ourselves be prepared to interact with
others in ways they will find pleasing and comfortable, we will be less able
to achieve what we value than otherwise might be the case. The standard of
politeness answers to this problem by requiring us to comply with the local
standards of etiquette.
Fourth is the epistemic problem. To achieve what we value and to meet
our needs, we need information, at least some of which is provided by others.
We need to be able to assess evidence and form beliefs that are reliably at
least approximately accurate. So we need our processes of belief formation
to be regulated by appropriate epistemic standards, standards conformity
with which will help assure that our beliefs are justified and that our overall
system of belief is one in which, very roughly, the ratio of true to false beliefs
is as high as feasible. To some extent we learn these standards from others,
so this problem and the problem of sociality are closely related. But the
epistemic problem is different in nature from the problem of sociality. It is
due to the fact that our untutored processes of belief formation are not in
general reliable in all the circumstances where we need them to be, given the
kind of things we value and aim to achieve.
Each of these problems is better coped with when people are governed
by some system of standards that they subscribe to than would otherwise be
the case. For instance, a society does better than would otherwise be the case
at dealing with the problem of sociality when its members are governed by
shared standards that restrict their pursuit of their own advantage. A society’s
culture is, inter alia, a source of shared norms that, when widely enough
subscribed to, enable people in the society to cope with these problems.
As I said, I take these problems to be circumstances that, other things
being equal, interfere with our ability to achieve what we value, no matter
what we value, within a wide range of possible things to value. These
circumstances might not be problems for persons with eccentric values,
such as a person who values conflict, chaos, or ignorance. The problems
in question are generic problems. They are problems for human beings as
they are in general, given the kinds of things that they tend to value, for
a very wide range of things to value. The idea is that normativity needs to
be understood in relation to such generic problems. Similarly, on a common
view, the nature of color is to be understood in relation to the human visual
system even though, to be sure, humans might have had a different kind
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 29

of perceptual system and even though some people are color blind. Again,
a community’s money is such that people in the community are generally
disposed to accept it in exchange for goods and services, although some
people might only accept gold.3 The present view is that normativity is to be
understood in relation to generic problems humans face, other things being
equal, in achieving what they value, problems that are better coped with
when people are governed by appropriate systems of standards that they
subscribe to than would otherwise be the case.
On my account, a person with eccentric values might have no self-
grounded or practical reason to care about what is morally required, or
about what is required by law or etiquette. My account does not “reduce”
normativity to practical reason. It is not necessarily the case that one has
self-grounded reason to be moral, but nor is it necessarily the case that one
has moral reason to act as practical rationality might require (see Copp
2009).
I have sketched four problems of normative governance. There might be
additional problems. I mentioned before a problem I characterized briefly
as a problem of security, and I suggested that law answers to this problem.
There is arguably a problem of expressing and understanding our emotional
responses to the various experiences of life in such a way that they enhance
rather than detract from our ability to achieve what we value. Aesthetic
norms can perhaps be seen as answering to this problem. In any event, we
need to be able to say something like this in order to integrate aesthetic
reasons into the pluralist-teleological picture.
It may be objected that, for all I have said, the problem that Norwegians
face of encouraging the purchase of Norwegian autumnal products is a
problem of normative governance. This objection is misplaced, however. The
Norwegians’ problem of encouraging the purchase of Norwegian products
made in the autumn, if they have such a problem, is not a generic problem
of normative governance. If it is a problem at all, it is a special problem
for Norwegians in certain occupations and it can be addressed in a familiar
way by action in accord with norms of prudence or instrumental efficiency.
Pluralist-teleology does not imply that there are reasons of the Norwegian-
autumnal-product kind.
It may seem that game-playing helps to address a generic problem faced
by humans. So pluralist-teleology may imply that there are ‘chess-reasons’.
And if the theory implies that there are chess-reasons, it presumably implies
as well that there are reasons within the Roman institution of gladiatorial
combat. As we saw, however, Joyce suggests that a gladiator might have no
reason at all to follow the rules of this kind of combat (2001, 40–41). I
agree that a gladiator might have no self-grounded or moral reason to follow
the gladiatorial rules, for he might have no value that will be advanced by
following the rules, and in most circumstances following the rules presumably
was not morally required. But the question Joyce wants to press is whether
30 David Copp

the ‘gladiatorial-reasons’ that are implied by the rules and that are in this way
‘internal’ to the institution of gladiatorial combat are genuinely normative.4
This question arises as well about the reasons that are internal to chess and
to other games.
According to pluralist-teleology, the ‘reasons’ that are internal to a game
are not genuinely and robustly normative unless there is a generic problem of
normative governance that is addressed by the normative system associated
with the game. Pluralist-teleology can deny that there is such a problem. It
can concede that humans have a need for enjoyable competition, but it can
hold that there is not a special problem of meeting this need over and above
the background problem of sociality as well as the problem of politeness. If
this is correct, our reasons to follow the rules when playing chess are moral
reasons or reasons of etiquette, or perhaps self-grounded reasons. Pluralist-
teleology can therefore agree with Joyce. The rules of gladiatorial combat
did not give rise to ‘gladiatorial-reasons’ that are genuinely normative. Still
pluralist-teleology needn’t deny that games have a kind of internal ‘quasi-
normativity’, as I will explain in the next section.
The picture I have been painting is an idealization. First, the various
problems of normative governance are interrelated. The problem of sociality
is closely related to the problem of politeness, for instance. Moreover, second,
more than one problem can be at issue in a given context. As I have
suggested, issues in game-playing impinge on both the problem of sociality
and the problem of politeness so that both morality and etiquette can give
us reasons to follow the rules of a game. Third, various normative systems
can help enable us to cope with a given problem. For example, addressing
the problem of sociality in very large and complex contemporary societies
requires the existence of a legal system as well as the currency of a system of
morality. Fourth a given normative system might help deal with more than
one problem. For instance, morality helps us to cope with both the problem
of sociality and the problem of politeness. For simplicity, I will ignore these
and similar complexities.

5. ‘Functions’ of Normative Systems

According to the pluralist view, as I said before, the truth conditions

for normative judgments of a given kind are to be specified in terms of
relevant properties of a relevantly corresponding system of norms. Pluralist-
teleology adds two points. First, normative judgments are geared to problems
of normative governance. Given a robustly normative judgment, there is
a corresponding problem of normative governance. And second, given
a problem of normative governance, there is a relevantly corresponding
normative system with the function of dealing with this problem. This again
is an idealization, but set this worry aside for now. Consider some examples.
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 31

Moral judgments are geared to the problem of sociality, and the function of
morality is to deal with this problem. The function of standards of normative
epistemology is to deal with the epistemological problem. The function of
the values standard of ‘self-grounded’ reason is to deal with the problem
of autonomy. This account raises the question, In what sense can it be the
‘function’ of a normative system to enable us to cope with a problem of
normative governance?
One attractive proposal would have it that each of the normative systems
I have in mind has the Darwinian evolutionary function of solving a problem
of normative governance. Humans with the capacity to ameliorate these
problems plausibly would have had a significant reproductive advantage
in the ancestral environment in which the species evolved. This capacity
arguably includes the capacity for normative governance (Gibbard 1990, 61–
80), among other things. Mackie suggests, for instance, that “the ordinary
evolutionary pressures, the differential survival of groups in which [sympathy
and other morally significant] sentiments are stronger, either as inherited
psychological tendencies or as socially maintained traditions, will help to
explain why such sentiments become strong and widespread” (1977, 113).
He suggests that similar explanations can be given of why humans tend
to exhibit morally significant virtues such as “non-maleficence, fairness,
beneficence, and non-deception,” and of why the cultures of many societies
include rules requiring certain kinds of behavior (111–114). Perhaps we can
invoke ‘cultural evolution’ to explain the currency of the various normative
systems that have actually emerged (see Kitcher 2006). I have discussed a
version of this idea before (Copp 2008).
This proposal is not, however, suited to my purposes. I cannot go into
details, unfortunately. The main point is that the currency of some of the
normative systems that are actually found in our cultures may provide worse
solutions to problems of normative governance than would the currency
of certain alternative systems. We do not want our account of the truth
conditions of moral judgments to be held hostage to the details of the
evolutionary account that turns out to best explain the phenomena. We
are rightly more confident, I think, that in some sense it is the ‘function’
of morality to solve the problem of sociality than we are that this is the
evolutionary function of morality.5
Let me set aside the idea of a function and explain the central ideas
in a different way. Pluralist-teleology says that the answer to a normative
question—or the truth conditions for a robust normative judgment of a
given kind—depends, inter alia, on two factors. (1) It depends on which
problem of normative governance is relevant to the question—on which
problem of normative governance corresponds to normative judgments of
the given kind. For instance, if the question is whether torture is morally
wrong, then, the theory says, the problem of sociality is the relevant one.
(2) The answer to a normative question also depends, roughly speaking, and
32 David Copp

inter alia, on the properties of a normative system the currency of which

would ameliorate the relevant problem of normative governance.
A problem of normative governance can perhaps be ameliorated by the
currency of any of a wide range of normative systems, but in the interesting
cases, the currency of some normative systems would contribute much better
to solving the problem than the currency of alternatives. Moreover, there may
be a normative system the currency of which in the relevant group would
contribute to solving the problem better than the currency of any alternative
system. For example, the existing moral code of a society might be less
satisfactory at handling the problem of sociality than some alternative would
be. It might discriminate against women, for example, thereby depriving the
society of the full potential contributions of women. In this case, the problem
of sociality would better be handled by the currency of a moral system that
did not discriminate against women. The example suggests that we should tie
the truth conditions for normative judgments to the content of the relevant
optimal normative system. We should say this: The normative system, the
properties of which determine the answer to a normative question related
to a given problem of normative governance, is the system the currency of
which in the relevant group would contribute to solving the problem better
than the currency of any alternative—ignoring for now the possibility of
‘ties’. Call this the “best” system for the problem at issue, relative to the
context. For instance, the answer to the question of whether torture is wrong
depends on the properties of the best code for the problem of sociality, given
the context at hand.
I have been simplifying by supposing that there is always a best system.
There could be cases in which there is a tie—different moral codes might do
roughly equally well at solving the problem of sociality, for instance. I have
discussed this issue elsewhere (Copp 1995, 198–199; 2007a, 17, 243), but I
ignore it here. I am also simplifying by supposing that the properties of the
best normative system, or of the systems ‘tied as best’, determine the answer
to relevant normative questions. If everyone else is complying with a moral
code that is not the best one, however, I might lose important opportunities
for cooperation if I comply with the best code; in such cases, I ought perhaps
to comply with the moral code that is actually being complied with by those
I am interacting with even if it is not the best code. I have discussed this
issue elsewhere as well (Copp 1995, 199–200), but for the sake of simplicity,
I ignore it here.
Etiquette and law are interesting cases because they suggest that, in
certain contexts, we use quasi-normative concepts that are simply relational
to a relevant normative system, setting aside the teleology of pluralist-
teleology. In talking about such cases, I will speak of ‘internal normativity’.
Games have an internal normativity relative to their rules, just as languages
have an internal normativity relative to their grammatical and semantic
rules.6
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 33

In the case of etiquette, whether an action is ‘rude’ depends on the

relevant local conventional rules, and there is a usage in which we will
speak of an action as the ‘right’ one purely with reference to the local
rules. ‘Rightness’ and ‘rudeness’ in such cases are simply relational to the
local conventional system of etiquette. The normativity here is ‘internal’
to the local system. Pluralist-teleology explains a more robust notion of
normativity, however, whereby acting contrary to the local etiquette is a
‘violation’ that is ‘rude’ in that, first, the problem of politeness is one of the
problems of normative governance, and second, the problem of politeness
is best addressed by a rule that asks us to comply with the local code of
etiquette. To be sure, one might take the different view that the problem of
politeness is simply an aspect of the problem of sociality.
The case of law is similar. There are contexts in which we may speak
of an action as the ‘right’ one purely with reference to the content of the
local legal system. The normativity here is ‘internal’ to the local system.
Even an unjust legal system has this kind of quasi-normativity. On pluralist-
teleology, however, if there is a problem of normative governance that is
best addressed by law, judgments of the ‘rightness’ of acting lawfully may
be normative in a more robust way and pluralist-teleology implies the
existence of (teleological) legal-reasons. This issue is closely related to the
traditional dispute between legal positivism and natural law theory. Pluralist-
teleology itself takes no position in this dispute. Perhaps, as I suggested
before, law answers to a problem of security, but this might not be right,
or the problem of security might simply be an aspect of the problem of
sociality. To my mind, the most plausible view is that, in circumstances
where there are robust teleological reasons to comply with law, and not
merely internal reasons, this is because the problem of sociality is best
addressed, inter alia, by a moral rule that requires compliance with law,
other things being equal. That is, in more familiar terms, I think the most
plausible view is that although law is not normative in itself—setting aside
its ‘internal normativity’—there is a pro tanto moral duty to obey the
law (Copp 1999). In some circumstances we may be morally obligated to
obey.
I described the theory I am proposing as a kind of “teleology” because
it accounts for normativity by reference to the idea that a normative system
can have the “function” of ameliorating a problem of normative governance.
I have now replaced this intuitive idea with the idea that a normative system
can be such that its being subscribed to or having currency in a relevant
group will contribute to ameliorating a problem of normative governance. A
system can be evaluated as better or worse at addressing a given normative
problem. The central point is that, according to pluralist-teleology, the truth
conditions of a robust normative judgment depend roughly on which problem
of normative governance is relevant and on the properties of a normative
system that would best address that problem. Explaining this in detail would
34 David Copp

require introducing the standard-based schema that I have proposed for use
in formulating truth conditions of normative judgments, and this would take
me far afield.
One might object that the judgment that a normative system would
do better than others at addressing a problem of normative governance
is normative. Hence, pluralist-teleology does not offer a fundamental ex-
planation of normativity. It offers merely an explanation of the content
of certain kinds of normative judgment in terms of the content of other
normative judgments—judgments about how best to deal with problems of
normative governance. I think, however, that rankings of things on the basis
of how well they meet a desideratum, or an established or presupposed set
of criteria, are not generally robustly normative. A rating of steak knives is
not normative, in my view, nor is a ranking of some boats as to how well
they likely would perform in a hurricane. More important, I would argue,
such ratings and rankings have naturalistic truth conditions. The important
point is that pluralist-teleology aims to explain normativity in naturalistic
terms.

6. Ought ‘Simpliciter’ or ‘Without Qualification’

It might seem that, in deliberating about what to do, an agent tries to

decide what she ought to do period, or without qualification. One might then
object that pluralist-teleology cannot make sense of such decisions because
it rests on the relational view, according to which there is nothing that a
person ought to do without qualification. Arguably, then, pluralist-teleology
cannot make sense of rational deliberation because it cannot make sense
of the conclusions of rational deliberation. This objection poses a serious
challenge.
According to the relational view, it makes no sense to suppose that
something ought to be done simply-as-such, independently of any relation
to a normative system. Nevertheless, as I will explain, the idea that we
reach conclusions and have beliefs that are properly expressed by saying that
something ought to be done “period” is compatible with both the relational
view and pluralist-teleology.7
First is the “contextual proposal.” Pluralist-teleology says that when
a person thinks there is something she ought to do, her use of “ought” is
relational to a normative system. Which system this is is determined by which
problem of normative governance is at issue. Pluralist-teleology obviously
can allow that this may depend on the context. It can say that if I decide
that I ought to do something “period,” the interpretation of my judgment
will depend on the context. Perhaps my judgment is about what I ought
‘rationally’ to do, by the standard of self-grounded rationality, or perhaps it
is about what I ought morally to do.
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 35

Second, it is compatible with pluralist-teleology to suppose that there

is an overarching problem of normative governance that subsumes all other
such problems. If there is such a problem, and if there is a normative system
the currency of which would best ameliorate this problem, there are things
we ought to do in relation to this system. We might think that these would
be the things we ought to do period. Indeed, the sum of the several problems
of normative governance might be taken to constitute a giant problem. We
could call it “the problem of living.” And if the normative systems that best
address these several problems are aggregated, the result could be viewed as
a single normative system, the “life-system.” We might then suppose that the
requirements of the life-system establish what we ought to do period. Call
this the “life system proposal.”
This proposal is unsatisfying. We want there to be a single standard
of choice that determines what we ought absolutely to do. If the so-called
life-system is merely an aggregation of normative systems with different
rationales, it is not a single standard of choice in any interesting sense.
Presumably there will be cases in which all the components of the life-system
speak with one voice, but the system will not tell us what to do when, say,
morality conflicts with the requirements of self-grounded reason or practical
rationality (see Copp 2007c). The life-system would not be a unified standard
that determines what we ought to do period.
Even if there is not a single overarching problem of normative gover-
nance, pluralist-teleology can say that the various normative systems that
best ameliorate the various problems of normative governance are not all on
a par in deliberation. For as I understand it, deliberation aims at decision,
and in deciding, an agent decides for herself what she is to do. Hence,
the problem of autonomy always lies in the background of deliberation.
Therefore, according to pluralist-teleology, the normative system with the
function of dealing with the problem of autonomy is always relevant to
evaluating deliberation. I have argued elsewhere (Copp 2007b) that this
system, whatever it is, determines what we are rationally required to do. It
determines what is required by practical rationality. Moreover, as I have also
argued, the standard that determines what is required by practical rationality
is the standard of self-grounded reason—it is the values standard that calls
on us to serve our values. Hence, given what it is to deliberate, the values
standard is always relevant to evaluating our deliberation. Self-grounded
reason has ‘default priority’ in evaluating deliberation (compare Copp 2007b,
347–350).
The third proposal, then, is that the standard of practical rationality is
the default for evaluating deliberation as such because it is always relevant
to evaluating deliberation, given what deliberation is. (My claim that the
standard of practical rationality is the values standard is a separate matter.)
Other normative systems are not always relevant to evaluating deliberation
because the problems of normative governance to which they answer are not
36 David Copp

always relevant. Not all deliberation raises moral issues, but all deliberation
does raise the problem of autonomy. Given this, when an agent judges that
there is something she ought to do period, it is reasonable, other things
being equal, to take her judgment to be that she ought rationally to do this
thing. The context might indicate otherwise, but it is plausible that this is
the default. Call this the “default interpretation proposal.” On this proposal,
the default is to interpret the ‘ought simpliciter’ as the ought of practical
rationality.
Clearly, then, pluralist-teleology can make sense of the conclusions of
rational deliberation. It can make sense of an agent’s decision that there is
something she ought to do period.
One concluding remark: I have proposed a pluralist and teleological
account of normative judgment. Unfortunately, however, there is little
agreement among philosophers about how to use the term “normativity,” and
it can often seem that philosophers who discuss normativity are talking past
one another. Let me therefore set aside the word. I hope to have at least shown
that pluralist-teleology provides a unified account of the truth conditions of
a class of judgments that bear on solutions to practical problems that are
endemic to the human condition.

Notes

∗
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Charles Chastain. Earlier versions of
it were presented to the conference held in honor of Charles at the University of
Illinois at Chicago; to the School of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos
Aires; and to the Department of Philosophy, McGill University. I am grateful to
the audiences on these occasions for helpful comments. I am especially grateful
to Paul Benaceraff, David Davies, Steven Davis, Stephen Finlay, Richard Kraut,
Horacio Spector, Robert Stalnaker, Natalie Stoljar, Christine Tappolet and Jon
Tresan.
1. They are not properly called “self-interested” or “prudential,” since we can have
altruistic values, and they are not well-described as “instrumental” since many of
our ends, including those we regret, are not among our values.
2. Stephen Finlay (2006) proposes a normative pluralism that is “end-relational”
rather than relational to normative systems.
3. Jon Tresan suggested this example.
4. Joyce agrees that there are “institutional” reasons, such as reasons of eti-
quette (2001, 39–42). He presumably would agree there are institutional glad-
iatorial reasons, but, he claims, institutional reasons are not “normative”
(101–102).
5. Robert Cummins says, “Flight is a capacity that cries out for explanation in terms
of anatomical functions regardless of its contribution to the capacity to maintain
the species” (1975, 756).
6. The distinction between the ‘internal normativity’ of games, language, and so
on, and the pluralist-teleological normativity of morality and the like roughly
 Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity 37

corresponds to the distinction between type-one and type-two normative proposi-

tions in Copp 1995 (22–24).
7. A similar response is offered by Finlay (2008).

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