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Petitioner vs. vs. Respondents Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo Nepomuceno, Hofileña & Guingona
Petitioner vs. vs. Respondents Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo Nepomuceno, Hofileña & Guingona
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REGALADO , J : p
This petition for review on certiorari impugns and seeks the reversal of the decision
promulgated by respondent court on March 8, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23615 1 affirming,
with modifications, the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLII, 2
which dismissed the complaint filed therein by herein petitioner against private respondent
bank.
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The undisputed background of this case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by
respondent court, appears of record:
"1. On various dates, defendant, a commercial banking institution, through its
Sucat Branch issued 280 certificates of time deposit (CTDs) in favor of one Angel
dela Cruz who deposited with herein defendant the aggregate amount of
P1,120,000.00, as follows: (Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts and Statement of
Issues, Original Records, p. 207; Defendant's Exhibits 1 to 280):
CTD CTD
Dates Serial Nos. Quantity Amount
22 Feb. 82 90101 to 90120 20 P80,000
26 Feb. 82 74602 to 74691 90 360,000
2 Mar. 82 74701 to 74740 40 160,000
4 Mar. 82 90127 to 90146 20 80,000
5 Mar. 82 74797 to 94800 4 16,000
5 Mar. 82 89965 to 89986 22 88,000
5 Mar. 82 70147 to 90150 4 16,000
8 Mar. 82 90001 to 90020 20 80,000
9 Mar. 82 90023 to 90050 28 112,000
9 Mar. 82 89991 to 90000 10 40,000
9 Mar. 82 90251 to 90272 22 88,000
—— —————
Total 280 P1,120,000
=== =======
"2. Angel dela Cruz delivered the said certificates of time deposit (CTDs) to
herein plaintiff in connection with his purchase of fuel products from the latter
(Original Record, p. 208).
"3. Sometime in March 1982, Angel dela Cruz informed Mr. Timoteo Tiangco,
the Sucat Branch Manager, that he lost all the certificates of time deposit in
dispute. Mr. Tiangco advised said depositor to execute and submit a notarized
Affidavit of Loss, as required by defendant bank's procedure, if he desired
replacement of said lost CTDs (TSN, February 9, 1987. pp. 48-50). LexLib
"4. On March 18, 1982, Angel dela Cruz executed and delivered to defendant
bank the required Affidavit of Loss (Defendant's Exhibit 281). On the basis of said
affidavit of loss, 280 replacement CTDs were issued in favor of said depositor
(Defendant's Exhibits 282-561).
"5. On March 25, 1982, Angel dela Cruz negotiated and obtained a loan from
defendant bank in the amount of Eight Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P875,000.00). On the same date, said depositor executed a notarized Deed of
Assignment of Time Deposit (Exhibit 562) which stated, among others, that he
(dela Cruz) surrenders to defendant bank `full control of the indicated time
deposits from and after date of the assignment and further authorizes said bank
to pre-terminate, set-off and 'apply the said time deposits to the payment of
whatever amount or amounts may be due' on the loan upon its maturity (TSN,
February 9, 1987, pp. 60-62).
"10. Accordingly, defendant bank rejected the plaintiff's demand and claim
for payment of the value of the CTDs in a letter dated February 7, 1983
(Defendant's Exhibit 566).
"11. In April 1983, the loan of Angel dela Cruz with the defendant bank
matured and fell due and on August 5, 1983, the latter set-off and applied the time
deposits in question to the payment of the matured loan (TSN, February 9, 1987,
pp. 130-131).
"12. In view of the foregoing, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, praying that
defendant bank be ordered to pay it the aggregate value of the certificates of time
deposit of P1,120,000.00 plus accrued interest and compounded interest therein
at 16% per annum, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
"After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision dismissing the instant complaint."
3
On appeal, as earlier stated, respondent court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint, hence this petition wherein petitioner faults respondent court in ruling (1) that
the subject certificates of deposit are non-negotiable despite being clearly negotiable
instruments; (2) that petitioner did not become a holder in due course of the said
certificates of deposit; and (3) in disregarding the pertinent provisions of the Code of
Commerce relating to lost instruments payable to bearer. 4
The instant petition is bereft of merit. cdrep
A sample text of the certificates of time deposit is reproduced below to provide a better
understanding of the issues involved in this recourse.
"SECURITY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY No. 90101
______________
Respondent court ruled that the CTDs in question are non-negotiable instruments,
rationalizing as follows:
" . . . While it may be true that the word `bearer' appears rather boldly in the CTDs
issued, it is important to note that after the word `BEARER' stamped on the space
provided supposedly for the name of the depositor, the words `has deposited' a
certain amount follows. The document further provides that the amount
deposited shall be `repayable to said depositor' on the period indicated. Therefore,
the text of the instrument(s) themselves manifest with clarity that they are
payable, not to whoever purports to be the `bearer' but only to the specified person
indicated therein, the depositor. In effect, the appellee bank acknowledges its
depositor Angel dela Cruz as the person who made the deposit and further
engages itself to pay said depositor the amount indicated thereon at the
stipulated date." 6
We disagree with these findings and conclusions, and hereby hold that the CTDs in
question are negotiable instruments. Section 1 of Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the
Negotiable Instruments Law, enumerates the requisites for an instrument to become
negotiable, viz:
"(a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;
(b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money;
(c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;
(d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
The CTDs in question undoubtedly meet the requirements of the law for negotiability. The
parties' bone of contention is with regard to requisite (d) set forth above. It is noted that
Mr. Timoteo P. Tiangco, Security Bank's Branch Manager way back in 1982, testified in
open court that the depositor referred to in the CTDs is no other than Mr. Angel de la Cruz.
Cdpr
In a letter dated November 26, 1982 addressed to respondent Security Bank, J. Q. Aranas,
Jr., Caltex Credit Manager, wrote: " . . . These certificates of deposit were negotiated to us
by Mr. Angel dela Cruz to guarantee his purchases of fuel products" (Underscoring ours.)
1 3 This admission is conclusive upon petitioner, its protestations notwithstanding. Under
the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
1 4 A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the
other party who relied upon them. 1 5 In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. 1 6
If it were true that the CTDs were delivered as payment and not as security, petitioner's
credit manager could have easily said so, instead of using the words "to guarantee" in the
letter aforequoted. Besides, when respondent bank, as defendant in the court below,
moved for a bill of particulars therein 1 7 praying, among others, that petitioner, as plaintiff,
be required to aver with sufficient definiteness or particularity (a) the due date or dates of
payment of the alleged indebtedness of Angel de la Cruz to plaintiff and (b) whether or not
it issued a receipt showing that the CTDs were delivered to it by De la Cruz as payment of
the latter's alleged indebtedness to it, plaintiff corporation opposed the motion. 1 8 Had it
produced the receipt prayed for, it could have proved, if such truly was the fact, that the
CTDs were delivered as payment and not as security. Having opposed the motion,
petitioner now labors under the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced. 1 9
Under the foregoing circumstances, this disquisition in Integrated Realty Corporation, et al.
vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 2 0 is apropos:
" . . . Adverting again to the Court's pronouncements in Lopez, supra, we quote
therefrom:
'The character of the transaction between the parties is to be
determined by their intention, regardless of what language was used or
what the form of the transfer was. If it was intended to secure the payment
of money, it must be construed as a pledge; but if there was some other
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intention, it is not a pledge. However, even though a transfer, if regarded by
itself, appears to have been absolute, its object and character might still be
qualified and explained by contemporaneous writing declaring it to have
been a deposit of the property as collateral security. It has been said that a
transfer of property by the debtor to a creditor, even if sufficient on its face
to make an absolute conveyance, should be treated as a pledge if the debt
continues in existence and is not discharged by the transfer, and that
accordingly the use of the terms ordinarily importing conveyance of
absolute ownership will not be given that effect in such a transaction if
they are also commonly used in pledges and mortgages and therefore do
not unqualifiedly indicate a transfer of absolute ownership, in the absence
of clear and unambiguous language or other circumstances excluding an
intent to pledge.'"
Petitioner's insistence that the CTDs were negotiated to it begs the question. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof, 2 1
and a holder may be the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or
the bearer thereof, 2 2 In the present case, however, there was no negotiation in the sense
of a transfer of the legal title to the CTDs in favor of petitioner in which situation, for
obvious reasons, mere delivery of the bearer CTDs would have sufficed. Here, the delivery
thereof only as security for the purchases of Angel de la Cruz (and we even disregard the
fact that the amount involved was not disclosed) could at the most constitute petitioner
only as a holder for value by reason of his lien. Accordingly, a negotiation for such purpose
cannot be effected by mere delivery of the instrument since, necessarily, the terms thereof
and the subsequent disposition of such security, in the event of non-payment of the
principal obligation, must be contractually provided for.
The pertinent law on this point is that where the holder has a lien on the instrument arising
from contract, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien. 2 3 As such holder of
collateral security, he would be a pledgee but the requirements therefor and the effects
thereof, not being provided for by the Negotiable Instruments Law, shall be governed by
the Civil Code provisions on pledge of incorporeal rights, 2 4 which inceptively provide:
"Art. 2095. Incorporeal rights, evidenced by negotiable instruments, . . . may
also be pledged. The instrument proving the right pledged shall be delivered to the
creditor, and if negotiable, must be indorsed."
"Art. 2096. A pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description
of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public
instrument."
Aside from the fact that the CTDs were only delivered but not indorsed, the factual findings
of respondent court quoted at the start of this opinion show that petitioner failed to
produce any document evidencing any contract of pledge or guarantee agreement
between it and Angel de la Cruz. 2 5 Consequently, the mere delivery of the CTDs did not
legally vest in petitioner any right effective against and binding upon respondent bank. The
requirement under Article 2096 aforementioned is not a mere rule of adjective law
prescribing the mode whereby proof may be made of the date of a pledge contract, but a
rule of substantive law prescribing a condition without which the execution of a pledge
contract cannot affect third persons adversely. 2 6
Respondent bank duly complied with this statutory requirement. Contrarily, petitioner,
whether as purchaser, assignee or lienholder of the CTDs, neither proved the amount of its
credit or the extent of its lien nor the execution of any public instrument which could affect
or bind private respondent. Necessarily, therefore, as between petitioner and respondent
bank, the latter has definitely the better right over the CTDs in question. LibLex
Finally, petitioner faults respondent court for refusing to delve into the question of whether
or not private respondent observed the requirements of the law in the case of lost
negotiable instruments and the issuance of replacement certificates therefor, on the
ground that petitioner failed to raise that issue in the lower court. 2 8
On this matter, we uphold respondent court's finding that the aspect of alleged negligence
of private respondent was not included in the stipulation of the parties and in the
statement of issues submitted by them to the trial court. 2 9 The issues agreed upon by
them for resolution in this case are:
"1. Whether or not the CTDs as worded are negotiable instruments.
2. Whether or not defendant could legally apply the amount covered by the
CTDs against the depositor's loan by virtue of the assignment (Annex 'C').
3. Whether or not there was legal compensation or set off involving the
amount covered by the CTDs and the depositor's outstanding account with
defendant, if any.
4. Whether or not plaintiff could compel defendant to preterminate the CTDs
before the maturity date provided therein.
6. Whether or not the parties can recover damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses from each other."
The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that it is not mandatory but
discretionary on the part of the "dispossessed owner" to apply to the judge or court of
competent jurisdiction for the issuance of a duplicate of the lost instrument. Where the
provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretional. 3 4 The
word "may" is usually permissive, not mandatory. 3 5 It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission and possibility. 3 6
Moreover, as correctly analyzed by private respondent, 3 7 Articles 548 to 558 of the Code
of Commerce, on which petitioner seeks to anchor respondent bank's supposed
negligence, merely established, on the one hand, a right of recourse in favor of a
dispossessed owner or holder of a bearer instrument so that he may obtain a duplicate of
the same, and, on the other, an option in favor of the party liable thereon who, for some
valid ground, may elect to refuse to issue a replacement of the instrument, Significantly,
none of the provisions cited by petitioner categorically restricts or prohibits the issuance a
duplicate or replacement instrument sans compliance with the procedure outlined therein,
and none establishes a mandatory precedent requirement therefor. LLjur
WHEREFORE, on the modified premises above set forth, the petition is DENIED and the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C . J ., Padilla and Nocon, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Per Justice Segundino G. Chua, with the concurrence of Justices Santiago M. Kapunan
and Luis L. Victor.
2. Judge Ramon Mabutas, Jr., presiding; Rollo, 64-88.
3. Rollo, 24-26.
6 Rollo, 28.
7. TSN, February 9, 1987, 46-47.
13. Exhibit 563, Documentary Evidence for the Defendant, 442; Original Record, 211.
14. Panay Electric Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 174 SCRA 500 (1989).
15. Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 189 SCRA 680 (1990).
16. Section 2(a), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
17. Original Record, 152.
23. Sec. 27, id.; see also Art. 2118, Civil Code.
26. Tec Bi & Co. vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 41 Phil 596 (1916); Ocejo,
Perez & Co. vs. The International Banking Corporation, 37 Phil. 631 (1918); Te Pate vs.
Ingersoll, 43 Phil. 394 (1922).
27. Rollo, 25.
34. U.S. vs. Sanchez, 13 Phil. 336 (1909); Capati vs. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794 (1982).