JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, Petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G. R. Nos. 157294-95; November 30, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
The Special Prosecution Panel filed on January 20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank
(EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the following documents during the
hearings scheduled on January 22 and 27, 2003:
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements
of account pertaining to certain accounts in the name of "Jose Velarde" and to testify thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21, 2003 and subpoenas were accordingly
issued.
The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the President of EIB or his/her authorized representative to produce
the same documents subject of the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 21, 2003 and to testify thereon on the
hearings scheduled on January 27 and 29, 2003 and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The
request was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was
accordingly issued on January 24, 2003.
Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution Panel had requested for the
issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank accounts belonging to him, attended the hearing of the case
on January 27, 2003
In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice Edilberto Sandoval,
advised petitioner that his remedy was to file a motion to quash, for which he was given up to 12:00 noon the
following day, January 28, 2003.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the President of the EIB dated January 21 and
January 24, 2003 be quashed.
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 and do not fall
under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in
the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an
earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its
capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution
in the case may not be allowed to make use of the information.
Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed another Request for the
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 31, 2003, again to direct the President of
the EIB to produce, on the hearings scheduled on February 3 and 5, 2003, the same documents subject of the
January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas with the exception of the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount
of ₱2,000,000 as Bank of Commerce MC #0256256 in the amount of ₱200,000,000 was instead requested.
The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum bearing the
same date, January 31, 2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice President-CR-II of the PDIC for her to produce
the following documents on the scheduled hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003.
The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan on January 31, 2003.
On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003 directed to Aurora Baldoz be
quashed for the same reasons which he cited in the Motion to Quash he had earlier filed.
On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion to
Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28, 2003.
Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Urgent
Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated February 7, 2003.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a reconsideration of the Resolutions
of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been denied by Resolution of March 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the "extremely-detailed" information contained in the Special Prosecution Panel’s requests for
subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of petitioner’s bank accounts, in violation of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

RULING:
No. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the primary source is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply
in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no
basis for applying the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding
petitioner’s bank accounts – the investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman – was lawful.
In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be
enforced, petitioner contends, as earlier stated, that the information found therein, given their "extremely
detailed" character, could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal
disclosure by the bank officials concerned. Petitioner thus claims that, following the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.
Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People, the "extremely-detailed" information
was obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the
charges against President Estrada, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at
the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner concludes that the information about his bank
accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the
same bank accounts.
Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting,
nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom
inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that "[a]ny violation of this law will subject the
offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court."
Even if the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to
apply the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no violation of
R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no "poisonous tree" to begin with, and, thus, no reason to
apply the doctrine.

JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon
City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 106429; June 13, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in
1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
The petition for annulment was filed before the RTC of Quezon City. It is alleged that petitioner came to realize
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial
court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage
in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon Erwin’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Furthermore, Joselita argued that the assertion is a statement of legal conclusion made by Erwin’s counsel and
not an averment of ulimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly
be inferred. But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its
sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Court
referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals denied due course to her
petition.
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of
particulars.
The Court finds that the specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement that a complaint must allege
the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a
specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and
person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules
of Court.
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological incapacity in the contemplation
of the Family Code is a question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the
case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present
petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition. Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of
Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential
marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if
not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for
information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare
her answer to the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constituting the ultimate facts is of sufficient
definiteness or particularity as to enable petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.

RULING:
Yes. The Court sustained the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private
respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent would be
to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private
respondent’s cause of action against her that she was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession upon Erwin’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even
to her mother, whose intervention caused Espinosa to lose his job.
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and
fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are
to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action;
the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the
existence of those facts.
Private respondent further argues that conclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the
complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as would
give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated.
A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action. Ultimate
facts has been defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. As stated by private respondent,
the term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It refers to the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts. And a motion for bill of particulars will
not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A
motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon
trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. 
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive
pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept
the demands made by his profession upon his time and efforts. Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand
for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove
essential or ultimate facts. For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of
particulars.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELO H. FLORES
G.R. No. 116181; April 17, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:
Private respondent Carmelo H. Flores purchased from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2)
manager's checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge. A
receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner. Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino
unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one
(1) of the checks. However, it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken
down to five (5) manager's checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of the
five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to
such an arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its
Malate Branch so that the check may be encashed but to no avail. A Formal Demand was made by private
respondent's counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal to honor the check. Thereafter, Flores filed a case with
the RTC of Quezon City.
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank
charges were actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two (2) manager's checks worth P1,000,000.00. It
alleged that due to Flores' demanding attitude and temper, petitioner's money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at
that time was still new at her job, made an error in good faith in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00. The
actuations of Flores allegedly distracted the personnel manning the unit.
After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Philippine National
Bank.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the respondent court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was likewise denied.
Hence, the present action with petitioner.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT, THE BEST EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER MR. FLORES PAID THE PNB CASINO UNIT P900,040 OR P1,000,040 IN PURCHASING
THE TWO MANAGER'S CHECKS EACH WORTH P500,000 IS THE RECEIPT FOR P1,000,040.
RULING:
No. The CA is correct in holding that the best evidence to show as proof of payment is the receipt.
Petitioner conceded that it issued the subject receipt for P1,000,040.00 to Flores; yet it immediately countered
that said receipt is not the best evidence to prove how much money Flores actually paid for the purchase of
petitioner's manager's checks.
A receipt is defined as awritten and signed acknowledgment that money has been paid or goods have been
delivered. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not conclusive. It is a written acknowledgment that
money or a thing of value has been received. Since a receipt is a mere acknowledgment of payment, it may be
subject to explanation or contradiction. A receipt may be used as evidence against one just as any other
declaration or admission. A simple receipt not under seal is presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted or
explained by other evidence of mistake in giving it, or of non-payment or of the circumstances under which it
was given. Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the case at bench, an exhaustive review of the
records fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment
embodied in petitioner's own receipt .
After having thoroughly evaluated the evidences on record, the Court finds and so believes that plaintiff indeed
paid defendant the amount of P1,000,040.00 when he purchased the two (2) manager's checks worth
P1,000,000.00. This is clearly manifested from the receipt issued by the defendant wherein it explicitly admits
that the amount stated therein is what plaintiff actually paid. While the defendant does not dispute the receipt it
issued to the plaintiff, it endeavored to prove that the actual amount involved in the entire transaction is only
P900,000.00 that is P450,000.00 manager's check and P450,000.00 cash by submitting in evidence, the
application forms filled up by the plaintiff, Exhibits "1, 2, 3 and 4". As may be readily seen, these application
forms relied upon by the defendant have no probative value for they do not yield any direct proof of payment.
Besides, defendant even failed to adduce concrete evidence showing that these forms which were crumpled and
retrieved from the waste basket were made the basis of the approval of the purchased made. At any rate, the
Court finds such pieces of evidence not only unconvincing but also self-defeating in the light of the receipt, the
accuracy, correctness and due execution of which was indubitably established. It is a cardinal rule in the law on
evidence that the best proof of payment is the receipt.
The Court explained further in Monfort v. Aguinaldo, that the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were
deemed to be the best evidence. Thus, the best evidence for proving payment is by the evidence of receipts
showing the same is also admitted. What respondents claim is that there is no rule which provides that payment
can only be proved by receipts. While receipts are deemed to be the best evidence, they are not exclusive. Other
evidence may be presented in lieu thereof if they are not available, as in case of loss, destruction or
disappearance.
Hence, having failed to adduce sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the contents of the receipt it
issued to Flores. The subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or that which affords the
greatest certainty of the fact in question. 
 W-RED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 122648; August 17, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner W-Red Construction and Development Corporation purchased from respondent Asia Industries, Inc.
various electrical equipment worth P976,487.18, covered by a total of eighteen sales invoices.  Petitioner was
able to pay the sum of P701,877.93, leaving a balance of P298,183.05, inclusive of interest at the rate of 14%
per annum computed as of January 20, 1982. For petitioner's failure to settle its remaining obligation despite
demands, respondent instituted on November 8, 1982 an action for sum of money and damages, filed with the
RTC of Makati.
Petitioner filed its answer denying receipt of some of the items stated in the sales invoices and alleging that
certain electrical equipment delivered to it were defective or faulty, for which proper demands for replacement
were ignored by respondent.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence  which was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner was given opportunity to adduce evidence but it failed to appear at the several hearings scheduled
therefor. The trial court, thus, declared petitioner as having waived its right to present evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment for respondent ordering petitioner to pay the sum of P298,163.05 plus 14%
interest from the date of filing of the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals. Respondent failed to file its comment on the
petition for review. Atty. Caesar F. Mones, counsel of record for respondent, manifested that as early as 1991 he
had severed his attorney-client relationship with respondent. The Resolution requiring respondent to comment
was sent to its office address. Respondent, still, failed to file its comment and, according to information
furnished by its former counsel, it was in the process of winding up its business.
In the instant petition, petitioner maintains that the sales invoices presented by respondent during the trial were
inadmissible for being mere photocopies which, moreover, were not authenticated by respondent's lone witness.
Likewise, the Statement of Account showing petitioner's unpaid obligation to respondent was not identified and
authenticated by the person who prepared it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sales invoices are inadmissible for being mere photocopies.

RULING:
No. Petitioner's claim that the photocopies of the eighteen sales invoices, marked as Exhibits "A" to "R", are
inadmissible, is untenable. While only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record
shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. Hence, it is not accurate to say that
the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court. This became clear at the beginning of the cross-
examination of respondent's witness by petitioner's counsel.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, respondent's only witness, Alma Ramas, was not entirely
incompetent to testify on petitioner's obligation. It was sufficiently established that Ms. Ramas, who was
connected with the credit and collection department, was in charge of monitoring the credit purchases of
customers, including petitioner.
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D.
EVANGELISTA, SR., vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA,
ADM. CASE NO. 5151; October 19, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Complainants alleged that respondent Atty. Norberto Mendoza, a former MTC Judge, abandoned his legal wife,
Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G.
Marcos. Respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife.
Respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente. Further, respondent and Marilyn
dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986,
making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia. In
respondent’s certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such
declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting
falsification of public documents; and respondent’s acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute
grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent argued that complainants, who are his political opponents, are merely filing this case to exact
revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them. Complainants illegally procured copies of the
birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are
inadmissible in evidence. Respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil
registry of subject birth certificates. Respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always
declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue
against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence,
respondent has not offended the public’s sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declared in his affidavit that ke knew respondent for they both reside in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge.
Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be
husband and wife, and from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Melgar received a letter from a
concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas, but respondent abandoned his wife
to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the
Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas. He also received information from
concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondent’s Certificate of
Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has
represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where
respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said
newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna
Normina.
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo is practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination,
witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth certificates of
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody
just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a
concerned citizen regarding respondent’s immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against
respondent at that time.
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by
respondent’s counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter
of one Luis Bermudez informing Melgar of respondent’s immoral acts, the Certification of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas, the Birth Certificate of respondent’s children, the certificates of candidacy of respondent,
a Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, attesting to the marriage celebrated
between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March
1999 issue) wherein it was stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum
expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said
testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight.
The Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123 suspending indefinitely Atty.
Norberto M. Mendoza from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer
cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
With regard to respondent’s argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact
that they are motivated by revenge for respondent’s filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if
witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they
are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza
born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and
the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records
of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are
public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article
41014 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent argued that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. –
(1) The records of a person’s birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be
issued except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official
proceedings to determine the identity of the child’s parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person’s death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine
in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court.
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth
certificates are relevant to the issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

RULING:
No. Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating
the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in
violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules
of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant
only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. 
The Court explained In People vs. Hipol, that the Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental
power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The
alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer’s office, can hardly fall
within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative
case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein
respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by
respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela
Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ,

G.R. No. 129296; September 25, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant Abe Valdez was caught unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe
manufactured or derived. He was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. SPO3
Tipay and his colleagues were instructed to uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.
The following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.  PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.  The police uprooted
the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested.
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September
25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he
does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.  Appellant was so nervous and afraid
that he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing
next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the
police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's
illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would be put in a bad
situation. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police.
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership
of marijuana plants as follows:

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused.
2. Whether or not the confession made by appellant is admissible in evidence.

RULING:
Both the seized plants and the confession made by the appellant are inadmissible in evidence. Appellant
contended that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample
time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The OSG’s argument that the records clearly showed that the instant case must be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine is misplaced. The Constitution lays down the general rule that a
search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed
tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.  Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence
of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one
(1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could
have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours
and inconvenient to them. There is no need to underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.  The mantle
of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine.
For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
In the instant case, it must be recalled that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant.  Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the
search of appellant's premises. Furthermore, the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin  precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. It must be taken note that the
testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye
and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
The Court cannot sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by
agents of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which
includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.  The guarantee refers to "the right of personal
security" of the individual.
The Court held that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. Thus,
the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them.
Appellant argued that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against
him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial
court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the
police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent
counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the
prohibited plants.
An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense. 
In the instant case, the Court finds that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well
as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police
operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to
appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was
no longer a general inquiry.
In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this
point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."  As a suspect, two
armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other
armed policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant
had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that
even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana
plants.
Moreover, the Court finds appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a
confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing. The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal
admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time
of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to
counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author
thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,  it must
likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it
to be introduced at trial."
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership
of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link
appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted
both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is
doubly tainted.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.

PEDRO BONGALON now substituted by FILIPINA BONGALON. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CECILIO BONGALON and AMPARO BONGALON.
G.R. No. 142441; November 10, 2004
CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
Pedro Bongalon, the late husband of petitioner Filipina Bongalon, respondents Cecilio Bongalon and Amparo
Bongalon and four others are the children of the late Cirila Bonga and Bernabe Bongalon. Cirila is one of the
five children of Rosalia Buenaflor and Cornelio Bonga. The other children of Rosalia and Cornelio are
Trinidad, Jacoba, Emilio and Benito. It appears that Jacoba and Emilio predeceased their children.
Rosalia was the owner of Lot No. 525-A in Albay. The original title was later cancelled and replaced by a
Transfer Certificate of Title also issued in Rosalia’s name.  Rosalia died intestate in 1940, survived by her
husband and five children.
On July 26, 1943, two (2) documents were executed over the same parcel of land, this in question.
First document, Exhibit-"2" defendants, Absolute Deed of Sale was executed and signed by vendors Trinidad
Bonga, Conchita Faustino, Teodora Bonga, heirs and children of Rosalia Buenaflor Bonga, [conveying] a part
of the property in question xxx in favor of vendee Cirila Bonga xxx. Said Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized
and acknowledged on July 26, 1943 by a notary public and entered as Doc. No. 2, Page 15, Book No. 1, Series
of 1943.
Second document, Exhibit –"B" – plaintiff, Absolute Deed of Sale was executed and signed by vendors
Trinidad Bonga, Cirila Bonga, Conchita B. Faustino and Teodora Bonga, heirs and children of Rosalia
Buenaflor Bonga, [conveying] a part of the property in question in favor of vendee Pedro Bongalon (son of
Cirila Bonga Bongalon).
The Exhibit-"2" for the defendants and the Exhibit-"B" for the plaintiff, contained a handwritten insertion, to
wit, "a part of" and initialled, which is unclear, found in the first paragraph, later portion. Both documents are
prepared/executed/signed by the same persons/ signatories, acknowledged and notarized by the same Notary
Public, Zosimo R. Almonte. Both documents, Absolute Deed of Sale, printed and expressed particular same
boundaries and description of the whole area which is One Hundred Forty Nine (149) square meters, more or
less, but did not contain expressly the part/portion of said property sold.
In March 1988, Pedro Bongalon sued respondents in the RTC for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Portion of
Property and Damages. Pedro Bongalon alleged in his complaint that: (1) he is the registered owner of Lot No.
525-A under TCT No. T-67780; (2) respondents occupied Lot No. 525-A through his tolerance; (3) he had
several times asked respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A but they refused to do so; and (4) respondents’
occupancy of Lot No. 525-A and their claim of ownership over the property cast a cloud over his title. Pedro
Bongalon prayed that the RTC declare his title free of any cloud and order respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A
and pay him damages and litigation expenses.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied Pedro Bongalon’s allegations. Respondents claimed that
Pedro Bongalon fraudulently obtained TCT No. T-67780 by executing the Extrajudicial Settlement. Amparo
claimed that on the contrary, she is the owner of Lot No. 525-A based on the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale.
As counterclaim, respondents sought the nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement and of TCT No. T-67780.
During the trial, Pedro Bongalon introduced in evidence other documents to prove his ownership of Lot No.
525-A, such as (1) Exhibit B and (2) Conchita’s Affidavit ("Exhibit C") confirming the sale under Exhibit B.
The RTC admitted these documents in evidence over the objection of respondents.
For their part, respondents also presented in evidence Exhibit 2 to prove that Cirila owned the entire Lot No.
525-A which she later sold to Amparo in the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale.
The RTC rendered judgment ordering, that the plaintiff is declared the rightful registered owner of the land
consisting of One Hundred Forty Nine (149) square meters, more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-67780, in the name of Pedro Bongalon, said title is free from defect, flaw and cloud of doubt, therefore,
indefeasible.
From the documentary evidence adduced during the hearing by both parties, it appeared that the real
property/land in question was formerly and originally owned by Rosalia Buenaflor, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No.[RO-17402 (23825)], then to [T-]67656, then to [T-67780], containing an area of One
Hundred Forty Nine (149) square meters, more or less.
Circumstances surrounding the execution of these two (2) documents is concluded and construed that
Exhibit-"B" for the plaintiff has to be given weight and effect. This, the entire area of 149 square meters, more
or less, is the subject of the sale as Cirila Bonga is now one of the four (4) vendors. Each vendor shared or
owned at least 37 square meters and 25 centimeters of this land in question, to be candid and clear.
In possession of the Deed of Absolute Sale, vendee Pedro Bongalon applied, processed and managed to have
the ownership of said property transferred in his name by submitting an Affidavit of Confirmation, by Conchita
F. Base, one of the vendors, and an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, this is a requirement. Finally, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-67780 in the name of Pedro Bongalon was issued. This is an indefeasible title of
ownership in favor of the plaintiff.
Exhibit-"1" for the defendants, Deed of Absolute Sale by vendor Cirila Bonga to the latter’s daughter vendee
Amparo Bonga Cortezano is defective having a flaw or cloud in the rights of an owner. She, Cirila Bonga, is not
the only owner of said land. Previously on July 26, 1943 said parcel of land was a subject of Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of Pedro Bongalon, the brother of vendee of Exhibit-"1" Amparo Bongalon Cortezano, by the
rightful owners/vendors of the land in question.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision. Pedro
Bongalon sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied his motion.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC should not have admitted in evidence Exhibits B and C.

RULING:
Yes. It was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the RTC should not have admitted in evidence Exhibits B
and C because Pedro Bongalon failed to allege these documents in his complaint. What was at issue before the
RTC, as raised in the pleadings filed by the parties, was the ownership of Lot No. 525-A. Pedro Bongalon
offered the pieces of evidence in question to support his claim of ownership over Lot No. 525-A. The fact that
Pedro Bongalon did not mention Exhibits B and C in his complaint is not a reason to rule them inadmissible.
While TCT No. T-67780 was Pedro Bongalon’s principal proof of ownership, it did not preclude him from
presenting other pieces of evidence to prove his claim. This is especially relevant because of his testimony that
he executed the Extrajudicial Settlement only because the Register of Deeds of Albay required it for the
issuance of TCT No. T-67780.
It can be argued that the plaintiff’s Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate is a defect, a minor one, but what is
controlling is Exhibit-"B", Absolute Deed of Sale in his favor, and the Affidavit of Confirmation of Conchita F.
Base.
The trial court is correct in, considering the evidence, and with careful perusal of the same adduced by both
parties at the hearing, holding and is of the strong opinion, that the plaintiff’s cause of action is sufficiently
impressed with merit supporting his claim of possession, as well as ownership of the land.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"

G.R. No. 150224; May 19, 2004

Facts:
Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers
away. Victim Kathylyn was left alone in the house. Later on, Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng
stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant Joel Yatar at the back of the house. They went inside the
house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing
there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.
While Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed appellant, who was
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not
find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. Later that afternoon,
Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without
collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel
could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were reddish and sharp. Appellant asked her where her husband
was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left
and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.
Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She went up the ladder to the second
floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out
of her stomach.
SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together
with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple
stab wounds. The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m. The police discovered the victim’s panties,
brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a
dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution.

RULING:
No. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. Well-
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight
on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same;
the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and
observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case,
the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing
to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides
that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence
is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were
found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body. Rigor
mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to
the completion of rigor mortis. In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking
in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, Dr. Bartolo
discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated
that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the
victim. In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the
victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the DNA of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was
identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such
as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair
and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the
assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the
appellant showed that a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given
by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant’s contention that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in
violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art.
III of the Constitution is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips
of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as
there is no testimonial compulsion involved. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused. It must also be noted that
appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court in the presence
of counsel.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures
or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes something more than a minimum of probative value,
suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a plus value. This may be necessary to preclude the trial
court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without plus value may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.JOERAL GALLENO,

GR. No. 123546; July 2, 1998

FACTS:
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to leave the province
to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-year old
Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed
by the Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense
presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn
sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to
her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn
herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her.
Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering her shorts, he made
Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. Then he forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-
years old while appellant was a fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her
cry in pain.
Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her
vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. Shortly, Emeterio and
Penicola came home from work. They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there was blood in
Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but
she did not answer. Emeterio spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood was
oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyn's vagina but this did
not stop the bleeding.
The following day, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr. Orosco. Upon examining Evelyn, the doctor
affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been caused by a blunt instrument inserted into the vagina,
that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina and that a
human penis in full erection is considered a blunt instrument. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco
asked Evelyn what caused her injuries. The child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its
insertion caused her pain. Dr. Orosco advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further
medical treatment.
Emeterio, then, brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital where she was examined by resident
physician , Dr. Lañada, upon examining Evelyn, found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left
anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the presence of about 10-15 cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada
recommended that Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in her vagina, which
was still bleeding, had to be repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted into the hospital
that day and went home with Emeterio to Barangay Balighot.
Upon her examination of the victim, Dr. Lañada opined that a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the
vagina. According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a girl
falls and hits her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a
speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of a blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger of a penis
of a man in full erection.
Evelyn was brought back to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machel
Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Upon
his examination of Evelyn, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the child suffered severe compound laceration which
could have been caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly
inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the
transfusion of 255 cc of blood.
Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought
Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same day,
appellant was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary School and brought to the police station.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information for the crime of Statutory Rape. The trial court finds accused
JOERAL GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant in
finding accused-appellant culpable for its failure to explain how his left ring finger accidentally came in contact
with Evelyn's vagina, while in the process of throwing her up and down. Besides, the prosecution was able to
establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn was not wearing
any pants or underwear at that time, accused-appellant failed to explain how his finger could possibly penetrate
the victim's vagina by about one-fourth of an inch. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim
with her 3-year old brother, in pain and bleeding.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors.

RULING:
No. The contention of accused-appellant that the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the,
which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended party, is misplaced.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to
draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and
opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the
principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of
the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a
judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of
doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the
other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on
the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's
laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which
was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of
accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of
logic and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the
determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must
be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience.