G.R. No.
145391            August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution 1 dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution 2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26,
1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack
of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas
RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a
pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the
Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the
accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the
other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved
parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if
the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based
on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is
no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether
there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal 5 that the
dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition
for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. 8 Forum-shopping
is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that
he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or
the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for
brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case,
but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in
1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same
act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to
the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended
party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as
follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure
to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based
on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil
action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same
act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal
action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate
civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending,
was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did
not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which
could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed
to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil
action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party
in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that
the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the criminal case is terminated
and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that "any
cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended
party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the
filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of
in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair
for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that
is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for  quasi-
delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in
the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts,
and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The
order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may
vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been
recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides
that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13 the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or
acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The
Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one
hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the
MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule
that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent."14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184905               August 28, 2009
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, Petitioner,
vs.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a
vehicular collision.
The facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah
Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing
Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat
("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of
five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of
Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear door
and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it
came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict
Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In
the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand
fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 33277,
and subsequently raffled to Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of
Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained
that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers
placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006
exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the defendant
are likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED."
The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the same before
the RTC of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed Decision dated 5 September
2006, affirming the MeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s) Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate
as it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 5 June 2007.1
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited.
Thus:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not
allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the
area.2 (Emphasis supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street
in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan
Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule. 3
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos’ vehicle was
moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction (the Katipunan
Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and fender of the passenger’s
side of Aquilino’s car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn. 4 It therefore found the driver Rodel
guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, 5 the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel
Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages.
Petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation’s claim for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which raises
the following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE
SAME IS INSUFFICIENT.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
There is no doubt in the appellate court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition
against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident.
Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even conceded that petitioner
was guilty of mere contributory negligence.6
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realty’s) barefaced assertion that its driver, Aquilino, was not to
be blamed for the accident –
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of
vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision,
Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the
ongoing road construction at the area.
This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal
purpose it may serve."
(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and
Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers not to pass through the
intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the "barriers were
broken" at that point creating a small gap through which any vehicle could pass. What is clear to Us is
that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is
established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil
Code –
"Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation."
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted in the
vehicular mishap.7
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory negligence in driving the
Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the appellate court made the
following pronouncement:
As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed in a major
thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a perilous act. He had no regard to
(sic) the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because of the impact of the collision, (Aquilino’s) sedan
made a 180-degree turn as (Ramos’) Ford Expedition careened and smashed into its rear door and
fender. We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by
his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that
in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good
father of a family. Employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly recommended
when he applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service Committee of his parish. A
certain Ramon Gomez, a member of the church’s livelihood program, testified that a background
investigation would have to be made before an applicant is recommended to the parishioners for
employment. (Ramos) supposedly tested Rodel’s driving skills before accepting him for the job. Rodel
has been his driver since 2001, and except for the mishap in 2004, he has not been involved in any road
accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained
unsubstantiated and are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which would
support (Ramos’) bare allegation of Rodel’s 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to present
convincing proof that he went to the extent of verifying Rodel’s qualifications, safety record, and driving
history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that his driver was texting with his
cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that
Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the
employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.1avvphi1
Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. These, (Ramos) failed to do.8
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was the
sole proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should suffer the consequences of the
accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:
20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can recover
damages is if its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. It has been clearly established in this case, however, that respondent’s negligence
was not merely contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the accident.
xxxx
22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Respondent’s
vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection was prohibited. Were it
not for the obvious negligence of respondent’s driver in crossing the intersection that was prohibited, the
accident would not have happened. The crossing of respondent’s vehicle in a prohibited intersection
unquestionably produced the injury, and without which the accident would not have occurred. On the
other hand, petitioner’s driver had the right to be where he was at the time of the mishap. As correctly
concluded by the RTC, the petitioner’s driver could not be expected to slacken his speed while travelling
along said intersection since nobody, in his right mind, would do the same. Assuming, however, that
petitioner’s driver was indeed guilty of any contributory negligence, such was not the proximate cause of
the accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did not cross the prohibited intersection, no
accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on Ilustrisimo’s could thus be
concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not guilty of any negligence that would make
petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver, respondent cannot claim
damages from petitioner.9
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate court’s findings and
pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his
vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence
of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.10
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the
proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by
respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.11
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition
was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account
of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from
respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of
mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in
this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s
negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006
dismissing for lack of merit respondent’s complaint for damages is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
 APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary
liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the
enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall
devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A
tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their
years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award
complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should
at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate
occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the
parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court
promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby reversed; and
instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the
following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from
which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and
19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts
until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly
found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell
kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting
the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of
General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors,
their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death
by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the
imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment
on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint
for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient
merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein
plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who,
as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this
case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established
decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make
petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu,
submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot
wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by
the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the
bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account
in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive
discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased
Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little
after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state
that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell
Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell
was hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about
eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the
record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was
already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it
was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw
the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head
which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had
earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he
found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which
are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless
made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or
tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said
may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc.,
from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that
the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows
a point of entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your
oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and
as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of
which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch
prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is
only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report
prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2
cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5
cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving
skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity,
lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making
an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9
cms. above left external auditory meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x       x       x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance,
gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot
wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please
indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will
you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost
straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants’
witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street
from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who
declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots
therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas
station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the
Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man
jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the
telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man
leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but
denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the
following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire
credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of
both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private
respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without
contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard
her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he
heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he
went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct and
candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique
Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who
shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the
trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the
assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they
should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun
which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to
Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father
of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one
of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of
his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that
he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents
were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their
children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or
even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a
handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a
revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the
start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners
and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this
dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children who live in their company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was
allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This vicarious liability
of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of
which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180
of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with
discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’
(3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the
key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said
gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein
he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since
then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a
CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x       x       x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not
correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by
evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in
preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees
which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was
still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil
liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take
this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which
we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v.
Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused
by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from
both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same
case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion
hereunder.chanrobles law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization
of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering
previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems
from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is
subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such
liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid
and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said
code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or
omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
x       x       x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a
person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil
liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability
ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid
rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside
from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.:
Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al.
v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were
basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9
but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since
these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held
that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore
enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and
not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there
are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether
the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is
primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly
and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The same
liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on
the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of
Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of
his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time,
disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the petitioners
herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son.
On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for
damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although
the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled
that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the
son, "although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons
causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons
and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil
liability of their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not
exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful
scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present
case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of
"subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the
decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the
discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted
therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of
no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this
civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-
delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and
on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners
failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 146224             January 26, 2007
VIRGINIA REAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SISENANDO H. BELO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution1 dated June 16, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed outright the
petition for review of Virginia Real (petitioner) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58799, and the CA Resolution 2 dated
November 27, 2000 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine
Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned
and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU.
Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood
stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including respondent's stall. An
investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the
fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank
installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded
compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent's demand.
Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 24, Manila (MeTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 152822. 3 Respondent alleged that petitioner
failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the
selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the
fire that gutted the fastfood stalls.4
In her Answer dated September 23, 1996, petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a
fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. 5
After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision 6 dated April 5, 1999 in favor of the respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter:
1) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 representing temperate or moderate damages; and
2) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The counterclaim filed by the defendant is hereby DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.7
The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate authority revealed that the fire broke
out due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall;
that factual circumstances did not show any sign of interference by any force of nature to infer that the
fire occurred due to fortuitous event; that the petitioner failed to exercise due diligence, precaution, and
vigilance in the conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining the safety of her cooking equipment
as well as in the selection and supervision of her employees; that even if petitioner passes the fault to her
employees, Article 2180 of the Civil Code finds application; that in the absence of supporting evidence,
the amount of actual damages and unrealized profits prayed for by respondent cannot be granted; that,
nonetheless, respondent is entitled to temperate damages since respondent sustained pecuniary loss,
though its true value cannot, from the very nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94606, insisting that the fire was a fortuitous event. On November 26,
1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages
awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to P80,000.00.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the increase in the award of temperate
damages is unreasonable since she also incurred losses from the fire.
In its Order dated April 12, 2000, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration holding that it
cannot disregard evidence showing that the fire originated from petitioner's fastfood stall; that the
increased amount of temperate damages awarded to respondent is not a full compensation but only a fair
approximate of what he lost due to the negligence of petitioner's workers.9
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58799. 10 On June
16, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being "procedurally
flawed/deficient."11 The CA held that the attached RTC Decision was not certified as a true copy by the
Clerk of Court; that a certified true copy of the MeTC Decision was not attached; that material portions
of the record, such as the position papers of the parties and affidavits of witnesses, as would support the
material allegations of the petition were also not attached.12
On July 14, 2000, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, 13 attaching photocopies of the
Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court.14
On November 27, 2000, the CA issued its Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 15
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the submitted certified true copy of the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court as
authenticated by a court employee other than the Clerk of Court who was not around at that time said
copy was secured constitutes compliance with the Rules?
2. Whether the submission of a certified true copy of the Metropolitan Trial Court's judgment is still an
indispensable requirement in filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals despite the fact that
said judgment was already modified by the above decision of the Regional Trial Court and it is the latter
decision that is the proper subject of the petition for review?
3. Whether the submission of copies of the respective position papers of the contending parties is still an
indispensable requirement in filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals despite the fact that
the contents thereof are already quoted in the body of the verified petition and in the subject judgment of
the Metropolitan Trial Court?
4. Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire that razed not
only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food Center premises of the Philippine
Women's University, including that of the respondent?
5. Whether the Regional Trial Court could increase the amount of damages awarded by the Metropolitan
Trial Court in favor of the respondent who has not even filed an appeal therefrom?16
Petitioner submits that rules of procedure should not be applied in a very harsh, inflexible and
technically unreasonable sense.
While admitting that the RTC Decision and Order were not certified by the Clerk of Court himself,
petitioner insists that they were certified as authentic copies by Administrative Officer IV Gregorio B.
Paraon of the RTC.
As to the MeTC Decision, petitioner contends that the submission of a certified true copy thereof is not
an indispensable requirement because that judgment is not the subject of the petition for review.
In any case, petitioner submits that she had substantially complied with the requirements of the rule
when she attached with her Motion for Reconsideration the copies of the Decisions of the RTC and
MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court.
Anent the non-submission of the position papers of the parties, petitioner maintains that the contents of
said position papers were lengthily quoted verbatim in the petition and in the attached copy of the MeTC
Decision.
On the submission of affidavits of witnesses, petitioner contends that it was not necessary because the
case before the MeTC was not covered by summary proceedings.
On the merits of her petition before the CA, petitioner avers that she should not be held liable for a fire
which was a fortuitous event since the fire could not be foreseen and the spread of the fire to the adjacent
fastfood stalls was inevitable.
Lastly, she argues that the RTC cannot increase the amount of temperate damages since the respondent
did not appeal from the judgment of the MeTC.
Respondent opted not to file a Comment, manifesting that the petition contains no new arguments which
would require a comment since the arguments are but a rehash of those raised and decided by the lower
courts.17
The Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda.18 In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted her Memorandum. 19 On the other hand,
respondent filed a Manifestation stating that since no new issues have been raised by the petitioner in her
petition and in order not to be redundant, he adopts as his memorandum the memoranda he filed in the
MeTC and the RTC.20
In his Memoranda before the MeTC and RTC, respondent emphasized the evidence he presented to
establish his cause of action against petitioner, principally the testimony of Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel
G. Pinca stating that the fire originated from the LPG stove and tank in petitioner's fastfood stall.
The requirements as to form and content of a petition for review of a decision of the RTC are laid down
in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law,
or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for
the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure to comply with the above requirements "shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof."
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice.21
In the present case, petitioner's submission of copies of the RTC Decision and Order certified as correct
by the Administrative Officer IV of the RTC is insufficient compliance with the requirements of the rule.
Petitioner failed to show that the Clerk of Court was officially on leave and the Administrative Officer
was officially designated as officer-in-charge. The rule is explicit in its mandate that the legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts must be certified correct by
the Clerk of Court.
Nonetheless, a strict application of the rule in this case is not called for. This Court has ruled against the
dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities in several cases, especially when the appellant had
substantially complied with the formal requirements. 22 There is ample jurisprudence holding that the
subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure.23 When the CA dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for the
reconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents or
order/resolution, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Revised Rules of Court. 24
Thus, in the present case, there was substantial compliance when petitioner attached in her Motion for
Reconsideration a photocopy of the Decision of the RTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court of the
RTC. In like manner, there was substantial compliance when petitioner attached, in her Motion for
Reconsideration, a photocopy of the Decision of the MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court of
the RTC.
On the necessity of attaching position papers and affidavits of witnesses, Section 2 of Rule 42 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires attachments if these would support the allegations of the petition. 25 In
the present case, there was no compelling need to attach the position papers of the parties since the
Decisions of the MeTC and RTC already stated their respective arguments. As to the affidavits, the
Court notes that they were presented by the respondent as part of the testimony of his witness Fire
Investigator Pinca and therefore would not support the allegations of the petitioner.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the
case.
The Court's pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals26 is worth echoing: "cases
should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be better served."27 Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor
or property on mere technicalities.28
The next most logical step would then be for the Court to simply set aside the challenged resolutions,
remand the case to the CA and direct the latter to resolve on the merits of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
58799. But, that would further delay the case. Considering the issues raised which can be resolved on the
basis of the pleadings and documents filed, and the fact that petitioner herself has asked the Court to
decide her petition on the merits, the Court deems it more practical and in the greater interest of justice
not to remand the case to the CA but, instead, to resolve the controversy once and for all.29
The Court shall now address the issue of whether the fire was a fortuitous event.
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting
to the creditor. 30
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.31
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank
installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and
destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent's fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not
support petitioner's theory of fortuitous event.
Petitioner's bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her favor. It is basic in the
rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. 32 In short,
mere allegations are not evidence. 33
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.34 To avoid liability for
a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.35
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in
her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also
failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking
equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that
petitioner had been negligent.36
As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof by the RTC is improper. The
RTC could no longer examine the amounts awarded by the MeTC since respondent did not appeal from
the Decision of the MeTC. 37 It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not
obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower
court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. 38 While there are exceptions to this rule, such as if
they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not
specified, and (3) clerical errors,39 none apply here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated June 16, 2000 and
November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the temperate damages awarded is reduced
from P80,000.00 to P50,000.00 as awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila in its
Decision dated April 5, 1999.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163609             November 27, 2008
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE
OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him,
which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Polomolok, Cotabato City,
Branch 39, insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned. The CA absolved Mayor
Miguel from any liability since it was not he, but the Municipality of Koronadal, that was the employer
of the negligent driver.
The Facts
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck
driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. 2 The pick-up truck was
registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan.3 Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at
General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.4
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. 5 The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some
fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident.6
7
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion.  He was
initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. 8 Due to the seriousness of his injuries, he
was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treatment. 9 Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.10
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC against respondents. 11 In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held
solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was Lozano's
negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin's death. Apostol and Simbulan
averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed
out that Marvin's sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel
denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the
answer of Lozano and Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle
insurer, it insisted that its liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured.
Since the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period, any cause of action against it had
prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable
for the damages incurred by other defendant (sic) being an agency of the State performing a (sic)
governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan, not being the owner of the
subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. The complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding
Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of action against said
insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums:
1. One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One Hundred One and Forty Centavos (P173,101.40) Pesos as
actual damages with legal interest of 12% per annum computed from February 11, 1989 until fully paid;
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney's fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Marvin Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano's employer and,
hence, solidarily liable for the latter's negligent act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal
was the driver's true and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due care
and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and
cannot be attributed to him.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the appeal, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as defendant-
appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and the complaint against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.13
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme.
Said the appellate court:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the employer of Lozano. Thus,
paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both
Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus be held
liable for the damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-
up at the time of the accident.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MAYOR FERNANDO
MIGUEL CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MARVIN JAYME WHICH
CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE SETTLED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE TRIBUNAL;
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT'S SUPERVISION.15
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. He was not a mere
passenger, but instead one who had direct control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the
accident. According to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated by the fact that Lozano's
employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor Miguel, being Lozano's superior, still had control
over the manner the vehicle was operated.
Article 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally
or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has
the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.17
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be
established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his
functions.18
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. In Belen v. Belen,19 this Court ruled that it was
enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no obligation
to prove the negative averment. This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff,
and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under
no obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the
Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.20
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer
of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's power of
selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of
doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.21
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was
the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as
a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the
accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee
relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity
because control over the employee subsists. 22 In the case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal
remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano and how the
latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to
buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano,
he still can not be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell,23 the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,24 ruled in a
similar vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to
it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned
and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x
x25 (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have
the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. 26 In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. 27 Whatever right of control the occupant
may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Handley v. Lombardi28 is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and superior
employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not
properly applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master, but only by
virtue of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he
was delegated Kruse's authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this state and elsewhere that the
negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent,
but only to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac. 425; Guild
v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
378, 52 S. E. 228; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p.
829; and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly that part commencing at p. 290.) We
can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between actionable negligence and
contributory negligence. x x x29
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30 and again in Sichterman v. Hollingshead
Co.31
In Swanson v. McQuown,32 a case involving a military officer who happened to be riding in a car driven
by a subordinate later involved in an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the general rule
that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since the
relationship is not a true master-servant situation.33 The court went on to rule that the only exception is
when they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it.34
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner.
There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him
accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him
warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts. 35 The
driver's duty is not one that may be delegated to others.36
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of
Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency
of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,37 where this Court held:
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant
cannot recover.38
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. The CA
observation along this line are worth restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record
continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation x x x.39
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents. However, justice demands that only
those liable under our laws be held accountable for Marvin's demise. Justice can not sway in favor of
petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent
driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third
person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.
PARAS, J.:
In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated
March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its
modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid
decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to
this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in the
resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially
by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought
to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-
spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from
the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the
heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of
the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay
the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which
resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.
Petitioners allege:
1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New
Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Should
moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in
varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the same, which should not
be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation
Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to
the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to
exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had been sufficiently
established in the hearing of May 23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower court upon
which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not for
the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration,
contends thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent National
Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal
issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the question as to whether or not the
driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus
becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved,
there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard,
the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated
December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the
respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit admission of
said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because while
petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of law
before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts.
3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident
involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and for
this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the shock
and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an agency of
the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle,
not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for
the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who should
answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation Administration
in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence
is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and
2180 of theNew Civil Code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an
ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to
do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If
the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting
through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984
Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the
other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it
collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be
liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions,
by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National
Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately
after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-
Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be necessary to
finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than
twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in
determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing
proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of
Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe
or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was
thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the
road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force
and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the
impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the radiator
guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report (Exhibit
"E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city
limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away
from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This
is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and
the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at
a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and
make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such
negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether
or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and
supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the
wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be
using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages
and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116617 November 16, 1998
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO
TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY R. ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 126395 November 16, 1998
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, and LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, (MMTC) PEDRO
A. MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are appeals brought, on the one hand, by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and
Pedro Musa and, on the other, by the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales from the
decision,1 dated August 5, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City holding MMTC and Musa liable to the spouses
Rosales for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit for the death of
the latter's daughter. MMTC and Musa in G.R. No. 116617 appeal insofar as they are held liable for
damages, while the spouses Rosales in G.R. No. 126395 appeal insofar as the amounts awarded are
concerned.
The facts are as follows:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its driver
assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high
school student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.
At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven
by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness
said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the south, hit her. 2 She
fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the
left rear tires thereof.3 Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie
was taken to the Philippine Heart Center,4 but efforts to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 6 years, as maximum, by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon
City.5 The trial court found:
All told, this Court, therefore, holds that the accused, who was then, the driver of MMTC Bus No. 027,
is criminally responsible for the death of the girl victim in violation of Article 365 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code. For, in the light of the evidence that the girl victim was already at the center of the
Katipunan Road when she was bumped, and, therefore, already past the right lane when the MMTC Bus
No. 027 was supposed to have passed; and, since the said bus was then running at a speed of about 25
kilometers per hour which is inappropriate since Katipunan road is a busy street, there is, consequently,
sufficient proof to show that the accused was careless, reckless and imprudent in the operation of his
MMTC Bus No. 027, which is made more evident by the circumstance that the accused did not blow his
horn at the time of the accident, and he did not even know that he had bumped the girl victim and had
ran over her, demonstrating thereby that he did not exercise diligence and take the necessary precaution
to avoid injury to persons in the operation of his vehicle, as, in fact, he ran over the girl victim who died
as a result thereof. 6
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC,
as a defendant therein. The counsel of MMTC and Musa attempted to introduce testimony that Musa was
not negligent in driving Bus No. 27 but was told by the trial judge:
COURT:
That is it. You can now limit your question to the other defendant here but to re-try again the actual facts
of the accident, this Court would not be in the position. It would be improper for this Court to make any
findings with respect to the negligence of herein driver. You ask questions only regarding the civil aspect
as to the other defendant but not as to the
accused. 7
The counsel submitted to the ruling of the court. 8
In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and
Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorney's fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Metro
Manila Transit Corporation primarily and defendant Pedro Musa subsidiarily liable to plaintiffs-spouses
Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales as follows:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00;
2. Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. Attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and
5. Costs of suit.9
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the following modification:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification deleting the award of P150,000.00 as actual damages and
awarding in lieu thereof the amount of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, the decision appealed from is, in
all other aspects, hereby AFFIRMED. 10
The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution, dated
September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Hence, these appeals.
In G.R. No. 116617, MMTC and Musa assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A
QUO'S DECISION PARTICULARLY IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MMTC EXERCISED
THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVERS. THIS BEING THE CASE, APPELLANT MMTC IS ENTITLED
TO BE ABSOLVED FROM ANY LIABILITY OR AT LEAST TO A REDUCTION OF THE
RECOVERABLE DAMAGES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, JUST LIKE THE COURT A QUO,
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT PETITIONER MMTC, A GOVERNMENT-OWNED
CORPORATION, COMMITTED NO FRAUD, MALICE, BAD FAITH, NOR WANTON,
FRAUDULENT, OPPRESSIVE AND MALEVOLENT ACTUATIONS AGAINST HEREIN
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A
QUO'S DECISION TO HOLD PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC PRIMARILY LIABLE TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P500,000 AS MORAL DAMAGES,
P100,000 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P30,000 BY WAY OF DEATH INDEMNITY.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A
QUO'S DECISION IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 126395, the spouses Rosales contend:
The Court of Appeals erred in:
First, considering that death indemnity which this Honorable Court set at P50,000.00 is akin to actual
damages;
Second, not increasing the amount of damages awarded;
Third, refusing to hold all the defendants, now private respondents, solidarily liable.
MMTC and Musa do not specifically question the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City that Liza Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27. Nonetheless, their petition
contains discussions which cast doubts on this point. 11 Not only can they not do this as the rule is that an
appellant may not be heard on a question not specifically assigned as error, but the rule giving great
weight, and even finality, to the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the
trial court bars a reversal of the finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa. Only where it is
shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned. To the
contrary, the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are solidly anchored on
the evidence submitted by the parties. We, therefore, regard them as conclusive in resolving the petitions
at bar. 12 Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' counsel submitted to the ruling of the court that the
finding of the trial court in the criminal case was conclusive on them with regard to the questions of
whether Liza Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27 and whether its driver was negligent. Rather, the
issue in this case turns on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that "employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." The responsibility of
employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary, that is, the
injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their
employees. 13 The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been adumbrated thus:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to
occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost
of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which
will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because
he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prides, rates or liability insurance, to the
public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight
argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the
enterprise is conducted safely. 14
In Campo v. Camarote, 15 we explained the basis of the presumption of negligence in this wise:
The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the carelessness of a
driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the choice of the
driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owner's lack of diligence, the right will in many
cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially in the cities, have the
opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So the law imposes the burden of
proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes
that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of
their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent
damage."16 For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such
diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the supervision of
the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. 17 On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating, procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. 18 To establish these factors in a trial involving
the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence. 19
In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with
respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.
According to MMTC, applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses, certifications of
work experience, and clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation; to undergo tests of their
driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to complete training programs on traffic rules,
vehicle maintenance, and standard operating procedures during emergency cases. 20
MMTC's evidence consists entirely of testimonial evidence (1) that transport supervisors are assigned to
oversee field operations in designated areas; (2) that the maintenance department daily inspects the
engines of the vehicles; and, (3) that for infraction of company rules there are corresponding
penalties. 21 Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Pedro Musa all these precautions were
followed, 22 the records of his interview, of the results of his examinations, and of his service were not
presented.
MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle
maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to
determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, 23 but there is no record that Musa attended
such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No proof was
presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections,
allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.
Normally, employers' keep files concerning the qualifications, work experience, training evaluation, and
discipline of their employees. The failure of MMTC to present such documentary proof puts in doubt the
credibility of its witnesses. What was said in Central Taxicab Corporation v. Ex-Meralco Employees
Transportation Corporation  24 applies to this case:
This witness spoke of an affidavit of experience which a driver-applicant must accomplish before he is
employed by the company, a written time schedule for each bus, and a record of the inspections and
thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn; yet no attempt was ever made to
present in evidence any of these documents, despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession
and control of the defendant company.
....
Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given by him as well as a
record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather' strange,
therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of Roberto, the driver involved in
this case.
The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof tending
to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the
opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
It is noteworthy that, in another case involving MMTC, testimonial evidence of identical content, which
MMTC presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees, was
held to be insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it. In Metro Manila Transit
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court said:
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold
sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that matter, inasmuch
as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently
persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision
of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.
Having found both MMTC and its driver Pedro Musa liable for negligence for the death of Liza Rosalie
on August 9, 1986; we now consider the question of damages which her parents, the spouses Rosales,
are entitled to recover, which is the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. 126395.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 2206 provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict. Initially fixed in said article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity has
through the years been gradually increased based on the value of the peso. At present, it is fixed at
P50,000.00. 26 To conform to this new ruling, the Court of Appeals correctly increased the indemnity it
had originally ordered the spouses Rosales to be paid from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in its resolution,
dated September 12, 1996.
Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved." The
spouses Rosales are claiming actual damages in the amount of P239,245.40. However, during the trial,
they submitted receipts showing that expenses for the funeral, wake, and interment of Liza Rosalie
amounted only to P60,226.65 itemized as follows: 27
Medical Attendance P 739.65
Funeral Services 5,100.00
Wreaths 2,500.00
Embalment 1,000.00
Obituaries 7,125.00
Interment fees 2,350.00
Expenses during wake 14,935.00
Mourning clothes 5,000.00
Photography 3,500.00
Video Coverage 10,000.00
Printing of invitation cards 7,977.00
TOTAL 60,226.65
Hence, apart from the indemnity for death, the spouses Rosales are entitled to recover the above amount
as actual damages.
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained thus:
. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity
of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him
and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 28
In the instant case, the spouses Rosales presented evidence of the intense moral suffering they had gone
through as a result of the loss of Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child. Rodolfo Rosales recounted
the place of Liza Rosalie in the family and their relationship with her in the following words:
Q: Mr. Rosales, how was Liza to you as a daughter?
A: Well, Liza as a daughter was the greatest joy of the family; she was our pride, and everybody loved
her — all her brothers and sisters — because she was sweet and unspoiled. . . . She was soft-spoken to
all of us; and she still slept with us at night although she had her own room. Sometimes in the middle of
the night she would open our door and ask if she could sleep with us. So we let her sleep with us, as she
was the youngest. 29
The death of Liza Rosalie left a void in their lives. Rodolfo Rosales testified on the devastating effect of
the death of Liza Rosalie:
Q: And after she died, what changes, if any, did you feel in your family?
A: Well, there is something hollow in our family, something is missing. She used to greet me when I
came home and smell if I was drunk and would tell me to dress up and take a shower before her mommy
could see me. She would call me up at the office and say: "Daddy, come home, please help me with my
homework." Now, all these things, I am missing, you know. . . I do not feel like going home early.
Sometimes my wife would complain and ask: "Where did you go?" But I cannot explain to her how I
feel. 30
Lily Rosales described life without Liza Rosalie thus:
Q: Now, your life without Liza, how would you describe it, Dr. Rosales?
A: You know it is very hard to describe. The family was broken apart. We could not go together because
we remember Liza. Every time we go to the cemetery we try as much as possible not to go together. So,
we go to the cemetery one at a time, sometimes, my husband and I, or my son and another one, but we
never go together because we remember Liza. But before her death we would always be together, the
whole family on weekends and on our days off. My husband works very hard, I also work very hard and
my children go to school. They study very hard. Now we cannot go together on outings because of the
absence of Liza. 31
The spouses Rosales claim moral damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00. In People v. Teehankee,
Jr.,32 this Court awarded P1 million as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was
murdered. This amount seems reasonable to us as moral damages for the loss of a minor child, whether
he or she was a victim of a crime or a quasi-delict. Hence, we hold that the MMTC and Musa are
solidarily liable to the spouses Rosales in the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the death
of Liza Rosalie.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving
quasi-delicts if "the defendant acted with gross negligence." This circumstance obtains in the instant
case. The records indicate that at the time of the mishap, there was a pending criminal case against Musa
for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries with another branch of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City. 33 The evidence also shows that he failed to stop his vehicle at once even after eye
witnesses shouted at him. The spouses Rosales claim exemplary damages in the amount of
P5,000,000.00. Under the circumstances, we deem it reasonable to award the spouses Rosales exemplary
damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 34 which
involved the death of a minor child in the sinking of a vessel, we held an award of P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees to be reasonable. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees made by the Court of
Appeals to the spouses Rosales in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the
indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; . . ."
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn
money. 35 Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was
reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. 36 In People v. Teehankee  37 no award
of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the heirs of a college freshman because there
was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would eventually become a professional
pilot. 38 But compensation should be allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a
minor who has not yet commenced employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient
evidence is presented to establish the amount thereof. In the United States it has been observed:
This raises the broader question of the proper measure of damages in death cases involving children,
housewives, the old, and others who do not have market income so that there is no pecuniary loss to
survivors or to the estate of the decedent. The traditional approach was to award no or merely nominal
damages in such cases. . . . Increasingly, however, courts allow expert testimony to be used to project
those lost earnings. 39
40
Thus, in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co.,   the court allowed the heirs of a seven-year-old boy who was
killed in a car accident to recover compensation for loss of earning capacity:
Considerable evidence was presented by plaintiffs in an effort to give the jury a foundation on which to
make an award. Briefly stated, this evidence showed Charles Haumersen was a seven-year-old of above
average characteristics. He was described as "very intelligent" and "all-American." He received high
marks in school. He was active in church affairs and participated in recreational and athletic events,
often with, children older than himself. In addition, he had an unusual talent for creating numerous
cartoons and other drawings, some of which plaintiffs introduced at trial.
The record does not disclose passion and prejudice. The key question is whether the verdict of $100,000
has support in the evidence.
Upon analysis of the record, we conclude that we should not disturb the award.
The argument for allowing compensation for loss of earning capacity of a minor is even stronger if he or
she was a student, whether already training for a specific profession or still engaged in general studies.
In Krohmer v. Dahl, 41 the court, in affirming the award by the jury of $85,000.00 to the heirs of an
eighteen-year-old college freshman who died of carbon monoxide poisoning, stated as follows:
There are numerous cases that have held admissible evidence of prospective earnings of a student or
trainee. . . . The appellants contend that such evidence is not admissible unless the course under study
relates to a given occupation or profession and it is shown that the student is reasonably certain to follow
that occupation or profession. It is true that the majority of these decisions deal with students who are
studying for a specific occupation or profession. However, not one of these cases indicate that evidence
of one's education as a guide to future earnings is not admissible where the student is engaged in general
studies or whose education does not relate to a specific occupation.
In sharp contrast with the situation obtaining in People v. Teehankee, where the prosecution merely
presented evidence to show the fact of the victim's graduation from high school and the fact of his
enrollment in a flying school, spouses Rosales did not content themselves with simply establishing Liza
Rosalie's enrollment at UP Integrated School. They presented evidence to show that Liza Rosalie was a
good student, promising artist, and obedient child. She consistently performed well in her studies since
grade school. 42 A survey taken in 1984 when Liza Rosalie was twelve years old showed that she had
good study habits and attitudes. 43 Cleofe Chi, guidance counselor of the University of the Philippines
Integrated School, described Liza Rosalie as personable, well-liked, and with a balanced
personality. 44 Professor Alfredo Rebillon, a faculty member of the University of the Philippines College
of Fine Arts, who organized workshops which Liza Rosalie attended in 1982 and 1983, testified that
Liza Rosalie had the potential of eventually becoming an artist. 45 Professor Rebillon's testimony is more
than sufficiently established by the 51 samples of Liza Rosalie's watercolor, charcoal, and pencil
drawings submitted as exhibits by the spouses Rosales. 46 Neither MMTC nor Pedro Musa controverted
this evidence.
Considering her good academic record, extra-curricular activities, and varied interests, it is reasonable to
assume that Liza Rosalie would have enjoyed a successful professional career had it not been for her
untimely death. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to
her heirs in accordance with the formula established in decided cases 47 for computing net earning
capacity, to wit:
Net Earning = Life [Gross Necessary
Capacity Expectancy x [Annual — Living
[Income Expenses
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and the age
of the deceased.48 Since Liza Rosalie was 16 at the time of her death, her life expectancy was 44 more
years. 49 Her projected gross annual income, computed based on the minimum wage for workers in the
non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of her death, 50 then fixed at P37.00, 51 is
P14,630.46. 52 Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%) of her projected gross
annual income, 53 her total net earning capacity amounts to P321,870.12. 54
Finally, the spouses Rosales argue that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Conrado Tolentino,
Feliciana Celebrado, and the GSIS of liability. The Spouses Rosales alleged that Tolentino, as Acting
General Manager of the MMTC, and Celebrado, as a dispatcher thereof, were charged with the
supervision of Musa and should, therefore, be held vicariously liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
With respect to the GSIS, they contend that it was the insurer in a contract for third party liability it had
with the MMTC.
Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions "managers" among those made responsible for the
negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the said provision in the sense of
"employers." 55 Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held liable for the tort of Pedro Musa.
In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion, 56 it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for third
party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it
cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The GSIS admitted in its answer that it was the
insurer of the MMTC for third party liability with respect to MMTC Bus No. 27 to the extent of
P50,000.00. 57 Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option either to claim the said amount from the GSIS
and the balance of the award from MMTC and Musa or to enforce the entire judgment against the latter,
subject to reimbursement from the former to the extent of the insurance coverage. 58
One last word. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City erred in holding MMTC primarily and Musa
secondarily liable for damages arising from the death of Liza Rosalie. It was error for the appellate court
to affirm this aspect of the trial court's decision.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of
Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not make
the employee's liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by the
common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. 59 Hence, the spouses Rosales
have the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.
From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that "the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary." We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday  60 that "the registered owner/operator
of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicle."
In Baliwag Transit Inc. v. Court of Appeals 61 it was held that "to escape solidary liability for a quasi-
delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such
degree of care." Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals  62 that "the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising
from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED
holding the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and Pedro Musa jointly and severally liable for the death
of Liza Rosalie R. Rosales and ORDERING them as such to pay to the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and
Lily R. Rosales the following amounts:
1) death indemnity in the amount of fifty-thousand pesos (P50,000,00);
2) actual damages in the amount of sixty thousand two hundred twenty six pesos and sixty five centavos
(P60,226.65);
3) moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
4) exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00);
5) attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of three hundred twenty-one thousand eight
hundred seventy pesos and twelve centavos (P321,870.12); and
7) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was bitten by
a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys
sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was
reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the
respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in
the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She
was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after
nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August
15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found that the
Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of
the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog
bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were
ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for
medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog
left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for
the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What
must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs
thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it
was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She said
that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the other") and
maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she
did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one
time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did not pay
any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did
not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders than
relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It also appears
that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said
house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically
declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a
dog.10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were
maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied paying the water bills for the
house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection
with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in
question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the
house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house
even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred.
It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness
there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites
for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is
established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and
then the father, because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give the child water and this
child went under the bed, she did not like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this
reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?
A: Yes, sir. 18
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and bacterial means. ...
It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which can lower your resistance
you can also get pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as CURRENT DIANOSIS
& TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your
attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as
a result of rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days
as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a positive diagnosis of rabies or
after a bite by a suspected animal if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give
rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory failure which leave in
the form of bronco-pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun
Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of
death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to
convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of
the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that,
as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.
As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time
she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original
posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals
for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the
medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint.
While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost,
their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED,
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Mediald
G.R. No. 164012              June 8, 2007
FLORDELIZA MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her natural mother
and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner asks this Court to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated November 17, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69037. The appellate court found petitioner, as employer of Lomer
Macasasa, liable for damages.
The facts are as follows:
At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon
Avenue in Quezon City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was
thrown five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact.
Gerard Villaspin, one of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but
after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus
brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died. Subsequently, the Quezon City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
against Macasasa.3
On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Soriano’s wife and daughter,
respectively, filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the
registered owner of the vehicle. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. C-18038 in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121. Respondents prayed that Macasasa and petitioner be ordered
to pay them: ₱200,000 moral damages; ₱500,000 for lost income; ₱22,250 for funeral services; ₱45,000
for burial lot; ₱15,150 for interment and lapida; ₱8,066 for hospitalization, other medical and
transportation expenses; ₱28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; ₱50,000 exemplary damages;
₱60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death; and ₱25,000 for attorney’s fees plus ₱500 per court appearance. 4
In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable since as owner of the vehicle, she
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was dismissed.
After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against petitioner. 5 It found Soriano negligent for
crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in the island’s fencing rather than the pedestrian
overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and supervision of
Macasasa since complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of petitioner’s
negligence.6
Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED, and another one is hereby rendered
ordering [petitioner] Flordeliza Mendoza to pay [respondents] Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano the
following amounts:
1. Hospital and Burial Expenses ₱80,926.25
2. Loss of earning capacity ₱77,000.00
3. Moral Damages ₱20,000.00
4. Indemnity for the death of Sonny Soriano ₱50,000.00
Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should, however, be reduced by twenty (20%) per cent
due to the presence of contributory negligence by the victim as provided for in Article 2179 of the Civil
Code.
SO ORDERED.7
While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent for
speeding, such that he was unable to avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Soriano’s own negligence
did not preclude recovery of damages from Macasasa’s negligence. It further held that since petitioner
failed to present evidence to the contrary, and conformably with Article 2180 8 of the Civil Code, the
presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and supervision of employees stood.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution 9 dated May 24,
2004.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE TOTAL AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
II.
[COROLLARILY], THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS [HAS] NO
BASIS IN LAW.10
The issues are simple: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the case? and (2) Was
there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court. She posits that to determine the jurisdictional amount, what should only be considered are
the following: ₱22,250 for funeral services; ₱45,000 for burial lot; ₱15,150 for interment and lapida;
₱8,066 for hospitalization and transportation; ₱28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; and ₱60,000
indemnity for Soriano’s death. She maintains that the sum of these amounts, ₱179,006, is below the
jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the following claims of respondents must be excluded: ₱200,000 moral
damages, ₱500,000 for lost income; ₱50,000 exemplary damages; ₱25,000 attorney’s fees plus ₱500 per
court appearance. Petitioner thus prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the
dismissal of the case by the trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 11 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states the pertinent
law.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00).
But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-9412 expressly states:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Underscoring supplied.)
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and effectively actions for the
recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious acts. 13 In this case, respondents’ claim of
₱929,006 in damages and ₱25,000 attorney’s fees plus ₱500 per court appearance represents the
monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the principal reliefs
sought by respondents in their complaint for damages. 14 Consequently then, we hold that the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case. 15
Petitioner further argues that since respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint against Macasasa,
there is no longer any basis to find her liable. She claims that "no iota of evidence" was presented in this
case to prove Macasasa’s negligence, and besides, respondents can recover damages in the criminal case
against him.
Respondents counter that as Macasasa’s employer, petitioner was presumed negligent in selecting and
supervising Macasasa after he was found negligent by the Court of Appeals.
The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. 16 Both the trial and the
appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding. 17 The records show also that Soriano was thrown five
meters away after he was hit.18 Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of
impact.19
Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding.
Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section
55,20 Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring
Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no showing of
any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s wrath. What remains undisputed is that he
did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article 2185 21 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating traffic regulations.
While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could
become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable
for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. 22 We must emphasize that this damage
suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as
driver and employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the
employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by
Macasasa.23 Respondents could recover directly from petitioner24 since petitioner failed to prove that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa. 25 Indeed, it is unfortunate
that petitioner harbored the notion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the case
and opted not to present her evidence on this point.
Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory
negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note
that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by
20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction 26 of the amount earlier awarded,
based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated
November 17, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69037.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23052           January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down
town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he
stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the
manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood
flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from
an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial
court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at
the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the
Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack
Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights
of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation
for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because
of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends.
During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his
minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated
himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain
Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a
catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same
was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported
missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of
the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered
between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged
with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report
is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to,
either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that
because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was
rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said
iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout
of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and
openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to
time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned
decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the
City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a
special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as
its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said
Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of
the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident
involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been
negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the
City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City.
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were
and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them
by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time,
in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore,
a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first
time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established
to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of
Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement,
and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other
public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to
provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all
structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to  provide
for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the
streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the
authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other
amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and
locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and
locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any
such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to
persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under
their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order
No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or
appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities
in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113
merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and
appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be
accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of
the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings
of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City
of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 174161               February 18, 2015
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LUISITO G. YU, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84175.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a
passenger bus in front of Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed
by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical City Hospital where
she was pronounced dead on arrival.3
On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased, respondent Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against petitioner R Transport, Antonio
Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC denied its
liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the incident, the actual
owner, being petitioner R Transport.4 It explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase Program of
the government, MMTC merely purchased the subject bus, among several others, for resale to petitioner
R Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro Manila. Since it was not actually
operating the bus which killed respondent’s wife, nor was it the employer of the driver thereof, MMTC
alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed. 5 For its part, petitioner R Transport alleged that
respondent had no cause of action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses are in good condition. Meanwhile, the driver
Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his failure to file an answer to the complaint.
After trial on the merits, wherein the parties presented their respective witnesses and documentary
evidence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that petitioner R Transport
failed to prove that it exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver, who, by its negligence, ran over the deceased resulting in her death. It also held
that MMTC should be held solidarily liable with petitioner R Transport because it would unduly
prejudice a third person who is a victim of a tort to look beyond the certificate of registration and prove
who the actual owner is in order to enforce a right of action. Thus, the trial court ordered the payment of
damages in its Decision6 dated June 3, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Rizal
Transport and Metro Manila Transport Corporation to be primarily and solidarily liable and defendant
Antonio Parraba Gimena subsidiarily liable to plaintiff Luisito Yu as follows: 1. Actual damages in the
amount of Php78,357.00 subject to interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
2. Loss of income in the amount of Php500,000.00;
3. Moral damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00;
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00;
5. Attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and
6. Costs of suit.7
On September 9, 2005, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC with modification that defendant
Antonio Gimena is made solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent. According to the
appellate court, considering that the negligence of Antonio Gimena was sufficiently proven by the
records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to support its
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for the damage caused. The CA noted that the fact that petitioner is not the
registered owner of the bus which caused the death of the victim does not exculpate it from
liability.8 Thereafter, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was further denied by the CA in its
Resolution9 dated August 8, 2006.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner essentially invokes the following ground to support its petition:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE
OF ITS EMPLOYEE, WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner insists that the CA and the RTC were incorrect in ruling that its driver was negligent for aside
from the mere speculations and uncorroborated testimonies of the police officers on duty at the time of
the accident, no other evidence had been adduced to prove that its driver was driving in a reckless and
imprudent manner. It asserts that contrary to the findings of the courts below, the bus from which the
victim alighted is actually the proximate cause of the victim’s death for having unloaded its passengers
on the lane where the subject bus was traversing. Moreover, petitioner reiterates its argument that since it
is not the registered owner of the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage
caused by the same.
We disagree.
Time and again, it has been ruled that whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which this
Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.10 This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties,
particularly where the findings of both the trial and the appellate courts on the matter of petitioners’
negligence coincide. As a general rule, therefore, the resolution off actual issues is a function of the trial
court, whose findings on these matters are binding on this Court, more so where these have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 11 save for the following exceptional and meritorious circumstances:
(1) when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the
findings of the trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) when the
lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) when
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of the appellate court
go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (6) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (7) when the findings of fact
are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the
specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted
by evidence on record.12
After a review of the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to reverse the rulings of the courts
below for none of the aforementioned exceptions are present herein. Both the trial and appellate courts
found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the victim and ruled that his negligence was
the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been defined as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." 13 Verily, foreseeability is the
fundamental test of negligence.14 It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.15
In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a reckless speed. As testified by
the police officer on duty at the time of the incident 16 and indicated in the Autopsy Report,17 not only
were the deceased’s clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and
spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared to believe petitioner’s contention that its bus was
travelling at a "normal speed" in preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained by the
deceased. Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was hit and run over further indicates Gimena’s
negligence. As borne by the records, the bus driven by Gimena bumped the deceased in a loading and
unloading area of a commercial center. The fact that he was approaching such a busy part of EDSA
should have already cautioned the driver of the bus. In fact, upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his
lane should have signalled him to step on his brakes to slow down for the possibility that said bus was
unloading its passengers in the area. Unfortunately, he did not take the necessary precaution and instead,
drove on and bumped the deceased despite being aware that he was traversing a commercial center
where pedestrians were crossing the street. Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a
reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
Under Article 218018 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the employee
is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or
supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its employee,
it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate and convincing
proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees.19
Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any proof showing the exercise by
petitioner of the required diligence. As aptly observed by the CA, no evidence of whatever nature was
ever presented depicting petitioner’s due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Gimena,
despite several opportunities to do so. In fact, in its petition, apart from denying the negligence of its
employee and imputing the same to the bus from which the victim alighted, petitioner merely reiterates
its argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be
held liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere was it even remotely alleged that petitioner had
exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. Because of this failure,
petitioner cannot now avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its negligent employee.
At this point, it must be noted that petitioner, in its relentless attempt to evade liability, cites our rulings
in Vargas v. Langcay20 and Tamayo v. Aquino21 insisting that it should not be held solidarily liable with
MMTC for it is not the registered owner of the bus which killed the deceased. However, this Court, in
Jereos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,22 rejected such contention in the following wise:
Finally, the petitioner, citing the case of Vargas vs. Langcay, contends that it is the registered owner of
the vehicle, rather than the actual owner, who must be jointly and severally liable with the driver of the
passenger vehicle for damages incurred by third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained
in the operation of said vehicle.
The contention is devoid of merit. While the Court therein ruled that the registered owner or operator of
a passenger vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the said vehicle for damages incurred
by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the said
vehicle, the Court did so to correct the erroneous findings of the Court of Appeals that the liability of the
registered owner or operator of a passenger vehicle is merely subsidiary, as contemplated in Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. In no case did the Court exempt the actual owner of the passenger vehicle from
liability. On the contrary, it adhered to the rule followed in the cases of Erezo vs. Jepte, Tamayo vs.
Aquino, and De Peralta vs. Mangusang, among others, that the registered owner or operator has the right
to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for
the injury caused.
The right to be indemnified being recognized, recovery by the registered owner or operator may be made
in any form-either by a cross-claim, third-party complaint, or an independent action. The result is the
same.23
Moreover, while We held in Tamayo that the responsibility of the registered owner and actual operator
of a truck which caused the death of its passenger is not solidary, We noted therein that the same is due
to the fact that the action instituted was one for breach of contract, to wit:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it holds that inasmuch as the third-party
defendant had used the truck on a route not covered by the registered owner's franchise, both the
registered owner and the actual owner and operator should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should
be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. This Article is as follows:
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.1âwphi1 But the action instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of contract, for failure of
the defendant to carry safely the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made
responsible, i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict. As
the registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict;
their responsibility is not solidary as held by the Court of Appeals.
The question that poses, therefore, is how should the holder of the certificate of public convenience,
Tamayo, participate with his transferee, operator Rayos, in the damages recoverable by the heirs of the
deceased passenger, if their liability is not that of Joint tortfeasors in accordance with Article 2194 of the
Civil Code. The following considerations must be borne in mind in determining this question. As
Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public orto any passenger riding in
the vehicle or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte,
supra, as quoted above. But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the
one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn be made responsible to the
registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without
transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as
agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for any damages
that he may cause the latter by his negligence.24
However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage, as in
Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict under Article 2176, 25 in relation to Article 218026 of the New Civil
Code. As such, the liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a pre-
existing contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage caused by the
negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its
solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and
primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 27
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the public for
both the owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the
driver.28 As aptly stated by the appellate court, "the principle of holding the registered owner liable for
damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been transferred to another
is designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle
to take refuge in, in order to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act. " 29
Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was sufficiently proven by the records of the
case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to support its defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of Gimena, may
be held liable for damages arising from the death of respondent Yu's wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution,
dated September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84175 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.