Epza VS CHR

Facts:
in May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General
Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided
into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate,
Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to
depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed
quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in the
respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice
and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the
complaint.
According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified
complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th
PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to
stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of
the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group
who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"
On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area
were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine National Police and some
government officials and their civilian followers.
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor
Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until
further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a
dialogue (Annex A).
On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the
area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents,
and fired a shot in the air.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of
May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their
subordinates.
Issue: CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human
rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?
Held:  "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the
victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2,
Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose
In  Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs.  Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held
that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, 

Embassy Farms Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 80682, August 13, 1990.
J. Paras

FACTS

1. Sometime on August 2, 1984, Alexander G. Asuncion (AGA) and Eduardo B. Evangelista (EBE) entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement.
a. EBE obligated himself to transfer to AGA 19 parcels of agri land with an aggregate area of 104,447sq
meters in Bulacan, together with the stocks, equipment and facilities of a piggery farm owned by Embassy
Farms, a registered corp wherein 90% of its shares of stocks is owned by EBE.
b. EBE also obligated himself to cede, transfer and convey “in a manner absolute and irrevocable any and all
of his shares of stocks” in Embassy Farms to AGA or his nominees until it shall constitute 90% of the paid-
in-equity of said corporation.
c. EBE obligated himself to turnover to AGA the effective control and management of the piggery upon
signing of the agreement.
d. AGA obligated himself, upon signing of the agreement to pay to EBE the total sum of close to P8,63,000.
e. AGA obligated himself to organize and register a new corporation with an authorized capital stock of
P10M which upon registration will take over the rights and liabilities of AGA.
2. Pursuant to clause 8 of MOA, EBE turned over to AGA the effective control and management of the piggery at
Embassy Farms.
3. In accordance with clause 15 of MOA, EBE served as President and Chief Executive of Embassy Farms. He
endorsed in blank all his shares of stock. However, despite the indorsement, EBE retained possession of said
shares and opted to deliver to AGA only upon full compliance of the latter of his obligation under MOA.
4. Notwithstanding the non-delivery of shares of stocks, AGA transferred a total of 8,602 shares to several persons.
5. For failure to comply with his obligations, EBE intimated the institution of legal action but was pre-empted by
AGA by filing an action for rescission of the MOA with damages.
a. AGA alleged that EBE misrepresented the piggery business since it is actually losing and EBE’s failure to
execute the deeds of conveyance of the 19 parcels of land.
6. Pasig Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction by AGA. On EBE’s motion, it issued an order to break open
the premises of Embassy Farms to enforce the writ of PI.
7. Embassy Farms filed a pet. w/ CA for prohibition with PI. It also instituted an action for Injunction w/ damages
against EBE alleging that EBE forced his way inside the Embassy Farms and while inside took some cash and
check.
8. MTD filed by EBE was denied.
9. Fifth Division of CA sustained the order of Pasig Court based on the findings that:
a. BODs of Embassy are nominees of AGA so that it considered AGA and Embassy Farms as one and the
same person.
b. It noted that EBE has not delivered the certificate of stock outstanding in his name in the books of the corp
to AGA because AGA has not complied with the terms and conditions of MOA.
c. it will appear that no transfer of shares of stock has been made by EBE to AGA as there had been no
delivery of cert. in order to produce or effect the transfer if such shares of stock.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error when it sustained the order dated of the Pasig Court
and lifted the restraining order it had issued.

HELD
NO. It must be stressed that the case at bar is merely an offshoot of a controversy yet to be decided on the merits by
the Pasig Court. The action for rescission filed by AGA will ultimately settle the controversy as to whether it is AGA or
EBE who have reneged on their obligations under MOA.

From the pleadings submitted, it is clear that although EBE has indorsed in blank the shares outstanding in his name
he has not delivered the cert of stocks to AGA because the latter has not fully complied with his obligations under
MOA. There being no delivery of the indorsed shares of stock, AGA cannot therefore effectively transfer to other
person or his nominees the undelivered shares of stocks. For an effective transfer of shares of stock the mode and
manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be followed. Under Corp Code, Sec. 3, shares of stock may be
transferred by delivery to the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed.

In the case at bar

The certificate of stock was not actually delivered to AGA so that EBE is still the controlling stockholder of Embassy
Farms despite the execution of MOA and the turnover of control and management of Embassy Farms.

Rescission filed by AGA

It merely restored and established status quo prior to the execution of MOA. It would be unjust and unfair to allow
AGA and his nominees to control and manage the Embassy Farms despite the fact that AGA who is the source of
their supposed shares of stock in the corp is not asking for the delivery of the indorsed cert of stock but for the
rescission of the MOA. Rescission would result to mutual restitution.

Not intra-corporate controversy

The conflict here is between AGA and EBE arising from a contract denominated as MOA. The controversy in reality
involves the contractual rights and obligations of AGA and EBE under the MOA and not to the enforcement of rights
and obligations under corp code or internal or corporate affairs. AGA or his nominees are not even the lawful
stockholders of Embassy Farms because EBE for a justifiable reason has withheld the delivery of the indorsed
certificate of stocks.

Petition is denied.
Traders Royal Bank vs. IAC

the Traders Royal Bank (Traders) seeks to nullify the decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court ordering the
dismissal of the collection case against the National Media Production Center (NMPC) and the Production
Specialists, Inc. (PSI) insofar as the NMPC is concerned, and the release of the garnishment on the moneys of the
NMPC as well as any attachment of its properties.

On April 9, 1981, Traders, a banking institution operating under Philippine laws, entered into a loan agreement with
the NMPC, a government instrumentality tasked with the function of disseminating government information, programs
and policies, represented by Director Gregorio S. Cendaña, and the PSI, a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws, represented by its president, Romeo G. Jalosjos. 2

Under the loan agreement, Traders approved a credit accommodation in the amount of two million five hundred
twenty thousand pesos (P2,520,000) in favor of NMPC and PSI through a domestic stand-by letter of credit to
guarantee payment of the coverage or broadcast rights for the 1981 season of the Philippine Basketball Association
(PBA). Among the conditions imposed were that NMPC and PSI would deposit with Traders all collections obtained
from the sponsoring companies and that during the term of said letter of credit they would maintain in their current
account with the bank a balance of at least P500,000 or 20% of the face value of the letter of credit. 3

As of July 27, 1981, the PBA had actually drawn against said letter of credit the total amount of P340,000. Inasmuch
as NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on their obligation nor did they comply with the conditions aforecited,
Traders filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a complaint against NMPC and PSI to collect the
whole amount of P2,520,000 (Civil Case No. 9303-P). Alleging therein that the defendants were selling or disposing
of substantial portions of their assets. Traders prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 4 The lower
court issued the writ prayed for 5 after Traders filed a bond of P2,520,000.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Pursuant to said writ, the deputy sheriff of Rizal collected an aggregate amount of P1,046,816.75 from the PSI whose
president, Jalosjos, thereafter requested Traders through a letter that said amount be considered as partial payment
of defendants’ principal obligation, interest and attorney’s fees. Traders acceded to the request and through a
manifestation, prayed the court to issue an order in the tenor of Jalosjos’ request. 6 Said prayer was granted by the
lower court. 7

A few months later, the NMPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction as the NMPC, being an entity under the Office of the President performing governmental
functions, cannot be sued without its consent 8

On September 21, 1982, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the strength of the ruling in Harry Lyons,
Inc. v. The United States of America 9 that the state may be sued without its consent if it entered into a contract with
a private person. In its answer to the complaint, NMPC reiterated its contention that it was immune from suit and
alleged that the claim should have been filed with the Commission on Audit pursuant to Article XII, D, Section 2(1) of
the 1973 Constitution and Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines). It filed a cross-claim against PSI alleging that it merely acted as a guarantor of PSI in the loan
agreement considering that it had appointed PSI as production manager and exclusive marketing manager for the
1979, 1980 and 1981 PBA seasons.

ADERS ROYAL BANK V IAC

G.R. No. 66321
FACTS
-
On March 18, 1983, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed a case against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc
before the RTC Pasay for the recover of the sum of P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of preliminary
attachment directed against the assets and properties of Remco. Pursuant to the writ of attachment,
Deputy Sheriff Santiago levied among others about 4,600 barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within
the premises of Remco. A third party claim was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent La
Tondeña, Inc claiming ownership over said attached property, claiming ownership over said property.
-La Tondeña also filed a complaint in intervention alleging among others that it had made advances to
Remco which totaled P3m and which remains outstanding as of date. Subsequently, La Tondeña, without
the foregoing complaint in intervention having passed upon by RTC filed a motion to withdraw praying that
it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from Remco and which motion was granted.
-The foregoing order was however reconsidered by the PAsay Court by virtue of its order declaring that the
alcohol which has not been withdrawn remains in the ownership of Remco. A motion for reconsideration of
the said order was filed by La Tondeña. It also prayed that the portion of the order declaring Remco to be
the owner of the subject alcohol be reconsidered and striken off said order. This motion has not been
resolved when a manifestation that it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration was filed by La
Tondeña
-La Tondeña then instituted before RTC Bulacan in which it asserted its claim of ownership over the
properties attached and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction. A motion to dismiss (for the application for P.I.) was filed by petitioner. La Tondeña filed
opposition to the MTD. Subsequently, the questioned order was issued by the respondent Judge declaring
La Tondeña to be the owner of the disputed alcohol and granting the latter’s application for injunctive relief
(Sheriff Evangelista issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction. Pasay Court also issued an
order requiring Deputy Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued by
said court, by preventing respondeng sheriff and LA Tondeña from withdrawing or removing the disputed
alcohol from the Remco ageing warehouse at Calumpit and requiring respondents to explain and show
cause why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing or removing said attached alcohol
belonging to Remco, from the latter’s ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan
ADERS ROYAL BANK V IAC
G.R. No. 66321
FACTS
-
On March 18, 1983, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed a case against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc
before the RTC Pasay for the recover of the sum of P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of preliminary
attachment directed against the assets and properties of Remco. Pursuant to the writ of attachment,
Deputy Sheriff Santiago levied among others about 4,600 barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within
the premises of Remco. A third party claim was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent La
Tondeña, Inc claiming ownership over said attached property, claiming ownership over said property.
-La Tondeña also filed a complaint in intervention alleging among others that it had made advances to
Remco which totaled P3m and which remains outstanding as of date. Subsequently, La Tondeña, without
the foregoing complaint in intervention having passed upon by RTC filed a motion to withdraw praying that
it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from Remco and which motion was granted.
-The foregoing order was however reconsidered by the PAsay Court by virtue of its order declaring that the
alcohol which has not been withdrawn remains in the ownership of Remco. A motion for reconsideration of
the said order was filed by La Tondeña. It also prayed that the portion of the order declaring Remco to be
the owner of the subject alcohol be reconsidered and striken off said order. This motion has not been
resolved when a manifestation that it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration was filed by La
Tondeña
-La Tondeña then instituted before RTC Bulacan in which it asserted its claim of ownership over the
properties attached and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction. A motion to dismiss (for the application for P.I.) was filed by petitioner. La Tondeña filed
opposition to the MTD. Subsequently, the questioned order was issued by the respondent Judge declaring
La Tondeña to be the owner of the disputed alcohol and granting the latter’s application for injunctive relief
(Sheriff Evangelista issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction. Pasay Court also issued an
order requiring Deputy Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued by
said court, by preventing respondeng sheriff and LA Tondeña from withdrawing or removing the disputed
alcohol from the Remco ageing warehouse at Calumpit and requiring respondents to explain and show
cause why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing or removing said attached alcohol
belonging to Remco, from the latter’s ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan
ADERS ROYAL BANK V IAC
G.R. No. 66321
FACTS
-
On March 18, 1983, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed a case against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc
before the RTC Pasay for the recover of the sum of P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of preliminary
attachment directed against the assets and properties of Remco. Pursuant to the writ of attachment,
Deputy Sheriff Santiago levied among others about 4,600 barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within
the premises of Remco. A third party claim was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent La
Tondeña, Inc claiming ownership over said attached property, claiming ownership over said property.
-La Tondeña also filed a complaint in intervention alleging among others that it had made advances to
Remco which totaled P3m and which remains outstanding as of date. Subsequently, La Tondeña, without
the foregoing complaint in intervention having passed upon by RTC filed a motion to withdraw praying that
it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from Remco and which motion was granted.
-The foregoing order was however reconsidered by the PAsay Court by virtue of its order declaring that the
alcohol which has not been withdrawn remains in the ownership of Remco. A motion for reconsideration of
the said order was filed by La Tondeña. It also prayed that the portion of the order declaring Remco to be
the owner of the subject alcohol be reconsidered and striken off said order. This motion has not been
resolved when a manifestation that it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration was filed by La
Tondeña
-La Tondeña then instituted before RTC Bulacan in which it asserted its claim of ownership over the
properties attached and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction. A motion to dismiss (for the application for P.I.) was filed by petitioner. La Tondeña filed
opposition to the MTD. Subsequently, the questioned order was issued by the respondent Judge declaring
La Tondeña to be the owner of the disputed alcohol and granting the latter’s application for injunctive relief
(Sheriff Evangelista issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction. Pasay Court also issued an
order requiring Deputy Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued by
said court, by preventing respondeng sheriff and LA Tondeña from withdrawing or removing the disputed
alcohol from the Remco ageing warehouse at Calumpit and requiring respondents to explain and show
cause why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing or removing said attached alcohol
belonging to Remco, from the latter’s ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan
Traders Royal Bank vs. IAC
Traders Royal Bank instituted a suit against the Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc. REMCO before the Regional Trial
Court for the recovery of the sum of Two Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Eight &
71/100 Pesos (P2,382,258.71) obtaining therein a writ of pre attachment directed against the assets and properties of
Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.
Pursuant to said writ of attachment issued, Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago levied among others about 4,600
barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found within the premises of said Remco Distillery Inc. A third party claim was filed
with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent La Tondeña, Inc. on April 1, 1982 claiming ownership over said
attached property (Complaint, p. 17, Rollo).On May 12, 1982, private respondent La Tondeña, Inc. filed a complaint-
in- intervention in said Civil Case, alleging among others, that 'it had made advances to Remco Distillery Inc. which
totalled P3M and which remains outstanding as of date' and that the 'attached properties are owned by La Tondeña,
Inc
Subsequently, private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., without the foregoing complaint-in- intervention having been
passed upon by the Regional Trial filed in Civil Case No. 9894-P a "Motion to Withdraw" dated October 8, 1983,
praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from the Remco Distillery and which motion was granted
per order of the Pasay Court dated January 27, 1983, authorizing respondent La Tondeña, Inc. to withdraw alcohol
and molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant at Calumpit,
The foregoing order dated January 27, 1983 was however reconsidered by the Pasay Court by virtue of its order
dated February 18, 1983 declaring that the alcohol "which has not been withdrawn remains in the ownership of
defendant Remco Alcohol Distillery Corporation" and which order likewise denied La Tondeña's motion to intervene.
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order of February 18, 1983 was filed by respondent La Tondeña, Inc.,
on March 8, 1983 reiterating its request for leave to withdraw alcohol from the Remco Distillery Plant, and praying
further that the "portion of the order dated February 18, 1983" declaring Remco to be the owner of subject alcohol,
"be reconsidered and striken off said order". This motion has not been resolved up to July 18, 1983 when a
manifestation that it was withdrawing its motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent La Tondeña Inc.
On July 19, 1983, private respondent La Tondeña Inc. instituted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX, Malolos,
Bulacan presided over by Respondent Judge, Civil Case No. 7003-M, in which it asserted its claim of ownership over
the properties attached in Civil Case, and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction
Petitioner contends that respondent Judge of the Regional T- trial Court of Bulacan acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining Civil Case No. 7003-M, in authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction, which enjoined the sheriff of Pasay City from interferring with La Tondeña's right to enter and withdraw the
barrels of alcohol and molasses from Remco's ageing warehouse and from conducting the sale thereof, said
merchandise having been previously levied upon pursuant to the attachment writ issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City in Civil Case No. 9894-P. It is submitted that such order of the Bulacan Court constitutes undue and
illegal interference with the exercise by the Pasay Court of its coordinate and co-equal authority on matters properly
brought before it.
Issue: Whether RTC has authority to issue, at the instance of a third-party claimant, an injunction enjoining the sale of
property previously levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by another Regional Trial Court.

Held: yes.
Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in
cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process
of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court . 2 The
purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a
harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.
It is further argued that since private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., had voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the Pasay Court by filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 9894-P, the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a
bar to the present action filed before the Bulacan Court.
We cannot sustain the petitioner's view. Suffice it to state that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring an
independent suit. 3 The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a
subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from
the order denying his original third-party claim.4
In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, 
It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the property attached is
appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the
sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing
it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary,
to release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over an
interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or
protect the parties' interests. This is self-evident.

Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos

Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit, docketed as civil case No. 11531, against Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro
Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper
published in Manila, asking damages aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the plaintiff secured a writ of
preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond, and the Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment
upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record.

Thereafter the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with the sheriff separate third-party claims,
alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. Whereupon, the sheriff required of Quirino a counterbond
of P41,500 to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and another bond of P59,500 to meet the
claim of Printers, Inc. These amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court,
were reduced by the court to P11,000 and P10,000 respectively.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash the attachment, on October 7, 1950, the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc.
and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety & Insurance Co. Inc., in which
the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above
mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as civil case No. 12263.

Whereas case No. 11531 was being handled by Judge Sanchez or pending in the branch of the Court presided by
him, case No. 12263 fell in the branch of Judge Pecson. On the same date, in virtue of an ex parte motion in case
No. 12263 by the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc., and Printers, Inc., Judge Pecson issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to the sheriff directing him to desist from proceeding with the attachment of the said properties.
After the issuance of that preliminary injunction, Antonio Quirino filed an ex parte petition for its dissolution, and
Judge Simeon Ramos, to whom case No. 12263 had in the meanwhile been transferred, granted the petition on a
bond of P21,000. However Judge Ramos soon set aside the order just mentioned on a motion for reconsideration by
the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc. and set the matter for hearing for October 14, then continued
to October 16.

Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit memoranda on the question
whether "the subject matter of civil case No. 12263 should be ventilated in an independent action or by means of a
complaint in intervention in civil case No. 11531." Memoranda having been filed, His Honor declared that the suit, in
case No. 12263, was 'unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila
Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531.

Ruling:little reflection should disabuse the mind from the assumption that an independent action creates a multiplicity
of suits. There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit where the attachment was levied are different
from the parties in the new action, and so are the issues in the two cases entirely different. In the circumstances,
separate action might, indeed, be the more convenient of the two competing modes of redress, in that intervention is
more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the parties in the case for debt or damages with which the
third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy
which is the underlying objective of the rules of pleading and practice. That is why intervention is subject to the court’s
discretion.

The same reasons which impelled us to decide the second question, just discussed, urge us to take cognizance of
and express an opinion on the third.

The objection that at once suggests itself to entertaining in Case No. 12263 the motion to discharge the preliminary
attachment levied in case No. 11531 is that by so doing one judge would interfere with another judge’s actuations.
The objection is superficial and will not bear analysis.

It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the property attached is
appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the
sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing
it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary,
to release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over an
interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or
protect the parties’ interests. This is self-evident.

The fault with the respondent’s argument is that it assumes that the Sheriff is holding the property in question by
order of the court handling the case for libel. In reality this is true only to a limited extent. That court did not direct the
sheriff to attach the particular property in dispute. The order was for the sheriff to attach Borres’ Padilla’s and Pastor’s
property. He was not supposed to touch any property other than that of these defendants’, and if he did, he acted
beyond the limits of his authority and upon his personal responsibility.

It is true of course that property in custody of the law can not be interfered with without the permission of the proper
court, and property legally attached is property in custodia legis. But for the reason just stated, this rule is confined to
cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interest. When the
sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger’s property, the rule does not apply and interference
with his custody is not interference with another court’s order of attachment.

It may be argued that the third-party claim may be unfounded; but so may it be meritorious, for that matter.
Speculations are however beside the point. The title is the very issue in the case for the recovery to property or the
dissolution of the attachment, and pending final decision, the court may enter any interlocutory order calculated to
preserve the property in litigation and protect the parties’ rights and interests.

None of what has been said is to be construed as implying that setting aside of the attachment prayed for by the
plaintiffs in Case No. 12263 should be granted. The preceding discussion is intended merely to point out that the
court has jurisdiction to act in the premises, not the way the jurisdiction should be exercised. The granting or denial,
as the case may be, of the prayer for the dissolution of the attachment would be a proper subject of a new proceeding
if the party adversely affected should be dissatisfied.

on May 24, 1972, the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga filed Civil Case No. 1291 against John Z. Sycip
(who died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs, namely: Natividad D.Sycip, Jose Sycip,
John Sycip, Jr., Alfonso Sycip II, and Rose Marie Natividad D. Sycip) for the declaration of nullity of documents and
recovery of possession of real property with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) and
damages. The subject matter of the case was Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd, the same lot being contested herein. The
trial court initially dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, but the CA set aside the order of dismissal and
remanded the case for further proceedings. After trial, wherein the court adopted the oral and documentary evidence
presented in Civil Case No. 969,5 the Court of First Instance (CFI)of South Cotabato, Branch 1, rendered its Decision
on April 22, 1981, the decretal portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff Melencio Yu, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Talinanap Matualaga (Mora) and residing in Dadiangas, Buayan, Cotabato, now General Santos City, as the
registered and absolute owner of the land in question, entitled to its possession; ordering the defendants to deliver to
him the property in question, including the Owner’s Copy of Original Certificate of Title No.(V-14496) (P-2331) P-523,
and to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred (₱1,500.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees.
Issue: won respondent CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents’ prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 38 To
justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1) the complainant has a
clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial; and
(3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.39 An injunction will not issue to
protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise since, to be protected by
injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.40 As
this Court opined in Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Juan Valdez :41

A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its
function of preserving the status quo between the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Accordingly,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.
When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper. While it is not required that the right claimed by applicant, as
basis for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the
right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.42

Thus, a preliminary mandatory injunction should only be granted "incases of extreme urgency; where the right is very
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."43
In this case, there is doubt on private respondents’ entitlement to a preliminary mandatory injunction since the
evidence presented before the respondent CA in support thereof appears to be weak and inconclusive, and the
alleged right sought to be protected is vehemently disputed. The documentary evidence presented by private
respondents does not suffice to prove their ownership and possession of the contested lot. Notably, both the
Quitclaim Deed44 allegedly executed on April 16, 1957 by the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga in favor
of Alfonso Aguinaldo Non and the Transfer of Free Patent Rights45 allegedly executed on May 28, 1957 by Melencio
Yu in favor of Concepcion Non Andres were among those documents already declared null and void by the trial court
in Civil Case No.1291 on the grounds that: (a) the spouses never received any consideration for said conveyances;
(b) the documents were falsified; (c) the instruments were not approved by the Provincial Governor or his duly-
authorized representative pursuant to Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu; (d) all transactions were restricted by the law governing free patent; and (e) Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd is a
paraphernal property of Talinanap Matualaga and was sold without her consent.46 The trial court’s decision was
affirmed in Heirs of John Z.Sycip v. Court of Appeals,47 wherein this Court ratiocionated:

Brocka vs. Enrile

This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to
permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against
petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.).On
learning that the corresponding informations for this offense had been filed by the City Fiscal against them on
February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding
Judge,[1] and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and
the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their arraignment.Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had
ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic (p.
396, Rollo).We shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to
Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and
violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization (ACTO
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each.Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was
ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention,
respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985
Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo).The
original informations filed recommended no bail

Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on
one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike.They maintain that while there may
be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two
offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.  issue here is the
legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters
of defense against the sedition charge.

We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by Injunction, preliminary or
final.There are however so exceptions, among which are:
"a.To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.  Albano, et al., L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
(Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.  Albano, supra;  Fortun  vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May
27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c.When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e.Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f.When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang  vs. People and  Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g.Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616);
"h.Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia  vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25,
1960);
"i.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.  Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953],
cited in  Roa vs.  Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al, vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April
4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
"j.When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied (Salonga  vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7.Preliminary Injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners (Rodriguez vs.  Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953)." (cited in  Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p.
188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had
become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before their
release on orders of then Pres. Marcos).This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only
on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release).Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be
invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila) (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748,
October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349).Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder,
p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office.In fact they found petitioner's plight
"deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's
bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be
furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official
custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however,
believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional rights, such as due
process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.

Meralco vs. Del Rosario

One Doroteo Jose, a resident of the city of Manila, had a contract with the Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company, by virtue of which Jose received, and the Light Company furnished electricity for lighting purposes for
several years. The Light Company suspected Jose of unlawfully appropriating electric current, by the use of a device
whereby the meter installed in Jose's residence failed to register all the current used by him. A criminal complaint
charging Jose with this offense, was dismissed, and Jose acquitted of the offense with which he was charged.
Thereafter the Light Company presented a bill to Jose for the amount which it claimed he was indebted to it on
account of the electricity which it alleged in the criminal complaint had been unlawfully appropriated by him, and upon
Jose's refusal to pay the bill, the company cut the wire connecting Jose's residence with its power house, and refused
thereafter to furnish electric current to Jose, unless and until its claim for current which it alleges was unlawfully
appropriated by him is paid.

Thereupon Jose filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for a writ of mandamus to compel
the Light Company to furnish him with electricity under his contract with the company, and under the rules,
regulations, ordinances and laws under and by virtue of which the Light Company is operating in the city of Manila;
and produced, ex parte, the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction directing the Light Company to continue
furnishing electricity to Jose upon the terms and conditions set forth in the complaint, pending the final determination
of the mandamus proceedings.

The Light Company is now before us, praying that a writ of certiorari issue to the judge of the court below who
granted the preliminary mandatory injunction, on the ground that in doing so he exceeded his jurisdiction, or rather
that he was without jurisdiction to issue an injunction of this nature.
Counsel for the Light Company bases his contentions in this court strictly on his proposition that the Courts of First
Instance in these Islands are wholly without jurisdiction to issue preliminary mandatory injunctions under any
circumstances whatever; and in open court he waived all objections based on other alleged defects and informalities
in the proceedings had in the court below.

Counsel's contention appears to be that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the issue of
preliminary injunctions do not contemplate the granting of preliminary mandatory injunctions, and that in the absence
of express statutory authority the courts of these Islands have no jurisdiction to issue such injunctions.

Ruling:this contention cannot be maintained. Modeled as are our courts and indeed our whole judicial system upon
Anglo-American precedents, we are of opinion that the power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and
mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these
Islands as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction both legal and equitable. To secure the rights
of the litigants in actions pending in these courts it may, and often does become necessary to preserve the status quo
of the parties or of the subject matter in litigation. To this end the power to grant preliminary injunctions, where no
other adequate remedy is provided in the ordinary course of law, is an important and, if complete justice is to be done
between the parties, a necessary incident of the general jurisdiction conferred upon these courts. Of course, in so far
as the statute limits or prescribes the exercise of this power it must be followed; but beyond this, and in cases not
covered or contemplated by the statute, our courts must exercise their jurisdiction in the issuance of preliminary
injunctions upon sound principles applicable to the circumstances of each particular case, having in mind the nature
of the remedy, and the doctrine established in the courts upon which our judicial system is based.

Section 55 of Act No. 136, in express terms confers upon Courts of First Instance the jurisdiction to grant writs of
injunction generally, but prescribes that they shall be issued in the "manner" provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The "method" of obtaining preliminary injunctions generally is set forth in section 166 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure; and while there is ground for the contention that the legislator in prescribing that method had in mind the
granting of preliminary preventative injunctions only, we think that it provides at the same time the "manner" in which
preliminary mandatory injunctions should be obtained. As we have said already, the power to issue injunctions
generally, including, as we hold, mandatory as well as preventive injunctions, is not only a logical and essential
incident of the general and unlimited equitable and legal jurisdiction conferred upon Courts of First Instance, but is
expressly conferred upon them under the provisions of section 55 of Act No. 136, with the single proviso, that this
jurisdiction is to be exercised in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It follows that whether or not the
code in express terms provides the manner for the issuance of a particular class of injunctions, jurisdiction to issue
such injunctions must be maintained, if the manner in which such injunctions may be issued can fairly be inferred
from the general provisions of the code, or from its provisions for the issuance of injunctions generally.
It may be admitted that since an injunction mandatory in its nature usually tends to do more than to maintain
the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing: on the other hand, in
cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly
in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by
the defendant, than to establish a new relation, we hold that the jurisdiction to grant such injunctions undoubtedly
exists; and while caution must be exercised in their issuance, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he
makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.
We agree with counsel for petitioner that a mandatory preliminary injunction should not issue where mandamus
proceedings in themselves furnish an adequate remedy, or indeed in any case where adequate relief for the
threatened injury will be furnished by an action at law or where adequate means a redress are in the hands of the
complainant without the need for its issuance. But cases do and will arise wherein no adequate remedy exists other
than the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, and we think the case at bar furnishes an excellent