001 LAO HU NIU v.

INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (Yap) ISSUE/s:

March 14, 1917 | Moreland, J. | Arts. 774-776 1. Whether Hu Niu and her children have the right to enter the Philippines as a
merchant and successor to her husband – NO, because she must first establish
PETITIONER: Lao Hu Niu her right as a merchant in the first instance. Her relationship to a deceased
RESPONDENTS: The Insular Collector of Customs resident Chinese merchant is of no moment.

SUMMARY: Hu Niu was the wife of a resident Chinese merchant in the
Philippines. Before Hu Niu and her children attempted to enter the Philippines,
her husband here already died and left property including the mercantile business.
The Board of Special Inquiry denied their entry on the ground that they are not
resident Chinese merchants. The CFI of Manila affirmed.
The issue is whether Hu Niu, as the widow and successor of a resident Chinese
merchant, has the right to enter the Philippine Islands with her children.
The SC ruled in the negative. First, the doctrine in the case of Ng Hian v. Collector
of Customs still holds – the widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese
merchant resident and doing business in the Philippine Islands at the time of his
death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such
relationship. Second, the fact remains that Hu Niu is not a resident merchant, and
it was not inherited from her deceased husband. She is still outside the Philippine
Islands and has never held such status as resident merchant. She must first
establish such right to enter as a merchant by presenting the section six certificate
which is the only evidence upon which her right to enter can be based. She must
produce the evidence which the law requires to establish that status.
DOCTRINE: The widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese merchant
resident and doing business in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death are
not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such relationship.
• They did not inherit the status of being a resident merchant from the
deceased husband/father.
RULING: Judgment in question is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The doctrine in the case of Ng Hian v. Collector of Customs still holds – the
widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese merchant resident and
doing business in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death are not
entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such relationship.
2. It appears simply that her husband was, at the time of his death, a resident
Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine Islands, and that he died
leaving property including a mercantile business.
3. The assumption of Hu Niu is that the mere fact of the death of a merchant
makes his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to them as heirs and
next of kin a mercantile business as a part of their inheritance.
a. The fact remains that Hu Niu is not a resident merchant. She is still
outside the Philippine Islands and has never held such status as
resident merchant.
b. She must first establish such right to enter as a merchant by
presenting the section six certificate which is the only evidence
upon which her right to enter can be based. She must produce the
evidence which the law requires to establish that status.

FACTS:
1. Lao Hu Niu is the wife of a former resident Chinese merchant in the
Philippines.
2. Prior to Hu Niu’s attempt to enter the Philippines, her husband died in the
Philippines and left property including the mercantile business.
3. The Board of Special Inquiry refused to allow the entry of Hu Niu and her
children on the ground that the Court had already ruled in Ng Hian v.
Collector of Customs that the widow and minor children of a deceased
Chinese merchant resident and doing business in the Philippine Islands at the
time of his death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by
reason of such relationship.
a. CFI of Manila affirmed.
b. Hence, this petition.
 DKC HOLDINGS v. CA (VILLAVICENCIO)
April 5, 2000 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest
PETITIONER: DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III
SUMMARY: Encarnacion Bartolome owned a parcel of land in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. DKC Holdings entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with
Encarnacion, whereby DKC was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the
subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted
from the signing of the Contract. DKC paid P3,000.00 a month as consideration for
the reservation of its option.When Bartolome died, DKC paid Victor Bartolome
instead as Encarnacion’s sole heir. However, Victor refused such. Victor executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion, including
the subject lot. DKC sent a notice of exercising the option mto lease and tendering
the rental amount which were refused by Victor. DKC also opened a savings account
in Victor’s name. DKC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Victor and the Register of Deeds, prayed for the surrender and delivery of
possession of the subject land in accordance, the title for registration, and annotation.
WoN not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late
Encarnacion Bartolome with DKC was terminated upon her death or whether it binds
her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. – It binds Victor as her sole heir because
heirs, as the general rule, are bound by the contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest.
DOCTRINE: "ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise
of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion,
integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a
personal nature, and terminates on the death of the party who is required to render
such service."
FACTS:
1. The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located
in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private
respondent Victor U. Bartolome’s deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome.
2. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of DKC Holdings and, as
such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site.
3. On March 16, 1988, DKC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby DKC was given the option to
lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised
within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract.
4. In turn, DKC paid P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of
its option.
5. Thereafter, DKC coursed its payment to Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir
of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments
6. Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of
Encarnacion, including the subject lot.
7. On March 14, 1990, DKC served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that
it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of
P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused.
8. DKC opened Savings Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1 with the China Banking
Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome and deposited
therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as P6,000.00 reservation
fees for the months of February and March.
9. DKC also tried to register and annotate the Contract on the title of Victor to
the property.
10. DKC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor
and the Register of Deeds, prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession
of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of
title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment
of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorneys fees.
11. A Motion for Intervention with Motion to Dismiss was filed by one Andres
Lanozo, who claimed that he was and has been a tenant-tiller of the subject
property, which was agricultural riceland, for forty-five years
12. lower court issued an Order denying the Motion to Intervene, holding that
Lanozos rights may well be ventilated in another proceeding in due time.
13. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered DKC to pay Victor 30,000 as
attorney’s fees.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late
Encarnacion Bartolome with DKC was terminated upon her death or whether
it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. – It binds Victor as her
sole heir because heirs, as the general rule, are bound by the contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40849 and that
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela in Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 are both SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering private respondent Victor Bartolome to:
(a) surrender and deliver possession of that parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-14249 by way of lease to petitioner and to perform all
obligations of his predecessor-in-interest, Encarnacion Bartolome, under the subject
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy;
 8. Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore,
(b) surrender and deliver his copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 to Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
respondent Register of Deeds for registration and annotation thereon of the subject 9. The case also mentioned that Victor properly exercised the option to lease the
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy; property by paying the rental fees, sending the letter of intent to Victor, etc.

(c) pay costs of suit.

Respondent Register of Deeds is, accordingly, ordered to register and annotate the
subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy at the back of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. V-14249 upon submission by petitioner of a copy thereof to his office.

RATIO:
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows-

1. "ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the
decedent.
2. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into
by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations
arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or
(3) provision of law.
3. In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision
making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their
nature, transmissible.
4. Arturo Tolentitno says that, "Among contracts which are intransmissible are
those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases
of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising
therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the
obligor”
5. In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the
exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience,
judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both
parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death of
the party who is required to render such service."
6. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well
be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that
performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the
contract or excuse nonperformance.
7. In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion
Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver
possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter
of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor.
 HEIRS OF YPON v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS (VICENCIO)
July 8, 2013 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Arts. 774-776, NCC
PETITIONER/S: Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon
RESPONDENT/S: Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. “Guadioso E. Ypon”, and the
Register of Deeds of Toledo City
SUMMARY: The Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Title and Reconveyance with Damages against Gaudioso Ypon, alleging that
Gaudioso was claiming to be the sole heir of the supposedly childless deceased
Magdaleno Ypon; that on this pretense, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, causing the transfer of the certificates of title of the lots left by
Magdaleno to him, to the prejudice of the Heirs who are the collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest. Gaudioso answered that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno,
and as a defense, claimed that the Heirs had no cause of action against him, as they
are not the real parties-in-interest, as they were never judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs. The RTC dismissed the case, agreeing that the complaint
did fail to state a cause of action against Gaudicio. The issue in this case is WoN the
the RTC’s dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was proper –
YES.
The complaint cannot prosper as the Heirs raised issues of heirship which cannot be
treshed out in an ordinary suit such as this one. For the same reason, the RTC’s
pronouncement on Gaudioso’s heirship is also devoid of any effect. (See Doctrine
hereon). Although this general rule admits of exceptions, such as practicality
purposes (See Ratio No. 11), such exceptions are not present in the case at bar.
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence dictates that matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
FACTS:
1. The Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon (Heirs), together with some of their cousins,
filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte, a.k.a. “Gaudioso
E. Ypon” (Gaudioso).
2. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno), died
intestate and childless, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J,
which were covered by TCTs.
3. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of th certificates of title,
leading to their transfer in his name, to the prejudice of the Heirs who are
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
4. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.
5. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioner Heirs
have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause
of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as
there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
6. The RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the case, finding that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudicio.
a. While the Heirs had established their relationship with Magdaleno
in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
b. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that
he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through
the documentary evidence he submitted.
7. The MR of the Heirs was denied, due to counsel’s failure to state the date on
which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certfiicate of Compliance
was issued. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaitn
failed to state a cause of action was proper – YES, Gaudioso’s heirship shoud
be threshed out in a proper special proceeding, not in an ordinary RTC case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to
determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
RATIO:
10. A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for.
11. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the
defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
12. As stated in the subject complaint, petitioner Heirs, who were among the
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno, and
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled.
13. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently
warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding (See next number hereon) precludes the
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from
granting the same.
14. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court partly provides: If there is a 24. The RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should be
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
person or as the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. effect.
15. In Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA: The Court held that the determination of
who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case.
16. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
17. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
18. In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes: the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights.
19. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
recovery of property.
20. By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding
for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when:
a. the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, OR
b. when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
21. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,
appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
22. Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether
the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.
23. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of the Civil Case was altogether proper.
 004 IN RE RODRIGUEZ v. RODRIGUEZ (VARGAS) 2. On the other hand, Anita is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name
January 31, 2018 | Tijam, J. | Rule 73, Section 1 of Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo in BPI. When Reynaldo died, said account
continued to be in active status.
3. BPI informed Anita that her joint account with Reynaldo would become
PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Reynaldo De Guzman; Anita
dormant if no transaction would be made. Thereafter, Anita decided to
Ong Tan
withdraw her funds. However, BPI required the extrajudicial settlement of
RESPONDENTS: Rolando C. Rodriguez, Racquel R. Gegajo, Rosalinda R. Landon,
the heirs of Reynaldo.
Reynaldo C. Rodriguez, Jr., Ester R. Fulgencio, Rafael C. Rodriguez, and Reynest C.
4. Respondent heirs refused to sign as they believed that the funds in the said
Rodriguez
account belonged to their father. Respondent heirs instead submitted
SUMMARY: Reynaldo and Ester died leaving their children as their heirs. In Feb
documents to BPI for the release of half of the funds.
2009, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo
5. BPI withheld the release of the funds due to the conflicting claims between
and Ester. Anita, on the other hand, is a co-depositor in a BPI Joint Account under the
Anita and the respondent heirs.
name of Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo Rodriguez. When Reynaldo died, said account
6. Anita filed before the RTC a petition for the settlement of the Intestate Estate
remained in active status. For fear of having the account declared as dormant, Anita
of the late Reynaldo and the issuance of letters of administration to any
decided to withdraw the funds thereof. The heirs claimed that the said funds belonged
competent neutral willing person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo.
to their father and asked for the release of half the funds. BPI however withheld the
Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI Joint Account were her
release of the said funds due to the conflicting claims between Anita and the
exclusive funds which came from her East West Bank Account. To prove her
respondent heirs. Anita filed before the RTC a petition for the settlement of the
claim, she presented as evidence a Debit Memo from East West which was
Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo and the issuance of letters of administration to
the exact amount deposited to the BPI Joint Account. Anita also presented
any competent neutral willing person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo. Anita
the testimony of the Branch Manager of East West to corroborate her
proved ownership over the said funds by showing a debit memo from her East West
testimony that the subject amount came from her East West Account.
Bank Account which amounts to the exact amount deposited to the BPI Joint Account.
7. RTC ruled in favor of Anita saying that she sufficiently adduced evidence to
RTC ruled in favor of Anita saying she sufficiently adduced evidence. CA reversed
rebut the presumption that the funds deposited under the BPI Joint Account
the RTC saying that Anita failed to prove that she is the sole owner of the funds
of Anita and Reynaldo were owned by them in common.
therein. The SC in this case ruled that Anita is the sole owner of the funds. In relation
8. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA maintained that the presumption
to our topic, the issue in this case is WON the intestate court properly exercised its
of co-ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts was not sufficiently
power of adjudication when it ruled out the inclusion of the BPI Joint Account in the
overturned, as Anita failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the
Intestate Estate of the decedent. The SC said YES. The determination of whether or
funds therein.
not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise
ISSUE:
of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land
1. WON the CA erred in declaring Anita and Reynaldo as co-owners of the
registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a
subject bank deposits despite the evidence submitted by Anita to prove
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
otherwise – YES. Anita is the sole owner of the funds in question.
DOCTRINE: While the probate court exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle
2. WON there exists a survivorship agreement between the co-depositors –
questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having legal
NO. There exists no survivorship agreement between Anita and
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
Reynaldo. Hence, it is but rightful to determine their respective shares
question to the probate court for adjudgment. Such waiver was evident from the fact
based on evidence presented during trial.
that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the court a quo as they
3. WON the intestate court properly exercised its power of adjudication
claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the exclusion
when it ruled out the inclusion of the BPI Joint Account in the estate of
of his co-depositor. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction
the decedent – YES. The determination of whether or not a particular matter
is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land
FACTS: registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a
1. Reynaldo and Ester died in 2008 and 2004 respectively leaving their procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
children, respondents hereof, as their heirs [RESPONDENT HEIRS]. In Feb. waived."
2009, respondent heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester. Decision dated June 13, 2016 and Resolution dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105665 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question
the Order dated March 13, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
74 is REINSTATED. 9. Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate
court exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to
RATIO: ownership when the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
1. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to
or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint the probate court for adjudgment.
owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be 10. Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. relief before the court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint
2. While the rule is that the shares of the owners of the joint account holders are equal, account of their father to the exclusion of his co-depositor.
the same may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. Hence, the mere fact that 11. In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the
an account is joint is not conclusive of the fact that the owners thereof have equal intestate court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While
claims over the funds in question. respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the
3. In line with this, it is also indispensable to consider whether or not there exists a allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative relief from the
survivorship agreement between the co-depositors. In said agreement, the co- intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of
depositors agree that upon the death of either of them, the share pertaining to the ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in
deceased shall accrue to the surviving co-depositor or he can withdraw the entire fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the
deposit. inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents
4. It must be noted that there exists no survivorship agreement between Anita and impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as
Reynaldo. Hence, it is but rightful to determine their respective shares based on an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the
evidence presented during trial. exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but
5. On this note, the Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita procedural; hence, waivable.
sufficiently proved that she owns the funds in the BPI joint account exclusively.
The exact amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account was
the exact amount used to open the BPI joint account. Notable is the fact that
these transactions occurred within the same day. It is also significant to consider
that no further transaction in said joint account was made after the same was
opened until the death of Reynaldo.
6. The Court also takes note of the fact that respondents admitted that they knew the
existence of the joint account, yet they still failed to include the same in the list of
included properties in the inventory when they executed an extrajudicial settlement.
Their failure to include said joint account in the list of the items owned by Reynaldo
for the purposes of determining his estate obviously refutes their claim that
Reynaldo was the sole owner of the funds in said joint account.
7. Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate court is
limited, it is equally important to consider the call of the exercise of its power of
adjudication especially so when the case calls for the same. The facts obtaining in
this case call for the determination of the ownership of the funds contained in the
BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has already been
extrajudicially settled by his heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised sound
judiciousness when it ruled out the inclusion of the BPI joint account in the
estate of the decedent.
8. Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration,
 005 Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang-Garcia (Valle)
9 June 2014 | Villarama Jr., J. | Rights of Succession only upon Death
PETITIONER: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang
RESPONDENTS: Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora calalang-sabile, and Carlito
S. Calalang
SUMMARY:
Two families are disputing over the ownership of a parcel of land. The first family
from the first marriage (Calalang-Garcia) and the second family (Calalang-
Parulan) share the same father, Pedro Calalang. According to Calalang-Garcia, the
land originated from their maternal grandmother who gave the land to their
mother. When the mother died, they believe that they should have inherited the
land alongside their father. But despite enjoying the possession of the land, the
spouses of the first marriage were unable to register the same in their name. When
the first spouse died, Pedro Calalang remarried. Then the said land was sold to
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. This is where the dispute started. The Calalang-Garcias
claim that the land is theirs because Pedro Calalang had no right to sell their pro-
indivisio share of the property and that the sale was absolutely simulated. The
Calalang-Parulans claim that the land was acquired during the second marriage
and thus part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. The trial court
declared that the land was jointly acquired during the first marriage. The CA, on
the other hand, said that Pedro Calalang was sole and exclusive owner of the
land and that by alienating the land to Nora B. Calalang, he deprived his heirs
of their right to succession.
The issue in this case is whether or not the property belonged to Calalang-Parulan.
The SC held that it does belong to Calalang-Parulan. The Calalang-Garcias were
unable to prove through documentary evidence that the land did indeed belong to
the maternal grandparents. All they presented were their testimonies. The SC also
held that the CA was wrong when it said that the heirs of Pedro Calalang were
deprived of their rights when the land was alienated to Nora.
At the time of the sale, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon
the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convicning evidence that the
sale was fraudulent or not supported by consideration, Calalang-Garcia has no
right to question the sale.
DOCTRINE:
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death.
Art 777 of the NCC provides that “the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.
FACTS:
4. The respondents (Calalang-Garcia) asserted their ownership over a certain
parcel of land agains petitioners (Calalang-Parulan) in a complaint for
Annulment of sale and reconveyance of property in RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.
5. The land has an area of 1266 square meters situated in brgy. Burol 2nd,
Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. This lot was allehgedly
acquired by Calalang-Garcia from their mother through succession since they
were the compulsory heirs.
6. According to Calalang-Garcia, their father (Pedro Calalang) contracted two
marriages. The first was with their mother. During this marriage, their parents
acquired the said land from their maternal grandmother. (Grandmother ->
mother-> to Calalang-Garcia). Despite enjpying the possession of the land,
the parents forgot to register the same. The first marriage was dissolved on
the death of the mother.
7. The father then entered into a second marriage with Elvira B Calalang who
then gave birth to Calalang-Parulan. According to Calalang-Garcia, it was
only during this time that their father filed an application for free patent obver
the land. The father committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and
exclusibe ownership over the land, concealing the fact that he had three
children with the first spouse. As a result, the Register of Deeds issued Oct
in favor of the father only.
8. Then the father sold the parcel of land to Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale. So the Register of Deeds cancelled the Oct and issued TCT in
the name of Calalang-Parulan. Then later on, the father died.
9. Calalang-Garcia now assails the validity of the TCT on two grounds:
a. The sale of the land was void because the father failed to obtain the
consent of the respondents who were co-owners of the land. As
compulsory heirs, they claimed that they acquired successional
rights over the land. So in alienating the land without their consent,
tthey were allegedly deprived of their pro-indivisio share in the
property.
b. They claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Calalang-
Parulan didn’t have the capacity to pay for the consideration.
10. Calalang-Parulan argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the
second marriage. They stressed that the OCT itself stated that it was issued
in the name of “Pedro Calalang married to Elvira Berba Calalang.” Thus the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses of the second
marriage.
a. They also denied the allegation that the sale was a simulation.
Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the
sale. Theya lleged that Calalang-Garcia did not have a valid cause
of action since they were already barred by laches, estoppel, and
prescription.
11. The trial court declared that the land was jointly acquired by the spouses of
the first marriage from the maternal grandmother. Thus, part of the conjugal
property of the first marriage. When it was dissolved, the shares of the
property were acquired by the heirs.
a. The trial court divided equally the land. It ordered all of Pedro’s
share to ve given to Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale.
 Because of the attendance of fraud and misrepresentation in
applying for the free patent, the father was considered as trustee of
an implied trust.
12. Calalang-Parulan appealed to the CA which modified the decision. It held
that the father was the sole and exclusive owner of the land. It also held that
the heirs of Pedro Calalang were deprived of their respective shares over
the property for alienating the land to Calalang-Parulan.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN the land belonged to Calalang-Parulan – YES, because Calalang-Garcia
was unable to prove trhough documentary evidence the ownership of their
maternal grandparents.
11. It is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang, the father, that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro
indivisio shares to his whole estate.
12. At the time of the sale, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convicning evidence
that the sale was fraudulent or not supported by consideration, Calalang-
Garcia has no right to question the sale.

RULING: WHEREFORE Petition for Certiorari is Granted.

RATIO:
4. The court sustains the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and
exclusive owner of the property.
5. Calalang-Garcia was able to estabnlish that the lot originated from the parents
of the spouse of the first marriage and terhefore the property either became
property of the spouse of the first marriage alone or joint with Pedro Calalang.
6. However, a close perusal of the records show that the records are bereft of
any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to
Calalang-Garcia’s maternal grand[arents. The evidence adduced merely
consisted of testimonial evidence such as declaration of Rosario Calalang-
Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember
and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her
maternal grandparents. She was unable to produce any document issued in
the name of either of her parents.
7. The court also noted that the free patent was issued more than 30 years after
the death of the first wife and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains of the first marriage.
8. As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang, had the right to convey his
property in favor of Calalang-Parulan by executing a deed of sale. The CA
therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their
respective shares over the property when the property was alienated.
9. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of
death. Art 777 of the NCC provides that “the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
10. The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic
in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the
capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art.
1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908),
and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly,
the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and
outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after
that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948)
 006 ENDAYA v. VILLAOS (CHIQUI)
January 27, 2016 | Del Castillo, J. | Successional Rights > Unregistered Deed of Sale
PETITIONER: Gina Endaya
RESPONDENTS: Ernesto V. Villaos
SUMMARY: Endaya and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of deeds of sale and recovery of titles concerning 8 parcels of
land against Villaos. Endaya argues that Atilano’s signature was forged and the deed
could not have been executed without the latter’s consent. On the other hand, Villaos
cannot take possession of the land so he filed an ejectment case with preliminary
mandatory injunction. MTCC, RTC, and CA all ruled in favor of Villaos.
Furthermore, the pendency of the nullity of deeds case cannot be considered as litis
pendentia because the parties’ rights and reliefs differ. Endaya, in their appeal, argued
that their succession rights are more superior than the supposed deeds of sale. W/N
MTCC and RTC erred in ruling that Villaos had better right of possession against the
successional rights of the Atilano heirs – YES, as opposed to an unregistered deed of
sale, a Torrens Certificate of Title deserves more probative value. SC cited the case
of Co v. Militar which said that the TCT is indefeasible and binding upon the whole
world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. While
Villaos has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land, these deeds were
not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner and seller Atilano. When
he died, title passed to Endaya and, who is his illegitimate child.
DOCTRINE: Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
FACTS:
1. Gina Endaya and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos filed before the RTC, of
Palawan a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of
titles, and accounting of income of the Palawan Village Hotel against Ernesto
Villaos. Civil Case No. 4162 sought the recovery of several lots, including
that on which the PVH and Wooden Summer Homes are located. The
complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the affected lots, from
Atilano to Villaos, was spurious.
2. Subsequently, Villaos filed an ejectment case with preliminary mandatory
injunction against Endaya and Leny Rivera before MTCC of Puerto Princesa
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1940.
3. According to Villaos, he bought from Atilano eight (8) parcels of land,
including those where PVH and WSH stood. Villaos then took possession of
the lots and started to manage and operate the said hotels. Upon taking
possession of the said lots, he told Endaya and the others who live in
residential houses in the lots in question, to vacate the premises, giving them
a period of six (6) months to do so.
4. However, instead of leaving, Endaya even participated in a violent and
unlawful take-over of portions of PVH and WSH, thus, the filing of the
ejectment case.
5. Denying that Atilano, during his lifetime, had executed deeds of sale
involving the subject lots in favor of Villaos, Endaya stated that during the
alleged execution of said deeds, Atilano was no longer ambulatory and could
no longer talk and give assent to the deeds of sale. She added that Atilano, an
educated and successful businessman, could have affixed his [signature] to
the documents and not merely put his thumbmark on it. She claims that the
deeds of sale were forged and could not have been executed with Atilano's
consent.
6. Also, the deeds of sale could not have been properly notarized because the
same were notarized in Palawan at a time when Atilano was purportedly
confined at a hospital in Quezon City. Finally, Endaya questioned the
propriety of the ejectment case since according to her, they already have filed
Civil Case No. 4162 precisely to nullify the deeds of sale.
7. MTCC ruled that Villaos had the right to the possession of the residential
house subject of the instant case and ordered Endaya to vacate the same and
pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
8. RTC promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the MTCC, holding that
the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 could not be considered as ground for
the dismissal of the present ejectment case under the principle of litis
pendentia because the parties therein assert contrasting rights and prayed for
different reliefs. It further ruled that the MTCC simply took cognizance of
the existence of the deeds of sale in favor of respondent without passing
judgment as to whether these deeds were valid or not.
9. CA denied the petition and said that MTCC was correct in refusing to dismiss
the ejectment case despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 which is an
action for declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale in another court. The case
then pending before the MTCC was concerned only with the issue of
possession, or to be exact, who between petitioner and respondent had the
better right to possess the properties in question. Villaos has in his favor the
deeds of sale which are notarized documents and hence, enjoy the
presumption of regularity.
10. Endaya, in their appeal, argued that MTCC and RTC erred when they decided
that Villaos had the better right of possession based on the supposed deeds of
sale in disregard of the successional rights of the Atilano heirs.
ISSUE/s:
2. W/N MTCC and RTC erred in ruling that Villaos had better right of
possession against the successional rights of the Atilano heirs – YES, as
opposed to an unregistered deed of sale, a Torrens Certificate of Title
deserves more probative value.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 2, 2012
Decision and June 11, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
110427 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1940 for ejectment is
ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the legal principle
that in resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered
owner of the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered
deed of sale. In Co v. Militar,
a. It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and
binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and
decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate
of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial
Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
b. As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of
the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership.
c. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System was adopted in
this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure
to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.
d. NOTE: SC cited cases that also mentioned Co v. Militar. All of these
cases said that a TCT will always prevail over unregistered deeds of
sale.
2. While Villaos has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land,
these deeds were not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the
owner and seller Atilano. When he died, title passed to Endaya and, who
is his illegitimate child. This relationship does not appear to be contested by
Villaos — in these proceedings, at least.
3. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Thus, applying
the principle enunciated in the above-cited cases, Endaya and her co-heirs
should have been favored on the question of possession, being heirs who
succeeded the registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the
MTCC, RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor of Villaos.
4. Besides, if there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the execution of
the judgment in the unlawful detainer case would result in the demolition of
the premises such that the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust
and probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case should at least be
suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in the
more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.
 7 DIONISIO v. DIONISIO (TIMBOL)
December 22, 1923 | Ostrand, J. | Art. 788-795
PETITIONER: In re probate of the will of Josefa Dionisio. Teofila Dionisio
RESPONDENTS: Angela Dionisio
SUMMARY: Angela filed an opposition with regard to the probate of the will of
Josefa Dionisio. According to Angela, the will was (1) not executed in the proper
form; (2) Josefa was of unsound mind; and (3) the signatures were forged.
The SC held that as to the (1) the document was not validly executed, because it does
not state the number of sheets or pages and that the testatrix signed every page. The
attestation clause was already executed in Tagalog, which was thereafter translated
by the official interpreter of the CFI of Manila; Angela, also submits her own
translation. And the SC held that the translation of the official translator is in
conformity with the idiomatic usage of the Tagalog tongue, and therefore, satisfy the
requirements needed under Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
Act No. 2645. As to (2) there was no evidence to prove that Josefa was of unsound
mind at the time of execution. And as to (3) the Court held that the discrepancies
with Josefa’s signature and the specimen was due to the differences in her physical
condition, since at the time of execution, she was extremely feeble and practically a
paralytic.
DOCTRINE: [NOTE: Most relevant from the range of provisions]
Article 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case
of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred. (n)
Article 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary & grammatical
sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, & that
other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will
was drawn solely by the testator, & that he was unacquainted with such technical
sense. (675a)
[NOTE: Based on Kat Gaw but not covered by the syllabus]
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval. (n)
[NOTE: THIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE WHOLE CASE; so you can opt to read
the original J]
FACTS:
8. The petition of the probate of the document was opposed by Angela Dionisio,
a niece of the deceased (Josefa Dionisio), on the grounds
a. That the document has not been executed in the form required by
law for a valid will;
b. That at the time of its execution the deceased was mentally
incapacitated; and
c. That the alleged signatures of the deceased to the document are
forgeries
9. According to Angela, as to (i) the will does not state the number of sheets or
pages used in the document, nor the fact that the testatrix signed every page
thereof, and as such is invalid under Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 2645, which states:
a. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator
and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesss in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
b. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, on the left margin and said pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet.
c. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, int eh presence of three
witntesses, and the latter witnesses and signed the will and all pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and each other
10. The challenged clause is executed in Tagalog:
TAGALOG TRANSALATED BY ANGELA’S
CFI Manila CONTENTION
Kaming nakalagda sa Nosotros los abajo Nosotros, los abajo
ibaba nito ay firmaments firmados, certificamos
pinagtototohanan atestiguamos que la que la testadora Josefa
naming na ang testadora, Josefa Dionisio esta en su
testadora na si G. Dionisio, este en su sano juicio y declare
Josefa Dionisio ay buen juicio y declare que la escritura
nasa kaniyang que el document arriba preinserta es su ultima
mahusay na kaisipan, escrito es su ultima voluntad y testament y
at isinaysay na ang disposicion y testament afirmo en presencia de
kasulatang nasa itaas y ella lo firmo en la nosotros tres al pie del
nito ay siya niyang presencia de nosotro mismo y en los
huling kalooban at tres al pie del margenes de cada dos
 testament at pumurma document y en los paginas, y nosotros 26. Without entering into an extended discussion of the evidence, it is sufficient
sa harap naming tatlo margenes de las dos tambien firmamos al to say that, in our opinion, it amply supports the finding of the court below
sa ibaba ng kasulatan paginas y tambien pie de esta clasula y en that the signatures in question are genuine.
at sa mga guilid ng firmanos a cada margen de dos 27. We share with the trial judge his distrust of the testimony of the “expert”
bawat dalawang continuacion y en los paginas en presencia Pedro Serrano Laktaw, and we are also of the opinion that such minor
pagina, at lumagda margenes de las do de la testadora y cada differences as there are between the disputed signatures and the admitted
naman kami sa ibaba paginas en la presencia uno de todos nosotros. signatures of the deceased are due to differences in her physical condition
nito at sa bawat guilid de la testadora y en la 28. At the time the will was executed she was extremely feeble and practically a
ng dalawang pagina presencia de cada uno paralytic, a fact which naturally would affect the appearance of her
sa harap ng testadora, y todos nostros. handwriting
at bawat isa sa aming
lahat.
11. Basicially, if the CFI version is correct, thenthe attestation clause does state
the number of pages used and also the fact that the testatrix signed all of the
pages
a. If, on the other hand, the version given by Angela is correct, the
meaning would, at least, be obscure and the clause would hardly
meet the requirements of the law.

ISSUE/s:
3. WoN the attestation clause is defective – NO
4. WoN the deceased was of unsound mind when she signed the will – NO
5. WoN the signatures were forgeries - NO

RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against

appellant. So ordered.1

RATIO:

The will is valid and is not defective

25. Several members of the court, who possess a knowledge of the Tagalog
language, have examined the two transalations and are of the opinion tha the
one made by the official translator is correct and in conformity with the
idiomatic usage of the Tagalog tounge; that anyone familiar with the
language, reading the Tagalog version of the clause in question, would
understand it in the sense given it by the official translator; and that the literal
trnsalation furnished by the appellant, while word for word correct, is not
idiomatic.

Josefa of sound mind

1. There is practically no evidence tending to show that Josefa Dionisio was of
unsound mind, at the time of the execution of the alleged will.

There were no forgeries

 008 IN RE WILL OF RIOSA (TAN)
Nov. 7, ’18 | Malcolm, J. | The Date at the Time of Execution Governs
PETITIONER: Marcelino Casas (Case didn’t mention how he is related to Jose
Riosa)
SUMMARY: Jose Riosa executed a will in January 1908 and he died on April 17,
1917. The will was executed in accordance with the prevailing law at the time, Sec.
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, before he died, Act. No. 2645 was
passed on July 1, 1916, amended sec. 618. Jose Riosa was not able to follow the
amended formalities in accordance with the new law. Because of this, the CFI
disallowed the will of Jose Riosa for probate proceedings. The Court said that the
law that governs is the law at the time of the execution of the will, not the law in
effect at the time of the testator’s death. There is a presumption that everyone
should know the law, but also, that no new law would affect his past act. It is true
that the will does not take effect until the testator’s death but the act of
bequeathing/devising, takes place when the will is executed, even if it takes effect
at a future time.
DOCTRINE: The SC said that the first theory is fallacious because the act of
bequeathing/devising is something more than just an inchoate/ambulatory right. It
becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to law,
although it does not take effect on the property until a future. Therefore, the will is
valid.
FACTS:
1. Jose Riosa executed a will in January 1908 and he died on April 17, 1917.
2. The will was executed in accordance with the prevailing law at the time, Sec.
6181 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. However, before he died, Act. No. 26452 was passed on July 1, 1916,
amended sec. 618. Jose Riosa was not able to follow the amended formalities
in accordance with the new law (check bold text in the footnotes for the
additional requirements not complied with).
1
Sec. 618. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible e witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will
or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each
other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven
that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
2
SEC. 618. Requisites of will· No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in
4. Because of this, the CFI disallowed the will of Jose Riosa for probate
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the law at the time of execution of the will governs or the law at the time
of death? The law at the time of execution.
RULING: The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of
December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record
shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate,
without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
RATIO:
1. The SC had already decided before that a will made after Act No. 2645 must
comply with the additional requirements; and that a will made by a person
whose death happened before Act. No. 2645 need not comply with the
requirements.
2. However, this case presents a new question – what law governs if a will was
made before Act No. 2645 but the person died after the law was enacted?
3. The Court gives three possible theories/schools of thought.
4. THEORY 1: Statutes in force at the testator’s death are controlling, and that
a will not executed in conformity with them are invalid, even if it was valid
at the time it was made.
a. The reasoning for this theory is that until the death of the testator, the
paper executed by him expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere
inchoate act which may or may not be a will. Therefore, the law that
controls it is the law at the time of the testator’s death.
b. If this theory is taken by the Court, then obviously, the will of Riosa will
be declared invalid.
5. THEORY 2: The validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently
passed have no retrospective effect.
a. The Court said that this is supported by the weight of authority. The
general rule is that the law looks at the time when the will was executed,
and not the time of the testator’s death.
the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator
or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
 b. Justice Sharswood in one of his decisions, said that laws should only be
given retroactive effect only if the legislature clearly intended it to be as
such.
i. When a testator makes a will which was formally executed with the
legal requirements at that time, it would unjustly disappoint his
lawful right of disposition if a subsequent law enacted would be
apply, even if such law was passed before his death.
ii. There is a presumption that everyone should know the law, but also,
that no new law would affect his past act.
iii. It is true that the will does not take effect until the testator’s death
but the act of bequeathing/devising, takes place when the will is
executed, even if it takes effect at a future time.
6. THEORY 3: Statues relating to the execution of wills, when they increase
formalities, should not be construed to impair the validity of the will already
made, but when they lessen the formalities, they should be construed as to aid
defective wills in accordance with the effective law at the time it was
executed.
a. In short, palaging construed in favor of the testator and the will.
7. The SC said that the first theory is fallacious because the act of
bequeathing/devising is something more than just an inchoate/ambulatory
right. It becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested
according to law, although it does not take effect on the property until a
future time (aka THEORY 2). Therefore, the will is valid.
8. Again, all statutes only have retroactive effect, unless legislature itself
provides/intends it to have a retroactive effect. In case of doubt, always rule
against retroactivity. No provision or intention in favor of retroactivity was
shown here.
9. Another strong argument is that Sec. 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides in negative terms that a will shall be disallowed in five case, the first
being “if not executed and attested as in this Act provided.”
10. There may be an argument that Act. 2645 has already become a part of the
Code of Civil Procedure. However, the general principle in the law of wills
inserts itself even within the provisions of Sec. 634.
11. The statute shows a positive rule for the transference of property which
must be complied with as a completed act at the time of execution, so far
as the act of testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to
the enactment Act No. 2645 but is not effective as to testaments made prior
to it.
 009 VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ v. ABADIA (STA. MARIA)
August 9, 1954 | Montemayor, J. | Art. 795, Validity of Will as to its form
PETITIONERS-APPELLEES: SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.
OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS: MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
SUMMARY: In 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. On January 14,
1943, Father Abadia died. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. In 1946,
one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the last will, filed a petition for its probate
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit
the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court found and
declared the document to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's
death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in
force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order admitted to probate such
document, as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
appealed. The issue is WON the document can be considered as a valid Last Will
and Testament? – No. Because according to Art. 795, the validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. In the
case at bar, at the time the document was executed (1923), holographic wills were
not yet permitted and the law at that time imposed certain requirements such as
numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the
left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses. These
requirements were not complied with in the document because the back pages of the
first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and
were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the
testator.
DOCTRINE: The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate
or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of
his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the
time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a
completed act.
FACTS: (super short case)
1. On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament which was
marked “Exhibit A”. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14,
1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee.
2. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the last will, filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.
3. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that:
- in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho
wrote out in longhand Last Will and Testament in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood;
- that he (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each
of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and
numbered the same with Arabic numerals,
- and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page
- all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that
it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names
on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other.
4. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
5. The trial court found and declared “Exhibit A” to be a holographic will; that
it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case
was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to
carry out the intention of the testator which is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order admitted to probate such
document, as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
6. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions
of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. WON the document can be considered as a valid Last Will and Testament? –
No. Because according to Art. 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends
upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. In the case at
bar, at the time the document was executed (1923), holographic wills were
not yet permitted and the law at that time imposed certain requirements for
the execution of wills and such were not complied with.
RULING: In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit
"A" is denied probate. With costs.
RATIO:
2. The new Civil Code under article 810 thereof provides that a person may said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed executed according to the law in force at the time of execution.
by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. 10. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the
3. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will.
sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the 11. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure
three attesting witnesses. These requirements were not complied with in to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution
Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator. subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with
4. Interpreting and applying this requirement, this Court in the case of In re such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
Estate of Saguinsin, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the
to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said: This defect is radical and estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can
totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing not validate void wills.
authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having
been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by
the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
5. And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, referring to the same requirement, this
Court declared: From an examination of the document in question, it appears
that the left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by
Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of
each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto,
is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
6. Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity
of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
at the time it is made."
7. The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the
law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed
will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
8. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa. It is a wholesome
doctrine and should be followed.
9. Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and
that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of
the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills,
 001 Bugnao v. Ubag (Soriano)
September 18, 1909 | Carson, J. | Art. 796-803
PETITIONER: Catalina Bugnao, proponent-appellee
RESPONDENTS: Francisco Ubag, et al., contestant-appellants
SUMMARY: Domingo made a will where he bequeathed everything he owned
to his wife. His wife petitioned for probate of the will but the respondents
(Domingo’s brothers) opposed, stating that Domingo was extremely ill, that he
was unable to speak, to understand or to make himself understood, and that he was
incapacitated to make a will, and that his signature was forged and, was that at or
about the time when the alleged will was executed, the subscribing witnesses were
not in the house. The issue in this case is whether Domingo is of sound of mind
and has testamentary capacity when he executed the will. The court held that Yes.
The evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the
testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together
with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is
strong evidence of his testamentary capacity. The testator was mentally capable
of making the will was fully established by the testimony of the subscribing
witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound
mind and memory. It is true that he was extremely ill—advanced stage of
tuberculosis with severe intermittent attacks of asthma—but all this evidence of
physical weakness does not establish his mental incapacityor lack of testamentary
capacity. It is not required that a testator must posses these qualities (of sound and
disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree
DOCTRINE: Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory
which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held
that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about and how or to whom he is
disposing of his property
FACTS:
13. This case is an appeal from an order of CFI Negros Oriental, admitting to
probate document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo
Ubag(deceased). He instrument was propounded by his widow, petitioner
Bugnao, the sole beneficiary.
14. Probate was contested by respondents Ubag et al., who are brothers and
sisters of Domingo (deceased), and who would be entitled to share in the
distribution of his estate, if the probate was denied, since the deceased has no
heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
15. Respondents contend that:
a. there was no sufficient evidence to establish the execution of the
will in the manner and form prescribed in Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
b. that at the time when the alleged will was executed, the deceased
was not of sound mind and memory
c. the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will
16. The alleged last will and testament was signed by the decesedent in the
presence of 3 subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face
to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
17. 2 of the subscribing witnesses, Bingtoy and Marino, testified in support of
the will, the latter being the justice of peace of the municipality wherein it
was executed.
18. It does not appear from the record why the 3rd subscribing witness was not
called, but since the counsel of the respondents makes no comment upon its
absence, the court thinks it may safely be inferred that there was some good
and sufficient reason therefore.
19. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because of death,
sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the
witness stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the
reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of
record, and this especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a
contests.
20. The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of
the will and swore that:
a. At the time of its execution, the testator was of sound mind and
memory
b. In their presence, the testator attached his signature thereto as his
will and testament
c. That in his (descedent’s) presence and the presence of each other,
they (2 subscribing witnesses) as well as the 3rd signed the
instrument as attesting witnesses.
21. The counsel of the respondents pointed to an alleged contradiction as to a
single incident which occurred at or about th time when the will was
executed:
a. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed and
signed his name to the will, and that after its execution, his wife gave
him food.
b. While the other testified that he w as assisted into a sitting position
and was given something to eat before he signed the document
22. But, eventhough there was a memory lapse on the part of either the witnesses
as to the precise details of an unimportant incident. The court does not
consider this sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses,
or as to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of execution of
the instrument.
 23. A number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses
to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or even a single
contradiction as to a particular incident, where the incident was of such a
nature that the attention of any person who was present must have been
directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are also
clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or probability take, might well
be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the witnesses could not possibly
have been present, together, at the time when it is alleged the will was
executed
a. but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses in
the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt as to their veracity,
b. In fact, their testimony as a whole is clear and is so convincing and
altogether satisfactory that the court has no doubt that the trial judge
who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy
of entire confidence and belief
24. Meanwhile, the respondents presented 4 witnesses for the purpose of proving
that at the time when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was
executed, these witnesses were not in the house of the descedent, and that the
latter was in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for
him to make a will.
25. One of the four witnesses was Macario Ubag, the brother of the descedent.
Macario, together with a relative, swore that they were in the house of the
descedent. That the latter was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged
that the will was executed, the subscribing witnesses were not in the house,
and the descedent was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand or
to make himself understood, and that he was incapacitated to make a will,
and that the his brother’s signature was forged.
ISSUE/s:
13. Whether the testator has testemantary capacity – Yes. The evidence of the
subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description
of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that
he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit
instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity
RULING: The order probating the will should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellants.
RATIO:
14. The court finds Macario’s testimony unworthy of credence. His manifest
interest in the result of investigation clearly discloses a fixed and settled
purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregardof
the truth.
15. When an admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased was
introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will,
Macario promptly and positively swore that the admitted genuine signature
was not his brother’s signature, but this statement was later on retracted. And
admitted that even though Macario lived near by, he, neither his other
brothers and family members, visited his dying brother. With thos the court
thinks that Macario’s testimony, as well as the other witnesses presented by
respondent is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses
16. Upon the comparison of the sgnatures, the SC affirmed the decision fo the
trial judge that the prinsopal strokes in the 2 signatures are identical.
17. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will was fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore
positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and
memory. It is true that he was extremely ill—advanced stage of tuberculosis
with severe intermittent attacks of asthma—but all this evidence of physical
weakness does not establish his mental incapacity or lack of testamentary
capacity.
18. The evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the
testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken
together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the
will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition
of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity
19. Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been
held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body,
or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or
feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding
and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about and how or to
whom he is disposing of his property
20. It has not been understood that a testator must posses these qualities (of
sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree
21. "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it
arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities or
suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of
making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from
knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is
engaged in
22. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
 supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the
manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.
23. The proof of existence of all these elements is sufficient to establish the
existence of testamentary capacity.

Galvez vs. Galvez (Siapno)
December 5, 2013 | Torres, J. | Mental Capacity of Testator
PETITIONER: Santiago Galvez
RESPONDENT: Canuta Galvez
SUMMARY: Victor Galvez died. However, he left two alleged wills – one in his
provincial dialect (the second will, which corrected the first will) & one in Tagalog
(the first will), both with different sets of witnesses. Canuta, Victor’s only
daughter, claimed that Victor lacked the intellectual capacity and clear judgment
requisite for making a will. The issue is WoN Victor was of sound mind during
the execution of the will? The Court held YES, In order to hold that Victor, on
account of serious sickness, was not then of sound mind and did not have full
knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was incapable to execute a will, it is
necessary that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental
incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and judgment at the time he
executed his will in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at
the foot thereof, for the witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on
executing his will, showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual
faculties and was perfectly cognizant of his acts. It may be true that cholera
patients do become incapacitated in the manner described by the witnesses but
there may be exceptions to the general rule, and to judge from the testimony of
the witnesses who saw and communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the
time he executed his will, his physical and mental condition must have been an
exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and clear
intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the requirements of the
law. Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of
the will and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he incurred in
the execution of this first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound mind and
was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his
daughter and sole heir, Canuta. Lastly, the physician in his testimony, referred to
the effects and results of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular
course of this disease but his statements, taken in general, cannot serve as a ground
upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did not examine Victor
at the time the will was executed.
DOCTRINE: In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was not of
sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of
executing a valid will, it is indispensable that the proceedings disclose conclusive
proof of his mental incapacity and of his lack of reason and judgment at the time
he executed his will in due form.
ISSUE: WoN testator Victor was of sound mind during the execution of the will
– YES, no sufficient evidence was presented to support that conclusion
FACTS:
1. Counsel for Santiago Galvez (Santiago) petitioned the CFI of Bulacan for the
probate of the will which it was alleged Victor Galvez (Victor) executed in
the dialect of the province in presence of the witnesses Dimanlig, Leoquinco,
and Nazaria Galves. This instrument appears also to have been signed by the
witness Lorenzo Galvez. Another will was written in Tagalog and executed
on the same date by Victor Galvez in presence of the witnesses Paguia, Sison,
and Mendoza. (2 wills, one in their dialect another in Tagalog)
2. In the course of the proceedings various witnesses were examined by
Santiago and Canuta Galvez (Canuta), the only daughter of the alleged
testator, and the attorney Antonio Constantino stated that he waived the right
to present evidence and acquiesced in the petition made by Santiago for the
probate of the will, in view of a transaction entered into by the parties; but
the court did not accept the compromise, on the ground that it is improper to
hold that a will is the faithful expression of the last wishes of a decedent, upon
the mere fact of the parties’ petitioning to that effect, when such will, as in
the case at bar, was assailed at the commencement of the suit.
3. Santiago appealed. This case deals with the probate of the second will
executed by Victor, and signed in his presence by the witnesses Juan
Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no
longer able to sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at his request,
affixed his own signature to the instrument, for him and below his written
name. This will, written in Tagalog and translated into Spanish.
4. The other will, written in Tagalog and marked Exhibit A, was presented
during the proceedings; it was the first one the testator executed on the same
date, and, for the purpose of correcting an error contained in this first will, he
executed another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate.
5. Notwithstanding the opposition by Canuta who alleged that her father,
owing to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual
capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will, and
notwithstanding her testimony adduced in corroboration of her brief, the
record sufficiently proved the contrary; the subscribing witnesses to the will
affirmed under oath that they were present when Victor, then such in his
house, stated to them that the document read before them by Lorenzo Galvez
contained his last will and testament, and that, as the testator was no longer
able to sign, he charged his nephew Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which the
latter did by affixing his own signature to the document, after having written
at the foot of the same the name and surname of the testator, Victor Galvez,
who, as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties; he talked intelligently and with perfect
knowledge of what was taking place. They further testified that they all,
including the said Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the
testator, Victor Galvez, who was at the time lying on his bed.
RULING: For the foregoing reasons, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from the reading of the will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez
in so far as it denies the probate of the said will, we hereby hold that the same was signed the will in the name of the testator and that they signed it in the
duly executed by Victor Galvez and expresses his last wishes, and we affirm the rest presence of all the persons assembled in the latter’s house, the conclusion is
of the said judgment, with respect to the appointment, as administratrix, of Canuta inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing his will, did so with a sound mind
Galvez, the testator’s daughter and sole heir. and the full use of his mental faculties; therefore, the will must be admitted
to probate.
RATIO:
1. In order to hold that Victor, on account of serious sickness, was not then of
sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was
incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the proceedings disclose
conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason
and judgment at the time he executed his will in the presence of the
witnesses whose signatures appear at the foot thereof, for these witnesses
positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will, showed that he
was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was perfectly cognizant
of his acts.
2. The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects
and results of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course
of this disease; but his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present
suit, serve as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason
that he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him between
the hours of 12 in the morning and 3 in the afternoon of the 12th of
August, 1910, during which period the testator ordered his will drawn up and
the attesting witnesses signed it, Galvez having died at about 6 o’clock that
same afternoon.
3. It may be true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become
incapacitated in the manner described by the witnesses; but there may be
exceptions to the general rule, and to judge from the testimony of the
witnesses who saw and communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the
time he executed his will, his physical and mental condition must have been
an exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and
clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
4. Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of
the will and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he
incurred in the execution of this first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his
sound mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal,
inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir, Canuta.
5. Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will (Exhibit B),
signed in the name of the testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses
Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testator’s
name appears written at the foot of the will and under this name Lorenzo
Galvez signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument was
also signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that
they heard and attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed
 003 HERNAEZ v. HERNAEZ (SEE)
February 10, 1903 | Arellano, J. | Mental soundness is presumed
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Eulalio Hernaez
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Rosendo Hernaez
SUMMARY: Dona Juana before a notary public and with the aid of an interpreter
executed her will. She gave 1/3 to her eldest son, Rosendo, 1/3 to the same son
again and the remaining 1/3 to her other kids and grandkids. Eulalio, the plaintiff
here, is one of the sons. He seeks to have the will annulled claiming that his mom
was incapacitated at the time of execution, the incapacity of the notary, attesting
witnesses and the interpreter, and the presence of a substantial formal defect in the
will. Refer to fact #5 for support Eulalio gave for his claims. The issue is WoN
the will executed by Dona Juana is valid—Yes, presumption is that of soundness
of mental faculties and the testimonies showed that she was still of sound mind
when she executed her will. The fact that on old woman gives contradictory
orders, that she walks in a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she
received the sacraments some days before making her will, are circumstances
which even if fully demonstrated by proof could not lead the court to establish a
conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to
be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively
proven.
DOCTRINE: There are 2 systems with respect to the mental capacity of the
testator: (1) Presumption of soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be
proven; (2) Presumption of mental weakness in the absence of proof that the act
was performed while the mental faculties were in their normal condition. The
Code (I’m assuming the old Civil Code) has adopted the first system as being
the most rational. By accepting the principle that mental soundness is always
to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been previously
incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and proven by the proper
person and the correctness of this choice is beyond doubt.
FACTS:
1. The subject of this action is the will executed by Doña Juana Espinosa, widow
of Don Pedro Hernaez, on December 5, 1894, in Bacolod, Island of Negros,
before a notary public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter,
the testatrix not understanding Spanish.
2. In this will the principal dispositions are those relative to the legacy of the
third part of the hereditary estate of free disposal, which the testatrix leaves
to her eldest son, Rosendo, to the betterment of the other third made in favor
of this same son, and the distribution of the remaining third in six equal parts
among her five children, Rosendo Domingo, Magdalena, Mateo, and Eulalio
Hernaez y Espinosa, and her two granddaughters, Peregrina and Victorina
Parapa y Hernaez, in representation of their deceased mother, Clara Hernaez
y Espinosa.
3. Eulalio, is one of the sons, his complaint has not been acquiesced in by his
sister Magdalena, and his nieces, Peregrina and Victorina, whose consent he
sought to obtain.
4. The action is brought to annul the will on the following grounds:
a. The incapacity of the testatrix, Dona Juana
b. The incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter
c. A substantial formal defect in the will
5. Eulalio claims that the following support his claims:
a. Incapacity of his mom:
i. That on the 5th of December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was
so ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme
unction, and that two days afterwards she died;
ii. that prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and gave contradictory
orders, as a result of her senile debility.
b. The incapacity of the notary:
i. he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the language of the testatrix.
c. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses:
i. their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish, and
d. the incapacity of the interpreter:
i. he was an amaneunsis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the
will.
e. The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact that
two physicians were not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at the
time of its execution, and the absence of two interpreters to translate the will,
because executed in a foreign language.
6. To prove the mental incapacity of his mom, Eulalio introduced oral testimony
and expert evidence.
a. That the testatrix on the 5th day of December, 1894, was so ill that she could
not speak; that by reason of her age she walked in a stooping position and gave
contradictory orders. The priest who was with her during the last hours of her
life was called to testify that on the 3rd day of the same month and year he had
administered the sacraments to her, and that the patient was at that time so
seriously ill that he scarcely understood her when she spoke.
b. The expert witnesses were called to testify upon the question propounded:
"Could an octogenarian in the pathological condition peculiar to that age
possess sufficient mental faculties to permit her to dispose of her
property causa mortis?" The result of the oral evidence is that the testimony of
the four witnesses called has proven one fact, which is, that the testatrix toward
the end of her life walked in a stooping position.
c. The first witness, Isidora de la Torre, affirmed that three days before her death
she was very ill but answered questions which were addressed her, and only
one witness, Ambrosia Sotsing, testified that four days before the death of the
testatrix she had been to see the latter and that she could not speak then because
she was suffering from fainting fits, this witness being the only one who
testified that the testatrix had given contrary order.
d. These four witnesses are, respectively, 78, 75, 60, and 57 years of age.
e. The priest, D. Nicolas Alba, stated that he had administered the sacraments to
the testatrix before the execution of the will but was unable to remember the
day; that he understood her then when she spoke and that the testatrix
frequently confessed even when not feeling seriously ill, and that when sick
she was accustomed to confess in her house (this point is confirmed by the
 witness Sotsing who testified that she had been to see the testatrix three times
and that on all three of these occasions the communion had been administered
to her); that when he confessed her some days before the execution of the will
he had also administered the extreme unction on account of her advanced age;
that at that time she was in the enjoyment of her mental faculties but the witness
could not state whether she preserved them up to the moment of her death, he
not being present when this occurred.
f. The expert evidence introduced by the testimony of Dr. Lope de la Rama gave
the following result: That if the organs are intact the physiological functions
are perfectly performed, and that consequently some men before reaching the
age of decrepitude lose their mental faculties by the weakening of the brain,
either as the result of illness or of abuses, while others preserve their
understanding to a very advanced age. It is unnecessary to pass upon the oral
evidence introduced by the defendant; the documentary evidence shows that
the testatrix did not die two days after the execution of her will. The will was
executed on the 5th and her death occurred on the 12th of December, 1894.
ISSUE/s:
3. WoN the will executed by Dona Juana is valid—Yes, presumption is that of
soundness of mental faculties and the testimonies showed that she was still
of sound mind when she executed her will.
RULING: Upon these grounds we hold that judgment must be for the defendant,
declaring the will executed by Doña Juana Espinosa on the 5th of December, 1894, to
be valid and efficacious, without special imposition of costs.
RATIO:
1. It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories
nor the documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be
reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties.
2. The fact that on old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a
stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments
some days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully
demonstrated by proof could not lead the court to establish a conclusion
contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to
be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is
conclusively proven.
3. The notary even certified that in his judgment, the testatrix had the necessary
legal capacity snd the use of the necessary metal faculties for the purposes of
the execution of the will.
4. There are 2 systems with respect to the mental capacity of the testator:
a. Presumption of soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be
proven
b. Presumption of mental weakness in the absence of proof that the act
was performed while the mental faculties were in their normal
condition
5. The Code (I’m assuming the old Civil Code) has adopted the first system
as being the most rational. By accepting the principle that mental
soundness is always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not
been previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and
proven by the proper person and the correctness of this choice is beyond
doubt; in the meantime the intervention of the notary and the witnesses
constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of their
knowledge of the matter
6. It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment of a public
instrument executed before a notary public by a native of these Islands,
ignorant of Spanish, that the notary was not acquainted with the dialect of the
party executing the same. If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the
obligation of drawing the instrument in the official language, that is,
Castilian, does not know the dialect he can avail himself of an interpreter in
accordance with the provisions of the law itself; hence the fact that the
notary who legalized the will in question did not know the Visayan
dialect spoken by the testatrix is by no means an argument in favor of
the nullity of this public instrument, nor has it been for the nullity of any
one of the long series of instruments executed before Spanish notaries,
and even Filipino notaries, unacquainted with the dialect or dialects of
the locality in which they performed their duties or the special dialect of
the party.
7. With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven by the manner
in which they testified at the trial, "without the necessity of an interpreter,"
as to those called as witnesses and by conclusive evidence as to the deceased
attesting witness whose signature and competency have been completely
established, that they knew the dialect of the testatrix in accordance with
section 5, article 681, of the Civil Code, and also understood Spanish. As
alleged, but not proven, their knowledge of the latter language may not
have been perfect, but this does not make them incompetent, nor is it a
ground for annulment.
8. Finally, the prohibition of article 681, section 8, (actual content of the
provision was not provided) is not applicable to the interpreter, of whose
services the notary availed himself for the execution, drafting and legalization
of the will, for the simple reason that it does not refer to the interpreter but
the witnesses, and there is nothing to authorize the extensive interpretation
attempted to be made of its precepts.
9. The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article
665, was not necessary. "This precept refers clearly and expressly to the
conditions which must be complied with in order that a demented person may
make a will by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct
from the cases governed by article 685 when the testator has not been
declared demented."
10. Had anyone observed any incapacity in the testatrix some time before it
would have been easy to have taken the proper steps to obtain a declaration
of the status of incapacity in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code,
and then, after a legal declaration of this condition, she could not have
executed a will unless two physicians had certified that at the time of her
 examination she was in the enjoyment of a lucid interval; but there was no
necessity of waiting for a lucid interval when the constant condition was
that of lucidity.
11. Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article
648 of the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a
foreign language, and neither by the letter nor by the purpose of this article
could it be required with regard to the will in question. Not by the letter,
because neither the testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign
language. Neither the Castilian spoken by the notary nor the Visayan
spoken by the testatrix are foreign languages. Nor is the case within the
purpose of the law.
 004 Bagtas v. Paguio (Sarmiento)
March 14, 1912 | Trent, J. | Mental Capacity
PETITIONER: Juliana Bagtas
RESPONDENTS: Isidoro Paguio et al.,
SUMMARY: A will was executed in 1908, and the testator Pioquito died in 1909.
The probation of the will was contesed on the allegation that the same was not
executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills,
and further that the testator was not in the full enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
Pioquinto Paguio, for some fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered
from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. At the time of the
execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin
Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, Francisco Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, an attorney, Sefior
Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. According to the witnesses, they saw the
testator wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of
his property and these notes were in turn delivered to Senor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. Testator assented that he affirms the
contents of the will and that it was signed by four subscribing witnesses. Witneses,
differ on their opinion on whether the testator was on his right mind when he
executed the will. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. The
other subscribing witness, testified that he was unable to state whether or not the
will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were
the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to
speak. The court said that the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity
of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack
of testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a
valid will. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator may
have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to
his mental capacity to make a will, yet the statements of the witnesses to the
execution of the will and the statemerits of the, conduct of the testator at that time
all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on
this occasion.
DOCTRINE: The presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the
testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of
testamentary capacity.
FACTS:
1. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of
Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator, Pioquinto Paguio y
Pizarro, died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months
following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by
the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are
a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the
children of a deceased daughter.
2. The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was
not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law
touching wills, and further that the. testator was not in the full enjoyment and
use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to
execute a valid will.
a. The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some
fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis
of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech.
b. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side,
and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
3. At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four
testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, Francisco Paguio,
and Pedro Paguio, an attorney, Sefior Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. The
other three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified
as to the manner in which the will was executed. According to the
uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the
following manner:
a. Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes
and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes
were in turn delivered to Senor Marco, who transcribed them and
put them in form.
b. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes
were written were delivered to the attorney by the testator; that the
attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with
an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole
had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in
the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Senor Marco gave
the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it,
signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that
they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other.
 c. These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the
will and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower
court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been
fully complied with.
4. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the
will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill,
he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were.
a. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say
whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not,
because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witness) was
not a physician.
b. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower
court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether
or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave
for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator
and the fact that he was unable to speak. This witness stated that the
testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a
subscribing witness.
c. Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he
was present when the will was executed and his testimony was
cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was
executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This
witness also stated that he transacted matters of business for the
decedent.The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator.
d. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physicians,
Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or
five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a
cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. He does not
say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the
execution of the will,
e. Doctor Viado, the other physician, had never seen the testator, but
his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what would
be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who
had suffered from a malady, he stated that he would be unable to
certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from
such a disease.
i. We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians
in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants.
ii. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of
a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind
was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his
life. However, we can not conclude from this that he was
wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of h'is
property by will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mental faculties of the testator were impaired to a
degree that would render the will void—NO. The pieces of evidence presented failed
to overturn the presumption in favor of mental capacity
RULING: For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
RATIO:
1. The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under
such circumstances, but the weight of authority is in support of the principle
that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to
set aside a testamentary document of this character.
a. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental
capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the
will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity.
2. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged
insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and
it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence.
a. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and
authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by
age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will.
b. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in
order to execute a valid will.
c. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of
wills that coulii meet such exacting requirements.
3. The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as
any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be
nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive
manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity. A testator may
be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities
and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.
4. The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, as
follows:
a. "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
 disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full
possession of his reasoning faculties."

5. In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated: In a word, were his
mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand
the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will."

6. In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon
the trial of the case:
a. The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he
was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior
to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his
mind and memory were much enfeebled. He became very dull of
hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was
affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became
filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant
of the proprieties of life.
b. The court, in commenting upon the case, said: "Neither age, nor
sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The
failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it
be total, or extend to his immediate family or property.

7. In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the
same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted.
a. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator
during the last years of his life may have led some of those who
knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental
capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the
witnesses to the execution of the will and the statemerits of the,
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably
had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion.
b. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have
comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which
he was engaged.
c. The evidence shows that the writing and execution of the will
occupied a period of several hours and that the testator was present
during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings.
Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person.
 005 TABOADA v. HON. ROSAL (EMAR)
May 28, 1990 | GUTIERREZ, Jr. J. | Art. 805
PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF
THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA
RESPONDENT: Southern Leyte, (Br.III,Maasin) CFI Judge AVELINO S. ROSAL
SUMMARY: Taboada filed a petition for probate before the CFI. Judge Pamatian
denied the probate of Perez’ will for want of formality in its execution. Taboada filed
an MR. Judge Rosal, assuming Judge Pamatian’s position after being transferred to
a new station, denied the MR; alleging that for a notarial will to be valid, it is not
enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but all the 3 subscribing witnesses
must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix
and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the
will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to
sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand of that page.
Issue: For validity of a formal notarial will, does Art. 805 require that the testatrix
and all the 3 instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in
the presence of the testatrix and of one another? No. The fact that attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only 2 pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. The 1st page containing the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while
the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked
as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two
pages inducting this page” (Continue to Doctrine)
DOCTRINE: While perfection in will-drafting may be desirable, unsubstantial
departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the
authenticity of the will is not assailed.
FACTS:
1. In the petition for probate filed with the CFI, Taboada attached the alleged last
will and testament of the late Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the
will consists of 2 pages.
a. 1st page: contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end
or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
3 instrumental witnesses.
b. 2nd page: contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at
the end of the attestation clause by the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left
margin by the testatrix.
2. Since no opposition was filed after Taboada’s compliance with the publication
requirement, TC commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive Taboada’s
evidence. Accordingly, Taboada submitted his evidence and presented Vicente
Timkang, one subscribing witness to the will, who testified on its genuineness and
due execution.
3. Judge Pamatian issued the questioned order:
a. denying the probate of the will of Perez for want of a formality in its
execution.
b. requiring Taboada to submit names and addresses of the intestate heirs so they
could be notified and intervene in the summary settlement of estate.
4. Taboada filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex parte praying for a 30d period
within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance
of the will. He also asked that the 10d period required by the court to submit the
names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.
5. Taboada filed a MR of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the
motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted
upon by Judge Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The
said motions or incidents were still pending resolution when Judge Rosal assumed
the position of presiding judge of the respondent court.
6. Taboada filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.
7. Because of the Taboada’s failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit
intestate heirs’ names and addresses New Judge Rosal denied the:
a. MR
b. manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte
c. motion for the appointment of special administrator
8. Taboada decided to file the present petition.
9. Judge Rosal alleges that for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only
the testatrix signs at the "end" but all the 3 subscribing witnesses must also sign
at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will
itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to
sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of
that page.
10. Taboada maintains that:
a. Art. 805, CC does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute
necessity for the extrinsic validity of the will that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the will after
the signature of the testatrix.
b. it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on
the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as
this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent
with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.
ISSUE: For validity of a formal notarial will, does Art. 805, CC require that the
testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the
will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another? – No. While perfection in
will-drafting may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
RULING: Petition granted. Judge Rosal’s orders denying probate of the will, the MR
of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special administrator are
set aside. CFI is ordered to allow the probate of the will and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
RATIO:
1. Art. 805, CC provides: “Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The testator/person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
2. The attestation shall state the:
a. number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
b. fact that:
i. the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
ii. caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the instrumental witnesses and
signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
3. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.” (End of Art. 805)
4. Under Art. 805, CC, the will must be subscribed/signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
5. The law uses the terms “attested” and “subscribed”.
a. Attestation - witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and
take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the
execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact.
b. Subscription - signing of witnesses' names upon the same paper for the
identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator.
(Ragsdale v. Hill).
6. The will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose
of identification.
7. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of
the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but
also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
8. Gonzales v. Gonzales: While perfection in will-drafting may be desirable,
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially
where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
9. The law is to be liberally construed, “the underlying and fundamental objective
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in
accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of
a will” (Report of the Code Commission,p. 103).
10. Judge Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were it not for the defect in
the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony
sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
11. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the
present case when:
a. the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which
contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so
b. the will was properly identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
the same will executed by the testatrix.
There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
12. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will.
This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only
2 pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.
13. The 1st page containing the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by
the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at
the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that
“This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages inducting this page”.
14. Singson v. Florentino: Re purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause
must state the number of pages used:
“The law referred to is art. 618, Code of CivPro, as amended by Act2645, requiring that the attestation
clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been
held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of
some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re will of Andrada; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca; Gumban vs. Gorecho; Quinto vs. Morata;
Echevarria vs. Sarmiento). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence
aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But Here the situation is different. While
the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages,
which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it
within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent
the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.”
15. Icasiano v. Icasiano applied a similar liberal approach:
“x x x Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and 2 other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the
notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law
to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance
of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, ‘witnesses may sabotage the
will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.”
 06 AZUELA v. CA (Saldua)
April 12, 2006 | Tinga J. | Attestation Clause
PETITIONER: Felix Azuela
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Geralda Castillo substituted by Ernesto
Castillo
SUMMARY:
Felix Azuela filed for a petition for probate seeking to admit the probate the notarial
will of the decedent Eugenia Igsolo. Azuela is the son of Eugenia’s cousin. The will
consists of 2 pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The 3 named witnesses to
the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will.
However, the witnesses did not sign at the bottom of the attestation clause. Said
petition for probate was opposed by Geralda Castillo who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of the “12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. Castillo argued, among
others, that the will was not executd and attested to in accordance with law. She also
argues that Eugenia’s signature did not appear on the 2nd page of the will, and the
will was not properly acknowledged. Issue is WON the will may be allowed for
probate proceedings? = NO. The provisions of Art. 805 that “the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is mandatory. The purpose
of the law in requiring the attestation clause to state the number of pages is to
safeguard against possible omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. The total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
While there can be substantial compliance as per Art. 809, it does not apply in this
case. In fact, the subject will possess many more defects. It is also important to note
that Art. 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Art. 805
DOCTRINE: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages
on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most
importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is
fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Felix Azuela filed for a petition for probate seeking to admit the
probate the notarial will of the decedent (who died on Dec. 16, 1982),
Eugenia Igsolo which was notarized on June 10, 1981. Azuela is the son of
Eugenia’s cousin.
2. The will consists of 2 pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The
3 named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
3
See last part for the full codal provisions.
margin of both pages of the will. However, the witnesses did not sign at
the bottom of the attestation clause.
3. The probate petition refered to only 2 heirs, legatees and devisees namely:
Felix Azuela and one Irene Igsolo (alleged to have resided abroad).
4. Said petition was opposed by Geralda Castillo who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of the “12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent.
5. Geralda Castillo claims that:
• The will is a forgery
• The true purpose of the will’s emergence is that so it could be used
a defense in several court cases filed by Geralda against Felix
particularly for forcible entry & usurpation of real property in
reference to Felix’s right to occupy Eugenia’s properties.
• Contrary to Felix’s claim Eugenia was actually survived by 12
legimitate heirs namely her grandchildren
6. Twin arguments central to the case: Geralda Castillo claims that the will
was not executd and attested to in accordance with law. She also argues that
Eugenia’s signature did not appear on the 2nd page of the will, and the will
was not properly acknowledged.
7. RTC – admitted the will to probate.
8. CA – reversed RTC and orderd the dismissal of the probate petition on the
ground that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
the will which rendered the will void.
9. There are also other defects in the subject will as discovered by the SC (see
ratio #10 onwards).
ISSUE/s:
1. WON the requirement under Art. 805 of the Civil that “the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is merely directory
rathan mandatory which would make it susceptible to the substantial
compliance rule? = NO. The provisions of Art. 805 is mandatory. While there
could be substantial compliance with the rules laid down in Art. 805 as
provided for by Art. 809, it does not apply in this case. In fact, the subject
will possess many more defects. (also see doctrine)
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO
ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. It is true that Art. 809 of the Civil Code provides that defects in the form of
attestation would not render the will invalid if it is proved that there is no bad
faith, forgery or fraud, and that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance of Art. 805.3
2. Yet, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which
the will was written as per Article 805, remains a fatal flaw, despite Article
809. Also, there could have been substantial compliance with Art. 805
 requirement only if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
composed of.
3. In this case, however, there is no substantial compliance because there is
no statement in the attestation clause or elsewere in the will itself as to the
number of pages comprising the will.
4. The purpose of the law in requiring the attestation clause to state the number
of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible omission
of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages means the absence of a
referral on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed
and subscribed to.
5. At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply
with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. The
transcendent legislative intent is for the fruition of the testator's incontestable
desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
6. As Justice J.B.L. Reyes commented on a previous case: “the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings.”
7. Other violations of Art. 805: (1) The decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed
to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing
at the so-called "logical end" of the will on its first page; (2) the will itself is
not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered
with Arabic numerals.
8. This is in spite of Art. 805’s requirement that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the
last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page
OTHER DEFECTS IN THE WILL:
9. (A) The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses.
While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand
margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
10. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the
execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses,
and it must necessarily bear their signatures. It is separate and aparat from
the disposition of the will.
11. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation. Thus, an unsigned attestation clause
results to an unattested will.
12. Signatures on the left-hand corner of every page – signifies that the witnesses
are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. Signatures to
the attestation clause – establishes that the witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
13. (B) Non-observance of Art. 806. Article 806 that "every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses".
14. In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
"Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila." The SC does not construe these words as an
acknowledgment.
15. Even if we consider that it was a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain
invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. A declaration
under oath and under pain of perjury, would allow for the criminal
prosecutionof persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or
those executed without the free consent of the testator.
16. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public.
Art. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
805 thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.
Art. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
809 and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy
of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
 007 GUERRERO v. BIHIS (Sabaupan)
17 April 2007 | Corona, J. | Art. 806
PETITIONER: Bella A. Guerrero
RESPONDENTS: Resurreccion A. Bihis
SUMMARY: Guerrero and Bihis are siblings whose mother died in February
1994. Guerrero filed a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the
decedent in May of the same year. Bihis opposed said petition on the ground that
the attestation clause and acknowledgement did not comply with the requirements
and the law. The trial court denied the probate of the will because the will did not
comply with Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. In this case,
the testatrix and the witnesses “acknowledged” the will at the testatrix’s residence
in Quezon City before Atty. Directo but the latter was a commissioned notary
public for and in Caloocan City. CA affirmed. Guerrero now argues before the SC
that the fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did
not affect the validity of the notarial will. The issue is whether the will
acknowledged before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission
satisfy the requirements under the law. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative
and declared that the notarial act performed by the notary public was void. The
formal requirement of acknowledgment is one of the indispensable requisites for
the validity of a will. The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator
and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary
public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.
Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the
testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as
devisees or legatees in the will. Thus, a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and
cannot be accepted for probate.
DOCTRINE: A last will and testament acknowledged before a notary public
acting outside his territorial jurisdiction is in effect, not acknowledged as required
by law.
FACTS:
26. Petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis are
siblings. Their mother, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura died at the
Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo in February 1994.
27. Petitioner Guerrero filed a petition for probate of the last will and testament
of the decedent in May 1994 alleging the following:
a. Petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent’s will and she was
legally qualified to act as such.
b. The decedent was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of her
death.
c. At the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years
old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud, or
undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
28. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister’s petition on the following
grounds:
a. The will was not executed and attested as required by law.
b. Its attestation clause and acknowledgement did not comply with the
requirements and the law.
c. The signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner
and her children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence.
29. The trial court appointed Guerrero as special administratrix of the decedent’s
estate. After Guerrero presented her evidence, Bihis filed a demurrer alleging
that petitioner’s evidence failed to establish that the decedent’s will complied
with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
30. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the
Civil Code was not complied with because the will was “acknowledged” by
the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix’s residence in Quezon City
before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for
and in Caloocan City.
31. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the appeal, hence the
instant petition.
32. Petitioner’s arguments:
a. She admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the former’s residence in Quezon City before Atty.
Directo, and that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary
public for Caloocan City.
b. She, however, asserts that the fact that the notary public was acting
outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the
notarial will.
ISSUE/s:
4. Whether the will acknowledged before a notary public acting outside the
place of his commission satisfy the requirements under the law. NO – the
notarial act performed by the notary public was void because he was acting
outside his jurisdiction. Hence, the will did not comply with the requirements
under Art. 806.
RULING: Judgment in question is affirmed. Petition denied.
RATIO:
24. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
 testator and the witnesses. This is found in Article 8064 of the Civil Code.
This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity
of a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot
be accepted for probate.
25. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case of a
notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public. The
acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It
also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as
heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will.
26. A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place
of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not
a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no
force and effect. In one case, the Court held that: “an acknowledgement taken
outside the territorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction is void x x x.”
27. In this case, since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for
and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of
the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and
her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus,
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect, not
acknowledged as required by law.
28. Further, pursuant to Article 55 of the Civil Code, a violation of a mandatory
or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless the law itself
declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statures
were transgressed in the execution of the alleged “acknowledgment.” The
compulsory language of the Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breach.
Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all
completely void.

4 5
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Clerk of Court.
 008 Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (Rosales)
June 30, 2008 | Quisumbing, J. | Doctrine of Liberal Interpretation
PETITIONER: Paz Samaniego-Celada
RESPONDENTS: Lucia D. Abena
SUMMARY: Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita
S. Mayores while Lucia D. Abena was the decedent’s lifelong companion since
1929. On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs. She was survived by her first cousins including Paz Samaniego-
Celada. Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on
February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real
property located at Singalong Manila to Lucia and two others. She likewise
bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at San
Antonio Village, Makati to Lucia and two others. Margarita also left all her
personal properties to Lucia whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her
will. Paz filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita
before the RTC of Makati. Lucia filed a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. RTC rendered a decision declaring the last
will and testament of Margarita probated and Lucia as the executor of the will
which was affirmed by the CA. Issue is WoN the will is invalid for failure to
follow the formalities required by law? The SC held NO, because the error must
have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally
defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed
of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate.
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to
invalidate the subject will.
DOCTRINE: The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation
or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of Article 805."
FACTS:
1. Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores
while Lucia D. Abena was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.
2. On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her.
She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay,
Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and Paz Samaniego-
Celada.
3. Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on February
2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real
property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1343 to Lucia D. Abena, Norma
A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion
each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real
property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square
meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920 to Lucia D. Abena, Isabelo M. Abena,
and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita
also left all her personal properties to Lucia D. Abena whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will.
4. On August 11, 1987, Paz filed a petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
5. On October 27, 1987, Lucia filed a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
6. On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and
testament of Margarita probated and Lucia as the executor of the will.
7. Paz appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
8. Paz, in her Memorandum, argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with
the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil Code because the will
was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
and in the presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the
testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or similar, indicating
that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will
was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of
execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely
dependent upon Lucia and her nephews for support, and these alleged
handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her
own.
9. Lucia, argues in her Memorandum that the petition for review raises
questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the
Supreme Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the
outset opined there was no compelling reason to review the petition, the Court
of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was
validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities
required by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also
concurred with the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was
of sound mind when she executed the will.
ISSUE/s:
5. WoN the will is invalid for failure to follow the formalities required by law
 – NO, because the error must have been brought about by the honest belief
that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. With regard to the contention of the oppositors, Paz Samaniego-Celada, et
al., that the testator, Margarita Mayores, was not mentally capable of making
a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The
oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation
and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind. In fact,
witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions,
attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita
Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the
illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization.
2. Not one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned any instance that they
observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a
manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be
physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound
mind. The testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
3. Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3)
pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will,
the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion
that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause
is not material to invalidate the subject will.
4. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by
the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3)
pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement.
5. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal
interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
a. "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and]
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in
the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805."
6. The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of
the testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation
that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and
appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After
examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same observation
as the oppositors. The picture shows that the testator was affixing her
signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There
is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than
February 2, 1987.
7. Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on
the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the
testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while
executing the subject will.
8. In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the
will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is
the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements
in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject
notarial will.
9. Since, Paz and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under
Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her
properties in a will duly executed and probated, Paz has no legal right to claim
any part of the decedent’s estate.
10. [Procedural] We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure
questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
11. The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was
signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another,
whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were
signed on the same day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon
the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of fact.
12. This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 45 limits this
Court’s review to questions of law only.
13. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions. We find
that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
 009 Lee v. Tambago (Cristelle)
February 12, 2008 | Corona J. | Article 806
PETITIONER: Manuel L. Lee
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Regino B. Tambago
SUMMARY: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty.
Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the
legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature
in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr.
and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent supposedly
bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of
land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965. Lee, however, pointed out that the residence
certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same
as his signature as donor in a deed of donation which supposedly contained
his purported signature. Lee averred that the signatures of his deceased father
in the will and in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from one another in all angles.” Lee also questioned
the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise
been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits. Lee
further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). Issue: Was the will
spurious? Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics
of legal profession. The law provides for certain formalities that must be
followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by
law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it
should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested
by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise
requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is
his or her own free act and deed. A cursory examination of the
acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For
one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence
certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will. As the acknowledging officer
of the contested will, Tambago was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. These formalities are
mandatory and cannot be disregarded.
DOCTRINE: The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2)
to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
FACTS:
1. In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L.
Lee charged respondent. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the
Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament.
2. In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent
Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the
spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay
and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
3. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate
to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised
to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
4. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before
Tambago on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that
the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment
of the will was dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of
the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of
donation (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant
averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in
the deed of donation were in any way entirely and diametrically
opposed from one another in all angles.
5. Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged
that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied
from their respective voters affidavits.
 6. Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was
on file in the archives division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA).
7. Tambago in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the
complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that
the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last
will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by
Tambago per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit of the
children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N.
Lee, Jr.
8. Tambago further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass
him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
9. Tambago did not dispute Lee’s contention that no copy of the will
was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no
copy of the contested will could be found there because none was
filed.
10. Lastly, Tambago pointed out that Lee had no valid cause of action
against him as Lee did not first file an action for the declaration of
nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
11. In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
12. In his report, the investigating commissioner found Tambago guilty
of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found
in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Thus, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period
of three months.
a. Tambago’s failure to comply with the laws in the discharge
of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago
is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year
and his notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for 2 years.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Tambago is guilty of violating the pertinent
provisions of the old Notarial law? Yes, he violated it. Tambago, as notary
public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with
due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied
with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties, we find that
he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
2. Whether or not Tambago is under the legal obligation to furnish a copy
of the notarized will to the archives division? According to Article 806 it is
not required. However, Tambago failed to do the necessary entries pertaining
to the will in his notarial register.
RULING: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby
found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath;
(2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the
provisions of the old Notarial Law. Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness
expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
RATIO:
1. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death. A will may either be notarial or
holographic.
2. The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.
3. A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by
law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In
addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
4. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay
and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
 5. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the
fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article
805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.
6. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or
her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will
has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered
in the manner that he intends it to be done.
7. A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in
question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly
nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly,
the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions
by respondent invalidated the will.
8. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, Tambago was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan: The Notarial Law is
explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged
before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of such certification.
9. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded,
considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. A notary public, especially a
lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to
furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division?
1. Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the
Clerk of Court.
2. Tambago’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives
division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for
disciplinary action.
3. Nevertheless, Tambago should be faulted for having failed to
make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial
register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
a. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him;
b. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument;
c. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
d. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument;
e. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
f. give each entry a consecutive number; and
g. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the
substance of the instrument.
4. In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned
rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and
entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a
photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he
presented a photocopy of a certification stating that the archives
division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
5. A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible
unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent
must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the
original, otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted.
Thus, the photocopy of Tambago’s notarial register was not
admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will
because it failed to comply with the requirements for the
admissibility of secondary evidence.
6. In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification
dated September 21, 1999 must fail. Not only did he present a mere
photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000; its contents did
not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his
notarial register.
7. Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will
be undermined.
8. Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law
render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken
lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will,
considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case,
 are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its
contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for
his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a
consequence of his breach of duty.
9. In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following
derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law.
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation
regarding cedula certificates.
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of
his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
 010 DE GALA v. GONZALES (PLEYTO)
March 26, 1929 | Ostrand, J. | Art. 807-809
PETITIONER-APPELLANT: Serapia De Gala
OPPONENTS-APPELLANTS: Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona
SUMMARY: Severina executed a will in which De Gala, Severina’s niece, was
designated as executrix. When De Gala presented the will for probate, Gonzales,
nephew of Severina, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been
executed in conformity with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. De Gala
was appointed as administratrix. She made several demands upon Ona, the surviving
husband of Severina, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which
he was in possession. Ona filed a motion asking to replace Severina as the special
administratrix. This was granted on the ground that he had possession of the property
and his appointment would simplify the proceedings. Meanwhile, the will was
declared valid and admitted to probate. Ona and Gonzales argue that the will was not
executed in the form prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645. The principal points raised were: (1) that the person
requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her
own; (2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark
of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the
presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last
paragraph of the body of the will. The issue is WoN the will is valid. SC held yes.
The testatrix’ thumbmark appears in the center of her name as written by de Gala on
all of the pages of the will. It is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the
testatrix signed by thumbmark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed
in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently
described and explained in the last caluse of the body of the will. It may be conceded
that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does
not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last
clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the
legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
DOCTRINE: The attestation clause does not, standing alone, quite meet the
requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last caluse of the body
of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent.
FACTS:
12. Nov. 23, 1920 – Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala,
a neice of Gonzales, was designated executrix.
6
"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed
by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
13. Nov. 1926 – the testatrix (Severina) died, leaving no heirs by force of law
14. Dec. 2, 1926 – De Gala, through her counsel, presented the will for probate
15. Apolinario Gonzales, nephew of Severina, filed an opposition to the will on
the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of
Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
16. April 2, 1927 – De Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of
Severina.
17. March 31, 1927 – She returned an inventory of the estate and made several
demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of Severina, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.
18. September 20, 1928 – CFI ordered Ona to deliver to De Gala all the property
left by the deceased
19. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Ona filed a motion asking that
the appointment of De Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that
he, Ona, be appointed in her stead
20. March 3, 1928 – Though opposed by Gonzales and De Gala, the motion of
Ona was granted. De Gala was removed, and Ona was appointed special
administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession
of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify the
proceedings
21. (In the meantime and after various continuances and delays) Jan. 20, 1928 –
the court declared the will valid and admitted it to probate
22. All the parties appealed
a. De Gala from the order removing her from the office of special
administratrix
b. Gonzales and Ona from the order probating the will
23. The burden of the argument of De Gala is that a special administrator cannot
be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in Section 653 of the
Code of Civil Procedure
24. Ona and Gonzales argue that the will in question was not executed in the form
prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act.
No. 26456
25. The principal points raised by the appeal are:
(1) that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the
latter's name and not her own;
(2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of
the testatrix in the will; and
(3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was
not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the
will.
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other."

ISSUE/s:
6. WoN De Gala can be replaced as special administratrix – YES. The court has
discretion.
7. WoN the will is valid – YES. The last clause of the body of the will was taken
with the attestation clause.
RULING: SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Pwede rin wherefore.
RATIO:
De Gala
29. Section 653 can only apply to executors and regular administrator, and the
office of a special administrator is quite different from that of regular
administrator
30. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court
31. The function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased and to return an inventory thereof
32. he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased.
33. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special
administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely
discretionary
34. SC cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case.
35. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the
property, pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court
probably prevented useless litigation.
Ona and Gonzales
36. The first point can be answered by the case of the Estate of Maria Salva:
"An examination of the will in question discloses that it contains five pages. The name of the old
woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left-hand margin of the first four pages and at the end
of the will. About in the center of hername she placed her thumb- mark. The three witnesses
likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will.
"On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity of the will
that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the old law prior to the
amendment, it had been held by this court that where a testator is unable to write and his name
is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto,
it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned, whether the person who writes
the name of the testator signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan [1912], 21 Phil., 461.) But
his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment introduced into the law the following
sentence: 'The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin,
. . .' This requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance.
"There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is that
the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law
says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is ful lled not only by the
customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put
upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than
the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed'
is satis ed if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
37. The testatrix’ thumbmark appears in the center of her name as written by de
Gala on all of the pages of the will
38. The second and third points raised by Ona and Gonzales are sufficiently
refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with the
attestation clause, both of which are in Tagalog:
"Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang naglalaman ng aking huling
tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng aking pangalan, ipinamanhik ko sa aking
pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda
ko ang titik ng kanang daliri kong hinlalaki, sa wakas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon ng
kasulatang ito, at ito'y ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at ng tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo
sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng Nobiembre ng 1920.
"(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
"Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na dahon na pinirmahan sa
harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni Severina Gonzales sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng
bawa't isa sa anim (6) na dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o
testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa wakas at sa gilid ng
bawat dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng tinurang testadora, at and bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma
sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong
1920.
"(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD"
Translation in English:
"In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and because of the fact
that I cannot sign my name, I request my niece Serapia de Gala to write my name, and above
this I placed my right thumb-mark at the end of this will and to each of the six pages of this
document, and this was done at my direction and in the presence of three attesting witnesses, this
23d of November, 1920.
"(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
"We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was signed in our
presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina Gonzales at the end and on the margins
of each of the six (6) sheets and was declared to contain the last will and testament of Severina
Gonzales, was signed by us as witnesses at the end and on the margins of each sheet in the
presence and at the request of said testatrix, and each of us signed in the presence of all and each
of us, this 23d day of November of the year 1920.
"(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD"
11. It is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumbmark,
but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses,
and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last caluse
of the body of the will
12. It may be conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in
connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently
carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of
the document.
13. The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the
fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the
attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
 011 CUEVAS v. ACHACOSO (PELIÑO)
May 18, 1951 |Bautista Angelo, J. | Attestation Clause
PETITIONER-APPELLEE: The Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of Jose Venzon; Valentina Cuevas
OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT: Pilar Achacoso
SUMMARY: Venzon died, leaving a will, and in that will, his heirs were his wife, Cuevas,
and his daughter. Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of the will. Achacoso, on the other
hand, filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by Venzon,
and praying that if the will submitted by Cuevas be rejected, then the will submitted by her
be admitted, since in the will that Achacoso has, other heirs were included. Achacoso
objected to the probate of the will submitted by Cuevas. Trial court admitted to probate
the will submitted by Cuevas. Achacoso filed a case in the CA, but the CA certified it to
the SC since it involves purely questions of law. Hence, this case. The issue in this case is
whether or not an attestation clause not signed by the instrumental witnesses but by the
testator himself, has the effect of invalidating a will. The SC held in the negative. They
found that the attestation clause substantially complies with the requirement of the law.
The only anomaly in this case was that it appears that the attestation was made by the
testator and not the instrumental witnesses. But then, after the signature, the 3 witnesses
signed. An instrumental witness does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but
also to the proper execution of the will. The fact that the 3 instrumental witnesses have
signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature but also to the due execution of the
will as embodied in the attestation clause. The Court relied on the pronouncement in
Aldaba v. Roque, which also dealt with the same thing, “it appears that it is the testatrix
who makes the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however as
the witnesses together with the testatrix, have signed the declaration, we are of the opinion
and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute sufficient compliance
with the requirements of Act No. 2645.”
DOCTRINE: The fact that the 3 instrumental witnesses have signed the will
immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested
not only to the genuineness of the signature but also to the due execution of the will
as embodied in the attestation clause. It is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. When an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator’s will,
must be disregarded.
FACTS:
1. January 19, 1946: Jose Venzon died (Venzon) in Iba, Zambales, leaving a
will.
a. In that will, Venzon instituted as heirs Valentina Cuevas (Cuevas), his
widow, and Rosario Venzon, his daughter. Cuevas was named as
executrix of the will.
b. On February 1, 1946, Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of said will.
2. On May 10, 1946, Pilar Achacoso (Achacoso) filed an alternative petition for
the probate of a previous will executed by Venzon, praying that if the will
submitted by Cuevas would be rejected, then the will submitted by her be
admitted to probate instead.
a. In the will submitted by Achacoso, there are other heirs instituted, among
them is her.
3. Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will executed by the deceased
on October 10, 1945.
4. After due hearing, the court found that the will presented by Cuevas was in
accordance with the law and ordered that it be admitted to probate.
5. Achacoso filed a case in the CA, but the CA certified it to the SC since the
case involves purely questions of law.
6. Hence, this case.
7. Main error assigned: alleged lack of attestation clause or if ther eis such, the
same has not been signed by the instrumental witnesses, but by the testator
himself and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating a will.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON an attestation clause, not signed by the instrumental witnesses but by
the testator himself, has the effect of invalidating a will. – NO, the fact that
the 3 instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately under the
signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature but also to the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause.
RULING: Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against the appellant.
RATIO
On whether an attestation clause not signed by the instrumental witnesses but by the
testator himself has the effect of invalidating a will
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba,
Zambales, Philippines, this 10th day of October, 1945, in the presence of three
witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso
Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3)
sheets marked by letter “A”, “B” and “C” consecutively on top of each sheet and upon
my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each of the aforesaid
instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament already referred to.
I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin
as well as the testament itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses
has also signed in my presence and in the presence of each other.
(Sgd.) JOSE VENZON
Witnesses:
(Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD
(Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO
 (Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL
1. The clause above quoted is the attestation clause, which in the opinion of the
SC substantially complies with its requirement.
a. The only anomaly that the Court finds its that it appears to be an
attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental
witnesses.
b. The anomaly, as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right
under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three
instrumental witnesses.
2. Instrumental witness as defined by Escriche, is one who takes part in the
execution of an instrument or writing.
a. An instrumental witness does not merely attest to the signature of
the testator but also to the proper execution of the will.
3. The fact that the 3 instrumental witnesses have signed the will
immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in
fact attested not only to the genuineness of the signature but also to the
due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
4. The attestation clause in this case bears similarity with the attestation clause
in the case of Aldaba v. Roque. In that case, the attestation clause formed part
of the body of the will and its recital was made by the testatrix and was signed
by her and by the three instrumental witnesses.
a. In reality it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about
the points in the last paragraph of the will; however as the witnesses
together with the testatrix, have signed the declaration, we are of the
opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament
constitute sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No. 2645.
5. In one case, it was said that the object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of the will is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in a
way as to attain this primordial end.
a. When an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator’s will, must
be disregarded.
6. The liberal view of interpretating wills is also enunciated in the Civil Code
in Arts. 788 and 791.
Jugo, J., Concurring:
1. I concur in the result. (Yes, this is the actual opinion)
Montemayor, J., Dissenting: (Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., concurring and dissenting)
1. In an ordinary attestation clause, the attestation clause invariably contains a
certification, affirmation, or solemn statement made by the witnesses and
signed by them, to the effect that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, in their presence, and that they also signed in the same manner and
in the presence of each other.
a. In other words, it is the witnesses who speak and certify and attest.
b. They are the ones who assure all persons interested, including the probate
court that the attestation clause signed by them contains a true and
faithful certificate or guarantee of the signing of the will by the testator
and by themselves as required by law, and that they were in a position to
do so because they signed last.
2. In the majority opinion, it is the testator that speak and not the attesting
witnesses. He certifies that not only he signed the will and every page in the
presence of 3 witnesses, but that said witnesses also signed in his presence
and in the presence of each other. Then he signed the clause, and the will,
and then the 3 witnesses signed under the word “witnesses”, evidently
giving us to understand that they saw him sign, nothing more.
3. From our everyday experience and observsation as regards contracts, the
witnesses who sign at the end merely witness the signature of the parties and
nothing more.
a. The law does not require and they do no certify that they sign in the
presence of each other much less, that the instrument or deed has been
executed according to legal requirements.
b. They have nothing to do or to say regarding the truth or falsity of the
statements.
c. That is what took place in the will in this case. The witnesses signed
merely as witnesses to the signature of the testator. They neither
expressly nor impliedly affirmed or certified that the assertions
about the signing of the will and every page thereof, contained in the
attestation clause, are true for the obvious reason that said clause is
not their own, neither have they signed it.
4. Supposing that in the attestation clasue there was a false narration of facts,
can and may the witnesses be accused of falsification? The justice doubts.
a. They can truthfully and correctly say in their defense that they made no
certificate, statement or narration, whether false of true.
b. As admitted by the majority, it was the testator who spoke and not the
witnesses. It may be the testator but the utterance and affirmation were
his not theirs. He erroneously assumed the role of the attesting witnesses.
5. It could also be the case that what the testator said in the will is true. Then he
signed the certificate or statement or clause.
a. How could he truthfully and correctly say all this when at the time that
he was making the statement or certificate and at the very instant that he
signed the same the three witnesses had not yet signed (in his presence
and in the presence of each other), for the simple reason that they signed
last, and, naturally, after the testator had made and signed his premature
and untrue statement and affirmation.
6. The majority use the case of Aldaba v. Roque. But Justice Montemayor thinks
that the ruling there constitutes a wide departure form the well established
rule about due execution of wills and that there is a need to revise the doctrine.
a. He thinks that they should strictly comply with the requirements of the
law about the execution of wills so as to effectively close the door to
fraud, deceit, and duress.
b. When the law requires that attesting witnesses make the attestation
and formal declaration, we should insist that they and not someone
else, even the testator, assume that role.
c. Testtator can never be a witness to establish and support the truth of the
statement contained in his certificate or attestation.
d. In a contested will where evidence is required to prove due execution of
the statement, a certificate of affirmation made by the testator, besides
being unnecessary and not required, becomes an empty and ineffective
attestation because the attestator himself is no longer available to support
it.
012 TESTATE ESTATE OF ALIPO ABADA v. ABAJA (MERILLES)
January 31, 2005 | Carpio, J. | Attestation Clause: Substantial Compliance
PETITIONER: Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada, Belinda Caponong-
Noble
RESPONDENTS: AlipioAbaja and Noel Abellar
SUMMARY: The case stems from a petition to probate the will of Alipo Abada,
who died in May 1940. Caponong alleges that the deceased left no will when he
died and that if such were true, the will presented were defective, specifically its
attestation clause as it violates Article 809 of the New Civil Code
The RTC admitted to probate the will, which the CA affirmed. The issue is
whether the CA erred in sustaining RTC-Kabanakalan in admitting to probate the
will of Abada? NO, the allegations of Caponong-Nobles must fail as a careful
examination of the document proves that there was substantial compliance with
the law.
The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page
in the presence of the witnesses. However, Caponong is correct in saying that the
attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows
that three witnesses signed it. Under, Art. 809: In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested
in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The Court sets limitations as to the application of the substantial compliance rule:
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought
to banish any fear of dire results.
From the above paragraph, the Court examined the contents of the will which
showed substantial compliance with the requirements of Article 805,
DOCTRINE: (Same as last paragraph of above) The Court sets limitations as to
the application of the substantial compliance rule: They only permit a probe into
the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to
determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear,
sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
FACTS:
1. Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died
sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
2. CASE # 1: Alipio C. Abaja (ABAJA) filed with the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition, or the probate of the last
will and testament (will) of Abada.
3. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio
Abaja (Eulogio) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
4. Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada
left no will when he died in 1940.
5. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons:
a. it was not executed and attested as required by law;
b. it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and
c. it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
the beneficiaries.
6. The alleged intestate heirs of Abada also opposed the petition. (These opposites
are the nephews, nieces, and grandchildren of Abada and Toray
7. CASE #2: Alipio filed another petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of TORAY.
a. Caponong, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds as above
enumerated.
8. CASE # 3: Caponong filed a petition praying for the issuance in his name of letters
of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray
9. In an Order dated 14 August 1981 (re: CASE #2), the RTC-Kabankalan admitted
to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for
reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Torays will became final and
executory.
10. In an order dated 23 November 1990 (re: CASE #3), the RTC-Kabankalan
designated Belinda Caponong-Noble (Caponong-Noble) Special Administratrix
of the estate of Abada and Toray.
a. Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the
will of Abada. But this was denied.
11. The RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994 (re: CASE #1),
admitting to probate the will of Abad.
12. The parties appealed, but the appellate court found that RTC-Kabankalan properly
admitted to probate the will of Abada.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON the CA erred in sustaining RTC-Kabanakalan in admitting to probate
the will of Abada - NO, the allegations of Caponong-Nobles must fail as a
careful examination of the document proves that there was substantial
compliance with the law.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.
RATIO:
1. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil
Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
2. The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will
of Abada.
3. Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are
the following:
a. The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator;
b. The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction;
c. The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other;
d. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each and every page
of the will on the left margin;
e. The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each sheet;
f. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page of the will, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
4. Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is
written in a language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains
that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She cites in
particular “Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code”, thus:
a. Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language
or dialect known to the testator.
b. Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses.
5. Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of
administrators of the property of an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old
Civil Code defines a legitime.
6. Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions.
a. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
b. Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the
Old Civil Code
7. However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil
Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is
not necessary in the execution of any will.
8. Therefore, Abad’s will does not require acknowledgement before a
notary public
9. Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that
Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and
must result in the disallowance of the will.
a. Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will.
b. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.
c. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-
speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his
companions would talk in the Spanish language. Which proves
Abada speaks Spanish.
10. Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation
clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the
number of pages on which the will is written.
a. The allegation has no merit. The phrase in the left margin of each of
the 2 pages of the will shows that it consists of 2 pages. The pages
are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO."
11. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state
expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence
of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to
the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809
of the New Civil Code
a. The English translation of the subjected clause is: Subscribed and
professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament
in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on
the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same.
b. The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will
and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
12. However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause
does not indicate the number of witnesses.
a. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three
witnesses signed it.
13. This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before
the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
a. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza, the Court recognized that
there are two divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being
based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction.
b. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan, the basic
case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later
decisions of the Court.
c. In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez, the petitioner, arguing for
liberal construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of
cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending that
the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series
 of cases to support his view.
14. The Court rules to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas
will. Abadas will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons.
a. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will.
b. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation
of evidence aliunde.
15. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction:
a. The so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor
does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions
do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any
part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in
the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an
exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to
determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and
ought to banish any fear of dire results.
16. Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not
expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the
will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other.
a. The last clause translated to english states: every one of us also
signed in our presence and of the testator.
b. This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing
of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in
the presence of one another and of the testator.
 SPS. AJERO V CA (ARMAND)
September 15, 1994 | Puno, J. | Art 810-819
PETITIONER: Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero
RESPONDENTS: CA and Clemente Sand
SUMMARY: The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s
body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations
and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.The petition was
also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and
lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s
holographic will to probate. RTC held that since it must decide only the question of the
identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it
finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.On
appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with
Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were
either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent. WoN the
CA erred in holding that Art 813 and 814 were not complied with – YES. A reading
of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and
date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the authenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It is also proper to
note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will
(Article810). This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and
814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of
wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. The
object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain
these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly
observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
DOCTRINE: A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will,
but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to
probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus,
unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
FACTS:
26. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto
and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong,
Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose
Ajero, Sr., and their children.
27. On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,
fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of
her estate by will.
28. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose
Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
29. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's
holographic will to probate, to wit:
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not
written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution,
and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the
testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity
of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to
be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in
question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3)
witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been
presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic
will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then
the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated
and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was
executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making
the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and
 the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed
knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots
she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And
considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on
will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the
testamentary act.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not
shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of
the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established
that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to
some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood
of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted
that the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and
not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding.
Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the
will herein.
30. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.
31. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations
and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE/s:
8. WoN the CA erred in holding that Art 813 and 814 were not complied
with – YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void.
RULING: Petitioner GRANTED. CA reversed and set aside, except with respect to
the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Agusan del Norte.
RATIO:
39. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed
in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
40. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
41. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus,
in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the
execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
42. In Abangan v. Abangan the court has held that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
43. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity
is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the
testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
44. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
45. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement
affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but
not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions,
the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
46. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw
vs. Relova, this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave
an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la
regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." (Citations omitted.)
47. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes.
48. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case
at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the
Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which
led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its
entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
 014 CRUZ v. VILLASOR (Matsumura)
November 26, 1973 | J. Esguerra | Notary Public as a Witness
PETITIONER: Agapita N. Cruz
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Guillermo Villasor, Branch I, CFI of Cebu, and
Manuel Lugay
SUMMARY: Valente Cruz died and supposedly left a will. His surviving spouse
Agapita Cruz opposed the allowance of the will, claiming that it was executed
with fraud as Valente was not fully informed of the properties he was disposing
and that it was not executed in accordance with law. The CFI allowed the probate
of the last will. Agapita appealed to the SC, claiming that Article 805 of the Civil
Code, requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will,
and Article 806, requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will
before a notary public, were not satisfied. Agapita noted that the out of the three
witnesses involved in the execution of the will, the 3rd one was also acting as the
notary public that acknowledged the will. Manuel Lugay, the supposed executor
of the will, maintains that there is substantial compliance, even if the notary public
was one of the witnesses. The issue before the court is WoN the last will was
executed in accordance with the law. The Court ruled in the negative. The notary
public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. The notary public cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the
will.
DOCTRINE: To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or as one of the
attesting and acknowledging witnesses in will, would have the effect of having
only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the
provisions of Article 8057 and Article 8068 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
33. Valente Cruz died and supposedly left a last will and testament. Agapita Cruz,
the surviving spouse of the decedent, opposed the allowance of the will,
alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
undue influence.
34. Agapita claims that the said instrument was executed without the testator
having been fully informed of the will’s contents, particularly as to what
properties Valente was disposing, and that the supposed last will and
testament was not executed in accordance with law.
35. The CFI of Cebu the allowed the probate of the said last will and testament
7 8
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another. […]
Hence this appeal by certiorari to the SC.
36. Agapita argues that the supposed last will and testament of Valente Cruz
was not executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805and
806 of the new Civil Code, the former requiring at least three credible
witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the latter requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.
37. Of the three witnesses involved in the execution of the willl, namely
Deogracias Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares, and Atty. Angel Teves, Jr.,
one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary Public before
whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. (the notary
public was also acting as the 3rd witness).
38. Agapita then claims that as a result, only two witnesses appeared before
the notary public to acknowledge the will.
39. Manuel Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will maintains that there
is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them.
ISSUE/s:
WoN the supposed last will and testament of Valente Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code –
NO. The third witness was also acting as the notary public, therefore, the requirement
of three credible witnesses was not fulfilled.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Cruz is declared not valid
and hereby set aside.
RATIO:
29. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the will.
30. To acknowledge before means to avow, to own as genuine, to assent, to
admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would
have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
31. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so
that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in
the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
32. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would defeated if
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.
 the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. The
notary public would naturally be interested sustaining the validity of the
will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would
place him in an inconsistent position. The very purpose of acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
33. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or as one of the
attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having
only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of
the provisions of Article 805 and Article 806.
34. The result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the
law would not be duly in observed.
 015 UNSON v. ABELLA (Marcos)
June 12, 1922 | Villamor, J. | Art. 827, Reference to another document
PETITIONER: Pedro Unson
RESPONDENTS: Antonio Abella Et. Al.
SUMMARY: Josefa Zalamea y Abella executed her last will and testament with
an attached inventory of her properties, in the presence of 3 witnesses, who signed
with her all the pages of said documents. When she died, Pedro Unson, filed with
the CFI of Laguna an application for probate of the will and the issuance of proper
letters of administration in his favor. Abella et. al. filed an opposition against the
application alleging that the will was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of the law as it was not paged correlatively in letters; nor was there any
attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the
presence of each other. The trial court overruled the opposition of the contestants
and ordered the probate of the will WoN the will can be admitted to probate – YES
because despite there being no attestation clause in the inventory, there was still
compliance with the law given that the will itself has an attestation clause and
referred to the inventory as an integral part of it (See doctrine). Further, there is
no need that the numbering was not in letters given that way on how they
numbered the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law. They also
failed to prove that not all of the pages were signed in the presence of each other.
Palileo's testimony which stated that one of the pages of the will had not been
signed by the witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the day of its execution is entirely
contradicted not only in the direct, but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. Palileo's
testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting witnesses, Gonzalo Abaya and
Eugenio Zalamea. And although not all the witnesses were produced when an
opposition was presented, the case at bar falls within the exceptions of the rule
(when it appears that the witness is hostile to the cause of the proponent). The
non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, does not render void the
decree of the court a quo, allowing the probate since said witness was openly
hostile to the proponents.
DOCTRINE: When in a will reference is made to an inventory of the properties
of the testator, which has thus been made a part of the will, if the will has an
attestation clause that meets the requirements of the law, no other attestation
clause is necessary for the said inventory, but that of the will be sufficient for the
validity both of the will and the inventory.
FACTS:
40. Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, residing in the Municipality of
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an
attached inventory of her properties, in the presence of 3 witnesses, who
signed with her all the pages of said documents.
41. When the testatrix died, Pedro Unson, filed with the CFI of Laguna an
application for probate of the will and the issuance of proper letters of
administration in his favor.
42. Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito (Abella
et. al.) filed an opposition against the application alleging that the will was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of the law as it was not paged
correlatively in letters; nor was there any attestation clause (this
contention is the one related sa syllabus) in it, nor was it signed by the
testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
43. The trial court overruled the opposition of the contestants and ordered the
probate of the will, holding that the documents contained the true and last
will of the deceased.
44. An appeal was made and Abella et. al. contends that the lower courts erred.
45. In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not
signed by the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of the
will, basing their contention on the testimony of Aurelio Palileo, who says
that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one of the pages of the will
had not been signed by the witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the day of its
execution.
46. Further, they also contend that the court erred in admitting the will to probate
notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce one of the attesting
witnesses.
47. Lastly, contends that the inventory of the properties (separate document from
the will) has no attestation clause in it and its paging is made in Arabic
numerals and not in letters.
ISSUE/s: WoN the will can be admitted to probate – YES because despite there being
no attestation clause in the inventory, there was still compliance with the law given
that the will itself has an attestation clause and referred to the inventory as an integral
part of it.
RULING: Adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, and followed in Aldaba vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the
solemnities of a will, we nd that the judgment appealed from should be, as is hereby,
a rmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
RATIO:
35. One of the errors assigned by the Abella et. al. was that the inventory did not
contain any attestation clause.
36. However, the will itself has an attestation clause and referred to the inventory
as an integral part of it.
37. The Court finds that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with
section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a
will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the
inventory.
38. When in a will reference is made to an inventory of the properties of the
testator, which has thus been made a part of the will, if the will has an
attestation clause that meets the requirements of the law, no other
 attestation clause is necessary for the said inventory, but that of the will witness has been in frequent communication with the contestants and their
be sufficient for the validity both of the will and the inventory. attorney, and has refused to hold any conference with the attorneys for the
39. As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals instead of in letters, the court proponent.
adheres to the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba v. Roque, where the
folios were paged with “A, B, C” instead ont the letters in “one, two, three”.
40. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance
with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates
the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of
them.
41. And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the
testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament
and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause.
42. Abella et. al further contends that as per Palileo’s testimony, one of the pages
of the will had not been signed by the witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the
day of its execution.
43. However, Palileo's testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya not
only in the direct, but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. To our mind, Palileo's
testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting witnesses, Gonzalo Abaya
and Eugenio Zalamea.
44. Abella et. al. tried to impeach the credibility of Zalamea’s testimony by
saying it is partial/bias given that there was a connection of it with the
dismissal of a criminal against a nephew of his but the Court ruled that this
allegation is of little importance to impeach the credibility of the witness
Zalamea, especially because his testimony is corroborated by the other
attesting witness, Gonzalo Abaya, and by attorney Luis Abaya, who had
prepared the testament at the instance of the testatrix
45. Further, the fact that one of the attesting witnesses was not produced will not
stop the will from being admitted to probate given that one of the exceptions
are present.
46. While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the
testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless as a
general rule, when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must
be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.
47. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, the general rule is that, where
opposition is made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be
produced. But there are exceptions to this rule, for instance, when a witness
is dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for
truth has been questioned or he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.
48. In such cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of
said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is
satisfied that the will has been duly executed.
49. The non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for
by the attorney for the proponent at the trial, does not render void the decree
of the court a quo, allowing the probate.
50. Said witness was openly hostile to the proponent, inasmuch as since the
announcement of the trial of the petition for the probate of the will, said
 016 REYES vs. CA (LAGUILLES)
October 30, 1997 Torres, Jr., J. | Extrinsic Validity in Probate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Salid Villanueva vda. De Bataclan and the minors Norma,
Luzviminda, Elenita, Oscar and Alfredo Bataclan
RESPONDENTS: Mariano Medina
SUMMARY: Torcuator Reyes executed his last will and testament, bequeathing
all his personal properties and 50% of his real estate properties to his wife,
Asuncion Reyes. It was signed by Reyes in the presence of three witnesses.
Private respondent Julio Vivares was designated as executor and in his
incapacity or default, his son Roch Alan Vivares. When Reyes died, Vivares
filed a petition for probate of the will before the RTC. The recognized children
and natural children (two sets of children from two different women) of Reyes
filed an opposition, alleging that the will was not executed according to the
formalities of law, and that Asuncion Reyes exerted undue influence upon
Reyes. The opposition also claimed that Reyes was never married to Asuncion
because the latter was married to another man. The trial court declared that the
will was executed according to the formalities of law. It also ruled that Asuncion
was never married to Reyes. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but
modified the provisions which the former declared invalid. The CA held that
since the oppositors did not show competent evidence that Asuncion’s marriage
to Reyes was void. The issue in this case is WoN the trial court and the CA erred
in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
The SC held in the affirmative. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings
are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. Thus, the Court merely requires on its due execution, whether or not it
complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of
the testator. It does not determine the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions.
The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however,
certain circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity can first be scrutinized, when
the defect is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a
useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The lower court was not asked to
rule upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and as a result, the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes was his wife did not have to be
scrutinized during the probate proceedings.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. It does not
determine the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic validity
is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the
will has been proved and allowed.
FACTS:
1. Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring:
a. That he bequeaths to his wife Asuncion Reyes all his shares of their personal
properties consisting of jewelry, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares,
furniture, fixtures and the building;
b. All his shares consisting of ½ or 50% of all the real estate he owns in
common with his brother Jose, situated in Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong,
Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta.
Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.
2. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the
presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad
Gaputan. Private respondent Julio Vivares was designated the executor and
in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan Vivares.
3. Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, Vivares filed a petition for
probate of the will before the RTC. It was set for hearing and the order was
published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation,
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were also sent to all the
persons named in the petition.
4. The recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo
(Manuel, Mila, and Danilo Reyes), and the deceased’s natural children with
Celsa Agape (Lyn and Marites Agape), filed an opposition with the following
allegations:
a. That the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested
according to the formalities of law; and
b. That Asuncion Reyes Ebarle executed undue and improper influence upon
Reyes at the time of the execution of the will.
5. The opposition also averred that Reyes was never married to and could never
marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will,
because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still alive and
and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion could not be a
compulsory heir.
6. Trial court issued an order declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction over the
petition and therefore allowed the presentation of evidence. The trial court
declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never married to
Reyes and therefore, their relationship was an adulterous case.
7. The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except that part which was
declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.
8. Vivares filed an appeal with the CA on the ground that the oppositors failed
to present any competent evidence that Asuncion was legally married to
another person during the period of her cohabitation with Reyes.
9. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the provisions which
the trial court declared invalid. The CA held that since the oppositors did not
show any competent evidence that Asuncion’s marriage to Reyes was void,
it was error for the trial court to strike down the provisions of the will as void
for being contrary to law and morals.
10. Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the CA was contrary
to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion
 Oning Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree.
11. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin. They
were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of
the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio pursuant to Art. 38
of the Family Code.They also alleged that Oning was already married to Lupo
Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with Reyes. Petitioners attached a copy
of the marriage certificate of Asuncion and Lupo Ebarle.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the CA erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will – YES,
because probate proceedings only pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will.
to his wife, Asuncion Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit
relationship.
10. The Court agrees with the CA that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion was still married to another during the
time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were
merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo
Ebarle.
11. Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the CA by presenting belatedly a
copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their
failure to present the said certificate before the probate court constituted a
waiver and the same can no longer be entertained on appeal.

RULING: Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for
review is DENIED for lack of merit.

RATIO:
1. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the Court merely
requires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator.
2. It does not determine the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The
intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed.
3. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was
first determined as when the defect is apparent on its face and the probate of
the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
4. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical
considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or
testamentary provisions are doubtful. Where the parties agree that the
intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so.
5. The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the
will of the late Torcuato Reyes.
6. The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and as a result, the declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate
proceedings.
7. The propriety of the institution of Asuncion Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity,
which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
8. The trial court erred in invoking Nepomuceno vs. CA because in that case, the
testator admitted his illicit relationship with the devisee. Thus, the very tenor
of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
9. The case mentioned is different from the case at bar. Torcuator merely stated
in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties
 017 Balanay v. Martinez (Hilario)
June 27, 1975 | Aquino, J. | Art. 838-839 CC, Rule 76 ROC
PETITIONER: Felix Balanay Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Antonio M. Martinez
SUMMARY: Felix Balanay Jr. filed a petition for the probate of the will of Leodegaria
Julian, his mother. (see fact 2 for the contents of the will) His father, Felix Sr., opposed
the probate of the will. Responding to this, Felix Jr. attached an affidavit of Felix Sr.
where he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate. Felix Sr. also signed an instrument captioned “Conformation
of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights, where he manifested that out of
respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate
in favor of their six children. The lower court denied the opposition, and reset for
hearing the probate of the will However, the counsel of the family filed a motion for
leave of court to withdraw probate of the alleged will, and requested authority to
proceed by the intestate estate proceeding. The lower court granted this motion, and it
dismissed the petition for probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
one, and ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding
for hearing. The issue is WON the court was correct in dismissing the petition for
probate—NO, the court was wrong. It should have proceeded with probate because it
it generally mandatory, according to Art. 838 of the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE: Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil
Code). Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate.
FACTS:
32. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973
in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban
and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
33. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English.
a. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared
1. that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots
2. that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
inherited from her father, and
3. that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of her properties.
4. Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death
(he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be
divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.
34. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
35. Felix Balanay, Sr. (her husband) and Avelina B. Antionio (case did not mention
how they were related) opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from
the testatrix.
36. In reply to the opposition, Felix Jr. attached an affidavit of Felix Sr. where he
withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate. Felix Sr. also signed an instrument captioned
“Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights, where he
manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument
he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death,
that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her
will.
37. Antonio in her rejoinder claims the affidavit and conformation of Felix Sr. to be
void.
38. The lower court denied the opposition, and reset for hearing the probate of
the will and acknowledged the affidavit and conformity of Felix Sr.
39. Both oppositors moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.
40. Meanwhile, David Montaña, claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Sr. and his
children, filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of alledged will
of Leodegaria Julian, and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding.
a. Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He
prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be
converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he
asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
41. Antonio agreed with the motion for issuance of anotice to creditors, and prayed
the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be
declared.
42. The lower court agreed, and it dismissed the petition for probate, converted
the testate proceeding into an intestate one, and ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing.
43. Felix Jr., after changing counsel, moved for reconsideration, on the ground that
Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the
will. Attached to the motion was their letter wherein he and his siblings terminated
Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the
probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated
reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
ISSUE/s:
9. WoN the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding—YES,
because in general, the probate of the will is mandatory.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974
(FACT 11) are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973 (FACT 7), setting for hearing
the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further
proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against
the private respondents.
RATIO:
49. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue.
50. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to
be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if
the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
"Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid
parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries."
51. The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner
thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code).
But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be
disregarded.
52. The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept
intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080
of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right
granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children
to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash.
53. The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among
her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-
half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more
children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that
the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain
undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate
should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be
effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are
compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
54. Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does
not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and
partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.
55. It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to
his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half
conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity
had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of
the compulsory heirs.
56. In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband
intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in
paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only
her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the
husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented
to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
57. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
58. It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of
the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in
an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate
court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the
probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code).
59. The very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof
that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed
in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that,
if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude
of the parties affected thereby.
60. Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose
of practically his whole estate.
 018 Rodriguez v Rodriguez (GUSTILO)
September 11, 2007| Ynares-Santiago, J | Probation of Will
PETITIONER: Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez (deceased so substituted by Susana
Llagas)
RESPONDENTS: Evangeline Rodriguez, Belen Rodriguez & Buenaventura
Rodriguez
SUMMARY: Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose
Street, Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City. On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed
a Huling Habilin at Testamento giving Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez (Cresenciana),
his live-in partner-Apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the
deceased husband of Evangeline Rodriguez)- Apartment A, Buenaventura Rodriguez-
Apartment B, and Belen Rodriguez- Apartment C. Then, Juanito executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Cresenciana. The case arose when
Cresenciana filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Evangeline, Buenaventura
& Belen, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property; and that
in 1984, she allowed Evangeline, Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness and
tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her
knowledge and consent, Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen separately leased the units
to Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated
demands, failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereo. In
their Answer, Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen claimed ownership over the subject
property by succession. They alleged that while Cresenciana is the registered owner
of the property, however, she is not the lawful owner thereof because the Deed of
Absolute Sale was simulated and void. As in the Civil Case now pending before the
RTC of Makati, which they filed to assail the validity of the said sale, Evangeline,
Buenaventura & Belen maintain that Cresenciana exerted undue influence over their
father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property for
only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in
the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Further, she had no cause of action against them for
being a party to the Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each other as co-
owners and partitioned the property in accordance with the provision of the last will
and testament. The MTC ruled in favor of Evangeline, et al, RTC reversed the decision
of MTC, CA reinstated decision of MTC.
The issue is WoN the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the
specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the
testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to Cresenciana prior to his
death?- NO it did not transmit ownership yet because Art 838 mandates that the will
first be probated and thus the Partition agreement executed in pursuance thereto cannot
be given effect.
The SC held that based on the 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito
Rodriguez; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and
Cresenciana; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of Cresenciana; and 4) the Partition
Agreement executed by Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen and Cresenciana,
Cresenciana had a better claim. Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen failed to prove
their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamentoand the Partition
Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will
can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor
of Cresenciana, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would
only pass to his heirs at the time of his death.
DOCTRINE: Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed
pursuant thereto can not be given effect.
FACTS:
*NOTE: Cresenciana is now deceased but it did not mention when she died so
just used Cresenciana throughout the case. In case Sir asks, she is substituted by
Susana Llagas
44. Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street,
Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City. On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a Huling
Habilin at Testamento giving Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez (Cresenciana), his
live-in partner-Apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the
deceased husband of Evangeline Rodriguez)- Apartment A, Buenaventura
Rodriguez-Apartment B, and Belen Rodriguez- Apartment C.
45. On June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
favor of Cresenciana. Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT was
issued in the name of Cresenciana.
46. The case arose when Cresenciana filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen, alleging that she is the lawful and registered
owner of the property; and that in 1984, she allowed Evangeline, Buenaventura
and Belen, out of kindness and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D,
respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent, Evangeline,
Buenaventura & Belen separately leased the units to Montano Magpantay, Mel
Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to
vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereof.
47. In their Answer, Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen claimed ownership over the
subject property by succession. They alleged that while Cresenciana is the
registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful owner thereof
because the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. As in the Civil Case
now pending before the RTC of Makati, which they filed to assail the validity of
the said sale, Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen maintain that Cresenciana
exerted undue influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to
agree to the sale of the property for only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two
apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Further, she
had no cause of action against them for being a party to the Partition Agreement
wherein they recognized each other as co-owners and partitioned the property in
accordance with the provision of the last will and testament.
48. The MTC rendered a judgement in favor of Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen
and held that the deed of sale was simulated otherwise Cresenciana would not
 have entered into the Partition Agreement, which legally conferred upon each heir
exclusive ownership over their respective shares.
49. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that Cresenciana’s certificate
of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; and
that unless and until said title has been annulled by a court of competent
jurisdiction, such title is existing and valid. This is true also with respect to the
deed of sale. The present action, which involves only the issue of physical or
material possession, is not the proper action to challenge it. Further, the MTC
erred when it relied heavily on the Huling Habilin at Testamento, which was not
probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition
Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at
Testamento should not also be considered.
50. The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the MTC correctly
received evidence on ownership since the question of possession could not be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Further, the Huling Habilin at
Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments not only to
Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen but also to Cresenciana; and pursuant thereto,
the parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the
testator. Cresenciana filed a petition for review.
51. Cresenciana alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys
the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in
an ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the
court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to
determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership
because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership
which is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Cresencia insists
that the CA erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not
probated yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the
property to Cresencia prior to his death.
52. As for Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen pray that the instant petition for review
be dismissed since the resolution of the question of ownership by the MTC and
the CA was provisional only to resolve the issue of possession. Cresenciana can
always avail of legal remedies to have the issue of ownership passed upon by the
proper court. Aware of the provisional nature of the resolution on ownership in
ejectment cases, they filed a Civil Case to assail the validity of the deed of sale of
the property and the registration thereof in Cresenciana’s name.
ISSUE/s:
10. WoN the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific
apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that
the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to Cresenciana
prior to his death?- NO it did not transmit ownership yet because Art 838
mandates that the will first be probated and thus the Partition agreement
executed in pursuance thereto cannot be given effect.
Other issue:
11. WoN the question of ownership can be raised in an ejectment case?- YES
but it is merely provisional to determine who between the parties has the
better right of possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC reversing the
decision of the MTC is reinstated.
RATIO:
61. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds
possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee
or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The sole issue to
be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto. Being a summary
proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of property, the question of title is not
involved and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action
in the proper court.
62. In the case at bar, Cresenciana’s cause of action for unlawful detainer was
based on her alleged ownership of land and that she merely tolerated
Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen’s stay thereat. However, when they
leased the apartments to other persons without her consent, their possession
as well as those persons claiming right under them became unlawful upon
their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the rent. On the other hand,
Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen assailed Cresenciana’s title by claiming
that the deed of sale upon which it was based was simulated and
void. They insisted that they were co-owners thus, they have the right to
possess the said property. To prove their claim, they presented the Huling
Habilin at Testamento of Juanito Rodriguez and the Partition Agreement.
63. The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving
at their respective decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the
MTC and Court of Appeals: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by
Juanito Rodriguez; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito
Rodriguez and Cresenciana; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of
Cresenciana; and 4) the Partition Agreement executed by Evangeline,
Buenaventura & Belen and Cresenciana.
64. Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is
preponderance of evidence in favor of Cresenciana’s claim. Evangeline,
Buenaventura & Belen failed to prove their right of possession, as
the Huling Habilin at Testamentoand the Partition Agreement have no
legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have
force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that no will
 shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated, the
Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be
given effect. Thus, the fact that Cresenciana was a party to said
agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of
possession.
65. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of Cresenciana,
Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only
pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he
had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or
not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in the
Civil Case, an action instituted by Evangeline, Buenaventura & Belen
for that purpose.

Question of owernship in an ejectment case

66. We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land described therein; the validity of which shall not be
subject to a collateral attack, especially in an ejectment case which is
summary in nature.
67. We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only
provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of
possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership,
which is the subject matter of the Civil Case.
68. Our ruling that Cresenciana has a better right of possession was arrived
at on the basis of evidence without prejudice to the eventual outcome of
the annulment case, where the issue as to who has title to the property in
question is fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment
suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

019 HEIRS OF URETA v. HEIRS OF URETA (GUECO)

September 14, 2011 | Mendoza, J. | Preterition
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely:
CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-
GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA- SOLANO, NENA URETA-
TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF
POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON
POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T.
URETA
RESPONDENTS: HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F.
URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR.,
EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY
F. URETA, ZALDY F. URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS
OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO,
WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P.
CORDOVA, EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M.
URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely:
EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T. URETA- VILLARUEL; ROQUE
M. URETA; ADELA URETA- GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M.
URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK
RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA;
JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and
BENEDICT URETA
SUMMARY: Alfonso had begotten 14 children. One of which was Policronio.
Sometime during his lifetime, Alfonso wanted to reduce the inheritance tax that
he would pay, so he made it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his
children (Policronio included) and his wife. When he died, his children executed
an extrajudicial partition over the land covered by the deed of sale. Conrado,
Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. When the Heirs of Policronio
learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate,
they averred that the extra-judicial partition is void because Conrado’s consent
was vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition without the authority or consent of his co-heirs. The RTC
ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. However, the CA annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. As such,
the Heirs of Alfonso brought this case to the SC arguing that without the Heirs of
Policronio in the partition, or with the lack of authority of their representative,
the result is not the invalidity of the entire deed of partition, but a preterition.
ISSUE: WON a preterition exists—NO. PRETERITION IS A CONCEPT OF
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION. IT REQUIRES A WILL TO EXIST. IN
THIS CASE, THERE WAS NO WILL INVOLVED; HENCE, NO
PRETERITION. RULING: Preterition, being a concept of testamentary
succession, requires a will. In this case, since there was no will, there can thus be
no preterition.
DOCTRINE: Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory
heir from the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a
compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at
all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly
disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. It is thus a
concept of testamentary succession and requires a will.
FACTS:
53. Alfonso Ureta (“Alfonso”) was financially well-off during his lifetime. He
owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and
was engaged in the buying and selling of copra.
54. Alfonso begot 14 children, namely: Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia,
Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda,
Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. Of all of them, only Policronio failed to finish
schooling. Instead, he worked on his father’s lands.
55. Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children (Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco) met at the house of Liberato.
56. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce
the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some
of his lands to his children.
57. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several
parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-
law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25,
1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the
properties disputed in this case.
58. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes, and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the
lands and their produce.
59. When Policronio died, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds
of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes.
60. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
61. On July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published
in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. They averred that the extra-
judicial partition is void because Conrado’s consent was vitiated by mistake
and undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
62. The RTC found that Conrado’s credibility had faltered, and his claims were
rejected by the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On the basis of such, the RTC
 ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of Extra- Judicial
Partition.
63. On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition under
Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding that a special power of attorney
was lacking as required under Article 1878 (5)9 and (15)10 of the Civil Code.
64. The Heirs of Alfonso brought this case to the SC arguing that without the
Heirs of Policronio in the partition, or with the lack of authority of their
represantive (Conrado), the result is not the invalidity of the entire deed of
partition, but a preterition.
ISSUE/s:
12. WoN preterition exists in this case—NO. PRETERITION IS A CONCEPT
OF TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION. IT REQUIRES A WILL TO
EXIST. IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS NO WILL INVOLVED; HENCE,
NO PRETERITION.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition
in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision and October
14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are hereby
MODIFIED in this wise: (1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19,
1989, is VALID, and (2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby
DELETED.
RATIO:
69. First, Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bar. It has been
held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of
another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict
dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.
70. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under
the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where
no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
9
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or
acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;
10
(15) Any other act of strict dominion.
71. Secondly, Article 1390 (1) is inapplicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the
incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in the
case at bench though is not Conrado’s incapacity to give consent to the
contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so.
72. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
73. Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity
to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered
the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having
been entered into without their authority.
74. Lastly, on preterition. The Heirs of Alfonso posit that without the Heirs of
Policronio in the partition, or with the lack of authority of their represantive,
the result is not the invalidity of the entire deed of partition, but a preterition.
However, the SC stated that this is erroneous. This is because preterition is
a concept of testamentary succession. In the absence of a will, it cannot
exist. In this case, there was no will involved; hence, preterition cannot
apply.
75. Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir
from the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard
to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned
in the will in the latter case.
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to a contract; (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled
by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.
 020 PALAGANAS v. PALAGANAS (Gonzales)
January 26, 2011 | Abad, J. | Probate of a will executed abroad by a foreigner
PETITIONERS: Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
RESPONDENT: Ernesto Palaganas
SUMMARY: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, died single
and childless. She designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for her
properties in the Philippines and the U.S. Ernersto, another brother, filed with the RTC
a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. However, Manuel and Benjamin (nephews) opposed on
the ground that the will should be probated in the U.S. where it was executed. RTC
issued an order admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will and appointing Ernesto as
special administrator at the request of Sergio and issuing the Letter of Special
Administration to Ernesto. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. Manuel and
Benjamin argue that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The issue is WoN a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed – YES. Our rules require merely that the petition for the
allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has
not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated
in the country of its execution. In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California, Manuel and Benjamin obviously
have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court.
DOCTRINE: The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
FACTS:
1. Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen,
died single and childless.
2. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for her properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S.
3. Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC Malolos, Bulacan,
a petition for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as
special administrator of her estate.
4. However, Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition
on the ground that Ruperta's will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where she executed it. Further, assuming Ruperta's will
could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testator's full understanding of
the consequences of such act. Ernesto, is also not qualified to act as
administrator of the estate.
5. Meantime, since Ruperta's foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and
Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit,
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition,
which it granted.
6. RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta's last will; (b)
appointing Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto.
7. CA affirmed the decision. The RTC properly allowed the probate of the
will, subject to Ernesto's submission of the authenticated copies of the
documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. Section
2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate,
which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad.
8. Hence, this petition.
9. Manuel and Benjamin argue that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines. Local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the
proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such
foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its
laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law
on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with
the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
ISSUE:
1. WoN a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed – YES. The rules do not require proof that
the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
RULING: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
2. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
3. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of
the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)
if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it.
4. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting,
or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.
5. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
6. In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind
the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed
in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate
court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. caTIDE
7. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of
the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
8. Notably, the assailed RTC order is nothing more than an initial ruling that
the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta's will
and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special
administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the
due execution of the will, i.e., the testator's state of mind at the time of the
execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws
of California.
 021 PECSON v. CORONEL (GALINDEZ)
October 11, 1923 | Romualdez, J. | Designation of an heir when there are no
compulsory heirs
PETITIONER: Lorenzo Pecson
RESPONDENTS: Agustin Coronel et al.
SUMMARY: Back story: Dolores made a will (Exhibit A, see Fact 1), and her then
lawyer, Atty. Francisco suggested that a new will be made (Exhibit B, see Ratio 8) in
order for the original will to comply with the formalities required by law.
Dolores Coronel, in her will, excluded her relatives from her will. Lorenzo Pecson
filed for the probate of the will. He is the husband of Angela Coronel, a niece of the
deceased Dolores. The probate of the will is opposed by Dolores’ relatives,
respondents in this case. They allege that it is not natural for Dolores to exclude her
relatives and assign Lorenzo Pecson as her sole heir, who is a mere relative by affinity.
Relevant issue: WoN the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as Dolores’ sole heir is valid
– YES
The Court here stated that the liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are
no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code: “Any person who [h]as no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person
qualified to acquire it.”
As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary nor a caprice or a
whim of the moment. The proof adduced by him, although contradicted, shows by a
preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had
been rendered by him to Dolores since 1914, he had also rendered services prior to
that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the
last years of her life. The Court does not find anything strange in the preterition made
by Dolores of her blood relatives, not in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole
beneficiary.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses
absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases
without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the
requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by
fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural,
unreasonable, or unjust.
FACTS:
1. On November 28, 1922, the CFI of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Dolores Coronel a Document (Exhibit A) which translated is as
follows:
a. I, Dolores Coronel, resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, Philippine
Islands, in the full exercise of my mental faculties, do hereby make my last
will and testament, and revoke all former wills by me executed.
b. I direct and order that my body be buried in conformity with my social
standing.
c. That having no forced heirs, I will all my properties, both movable and
immovable, to my nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to my niece
Angela Coronel, in consideration of the good services with he has rendered,
and is rendering to me with good will and disinterestedness and to my full
satisfaction.
d. I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all
that is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be
able to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I
name and appoint as substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, a
native and resident of the town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond.
e. All my real and paraphernal property as well as my credits for I declare that
I have no debts, are specified in an inventory.
f. In testimony whereof and as I do not know how to write my name, I have
requested Vicente J. Francisco to write my name at the foot hereof and on
the left margin of each of its sheet before me and all the undersigned
witnesses this July 1, 1918.
2. The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, Angela Coronel’s
husband who is a niece of the deceased Dolores.
3. This is opposed by Eriberto Coronel et al. (Dolores’ relatives)
4. The probate of the will is impugned on the following grounds:
a. That the proof does not [show] that the document Exhibit A contains
the last will of Dolores Coronel
b. That the attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions
of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 2645)
5. The contentions of the opponents are the following:
a. It was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should
dispose of her estate, as set forth in Exhibit A, her true being that the
same be distributed among her blood relatives
b. If such will not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal
influence.
ISSUE/s:
1. RELEVANT: WoN the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as Dolores’ sole heir
is valid – YES, because any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by
will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire it.
2. WoN the true last will of Dolores was expressed in the testament Exhibit A
– YES, because the fact that Dolores foresaw the necessity of an executor
does not imply a negation of her desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo
Pecson.
RULING: In conclusion we hold that the assignments of error made by the appellants
are not supported by the evidence of record.

RATIO:
First Issue
1. The opponents allege that it was not the will of the testatrix because it is not
natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from
her estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by affinity,
and that there is no motive for such exclusion.
2. In fact, they allege that she maintained very cordial relations with the
aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of
her lands.
3. However, it reveals from a TSN (testimony of Atty. Francisco) that Dolores
revealed to him her suspicion against some of her nephews as having been
accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim.
4. The opponents admit that Lorenzo Pecson rendered services to Dolores at
least from the year 1914.
5. Although ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
6. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs
is rendered sacred by the Civil Code:
a. Any person who [h]as no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property
or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it.
7. As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary nor a
caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by him, although
contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services
which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores since 1914,
he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator and
manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life
8. That this was not the whim of the moment is shown by the fact six years
before the execution of the will in question, Lorenzo Pecson was named and
appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the Document (Exhibit B):
a. That my present property was acquired by me by inheritance from my
parents, but a great part thereof was acquired by me by my own efforts and
exertions;
b. That I have made no inventory of my properties, but they can be seen in the
title deeds in my possession and in the declarations of ownership;
c. That I institute Lorenzo Pecson, married to Angela Coronel, and a
known resident of the town, my heir to succeed to all my properties;
d. That I appoint my said heir, Lorenzo Pecson, as executor, and, in his
default, Victor Pecson, a resident of the same town;
9. The opponents find in Exhibit B something to support their contention that
the intention of Dolores was to institute Lorenzo Pecson not as sole
beneficiary, but simply as executor and distributor of all her estate among
heir heirs, for while Lorenzo Pecson’s contention that he was appointed sole
beneficiary is based on the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of Dolores in
1918 and administered all her property, he did not exclusively have this
confidence and administration in the year 1912.
10. But although such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Lorenzo
Pecson always jointly with others and never exclusively, this fact does not
show that the will of the testatrix was to appoint Lorenzo Pecson only as
executor and distributor of her estate among the heirs, nor does it prevent her,
the testatrix, from instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor
does it constitute, lastly, a test for determining whether or not such institution
in favor of Lorenzo Pecson was the true will of the testatrix.
11. Hence, the Court does not find anything strange in the preterition made by
Dolores of her blood relatives, not in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as
her sole beneficiary. Also, although the institution of the beneficiary is not
the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
a. In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute
dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases
without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator
possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered
invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can
prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as
unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already
been shown, the unreasonable or injustice of a will may be considered on
the question of testamentary capacity.
12. The testamentary capacity of Dolores is not disputed.
Second Issue
13. Around 1916, Dolores showed Exhibit B to Atty. Francisco, her then legal
adviser and who, considering that in order to make the expression of her last
will more legally valid, advised Dolores that the will be remade (to conform
with laws and extrinsic formalities required by Act 2645).
14. She followed such and after receiving her instructions, Atty. Francisco drew
the will Exhibit A and brought it to Dolores for execution.
15. Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores in her presence and that of
witnesses and aksed her whether the will was according to her wishes.
Dolores said it was and requested Atty. Francisco to sign the will for her,
which he did in the presence of witnesses who in turn signed it.
16. Upon filing of the motion for a rehearing on the first order allowing the
probate of the will, the opponents presented an affidavit of Pablo saying that,
following Lorenzo Pecson’s instructions, he had informed the testatrix that
the contents of the will were that she entrusted Lorenzo Pecson with the
distribution of all her property among Dolores’ relatives.
17. However, during trial Pablo, in spite of him being present, was not presented
as a witness.
18. It was incumbent for the opponents to present Pablo to prove his statement
by affidavit.
19. The opponents call to the Court’s attention the fourth clause of the document:
a. “I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all
that is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be
able to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I
name and appoint as a substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson,
resident of the town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond”
20. They contend that this clause is repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo
Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her estate, for if such was the intention of
the testatrix, there would have been no necessity of appointing an executor,
nor any reason for designating a substitute in case that the first one should
not be able to discharge his duties, and they perceived in this clause the idea
which, according to them, was not expressed in the document, and which was
that Lorenzo Pecson was simply to be a mere executor entrusted with the
distribution to the estate among the relatives of the testatrix, and that should
he not be able to do so, this duty would devolved upon his substitutes.
21. But it is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute the estate. All executor
has, besides, other duties and general and special powers intended for the
preservation, defense, and liquidation of the estate so long as the same has
not reached, by order of the court, the hands of those entitled thereto.
22. The fact that Dolores foresaw the necessity of an executor does not imply a
negation of her desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It is to be noted,
furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that her body be given a burial in
accordance with her social standing and she had a perfect right to designate
a person who should see to it that this order was complied with. One of the
functions of an executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained in the will.
23. There is an allegation that the will of the testatrix was to will her estate to her
blood relatives, and the promise was maid to Maria Coronel, whom Rosario
Coronel tends to corroborate. However, such was not sufficiently proven.
24. In the absence of sufficient proof of fraud, or undue influence, we cannot take
such a promise into account, for even if such a promise was in fact made,
Dolores Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards and dispose of her estate
as she pleased. Wills themselves, which contain more than mere promises,
are essentially revocable.
25. It is said that the true will of Dolores Coronel not expressed in the will can
be inferred from the phrase used by Jose M. Reyes in his deposition when
speaking of the purpose for which Lorenzo Pecson was to receive the estate,
to wit:
a. In order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate
manner
26. Weight is given to this phrase from the circumstance that its author was
requested by Attorney Francisco to explain the contents of Exhibit B and had
acted as interpreter between Dolores Coronel and Attorney Francisco at their
interviews previous to the preparation of Exhibit A, and had translated into
the Pampango dialect this last document, and, lastly, was present at the
execution of the will in question.
27. As to whether or not the burden of proof was on the petitioner to establish
that he was the sole legatee to the exclusion of the relatives of Dolores
Coronel, we understand that it was not his duty to show the reasons which
the testatrix may have had for excluding her relatives from her estate, giving
preference to him. His duty was to prove that the will was voluntary and
authentic and he, who alleges that the estate was willed to another, has the
burden of proving his allegation.
28. Atty. Francisco is charged with having employed improper means of making
Lorenzo Pecson appear in the will as sole beneficiary. However, after an
examination of all the proceedings had, we cannot find anything in the
behavior of this lawyer, relative to the preparation and execution of the will,
that would justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his personal and
professional conduct, nor that he should harbor any wrongful or fraudulent
purpose.
29. There is nothing wrong with Atty. Francisco advising Dolores to make a new
will so that the instrument might be executed with all the new formalities
required by the laws then in force, nor the selection of witnesses, or in the
preparation of the new will substantially in accordance with the old one.
30. The fact that this attorney should presume that Dolores was to ask him to sign
the will for her and that he should prepare it containing this detail is not in
itself fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to presume, and it appears
that he asked her, through Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the
document in her stead.
31. As to Lorenzo Pecson, there is no sufficient proof to show that he should have
tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to frustrate the intention of
Dolores to leave her estate to her blood relatives.
Issue on Formalities of the Will (not relevant but in case Justice Hofs asks)
32. The opponents allege that the will was probated in spite of the fact that the
attestation clause was not in conformity with Sec. 619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
33. The attestation states:
a. The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to
be her last will testament in our presence, and as testatrix does not know
how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name
under her express direction in our presence at the foot and on the left margin
of each and every sheet hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed
these presents in the presence of others of the testatrix at the foot hereof and
on the margin of each and everyone of the two pages of which this document
is composed. These sheets are numbered correlatively with the words "one
and "two on the upper part of the face thereof.
34. They remark that it is not stated in the clause that the will was signed by the
witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each other
35. However, there is a phrase in the attestation clause which states “each of us
signed in the presence of others”
36. Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to the expression "of
others." One, that insinuated by the appellants, namely, that it is equivalent
to "of other persons," and the other, that contended by the appellee, to wit,
that the phrase should be held to mean "of the others," the article "the" having
inadvertently been omitted.
37. Should the first interpretation prevail and "other persons" be taken to mean
persons different from the attesting witnesses, then one of the solemnities
required by law would be lacking. Should the second be adopted and "of
others" construed as meaning the other witnesses to the will, then the law
would have been complied with in this respect.
38. Including the concomitant words, the controverted phrase results thus: "each
of us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix."
39. The Court believes it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase
"of others" as meaning "of the other witnesses," and that a grammatical or
clerical error was committed consisting in the omission of the article "the".
40. Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance
when the intention is manifest in the will.
 022 DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (Fordan)
May 19, 1903 | Willard, J. | Description of Legatees
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Ramon del Rosario
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Clemente del Rosario
SUMMARY: Ramon, son, filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against his father,
Clemente, who was then the executor, for the enforcement of the provisions in the
wills of his deceased uncle and aunt, Don Nicolas and Doña Honorata del Rosario.
Ramon, Enrique, and Luisa were stated as the natural children of Clemente in both
wills of Don Nicolas and Doña Honorata. Don Nicolas died on July 14, 1987 while
Doña Honorata died on July 7, 1900. Furthermore, Luisa died a year after Don Nicolas
while Enrique died a day before Doña Honorata. Due to all of this, Ramon claimed
that he is now entitled, by virtue of both wills, to a certain part of the share of the
estates left to Luisa during her life. However, Clemente claimed that Ramon is not
entitled, because the gift to him was conditional, the condition being that he should be
his natural son and recognized by ways stated in the Civil Code. Ramon has only
provided parol evidence which was prohibited by the Civil Code, and thus, he has not
complied with the condition. Ramon countered that such evidence was proper and that
both wills state he was his natural son and that in any event, the bequests were made
to him by his name. The CFI ordered judgment in favor of Ramon. Hence, the current
petition.
The issue in this case is whether or not Ramon is entitled to the share of the estates left
to Luisa during her life. YES. The SC held that as to the disposition of that part of the
inheritance left in Doña Honorata’s will to Luisa for life is concerned, the question is
free from doubt. It is distinctly declared that Ramon and Enrique shall take certain
parts of it after P1,000 have been deducted. Both Ramon and Enrique are pointed out
by name as the legatees. It is true that they are called the natural sons of Clemente. But
this is merely a further description of persons already well identified, and, if false, can
be rejected in accordance with the provision of Art. 773 (now 844) of the Civil Code,
which by Art. 789 is applicable to legatees. As stated in the 9th clause of the will of
Doña Honorata, Ramon was entitled to ½ of this legacy in his own right. This has been
paid to him.
DOCTRINE: Where legatees are pointed out by name in the will the fact that they
are referred to as the natural sons of a third person does not make the legacy
conditional upon proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.
*NOTE: Some of the Civil Code provisions mentioned in this case have no current counterpart since I could
not exactly find them and I think some of the numbers were not really in their proper order. L
11
Seventh.The testator desires and wills that in the distribution of his property and that of his wife among
the male children of his brothers, Clemente and Rosendo, and those of his sister, Luisa, in such
distribution his nephews Enrique and Ramon must be understood to be included, in addition to the
legacies mentioned in his said testament.
FACTS:
76. Ramon del Rosario (Ramon), son, filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila
against his father, Clemente del Rosario (Clemente), who was then the
executor, for the enforcement of the provisions in the wills of his deceased
uncle and aunt, Don Nicolas and Doña Honorata del Rosario.
77. On July 14, 1987, Don Nicolas del Rosario (Don Nicolas) died with a will.
The following were the pertinent provisions:
Seventh. The testator states that in the present condition of his affairs he has
acquired, during his married lifesome tens of thousands of dollars, of which
one-half belongs to his wife as her share of the profits of the conjugal
partnership, and the other half belongs to him as his share of such profits; but,
in view of the agreement entered into between the two spouses, the property
will not be partitioned, and upon the death of the testator all the said property
will pass to his wife, in order that she may enjoy the revenue therefrom during
her lifetime, but without authority to convey any of such property, inasmuch
as she, being grateful for the benefit resulting to her, binds herself in turn to
deliver said property at her death to the testator's brothers, Clemente and
Rosendo del Rosario (Rosendo), and his sister, Luisa del Rosario (Luisa), who
shall enjoy the revenue from the said property during their respective lives,
and shall then, in turn, transmit the same to their male children, both those
born in wedlock and natural children who may be known. [This was modified
by a codicil11]
Eighth. The testator declares that the P5,000 which he brought to his marriage
he hereby bequeathes to his nephews Enrique Gloria y Rosario (Enrique) and
Ramon, natural children of his brother Clemente, notwithstanding the fact that
they purport to be the issue of the marriage of Escolastico Gloria and
Rosendo, successively.
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of P5,000 is to be divided,
P3,000 for Enrique and P2,000 for Ramon, the delivery of the said sums to
be effected by the wife of the testator, provided that these young men behave
themselves as they have done up to the present time, and do not cease to study
until taking the degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a business course, if
their health will permit, their support to be paid out of the testamentary estate
and they to live in the house of the widow.
Eleventh. The testator declares that in case the said young men should be still
engaged in study at the time of the death of the testator's wife, they shall
continue to be supported at the expense of the testamentary estate, without
deducting such expenses from their legacies, if they should desire to continue
the same studies.
Thirteenth. The testator declares that in case Luisa should die before or after
the wife of the testator, then the legacy due her by virtue of this will shall not
pass in its entirety to her male children, except as to the sum of P1,000, the
remainder to pass to Enrique and Ramon, natural sons of Clemente as already
stated. [This was modified by a codicil12]
12
Thirteenth. The testator provided that upon the death of his sister, Luisa, her male children were to
inherit from her up to the sum of P1,000, and this he rectifies, for better understanding, to the effect that it
is his will that the remainder of all her portion
 Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife is at the present
time 55 years of age, and consequently is not likely to marry again, as she
herself says, nevertheless it is possible that the opposite of what she asserts
might occur, and, if so, then it is to be regarded as sufficient reason to
authorize Ramon and Enrique to separate from their aunt, in which event they
are to be supported by the testamentary estate on a small allowance of
P25/month, provided that they continue their studies or should be in poor
health, this without in any respect reducing the amount of their shares.
78. On other hand, Doña Honorata made her will 3 days after that of Don Nicolas
and she died on July 7, 1900. The following was one of the provisions:
Seventh. The testatrix declares that she institutes her beloved husband, Don
Nicolas, as her heir to all the property which she may have at her death, and
in the unexpected case of the death of her said husband then she institutes as
heirs her brothers-in-law, Rosendo and Clemente, and her sister-inlaw, Luisa,
who shall enjoy the usufruct during their lifetime of all the revenue of the said
property. Upon the death of any of them, then the property shall pass to the
male children of her said brothers-in-law and sister-in-law, the issue of lawful
marriage or natural children who may be known; but upon the death of her
sisterin-law, Luisa, then her share shall not pass in its entirety to her male
children, except the sum of P1,000, and the remainder shall be paid to her
nephews, Enrique and Ramon, natural children of her brother-in-law
Clemente.
79. However, Luisa died one year after Don Nicolas while Enrique died a day
before Doña Honorata.
80. Due to all of this, Ramon claimed that he is now entitled, by virtue of both
wills, to:
a. receive an allowance from the death of Doña Honorata, widow of Don
Nicolas, at the rate of P75/month;
b. live in the house in which Doña Honorata was living at that time;
c. a certain part of the share of the estates left to Luisa during her life; and
d. account for all properties and proceed to the partition of said estates.
81. On the other hand, Clemente claimed that Ramon is entitled to nothing under
the wills, because the gift to him was conditional, the condition being that he
should be his natural son and recognized by ways stated in the Civil Code.
However, Ramon only provided parol evidence which was prohibited by the
Civil Code, and thus, he has not complied with the condition.
82. Ramon countered that such evidence was proper and that both wills state he
was his natural son and that in any event, the bequests were made to him by
his name.
83. The CFI then ordered judgment in favor of Ramon with respect to the
allowance and the right to live in the house. It further hold that parol evidence
is immaterial and that Ramon is entitled to his share.
84. Hence, this current petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon is entitled to all his claims (fact no. 5) as stated in
the provisions of both wills of Don Nicolas and Doña Honorata. – NO, Ramon is
13 "The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her nephews Enrique Gloria and Ramon del Rosario
in equal parts—that is, 1,500 pesos each."
only entitled to be paid a total of P3,000 from the will of Doña Honorata and a share
of the estate left by the will of Doña Honorata to Luisa during her life, after deducting
P1,000.
RULING: The judgment of the CFI of Manila is reversed and the case remanded with
directions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. The costs of this instance
will be equally divided between the parties. So ordered.
RATIO:
(IMPORTANT) Description as legatees
1. The SC held that as to the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in
Doña Honorata’s will to Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from
doubt. It is distinctly declared that Ramon and Enrique shall take certain parts
of it after P1,000 have been deducted.
2. Both Ramon and Enrique are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is
true that they are called the natural sons of Clemente. But this is merely
a further description of persons already well identified, and, if false, can
be rejected in accordance with the provision of Art. 773 (now 844) of the
Civil Code, which by Art. 789 is applicable to legatees.
3. As stated in the 9th clause13 of the will of Doña Honorata, Ramon was entitled
to ½ of this legacy in his own right. This has been paid to him.
On the right to accretion
4. Furthermore, Enrique died before the testatrix. By the provisions of Art. 982
(now 1016) and 983 (now 1017) of the Civil Code, the right of accretion
exists as to the other half in favor of Ramon and he is entitled to have it paid
to him.
On payment of legacies
5. The SC have passed upon the rights of Ramon to the share of Luisa under the
will of Doña Honorata because the interest is expressly left to him (en
concepto de legado) as a legacy. This is controlling.
6. However, these or equivalent words are wanting in the will of Don Nicolas.
Applying Art. 668 of the Civil Code, the SC hold that any interest which
Ramon may have taken in the share of Luisa under the will of Don Nicolas,
he took as an heir and not as a legatee.
7. The distinction between the two is constantly maintained throughout the Civil
Code and their rights and obligations differ materially. (Arts. 660, 668, 768,
790, 858, 891, and 1003 of the old Civil Code)
8. The legatee can demand his legacy from the heir or from the executor, when
the latter is authorized to give it. (Art. 885, now Art. 953)
 9. In this case, the powers given to the executors by the will of Doña Honorata
are contained in the 14th clause14. The will of Don Nicolas also contains the
same provision which was provided in the 21st clause wherein any judicial
intervention in the settlement of the estates was prohibited.
10. If the executor was not authorized to pay the legacies, the heirs must pay
them. However, by reading the whole will, the SC held that the executors
were given power to pay the legacies.
11. The action, therefore, was properly directed against the executor (in this case
Clemente) so far as it related to the allowance and the legacy of P3,000. As
to these legacies, the action may be supported also under Art. 902, which
allows executors to pay money legacies.
12. It was also properly directed against Clemente so far as it related to the share
to which Ramon was entitled under the will of Doña Honorata in the portion
left to Luisa for life.
13. The provisions of Arts. 1025-1027 of the old Civil Code were no obstacle to
this suit. That an inventory is being formed, or that the creditors have not
been paid, is a matter of defense which should have been set up in the answer.
14. In this case, it was not properly directed against Ramon in so far as it related
to the similar share left to him by the will of Don Nicolas. He took that as
heir and not as legatee, and the heir can maintain no such action against the
executor.
15. However, the fact that Ramon, under the will of Doña Honorata is a legatee
of an aliquot part of the estate, having become entitled to 1/3 of it on the death
of Luisa, does not prevent him from maintaining this action against Clemente.
16. Though such a legatee closely resembles an heir, yet, like all other legatees,
he must seek his share from the heir or executor.
On the partition of the estate
17. While Ramon has a right to have his interest as legatee declared, yet it cannot
be delivered to him without a partition of the estate.
18. In this case, the power to partition was expressly given to Clemente.
However, such provision is under the terms of Art. 105715 (now Art. 1081)
of the Civil Code.
19. Clemente, as executor, has the duty to divide the estate into 3 parts, or at least
to set off the third, which was to pass to Ramon by the death of Doña
Honorata and Luisa.
20. In this partition, however, he was directly interested, for, with his brother
Rosendo, he had a life interest in the part of the estate not set off to Ramon.
14
"The testatrix appoints as the executors of her will, in the first place, her beloved husband, Nicolas del
Rosario y Alejo, in the second place her brother-in-law Clemente del Rosario, in the third place her brother-
in-law Rosendo del Rosario, in the fourth place Don Ramon del Rosario when he shall attain his majority,
all of them without bond and free from the obligation of terminating the administration within the legal
term. At her death they shall take possession of all such goods and things as may be her property, and are
hereby authorized fully and as required by law to prepare an inventory of said property, and to effect the
division and partition of the estate among her heirs. She also authorizes them to execute and sign deeds of
Art. 1057 prohibited an heir from being contador for this very reason,
namely, that the partition should be made impartially.
21. Ramon, being a legatee of an aliquot part, has the same right with an heir to
seek partition. However, in seeking for partition, he must make parties to the
suit all persons interested in the estate which he has not done in this case.
Hence, he was not entitled for the partition.
On the right to render account
22. The CFI of Manila has ordered Clemente to render accounts of his
administration of both estates.
23. As to the estate of Don Nicolas, Ramon was not entitled since he was not a
legatee.
24. As to the estate of Doña Honorata and Luisa, even though Ramon was a
legatee, he was still not entitled to an accounting since other interested parties
to the estate were not made part of the suit and thus, there was no final
determination of the rights of each parties.
On the right to receive an allowance and live in Doña Honorata’s house
25. SC held that while by the 8th clause the support of Ramon and Enrique is
charged against the estate, yet the 11th clause makes it plain that this
unconditional right was to last only during the lifetime of Doña Honorata.
After her death the right to this allowance is made to depend on the
continuance of their studies.
26. This is the correct construction of the will is made more plain by the 18th
clause above quoted. In the case of their separation from their Aunt by her
remarriage, they were entitled to the specified allowance of P25/month only
on condition that they were pursuing their studies or were in poor health.
27. In this case, the SC did not find that Ramon was still pursuing his studies. On
the contrary, Ramon had already fulfilled the condition by obtaining the
degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1898.
28. The right to live in the house of Doña Honorata was terminated at her death.
partition, sales with a resolutory condition, cancellations, receipts, acquittances, and such other documents
as may be necessary."
15
"The testator may, by.an act inter vivos or causa mortis, intrust the mere power of making the division
after his death to any person who is not one of the coheirs.
"The provisions of this and the foregoing articles shall be observed even should there be a minor or a person
subject to guardianship among the coheirs; but the trustee must in such case make an inventory of the
property of the inheritance, citing the coheirs, the creditors, and the legatees."
 023 AUSTRIA v. HON. REYES (Escalona)
February 27, 1970 | Castro, J. | Annulment of institution of heirs
PETITIONER: Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta, and Lauro Austria
Mozo
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Andres Reyes (Judge of CFI of Rizal), Perfecto Cruz,
Benita Cruz-Menez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga
SUMMARY: Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was
given to respondents, who are all declared by her as her legally adopted children.
Basilia filed a probate of her will while she was still alive. The present petitioners
filed an opposition, but the probate court eventually allowed the will. After Basilia
later on died, the present petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition,
alleging that the respondents were not actually adopted in accordance with law,
therefore having no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the validity
of their adoption is not material to the disposition of Basilia’s estate. This is
because her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery, or undue
influence, as held by the probate court. The issue is WoN the respondents deserve
to receive properties based on Basilia’s will. The SC held that the respondents
deserve such. Firstly, (see doctrine). Petitioners in this case failed to prove any of
these requisites, which are primarily based on the will of the testator. Therefore,
Basilia’s will stands and respondents, since they’re named in the will, deserve
some property. Secondly, testacy is favored when the will shows a clear intention
on the part of the testator to dispose of his whole estate. Since intestacy is strictly
construed, the SC upheld the contents of the will in order to dispose of Basilia’s
estate.
DOCTRINE: Before the institution of the heirs may be annulled under Art. 850
of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:
1. The cause must be stated in the will
2. The cause is shown to be false
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity
FACTS:
1. On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, who are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate
of the will allowed after due hearing.
2. The bulk of the estate of Basilia was destined to pass on to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz
Cruz-Salonga, under the will. They had been assumed and declared by Basilia
as her own legally adopted children.
3. On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate,
Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without
bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's
will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben
Austria.
4. Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance
that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere
strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
5. Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of
the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of
December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in
Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben
Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."
6. In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity
or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by
the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of
the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results,
managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said
documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court
to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study.
The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court, which
appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written
depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent
adoption proceedings.
7. On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to
intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set
for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for
hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez who entered an
appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on
February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative
relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention to properties not disposed
of in the will of the decedent.
8. On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion.
Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally,
the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners'
intervention to the properties of the deceased, which were not disposed
of in the will.
 9. The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting
thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same
court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
10. A second motion for reconsideration, which set off a long exchange of
memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Respondents Cruz, et. al. deserve to receive properties based on the will
of Basilia – YES. Because firstly, the Court cannot base the receipt of
legitimes on speculations on the reasons as to why the testator wrote the will
that way. The will and its contents are valid no matter the alleged motivations
of the testator for writing the will in such way. Secondly, the Civil Code
explicitly states that a will is strictly construed against intestacy, and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of disposing the whole estate. Thus, the
respondents’ share in the estate of Basilia still stand.
RULING: Appeal is denied. Petitioners lose.
RATIO:
51. The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over
the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners
Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a
number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving
blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers
and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz
and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia,
and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption.
At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will.
52. The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of
the tie, which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim
to have with the decedent. The lower court had assumed, by its orders in
question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor
decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption
in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will
nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs
instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article,
842 of the Civil Code which reads:
a. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
b. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs.
53. The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioner’s nephews and
niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be
prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners'
interest is confined to properties that have not been disposed of in the
will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the
question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
54. The petitioners insist that the entire estate should descend to them by
intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs
embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue
of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event
there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
55. The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code
which reads:
a. The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such
cause.
56. Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the
attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions
of the will of the deceased which recite:
a. Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang
aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente
adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na
pawang may apelyidong Cruz.
b. Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang
aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
i. Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na
sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang
may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't
isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang
sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati (½) ng aking
kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking
yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion
Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal
at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito,
ang kalahati (½) ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa
Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong
ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati (½) ng ilang lagay
na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking
namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.
57. The e petitioners argue that the tenor of the language used gives rise to
the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she
was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners
further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be
spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all — the basis
of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs.
Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the
institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy.
58. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur:
a. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
b. The cause must be shown to be false;
 c. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result
59. The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the 64. Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the explicit injunctions in Art. 791 of the Civil Code: "The words of a will are
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, preferred which will prevent intestacy."
she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed 65. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so
statutory scheme. compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes
60. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the
of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One will for the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final
fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty
implications. to give full expression to her will.
61. And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent 66. At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix
instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot
that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her be the subject of a collateral attack.
adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
62. Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore
whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the
institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is
satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would
not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of
heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
63. The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on
this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of
the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of
heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than
the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make
allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's
children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought
the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small
devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including
the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of
the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto
 024 REBUSQUILLO vs. GUALVEZ (Eleazar)
June 4, 2014 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Intestate Proceedings and Simulation of Contracts
PETITIONERS: AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by
her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO
RESPONDENTS: SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO
GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY
SUMMARY: Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died
intestate. On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi
City. In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her
daughter Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo, respondents in this case, on the
pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was
only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial, RTC held
the annulment of the subject documents. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held
that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on
petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in
an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor
the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
The issues in this case are (1) whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must
be raised in a separate administration or intestate proceedings (NO); and (2)
whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale can be nullified (YES). FIRST ISSUE:
No. The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate
intestate proceedings. The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, the
Court also ruled that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who
heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such
recourse. The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration
proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. Similar to the case of Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land
being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would
be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special
proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of
Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted
in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights
over the subject land. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered
judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is
only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. SECOND ISSUE:
Yes. The Court held that it is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the
records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of
whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute
Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract. Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v.
Heirs of Liberato Ureta: In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it
has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main
characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void,
and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract. In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale is simply to “facilitate the titling of the subject
property,” not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore,
respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property
and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject
property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of
the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is
contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that
renders the whole transaction void.
DOCTRINE: Declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not
in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse
to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if
there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco
(Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale before the court a quo.
2. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio
Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria).
3. Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six
legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina
Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-
Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan
Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7)
Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30,
1983.
4. On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City
consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (2,869) square meters,
more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.
5. In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her
daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law
Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that
the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in
 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents.
6. As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them,
Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two
(2) documents in order to reinstate TD 0141 and so correct the injustice done
to the other heirs of Eulalio.
7. In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling
of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:
a. Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the
other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to
[respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property
described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the
Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the titling of the
property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers,
it was agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be transferred
to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo
Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to
reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it
was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares
on the property; That pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-
Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs
signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact,
[petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses
and all the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents].
8. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore
solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Avelina did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only
executed to facilitate the titling of such property. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
as follows:
b. 1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the
Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated
December 4, 2001 as well as the subject Deed of Absolute Sale,
notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in
par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
c. 2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is hereby
ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name of private
[respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No. 4143 and to
REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name
of Eulalio Abarientos;
d. 3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos
Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to return or refund to [respondents]
spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the ₱50,000.00
given by the latter spouses to the former.
9. Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the
CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document
that has for its object the creation and transmission of real rights over the
immovable subject property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not
offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed
remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents
contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador
before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for those
compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
10. Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on
September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent
Emelinda.
11. In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal
and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the
RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on
petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings,
not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the
Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face.
12. Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her
heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before
this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
ISSUE/s
1. Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate
administration or intestate proceedings. – NO, It would be more practical, as
Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio,
especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in
court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with
rights over the subject land.
2. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale can be nullified. – YES, it is
apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that
Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over
the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing
more than a simulated contract.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.
RATIO:
1. It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court
had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine
who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for
such recourse.
2. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration
proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. In Portugal
v. Portugal-Beltran, this Court held:
a. In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988
the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence
of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an
exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
b. Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who
are the heirs of a deceased.
c. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it
is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
d. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
3. Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of
land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio.
It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate
special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as
sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina
was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the
other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC
in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the
veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:
a. IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of
facts in the Pre-Trial Order)
b. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted
the following facts:
c. 1. Identity of the parties;
d. 2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and
be sued;
e. 3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only
surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
f. 4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion
of the subject property;
g. 5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;
h. 6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of
[petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;
i. 7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;
j. 8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the
Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner]
Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject property.
4. In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more
reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on
the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As
pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper
when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication
is only warranted when there is only one heir:
a. Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. ––
x x x If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds.
5. As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact,
as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right
of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself
when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir
of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL."
The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the
 inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in
granting Avelina’s prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct
the wrong she has committed.
6. In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of
respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not
in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to
partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject
property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to
respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent
from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina
had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the
property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more
than a simulated contract.
7. The Civil Code provides:
a. Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The
former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all;
the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
b. Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A
relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is
not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement.
8. In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta, this Court
explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:
a. In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no
substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The
main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or
in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties
may recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to
conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and
the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the
essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers
only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is
absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest.
9. In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own
Answer to petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge,
the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling
of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in
possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents ever
took possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase. Such
failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of
ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole
transaction void.
10. Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the
quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule.
The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act
valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
a. Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x
b. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
i. (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
ii. (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
iii. (c) The validity of the written agreement; or
iv. (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
c. The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)
11. The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present
case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to
facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply
the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to
ascertain the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of
the document. That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded
from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.
 025 MANINANG v. CA (Dim)
June 19, 1982 | J. Melencio-Herrera | Preterition v. Disinheritance
PETITIONERS: Rafael Maninang and Soledad Maninang
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo Pronove Jr., as judge of the
CFI of Rizal, and Bernardo Aseneta
SUMMARY: Clemencia Aseneta (decedent) died. She left a holographic will
stating that her real and personal properties will be inherited by Soledad Maninang
because her family was kind to her and she found peace and happiness with them,
even if she had blood relatives. Soledad filed a petition for the Probate of
Clemencia’s will (testate case). Bernardo instituted intestate proceedings in a
different court. The two cases were consolidated leading Bernardo to file a motion
to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and void for
preteriting him, who was a compulsory heir. Soledad filed an opposition stating
that in the probate of a will, the rule is that the probate court is limited to an
examination of the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by Clemencia. The lower court and the CA ruled in favor of Bernardo.
The issue before the court is WoN the lower courts erred in granting the motion
to dismiss based on the preterition of Bernardo. YES. The SC remanded the
Testate and Intestate case to determine whether or not Bernardo was disinherited
or preterited. First, the SC ruled that the probate of a will is mandatory to
effectively enforce the right of a person to dispose of his property upon death
through testamentary succession. The exception to this general rule is when the
compulsory heir is totally preterited, making the will intrinsically invalid. For this
exception to apply, it must be determined whether the words in the will would lead
to preterition or disinheritance.
DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of
his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law.
FACTS:
48. On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will stating:
a. It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila,
Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my
personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra.
Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously
for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband
Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness
with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and
especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew
Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy
would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can
decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He
has made me do things against my will.
49. Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for Probate of the Will of the decedent
with the CFI-Branch IV, Quezon City (Testate Case).
50. A few weeks after, Bernardo Aseneta (adopted son; weird cause the will
called him her nephew), who claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia
Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-Branch XI, Pasig,
Rizal (Intestate Case).
51. The Testate Case and the Intestate case were consolidated before the CFI-
Branch XI, Pasig Court.
52. Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground
that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
53. Soledad filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, averring that it is
still the rule that in a case for probate of a will, the Court is limited to an
examination of the extrinsic validity of the will; and that Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent Clemencia.
54. The CFI ruled in favor of Bernardo and dismissed the testate case. The MR
of Soledad was denied, and Bernardo was appointed as the administrator of
the intestate estate of Clemencia, considering that he is a forced heir and that
he has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. The CA
also affirmed the ruling.
ISSUE: WoN the lower courts erred in granting motion to dismiss on the ground
that the will was null and void for failing to include the compulsory heir Bernardo
(preterition) – YES. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires
it.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the
CFI-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified.
Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 [Testate Case] is hereby REMANDED to said Court
of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with
Special Proceeding No. 8569 [Intestate Case] for further proceedings.
RATIO:
Probate of a will looks into its extrinsic validity
67. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of
the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
68. One exception to this general rule is when compulsory heir is totally
preterited, making the will intrinsically invalid. However, for this exception
to apply, it becomes important to examine whether the words in the will in
this case lead preterition or disinheritance.
69. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
 The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
70. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in a probate proceeding because its only purpose
is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law.
71. The Nuguid and the Balanay cases cited by Bernardo provide the exception
rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was
passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will

Preterition v. Disinheritance
72. In this case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms
of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited,
and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
73. Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
Preterition is presumed to be "involuntary"
74. Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law."
Disinheritance is always "voluntary".
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
75. Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution
of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.
76. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as
it may prejudice the person disinherited. In other words, the nullity in
disinheritance is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited
heirs have been illegally deprived.
77. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. That is why the SC
remanded the case so that it could be conclusively determined whether
Bernardo was disinherited or preterited. The lower court erred in
immediately concluding that Bernardo was preterited.
 026 NON vs. CA (DAGUMAN)
February 15, 2000 | Vitug, J. | Preterition
PETITIONER: Rebecca Viado Non, Jose A. Non and Delia Viado
RESPONDENTS: The Honorable Court of Appeals, Alicia N. Viado, Cherri
Viado and Fe Viado
SUMMARY:
Spouses Julian and Virginia owned a house and lot in Isarog. When they died,
their children—Nilo, Leah, and petitioners Rebecca et. al—survived them. Nilo
and Leah thereafter died so their heirs, respondents Alicia et. al, succeeded.
Rebecca et. al and Alicia et. al both lived at the Isarog property since 1977.
However, tension seemed to have escalated between them when Rebecca asked
Alicia to have the property divided between the two families. Since they could
not get along, Rebecca et. al file a case for partition before the RTC. Alicia et. al
claims absolute ownership over the disputed property. They base their claim on
two documents, namely: (1) a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
(father) covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo and (2) a deed of extrajudicial settlement which states that Julian, Leah and
Rebecca waive their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited
from Virginia in favor of Nilo. Rebecca counters that said instruments are invalid
because Nilo employed forgery and under influence to coerce Julian to execute
the deed of donation. Further, she claims that the exclusion of her retardate
sister, Delia, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in preterition that should
warrant the settlement’s annulment. RTC ruled in favor of Alicia et. al. CA
affirmed but ordered the remand of the case with the court a quo so that said court
could determine the value of the property and the amount that Alicia et. al should
pay to Delia for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
ISSUE: WoN the partition should be rescinded due to the preterition of Delia as
an heir—NO BECAUSE THE PRETERITION WAS NOT ATTENDED BY
BAD FAITH OR FRAUD. RULING: The exclusion of petitioner Delia, who
was alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement had the
effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of
fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued in favor
of the heirs of Nilo. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code (see
doctrine).
DOCTRINE: Where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of
the share pertaining to her.
ISSUE/s:
13. WoN the partition should be rescinded due to the preterition of Delia as an
FACTS:
65. During their lifetime, Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several
pieces of property, among them was a house and lot located in Isarog, Quezon
City. Virginia died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later
on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their childten—Nilo, Leah and
the petitioners Rebecca, Jose, and Delia (“Rebecca et. al”).
66. Nilo and Leah died so their heirs, Alicia, Cherri, and Fe, succeded them
(“Alicia et. al”)
67. Since 1977, Rebecca et. al and Alicia et. al lived at the Isarog property.
However, tension seemed to have escalated between Rebecca and Alicia after
the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families.
68. Alicia et. al claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and
demanded that Rebecca et. al vacate the portion occupied by them.
69. Rebecca et. al, meanwhile, asserts co-ownership over the disputed property.
Since the two familied could not get along, Rebecca et. al filed a case for
partition before the RTC.
70. Alicia et. al base their claim of absolute ownership on two documents —
a deed of donation executed by the late Julian (father) covering his one-
half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo and a deed of
extrajudicial settlement which states that Julian, Leah and Rebecca waive
their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from
Virginia in favor of Nilo. Said documents were executed on August 26, 1983
and registered on January 7, 1988. And as a result, a TCT was issued in favor
of Nilo’s heirs.
71. Meanwhile, Rebecca et. al attacked the validity of the mentioned instruments.
They contend that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to
coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation.
72. Rebecca, in particular, averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to
procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that
the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia, in the extrajudicial
settlement, resulted in the latter’s preterition that should warrant
its annulment. Finally, Rebecca asseverates that the assailed instruments,
although executed on August 23 1983, were registered only five years later,
on January 7, 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian, Nilo and
Leah had already died.
73. The RTC ruled in favor of Alicia et. al, declaring them as the true owners of
the disputed property.
74. The CA affirmed with modification. It ordered the remand of the records of
the case to the court a quo in order to determine the value of the property and
the amount that Alicia et. al should pay to petitioner Delia for having been
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
heir—NO BECAUSE THE PRETERITION WAS NOT ATTENDED BY
BAD FAITH OR FRAUD.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29
May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special
pronouncement on costs.

RATIO:
85. The exclusion of petitioner Delia, who was alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not
justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued in favor of the heirs of Nilo. The
relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where
the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall
not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her.
86. The appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case
for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property
and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia.
87. Regarding Rebecca’s argument that the deed was registered only upon the
death of Julian, Nilo, and Lea: The fact alone that the two deeds were
registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect
their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a
constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the
parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.
 027 Vda. de Aranas v. Aranas (Cruz)
May 29, 1987 | Paras, J. | Article 870
PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Rev. Father
Teodoro Aranas, Ramona B. Vda. de Aranas, Adelia B. Aranas-Fernandez, Heirs
of the Late Rodulfo B. Aranas, Etc., Et al.,
RESPONDENTS: Vicennte B. Aranas and Hon. Luis B. Manta
SUMMARY: Father Teodoro died and left a Last Will and Testament which was
admitted to probate. In the Last Will and Testament, Vicente was appointed as
“special administrator” of the testator’s properties as he was a faithful and
serviceable nephew. Vda. de Arans et al's (in Sp. Proc. No. 303) filed a "Motion
for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of Vicente as
Administrator and/or for his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His
Successor." The lower court ruled that the portion of the estate of perpetual
inalienability and administration by Vicente is null and void and eclared the
removal of Vicente in the will. Upon Motion for reconsideration, this was set aside
for violation of due process and without legal and factual basis. The issue in this
case is WoN the lower court erred in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of
the New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as Group "C" in the
Last Will and Testament. The Sc ruled in the negative. It was the se=incere wish
of Father Teadoro to allow Vicente to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's
third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator
in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas
among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select
one among themselves. Vicente’s right to enjoy the fruits of the properties is
temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or
his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited
by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the
Civil Code relied upon by the Vda. de Aranas et al..
DOCTRINE: Application of Artice 870: The dispositions of the testator declaring
all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
1. If the testator imposes a longer period than 20 yrs, the prohibition is valid
for only 20 yrs
2. If there is a fideicommissary substitution, tArticle 863 will apply, which
allows, as a period, the lifetime of his first heir.
FACTS:
55. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January
19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which
was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament,
Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
a. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired
by Fr. Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels
of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his
parents.
ISSUE/s:
b. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired
by Fr. Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels
of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his
parents.
c. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the
testator by Vicente Aranas (Vicente), a faithful and serviceable
nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce
of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration
and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church
for the eternal repose of the testator's soul.
It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons
should be converged and placed under a "special
administrator."
56. The special administrator of these lands, for his office, should receive one
half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the
administration, and the other half of the produce should be received by the
Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas,
because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew, should be the first special
administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he
should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my
brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator, and
none other than they. Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the
one to decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon the death
of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have power to select
the one among them ourselves. The special administration is perpetual.
57. Vda. de Arans et al's (in Sp. Proc. No. 303) filed a "Motion for the Declaration
of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente
Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His
Successor."
58. The lower court ruled that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of
the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by
Vicente Aranas, is null and void after twenty years from January 19, 1954 ...
" and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas.
a. It also declared that "the removal of Vicente Aranas will, therefore,
not serve the ends of justice and for the best interest of all the heirs,
particularly with respect to the portion of the estate taken by the
heirs of Aniceto Aranas, represented by the petitioners herein and
the rest of the heirs of Carmelo, represented by the intervenors,
coheirs of Administrator Vicente Aranas."
59. However, this was set aside upon the "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and to Declare Testate and Intestate Heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas,"
filed by the administrator Vicente Aranas on the allegation that said order
was violative of due process and without legal and factual basis because only
the issue for the removal of the administrator was heard and not the matter of
the declaration of heirs.
 6. WoN the lower court erred in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of the
New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as Group "C" in the
Last Will and Testament – NO, because. It is the sincere desire of Father
Teodoro to reward Vicente for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing
him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties
until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his
sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one
among themselves.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
78. Vda. de Aranas et al. rely heavily on the doctrine laid down in Art. 870 of the
New Civil Code to wit:
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
79. A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament
shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his
nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing
him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties
until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his
sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one
among themselves.
80. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property
of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or
exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent.
81. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and
therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his
refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the
Civil Code relied upon by Vda. de Aranas et al..
82. Note that Vicente is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits
arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of
the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas
prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of
course to Vicente's continuing usufruct.
83. To void the designation of Vicente as usufructuary and/or administrator is to
defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his
faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator
was seriously ill or bed-ridden.
84. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the
refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which
period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations
provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary
substitution, said Article says:
A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or
first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and
to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall
be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided
further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living
at the time of the death of the testator.
85. It is contended by Vda. de Aranas that the ruling made the lower court was
already final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be
reheard was only regarding the determination of additional heirs. Such
contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents in their Memorandum
allege and it is not disputed by Vda. de Aranas et al. that the order has not
yet become final because it was received only on January 12, 1978 by the
counsel for Vicente Aranas and the Motion for Reconsideration and to
declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by
Vicente within the reglementary period. Besides the validity or invalidity of
the usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs.
86. As to Vda. de Aranas et al.'s allegation is without basis.
a. the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion for
reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it
was proven conclusively by Vicente that he was instituted as a
remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and Testament by
way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic
Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the
statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of
the effectivity of said legacy, was also established.
 028 MICIANO v. BRIMO (Coscolluela)
November 1, 1924 | Romualdez, J. | Conditional Testamentary Disposition
PETITIONER: Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo. Juan Miciano, administrator
RESPONDENTS: Andre Brimo
SUMMARY: After Joseph Brimo died his judicial administrator filed a scheme of
partition. The same was approved by the court with opposition from and exclusion
of Brimo’s brother, Andre Brimo. Andre argues that since Brimo was of Turkish
nationality, Turkish laws should govern the settlement of his estate. He also argues
that a provision of the will violates Turkish law and thus, makes it void. The
provision provides that Brimo wished for his estate to be settled according to
Philippine law and that he annuls beforehand whatever disposition found in the whill
in favor of any relative should they fail to comply with his request. WoN the
condition in Brimo’s will is valid. No, the condition is void because it is contrary to
article 792 of the Civil Code. Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or
good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. It is
contrary to law because it ignored the testator’s national law when, according to
article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law is the one to govern Brimo’s
testamentary dispositions.
DOCTRINE: Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever.
FACTS:
75. The judicial administrator of the estate of the descedent Joseph G. Brimo
(Brimo) filed a scheme of partition. This was opposed by Brimo’s brother
Andre Brimo (Andre).
76. Brimo’s will provides that:
a. “Second. I likewise desire to state that although, by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in. the
Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property
that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this
16
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request .”
77. Andre argues that following errors:
a. The scheme partition should not have been approved
b. His exclusion from participating in the inheritance due to the cited
provision found in Brimo’s will
c. Denial of his MR of the order approving the partition
d. The purchase made by Pietro Lanza of Brimo’s business and deed
of transfer should not have been approved
e. Turkish laws should have been used in this case and that the court
erred when it did not postpone the approval of the scheme and the
delivery of Brimo’s business to Pietro until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
1. Andre’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Brimo’s will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality for which reason they are void as being in
violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.16
ISSUE/s:
14. WoN the settlement of Brimo’s estate violated Turkish law – NO, because
the Turkish law was not proven and presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines.
15. WoN the the provision found in Brimo’s will is valid – NO, because it is
contrary to article 10 of the Civil Code which is deemed written into every
RULING: Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant
Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.
RATIO:
First issue
1. Andre did not prove that said disposition are not in accordance with Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
a. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
are.
b. Andre himself acknowledged it when he tried to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated."
 assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval
of the scheme.
2. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does
not constitute an error, It is discretionary with the trial court.
3. Therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with.

Second issue (important)

1. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the Brimo’s will to distribute his property,
not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.
2. If the condition was legal and valid, any legatee who failed to comply would
have been prevented from receiving his legacy. But the condition is void
because it is contrary to article 792 of the Civil Code.17
a. It is contrary to law because it ignored the testator’s national law
when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law is
the one to govern Brimo’s testamentary dispositions.
b. Said condition is therefore considered unwritten and the institution
of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective
even as to Andre.

17
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
 029 Morales v. Olondriz (CELAJE)
February 03, 2016 | Brion, J. | Preterition
PETITIONER: IRIS MORALES
RESPONDENTS: ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ,
JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND
FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ
SUMMARY: In Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9,
2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his
children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel
Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the respondent
heirs. Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a
petition with the Las Pinas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate.
However, petitioner Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging
that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Petitioner Morales prayed for the
probate of the will and for her appointment as special administratrix. Eventually
what happened was that petitioner Morales' prayer for the probate of the will was
denied as the RTC found that there was preterition in the will, because Francisco
Javier Olondriz, as the decedent's illegitimate son, is a compulsory heir and was
omitted from the will and this constitutes preterition. The RTC then proceeded to
intestate proceedings. Issue: W/N there was preterition. Yes.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is
neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly
being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. In the present case,
the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the
direct line. Thus, because of the preterition, and because the decedent's will does
not contain specific legacies or devices, this resulted in the annulment of the
institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the
will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.
DOCTRINE: Preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory
heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
FACTS:
1. In Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was
survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children:
Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O.
Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the
respondent heirs.
2. Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition
with the Las Pinas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the
appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.
3. On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special
administrator.
4. However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the
RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed
for the probate of the will and for her appointment as special administratrix.
Her petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.
5. The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:
a. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor
hereof and administrator of my estate until its distribution in
accordance herewith, x x x
b. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed
equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my
children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3) ALEJANDRO
OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO
OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS
OLONDRIZ, SR.3
6. Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an
illegitimate son of the decedent.
7. On November 27, 2003, the RTC then consolidated both proceedings.
8. On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate
proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.
9. On January 10, 2006, petitioner Morales agreed to the holding of an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered
the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate the
existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.
Morales failed to appear.
10. On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended
the intestate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case
for probate. The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take precedence
over intestate proceedings. Respondent heirs moved for a MR but was denied.
11. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously
issued to Alfonso Jr. The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the
summary revocation of the Letters of Administration.
12. The respondent heirs also moved for the inhibition of Judge Aglugub of
Branch 254. On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for
inhibition. The case was transferred to Branch 253 presided by Judge
Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.
13. Acting on the respondent heirs MR, The RTC observed: (1) that Morales
expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir
of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3)
that based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus,
the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the
case to proceed in intestacy.
14. On appeal, on May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition
for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate proceedings take
precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire
inheritance into intestate succession.4Thus, the continuation of the probate
 proceedings would be superfluous and impractical because the inheritance
will be adjudicated intestate. MR denied. Hence this petition.
15. Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the case to proceed intestate because: (1) the probate of a decedent's
will is mandatory; (2) there was no preterition because Francisco received a
house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
ISSUES:
1. W/N there was preterition. Yes. Franco, as the decedent's illegitimate son is
a compulsory heir and his omission from the will constitutes preterition.
2. WN it was proper for the RTC to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will
during probate proceedings. Yes. It is proper in exceptional circumstances,
such as when there is preterition.
3. W/N it was proper for the RTC to order the case to proceed intestate because
of preterition. Yes. Preterition results in the abrogation of the will (if there are
no legacies or devices), meaning that the will is null and thus the case should
proceed to intestacy.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
RATIO:
1. We join the ruling of the CA.
2. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is
neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without
expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did
not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.
3. In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory
heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
4. Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
a. Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
b. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
5. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will
does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.7
6. In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz
as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco
is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
7. During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present
evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his
legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the
hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue.
Thus there was preterition.
8. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry
is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court
will only determine the will's formal validity and due execution.8
9. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not beyond the probate
court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so
warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is
probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
10. The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and
Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy
of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void.
11. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions would be superfluous. It is thus well within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will
if probate proceedings might become an idle ceremony due to the nullity of
the will. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion
- on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
12. Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner's argument that the previous order
setting the case for probate barred the RTC from ordering the case to proceed
intestate. The disputed order is merely interlocutory and can never become
final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment does.13 An
interlocutory order does not result in res judicata.14 It remains under the
control of the court and can be modified or rescinded at any time before final
judgment.