Kantian Tables

Being some tables about Kant

Nicholas Joll

Last substantial revision: 29 December 2018.

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Notes on format, etc. The original (editable) format of this document is Word 1997–2003
(.doc). If converted to Word’s newer file format, conversion to PDF fails. Moreover, even
in the .doc format, the last line of the table of the contents requires manual correction
when that table has its text (as against its numbers) updated.
Contents (in the form of hyperlinks, except in PDF version)

Preamble and Acknowledgements 3

Textual abbreviations 4

1 A simple Kant chronology (with Kant’s works in bold) 5

2 A fuller Kant chronology (with Kant’s works in bold) 6

3 The structure of the Critique of Pure Reason (with some page ranges) 7

4 A more detailed map of the 1st Critique, with hyperlinks to other tables and cross-
references to the Prolegomena [= ‘P’] 8

5 The more detailed map of the 1st Critique 9

6 The structure of Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 10

7 Critique of Pure Reason: the Aesthetic’s structure in fine detail 11

8 Critique of Pure Reason: the structure of the ‘Clue’ chapter 12

9 Critique of Pure Reason: table of judgments 13

10 A table explaining the table of judgments 14

11 Further explanation of the table of judgments: specific forms of judgment 15

12 Critique of Pure Reason: the table of categories & the metaphysical deduction 17

13 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental deduction as in the first (A) edition 18

14 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental deduction as in the second (B) edition 19

15 Critique of Pure Reason: the Principles, correlated with forms of judgment & with
categories 20

16 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental schemata 21

17 The Ideas23

18 Kant’s division of logic 24

19 Types of knowledge (Critique of Pure Reason; Prolegomena) 25

20 Types of knowledge (flowchart) 26

21 Very broad summary of the 1st Critique’s overall argument 27

22 Alternative / even broader summary of the 1st Critique’s overall argument 28

23 A representation of the place of the POSTULATES (of pure practical reason) in Kant’s
defence of morality & religion (that dual defence being mounted in several of Kant’s
works) 29

Notes 30

3
Preamble and Acknowledgements

This document was begun for the course ‘Kant’s Transcendental Idealism’

(6HUM0007), University of Hertfordshire, 2010. It is a work in progress.

The first few tables are broad overviews of texts (or, in the case of the first table, of

Kant’s life). After that, there is a stretch of tables each of which is to do with some part of

the Critique of Pure Reason. The remaining tables are fairly heterogeneous..

Several philosophers have been kind enough to assist me in the formulation of these

tables. The following were especially helpful, particularly with Kant’s logic: Professor

Robert Hanna (University of Colorado); Dr G. J. Mattey (University of California); Dr

Andrew Ward (University of York).

4
Textual abbreviations

Works by Kant

CPR / A / B / KS Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp Smith translation (MacMillan, 1933). ‘A’ and
‘B’ refer to pages of Kant’s two editions of the text. ‘KS’ refers to Kemp
Smith’s pages. ‘CPR’ is used for other types of reference. 1

CPrR Critique of Practical Reason

P Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Other works

KTI Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (second edition).

DICT Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary

EWING A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

KCPR Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason

KA Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic

KEMP John Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant

KTK Georges Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge

BS P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense

WOOD Allen W. Wood, Kant

Numbers following abbreviations are page or (when indicated) section numbers. Emphasis in
quotations is the original’s unless contra-indicated. All interpolations and elisions are mine unless
contra-indicated. For details of the books cited above, see the course description.

5
1 A simple Kant chronology (with Kant’s works in bold)

For greater detail, see the next table.

1724 Kant born to a poor family in Königsberg, Prussia.

1740–1770 In this period Kant is either at the University of Königsberg or doing private tutoring near it. Publishes metaphysical works.

1770–1781 The ‘silent years’: Kant publishes almost nothing, but works on the ideas that will become the Critique of Pure Reason.

1781 Critique of Pure Reason (published one month before Kant is 57).

1783 Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.

1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

1787 Second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.

1788 Critique of Practical Reason.

1790 Critique of Judgment.

1793 Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone (published in such a way as to evade censorship).

1794 Prussian government rebukes Kant on religion. Kant promises silence on religion (at least while Frederick William II lives).

1795 Toward Perpetual Peace.

1797–8 Metaphysics of Morals.

1798 Conflict of the Faculties (which treats religion; Frederick William II is now dead).

1804 Kant dies, just before his eightieth birthday.

6
 2 A fuller Kant chronology (with Kant’s works in bold)2
1740: Frederick II April 1724 Kant born to a poor family in East Prussian Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic, between Poland and Lithuania). 3
succeeds Frederick
William I (and 1740–1744 Kant at the University of Königsberg. He studies Latin literature, science, philosophy, and theology.
rescinds exile of 1747–54 Private tutoring near Königsberg. Two failed marriage engagements. Discovers Hume’s Enquiry (translated into German 1754–6) around now.
the Pietist Wolff).
Re-enters university life. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens extends Newtonian explanation to the formation of the solar
1755–83: 1755
system. A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition gains Kant Privatdozent position.
American War of
Independence 1762 Rousseau’s Émile appears (as does his Social Contract) and immediately inspires Kant.
1758–62: Russian 1766 Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer largely disavows his burgeoning aspirations for metaphysics.
occupation of
Königsberg during 1770 Gains Königsberg philosophy professorship (having declined various other offers). Inaugural Presentation.4
Seven Years War 1770–1781 The ‘silent years’/‘silent decade’: Kant publishes almost nothing, but from around ’72, is working on the ideas of the Critique.5
1781 Critique of Pure Reason (published a month before Kant is 57). Its ‘transcendental doctrine of method’ is based on Kant’s Logic (q.v. below).
1783 Prolegomena (which responds to the Göttingen / Feder-Garve Review of 1782). 6
1784 ‘Idea for a Universal History of Mankind’ and ‘Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”’
1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
1786: Frederick
William II ascends 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.7 Reinhold’s ‘Letters on the Kantian Philosophy’ make Kant centre of philosophical discussion.
throne
1787 Critique of Pure Reason, second edition. This edition was intended originally to include material that, ultimately, became the second Critique.

1789: French 1788 Critique of Practical Reason (the ‘second Critique’).

Revolution 1790 Critique of Judgment (the ‘third Critique’). It was over the course of this decade that Kant wrote his so-called Opus Postumum.8
1793 Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone (published in such a way as to evade censorship).9
1794 Education minister Wöllner sternly rebukes Kant on religion. Kant promises silence on religion (at least while Frederick William II lives).
1795 Toward Perpetual Peace.
1796 Kant retires from lecturing.
1797: Frederick
William III 1797 & ‘98 The Metaphysics of Morals is published in two parts.
succeeds.
1798 Conflict of the Faculties (which treats religion); Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (derived from 25 years of lectures).
1799 Kant publicly disavows Fichte’s appropriation of his philosophy (despite having earlier helped Fichte).
1800 Jäsche edits and publishes Kant’s Logic (based on 40 years of lectures and, initially, on a textbook by the Wolffian Meier).
Feb. 1804 Kant dies, just before his eightieth birthday.

7
 3 The structure of the Critique of Pure Reason (with some page ranges)10

Critique of Pure Reason

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF

ELEMENTS METHOD
(KS 573-669)

Transcendental Aesthetic Transcendental Logic

(KS 65-91) Discipline of Canon of Pure Architectonic of History of
Pure Reason Reason Pure Reason Pure Reason

Transcendental Analytic Transcendental Dialectic

Analytic of Analytic of Concepts of Dialectical Inferences

Concepts Principles† Pure Reason of Pure Reason
(KS 103-175) (KS 308-326)

Schematism The Principles Paralogisms Antimony Ideal

(KS 180-187) (Axioms, Anticipations, (KS 328-383) (KS 384-484) (KS 485-531)
Analogies, Postulates)
(KS 188-256)

8
 4 A more detailed map of the 1st Critique, with hyperlinks to other tables and cross-references to the Prolegomena [= ‘P’]11

Prefaces Introduction [P §§1–5]

TRANSCENDENTAL
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS DOCTRINE OF
METHOD12

Transcendental Aesthetic Transcendental Logic

[P §§6–13, 60]
[P §§6–13] Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic

Section I: Section II: Transcendental Analytic [P §§9–39 (mainly)] Transcendental Dialectic [P §§40ff.] Discipline of
Space Time Pure Reason
Analytic of concepts Analytic of Principles Concepts of pure reason Dialectical inferences of pure reason

Metaphysical Metaphysical The Clue to the Schematism [P §34] [These concepts, Paralogisms of Pure Reason
exposition exposition Discovery of All a.k.a. the Canon13 of Pure
[according to which the soul is (1) a
Pure Concepts of the Principles [P §§23–26ff.] ‘transcendental Ideas’, Reason
substance that is (2) simple (indivisible),
Understanding [a.k.a. are treated further, and (3) identical with the person, (4) known
the Metaphysical  Axioms of intuition more positively, in: more certainly than outer appearances.15
[And, in B:] [And, in B:] Deduction; this  Anticipations of
section includes perception  the Dialectic’s Antinomy of Pure Reason Architectonic of
Transcendental Transcendenta appendix (see
exposition l exposition
tables of (1)
[= The ‘antimonies’ of: (1) finitude;
Pure Reason14
judgment and (2)  Analogies of experience below);
(2) divisibility; (3) causality / freedom;
categories]  Postulates of empirical  the Canon of Pure (4) necessary being. Other sections here
[P §§21, 39] thought (including, in B, Reason (see include ‘Transcendental Idealism as the
‘The Refutation of opposite); Key to the Solution of the Cosmological History of Pure
Idealism’ and ‘General  Kant’s moral works.] Dialectic’.]16 Reason
The Deduction of the Note on the System of the
Pure Concepts of Principles’.) Ideal of pure reason
Understanding –
[a.k.a. the Ground of the distinction of [argues against the (1) ontological,
Transcendental all objects into phenomena (2) cosmological, and (3) ‘physico-
Deduction] and noumena theological’ (/ teleological) arguments
[P §§32, 34, 45, 57] for God’s existence.]
[P, §§14–39, passim]

Appendix: The Amphiboly of concepts of reflection Appendix: The Regulative employment of the ideas of pure
[P §39] reason [P §§44, 56, 60]

9
 5 The more detailed map of the 1st Critique

Prefaces Introduction

TRANSCENDENTAL
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS DOCTRINE OF
METHOD

Transcendental Aesthetic Transcendental Logic

Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic

Section I: Section II: Transcendental Analytic Transcendental Dialectic

Space Time Discipline of
Analytic of concepts Analytic of Principles Concepts of pure reason Dialectical inferences of pure reason Pure Reason
Schematism Paralogisms of Pure Reason
Metaphysical Metaphysical The Clue to the
exposition exposition Discovery of All Pure Principles [according to which the soul is (1) a Canon of Pure
substance that is (2) simple
Concepts of the
 Axioms of intuition
Reason
Understanding [a.k.a. (indivisible), (3) identical with the
person, (4) known more certainly than (including ‘The
the Metaphysical  Anticipations of
perception outer appearances. Ideal of the
Deduction; includes
Transcendental Transcendental Highest Good, as
exposition exposition
tables of (1)  Analogies of experience
judgment and (2)  1st Analogy
Antinomy of Pure Reason a Determining
categories]  2nd Analogy [= The ‘antimonies’ of: (1) finitude; Ground of the
 3rd Analogy (2) divisibility; (3) causality / Ultimate End of
freedom; (4) necessary being. Other Pure Reason’)
 Postulates of empirical sections here include ‘Transcendental
The Deduction of the
thought (including, in B, Idealism as the Key to the Solution of
Pure Concepts of
‘The Refutation of the Cosmological Dialectic’]
Understanding –
Idealism’ and ‘General Architectonic of
[a.k.a. the Pure Reason
Note on the System of Ideal of pure reason
Transcendental
the Principles’.)
Deduction] [argues against the (1) ontological,
Ground of the distinction of (2) cosmological, and (3) ‘physico- History of Pure
all objects into phenomena theological’ (/ teleological) arguments Reason
and noumena for God’s existence.]

Appendix: The Regulative employment of the ideas of pure

Appendix: The Amphiboly of concepts of reflection
reason
10
6 The structure of Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Preface

Preamble on the Peculiarities of All Metaphysical Cognition [§§1–5]

First Part of the Main Transcendental Question: How Is Pure Mathematics Possible? [§§6–13]

Second Part of the Main Transcendental Question: How Is Pure Natural Science Possible? [§§14–39]

Third Part of the Main Transcendental Question: How Is Metaphysics in General Possible? [§§40–56]

Conclusion: On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason [§§57–60]

Solution of the General Question of the Prolegomena: ‘How Is Metaphysics Possible as Science’? [No section numbering]

Appendix [contains no section numbering, but does contain the following subheadings]

 On What Can Be Done to Make Metaphysics As a Science Actual

 A Specimen of a Judgment About the Critique Prior to Its Examination

 Proposals as to an Investigation of the Critique upon which a Judgment May Follow

11
7 Critique of Pure Reason: the Aesthetic’s structure in fine detail

Titles and numbers in the following table are Kant’s except when in brackets (and I include some
page ranges, and comments, in brackets too). In A, the subsections marked ‘§’ in B are not numbered,
although some have titles. Other differences between the A and B edition are marked in the table itself.

§1 [untitled, but labelled ‘Introduction’ in the contents pages of Kemp Smith’s translation]

SECTION I. SPACE [A22-A30 / B37–45 / KS 67–74]

§2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Concept [section title added in B]

[Account as in A:] [Account as in B:]

1. [‘Presupposition’ argument for spatial apriority] 1.[As in A]

2. [‘Conceivability’ argument for spatial apriority] 2.[As in A]
3. [Geometrical argument for spatial apriority] 3.[As in #4 of A]
4. [‘Unity argument’ for intuitionality of space] 4.[As in #5 of A]
5. [‘Containment argument’ for intuitionality]

§3. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space [whole subsection added in B; and, in
B, contains the geometrical argument for spatial apriority]
 Conclusions from the above Concepts [still within ‘Section I’ and, indeed, within §3]

SECTION II. TIME [A30–41 / B46–58 / KS 74–82]

§4. Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time [this section title added in B]
1. [1st argument for apriority of time]
2. [2nd argument for apriority of time]
3. [3rd argument for apriority of time]17
4. [1st argument that time is an intuition]
5. [2nd argument that time is an intuition]

§5. The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time [whole subsection added in B]

§6. Conclusions from these Concepts [this section does, seemingly, fall under ‘Section II’]
§7. Elucidation [this section does, seemingly, fall under ‘Section II’ – though it mentions space;
contains arguments against Newton and Leibniz]

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC (§8) [A41–9 / B59–72 /

KS 82–90] [title and number added in B, as were the whole content of subsections II-IV]
I. [Untitled; is about transcendental idealism]
II. [Untitled; introduces ‘apperception’ and relates the ideality of space and time to relations
(and thereby provides another argument for transcendental idealism about space and time)]
III. [Untitled; contrasts appearance with illusion]
IV. [Untitled; is about ‘intellectual intuition’]

CONCLUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC [this unnumbered section added in B]

12
8 Critique of Pure Reason: the structure of the ‘Clue’ chapter

The ‘§’ section numbering occurs only in B, and continues from the numbering added, in B,
to the Aesthetic. The sections labelled ‘§11’ and ‘§12’ were, in their entirety, added in B. Text
within parentheses has been added by me.

Chapter 1. The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding Pagination
[a.k.a. ‘the metaphysical deduction’]18

A66–67
[Untitled; the section is about finding a rule to disclose the pure concepts of the
B91–92
understanding] KS 104

Section I.19 The Logical Employment of the Understanding

A67–69
B92–94
[Argues that the understanding is the faculty of concepts and of judgment. KS 105–106
Analyses the nature of judgment.]

Section II / §9. The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments

[The table of judgments] A70–76

B95–101
1. [On quantity] KS 106–110
2. [On quality]
3. [On relation]
4. [On modality]

Section III / §10. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories A76–83
B101–109
[This section, which presents the table of categories/of the pure concepts of the KS 111–115
understanding, is the ‘metaphysical deduction’ more narrowly construed.]

B109–113
§11 [Untitled, and not a part of § III] [on some niceties of the table of categories] KS 115–118

B113–116
§12 [Untitled] [On the transcendental philosophy of the ancients] KS 118–119

13
9 Critique of Pure Reason: table of judgments

I – Quantity
Universal
Particular
Singular
II – Quality III – Relation
Affirmative Categorical
Negative Hypothetical
Infinite Disjunctive

IV – Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic

According to the table (A70/B95/KS 107; cf. P §21) – which Kant derives, with some
modifications, from the Aristotelian logic of his day – every judgment has some quantity, some
quality, some relation, and some modality. The next table explains that idea.20

14
10 A table explaining the table of judgments

Group About the group Judgment-form21 Explanation of the judgment-form Example of the judgment-form22

Universal The judgment’s subject is expressible with ‘all’. All men are mortal.
Concerns the
Quantity subject of the Particular The judgment’s subject is expressible with ‘some’. Some men are tall.
judgment.
Singular The judgment’s subject is expressible with ‘the’/‘this’/‘that’. This woman is rich.

Affirmative Asserts that a predicate belongs to a subject. The taxi is black.

Negative Denies that a predicate belongs to a subject. The taxi is not black.
Concerns the
Quality predicate of the Asserts that a predicate of the form ‘non-P’ applies to the
judgment. subject. Thus it asserts that the subject belongs ‘to an infinite
Infinite or unlimited class of which no more is said than that [in the Zeus is non-mortal.
example opposite] it does not include the class of things that
are mortal.’23

Categorical The judgment has the form ‘S is P’. Fred is mortal.

Concerns how
judgments If the sun shines on the stone, then the stone
Relation Hypothetical25 The judgment has the form ‘If S is P, then T is Q’.
interrelate within becomes warm.
syllogisms.24
Disjunctive26 The judgment has the form ‘S is either P or Q’. Either the world has a beginning or it does not.

Problematic The judgment is asserted as possible. It is possible that the moon is made of cheese.
Concerns the
Modality modality of the Assertoric The judgment is asserted as is actual, i.e. as true. The moon is made of cheese.
whole judgment.27
Apodeictic The judgment is asserted as necessary. The moon must be made of cheese.

15
11 Further explanation of the table of judgments: specific forms of judgment

The table below lists all of the specific forms of judgment for which Kant’s table of judgment
allows. For the table presents all possible combinations of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.
That said: my table omits judgments with an ‘infinite’ quality, because Kant acknowledges that, in
the present context, those judgments do not deserve a class of their own.28 The table denotes subjects
with ‘S’ and, where more than one subject is involved, ‘T’, and predicates with ‘P’ and, where more
than one predicate is involved, ‘Q’. The rationale behind some of the formulations is somewhat
complicated.29 But the main point of the table is only to help convey a sense of the meaning of Kant’s
table of judgments.

Combination of forms of judgment

# Resulting specific judgment-form
Relation Quality Quantity Modality
1 Categorical Affirmative Universal Assertoric All S are P
2 Categorical Affirmative Universal Problematic Possibly: all S are P
3 Categorical Affirmative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: all S are P

4 Categorical Negative Universal Assertoric All S are not P (i.e. no S are P).
5 Categorical Negative Universal Problematic Possibly: all S are not P.
6 Categorical Negative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: all S are not P.
7 Categorical Affirmative Particular Assertoric Some S is P
8 Categorical Affirmative Particular Problematic Possibly: some S is P
9 Categorical Affirmative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: some S is P
10 Categorical Negative Particular Assertoric Some S are not P
11 Categorical Negative Particular Problematic Possibly: some S are not P
12 Categorical Negative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: some S are not P
13 Categorical Affirmative Singular Assertoric Individual S is P
14 Categorical Affirmative Singular Problematic Possibly: individual S is P
15 Categorical Affirmative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: individual S is P
16 Categorical Negative Singular Assertoric Individual S is not P
17 Categorical Negative Singular Problematic Possibly: individual S is not P
18 Categorical Negative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: individual S is not P

19 Hypothetical Affirmative Universal Assertoric If all S are P, then T is not Q

20 Hypothetical Affirmative Universal Problematic Possibly: if all S are P, then T is Q
21 Hypothetical Affirmative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: if all S are P, then T is Q
22 Hypothetical Negative Universal Assertoric If not all S are P, then T is Q
23 Hypothetical Negative Universal Problematic Possibly: if not all S are P, then T is Q
24 Hypothetical Negative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: if not all S are P, then T is Q

16
 Combination of forms of judgment
# Resulting specific judgment-form
Relation Quality Quantity Modality
25 Hypothetical Affirmative Particular Assertoric If some S are P, then T is Q
26 Hypothetical Affirmative Particular Problematic Possibly: if some S are P, then T is Q
27 Hypothetical Affirmative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: if some S are P, then T is Q
28 Hypothetical Negative Particular Assertoric If some S are not P, then T is Q
29 Hypothetical Negative Particular Problematic Possibly: if some S are not P, then T is Q
30 Hypothetical Negative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: if some S are not P, then T is Q
31 Hypothetical Affirmative Singular Assertoric If individual S is P, then T is Q
32 Hypothetical Affirmative Singular Problematic Possibly: if individual S is P, then T is Q
33 Hypothetical Affirmative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: individual S is P, then T is Q
34 Hypothetical Negative Singular Assertoric If individual S is not P, then T is Q
35 Hypothetical Negative Singular Problematic Possibly: if individual S is not P, then T is Q
36 Hypothetical Negative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: if individual S is not P, then T is Q

37 Disjunctive Affirmative Universal Assertoric Either all S are P or all S are Q

38 Disjunctive Affirmative Universal Problematic Possibly: either all S are P or all S are Q
39 Disjunctive Affirmative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: either all S are P or all S are Q
Either all S are not P (i.e. no S are P) or all S are not
40 Disjunctive Negative Universal Assertoric
Q (i.e. no S re Q)
41 Disjunctive Negative Universal Problematic Possibly: either no S are P or no S are Q
42 Disjunctive Negative Universal Apodeictic Necessarily: no S are P and no S are Q
43 Disjunctive Affirmative Particular Assertoric Either some S are P or some S are Q
44 Disjunctive Affirmative Particular Problematic Possibly: either some S are P or some S are Q
45 Disjunctive Affirmative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: either some S are P or some S are Q
46 Disjunctive Negative Particular Assertoric Either some S are not P or some S are not Q
47 Disjunctive Negative Particular Problematic Possibly: either some S are not P or some S are not Q
48 Disjunctive Negative Particular Apodeictic Necessarily: some S are neither P nor Q
49 Disjunctive Affirmative Singular Assertoric Either individual S is P or S is Q
50 Disjunctive Affirmative Singular Problematic Possibly: either individual S is P or S is Q
51 Disjunctive Affirmative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: individual S is either P or Q
52 Disjunctive Negative Singular Assertoric Either individual S is not P or S is not Q
53 Disjunctive Negative Singular Problematic Possibly: individual S is neither P nor Q
54 Disjunctive Negative Singular Apodeictic Necessarily: individual S is neither P nor Q

17
12 Critique of Pure Reason: the table of categories & the metaphysical deduction

In compiling his table of judgments, Kant’s interest is not in logic, or judgment, for its own
sake. He is interested in using the table of judgments to generate his table of categories. So the basic
idea – the basic idea of the so-called ‘metaphysical deduction’ – is representable as follows.

Table of judgements

Metaphysical
deduction

Table of categories

The table of categories itself (80/B106/KS 113; cf. P §21) is as follows.30

I – Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality

II – Quality III – Relation

Of inherence and Subsistence
Reality (substantia et accidens
[substance and accident])
Of Causality and Dependence
Negation
(cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity
Limitation
between agent and patient)

IV – Modality
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Non-existence
Necessity – Contingency

18
13 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental deduction as in the first (A) edition

PAGINATION KANT’S SECTION HEADINGS

A84-A130 / KS 120–150 ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS. Chapter II: The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

A84–95 / KS 120–128 Section 131

A84–92 / KS 120–125 The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction

A92–95 / KS 125–128 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

A95-A114 / KS 129–140 Section 232

A95–98 / KS 129–131 The A Priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience

A98 / KS 131 Preliminary Remark

A98–100 / KS 131–132 1. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

A100–102 / KS 132–133 2. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination

A103–110 / KS 133–138 3. The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

A110–114 / KS 138–140 4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of Categories, or Knowledge a priori

A115-A130 / KS 141–150 Section 333

A115-A128 / KS 141–149 The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Knowing them A Priori
Summary Representation of the Correctness of this Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, and
A128–130 / KS 149–150
of its being the only Deduction Possible

19
14 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental deduction as in the second (B) edition

KANT’S SECTION headings PAGINATION

B129–169
ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS. Chapter II: The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding / KS 151–175

§13 Section 1. The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction B116–129 (/A84–95) /

KS 120–12834
§14 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

Section 2. Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

§15 The Possibility of Combination in General B129–131 / KS 151–152

§16 The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception B131–136 / KS 152–155

§17 The Principle of the Synthetic Unity [of Apperception]35 is the Supreme Principle of All Employment of the Understanding B136–139 / KS 155–157

§18 The Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness B139–140 / KS 157–158

§19 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Apperception of the Concepts which they contain B140–142 / KS 158–159

§20 All Sensible Intuitions are Subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone their Manifold can come together in one Consciousness36 B143 / KS 160

§21 Observation [mainly on what has been done and what remains to be done] 37 B144–146 / KS 160–161
§22 The Category has38 no other Application in Knowledge than to Objects of Experience B146–148 / KS 161–162

§23 [Untitled; about the limits of the categories’ applicability] B148–149 / KS 163–164

§24 The Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General [with a coda on how inner sense relates to apperception] 39 B150–156 / KS 164–168

§25 [Untitled; but about inner sense] B157–159 / KS 168–169

§26 Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Employment in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding B159–165 / KS 170–173

§27 Outcome of this Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding B165–168 / KS 173–175

40
Brief Outline of this Deduction B168–169 / KS 175

20
15 Critique of Pure Reason: the Principles, correlated with forms of judgment & with categories

Category Type of
Form of judgment Category Name of principle(s)41 Principle(s)
group principle42

Universal Unity
‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes’ (= things
Particular Plurality QUANTITY Axioms of intuition
have spatial dimensions and temporal duration).43

‘Mathematical’
Singular Totality44

Affirmative Reality
‘The real that is an object of sensation has intensive
Negative Negation QUALITY Anticipations of perception magnitude, that is, a degree’ (= sensations – e.g.
heat – come in degrees).45
Infinite Limitation

1st Analogy: ‘The Principle of the Permanence of

Categorical Inherence and subsistence
Substance’.47

‘Dynamical’
2nd Analogy: ‘The Principle of Succession in Time,
Hypothetical Causality and dependence
RELATION Analogies of experience 46 in accordance with the law of causality’.48

3rd Analogy: ‘The Principle of Coexistence, in

Disjunctive Community accordance with the Law of Reciprocity or
Community’.49

1st Postulate: the possible is that which is consistent

Problematic Possibility–Impossibility
with the (rest of the) system of experience.

[No label]
Postulates of empirical 2nd Postulate: the actual is that to which we relate
Assertoric Existence–Non-existence MODALITY
thought in general via sensation.

3rd Postulate: the necessary is that which is

Apodeictic Necessity–Contingency
connected by causal laws to other actual things.50

21
16 Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental schemata51

QUANTITY

Number

QUALITY RELATION

Increasing/decreasing quanta of sensation Substance: permanence of the real in time.

Cause: ‘the real upon which, whenever posited,

something else always follows [. . .] the succession
of the manifold insofar as that succession is
subject to a rule.’

Community or reciprocity: ‘co-existence,

according to a universal rule, of the
determinations of the one substance with those of
the other.’

MODALITY

Possibility: ‘the determination of a thing at

some [particular, exclusive] time or other.’

Actuality: ‘existence in some determinate

time.’

Necessity: ‘existence of an object at all times.’

22
‘We thus find that the schema of each category contains and makes capable of representation only a determination of time’. 52

 Schema of quantity (number): generation of time in successive apprehension of an object.

 Schema of quality (increasing/decreasing quanta of sensation): the filling of time.

 Schema of relation (permanence, necessary succession, co-existence): connecting of perceptions according to a rule of time-determination.

 Schema of modality: time itself as correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time.

23
17 The Ideas

‘The idea is a concept of reason whose object can be met with nowhere in experience’ (Kant’s Logic, cited in DICT 236; cf. also P §40).

Syllogistic form53 Idea of pure reason54 Topic in ‘special metaphysics’55 Place in CPR’s dialectic Postulate of Pure Practical Reason56

Categorical The complete subject57 Soul / self The Paralogisms58 Immortality of the soul

The complete series of

Hypothetical World / free-will The Antinomies Freedom of will
conditions

The complete totality of

Disjunctive God Ideal of Pure Reason Existence of God
the possible

24
18 Kant’s division of logic

On this division, see, in CPR, esp. ‘Introduction’ to ‘Transcendental Logic’ in the Transcendental Analytic. Grey text below indicates forms of
logic merely enumerated – i.e. little treated – in the CPR.

LOGIC

GENERAL LOGIC SPECIAL LOGIC TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

This is the methodology Treats laws of thought so far as they apply
of particular sciences. apriori to objects.†

Analytic general logic
Treats the forms of thought.
(This is the part of Kant’s
logic that corresponds most
closely to the contemporary
notion of logic.)
Dialectical general logic
The misguided attempt to use
the forms of thought as
sufficient criteria of truth.
Transcendental Analytic
Treats the ‘pure [i.e. apriori]
knowledge yielded by the
understanding’ (A62/B87) when the
understanding is applied to
appearances (i.e. to intuition).
(For subdivisions of Transcendental
Analytic, see diagrams above.)
Transcendental Dialectic
The application of transcendental
logic to all objects, i.e. the misguided
quest for apriori knowledge of things
in themselves. Alternatively
(A63/B88): the critique of that
enterprise. (See diagrams above for
subdivisions of Transcendental
Dialectic, considered qua critique.)

Pure general logic Applied general logic

Concerns those principles of
the understanding/reason that
are both formal and general;
i.e. forms of thought.
The application of pure
general logic to human
psychology.
(See A53-5/B77-9.)
† See A50ff./B74ff. – and note Error: Reference source not found above.

25
19 Types of knowledge (Critique of Pure Reason; Prolegomena)
The Apriori–Aposteriori distinction
A judgment is apriori iff it is
(or can be) known
independently of experience.
‘Sure criteria’ of aprioricity:
necessity; strict universality.63
A judgment is aposteriori
(synonymously: ‘empirical’)
iff it is (or can be) derived
from experience.68
The Analytic–Synthetic distinction – which concerns the type of knowledge at issue
A judgment59 is analytic iff60 its subject ‘contains’ its
predicate. Thus analytic judgment is ‘explicative’: it
merely explicates (unpacks) its subject. 61
ANALYTIC APRIORI KNOWLEDGE: knowledge that is
explicative and not derived from experience.
Encompasses definitions, conceptual truths, logical truths.
ANALYTIC APOSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE: knowledge that is
explicative and derived from experience [sic!]
‘It would be absurd to found an analytic [= explicative]
judgment on experience’.69
A judgment is synthetic iff its subject does not
‘contain’ its predicate. Thus synthetic judgment is
‘ampliative’: the predicate adds to the subject. 62
SYNTHETIC APRIORI KNOWLEDGE: knowledge that
is ampliative and not derived from experience.
Encompasses: (much of) mathematics (including
geometry);64 first principles of natural science; 65
‘immanent’ metaphysics.66 ‘Transcendent’
metaphysics aspires, mistakenly, to such
knowledge.67
SYNTHETIC APOSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE: knowledge
that is ampliative and derived from experience.
Encompasses everyday judgments and (most)
judgments of natural science.70
26
 – concerns the origin of knowledge

So: Kant recognises three types of knowledge: (1) the analytic apriori (or simply ‘analytic’); (2) the synthetic aposteriori (or simply ‘empirical’); and
(3) the  synthetic apriori (this last being the key to the Critique). Compare the bottom of the flowchart on my next page.71

Note also these relations: (i) analyticity implies apriority (but apriority does not imply analyticity – because (according to Kant) there is synthetic
apriori knowledge); (ii) aposteriority implies syntheticity (but syntheticity does not imply aposteriority – because, again, there is synthetic apriori
knowledge).

27
20 Types of knowledge (flowchart)

Is the judgment
merely ‘explicative’,
i.e. does its subject
contain its
predicate?

Yes No

The
judgment/knowledge is
synthetic. But is it
known independently of
experience?

Yes No

The judgment/knowledge is The judgment/knowledge is The judgment/knowledge is

ANALYTIC and hence SYNTHETIC APRIORI. SYNTHETIC
APRIORI. APOSTERIORI.

Apriori Aposteriori

Analytic Synthetic

28
21 Very broad summary of the 1st Critique’s overall argument

Space and time are ‘transcendentally ideal’ but ‘empirically real’.

(THE AESTHETIC)

In conjunction with space and time, the ‘categories’: confer objectivity

upon experience; allow (synthetic) apriori knowledge; and establish
transcendental idealism (or at least help to establish it).

(The ANALYTIC’s METAPHYSICAL & TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS)

Justification of the applicability of individual categories, or rather of their

‘schematised’ ‘principles’, to experience. Also: refutation of idealism (of
‘empirical’ – ‘sceptical’ and ‘problematic’ – idealism).

(The ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES, in the ANALYTIC)

(The Aesthetic)

Refutation of the claims of transcendent metaphysics (metaphysics which

tries to apply the categories beyond experience) – whilst leaving room for a
‘practical’ ‘proof’ of free will, immortality of the soul, and God.

= Reason limited in order to make room for faith – and morality.

(The DIALECTIC – and the other parts of Kant’s philosophy)

29
22 Alternative / even broader summary of the 1st Critique’s overall argument

We must have (synthetic) apriori knowledge, on pain of scepticism

(as Hume’s empiricism pretty much showed, Kant thinks).
pretty

Only two epistemologies are contenders for securing (synthetic) apriori

knowledge: rationalism and transcendental idealism.

Rationalist epistemology – the attempt to derive (synthetic) apriori

knowledge solely from concepts – cannot succeed. (How could it?)

Transcendental idealism (which derives the synthetic apriori from forms of

experience) is true.

Or, even more concisely (see A46-7/B64/KS 85): if there is knowledge that is apriori yet
synthetic – and we do – then only transcendental idealism can explain that situation. (See also
Kant’s Prolegomena. Note also that this argumentative strategy – of trying to show that
something undeniable and perhaps even obvious entails a substantive philosophical conclusion
– has come to be called ‘transcendental argument’.)

30
23 A representation of the place of the POSTULATES (of pure practical reason) in Kant’s defence of morality & religion
(that dual defence being mounted in several of Kant’s works)

Fact of reason FREE WILL SOUL

Idealism Morality Highest good

Primacy of practical reason

GOD

In words: If there is such a thing as duty, then the will is free, the soul is immortal and God exists; and there is such a thing as duty
– or at least we are entitled to believe so.

31
Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, references in what follows to notes, tables and sections are cross-
references within this document.

32
1
In preparing this document I have referred to (but not cited) the German original of the Critique: Kant,
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe, Bande III & 4, Wilhelm Weischedel ed.,
Suhrkamp, 1968.
2
For fuller chronologies, see Kuehn, Kant, Zöller’s edition of the Prolegomena, and
http://www.manchester.edu/kant/helps/KantsLife.htm. See also WOOD chapter 1.
3
On the subsequent history of Königsberg / Kaliningrad (which one can locate via this link:
http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?ll=54.711595,20.509972&z=6&t=h&hl=en-GB), see WOOD 3.
4
The Presentation posits a sensible Newtonian world and a metaphysical intellectual world. But by the time
of the 1772 letter to Herz, Kant had come to worry about this position.
5
The Critique was written, or assembled, in only a few months – but after years of preparation.
6
On that review and on other reviews, see Prolegomena, Zöller ed., especially its Appendix and therein 184
n. 14.
7
Called Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science in Kemp-Smith’s edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason, p. 116.
8
On the Opus Postumum, see the entry under that title in DICT.
9
See WOOD 18.
10
There is a similar table in Will Dudley, Understanding German Idealism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), p.
21. Doubtless other variants exist too.
11
There are several points to note here. (1) ‘Pure Reason was a term used by Wolffians to describe their
philosophy. Meissner, in his Wolffian Philosophisches Lexicon [Philosophical Lexicon] (1737) defines pure
reason as “a completely distinct cognition in which the understanding in separated from the senses and
imagination”. Thus when Kant criticizes “pure reason” [or sets out to determine its proper limits] he intends
[to criticise] both this form of knowledge and the dominant philosophical viewpoint that had laid claim to it
[i.e. Wolffian/Leibnizian rationalism]’ (DICT 342, my interpolations). (Kant writes also – Bxxii – of ‘this
critique of pure speculative reason’; ‘speculative’ might here mean the same as ‘pure’, i.e. in separation
from other forms of cognition, or it might mean theoretical reason as against practical reason.) On the
notion of ‘critique’ in ‘critique of pure reason’, see Axi-xii, Bxxii, Bxxv-xxvi and CPR’s Introduction (esp.
§VII). (2) Bxxxviii–Bxl lists the main changes that Kant made in the ‘B’ (i.e. second) edition of the
Critique. The changes he lists pertain to: the Aesthetic, and especially its treatment of time; the
transcendental deduction; the Principles; and the Paralogisms (the fourth of which migrates, somewhat, into
the ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ that, in B, appears within the Postulates section of the ‘Principles’).
(3) Initially Kant intended the B edition of CPR to include material that actually appeared in CPrR. (4) For
a page-and-a-half run-through of the Critique’s sections, see KTK 19–20.
12
Referred to as ‘methodology’ in P.
13
A canon is a method or set of principles or set of texts. But, in a more particular Kantian sense (which
Kant takes from Epicurus), a canon is something that allows you to check the truth of a judgement. See
DICT 98-9.
14
The ‘architectonics’ of a complex structure are the structure of that system. As the ‘Architectonic of Pure
Reason’ section shows, Kant plays up the unity, the systematicity of a – or at least of his – architectonic.
15
In B, the fourth Paralogism largely becomes the Postulate’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’. Note also that my
‘according to which’ means: according to these ‘paralogisms’; Kant rejects all the arguments for the views
at issue.
16
An antinomy is a situation wherein each of two contradictory ideas (two ideas that contradict one another)
very much seems to be true.
17
Kant says (B49 / KS 76) that, strictly speaking, this argument in the wrong place.
18
Kant uses the phrase ‘metaphysical deduction’ only later (namely, at B159, within the transcendental
deduction; actually, that is the only time, at least in the Critique, that Kant uses the phrase). See below in the
table for a narrow sense of ‘the metaphysical deduction’.
19
This section can seem to have this additional title: ‘The transcendental clue to the discovery of all pure
concepts of understanding’. And sections II and III seem each to have this title: ‘The clue to the discovery
of all pure concepts of understanding’. What appears to be going on is this: Kant is trying to indicate,
simply, that sections I through III are indeed sections of a chapter that is called, ‘The clue to the discovery
of all pure concepts of understanding’. So all these extra titles may be ignored – as they are ignored in my
table.
20
Commentators are unanimous in holding that Kant’s table departs from the logic of his day more than
Kant acknowledges. Still: so far as these four headings (quantity, quality, relation, modality) go – as against
Kant’s account of those headings (that is, as against the three ‘moments’ that he places under each of them),
Allison says the following. ‘Apart from relation, which replaces the then standard division of judgments
into simple and compound, there is nothing remarkable about this list’ (KTI 136). One Kantian departure
from the traditional account of the forms of judgment that come under the headings, is the distinction, under
the heading of ‘quantity’, of universal from singular judgments. For, traditionally, the latter had been seen
as merely a case of the former; and Kant admits that singular judgments can be reduced to universal ones.
See KTK 54.
21
Kant holds that ‘the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second
category with the first’ (B110 / KS 116).
22
As said above, each judgment is characterised by one of each of the four groups of judgment forms. In
this column of the table, however, I am concerned to bring out only the particular judgment form (e.g. the
quantity of universality) that each particular row of the table means to explain.
23
I quote KEMP 20fn. (on A72/B97). Section 11 below revisits infinite judgments.
24
‘[I]n traditional logic judgments may be combined with one another in syllogistic inferences, and this in
three ways:¶Categorical: All S is P (and all P is R; therefore, All S is R).¶ Hypothetical: If S is P, then S is R
(and S is P; therefore, S is R).¶ Disjunctive: S is either P or R (and S is not R; therefore, S is P)’ (WOOD
42).
25
There are several points to note here. (1) Kant seems to think that the components of a hypothetical
judgment – i.e. its antecedent and consequent – have quantity, but the hypothetical judgment itself – as a
whole – does not (cf. KA 81). (2) Presumably the components can each have any quality, too. (3) In Kant’s
logic, the antecedent and the consequent of a hypothetical judgment can, but need not, share the same
subject. For consider, first, the example of a hypothetical judgment given in CPR: ‘If there is a perfect
justice, the obstinately wicked are punished (A73 / B98). Here the antecedent and the consequent do not
share a single subject. But contrast the Prolegomena: ‘When the sun shines on the stone, it [the stone]
grows warm’ (P, §20 fn.)
26
Note three points. (1) Unlike the standard form of modern logic, Kant takes disjunction as exclusive. That
is: ‘“p or q” means that at least one of the two statements is true but they are not both true’ (KTK 77,
second italics mine). (2) In accord with modern logic, Kant does not limit the number of disjuncts in a
disjunction. (3) Unlike modern logic, Kant seems to conceive only of disjunctions that have a single subject.
Kant’s example of a disjunction is: ‘“The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner
necessity, or through an external cause”’ (A73–74/B99/KS 109). But what of disjunctions of the form:
‘either S is P or T is P’ (or: ‘either S is P or T is Q’), i.e. disjunctions that have more than one subject? Kant
seems not to consider such judgments. Indeed, G. J. Mattey tells me that none of the main logicians of
Kant’s day considered such judgments. Moreover: the correlation that Kant proceeds to make between the
logical form of disjunction and the category of ‘community’ does not work (or, perhaps, works even less
well) for such disjunctions (for disjunctions with more than one subject).
27
Modality ‘concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general’ (A74/B100); and the
copula is the connective only in categorical judgments. Yet it does seem that a hypothetical judgment may
be made problematically, assertorically, or apodictically – and the same for a disjunctive judgment. For
more on Kant’s conception of modality, see KTK 56–7 and 79–83 and KTI 139.
28
The acknowledgement is at A72/B97. Kant’s point, more specifically, is as follows. In formal logic –
strictly: ‘analytic general logic’ (see table 18) infinite judgments need not be distinguished from affirmative
judgments. One might expect negative judgment to be the absorbing class. Isn’t ‘the soul is non-mortal’
identical to ‘it is not the case that the soul is mortal’? Well, on the other hand, an infinite judgment asserts –
rather than denies – that a predicate (albeit a predicate of the form ‘non-X’) applies to a subject. Moreover –
in fact, in accord with the foregoing points – Kant is committed to the view that infinite judgments partake
of the nature of both affirmative and negative judgments (cf. note Error: Reference source not found). Now,
there are 27 infinite forms. If we count them (and do not, for whatever reason, disqualify any of the other
judgment forms), then the number of forms of judgment increases is 81, 81 (3 4) being the number of
possible combinations of four groups of three categories. As to the qualification (in my main text) ‘in this
context’: the contrast is with transcendental logic. Transcendental logic ‘concerns itself with the laws of
understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate a priori to objects’ (A57/B82; cf. A130–
36/B169–75). That is: transcendental logic concerns that which the understanding can, via the forms of
judgment transformed into the categories, legislate for objects apriori (as to reason, that is the sphere of the
purely negative ‘dialectic’ of transcendental logic – see table 18). In short, transcendental logic is about the
‘intelligible’ conditions of objects (as against their ‘sensible conditions’, which is the sphere of the
transcendental aesthetic). Transcendental logic counts as logic because (1) it has to do with forms of
judgment, (2) without the conditions studied by transcendental logic, all synthetic apriori and synthetic
aposteriori judgments (see table 19) would lack objects and, in that sense, be false (cf. KCPR 125f.). Now,
the infinite judgments matter for transcendental logic for the following reason. Whereas the quality of
negation corresponds to the category of cause and effect, the quality of negation corresponds to a different
category, namely, the category of ‘community’. Note finally that my table does include singular judgments,
even though Kant holds of them what he holds of infinite judgments, namely, that in general logic they are
reducible to one of the other forms of judgment (see note Error: Reference source not found).
29
See §10, including the notes to that section.
30
The table in P is simpler, in that it gives simpler expressions of the respective categories of relation and
modality. The table in P adds glosses, too, to the categories of quantity – thus: ‘Unity (measure); Plurality
(quantity); Totality (the whole)’.
31
Kemp Smith’s edition of the Critique seems to give this section as a whole the title ‘The Principles of Any
Transcendental Deduction’. Judging by the German, however, and by the Guyer-Wood translation, the title
is best applied only to the subsection that follows. Note also that this ‘Section 1’ is largely identical to
B116–129.
32
Kemp Smith’s edition of the Critique seems to give this section as a whole the title ‘The A Priori Grounds
of the Possibility of Experience’. Judging by the German, however, and by the Guyer-Wood translation, the
title is best applied only to the subsection that follows.
33
What is said in notes Error: Reference source not found and Error: Reference source not found applies
here, making the necessary adjustment for the subsection title that follows.
34
The text of these pages (including that of §14) is largely identical to A84–95. One difference is that the
numbers ‘§13’ and ‘§14’ were added in B. A more substantive difference is as follows. The sketch provided
by §14 in the B edition of the Deduction’s procedure is somewhat different to the sketch given in the A
version. In the B edition, the topics treated are: transcendental idealism / Copernican revolution; the notion
of an object-in-general; Locke, Hume; the idea of a category.
35
Kemp Smith’s translation omits these words – but they are there in the German.
36
This section, together with section 26, relates the transcendental deduction to the metaphysical deduction.
37
According to this section (B144 / KS 160), the material of ‘Section 2’ falls into two halves: (1) §§15–20,
wherein ‘a beginning is made of a deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding’; (2) §§21–26,
wherein the deduction is ‘fully attained’ (with the remaining sections summing up).
38
This is an accurate translation by Kemp Smith (of ‘Die Kategorie hat’). But a more natural rendering
would be: ‘Categories have’.
39
§24 and §26 briefly reprise the A edition’s ‘subjective deduction’. But they do change some terminology
(cf. KCPR 139). ‘Synthesis of reproduction in imagination’ becomes ‘figurative synthesis’. ‘Synthesis of
recognition in a concept’ becomes ‘intellectual synthesis’. Note that the coda to §24 somewhat indicates
that it is a coda by its coming after a break indicated thus in the text: ‘* * *’.
40
This section has no number.
41
Sometimes more than one Principle, or subprinciple, is at issue under each of the headings of Axioms,
Anticipations, Analogies and Postulates. Cf. note Error: Reference source not found below.
42
Kant calls the first two Principles ‘mathematical’, the latter two ‘dynamical’. The table’s double line
marks the distinction. Part of the idea here is as follows (KS 210, 197). The mathematical Principles are
those that are necessary for mathematics, and the dynamical for ‘dynamics’, i.e. for mechanics, or for that
part of mechanics that is the study of motion – in a word, the physics of bodies. Both sets of Principles are
necessary, Kant thinks, for the objective world in which we take ourselves to live (cf. KCPR 166).
Moreover, the ‘mathematical’ Principles – those of the ‘Axioms’ and ‘Anticipations’ – are about rules to
which intuitions must conform (if there is to be any objectivity), whereas the ‘dynamical’ Principles (the
Analogies and Postulates) are about how intuitions must be connected one to another (if, again, there is to
be any objectivity).
43
I quote B202. Note also the following (from Guyer, quoted at KTK 63; but the abridgment and
interpolation are mine). ‘The principle of the axioms of intuition is not itself intended to be an axiom, let
alone more than one; it is intended to be the principle which licenses the empirical use of [. .] genuine
axioms of intuition more properly so called, which are [. .] axioms [from some parts of] mathematics’. Cf.
A164/B204 and, for detail, KTK §3.3.1.
44
There is some doubt about whether Kant really intended the correlation between singular judgments and
the category of totality. See KTK 61–2. As to why the three categories of quantity correspond only to a
single principle, see the previous note.
45
B207.
46
The Analogies section elaborates the idea that, ‘Experience is possible only through the representation of
a necessary connection of perceptions’ (B218, my stress; cf. P §26, §36 – and note above Error: Reference
source not found). As to the term ‘Analogies of Experience’, Kant’s reasons for the term seem to turn on the
idea that the Principles of the Analogies (and of the Postulates) are ‘regulative’ as against ‘constitutive’ (see
KS 210-1, and cf. KS 258 and 196). But the idea seems to boil down to the following. In something of a
parallel to the use of the term ‘analogy’ in mathematics, Kant will use the phrase ‘analogy of experience’ to
mean an account of some structure(s) to experience that experience must have, given that it (experience)
has some other structural feature(s). An Analogy – here as in mathematics – is something inferred.
47
‘All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere
determination’ (A182; cf. B224).
48
‘All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect’ (B232).
49
‘All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity’
(B 256).
50
A218/B265–6. My exposition draws on KCPR 197f.
51
On the idea of ‘the schematism’, see, in KTK, 65–6 and the Appendix.
52
A145/B184–185.
53
A397 gives a seemingly different derivation or articulation of the Ideas, or at least of the three types
(Paralogisms, Antimonies, Ideal) of ‘dialectical inference’.
54
The theoretical ideas also have a legitimate, ‘regulative’ use (see throughout the Dialectic, and esp.
A644/B672 in its appendix; cf. P §44). They point towards the unachievable ideal of knowing nature as a
determinate whole. Here the Ideas take the form (I cannot discern the specific correspondences, if any) of
principles of ‘genera’, ‘specification’ and ‘affinity’, instructing us to seek, respectively, ‘homogeneity’,
‘variety’ and ‘continuity’ (see KCPR 222).
55
‘In the period immediately prior to Kant the content of metaphysics had settled into four sections: the first
was general metaphysics or ontology, which was concerned, in the words of Wolff’s metaphysics, with
“The First Grounds of our Knowledge and of Things in General”; the remaining three were the objects and
sciences [respectively] of “special metaphysics”, namely, (a) the soul and psychology, (b) the world and
cosmology, and (c) god and theology’ (DICT 291).
56
These are guarantors of the moral law – CPrR 138–9 and Bxxix-x. See also the ‘Moral Proof of the
Existence of God’ in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. See further KEMP 67f. and KCPR 317f. See also a table
later in this document.
57
My use of ‘complete’ here and below owes to Zöller’s analysis of P (see, in his edition of the latter, p. 42).
Note also that one could speak of ‘the unconditioned’ instead of ‘the complete’. The most general Kantian
idea of the unconditioned is of that which is unconditioned by intuition (cf. Scruton, Kant, p. 54).
58
A paralogism is simply an invalid syllogism (see A341/B399), a syllogism being, roughly (for a fuller
account, see ‘syllogism’ in Ted Honderich (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy), a three-step
argument. But Kant suggests that his ‘transcendental paralogisms’ (A341/B399) are specific in that ‘all four
of the paralogisms [. . exemplify] a common pattern of invalid argument, in which categories are employed
transcendentally [i.e. ‘transcendently’?] in the [respective] major premises, but empirically in the minor
premises and conclusions’ (KCPR 227, referring to A402–3).
59
The judgment that comprises the knowledge, or the ostensible knowledge, in question. But sometimes
Kant speaks, also, of concepts being apriori or aposteriori. See for instance B5, B40, and, crucially –
because on (or anticipating) the ‘categories’ – A65–6/B90.
60
In this document I follow the convention of using ‘iff’ to mean ‘if and only if’.
61
See A6/B10/KS 47, and forward, and P §2. Note that analyticity is, Kant thinks, testable via the principle
of contradiction. The test at issue works as follows (B6; A151/B191). If the denial of a judgment is self-
contradictory (as is the case, for example, in the denial of the judgment a square has four sides), then it
must be true that the judgment (in the example, the judgment a square has four sides) is analytic, i.e., that
the judgment’s predicate (in this case, has four sides) is contained in the judgments subject (here, square).
Note further that the idea of a subject containing its predicate applies – directly, anyway – only to
categorical judgments.
62
A6–7/B11; P §2.
63
B3–4. ‘Strict universality’ means actual as against probable universality, i.e. as against a suspected
universality that is derived from induction. Now, according to EWING 17 (and cf. B4 and A1), Kant ‘held
rightly that the two [criteria of apriority, viz., (strict) universality and necessity] entail each other, for, if B
follows necessarily from A, B must be present whenever A occurs [so necessity implies universality], and
unless B follows from A we have not genuine universality because exceptions are always at least possible
[i.e. can have universality only through necessity – so universality implies necessity]’ (my interpolations).
Still, there seems to be one type of case in which necessity does not imply universality (at least under one
construal of universality). ‘[S]trict universality does not seem to work for singular a priori propositions, like
“9 is an odd number.” But this proposition is still necessarily true. So it seems that strict universality entails
necessity, but not vice versa, and that necessity is the fundamental criterion’ (KTK 9).
64
Contrary to B14, Kant asserts sometimes (e.g. B16–17) that mathematical tautologies are analytic. Cf.
EWING 23, which suggests a way of resolving the contradiction, namely, by taking properly mathematical
propositions as synthetic, and analytic propositions encountered in maths as merely methodical
propositions.
65
These first principles of science () are not quite or at least not all principles one will actually encounter
within science. True, Kant calls some of the principles at issue ‘laws of mechanics’ and those laws relate
closely to Newton’s three laws of motion – those latter laws being: (1) a body remains at rest unless acted
upon, (2) change of motion is proportional to force impressed, (3) every action generates equal and opposite
reaction. (‘Newton’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropedia, vol. 24, p. 933, 15th edition, 1997.) One of
Kant’s ‘laws of mechanics’ seems identical with Newton’s second law. Another one of the Kantian laws
resembles Newton’s first law. A third Kantian law is a principle of the conservation of matter. On all this see
CPR B17, B22 fn. and The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant tries to derive these – and
other – ‘first principles of science’ apriori, via the categories, the Principles of Pure Understanding and,
within the latter, particularly the Analogies. (So Kant’s first principles of science are not identical with the
‘Principles of the Pure Understanding’.)
66
Immanent metaphysics is ‘critical’ metaphysics – i.e. the sort of metaphysics that Kant himself means to
do, and which reaches its fruition in Kant’s ‘Principles’.
67
So ‘transcendent metaphysics’ is the subject that aspires, impossibly, to knowledge that is ampliative and
not derived from experience. Still: Kant holds that we can, in a sense, know something that is
transcendentally metaphysical, namely, the ‘postulates of practical reason’ (although these are meant to be
only ‘postulates’. .). See table 17.
68
See esp. B2.
69
CPR B11; P §2.c.1. Cf. also Andrew Ward, Kant: The Three Critiques. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, p.
19.
70
The example owes to A7 / B11. See also esp. P §18.
71
See also KTK 16–17.