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Clayton, Philip (2004) Emergence and Physicalism PDF
Clayton, Philip (2004) Emergence and Physicalism PDF
PHILIP CLAYTON
13. See Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation’,
in Heil and Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, 189–210, p. 209. Cf. Carl Gillett,
‘Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist
Metaphysics for “Downward” Determination’, Principia, 6 (2003), 83–114.
14. Gillett, ‘Non-Reductive Realization’, 42.
15. See Carl Gillett, ‘Physicalism and Panentheism: Good News and Bad News’,
Faith and Philosophy, 20/1 (Jan. 2003), 1–21.
16. ‘A property instance X is strongly emergent, in an individual S, if and only if
(i) X is realized by other properties/relations; and (ii) X partially non-causally
determines the causal powers contributed by at least one of the fundamental
properties/relations realizing X’ (Gillett, ‘Non-Reductive Realization’, 37–8).
17. In one sense, of course, physics is privileged: it constrains explanations
at all levels above it, but is not constrained by them. But one can accept this
principle without accepting that all causes are physical causes.
18. At the end of both of the more recent articles, Gillett admits that the
question about emergence will have to be decided by empirical enquiry. I am
arguing that, were he to be consistent, he would have to say the same thing
about the pre-commitment to micro-physicalism.
19. This limitation does not apply to those (such as Samuel Alexander and
Weiland) who understand ‘deity’ as an emergent property of the physical world
itself. See Chapter 5.
20. See Arthur Peacocke, “The Sound of Sheer Silence,” in Robert J. Russell
et al. (eds.), Neuroscience and the Person (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory
Publications, 1999).
21. See Harold Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became
Complex (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).