Criminal Liability

Conspiracy

[G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MIRIAM RUTH T. MAGSINO, Petitioners, v. PO1 RICARDO P. EUSEBIO,

SPO2 ROMEO ISIDRO, AND JOJIT GEORGE CONTRERAS, Respondents.

At any rate, conspirators are persons who, under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), “come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Because witnesses are rarely present when several
accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is usually inferred from their “concerted actions”
while committing it. On the other hand, accomplices, according to Article 18 of the RPC, are the persons who, not
being included in Article 17 [which identifies who are principals], “cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts.”

The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is
indeed slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; but they assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment.19 The solution in case of doubt is that, as the RTC said with ample jurisprudential
support, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed the role
of principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the “milder form of responsibility.” He should be
given the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice. (People v. Jose Tamayo,
44 Phil. 38; People v. Bantangan, 54 Phil. 834, 840; People v. Lansang, 82 Phil. 662, 667; People v.
Ubina, 97 Phil. 515; People v. Raganit, 88 Phil. 467;  People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498; People v.
Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514). Hence, in the case at bar, the accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras
should be granted the benefit of doubt and should considered merely as accomplices and should be
meted a penalty one degree lower than that to be imposed on accused Jesus Bongon, Jr. who is
unequivocally the principal.

Principal By Inducement

G.R. No. 133527-28 December 13, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs Dumancas

What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to
commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.

There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by causing
uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to conclude
that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual
findings of the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the victims was hatched on August 5, 1992
(10:30 A.M.) without Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever (p. 202, Rollo). The record is entirely bereft of
any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting to come up with such plan, by
either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied upon by the trial court in arriving at
its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is the supposed "commands" or order
given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two occasions (one inside the Ceres Compound: p.
205, Rollo, and the other in D'Hacienda Motel: p. 207, Rollo). By no stretch of the imagination may these so-called
"commands", standing alone, be considered as constituting irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear.

Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering
reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court, to show
that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and later kill
the victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money
to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for paying the latter's debts or obligations. But definitely, no money ever
came from Jeanette herself. The trial court's surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group was
with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette in completely baseless.

The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly given by Jeanette to accused-appellant
Geroche "to take care of the two" constitutes words of command which may be considered sufficient basis to convict
Jeanette as principal by inducement.
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present: (1) the inducement
be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute inducement,
there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation
to commit the crime.

By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not constitute the command required
by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs.  Indanan, supra, "a
chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may
give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed
thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be
followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the
results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed the act) would not be guilty of the
crime committed" (p. 219).

Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the crime
itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime
charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant
Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime
charged in this case.

Principal by Indispensable Cooperation

G.R. No. 193854               September 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.

The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of Rape under Article 266-A,
No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually
convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the RPC.

However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court, as sustained by the CA
that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.

Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or
by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. 15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of
rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received
money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even
AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus,
this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the
Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she
was raped by "Speed."

n this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

Accomplice

People vs Gambao

Degree of Culpability

Issue on Conspiracy
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were
concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those
arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and
Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation,
the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people apprehended
when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector
Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue
operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the
conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties
before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to
the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-
appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1)
before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping,
accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when
the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and
Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators.

Accomplice

Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in
order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal
and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo
that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to
keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable and
essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this
Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., 63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

People vs Bayabos

Issue: Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused.

Ruling:

It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of
trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially
when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.22  In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En
Banc reasoned thus: “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from
each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly, so long as the
commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal
liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.2

Accessory

JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y

JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime

The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not the
technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and
in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It
in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts
alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and specific name,"
but "did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth."50

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler
truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and
forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.

Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were accessories to
the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name of an accused's
criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their alleged
acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.

These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the subject
truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as
tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations,
against which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of "accessories"
under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused as accessories to the
crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of
the crime.52

In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been
discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the loaded
lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal
definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that
serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.

Mel Dimat vs People

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to
Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat
sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold
to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of
sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number
TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and,
therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.4 Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1âwphi1

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice
him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to
make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in
the case.

RAMON C. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Issue:The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as
against petitioner.

Ruling:We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.

The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have
been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."

P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery
and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised
Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but
becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and
fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. 8 The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under
the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering
that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing9 and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.

In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.11
Consequently, "the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the elements of
the crime charged."12

Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can
be no conviction for such offense.13 "It is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)."14

In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing?

Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items
and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted
that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and
did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant,
but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there
was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, crime of robbery or
theft has been committed.