Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CONCLUSIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS
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CHAPTER-8
The preamble to SEBI Act lays emphasis on Investor Protection. The main
objective of all these guidelines is to bring in transparency. A laudable work has
been done by SEBI in this regard for Primary market in terms of -
• Regulation of intermediaries.
• Equitable pricing for promoters and investing public.
• Revamp of the allotment process
• Greater and better disclosure norms.
• Setting entry barrier for Primary issues.
• Stricter norms for disclosure on financial matters.
These steps have resulted in improving the quality of the offer documents and
they are containing a lot more information than what it used to contain.
• The entry point norms for Initial Public Offer (IPO) which form a part of the
Disclosure and Investor Protection Guidelines (DIP) relaxed for companies
in the Information Technology (IT) sector to enable these companies to list
their shares by making public offer of 10 per cent of post issue capital
instead of 25 per cent for other sectors, subject to requirements of
minimum number of 20 lakh securities and minimum net offer value of
Rs.30 crore. This will encourage IT companies to come to the market.
• The requirement of "ability to pay dividend" substituted for "actual payment
of dividend", in the entry point norms for public offers. This will further
strengthen the guidelines.
• The DIP guidelines made common for all Initial Public Offers (IPOs) made
common in the wake of abolishing of the concept of fixed par value. This
will help streamline the guidelines.
• The guidelines for employees stocks options schemes have been revised
based on recommendations of committee appointed by the SEBI under J.
R. Varma.
(c) Book-Building
• The regulations for CRAs has been notified to bring the CRAs under a
regulatory framework for the first time.
• The Securities Law (Amendment) Bill, 1999 was passed by the Parliament
facilitating the regulation of Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) and
expanding the definition of securities to include units of CIS. This will help
the SEBI to regulate the CIS and protect the interest of investors in these
schemes.
bourses. Euronext allowed for the creation of common order book for any
share listed on any of the said bourses and the trade are settled through
Clearnet, the clearing house acting as counter party and Euroclear acting
as the depository.
• Flis allowed to directly participate in the public offer in takeover and buy-
back offer of companies.
• Foreign corporate or high networth individual investors allowed to invest
as sub-account to widen the base of Flis provided provident investment
does not exceed 5 per cent of total issued capital of company.
The measures enumerated above enabled the SEBI to accomplish and achieve
the targets set by it to fulfill its statutory obligations to develop and regulate the
securities market and protect the investors. Besides, with the maturity of the
regulatory framework and stepped up market surveillance, the market has also
become safer and the investor is better protected. While volatility has become an
endemic feature of all the markets in the world because of increased volumes
within the markets and cross border, complexities, impact of other financial
markets like currency, commodities and property, existence of common players
in different markets fleeing from one market to the other, thus transmitting the
risk, the Indian market has remained comparatively less volatile. This has been
possible because of the prudential macro-economic policies of the country,
proper management of change and effective regulatory system.
SEBI has been trying to strengthen the role of exchanges as effective self-
regulatory organisations. Setting up of independent surveillance cells directly
reporting to the exchange executive directors is a step in this direction.
Development of exchange level surveillance capabilities like stock watch system,
directing exchanges to augment their surveillance staff strength and devising a
training and certification module for the exchange surveillance staff are further
initiatives taken by SEBI in this direction. Self-regulatory steps taken by
exchanges under the oversight of SEBI have improved market safety and
integrity.
There are 23 stock exchanges having different trading and settlement cycles and
at the same time scrips have multiple listing on these stock exchanges. For
effective and meaningful co-ordination between these stock exchanges for
healthy functioning of the market, an Inter Exchange Market Surveillance Group
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has been set up by the SEBI. The group meets at regular intervals. Six meetings
of the Group were convened by the SEBI during 1999-2000. In these meetings,
the Group reviewed the prevailing market conditions and several measures, such
'I _.._ as increase in the cash component of margin and additional capital to 30 per
cent, imposition of special/ad-hoc margins in scrips with low floating stock and
specific measures such as exposure reduction, etc. were initiated to enhance the
safety and integrity of the market.
In principle both SEBI and SEC promise to protect the interests of the investors
in the Securities market, however the two regulatory authorities differ
substantially from each other in three ways.
First, the level of enforceability, which is central to the role of any regulatory
agency, markedly differs in the two countries. In the United States the Sec insists
that officers must disclose their intent to either purchase or sell shares to the
public at the beginning of each quarter. This makes the reporting much more
detailed, which subsequently leads to higher levels of enforceability by the SEC.
Sebi, in contrast, lacks the power and enforceability that the SEC commands, for
the simple reason that reporting in India is not as detailed and readily available
as in US.
A second difference that flows directly from the first is the relative differences in
insider trading cases that have actually been proven by the two regulatory
agencies. The SEC has managed to win a series of insider trading cases. Sebi,
in contrast, is yet to book any major case on insider trading. Clearly, Sebi is
being zealous about prosecuting insider traders without being too aggressive
about actually proving them guilty.
A third critical difference between the two regulatory authorities is that, in India,
institutional investors can be nominated to sit on the boards of public companies.
This gives them access to non-public information, which gets discussed and
debated at board meetings, although the institutions which they represent are
actively engaged in dealing in shares of the company. For all practical purposes
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institutional investors argue that there exists a firewall between the investment
divisions and a company's board representatives. In reality, however it is difficult
to ensure that none of the non public information discussed during board
"' _.., meetings influences the buying or selling decisions of the institutional investors.
From the findings of the survey, it is very much evident that SEBI has not lived
upto the expectations of the investors and the reason for the same has been the
lack of powers as well as improper utilization of the existing powers. This survey
vindicates the purpose of this study and emphasises the need for formulation of
stringent regulations with no loopholes and their proper implementation
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Future strategy
Sebi should ensure end use of funds raised from the market and there
should be a mechanism for debarring promoters from tapping market for
some time where there is misuse of fund raised.
Despite there being several rules and guidelines, foul play is persisting in
the market. These foul plays when exposed lead to loss of faith of
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investors in the market and adversely affect the volume of business. Sebi
should have a separate specially trained Intelligence wing to track the foul
plays.
3. Investor Education
4. Verdicts by Court
This decision, however, goes against the spirit of section 299 in view
of following reasoning: Section 299 has covered all companies, whether
public or private or closely held within its ambit and hence no exceptions
can be made for closely held companies. The Act makes many exceptions
for private companies but that is not the case here. The section itself has
made no exceptions.
The very fact that Section 229 has mandated submission of fresh
notice in the last month of the financial year so as to validate the previous
notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature that a notice would
be required to be given by every director for every financial year.