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Technical Safety

HSE Seminar with focus on Safety

Cynthia Spitzenberger, DNV GL


8 November 2013
Background
 When exploring deeper, harsher
environments, failures become more
critical
 Technical Safety, industry best practice
 Goal – Prevent, control and mitigate
potential events
 Safety, environment and assets

Piper Alpha Memorial, Aberdeen


Technical Safety
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Technical Safety – NORSOK Standard
 Technical Safety, NORSOK Standard S-001

 “describes the principles and requirements for the


development of the safety design of offshore
installations for production of oil and gas”

 “defines the required standard for


implementation of technologies and
emergency preparedness to establish and
maintain an adequate level of safety for
personnel, environment and material assets”

Technical Safety
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Technical Safety Design Process (S-001)

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Safety Performance Standards
 Verifiable standard to which safety system elements are to perform.
 Add any supplemental safety requirements other than those specified by authority
requirements and standards.
 Based on the safety strategy document(s)
 Ensure that barriers, safety systems or safety functions
- are suitable and fully effective for the identified hazards,
- have sufficient capacity for the duration of the hazard or the required time to provide
evacuation of the installation,
- have sufficient availability to match the frequency of the initiating event,
- have adequate response time to fulfill its role,
- are suitable for all operating conditions.

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Dimensioning Accidental Load (DAL)
 Based on quantitative risk analysis, comparison of estimated risk with risk
acceptance and/or design criteria.
 Dimensioning load shall not cause loss of safety functions or escalation (locally).
 The following loads are assessed:
- Explosion loads (NORSOK Z-013 method) to walls, decks, equipment, external areas
- Fire loads, heat loads
- Impact loads to structure (ship collisions, dropped objects)

1.E-03

90% closed
Exceedence frequency (1/year)

60% closed

30% closed

1.E-04

1.E-05
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pressure (barg)

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Specific Safety Performance Standards
 Layout  Human – machine interface
 Structural integrity  Natural ventilation & HVAC
 Containment  Public address, alarm communication
 Open drain  Emergency power and lighting
 Process safety  Passive fire protection (PFP)
 Emergency shut down (ESD)  Fire fighting systems
 Blow down and flare / vent system  Escape and evacuation
 Gas detection  Rescue and safety equipment
 Fire detection  Marine systems and position keeping
 Ignition source control  Ship collision barrier

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Let’s focus on detailed quantified
risk analysis...

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How can detailed risk analysis help?
 Highlight key risk drivers
 Prioritize process issues with risk
perspective
 Assess layout or design alternatives
 Input to Design Accidental Loads (DAL)
 Dimensioning of Safety Barriers
 Dimensioning of Emergency
Preparedness, Escape and evacuation
measures
 Define performance requirements on key
safety systems (reliability, SIL Level,
survivability)

Image Source: http://abouthipaa.com/hipaa-compliance-guides/hipaa-security-risk-


analysis-tips-meaningful-use-stage-2-underscores-need-for-risk-analysis/

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New Offshore Risk Model – Safeti Offshore

Integrated Time varying


Subsea
smoke discharge, with
releases
modelling safety systems

Confined
Choice of
ignition models 3D viewer module fire
model

Detailed Detailed Escape and


impairment escalation Evacuation
estimation modelling modelling
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Phases of event and hazards to people
Detection
Release Ignition
starts Fire grows - Fire spreads –
escalation to wall or deck
other equipment failure
Explosion If fire continues
Overpressure
Down Tools

Evacuation Rescue
Escape / Muster
People Hazards

Toxic Explosion / Overpressure Escape Rescue

Fire / Thermal Radiation

Toxic Smoke

Technical Safety Time


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Time Dependent Sequence Calculations
 The following calculations vary over time
- Release discharge
- Activation of safety systems (detection alarms, isolation, blowdown)
- Cloud size
- Ignition probability
- Explosion probability and explosion load
- Fire size

 People move across the platform to Muster location


 Failure of barriers (walls / decks) depending on exposure
 Escalation to other equipment depending on exposure

All of these issues should be reflected in the risk model

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Time Varying Discharge with Safety System Behaviour

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Safety System Modelling
 Improvements to safety systems are used to reduce potential risks
 Potential active safety systems to include
- Detection (automatic, manual, external, fire detection)
- Isolation and shutdown
- Blowdown
- Ignition control
- Firewater deluge

 Activation times and failure probabilities are key inputs


 Different combinations of these systems create different discharge conditions,
hazard size, release duration, and personnel impact
 Passive fire protection and barriers should also be accounted for

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Leak Probabilistic explosion model
IS1-G
Location
Cumulative Probability of Ignition
 Flammable cloud
1.000E+00

1.000E-01
0.0 200.0 400.0 600.0 800.0 1000.0 1200.0 1400.0 1600.0 1800.0 2000.0 dispersion in source
1.000E-02

1.000E-03
module (cloud volume)
1.000E-04

1.000E-05

1.000E-06 Small (main)


 Detection, Ignition and
Probability

1.000E-07

1.000E-08
Medium (main)
Large (main)
Explosion probabilities
1.000E-09

1.000E-10

1.000E-11
 Explosion Overpressure
1.000E-12

1.000E-13
Exceedance Curves (at
1.000E-14
Time [s] each defined target)
Leak
IS1-G\Explosion Target
Location
Aggregated Exceedance Probability vs Explosion Overpressure

1.000E+00
0.0000 0.2000 0.4000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 1.2000

1.000E-01

1.000E-02

Small (main)
Probability (given Ignition)

1.000E-03 Medium (main)


Large (main)

1.000E-04

1.000E-05

Technical Safety 1.000E-06


8 November 2013 Pressure [bar]
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Module Explosion & Fire Modeling
 Free-field fire modeling does not reflect obstacles
- Wall or deck barriers should block fire path and thermal radiation
- Simplistic impact distance lookup tables often applied

 CFD modeling realistic, however time limiting


- Usually detailed CFD models for key / representative fire hazards
- Various combinations of fire orientation and wind conditions & orientation
- Application to risk model for impact and impairment

 New simplistic module fire model accounting for barriers


- To model the range of release scenarios
- To get better estimation of radiation for impairment calculations

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Escalation & Impairment Modeling
 Current models look only at failure of first barrier or escalation
- Many possible outcomes, given different possible escalations of barriers
- Critical to know how often escalation occurs to first barrier of originating area
- Multiple barriers often, but are they sufficient?

 Impairment modeling (of area locations, key targets such as escapeways)


- CFD analysis may be applied for representative scenarios
- If no CFD available, then analyst judgments apply
- Usually time variance of impairment ignored

Wall 2

TR
Wall 1

Escapeway
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Escalation & Impairment Modeling

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Muster & Escape Modeling
 Immediate fatalities to the initial hazardous event are “easy” to estimate
 Muster fatalities or those trying to escape and get to a “place of safety” are more
difficult
- Involves accounting for movement of personnel with time
- Different possible path combinations
- Impairment impacts affect the movement and path taken

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Conclusions
 NORSOK S-001 provides good guidance for inclusion of safety in design and
modifications – Technical Safety Approach
 Safety Performance Standards help ensure the safety barriers and functions are
adequate and perform when needed
 Detailed risk analysis allows for greater understanding of risk drivers and potential
risk reduction options
- This needs greater investigation of details and powerful compiled code
- Retention of complete risk results, which are accessible and permit traceability
- Support for easy and fast sensitivities to support decision processes

 Key features of the new generation of risk models include


- Features for easy risk communication
- Inclusion of safety system modeling
- Improved module fire modeling / greater integration of CFD results
- Escalation and impairment modeling
- Reflection of people movements and escape

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Safeguarding life, property
and the environment

www.dnv.com

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