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Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 3
Technical Safety Design Process (S-001)
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 4
Safety Performance Standards
Verifiable standard to which safety system elements are to perform.
Add any supplemental safety requirements other than those specified by authority
requirements and standards.
Based on the safety strategy document(s)
Ensure that barriers, safety systems or safety functions
- are suitable and fully effective for the identified hazards,
- have sufficient capacity for the duration of the hazard or the required time to provide
evacuation of the installation,
- have sufficient availability to match the frequency of the initiating event,
- have adequate response time to fulfill its role,
- are suitable for all operating conditions.
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 5
Dimensioning Accidental Load (DAL)
Based on quantitative risk analysis, comparison of estimated risk with risk
acceptance and/or design criteria.
Dimensioning load shall not cause loss of safety functions or escalation (locally).
The following loads are assessed:
- Explosion loads (NORSOK Z-013 method) to walls, decks, equipment, external areas
- Fire loads, heat loads
- Impact loads to structure (ship collisions, dropped objects)
1.E-03
90% closed
Exceedence frequency (1/year)
60% closed
30% closed
1.E-04
1.E-05
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pressure (barg)
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 6
Specific Safety Performance Standards
Layout Human – machine interface
Structural integrity Natural ventilation & HVAC
Containment Public address, alarm communication
Open drain Emergency power and lighting
Process safety Passive fire protection (PFP)
Emergency shut down (ESD) Fire fighting systems
Blow down and flare / vent system Escape and evacuation
Gas detection Rescue and safety equipment
Fire detection Marine systems and position keeping
Ignition source control Ship collision barrier
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 7
Let’s focus on detailed quantified
risk analysis...
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 8
How can detailed risk analysis help?
Highlight key risk drivers
Prioritize process issues with risk
perspective
Assess layout or design alternatives
Input to Design Accidental Loads (DAL)
Dimensioning of Safety Barriers
Dimensioning of Emergency
Preparedness, Escape and evacuation
measures
Define performance requirements on key
safety systems (reliability, SIL Level,
survivability)
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 9
New Offshore Risk Model – Safeti Offshore
Confined
Choice of
ignition models 3D viewer module fire
model
Evacuation Rescue
Escape / Muster
People Hazards
Toxic Smoke
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 12
Time Varying Discharge with Safety System Behaviour
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 13
Safety System Modelling
Improvements to safety systems are used to reduce potential risks
Potential active safety systems to include
- Detection (automatic, manual, external, fire detection)
- Isolation and shutdown
- Blowdown
- Ignition control
- Firewater deluge
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 14
Leak Probabilistic explosion model
IS1-G
Location
Cumulative Probability of Ignition
Flammable cloud
1.000E+00
1.000E-01
0.0 200.0 400.0 600.0 800.0 1000.0 1200.0 1400.0 1600.0 1800.0 2000.0 dispersion in source
1.000E-02
1.000E-03
module (cloud volume)
1.000E-04
1.000E-05
1.000E-07
1.000E-08
Medium (main)
Large (main)
Explosion probabilities
1.000E-09
1.000E-10
1.000E-11
Explosion Overpressure
1.000E-12
1.000E-13
Exceedance Curves (at
1.000E-14
Time [s] each defined target)
Leak
IS1-G\Explosion Target
Location
Aggregated Exceedance Probability vs Explosion Overpressure
1.000E+00
0.0000 0.2000 0.4000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 1.2000
1.000E-01
1.000E-02
Small (main)
Probability (given Ignition)
1.000E-04
1.000E-05
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 16
Escalation & Impairment Modeling
Current models look only at failure of first barrier or escalation
- Many possible outcomes, given different possible escalations of barriers
- Critical to know how often escalation occurs to first barrier of originating area
- Multiple barriers often, but are they sufficient?
Wall 2
TR
Wall 1
Escapeway
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 17
Escalation & Impairment Modeling
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 18
Muster & Escape Modeling
Immediate fatalities to the initial hazardous event are “easy” to estimate
Muster fatalities or those trying to escape and get to a “place of safety” are more
difficult
- Involves accounting for movement of personnel with time
- Different possible path combinations
- Impairment impacts affect the movement and path taken
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 19
Conclusions
NORSOK S-001 provides good guidance for inclusion of safety in design and
modifications – Technical Safety Approach
Safety Performance Standards help ensure the safety barriers and functions are
adequate and perform when needed
Detailed risk analysis allows for greater understanding of risk drivers and potential
risk reduction options
- This needs greater investigation of details and powerful compiled code
- Retention of complete risk results, which are accessible and permit traceability
- Support for easy and fast sensitivities to support decision processes
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 20
Safeguarding life, property
and the environment
www.dnv.com
Technical Safety
8 November 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 21