EDITED BY |.

WILLIAM ZARTMAN

BOUNDARIE
IN DEPTH
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments xi

INTRODUCTION. Identity, Movement, and Response I

L William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University

Part |. Structures in Evolution

CHAPTER ONE. Borderland Dynamicsin the Era of the Pyramid Builders
in Egypt 21
Miroslav Barta, Charles University

CHAPTER TWO. Conflict and Control on the Ottoman-Greek Border 40

George Gavrilis, University of Texas at Austin

CHAPTER THREE. Illicit Trade and the Emergence of Albania

and Yemen 58
Isa Blumi, Georgia State University

CHAPTER FOUR. Onthe Marginof Statehood? State-Society Relations

in African Borderlands 85
Judith Vorrath, Centerfor Security Studies, ETH Zurich

CHAPTER FIVE. Change and Non-change in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands

after NAFTA 105
DavidStea, Jamie Zech, and Melissa Gray, Texas State University-San Marcos

Part Il. Identities in Transition

CHAPTER SIX. Colonialism or Conviviencia in Frankish Cyprus? 133
James G. Schryver, University of Minnesota, Morris

CHAPTER SEVEN. Constructing National Identity in Ottoman

Macedonia 160
Ipek K. Yosmaoglu, University of Wisconsin-Madison
[x] CONTENTS

and Jewsin the

CHAPTER EIGHT.Pioneers and Refugees: Arabs
Jordan River Valley 189
go ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Rachel 8. Havrelock, University ofIllinois at Chica
Mexico Border; Identities
CHAPTER NINE. Whos Who across the U.S.-
a .
in Transition 217
University of Texas at San Anto nio
Harriett Romo and Raquel R. Marquez,
CAORCis the federation of twenty-three American Overseas Research Centers
zon 235
CHAPTER TEN. Looking across the Hori located in five continents. The centers, structured as consortia of American
Shelley Feldman, Cornell University universities, colleges, and museums, sponsor advanced research by American
Up with Change 245
CONCLUSION, Borderland Policy: Keeping and host-countryscholars, primarily through fellowshipstor pre- and postdoc-
University
L William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins toral scholars focusing on projects in the humanities andsocial sciences, and
their workin the field is gratefully acknowledged as a basis for this project
References 251
The Borderlands {nterdisciplinary Project (BLIP) began witha discussionin
Contributors 279 the Boardof Directors’ meeting of the Council of American Overseas Research
Centers (CAORC) concerning converging researchinterests of scholars funded
Index 283 by CaORC memberinstitutions. CAORC vice-chairman I. William Zartman, a
political scientist representing “modern”studies, and CAORC Executive Com-
mittee member-at-large Kenneth Sams,a classical archaeologist, examined the
list of scholars and their topics for the previous three-year period and identified
three prevailing themes: gender studies, identity, and borderland studies, se-
lecting the thirdas the themeofthe first Interdisciplinary Project. Ofthefifteen
scholars originally identified in the CAORC fellowship database, seven are repre-
sented in this volume: Miroslav Barta, Associate Professor, Charles University,
Prague, funded by caorc’s Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Fellows
Program to carry out research at the Albright Institute of Archaeological Re-
search; Isa Blumi, doctoral candidate, CAoRc Multi-countryFellowship Program
fundedbythe U.S. DepartmentofState for residence at American Research In-
stitute in Turkey; James G. Schryver, doctoral candidate, at the Cyprus Ameri-
can Archaeological Research Institute, funded by the Fulbright Program; Ipek
Yosmaoglu, doctoral candidate, Princeton University, at the American School
of Classical Studies at Athens, funded by the Frantz Fellowship; and Shelley
Feldman, Professor, Cornell University, at the American Institute of Bangla-
desh Studies; George Gavrilis, doctoral candidate, Columbia University, at
the American Research Institute in ‘Turkey; and Rachel S. Havrelock, doc-
toral candidate, University of California, Berkeley, at (he American Center of
Oriental Research, Amman,the last three funded by the DepartmentofState.
 INTRODUCTION

Identity, Movement,
and Response
1. William Zartman

Bo run across Jand but through people. On mapsthey appearas fine

one-dimensional lines, whereas on the ground they have many dimen-
sions. Borderlands are boundaries in depth, space arounda line, the place where
state meets society, and “where no one everfeels at home” (Simon 1997). They
are a terra de pas (footlands or steplands) to Catalonians and “the third coun-
try” to Mexican Americans. In humanterms, it is impossible to understand
borders, and indeed the peripheral relations between the states and societies
they contain— without understanding howit is to live along them, The core of
that understanding,as this work shows,is found in a recognition ofthe distinct
identity and dynamics of borderland communities and the realization that any
measures to deal with specific current dynamics contain within themselves the
seeds of new dynamic problems.
‘The various academic definitions (since academicsrarely stick to one defini-
tion) al} stress the effect that borders have on our lives. Borderlands are “sub-
national areas whose economic and sociallife is directly and significantly af-
fected by proximity to an international boundary” (Hansen 1981) os, more
extensively, “zones of varying widths, in which people have recognizable con-
figurations ofrelationships to peopleinside that zone, on bothsides ofthe bor-
dertine but within the cultural landscape of the borderlands, and, as people of
the border, special relationships with other people and institutions in their re-
spective nations and states” (Donnan and Wilson 1994, 8). This collection of
case studies is an attempt to begin to understand boththese areas and the inter-
actions that occurwithin and across them. }t is an atlemp! to understand how
borders atfect the groups living near them.
 [2] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
Borderlandsare inhabited territories located on the margins of a power cen-
ter, or between powercenters, with power understood in the civilizational as
well as the politico-economic sense. But like the sea at the edge of the land (and
the reverse), they are continually in movement, both fast and slow, and any
static depiction of the moment contains withinit the elements ofits change—
Kokoschka in motion, to build on the image of Ernest Gellner (1983, 140). It
is that dynamic quality that is the message ofthis collective interdisciplinary
study. Borderlands needto be understood, not as places or even events, but as
social processes.
There is an enormousliterature on interstate boundaries as lines, and much
literature on secessional territories boundedby lines. But until relatively re-
cently there waslittle attempt to understand the nature of the land and people
abutting on and divided by the boundary—the boundary in depthor border-
lands. The collective work edited by Frederick Barth (1969) on ethnic groups
and boundaries launched the field of study and led scholars to investigate the
human conditionin regionssplit by state sovereignty. The focus was aboveall
on waysof maintaining identity under challenge from otheridentity groups or
changing situations (Barth 1969, 127, 132). Whereas previous studies in the social
sciences tended to focus on communities within states, so as to hold onevari-
able constant, or on comparisonsofdifferent communities in different states,
so as to analyze the differences, the newfield of inquiry concerned transborder
communities affected by a political line imposed on them. In mostcases, these
studies (such asthe larger studies behind the individual chaptersin this volume)
concentrated on onelocale, exploring and developing concepts onthe basis ofa
single community; edited works (such as the present study) brought together a
numberofsuchstudies to compare cases and construct concepts. But as Thomas
Wilson andHastings Donnan(1998, 5) point out, “Regardless oftheoretical ori-
entation orlocale, however, most of these studies have focused on how social
relations, defined in part by the state, transcend the physical limits ofthe state
and, in so doing, transform the structure ofthe state at home andits relations
with its neighbours.”
The presence of borderlands is not dependent on the existence ofa particular
type ofpowercenteror state, Borderlands have existed duringall times. When-
ever there have beenpolitical communities so large that distinctions could be
made betweenthe powercenter and a periphery far enough away fromit to be
able to enjoy some degreeof difference and autonomy,relations betweencenter
and periphery tended to be counterbalancedbyrelations between neighbor-
Introduction [3]
ing peripheries orby relations within the autonomous periphery,
Empires both
ancient and modern, cultural blocs andcivilizational areas, and evolvin
g states
even from the pre-Westphalianera all have had their borderlands.
The phe-
nomenon is sharpenedby the territorial state, a Western inventio
n, established
by the Romans andrevivedafter 1648 in the Westphalian system. Inthet
errito-
rial state, the political boundaryis imposed onthe populationreg
ardless ofits
social structure—in a process sometimes termed “territoriality”
(Winichakul
1994, 14)—and has an important influence on that structur
e as a result. But
borderlands can also be found on the edges of a communitaria
n state, whose
writ runs whereverits people are, not whereits territorial limits
end, but whose
people mingle with other communitarian states’ people as minorities.
In the
communitarian state, the social and political boundaries coincide, at
least in
theory, although even the purest community can contain subcommuniti
es
withinit orgive rise to forces that seek to define the pure community in a
way
offensive to anotherpart of the same community.
The phenomenon is further heightened by the nation-state. The
broadest
sociopolitical structure or communityis called a nation, marked most strongly
by
a senseofidentity and moreloosely by otherstructural and cultural characteris-
tics. Since therise ofnationalismatthe end ofthe eighteenth century, thereis a pre-
sumedcoincidence between thestate andits nation, but this coincidence can run
in either oftwodirections. Originally the presumption has beenone ofa nation-
state, in which the pre-existence ofthe identitarian community defines the
existence, legitimacy, andlimits ofthe political institution. However,
more re-
cently new states have beencreated, usually as a result ofanticolonial nation-
alist movements, with the need to unite a numberof component traditi
onal
nations into a state nation, a new identity communitythat coincides with the
political unit. In both directions, however, the coincidenceofstate andnati
onis
a best approximate, and nowhere more approximate than at their
edges, where
the official presumption is quite the opposite—one of sharp distinctions with
neighboring nations andstates,
Borders, even political borders, have a social aspect. Social communities can
exist in relation to the political borderin other forms than as coterminous na-
tion and state—as majoritarian communities that spill over as majoriti
es into
a neighboring state, as majoritarian communities that spill over as minorit
ies
into a neighboring state, as communities that exist as minorities on bothsid
es
of a border, and as minority communities that do not hang overacross a po-
litical border (cf. Wilson and Donnan 1998, 14). The political border
may or
 Introduction [5]
[4] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
“criteri{on] for often coincide with the physical location of borderlands. On the other hand,
may not contain or correspond to a social boundary, defined asa
. . . for judg|ing] some borderlands are conceived by their inhabitants as proto-states, peripher-
determining ... and. .. . signaling membership and exclusion,
in behavior” (Barth ies seeking to break off fromthe center to formtheir owncenter(with its own
value and performance, . . . [and for] mark[ing] difference
or separation” (Tilly peripheries). All ofthese features have been woven through borderlands’ ana-
1969, 15) or a “zone ofcontrasting identity, rapid transition,
lytical chronologies supplied by historians of specific areas, bringing to light
2004, 3; Abbott 1995).
ethnic groups the diachronic characteristics of world events on the fringes ofstates, empires,
But not all border and transborder activities are performedby
dominant commu- and civilizations.
or other social units, whether as local minorities or as the
dynamics that The purpose ofthe BorderlandsInterdisciplinary Project (BLIP) of the Coun-
nity within theirstate. Transborderactivities and the general
such as profes- cil of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) is to draw out conceptual
they produce can be performed by socioeconomic categories,
and membership in characteristics of the human condition in borderlands across enormous varia-
sions, occupations, orclasses, withlittle sense of identity
activities, such tions in time, in development, andin history. These characteristics involve such
diverse communities or identity groups. Indeed, someof these
own agents and dimensionsoflife as identity, socioeconomicrelations, power exercise andre-
as smuggling, taking refuge, or guarding borders, create their
may focus on one lations, security, and culture. While the technology ofthe timeshasits effects,it
wouldnot exist were it not for the border. Although studies
can be a jumble of is notlikely to affect the basics of these dimensions, whichareat least relevantly
sort of group or another for analytical purposes, full reality
course, such a mesh, comparable across time. Such multidimensionality of the human condition in
actors, understandable only as a mesh. All sociallife is, of
may be most pro- borderlands, however, demandsanequally multifaceted analytical approach, an
but such a mixture oflevels, actors, activities, and identities
constituted by a state interdisciplinarity that sets this collective enterprise apart from most other bor-
nounced whenactivated by the intrusion ofthe division
agents but can act on derland studies. While the individual studies presented here have oftenorigi-
boundary line. In sum, borders are not simply passive
nated ina particulardiscipline, the whole is broaderthan its parts and thereby
groups, encouraging the development of separate identities.
by several richer, since the parts are obliged to take into account elementsthat are promi-
As a result, the rising study of borderlands has been undertaken
claims Barth asits nent in otherchapters in the work. Anthropology, history, political science,reli-
disciplines. The mostactive has be en anthropology, which
l borders and on the gious studies, and archaeology join togetherin their particular contributions to
scoutmaster, orienting its analysis on social and cultura
of the anthropological the subject, andin addition several ofthe authors have multi- or interdisciplin-
boundedunits’ efforts to maintain theiridentity. Much
ess of ethnic and other ary identities and points ofview. The result, then, is not undisciplined but truly
work showed borderlands to be areas where the sharpn
groups’ needto interact multidisciplinary, with different analytical approaches enriching the combined
cultural limits and differentiations clashed with the
As a result, walls and understanding by building on eachother.
with other groups on the otherside ofthe dividinglines.
own syncretic charac-
moats tend to dissolve into hills and marshes, with their
initial study of boundar-
teristics. Such understanding has cometo replace the BORDERS AND BORDERLANDS
whose focus was on the
ies, in line or in depth, as conducted by geographers,
aphers supplemented The nature and conditionsof the borderlandis affected by the nature ofthe bor-
moats and walls themselves (Boggs 1940). Human geogr
notionsofnatural and ar- deritself. The borderis anartificial—that is,man-made, political—line running
the work ofphysical geographers by broadening the
well as topographicalcriteria. through the region. Borders can be sharp, clear, deep lines where the political
tificial boundaries to relate to social criteria as
te as the defining agent of line is reinforced by “natural” distinctions in termsof physical and humangeog-
Political scientists have added a concern with thesta
transaction, and organiza- raphy, that is, where populations are clearly different on eitherside of the line
boundaries andofrelations of authority, identity,
to relate the line to the law (Brownlie
and where they are thinned out by clearly marked, less inhabitable distinctions
tion behind them; lawyers have sought
terrain, butrather a set ofrelation- such as natural walls and moats, mountainridges, or water bodies. Or they can
1979). The state, however,is not a featureless
onalfeatures of the latter be indistinguishable on the ground, correspondingto nonatural features, pene-
ships between center and periphery, where the functi
 {6] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
Introduction {7}
trable, uncontrolled; indeed,in the extreme, the bordercanbe the regionitself, | on change is within someth
ing, from something to some
a buffer state or neutral zone controlled by neitherside and tolerated by both. identifiable chaos, and it is the thing, not un-
further task ofthis study to tdeu
Borders, according to Strassoldo, “divide and unite, bind theinterior and link these peiterns, The situations tite sa ts
that frame the dynamics of cha
with the exterior, [as] barriers and junctions, walls and doors, organs ofdefense pressed in three possible spatial nge i be :
models for social relations in
and attack. Frontier areas (borderlands) can be managed as to maximize either black-and-white, grey borderk: as
, and some intermediate type
of such functions. They can be militarized, as bulwarks against neighbors, or s —spotty, buftered salts :
ered, as well as mixtures of
the three (cf. Barth 1969 a
madeintoareas of peaceful interchange” (Strassoldo 1989, 393). Two character- Mar
n Strass aia,
tinez 1994),
istics of the borderaresalient, its political nature and its depth. Political means —P ae

its relation to the power center, the strength ofthe force and authority behind ® Phe black-and-white model
pictures a sharp distinction bet
it, the degree of enforcementthat sustainsit, the will and capacity to maintain ferent peoples along a clear bor ween two dif.
derline running through the bor
the artificial division running through a populated area. Borders can be backed ae border with alienate derlands é ;
d borderlands in Martinez’s
by weakstates, undemarcated and unadministered, or can be forcibly asserted (199 4) terms The sie
ey people are sell-detining;
whether they are “really” (objecti
and maintained by a strong central authority running its writ to the ends ofits is on uuiportant than their feel vely) different
ing different, although there is like
earth, or some condition in between these two extremes. objective fact on whichsubject ly to be some
feelings are based. The separati
Depthrefers to the degree ofdifference occurring in that area between the tion fetpiires some sort of border, on in the tts
althoughit can be formal orinfor
two sides of the border. Again, the line can be merely a political imposition, nally or internally drawn. In this mal, exter-
model, borderland populations
resting lightly on an undifferentiated population that largely ignores the at- eens of the resp are wn sive
ective powercenter, inherent
ly hostile
in their transbo iu
temptto separate their sameness,or it can correspond to pre-existing or rapidly relations, lacking cross-border
interaction, knowledge, and com
adopted distinctions of identity, based on language,religion, culture, ethnic- and protectedin their security and municé ; .
self-image by the hostility bet
ity, history, race, and other things that make people think themselves different power centers. The ween 1s nia
situation in contemporary Cypr
usis a good exam va
from the Other. The U.S.-Canada border is not very deep; it does notdivide ee aan as were relations
along the Iron Curtain. Images
much except customsofficials and tax forms, whereas the Iron Curtain was — ity along the nineteent and in smh
h-century Ottoman Balkan bord
much, much deeper, and where it was not naturally deep, as between East and er are also ex-
West Germany,it madeitself so by creating new distinctions between people on | 2. The grey modelis quite Opposite
, with the different populationsfully
eitherside. Interestingly, even borders that purport to be very deep,such as the aiid, whetherthey feel “differe inter-
nt”or not. This is a model ofinteg
Israeli or Cypriot Green Lines, the Korean DMZ orthe Kashmiri LOC,the US.- during an intermedi rat ion vo
ate population andculture com
posedofa ieitedien of
Mexico border, or the border between apartheid South Africa and the Front traits and people from the twos
ides. Borders may still exist
Line States, turn out to be more disruptive thanseparative for the borderlands able, making cultures permea but the are pern
ted too. The Tex-Mex border,
and less deep than authorities might wish. The deepest boundaries are places Schleswi m st is
between Germany and Denmar
k, and Alsace, where German
wherecivilizations meet, clash, and then draw a truce, betweenhistorical, reli- tures avalos and teed
are examples marked by hybrid
cultures, Balkanreality in ae
giously backed empires. odsof the nmeteenth century and
Africanreality in the twentieth cen
People in borderlandsare living on the edge, meeting people living on the took a grey form inreaction tur a :
to the official black-and-white
edge on the otherside of the border, in constantly—if gradually— changingre- polic os
. 3a. The otherthree models fal)
between the two extremes, The
lationships. These three conditions comprise the defining characteristics ofbor- 's an extreme formof the grey mod mane model
el: a different culture is located
between the
derlands—a population on the margins of power centers, traversed by a formal cans main Cultures/populatio
ns to insulate them from one anot
political boundary,living dynamic relationsinternally and externally (with the is characteristics and establis her, distinct in
hed for the internal or external pur
powercenter). ing the two populations separate pose of keep-
. Hybrid cultures have evolved,
or third bd
 Introduction {9}
[8] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

Serbspl aced in the each other, unproductive of crossings and interactions, Noris the situation
ed sepa
aced
are strategii cally plac s ratii ng Opp osi ng powercenters.
static, as the snapshot tempts us to believe. Borderlands are always in move-
s from the Ottoman Muslimpop-
Krajina by: the Austrians to separate the C roat ment fromhere to there and within the here andthere of the moment. The sec-
y. a
ulatiions cons ti te one example among man
constitu ondpart ofthe thesis and novelty ofthis work is the identification of movement
in the other,
of one culture/population with
3b. The spotty model has islands butstill wit rather than any particular model as the characteristic of borderlands. Border-
andlivingin ghettos or enclaves,
separated by internal boundaries surround
the surt | in g landreality is a moving machine at any moment, andit changesitsmovements
ss the borders.S Doubtless,;, the
diverse contacts and influence acro « eg- as it moves through time, in motion both synchronically and diachronically.
malintain their own int
culture wi off on the islands, but they try to Because of the complexity of the machine, it is tempting to revert to a picture
wo rid (e.g., Morocco) and African-
rity. Jewish s
e ghettos in Europe and the Arab of incomprehensible chaos, a seemingly endless numberoffactors locked to-
mples, although
in segregated A merica are exa
American populations living erse” examples, in gether, describable but unordered. Instead, that movementhas to be captured
settlements in Palest ine are “rev
not borderland cases; Jewish rol the ma- in identification and description by particular terms ofanalysis. Three dimen-
are implanted to displace and cont
which the “ghettos” or enclaves second millen- sions need to be handledin the analysis— time, space, andactivity.
ty. The nobi lity of Lus ign an Cyprus in the firs t half of the Time,first. The picture of a borderlandovera five-hundred-year time period
jori
nium provides a softer example. ical sepa- will naturally be different in its detail from a picture of a decade, and the depic-
ouses horizontalr ather than vert
3c. Finally, the layered model esp anotheroerfa tion of a spanoftimewill vary from a comparative analysis of (wo time periods
ulation from one c ulture over
rations, imposing a dominant pop are examples, as 1n at either endofthe span, just as the examination of a machine will differ from
eren t cult ure. Col oni zat ion s, especially settler colonies, the study ofa mill andthat fromthe analysis of an industry.
diff South Af-
an and the Arab worl d; Apartheid
the Maghrib between the Europe bolic sense, Spaceis the second aspect in the dimensions ofanalysis. Borderlands involve
is a fine exa mpl e, but onl y a borderlandin the extre mely sym local interactions as a primary focus, but they in turn are affected by relations
rica wasitself such
between two power eatsrs but
sinceit did notlie geographically ty-layered with and between the powercenters (generally, states) that purport to govern
er. The P ales tini an Wes t Ban k combines the last two nto a spot
a cent the neat them, andthese in their turn are affected by the larger regional or global order,
and ma ny other realities are
in fact messy combi nations of
model, often reaching directly into the local interactions. Indeed, no standard dimen-
types identified above. sions identify a borderland; they are self-defining and can even be multiply
e, defined for portrayal or analysis, containing themselves in larger or smaller
markings of ate object, one n
However, despite the particular r’ ab i. regions like Russian Matrushka dolls. Perhaps confusingly, the lessons of the
of the models—the fact that ma
overshadowsand contains all k “ analysis can vary with the focus within the sameregion. Is the best subject for
an iden tifi able unit unt o the mselves, Genin em a
stitute : Xea i ea of : * understanding the Cerdanya valley in Catalonia (Sahlins 1989) or Catalonia
r experiences andtheir isectety
ther back fromthe line by thei it inform
n s all ine itself (Douglass 1998), a neighborhood in Cyprus or Cyprus itself (Schryver
latii oni
o n s
is t the firs t mes sag e of this wide collection, and e
inct popu
tinc i 2006a), Transnistria or Moldova (Dawisha andParrott 1997; Hopmann2001),
to the policy implications inthef
subsequent analysis, extending (Trans-)Jordan or Cis-Jordan (West Bank)? Infact, any borderlandwill embody
characteristics ofall three conditions, displaying componentintegrity, internal
ONS separation, and external differentiation, at the same time. While the levels of
DYNAMICS AND REACTI
gross aimaphiices analysis in time and in focus should complementeachother, they mayalso re-
types or Barth's (19645 1969, 20)
These models — Weber's ideal stays aes At veal tensions thal are part of their dynamic. Sinceit is not only the nature but
are onl y sna psh o ts of a dou bly dynamic reality that never
tions— that is notlikely the source of the dynamics of borderlands that is sought, these analytical rela-
border or assume a symmetry
best, they referto a side of the reality, the o is tionships will be important andelucidating.
t, Eve nin th e stri c test app roximations of the models to A third type of variable concerns the nature of the interaction that is the
to exis lly sealed from
s never impermea ble, hermetica
nevertight and the component
{10} 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN Introduction fii}

s Weeds ant com- population on the margins of power, traversed by a political boundary, living
focus ofthe analysis. While social science contains a vigoran
bor- internally and externally dynamic relations—encompass an area of humanac-
peting claimsfor decisive terms ofanalysis, a numberof facets oflife in me
level, these involve tivity andscientific analysis that continues across history andis therefore rele-
derlands standout as particularly important. On the local
tion a nd exchange
various dimensionsof participation suchas economic produc
vant to understanding events yet to come.
geograp hic ject One major source of dynamics in the borderlands derives from the evolu-
(trade), land ownership, social ownership (identity), rule,
Onthe ee tion ofpowercenters controlling the borders. When a powercenter(state) seeks
(fixed and migratory), communications (language), and eee
(in the meaning to grow, consolidate its authority, or modernize (in the understanding of the
tionallevel, they involve, particularly, pressures to ee
s asc between the times), it is likely to harden its borders, centralize economic supplies and ex-
of the times) and to centralize power; the first involve
is ee mo" changes, inhibit local bordercontrol mechanismsand transborder cooperation,
external/globallevel and theregionallevel, whereas the gecone
baw ia ae : : and introduce conflict betweenthe twosides of the borderland. The result on
regional powercenters. Hanging over all is the mythological
wae different 7 either side is a heightened sense ofdifferentiation and identity, an increase in
derlandsare perceived from eitherside ofthe dividing line.
eaze ae ne migration and relocation, and a growth ofnostalgia forthe territorial expres-
perceptions ofthe dynamics of borderlandlife may eanieen
tokane sing : ac sionofidentity.
of analysis fromthis list, the others need to be kept in sight
1 of analysis may be A strong powercenter bent on controlling its side of the borderlands is
tor analysis under control. However important a single tern
restore n| analytical bound to send “foreign” populations to occupyits (often already populated)
and how evernecessaty it may be to emphasizeits role to
i, a
g in ife
;

interaction among territory and confirmits consolidation, as the colonizers and newly formed
balance or introduce a new perspective, itis the balance and
rland dynamics. The United States did in North America and the Ottomans didin the Balkans. These
variables that provides a full understanding of the borde
to incorporate as populations can be military and border guards, administrators, and settlers,
broad range of studies in this collection represents an attempt
oo _ whose authority depends on theirability to resist assimilation (in either direc-
manyofP these
a¢
variables
ic os
as possi
C sible.

of bor cerhany ute tion) with the local population. But the effect of such foreign implantations
The epistemological result of these sets of components
ci limited,aat
but s i its
spinning often works in two opposite directions —to create the very opposile ofthe sepa-
andanalysis is a Rubi c cube ofinteractions, complex
tions to any analogy). ration and control that they were sent to achieve, and to provoke violence and
ownplanes andtraveling through time (there are limita
internally, among rent resistance to imposedinternal changes, as seenin late nineteenth-century Bal-
A numberofsalient variables as identified interact
tute a dynamic that characterizes the his- kans and Yemenin Isa Blumi’s chapter. Both violent resistance and the crea-
selves, and betweenlevels, to consti
oO e€

up ibe, possib
_ility of iden- tion of newsocial categories create the seeds for heightenedlocalidentities and
+ “re

toric subject. However, this fluid structure only ea

Se
in ia la “e dynamics
: eventual separatism,
tifying some salient interactions that stand out
is that in their c ee However, if this physical, economic, and identitarian separation is not
of borderlandlife. The third part of this work's thesis
move at the same time as achieved completely, as is likely, the old habits of wansborder communication,
istic mobility, borderlands always prepare for the next
né—n € rt aiiu st mn rh nt,
moveme
5se toa
it bu t mo Vv ement in ve. 5 Poni the need for economic exchanges, differentiation within the unhomogenized
the y Té: ‘5y po nd d t O t h (4 | as t oné

e en Pout population, and reactions against the efforts to create a black-and-white bor-
particular situation, producing pressures for a futur
The studies col-

cttons. Noclaim ca derlandare likely to produce new groups working totie the two halves ofthe
lected here offer a step toward understanding these intera
be madeforuniversality, but only for windowsthat
permit better-informed ob- borderland together. ‘These include dayworkers, smugglers and bandits, trad-
in borderlands. There are ers, indigenous minorities, and tax collectors, among others, Their activities
servation and understanding of the dynamics oflife
cases presented here. But will prompt further conflicts within the borderlands andwill either be reduced
doubtless examples and perhaps universes bey ond the
ieth century BC to the if the power centeris etfectively consolidated or create a new type ofrelations
the examples, ranging overfour millennia from the twent
fining characteristics—a within the borderlands, further weakeningthe state. As Africanstates attempt
twentieth century 4p, show at Jeast that the three de
 [12] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
to bring their writ to their borders and control permeability and profitable
smuggling, they risk riling up separatist identities and troubling current accep-
tance ofthe borders, as Judith Vorrath’s chapter indicates.
A weak powercenter will tend either to leave its borderlands alone ontheir
ownor to make compensating efforts to assert whatlittle power is left to se-
cure its borderlands. It may delegate security and other functions to local au-
thorities, as along the nineteenth-century AD Ottoman borderlands, or make
preemptive raids along the border to keep potential adversaries off balance, as
in nineteenth-century BC Egypt, or “leap the local” and invest in international
norms, symbols, and lore to tighten their weak control, as in the African con-
tinent and the Jordanvalley in the twentieth century, as discussed in RachelS.
Havrelock’s chapter. The Berlin Congresses of1878 —discussed by Blumi—and
1895 and the Dayton Conference of1993, and the maps that followed them, dis-
cussed by Ipek K. Yosmaoglu,gave international legitimacy to dubious bound-
aries. If the opposing powercenter is weak too, the internal characteristics of
the borderland, whether harmonious or conflictual, become dominant,local
groups becomesalient, and functional specializationgives rise to local purvey-
ors of products andactivities that the powercentersstill require. If the oppos-
ing powercenteris strong, local autonomy in the borderland and indeed the
borderitself may be in danger; security means either bandwagoning with the
stronger neighboror finding a balancer fromoutside. A grey area between two
weak power centers such as contemporary Eastern Congo or mid-nineteenth-
century Texas is a vacuumthat requiresthat the regioneither rise to the chal-
lenge of handling its own internal coherence and external security or call in
assistance from an external protector, not too close but not too distant. A grey
area between two strong power centers such as eighteenth-century Andorra or
nineteenth-century Belgium is either the result of a protective pact or the prep-
aration for an impendingbattlefield. The first contributes to the internal coher-
ence ofthe area; the secondtearsit apart into union and rebel sympathizers in
the borderstate.
Stepping down from the level of power centers, a second dynamic is trig-
gered by sudden attempts to impose a new boundary on an old borderland, in
the formofa ceasefire line, greenline, or line of control. Typically, such a line
attemptsto arbitrate between competing claims fromrival centers and overlap-
ping loyalties within the borderland population and is often accompaniedby a
physicalor virtual “nationalcleansing,’ in which populations homogenizeeither
by taking on the newly imposedloyalties or by moving. The Israelo-Palestinian
Introduction [13]
and Cyprus Green Lines, the KashmirLine of Control, the Korean 38th
Parallel
correctedto the Ceasefire Line, the German Iron Curtain, the various
Ottoman
Balkan borders, and many others are diverse examples, The cases immedia
tely
recall that the imposed homogeneity is not only artificial but also
incomplete
andunstable inits attempt to construct identity and meaning.
Competing with
the state efforts to create newidentities andtheir supporting
social structures
are the borderlandpeoples’ efforts to overcome the line, andthis
competitionis
the basis of the new dynamic.
“Green lines” create physical and social mobilities, quile the opposite
oftheir
intent. Newrefugees transport theirterritorial identity on their backs,
and ref-
ugee camps become little homelands on the wrongside ofthe border. Leftover
islands fromeither side reach back in space and memory across the new line.
Newprofessions, such as middlemen for commerce and communications
and
smugglers of goods andpeople, poke holes in the borderthat other new profes-
sions, such as guards and administrators, try to close. The authorities seek to
overcome the newartificiality of the border by givingit civilizational meaning
as the endofthe world, with nothing onthe otherside, loading it with signifi-
cance that would not be necessary if the border were morenatural, Pressure
s to
soften the border only became reasons to hardenit.
Against these tensions, artificially imposed borders tend to be dismantledas
dramatically as they were imposed, rather than gradually eroding. The flood re-
leased whenthe wall is torn down, however, does not wash awayits traces;
just
as thefield ofthe previous borderlandwas hard to fence definitively, so the im-
print ofthe wall andthe differences they created aredifficult to erase. The Iron
Curtain is gone, but there arestill Ostlis from the recoveredterritories, just as
there were Ostlanders fromthelost territories after World War II.
A third source of dynamics and change is found in shifts in and interac-
tions among horizontal divisions ofclass and otherstratificationsthatarise in the
borderlands andinteract across the frontier. Most writing about borderlands,
beginning with the anthropological tradition and the idea ofsocial boundar-
ies, has been a two-dimensional analysis emphasizing the vertical or ethnic
di-
visions andrelations within society. Muchless attention has been paid toa
three-dimensional analysis of horizontal orclass divisions within the border-
lands and thentotheir interaction with the vertical divisions and relations;
Barth (1969, 27~28) treats “stratification” asa given, like geography. But
all can-
not be subsumedwithin vertical relations; to the contrary, it is often the
hori-
zontal position that gives role and meaningto the vertical divisions. Border-
 [ig] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
Introduction [15]

lands have their ownsocialstratification, one that typically incorporates some itis the interaction between vertical and horizontal
divisions that providedthe
ethno-national elements in particular places in the strata. A three-dimension dynamic of sociopolitical relations within the border
land, a process of move-
analysis is needed to comprehend change and dynamics. ment that could not be accountedfor by one dimensionof
divisions alone
Local relations in the borderlands frequently replicate in the small Bar-
rington Moore’s classic dynamic betweencentral authority (monarchy), land-
CASES AND LESSONS
owners (barons), and commercial forces, adding a fourth force oflaborto re-
place peasantry in modern times, An additional element to complete the array In an age ofglobalization, borderlands may seemto have
gone the wayof all
ofplayers is the military, who are particularly important actors in borderlands; borders, overwhelmed by the penetrating effects of
transnational actions. Yet
regime overthrow bydissatisfied military forces stationed in the borderlands the following chapters convey two importantlessons to the
contrary. They tell
is a frequent phenomenon, as experiences from Caesar in Rome to Franco in us first that borderlands maintain their own dynamics andide
ntities against
Spainillustrate. In this schema,it is the particularalliances among forces that some ofboth the most robust and most dissolvingsituation
s,andif these events
determine the social evolution and create particular reactions in the next round drawnfromthe distant or current past are not exact replic
as of the newchal-
ofhistory. Local dynamics can be quite independentof the larger national dy- lenges and conditions ofthe nearor distant future, they certai
nly cover the
namics but canalso bethe tail that wags the national dog. gamut ofpossibilities in similarity to those in times
to come. Then too, the fol-
There are a numberofpossibilities for these dynamics. If the borderland lowing chapters show,in visions ranging from telescopic to micros
copic, that
elites or upper strata do well in relation to the powercenter, they can invade the seemingly stable solutions drawnup in response to past challe
nge bear within
capital, either to take over orto be assimilated. These were the outcomes for the them the elements of new challenges calling for new solutions—
the theme of
Oranais in independentAlgeria and the Phanariots in nineteenth-century Wal- this collective effort.
lachia, respectively. Or they can stay at home, raising rivalries with the power The collection ofanalyses in the first part focuses on border
lands as the
center and eventually notions of autonomyand secession, usually because they fringes of structures of power in evolution. Thefirst moving
picture, rather
feel they are not getting their due from the center and wantto keep their own broadin its range, comes from the secondmillenniumbefore our era,
along the
resources for themselves. This is what happenedin recent times in Kurdistan, bordersofthe great—if not super—powerofits time, Pharaonic
Egypt. Miro-
Biafra and Katanga, Slovenia and Croatia, and the Baltic States. Horizontalre- slav Barta of Charles University in Prague examines “Borderlan
d Dynamics in
lations can also determine the ways in which the borderlands will swing in the Era of the Pyramid Builders in Egypt,” showing howeff
orts to shore upa
relation to competing —bordering— powercenters. The civil war in Northern declining powerwere played out onthe large swath of border
lands. The bor-
Ireland is as mucha class conflict as an ethnic or religious conflict, ultimately derland was part of Egyptian mythology, usedphysically and
mythologically by
pitting demographic against economic power to decide whose borderland the the great state to defineitself, much as the Ottomanstate or the
Soviet Union
territory will be. Socioeconomic changes through developmentraise the power would later define themselves by their borders. Originally aninte
raction zone,
of the workers; vertical consolidation through nationalism or ethnic solidar- its permeability requireda fortified line whenthe Asiatic influx appear
ed. But
ity comesas a natural reactionto the introduction of class consciousness and as the state weakened, it first used a policy of preventive
strike to discourage
warfare, although lower-class ideological leaders may then seek support from neighbors fromtaking advantageofits weakness. When the
power center then
excludedethnicities. This is what happenedin Catalonia at the endof the nine- collapsed,its structured borderlands collapsed withit, but econom
ic,cultural,
teenth century (Douglass 2002, 68-73). In another aspect of the modernization and commercial traits began to develop withinthe prevailing
anarchy that were
process, the classical struggle between the herders and the farmers, reinforced to define the upcoming centralized state and its borderlandsinits newinc
ar-
by social boundaries separating ethnic groups dominating each occupation, nation.
canescalate into genocidein the borderlands, as in the American West, Darfur Nearly twenty centuries later, George Gavrilis of the Univer
sity of Texas
(Haaland 1969), and Kivu, among manyothers.In all these cases, amongothers, at Austin and Isa Blumi of Georgia State University examine
borderland

eo
[16] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
structures on the edges of the Ottoman Empire, another great power slid- |
ing from consolidation to decline. Gavrilis analyses “Conflict and Control on
the Ottoman-Greek Border? as a new border delineation creates elements of
change that undermineits own stability that it was created to maintain. Blumi
compares two borderlandsof the Ottoman Empire where“Illicit Trade and the
Emergence of Albania and Yemen”turns measuresat consolidationinto causes
offractionalization. In both cases, economic activities within and across the
borderlands proved untamable elements that refused to stay within their as-
signed bottles and so built up presses to break their containers, muchastrade
foundits way across the Pharaonic borderlandsand created its own support-
ing populations,
Judith Vorrath of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich presents a
comparative picture of African borderlands in “On the Margin of Statehood?
State-Society Relations in African Borderlands,’ drawn fromthirteen different
studies of twenty-one different countries. She shows that the borderlocation
provides locals with economic opportunities, mainly associated with contra-
band tradeas in the Ottoman borderlandsbutconstituting a legitimate survival
strategy under the conditions of weak statehood. There is a complete lack of
interest on the side of borderland communities in redrawing African borders.
Instead, they blunt borderpolicing through informalarrangements withstate
actors that integrate them into local power structures. National identity is re-
inforced at the border, not despite but because of transborder interaction. Yet
permeability can have negative effects on security in borderlands, which be-
comeentrancepoints for conflict-generating factors, generating new problems
requiring new policy responses.
David Stea, Jamie Zech, and Melissa Gray of Texas State University-San
Marcosevaluate the sources and impactof the North Atlantic Free Trade Agree-
ment on the southern U.S. and northern Mexicanborderland. Identity is built
aroundthe border and within the borderlands—the chorizo—in waysthatare
sovereign over the attempts ofthe legally sovereign states to control. Incom-
plete efforts to open the border moreliberally while controlling the undesir-
able aspects of openness provide a multiplicity of contrary characteristics of
“Change and Non-change along the Borderafter NAFTA,’as the Stea, Zech,
and Gray chapterillustrates.
The secondpart of the collection deals with identities in transition as the
structures attemptto stabilize. James G, Schryver of Cornell University dissects
“Colonialism or Conviviencia in Frankish Cyprus” in the fourteenth century to
Introduction [17]
find a complex interweaving ofcultures washing around some very deliberate
attempts to assert identities within them, defying a single black-and-white or
grey understanding ofthe island borderland. The selective porosity (or selec-
tive hermetism) of the horizontal and vertical divisions within the island were
not only coincident but dynamic, shifting according to the discomforts they
produced. Ipek K. Yosmaoglu of Princeton University returns to the Ottoman
Balkans to throw an equally focused light on the methods of “Constructing Na-
tional Identity in Ottoman Macedonia,’ revealing the poweroftotally foreign
artifices such as mapmakingto freeze fluidity in identity. Again, efforts to con-
solidate territorial authority sharpened identities that they sought to amalgam-
ate andseparate, preparing for the next—but then unforeseen stage ofdisin-
tegration. Rachel $. Havrelock of the University ofIllinois at Chicago portrays
the way in which populations combinedfixed geographic andfluctuating po-
litical components oftheir border andits hinterlands, as “Pioneers and Refu-
gees: Arabs andJewsin the Jordan Valley.’ Each side hasits images ofthe other
side of both the borderland population and the area in which it lives, in both
humanand geographic terms,so that the borderlands overlap anddiffer in each
other's reality and identity. As if images wereterritory, a shared symbol proved
more contentious than separate symbols for the same object.
Harriett Romo and Raquel Marquez at University of Texas at San Anto-
nio focus on the multiple notionsofidentity that borderland inhabitants carry
along with themin movement,in their analysis of “Who's Whoacrossthe U.S.-
Mexico Border: Identities in ‘Transition.’ Black-and-white and grey models vie
to presenta clear picture of identitarian confusionthat clearly marks an unde-
fined borderland and carries new pressures for change andtransition to an un-
clear next stage. Multiple identities, including borderlandidentityitself, express
themselves through thevertical and horizontalcategories.
Each chapter, in its way and across great distances of space and time,il-
lustrates the dynamic quality of borderlands and their successively responsive
nature, Shelley Feldman of Cornell University, in “Looking across the Hori-
zon,” emphasizes the importance ofseeing a social process such as borderlands
in its historical context and acrosshistory at the same time as lessons fromthe
past andenlightenmentofthe present. Only by looking diachronically, at times
rather than moments, can we see where the moments come fromand go. This
change is a constantfeature of the globalized context in which borderlands per-
sist. It calls for wise policy measures to avoid exacerbated problems and un-
prepared responses to evolving borderlands. Nosingle policy response fits all
[18] 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

borderlandsituations, as the conclusion, “Borderland Policy: Keeping Up with

Change,”by I. William Zartmanofthe Johns Hopkins University School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, emphasizes. The pointis not to provide a border-
lands policy, but to offer lessons fromhistorical and contemporary experience
that will help policymakers deal with the characteristically dynamic nature of PART |
the subject. The overarching lesson is that there is no model picture or “solu-
tion,” but rather that the responseto each situationcarries with it newsituations
requiring new responses.

Structures in Evolution