Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Acquisitions, and
Sales
How Internal Audit Adds Value
and Effectiveness
Carl Pitchford
Limit of Liability: The IIARF publishes this document for informational and
educational purposes and is not a substitute for legal or accounting advice.
The IIARF does not provide such advice and makes no warranty as to any legal
or accounting results through its publication of this document. When legal or
accounting issues arise, professional assistance should be sought and retained.
The IIA and The IIARF work in partnership with researchers from around the
globe who conduct valuable studies on critical issues affecting today’s business
world. Much of the content presented in their final reports is a result of IIARF-
funded research and prepared as a service to The IIARF and the internal audit
profession. Expressed opinions, interpretations, or points of view represent a
consensus of the researchers and do not necessarily reflect or represent the
official position or policies of The IIA or The IIARF.
ISBN-13: 978-0-89413-880-5
19 18 17 16 15 14 1 2 3 4 5 6
Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
vi
Table 2.1: Impact of EFB Merger on Market Value and Earnings per
Share of MFB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
vii
Every day, all over the globe, privately owned and publicly listed organiza-
tions couple and uncouple in the dance known as “strategic transactions.” They
merge. They buy each other out and take each other over. Sales are made, and
businesses are chopped up or sold off. Ultimately, they flourish or die; and on
many occasions, their success or failure is directly related to the strategic trans-
actions that shaped their future.
My intention in writing this book is not to silence the music or stop the
dance of the mergers, acquisitions, and sales (MA&S) process, but to encourage
you, as internal auditors, to think long and hard about the ways you can make
your voices heard, either by championing an advantageous transaction or by
sounding the alarm if a deal does not add up.
Due diligence audits should be carried out by those in the bidding or
acquiring company who have broad, in-depth knowledge, expertise, and
experience regarding the different activity sectors involved and who can
fully comprehend the business of the target company: the internal auditors.
By completing thorough due diligence, internal auditors can impress upon
management important information that signals a red or green light for these
critical business transactions.
The work is complex. Obviously you should be supported in your work by
other departments and by outside experts and consultants, especially if your
internal audit activity does not possess the requisite skills and experience to
complete all aspects of thorough due diligence effectively.
The MA&S process can be long and filled with details, decisions, and diffi-
cult personalities. The larger the target company, the more complicated the
ix
Carl Pitchford
Capricorn Consulting
I would like to thank all those who have contributed directly to my knowl-
edge of this vast subject—in particular, those internal audit managers, senior
managers, and private equity partners who took the time to explain the intri-
cacies of various transactions. I would also like to thank the owner-managers
from the global furniture industry who gave me the opportunity to be involved
directly in mergers, acquisitions, and sales transactions as a preferred adviser
and due diligence auditor.
I am also grateful to the staff and leadership of The Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA) and The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation
(IIARF) for their support throughout this project.
xi
Carl Pitchford has more than 20 years of experience in the international furni-
ture industry including operations and export management, as well as strategic
and management consulting. In 2003, he created Capricorn Consulting with
the main goal of providing a broad range of strategic services to the global
furniture industry. Although born and raised in the United Kingdom, Carl has
lived and worked in Continental Europe for the past 27 years and speaks fluent
French and Spanish.
He works mainly with privately held companies facing critical issues
including industry consolidation, distribution channel changes, sales and margin
erosion, asset redeployment, global competition, strategic challenges, and
succession concerns. Carl has coordinated more than 350 diagnostic reviews
along with operational and due diligence audits. A major part of his consulting
work also involves providing advisory services in mergers, acquisitions, and
sales (MA&S) transactions within the furniture industry. He is an expert MA&S
adviser with Corporate Finance in Europe.
He holds the French professional qualification in internal auditing (DPAI).
In addition, he is currently completing an Executive Doctorate in Business
Administration thesis with a research focus on the strategic and financial issues
facing the furniture industry.
xiii
assumptions. Auditors should help ensure that both buyers and sellers keep a
close eye on the planning of the post-acquisition environment, so that potential
trouble spots and future areas for enhancement can be discussed before the
transaction is finalized. Performing the steps associated with the purchase of a
company may take several months, but the combined companies must find a
way to coexist and operate as a new organization for many years to come.
This book contains specific action points or bits of essential knowledge
called “Takeaways” at the end of each chapter that you can implement imme-
diately. In keeping with the global scope of internal auditing, this book contains
international case study examples using the U.S. dollar ($), the British pound
sterling (£), and the euro (€).
The authors of the book Organizational Behavior wrote in 2008 that synergy
is “the creation of a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.” This, of
course, is the ultimate goal of all mergers, acquisitions, and sales (MA&S)
activities.
Similarly, Barb Rentenbach, author of the 2009 book Synergy, posited that
“A designed beauty of synergy is that it serves only to add, never subtract.”
We might ask, then, why do some business combinations live up to the
promises of synergy while others fail, and how do we ensure that our MA&S
activities succeed?
example. Often you should do a gut check and continue researching until all
your concerns are addressed; however, as internal auditors, there is only so
much you can do to protect a management team for whom the merger may
provide both a bonus and an ego boost. Only so much can be done with a
determined management team, especially when it is a case of “swallow or be
swallowed.”
You can only go so far: After all, it would be pointless to aggressively ques-
tion and challenge every strategic decision made by your management team;
but you can draw management’s attention to what you seriously believe to be
key risk management issues. Then you will have done your job, regardless of
how management decides to resolve those issues.
Unfortunately, attracting management attention even for the “right reasons”
can sometimes be a major challenge during MA&S activities. For those of you
lucky enough to work in a company that operates in an open culture, sees the
internal auditors as advisers, and embraces a positive perspective regarding the
role of internal audit, then half the battle is already won.
As recently failed MA&S transactions show, relying on audited financials
is only the beginning of a thorough due diligence process. During economic
downturns and volatile trading conditions, for example, an MA&S target compa-
ny’s income projections and pre-sale valuations might prove to be extremely
optimistic. Imagine the benefit a thorough pre-closing audit of these factors
could bring to the negotiation of the transaction.
When a bidding company finally ends up writing off a significant portion of
the price it paid for a target company, it is not surprising if the bidder considers
possible ways for recouping that loss. This could include going to court, which
is usually much more costly than letting the internal audit activity conduct
complete due diligence in the first place.
Think how rewarding it would be to say that you, as an internal auditor,
saved your company from a multiyear journey through the courts to secure
redress for shareholders who witnessed the value of the company’s shares drop
by a significant percentage.
Financial and economic downturns provide buyers with an added incentive
to question the accuracy of financial information, especially when their target
companies are not performing as well as could be expected.
Even when the economy is running well, MA&S activity will involve finan-
cial and operational risks that, if not dealt with appropriately, can lead to enor-
mous erosion in value for the purchaser. When any market slows down, overly
optimistic sales forecasts and projected order books can be exposed. An effec-
tive due diligence audit could uncover some of these discrepancies and put
a quick stop to any deal, however strategic. The audit results may not initially
please those eager management teams, but they can save a lot of your orga-
nization’s time, effort, and money. They may even help maintain shareholder
value when it is in danger of being destroyed.
In a tough economic environment, buyers have become more “streetwise”
and cautious about big-ticket deals.
At an early stage, some management teams decide on an “inorganic”
growth model. In other words, they expand the business by acquiring other
businesses in the same activity sector or businesses providing complimentary
activities, either in the same country or in other areas of the world.
In the past, some of the major global deals were driven by what is
commonly known as the “empire building” theory. With some rhetorical zeal,
the CEOs of merging organizations listed the usual reasons to justify their deci-
sions, such as synergy, scale, scope, operating leverage, and global reach.
The outcome was often very different from expectations: value destruction
for the shareholders of the acquiring organizations. Many of those jumping on
the “merger bandwagon” were inherently unfit because of cultural mismatches
or organizational complexity.
With hindsight, mixing some of these businesses together proved impos-
sible because of five specific constraints:
1. Internal politics
After an acquisition, the new whole must be worth more than the sum of
the parts. (Remember synergy?) When analyzing various deals over the past 10
years, however, this principle appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
Size is an important factor: Costs increased as organizations became “too big
to manage.” Some organizations were even forced to demerge. The odds are
daunting: Since 2005, demergers have been just as common as mergers.
In my experience, successful MA&S deals have five common traits:
These lessons have fundamentally changed thinking among the new gener-
ation of top executives. Their approach to MA&S is far more down-to-earth than
that of their predecessors, who were readily persuaded by the “big is beautiful”
argument. This change will not rule out megamergers completely in the future,
but it does mean that coming deals will be driven less by some sort of gran-
diose design and more by practical issues such as economies of scale.
So if top executives are taking a more practical approach to MA&S, what
about internal auditors? How do they fit into the process?
Based on an informal survey by Capricorn Consulting of 240 internal audit
managers and CAEs from major European companies involved in MA&S activi-
ties, an overwhelming 80 percent of respondents believe that internal auditors
can add value to the MA&S process. Around 20 percent of survey respon-
dents were uncertain or disagreed about the contribution and the added value
of expanding the role of internal audit. One third of responding internal audi-
tors saw their role as “watchdogs” or “internal control experts.” Unfortunately, a
small number of respondents viewed their role merely as “box tickers.”
Internal audit’s low level of involvement in the upstream stages of MA&S
transactions appears to indicate that management would just like to see
the deals go through. Management may believe either that internal audi-
tors are unable to contribute anything substantial to the process, or that the
involvement of the internal auditors will increase the time and cost of the
pre-transaction stage.
acquiring organization cannot know whether the control environment has suffi-
cient rigor, or whether the state of risks and controls are properly taken into
account at the time of valuation by the acquiring organization.
According to the 2011 survey of CAEs, strategic transactions such as MA&S
remain some of the most risk-intensive initiatives that any organization can
undertake. Unfortunately, management teams often underestimate the chal-
lenges associated with the MA&S of a company or a line of business. Without
internal audit evaluation and input, this oversight might lead to opportu-
nity losses or the need for unanticipated additional investments necessary to
address major risk and control issues.
Eight potential ways the internal audit activity can help during strategic
transactions are by taking the following actions:
5. Calling out the impact that the acquisition and its integration, or
the sale, may have on other parts of the business
2. During the due diligence phase, internal auditors can alert the
management team to potential risk, control, or regulatory issues
that would cause the organization to overpay or undervalue.
3. Before the closing of the deal, the internal audit activity can help
prevent deal value erosion.
4. After the transaction is finalized, the internal audit team can help
create organizational efficiencies and ascertain proper control
monitoring of new or revised processes.
Contradictions in Roles
How deeply could and should internal auditors be involved in MA&S transac-
tions? This subject will no doubt stir debate not only among internal auditors
themselves but also among senior management and boards. The intention of
internal audit management to get involved in MA&S projects is a key strategic
aspect, with built-in contradictions.
Internal audit management is cognizant of the myriad benefits of its partici-
pation, early and often, in the process. Sometimes, for political reasons, though,
internal audit management does not want to change board of directors’ and/or
senior management’s perceptions of the MA&S project. Internal audit manage-
ment may also be naturally reluctant to take any responsibility for the possible
failure of an MA&S deal.
Many internal audit groups do not have the available resources or specific
knowledge, expertise, experience, and skills to be involved in an MA&S deal.
Conversely, in some major multinational organizations, MA&S activities
10
It is also essential to have an internal audit toolkit. Examples are risk assess-
ment software and specific audit programs suitable for the various stages of
the MA&S process. Electronic workpapers are also useful in nurturing internal
audit’s proactive role in the MA&S process. The audit work could be saved in a
special database, enabling the internal audit activity to build on, and learn from,
experiences with strategic transactions.
Internal audit activity responsibility in MA&S activities is also a key issue.
Internal audit management can expand the role of its department only if it can
define and communicate an appropriate level of responsibility in the case of
either a positive or a negative MA&S outcome.
Perception is another important issue in organizational culture. Internal
audit must be perceived as a value-added activity. Confidence and trust in
the internal auditor as a valued adviser and consultant is essential. In this
regard, professionalism is vital. Internal audit management must ensure that
the internal audit activity has or develops the necessary knowledge and skills
to effectively audit, monitor, and advise on the target organization’s systems,
processes, and procedures.
Senior management must be convinced that the internal audit activity has
the necessary expertise to assess the control environment and activities of the
target organization. Internal auditors should plan to provide an opinion at the
pre-transaction phase and offer additional information and assistance if the
deal goes through.
During the MA&S project, the internal audit team can join forces with senior
management of both the bidder and target companies to identify functional
and risk areas, prioritize the risks, and create the risk profiles of the target
company and the buyer. These risk profiles can then be used for establishing
audit plans, assessing key risks, identifying key controls, developing findings,
and preparing recommendations. Drawing up such a list of potential acquisi-
tion risks can form the basis for post-acquisition audits of the newly created
company. This is a vital aspect, as it will enhance the level of internal audit
participation in future MA&S projects.
If MA&S activities and subsequent audits of newly acquired processes
are not included in the internal audit activity’s plan of engagements, the CAE
should revise the plan (taking management’s input into consideration) and
present it to the audit committee for approval. This not only keeps the board
informed about essential internal audit activities, it also helps to ensure that the
11
internal audit team has the appropriate capabilities and that MA&S responsibili-
ties do not interfere with other essential audit work.
To provide a smooth transition into the post-acquisition audit, the internal
audit organization needs to function effectively as a member of the new
company. The auditors must understand the control environment, reporting
lines, information systems, and structure of the target company.
The high rates of failure in such business transactions would appear to indi-
cate that most companies underestimate the significance of risk management
in transaction decision making. Internal auditors are well-positioned to improve
the quality of risk management significantly throughout the MA&S process by
carrying out comprehensive due diligence and providing specific expertise and
knowledge of business process integration.
12
It is time for internal auditors to move into action. Each year, strategic trans-
actions receive greater scrutiny from investors, regulators, and the media,
including social media. Internal auditors must be prepared to take on an
expanded role in the risk management process connected with MA&S trans-
actions. A narrow focus on financial statement accuracy is inadequate for risk-
based internal auditing.
Chapter 1 Takeaways
1. Effective due diligence uncovers discrepancies, which can save
time, effort, money, and shareholder value.
13
Types of Mergers
Sources of Synergy
Internal auditors should plan to make a careful analysis of all proposed syner-
gies, just as they are expected to evaluate other strategies on a regular basis.
For example, one potential motive for a merger is to replace the existing
management team. You would expect that poorly performing companies would
tend to be targets for an acquisition; however, evidence suggests that compa-
nies acquire other companies for reasons that often have nothing to do with
15
16
Dubious Synergies
Other potential synergies described below are more doubtful and should,
therefore, be analyzed in full.
Diversification
The management team of cash-rich companies may prefer to use that cash
for mergers and acquisitions than for shareholder gains; however, diversifica-
tion could be an end in itself. Diversification normally mitigates risk, which is
supposed to be an advantage of a merger. The problem with this argument is
that diversification is easier and cheaper for the individual shareholders than it
is for the company.
What you should ask yourself is, “Why would U.S. Technologies, Inc., buy
U.K. Technologies, PLC, to diversify, when the shareholders of the U.S. organi-
zation can quite easily buy the shares of the U.K. organization to diversify their
17
own portfolios?” It is far easier and cheaper for individual investors to diversify
than it is for companies to combine operations.
You can see that, because EFB has relatively poor growth prospects, its
shares sell at a lower price/earnings (P/E) ratio than MFB. You can also assume
that the merger produces no economic benefits, so the companies should be
worth exactly the same together as they are separately. The value of MFB after
the merger is thus equal to the total of the separate values of the two companies.
18
Because the shares of MFB are trading at double the share price of EFB,
MFB can buy 100,000 shares for 50,000 of its own shares. Therefore, MFB will
have 150,000 outstanding shares after the merger.
MFB’s total earnings double as a result of the acquisition, but the number
of shares increases by only 50 percent. Its earnings per share rise from $2.00
to $2.67. This is what is known as a “bootstrap effect,” because no real gain is
created by the merger and there is no increase in the two companies’ combined
value. Since MFB’s share price is unchanged by the acquisition of EFB, the P/E
ratio falls.
Before the merger, $1.00 invested in MFB bought 5 cents of current earn-
ings and rapid growth prospects. On the other hand, $1.00 invested in EFB
bought 10 cents of current earnings but slower growth prospects. If the total
market value does not change because of the merger, then $1.00 invested in
the merged company gives MFB shareholders 67 cents of immediate earnings,
a bit slower growth than before the merger. EFB shareholders get lower imme-
diate earnings but faster growth.
In fact, neither company wins nor loses, provided that everybody under-
stands the deal. If the investors are taken in by the exuberance of MFB’s CEO
and confuse the 33 percent post-merger increase in earnings per share with
sustainable growth, then the price of MFB’s shares increases and the share-
holders of both companies receive something for nothing in the short term.
You have now seen the types of strategies some financial manipulators
implement and how you can analyze these strategies to provide an opinion on a
proposed merger transaction. This is the sort of added-value service that most
managers will appreciate.
In conclusion, you can now see how the bootstrap game is played. If your
company is enjoying a high P/E ratio because investors anticipate rapid growth
in future earnings, this growth is then achieved not by capital investment,
product innovation or improvement, or increased operating efficiency, but by
purchasing slow-growth companies with low P/E ratios.
The long-term result will be slower growth and a depressed P/E ratio, but
in the short run, earnings per share can increase dramatically. You have to
see through this “strategic game” of fooling investors, because we all know
that expansion does not go on forever. Earnings will eventually decline, and
the house of cards will come tumbling down. In our case, it is probably much
more professional to warn management of the dangers of implementing such
a short-term strategy than to come out with the “I told you so” disclaimers a
couple of years later.
19
Chapter 2 Takeaways
1. Many mergers are motivated by potential gains in efficiency from
combining operations.
3. If the merger does not provide the right environment, the best
people will leave.
20
Evaluating Mergers
If, in your professional career as an internal auditor, you are responsible for eval-
uating a proposed merger, you should think long and hard about the following
two questions:
The answers to these questions are not so easy. Some economic gains
can be extremely difficult to quantify, and complex cross-border merger
financing can cloud the real terms of a deal. For the purposes of internal audi-
tors, however, the basic principles for evaluating mergers are not terribly
complicated.
21
purchasing all of HI’s outstanding shares for £19 per share. The merger would
increase both companies’ combined earnings by £4 million.
The financial information (in British pounds sterling [£]) for the two compa-
nies is provided in table 3.1.
The first question you should ask is, “Why would SFF and HI be worth more
together than apart?”
Let’s assume that the operating costs can be reduced by combining both
companies’ marketing, distribution, and administration processes. Income also
can be increased in HI’s region. The right-hand column (Combined Companies)
in table 3.1 contains projected income, costs, and earnings for both companies,
if the companies were operating together. Annual operating costs post-merger
will be £2 million minus the total of the separate companies’ costs, and income
will be £2 million more. Therefore, projected earnings increase by £4 million.
For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume that the increased earnings are the only
synergy to be generated by the merger.
22
The economic gain from the merger is the present value (PV) of the extra
earnings. Let’s see now how you can calculate this. If the earnings remain
constant and the cost of capital is 20 percent, then:
23
The £492.50 million total market value of the merged companies is calcu-
lated as follows:
2. The terms of the merger provide only £7.5 million of that £20
million overall gain to HI’s shareholders, leaving £28.4 million for
SFF.
You can, therefore, see that the cost of acquiring HI is £5 million, the differ-
ence between the cash payment and the value of HI as a separate company.
24
HI shareholders are ahead by £7.5 million, and their gain is your company’s
cost. As we have seen above, SFF shareholders come out £12.5 million ahead.
You can call this SFF’s Net Present Value (NPV) for the merger:
If you write down the economic gain and cost of a merger in this way, you
separate the motive for the merger (the economic gain or added value) from
the terms of the merger (the division of the gain between the two merging
companies).
25
It is apparent that SFF’s share price has risen by £1.85. The total increase in
value for SFF’s original shareholders, who retain 10 million shares, is £18.5 million.
It is not always easy to evaluate the terms of a merger when it includes an
exchange of shares. HI’s shareholders will retain a stake in the merged compa-
nies; therefore, you have to estimate what the company’s shares will be worth
after the merger is announced and the benefits appreciated by investors.
Notice that we started with the total market value of SFF and HI post-
merger, took into consideration the merger terms (833,333 new shares issued),
and worked back to the post-merger share price. Only then can you calculate
the division of the merger gains between the two companies.
There is an essential distinction between cash and shares regarding
financing terms. If cash is offered, the cost of the merger will not be affected
by the size of the merger gains. If shares are offered, the cost is dependent on
the gains, because the gains show up in the post-merger share price, and these
shares are used to pay for the acquired company.
Share financing also mitigates the effects of over- or under-valuing either
company. Suppose, for example, that SFF had overestimated HI’s value as a
separate entity, maybe because it had overlooked a hidden liability (empha-
sizing the importance of due diligence). Therefore, SFF makes a too-generous
offer. Other things being equal, SFF’s shareholders would have been better off
if it had been a share offer rather than a cash offer. With a share offer, the inevi-
table bad news about HI’s value would have fallen partly on HI’s shareholders.
A Word of Warning
The cost of a merger is the premium the acquirer is willing to pay for the
target company over and above its value as a separate company. If the target
company is a public company, you can measure its separate value by multi-
plying its share price by the number of outstanding shares. However, be careful:
If the investors expect the target to be acquired, its share price may overstate
the company’s separate value. The target company’s share price may already
have risen in anticipation that a premium will be paid by an acquiring company.
26
This can be a dangerous exercise. Even the most astute and well-trained
analyst can make huge errors when it comes to valuing a business. The esti-
mated net gain might be positive, not because the potential merger makes
sense, but simply because the analyst’s cash-flow forecasts are overly opti-
mistic. Alternatively, a good merger deal may be lost if the analyst fails to
recognize the target company’s potential as a stand-alone business.
A much better exercise would be to start with the target company’s current
and stand-alone market value, and then concentrate on the changes in cash
flow that would result from the merger.
When evaluating an MA&S transaction, it is a good idea to ask your-
self continually why the two companies should be worth more together than
apart. You have to remember that you add value only if you can generate addi-
tional economic benefits—for example, by taking advantage of some compet-
itive edge that other companies cannot match and that the target company’s
management is unable to achieve by itself.
Thus, it makes sense to keep an eye on the value that investors place on the
gains from merging. If a bidding company’s share price falls when the deal is
announced, investors are sending a very clear message that the merger benefits
are doubtful, or that the bidding company is paying too much for these benefits.
Merger Tactics
In recent years, most mergers have been agreed upon by both parties, but
sometimes an acquirer goes over the heads of the target company’s manage-
ment and makes a direct offer to the shareholders. The management of the
target company may advise shareholders to accept the offer, or it may attempt
to fight the bid in the hope that the acquirer will either raise its offer or with-
draw the bid.
27
Chapter 3 Takeaways
1. When evaluating mergers, ask about the economic gain overall,
and for your organization and its shareholders or stakeholders.
10. Start with the target company’s current and stand-alone market
value, and then concentrate on the changes in cash flow that
would result from the merger.
28
Strategy Development
Internal auditors can enhance their images as value providers within their orga-
nizations as well as prevent potentially negative consequences throughout the
MA&S process. To do so, it is essential for internal auditors to get involved in
the MA&S process as early as possible.
Most organizations understand the value internal audit can bring once a
deal has closed. What they do not often appreciate is the value internal audit
can provide throughout the transaction process. Initially, internal audit can
determine an organization’s readiness for a merger or acquisition. During due
diligence, internal auditors can alert the organization to potential risks: control,
governance, or regulatory issues that would cause the organization to overpay.
Before closing the deal, internal audit can help prevent deal value erosion.
From a post-acquisition perspective, internal audit involvement in crit-
ical components of the integration can preserve organizational synergies and
ascertain proper control monitoring of new processes or changes in processes.
Throughout the MA&S life cycle, internal audit can evaluate the management of
the program to promote the use of leading practices.
Internal audit provides a critical perspective to MA&S deals that many exec-
utives may not consider. Without that perspective right from the start, the
organization could find out far too late that it paid too much for its acquisi-
tion—or that it must spend a significant amount of money to fix issues that
internal audit could have identified and helped the organization avoid.
29
By ensuring that these four key strategic areas are planned and managed
adequately, the internal audit activity can add value at the strategy develop-
ment stage:
30
31
Best Practice 1
Work in close cooperation with other departments in your organization.
Internal auditors should plan to work closely with departments such as finance
and accounting, human resources, legal, information technology (IT), and
production. You should also ensure you keep open communication channels
within the bidder company because this can be essential for avoiding duplicate
or unnecessary effort.
Best Practice 2
Save time and effort by conducting a thorough review of the target compa-
ny’s internal audit activity. A clear plan to merge or integrate the two internal
audit organizations can provide valuable insights for the entire MA&S project.
A major issue noted in most transactions is the existence of duplicate depart-
ments or processes.
Best Practice 3
Ensure your due diligence includes finance, operations, and compliance.
Evaluation of these areas should be the basis of every due diligence audit.
Ignoring any of these functions could potentially lead to the failure of the MA&S
transaction.
Best Practice 4
Identify and follow up on major issues. You should ensure that weaknesses
unearthed during the due diligence phase are assessed and dealt with before
the deal is finalized.
Best Practice 5
Bring in external consultants and/or outsourced internal audit experts. Internal
auditors possess enormous qualities and skills, but we cannot always be
experts in every area of a particular industry or business. It is common prac-
tice to outsource all or part of the due diligence process to third parties. This
is particularly useful when the internal audit organizations of the compa-
nies involved possess neither the necessary skills nor the experience to carry
out due diligence effectively. Sometimes outside help in areas such as legal
32
aspects, the environment, or trade union relations can prevent sensitive issues
from exploding into full-scale crises. By working closely with experienced third
parties, in-house internal auditors can take advantage of a fantastic opportunity
to upgrade their own skills. To ensure there is no duplication of efforts, open
communication is critically important. Ongoing meetings and feedback are
essential for assuring that audit resources are efficient and effectively deployed.
Best Practice 6
Be aware of regulatory and compliance issues. In most countries, particularly
in Europe, MA&S activities are bound by strict regulatory frameworks in terms
of competitive advantage and monopolies. Many major mergers and acquisi-
tions have failed simply because of noncompliance with these regulatory frame-
works. With specific knowledge of compliance or with the help of outside
consultants, these issues can be avoided.
Best Practice 7
Document the target company’s business processes and control points. The
bidder company’s internal audit organization should have the freedom to
conduct a pre-transaction audit of the target company’s business processes. You
should conduct a complete diagnostic review of the main processes, including
mapping of the principal risk areas and control activities. This review can form
the basis for future audits and save time during the post-acquisition stage.
Too often, senior management has already “sold” the deal before internal
audit organizations—or even outside consultants, for that matter—can have
their say. Because of this “pre-planned” scenario, due diligence may become
more of a fact-finding mission than a critical phase in the transaction deci-
sion process. Senior management may view internal auditors as fact checkers,
and not as a source of important new information. The internal audit activity,
however, can provide management with vital information about the value of the
company being acquired or merged, its financial condition, and any weaknesses
in internal controls.
33
Pre-Merger/Pre-Acquisition Integration
At this stage, the main objective is for both companies to ensure a smooth inte-
gration into a single entity. The integration period is also a time of enormous
uncertainty for staff, especially within the target company.
What Role Can Internal Auditors Play in Reducing the Risk in This
Phase?
Post-Merger/Post-Acquisition Audit
The final phase of any MA&S transaction is the post-merger/post-acquisi-
tion audit. Here again, the level of involvement of internal audit is crucial for
34
a smooth transition and potentially, the success of the entire operation. This
involvement often has an impact on the future stages of other transactions.
If the internal audit activity did not get involved in the early stages, then
time-consuming efforts may be necessary to gain an understanding of the
newly formed entity’s key risks and processes. This will ultimately have an
impact on documenting key controls and finalizing the audit plan.
Increased involvement during the initial stages of the post-merger/post-
acquisition audit can provide a much deeper understanding of the newly
merged or acquired company. This means that the audit plan for the coming
year will more effectively address the significant risks facing the combined
organization. Internal auditors can now carry on their work by following these
five steps:
3. Audit the new entity. This is the opportunity to review the poli-
cies, procedures, and controls in the newly formed entity,
whether a merger or an acquisition. A risk-based approach
should be used. The audit plan will be based on a risk assess-
ment and on the corporate objectives set forth by the new
management team.
35
36
2. Ensure that internal audit has the required skills, expertise, and
resources to participate to the extent described above.
Let’s not forget one important point: Part of the role of internal auditors
is to support senior management, and the whole company, as key advisers
during the entire MA&S process. This task can be difficult enough when trying
to support their role in their own country, where they speak the same language
and where business customs are familiar. Imagine this exercise in countries
where internal audit teams do not share the same language and customs. The
degree of difficulty is, under those circumstances, compounded.
37
Chapter 4 Takeaways
1. Internal audit should promote the use of best practices during all
phases of the MA&S process, and should prepare a best practices
document at the conclusion of the project.
38
39
Risks are involved in every major strategic project. Some of the most common
risks associated with MA&S projects are listed in this chapter. The following list
is by no means exhaustive and is not necessarily in order of significance, but it
provides an overview of the key areas internal auditors should evaluate during
MA&S risk assessment. The due diligence process of the MA&S cycle will also
evaluate many of these risks to ensure that they do not pose a serious threat to
either the acquiring or target company; however, the internal audit group also
should perform a comprehensive risk assessment that includes these and other
significant risks.
Business Market
Market Risk
Market risk refers to the possibility that investors may experience losses due
to factors that affect the overall performance of financial markets. Risks such
as recessions, natural disasters, political turmoil, changes in interest rates,
and terrorist attacks can cause a decline in the market that affects compa-
nies across the board. Also called “systematic risk,” market risks can be hedged
against but cannot be totally eliminated through diversification. Sensitivity to
market risk is generally described as the degree to which changes in interest
rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity process, or equity prices can
adversely affect earnings and/or capital.
Analysis of market risk often presents complex variables, but at times it
can be a major factor in decisions regarding MA&S transactions. For example,
41
Marketing Risk
Closely related to market risk, marketing risk refers to risks that lead to
shrinking market share. Marketing risk is affected by factors such as inade-
quate/obsolete product design, unsuccessful marketing campaigns, uncompeti-
tive pricing strategies, or inappropriate distribution methods.
Marketing risk levels often fluctuate in the midst of MA&S activities. For
example, brand loyalty may or may not transfer successfully to an acquiring
organization; or previously successful distribution channels may need to be
changed to fit with the acquiring company’s distribution system. Internal audi-
tors should carefully analyze sales forecasts for possible marketing risk impli-
cations, because sales predictions based on past performance may be heavily
impacted by MA&S activities. Auditors should also be on the lookout for
overly optimistic sales projections that may, consciously or unconsciously, be
designed to present the company in an unjustifiably favorable light during
MA&S negotiations.
Environmental Risk
In the context of MA&S activities, environmental risk refers not just to the risk
of adverse effects on living organisms or the environment from sources such as
emissions, waste, or accidental chemical releases: It refers to all potential events
that could impact the environment, social responsibility, or corporate gover-
nance. Environmental auditing requires a very different skill set from that used
in most other types of auditing. This is an area where it is particularly important
to remember that The IIA’s International Standards for the Professional Practice
of Internal Auditing (Standards) requires the CAE to obtain competent advice
and assistance if the internal auditors lack the knowledge, skills, or other
competencies needed to perform any part of an engagement. If your engage-
ment team does not possess specific knowledge of environmental auditing, it is
advisable to seek advice from an external specialist.
42
43
In the past, IP was within the scope of legal due diligence, but audits were
usually limited to the ownership of trademarks, patents, copyrights, and a
review of relevant contract terms. Today, IP issues can be complex, and partic-
ular technologies or software may rapidly become obsolete, which can bring
difficult challenges and uncertainties to the valuation of IP assets. Therefore,
when acquiring a target with major IP assets, it is important to separate
IP matters from other legal relationships and treat them separately in the
valuation.
Financial Risk
Financial risk includes all areas of valuation of assets, accounting guidelines,
investments, tax issues, and asset and liability management. Internal audit
procedures should include a complete ratio analysis and a thorough examina-
tion of key accounting issues such as pension liabilities, receivables, payables,
profit and loss, cash flow statements, unaudited financials, and incomplete
or unreliable financial data. Auditors should be particularly alert for over-
valued assets and overly optimistic estimates, budgets, and forecasts, because
management estimates are particularly likely to involve “wishful thinking” when
strategic transactions are being considered.
Legal Risk
Legal risk includes risks arising from legal claims or counterclaims, defec-
tive contracts, and lawsuits (for example, as a result of the termination of a
contract). It can also arise from failing to take appropriate measures to protect
44
45
Pitfalls
Several significant risks are inherent within MA&S processes. The four most
common risks are described below.
46
Chapter 5 Takeaways
1. Various risks must be examined in key areas of focus to diffuse
potential threats to the acquiring and/or target organizations.
47
5. Even though myriad causes exist for inadequate due diligence, all
must be avoided.
48
Corporate Valuation
49
n Availability of financing
n Interest rates
n Economic situation at the time of the valuation, but also for the
future
n Stock price (for public companies)
Valuation Techniques
Four valuation methods are commonly used to determine the worth of poten-
tial MA&S transactions:
Let’s look at the first method, DCF, in detail. You should also understand the
concepts of net present value and internal rate of return.
Net present value (NPV) is an indicator of the value or magnitude of an
investment. It gives you the current value of both the incoming and outgoing
cash flow over a future period of time.
50
Internal rate of return (IRR) is a rate quantity, and indicator of the efficiency,
quality, or yield of an investment. An investment is considered acceptable if its
IRR is greater than an established minimum acceptable rate of return or cost of
capital.
Given a time period and cash flow for a project, the IRR follows from the
NPV as a function of the rate of return.
The underlying assumptions used in the DCF method can significantly alter
the outcome, thereby changing the validity and appropriateness of the valu-
ation numbers. Five components often have the largest impact on decisions
regarding estimated cash flows:
51
Residual Value
The remaining value of the acquired business, after the projection period, is
referred to as the residual value. The two ways of calculating the residual value
are the perpetuity method and the multiplier approach.
The perpetuity method treats residual value like an annuity, by capital-
izing the final year’s projected cash flow by the discount rate. The multiplier
approach applies a multiple of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the
final year’s EBIT.
52
Chapter 6 Takeaways
1. Many of the same techniques can be used to value public or
private organizations.
53
n Size
n Operational history (or lack of operational history)
n Management and operational control issues
n Difficulty in quantifying earnings and cash flow
n Capital structure
n Specific business risks
Following are some useful tips and techniques for determining the value
of a privately owned, unlisted company. Business valuation is part art and part
science. The number and diversity of variables that influence the value of a
privately owned business often make establishing a sale or purchase price
extremely difficult. Factors that can influence values include:
55
56
How Can Internal Audit Help Both Sellers and Buyers Reach a Fair Price?
Following are some “golden rules” for establishing the value of a business as
well as ways to help you create your own guiding framework.
Rule 1
There is no single best method for determining the value of a business, because
each business sale is unique. The most practical approach is often to estimate
the value of a company using a mixture of several techniques. The idea is to
review the values you calculate and then decide on the range (according to
market, industry, and country) in which most of the values converge.
Rule 2
To be viable, the deal must be financially feasible for both parties. The seller must
be satisfied with the price received for the business, but the buyer cannot pay an
excessively high price that necessitates an unrealistically high level of borrowing
or that strains cash flows to the point where the transaction has no benefit.
Rule 3
The buyer should have access to all business records. This is called effective
due diligence. Would you buy a house without ever visiting it and its neighbor-
hood, asking the present owner a certain number of questions, and carrying out
a small “investigation”?
Rule 4
Valuations should be based on facts, not feelings or fiction.
Rule 5
The two parties should deal with each other openly, honestly, and in good faith.
As experience shows, this is not always the case and, for that reason, many
business sale transactions simply do not go through or turn into costly and acri-
monious court cases.
The most common reason that buyers purchase existing businesses is to
acquire their future earning potential. The second most common reason is to
57
obtain an established asset base: It is often much easier to buy assets than to
build them. Although some valuation techniques take these objectives into
consideration, many business sellers and buyers simplify the process by relying
on “rules of thumb” to estimate the value of a business.
For example, one rule of thumb for appraising a sporting goods shop is to
use 30 percent of its annual sales, plus inventory, to establish a rough estimate
of its value. Other rules use multiples of a company’s net earnings to value the
business. These multipliers can vary according to the industry sector, with most
small businesses selling for between two and 12 times their earnings before
interest and taxes (EBITs), with an average of between six and seven times EBIT.
Internal auditors should be particularly aware of the following factors,
because any one, or a mixture of factors, could have an impact on due dili-
gence. It doesn’t hurt to study the industry as well.
The five factors that can increase the value of the multiplier are:
The six factors that can decrease the value of the multiplier are:
58
Specific Techniques
The three techniques most commonly used to verify the value of a business are:
First, you should determine which assets are to be included in the sale of
the company. The management teams from both the buying and selling orga-
nizations should draw up a list and come up with a reasonable valuation price.
You should be able to value the assets based on benchmarks and experience.
Remember that the net worth on a financial statement will probably be very
different from the actual net worth in the market.
Let’s take an example, and go through the due diligence and valuation veri-
fications based on the potential sale of MDF Furniture, a small European-based,
flat-pack furniture manufacturer.
MDF Furniture has assets of €1,900,000 and liabilities of €850,000. Thus,
we can calculate the company’s net worth:
59
STEP 1
60
liabilities gives you the adjusted tangible net worth. In the case of our example,
MDF Furniture, the adjusted tangible net worth is:
STEP 2
2. Inflation premium
The risk-free return and the inflation premium are reflected in investments
such as U.K. or U.S. government bonds. To determine the appropriate rate of
return for investing/buying a business, the buyer must add to the base rate a
factor that reflects the risk of purchasing the company. The greater the risk
involved, the higher the rate of return should be in the calculation.
An average-risk business typically has a rate of return of 20 to 25 percent;
however, the rate varies greatly between industries. You should, therefore,
research specific benchmarks for the industry and geographic location of the
target company.
I consider MDF Furniture to be a slightly higher-than-average-risk business,
so I will use the 25 percent rate. In this case, for MDF Furniture, the opportunity
cost of the investment/purchase is:
The second part of the buyer’s opportunity cost is the salary that the buyer
could have earned by purchasing another business or by making other alterna-
tive investments. Assuming that the buyer forgoes a salary in another business
61
of €60,000 per year, the total opportunity cost for the MDF Furniture transac-
tion would be:
STEP 3
Project net earnings. You must be able to estimate the company’s net earn-
ings for the coming year, before deducting the owner’s salary. Averages are
sometimes misleading, especially when analyzing the sale/purchase of small-
and medium-sized businesses. You must also try to analyze the trend of net
earnings and ask what has happened to the earnings over a given period. By
looking at past income statements, you can obtain useful guidelines. Let’s say
that the current owner of MDF Furniture, together with an accountant, have
projected net earnings to be €750,000.
STEP 4
Now let’s calculate the extra earning power. A company’s extra earning power is
the difference between forecasted earnings (STEP 3) and the total opportunity
costs of investing/purchasing the business. The extra earning power of MDF
Furniture is:
STEP 5
Estimate the value of intangibles. You can now use the company’s extra earning
power to estimate the value of its intangibles. If you multiply the extra earning
power by a years-of-profit figure, the result will give you an estimated value of
the intangible assets. The years-of-profit figure for a normal-risk business typi-
cally ranges from three to four. A high-risk business may have a years-of-profit
figure of one, whereas a well-established company might have a figure of seven.
Next, rate the company on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high) based on the
following factors. This will enable you and the purchaser of the business to
calculate a reasonable years-of-profit figure to estimate the value of the intan-
gibles. See table 7.1.
62
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Risk More risky Less risky
2. Level of competition Intense competition Few competitors
3. Industry attractiveness Fading Attractive
4. Barriers to entry Low High
5. Growth potential Low High
6. Owner’s reason for selling Poor performance Retiring
7. Age of business Young + 10 years old
8. Current owner’s tenure Short + 10 years
9. Profitability Below average Above average
10. Location Problematic Desirable
11. Customer base Limited and shrinking Diverse and growing
12. Image and reputation Poor Strong
To calculate the years-of-profit figure, add the score for each factor and
divide by the number of factors—in this case, 12. For MDF Furniture, the scores
are illustrated in table 7.2.
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1. Risk 3
2. Level of competition 2
3. Industry attractiveness 4
4. Barriers to entry 4
5. Growth potential 2
6. Owner’s reason for selling 6
7. Age of business 6
8. Current owner’s tenure 6
9. Profitability 4
10. Location 4
11. Customer base 3
12. Image and reputation 5
Total 49
Therefore, for MDF Furniture, the years-of-profit figure is 49/12, or 4.1, and
the value of intangibles is (€402,500 X 4.1), or €1,650,250.
STEP 6
Determine the value of the business. Now all you have to do to verify that the
price requested by the seller is the right one is to add the adjustable tangible
net worth (STEP 1) and the value of the intangibles (STEP 5). Using this
method, the value of MDF Furniture is:
64
Companies with lower risk factors offer greater certainty and, therefore, are
more valuable.
In our example, a lower rate of return of 10 percent gives us a value of
€6,900,000 compared with companies that have higher risk factors, giving us a
value of €1,380,000.
STEP 1
Project the earnings for a five-year period into the future. Assume that earnings
will grow by a constant amount over the next five years. Develop three fore-
casts for each year: Pessimistic, Most Likely, and Optimistic.
65
The most likely forecast is weighted four times more than the pessimistic
and optimistic forecasts. Thus, the denominator is the total of the weights
(1 + 4 + 1 = 6).
For our example, MDF Furniture, the buyer has forecast the following earn-
ings, illustrated in table 7.3.
You should remember that the further into the future the forecasts go,
the less reliable they will be; but you now have a more realistic picture of the
current value of any future earnings.
STEP 2
Discount these future earnings using the appropriate present value factor. If
you are unable to find the appropriate updated present value table, then you
can calculate it yourself by using the following equation:
1/(1 + k)
K = rate of return = 25%
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The rate you select should reflect the rate that a buyer could earn on an
investment of similar risk. Because MDF Furniture is a normal-risk business, we
can take 25 percent as a maximum value. See table 7.4.
*To calculate the Present Value Factor, use the following formula:
Then, keep dividing the Present Value Factor by 1.25 for each year
(0.8000/1.25 = 0.6400) and so on.
STEP 3
Estimate the income stream beyond five years. One technique involves multi-
plying the fifth-year income by 1/(rate of return). For MDF Furniture, the esti-
mate is:
STEP 4
Discount the income estimate beyond five years using the present value factor
for the sixth year. For MDF Furniture:
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STEP 5
The main advantage of this technique is that you can evaluate any type
of business solely on the basis of its future earnings potential. Its reliability,
however, depends on making accurate forecasts of future earnings and on
selecting a realistic present value factor.
Company 1 3.3
Company 2 3.8
Company 3 4.3
Company 4 4.1
Average 3.875
68
The advantage is that this technique is quite simple; however, the market
approach method has four specific disadvantages:
69
Chapter 7 Takeaways
1. The number and complexity of variables that influence the value
of a privately owned business make establishing a price difficult.
10. You can add value by making a complete analysis using all
methods and using the results to guide management in the
decision-making process.
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Due Diligence
In this chapter, we will examine some of the major areas that should be
reviewed during the due diligence process. It is important to remember that
due diligence frameworks and checklists must be adapted to suit the target
company’s industry sector, the objectives of the acquisition, and the final
outcome. Even when they operate in similar activity sectors and locations,
companies often vary greatly in many other respects. It is impossible, therefore,
to create a standard “one size fits all” set of due diligence guidelines that are
appropriate for all companies and situations. Appendix A presents an example
of the due diligence checklists that I use as a starting point in such evaluations.
It is essential to evaluate how well the acquisition will meet the acquiring
company’s objectives. The seven primary areas for consideration are:
71
72
73
Key People
You can enhance your role in the acquisition process by providing a thorough
overview of the “people aspects” of the transaction, which are increasingly
important and can have a significant impact on the success or failure of any
transaction.
A target company that has a well-rounded management team and that has
identified a good secondary backup for the CEO is obviously worth more than
a comparable company that is basically a one-person operation. If a compe-
tent management team is in place that can replace the owner/founder, and if
key staff is in place in other areas of the business, it is likely that the buyer’s
investment is safer. From the target company’s point of view, the company
will benefit from a higher market value if it has taken the time to develop its
management team.
74
Often the target company owners want to sell because they have invested
most of their personal net worth in their company and would like to diversify
their risk. In many cases, the target company’s management would like to be
able to get away from the day-to-day pressures of running a business, while still
remaining active in the business. Understanding the owner’s motivation places
you in a better position to advise your company’s management regarding struc-
turing the transaction.
75
could cause the target company to lose those advantages and assess the prob-
ability of that happening.
n Main products and services from the sales income point of view,
in both national and international markets
76
Customer Base
You should examine the customer profile and determine the risks. The customer
base may include:
77
Finally, you should determine whether the target company has been
spending enough on R&D activities in relation to its planned budget, the
particular industry sector, and the competition. This is vital for understanding
78
whether the target company has reached its full potential earnings power, or if
there is room for improvement.
79
n Relationship between raw material costs and sales over the last
three to five years
80
81
Financial Information
There will be numerous sources for up-to-date financial information, especially
if your target is a listed company. However, evaluation of the following docu-
ments can improve your role in fulfilling management’s expectations. In general,
you should examine:
Make a financial ratio comparison of the past three years’ financial informa-
tion, and also include industry benchmarks. The following ratio comparisons will
provide important insights into the financial management of the target company:
n Net profits to net sales, tangible net worth, and net working
capital
82
n Fixed assets, current debt, and total debt to tangible net worth
Balance Sheet
You should review the following in order of priority:
n Marketable securities
n Inventory summary for each product line for the current and
prior year, including the latest physical inventory. Physically
observe the general condition and quality of inventory in the
various warehouses.
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84
85
Identify the Hidden IT Risks and Costs… Before the Deal Closes
According to informal research studies conducted by my company, Capricorn
Consulting, about half of all MA&S events end up destroying value, and another
two in 10 events fail to create meaningful value for stakeholders. It is your job to
help beat these odds and to ensure the deal builds business value. But in many
cases, IT problems and related unforeseen costs, issues, and complexities can
trip up an otherwise well-thought-out merger or acquisition strategy. Again, our
research reveals that IT issues contribute up to 25 percent of all financial risks in
strategic transactions. All too often, no one has evaluated the enormous poten-
tial impact that IT risks pose.
Here is how you can ensure that IT contributes positively to the transaction:
Sample Acquisition
A Acquiring company’s IT budget $12,500,000
B Target company’s IT budget $5,500,000
C Total combined IT budget (A + B) $18,000,000
D Average one-time charge (12%) ($2,160,000)
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In addition to the IT aspect, you should look for undervalued and over-
valued assets. The due diligence phase can be quite long in duration, time-
consuming, and a drain of already limited resources. Unfortunately, there is no
magic formula that can be applied to all businesses.
It provides, however, a perfect opportunity for you to conduct an assess-
ment of the business processes (not only of the target company but also of
your own (acquiring) company). When this phase is complete, your work is still
not done because internal audit can also contribute to the post-merger imple-
mentation and integration phases.
The success of any MA&S transaction relies greatly on three key areas:
n Processes
n People
n Technology
87
Internal auditors can assist their companies in ensuring a strong due dili-
gence process is maintained in all its forms: pre-acquisition, post-acquisition,
88
and sell-side. A strong due diligence process is critical to ensure the acquirer
is fully aware of all aspects of the deal and provides access to vital intelligence
that is used to negotiate the final price and integrate the new subsidiary more
effectively.
In conclusion, based on my experience and knowledge of MA&S successes
and failures, I believe strongly that if internal audit can take on a more proactive
role and be involved from the start of the strategic process, continue throughout
the due diligence process, and review the post-merger/post-acquisition integra-
tion, then companies are more likely to avoid costly mistakes. This will also help
generate strategic business combinations that create stakeholder value.
Chapter 8 Takeaways
1. Establish an experienced and qualified MA&S team.
7. Renegotiate the terms of the deal after the due diligence results.
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91
The most fundamental question we should ask is why the U.S. group paid so
much for this type of company. There was no particularly sound business reason
for P&H Systems to buy Soft Cell. Where was the much-acclaimed “synergy”?
P&H Systems’ management comments were relatively vague regarding its
strategic plan and what it was going to accomplish with the purchase. The CEO
of P&H Systems spoke about grandiose projections for “ongoing cooperation”
and “reinventing the world as we know it.” There was never even a clear inten-
tion of how the new acquisition would be integrated into the U.S. group.
Upon later, more in-depth analysis, it appeared that P&H Systems’ real
motives had less to do with commercial logic than with managing the stock
market. A more convincing explanation for the acquisition is that the CEO
wanted to rearrange the technology group to enhance its attractiveness to
the growth-focused fund managers who had traditionally been purchasers of
P&H Systems’ shares. P&H Systems was in a maturing market, and this factor
weighed heavily on its stock market valuation. Those fund managers who had
originally supported P&H Systems were looking elsewhere for their returns.
The hope was that Soft Cell’s much higher market valuation would
somehow rub off on P&H Systems’ share price. This was one more example of a
deal simply driven by what could be described as “Price/Earnings (P/E) envy.”
For all intents and purposes, the CEO of P&H Systems had become just
another fund manager. He was, in fact, shuffling a portfolio of companies rather
like a fund manager shuffles a portfolio of shares. Chasing the stock market
might have been the primary reason behind this strategic acquisition.
We have witnessed this misconception many times before (obviously, few
lessons have been learned from previous debacles), as CEOs across the globe
take on the role of elated fund managers. During the MA&S bull market, many
companies allowed their strategies to be dictated by stock market valuations.
The role of CEOs is not to mirror fund managers but to run a business that
adds value, primarily through the provision of goods and services to customers.
If senior management succeeds at this, they will generate long-term returns for
their investors. What is troublesome is that some companies make a habit of
systematically “getting it wrong,” with acquisition after acquisition, or merger
after merger, wiping millions, if not billions, of value off companies’ net worth.
The long MA&S bull market that ended in 2007 may have convinced
investors that companies could somehow increase in value without actually
becoming better managed. Today, however, the global business environment is
much tougher. CEOs need to think much more about staff and customers, and
less about the stock market.
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One of the lessons learned from this case study is the importance of
possible accounting irregularities and fraud during strategic transactions. When
internal audit is involved in the due diligence process from the very begin-
ning, they can alert stakeholders that vague answers regarding why a target
company is an attractive acquisition may be an indication that sound business
practice and honest synergy are not the underlying motivations.
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Key Objectives for the Merger of the Two Internal Audit Organizations
94
n The joint FR-A and DE-V internal audit work team first met in
February 2012.
n The internal audit leaders for each country were appraised and
selected in May and confirmed in June 2012.
The FR-A’s CAE had the following comments concerning the merger of the
two internal audit organizations:
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1. Get organized.
3. The internal audit global work team would consist of a core four-
member team, with two executives from each company.
4. The team would meet every two weeks, in Paris and Köln.
FR-A’s approach to internal audit was presented to the DE-V team in Köln
and then to teams around the world, explaining the decentralized versus
centralized approach:
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97
were located in Madrid and Barcelona; and offices in Germany were located
in Köln and Frankfurt. “Joint teams” were established to foster the integra-
tion and ensure staff would gain experience across all aspects of the merged
organization.
The FR-A CAE comments on merging internal audit organizations and the
actions that could have been done better follow:
98
Chapter 9 Takeaways
1. When internal audit was the first team to integrate and become
an operationally effective transversal function, it facilitated
internal audit’s strategic reviews of merging business operations.
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100
Conclusion
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102
103
attention. Time is of the essence here: If the auditor’s opinion is with reserva-
tions, there may be reason to reject the proposed merger, so it is essential to
keep management informed as quickly as possible when you become aware of
potential issues. Timely communication about potential risks and issues can also
enable management to address problems even before your report is issued.
Unfortunately, your work will be in vain if appropriate action is not taken
on your recommendations, and in the midst of MA&S activities, an enthusi-
astic management team may be very tempted to accept risks they otherwise
would consider unacceptable. The IIA’s Standards require that, when the CAE
concludes that management has accepted a level of risk that may be unaccept-
able to the organization, he or she must discuss the matter with senior manage-
ment, and if the matter is not resolved, it must be communicated to the board
of directors.
Even if management enthusiastically embraces all of your recommenda-
tions, there is a danger that reported issues may not be addressed appropri-
ately. Action plans must be developed for each reported risk or control issue,
clearly indicating those items that must be completed before the strategic
transaction is finalized. Rigorous follow-up is essential: Keep in mind that in the
midst of frenzied MA&S activities, it is very common for management to let
details “fall through the cracks” or for them to postpone addressing important
control issues in favor of other activities that are more likely to impress the new
senior management team.
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105
106
Chapter 10 Takeaways
1. Internal auditors can contribute significant value by ensuring
a robust due diligence process is in place and operating as
intended.
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108
3. Company’s minute book, including all (a) minutes and (b) reso-
lutions of the shareholders and directors, executive committees,
and other governing groups
109
B. Financial Information
8. Schedule of inventory
C. Physical Assets
110
D. Real Estate
1. Schedule of the company’s business locations
2. Copies of all real estate leases, deeds, mortgages, title policies,
surveys, zone approvals, variances, and use permits
E. Intellectual Property
1. Schedule of domestic and foreign patents and patent
applications
3. Schedule of copyrights
111
12. Copies of all stock option and stock purchase plans and a
schedule of grants
H. Environmental Issues
112
I. Taxes
1. National, local, and foreign income tax returns for the last three
years
J. Material Contracts
113
L. Customer Information
114
6. List and explanation for any major customers lost over the last
two years
M. Lawsuits
N. Insurance Coverage
O. Professionals
115
1. Copies of all company articles and press releases within the past
three years
a) Product type
b) Channel
c) Geography
B. Financial Projections
3. Predictability of business
116
C. Capital Structure
1. Current shares outstanding
2. List of all stockholders with shareholdings, options, warrants, or
notes
II. Products
A. Description of Each Product
117
3. Market share
1. Contact details
2. Product(s) owned
3. Timing of purchase(s)
1. Contact details
2. Revenue contribution
3. Marketing agreements
1. Name
2. Contact name
1. Contact details
118
E. List of Top 10 Suppliers for the Past Two Fiscal Years and Current Year-
to-date with Contact Information, Including:
1. Contact details
2. Purchase amounts
3. Supplier agreements
IV. Competition
A. Description of the Competitive Landscape within Each Market Segment,
Including:
B. Major Customers
3. Pipeline analysis
119
1. Compensation
2. Quota average
3. Sales cycle
1. Strategy
2. Key personnel
3. Major activities
2. Cost of development
4. Risks
1. Employment history
2. Age
120
D. Compensation Arrangements
1. Copies of key employment agreements
2. Benefit plans
G. Personnel Turnover
2. Benefit plans
1. Claimant
2. Claimed damages
3. Brief history
4. Status
5. Anticipated outcome
1. Defendant
2. Claimed damages
3. Brief history
121
4. Status
5. Anticipated outcome
1. Safety precautions
1. Issued
2. Pending
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
This is
particularly
important for
organizations
involved in export
activities.
XV.2 Terms and A description of the company’s
Conditions standard sales terms and
conditions.
XV.3 Market Description of all marketing
Activities research, campaigns, plans,
programs, budget, and materials.
XV.4 Competitors A list of the company’s 10 most
significant competitors.
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149
151
and monitor program management activities, review controls, and provide key
insights, while maintaining independence and objectivity.
Internal audit can play a crucial role in the MA&S life cycle in six key areas:
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155
Cai, C. 1997. “On the functions and objectives of internal audit and their under-
lying conditions.” Managerial Auditing Journal 12.4/5: 247–250.
157
Fadzil, F. H., H. Haron, and M. Jantan. 2005. “Internal auditing practices and
internal control system.” Managerial Auditing Journal 20.8: 844–866.
Lin, B., S. Hung, and P. Li. 2006. “Mergers and acquisitions as a human resource
strategy: Evidence from U.S. banking firms.” International Journal of
Manpower 27.2: 126–142.
Mathur, I. and S. De. 1989. “A review of the theories of and evidence on returns
related to mergers and takeovers.” Managerial Finance 15.4: 1–11.
158
Schraeder, M. and D. Self. 2003. “Enhancing the success of mergers and acqui-
sitions: an organizational culture perspective.” Management Decision 41.5:
511–522.
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163
President
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Vice President-Strategy
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Vice President-Development
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Treasurer
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Staff Liaison
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The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation
165
Members
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166
Chairman
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