The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19

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The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics

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Original Article

Application of game theory to analyze the competition and

cooperation scenarios among container terminals in Northern
Vietnam
Minh Duc Nguyen a , S. June Kim b,∗
a
Vietnam Maritime University, Viet Nam
b
Korea Maritime & Ocean University, South Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Northern Vietnam plays an important role in Vietnam’s national economy. In recent years, the sea-port
Received 10 April 2019 industry in the area has witnessed an impressive development and fierce competition especially among
Received in revised form 26 August 2019 local container terminals. Under the pressure of competition, local container ports are competing through
Accepted 28 August 2019
attractive handling charges. The paper applies a Bertrand-Nash game model to estimate the equilibrium
handling charges and equilibrium market share of each container terminal in the area. The game can be
Keywords:
divided into non-cooperative game and cooperative game. Under the cooperative game, three different
Northern Vietnam
scenarios are considered. The game results will verify the implication of price competition among local
Container terminals
Game theory
container terminals and present the outcome of each coalitional scenario for further discussion.
Handling charges © 2019 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction is necessary to perform analyses on the topic of handling charges

The seaport industry in Northern Vietnam has witnessed an
impressive development in recent years. From 2005 to 2016, both
the number of berth and total berth length doubled in figure while
the area of the container yard in the whole region increased more
than three times. However, the rising number of players and the
slowing down of throughput growing rates hardened the competi-
tiveness in the area. Through the period of 2000 to 2012, the supply
was always higher than the demand and the gap was even greater
since 2012. After 2017, the competition in the area was forecasted
to be tougher than when the Lach Huyen International Container
Terminal began its operation. The list of local container terminals
is presented in Table 1.
Under the pressure of competition, local container terminals
are competing through attractive handling charges. This situa-
tion benefits only foreign shipping lines while local terminals lose
profit to reinvest for improving their service quality. Therefore, it
and various cases of cooperation among local terminals for better
mutual benefits. The purpose of the research is to fulfil the two
major targets: firstly, to verify competition situation between the
local container terminals and the statement that their handling
charges are lower than the equivalent level and secondly, to sug-
gest a scenario of cooperation between numbers of local container
terminals which can generate the highest mutual benefit. The two
targets would be reached by applying a game theoretical model to
generate equivalent handling charges and profit under scenarios
of cooperation and non-cooperation. Some parameters used in the
model will also contribute to solve the given questions.
The paper consists of five sections including Introduction section
followed by Literature review to present the application of game
theory in the field of port competition. The game model specifi-
cation is then presented in the 3rd section under non-cooperative
game and cooperative game and different scenarios. Input param-
eters to solve the model are the next part required before the game
results can be generated. Implication and Conclusion is the last
section to conclude the whole paper.

∗ Corresponding author at: c.314, Division of Navigation Science, Korea Maritime

& Ocean Univ., 727 Taejong-no, Yeongdo-gu, Busan 49112, South Korea.
2. Literature review
E-mail addresses: ducnguyen@vimaru.edu.vn (M.D. Nguyen),
sjunekim@kmou.ac.kr (S.J. Kim).
Peer review under responsibility of the Korean Association of Shipping and The first important text in game theory was “Theory of
Logistics, Inc. Games and Economic Behavior” published by Von Neuman and

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajsl.2019.08.001
2092-5212 © 2019 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
14 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19

Table 1 There is no literature review on the topic of game theoretical

Container terminals in Northern Vietnam.
approach to competition among container terminals in Northern
No.
Terminals Throughput 2016 (1000 TEUs) Vietnam. There is also no previous research analyzing different
1 Haiphong – Chua Ve 270 cases of cooperation between local terminals. The paper, there-
2 Haiphong – Tan Vu 788 fore, is the first research dealing with the cooperation among local
3 Dinh Vu 722 container terminals from the perspective of handling charges.
4 Nam Hai 255
5 Nam Hai Dinh Vu 464
6 Hai An 293 3. The game model specification
7 PTSC Dinh Vu 245
8 Doan Xa 240 3.1. Utility and demand for container terminal services
9 Green Port 280
10VIP Green Port 350
11Saigon New Port (SNP) 223
The structure of Bertrand game is used to describe the game for
12Transvina 120 container terminals in Northern Vietnam. All the container termi-
13Cai Lan International Container Terminal (CICT)
12 nals are assumed to provide similar services to containers but at
14Quang Ninh N/A different charges. Customers or service users (here, shipping lines
Source: Vietnam Port Association (2017). and consignors) will have to decide the container terminal which
can maximize their satisfaction. In other words, container terminals
will be chosen depending on the utility that they offer to users. The
Morgenstern (1944). In the book, game theory was mostly utility function of terminal ‘i’ (i = 1,2,3. . .12) can be presented as
considered from the perspective of mathematics. From that pub- follows (Saeed and Larsen, 2010):
lication, game theory has extended further, especially under the
contribution of Nash (1950, 1953). It was in the 1970s that game Ui = ai + b(pi + OUCi) (1)
theory, as a way of analyzing strategic situations, began to be Where:
applied in all sorts of diverse areas including economics, politics, Ui is utility of terminal i
international relations, business, and biology (Carmichael, 2005). ai is a derived constant which can be estimated in different ways
Game theory is described by Roger (1991) as “the study of math- b is price coefficient at container terminals. b can be estimated
ematical models of conflict and cooperation intelligent rational in different ways
decision makers.” Hutton (1996) describes game theory as “an pi is handling charge of container terminal i
intellectual framework for examining what various parties to a OUCi stands for other users’ costs which are users’ additional
decision should do given their possession of inadequate informa- costs beside the handling charges. The OUC can consist of the
tion and different objectives.” waiting cost of vessels during their stay at port, the inland trans-
In the topic of port competition, game theory has been widely portation cost.
recognized as an important tool. Zan (1999) used a bi-level Stack- Kaselimi, Notteboom, and Saeed (2011) describe the other users’
elberg game to capture the flow of foreign trade containers in costs by the following formulation:
order to investigate the behaviour of port users in transship-
ment ports. Anderson et al. (2008) developed a game theoretic OUCi = COi + f (X i/CAP i) (2)
best response framework for understanding how competitor ports
Where:
will respond to the development of a given port and how the
COi is inland transportation cost which is fixed and independent
given port will respond. Bae Min Ju (2013), in his thesis, applied
to the volume of containers handled.
a two-stage game approach to analyze container transshipment
f(Xi/CAPi) is a function of vessels’ waiting cost which commonly
port competition. Ishii, Lee, Texuka, and Chang (2013) developed a
increases when the volume of the containers handled increases.
non-cooperative game model under stochastic demand to explain
Xi is the volume of containers handled by terminal i.
inter-port competition under demand uncertainty and derive a
CAPi stands for the capacity of terminal i.
unique equilibrium. The competition between the port of Busan
The market share of terminals is expressed by the following
and Kobe is used as the case study. Park, Han, and Lu (2010) applied
formulation according to Malchow and Kanafani (2004):
Counot Model–Quantity competition and Bertrand Model-Quantity
competition to examine the response of ports under other ports’ eU i
demand and profit.
Qi = 13 (3)
i=1
eUi
In the topic of price competition among ports, game theory
is also commonly applied. Han, Park, and Ahn (2012) built game Where: Qi is the market share of terminal i
models to analyze port price strategies and competition for trans- The total demand of all the container terminals in Northern
shipment containers between the Busan and Shanghai ports. In Vietnam can be denoted by X and expressed by the following for-
this research, the authors used a utility function to measure a cus- mulation (Saeed and Larsen, 2010):
tomer’s satisfaction based on transport cost, port charges, service
X = AeLS (4)
quality, and time. Zhang, Yang, and Wang (2010) developed a
Bertrand price competition model in both the cases of cooperation Where:
and non-cooperation to study the price competition between the A and  are constants and 0 <  < 1
container ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The paper analyses LS is log sum and determined by:
the solution of Nash equilibrium and raises strategies to solve the  13 
vicious competition in the price war of the two ports. Saeed and 
Larsen (2010) developed non-cooperative and cooperative game LS = ln eU i (5)
models to examine the equilibrium price of container terminals i=1
in one port. Park and Suh (2015) applied the model developed by The demand of 1 container terminal, therefore, can be expressed
Saeed and Larsen (2010) to solve the equilibrium price of con- by:
tainer terminals in port of Busan in both non-cooperative and
co-operative games. Xi = XQi (6)
 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19 15

The profit of container terminal ‘i’ in Northern Vietnam can be (17) can be substituted to (12) to gain:
defined based on the volume of containers handled as follows:
1 + [b(Qi + 1 − Qi )](pi − ci ) = 0 (18)
˘i = Xi(pi − ci) (7)
Or:
Where:
i is the profit of container terminal i 1
pi = Ci − (19)
ci is the marginal cost per TEU of container terminal i in handling b(Qi + 1 − Qi )
cargo
Before the games are modelled, it is necessary to assume some Eq. (19) is the price response function of container terminal i.
conditions to validate the model:
3.3. Cooperative game
- All the container terminals offer similar services but they are not
exact substitutes to each other. Among all container terminals in Northern Vietnam, there are
- The total demand for the container terminal services of the whole 6 container terminals which are owned by Vinalines with the per-
area is fixed when the handling charge of each terminal changes. centage of share-holding varying from 51% to 100%. They are Chua
- The costs which occur in the same amount like inland transporta- Ve, Tan Cang Dinh Vu, Doan Xa, Dinh Vu, Quang Ninh, and Cai Lan
tion, berthing charge, port charge, and wharf charge, regardless International Container Terminal. However, the two container ter-
of the location of the container terminals, will not be considered minals in Quang Ninh province, including CICT and Quang Ninh,
in the model because the utility model deals with customers’ show a very low level of performance in recent years and will be
behaviour which depends on the difference of cost of service. eliminated. Furthermore, Chua Ve and Tan Cang Dinh Vu are the
- When a terminal reduces its handling charge, users will choose two terminals of Haiphong Port Join Stock Company (HPC). Simi-
to move their containers to this terminal. larly, Nam Hai and Nam Hai Dinh Vu are also operated by the same
- The users’ selection will depend on only the cost while other kinds operator named Gemadept Corporation. Green Port and VIP Green
of conditions or agreements are out of scope. Port are the two container terminals operated by Vietnam Con-
tainer Shipping Join Stock Company (Viconship). Therefore, in a
3.2. Non-cooperative game co-operative game, one can assume some coalitional scenarios as
follows:
Under the non-cooperative game, each container terminal will
compete with others independently to maximize their own profit. Scenario 1: The 4 container terminals of Vinalines cooperate
Therefore, the Bertrand Nash equilibrium can be characterized by together and the other terminals operate independently.
the following condition: Scenario 2: The 4 container terminals of Vinalines cooperate
∂˘i together and the other similar cooperation is set up between Nam
=0 (8) Hai and Nam Dinh Vu, and between Green Port and VIP Green Port.
∂pi
The other terminals work independently.
According to Eqs. (4) and (6): Scenario 3: There are 3 similar coalitions set up between terminals
Xi = XQi = AeLS Qi (9) operated by the same operator. Those coalitions are between Chua
Ve and Tan Cang Dinh Vu, Nam Hai and Nam Hai Dinh Vu, and
Subsequently: Green Port and VIP Green Port.
˘i = AeLS Qi (pi − ci ) (10)
In each case, the objective of the coalition is to maximize the
Therefore, Eq. (8) becomes:
total profit of all the members. This study will consider the scenario
∂˘i ∂[AeLSQi(pi − ci)] 1 first and the other cases are similar in terms of mathematical
= =0 (11)
∂pi ∂pi expression.
Eq. (11) can be differentiated to become: In the scenario 1, the total profit of the 4 members is presented
by Eq. (20) below:
∂(AeLSQi)
AeLS Qi + (pi − ci ) = 0 (12)
∂pi 
4

4

˘= ˘i = (pi − ci )Xi (20)

By handling Eq. (12) by logarithm:
i=1 i=1
ln(AeLS Qi ) = ln A + LS + ln Qi (13)
In respect of the first terminal, by taking derivative of the total
By taking the derivative of Eq. (13) by pi: profit by p1:
∂ ln(AeLSQi)
∂ ln A + ∂ ln(LS) + ∂Ui − ∂LS (14) ∂˘ ∂(AeLS Q1 ) ∂(AeLS Q2 )
∂pi = (p1 − c1 ) + AeLS Q1 + (p2 − c2 )
∂p1 ∂p1 ∂p1
Because ln(A) is a constant, then: (21)
∂(AeLS Q3 ) ∂(AeLS Q4 )
+ (p3 − c3 ) + (p4 − c4 )
∂LS ∂LS ∂p1 ∂p1
∂ ln(LS) + ∂Ui − ∂LS = +b− (15)
∂p ∂p
According to Eq. (17):
And
∂LS  ∂eU eU xb ∂(AeLS Q1 )
= ∂ ln eU =  =  = Qb (16) = AeLS Q1 [b(Q1 + 1 − Q1 ] (22)
∂p eU eU ∂p1

(16) can be substituted to (15) to gain: And

∂ ln(AeLSQi) LS ∂(AeLS Q2 )

Ae Qi [b(Qi + 1 − Qi )] (17) (p2 − c2 ) = AeLS Q2 [b(Q1 − Q1 ](p2 − c2 ) (23)
∂pi ∂p1
16 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19

Therefore:
∂˘
= AeLS Q1 [b(Q1 + 1 − Q1 ](p1 − c1 ) + AeLS Q1
∂p1
+AeLS Q2 [b(Q1 − Q1 ](p2 − c2 )
+AeLS Q3 [b(Q1 − Q1 ](p3 − c3 )
+AeLS Q4 [b(Q1 − Q1 ](p4 − c4 ) = 0
Finally:
[b(Q1 + 1 − Q1 ](p1 − c1 ) + 1 + Q2 [b( − 1](p2 − c2 )
+Q3 [b( − 1](p3 − c3 ) + Q4 [b( − 1](p4 − c4 ) = 0
Or:
p1 = c1 − {1 + Q2 [b( − 1)](p2 − c2 ) + Q3 [b( − 1)](p3 − c3 )
+Q4 [b( − 1)](p4 − c4 )}/[b(Q1 + 1 − Q1 ]
A similar transformation is applied to the three other terminals,
and the price response function of those container terminals is as
follows:
p2 = c2 − {1 + Q1 [b( − 1)](p1 − c1 ) + Q3 [b( − 1)](p3 − c3 )
+Q4 [b( − 1)](p4 − c4 )}/[b(Q2 + 1 − Q2 ]
p3 = c3 − {1 + Q1 [b( − 1](p1 − c1 ) + Q2 [b( − 1](p2 − c2 )
+Q4 [b( − 1)](p4 − c4 )}/[b(Q3 + 1 − Q3 ]
p4 = c4 − {1 + Q1 [b( − 1)](p1 − c1 ) + Q2 [b( − 1)](p2 − c2 )
+Q3 [b( − 1)](p3 − c3 )}/[b(Q4 + 1 − Q4 ]
The other scenarios have similar price response functions.
4. Input parameters and the game results
In order to set the pricing rule by the users, the Nash equilib-
rium for the Bertrand game will be implemented. Before that, the
necessary parameters are defined.
The parameters ai and b are used in the utility function as
expressed in Eq. (1). Saeed and Larsen (2010) and Munim, Saeed,
and Larsen (2017) define these parameters by assuming based on
personal experience while Park and Suh (2015) use linear regres-
sion to estimate. All the authors consider that a change in terminal
service charge will not affect the total demand profoundly but
demand of individual terminals might change. Therefore, the value
of  is quite low and  can be assumed by the value (0.01).
In this research, the value of  is fixed by 0.01. In order to deter-
mine the ai value, a1 = a2 = a3 = . . . = a14 = a is assumed. The values
of a and b will be determined by linear regression.
The average utility, handling charge, and OUC of all container
terminals in Northern Vietnam from 2011 to 2016 are presented in
Table 2 as the input of the linear regression.
In this table, Eq. (3) is solved by logarithm as follows in order to
(24) calculate the utility of each terminal:
 
eUi eUi
Qi = 13 ⇒ ln Qi = ln  or
eUi i=1
eUi (30)
i=1

Ui = ln Qi + ln i=1
eUi

(25) Where ln = i=1
eU i is denoted by LS, LS = 15.24
Here, the total throughput of container terminals in
Northern Vietnam is used as a proxy variable of total
utility.
The linear regression analysis returns the value of a as
(26)
15.79 and b as −0.078. The input to solve the game is pre-
sented in Table 3 in Appendix A. The game results of different
scenarios are also presented respectively in Tables 4–7 in
Appendix A.
The calculated results of the non-cooperative and cooperative
game reveal the following points that one can learn from the case
(27) of container terminals in Northern Vietnam. The current handling
charges offered by container terminals in Northern Vietnam are
at a significantly low level than the equilibrium price. This result
(28) is conformable with the fact that container terminals in the area
are competing fiercely with each other and a common strategy to
attract customers is offering a better price than competitors. Under
this condition, only foreign shipping lines earn benefit from the
(29)
price competition policy and local terminals lose profit which can
be used to reinvest for better performance. This situation is harmful
to the local port industry and should be changed. The value of b in
the utility function (Eq. 3.1) which is determined by linear regres-
sion also reflects the elasticity of local container terminals’ utilities
to handling charges. In comparison with the b value in other areas,
the b value in Northern Vietnam is −0.078, the b value in Busan is
−0.046 according to Park and Suh (2015), the b value in Greek Port
is −0.056 according to Polydoropoulou and Litinas (2007), and the
b value in port of Karachi, Pakistan is −0.05 according to Saeed and
Larsen (2010). It implies that the container terminals in Northern
Vietnam are more sensitive to change of handling charges than the
mentioned areas. This implication is also confirmable with the cur-
rent situation of handling charges in the area. The value of b in the
case of container terminals in Northern Vietnam also implies that
terminals’ market share can be increased significantly by reduc-
ing users’ costs. Besides the handling charge, the other user cost
is also an important factor that impacts the decision of customers.
Investments in improving cargo handling speed, therefore, become
critical. In the case of cooperative game, Scenario 1, all the four

Table 2
Input data to estimate parameters a and b.

Terminals Utility Handling charge (USD/TEU) OUC (USD/TEU) Total cost (USD)

Chua Ve 12.49796 35 3.939213 38.93921

Tan Vu 13.56904 33 4.187564 37.18756
Dinh Vu 13.37651 33 6.62151 39.62151
Doan Xa 12.38018 37 7.661986 44.66199
Nam Hai 12.4408 33 7.109182 40.10918
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 13.03943 33 4.072414 37.07241
Hai An 12.57971 36 6.201712 42.20171
PTSC 12.40081 37 6.209939 45.20994
Green Port 12.53434 33 5.207364 38.20736
VIP Green Port 12.75747 33 3.691217 36.69122
SNP 12.30672 33 12.90142 45.90142
Transvina 11.68705 36 3.874874 39.87487
 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19 17

container terminals of Vinalines show better results in profit. This
increase of profit is caused by the increase of equilibrium hand-
ling charges rather than expansion of throughput. The reason is
because the 2 leading terminals named Tan Vu and Dinh Vu have
already taken full advantage of capacity, and increase in throughput
will return a significant increase in vessels’ waiting cost. The con-
siderable increase of profit in cooperation game opens a potential
coalitional strategy to given terminals. It also implies that the two
terminals, Tan Vu and Dinh Vu, have a potential chance of increasing
market share and profit if those terminals are invested in to expand
the capacity. In addition and in the case of the cooperative game,
Scenario 1, not only the four container terminals of Vinalines record
better profit but also all the other container terminals in the area
do the same result. It implies a positive impact of the coalitional
strategies of the four terminals to the whole local market. Under
all the scenarios of coalition, the profit of terminals is higher than
the case where they operate independently. However, among those
coalitional scenarios, the highest results of equilibrium profit can
be found in Scenario 2, with Scenario 3 and the lowest equilibrium
profit being found in Scenario 1. This implies that the more play-
ers join a coalition, the better the results are for all the container
terminals in the area.
minals’ utility which directly impacts the terminals’ market share.
Lach Huyen International Container Terminal is expected to begin
its operation in a very near future. The competition among con-
tainer terminals in the area will be more difficult and, therefore,
which terminals cannot keep up with the trend will be eliminated.
Coalition under scenario 1 is a potential scenario that Vinalines’
terminals can apply to increase all the members’ profit. However,
while the equilibrium handling charges and profit increase, the
overall market share of Vinalines’ terminals slightly decreases. As
a result, not only fixing appropriate level of handling charges, but
other policies are also required to increase the utility of those ter-
minals.
In summary, the paper applies a Bertrand-Nash game model
to estimate the equilibrium handling charges and equilibrium
market share of each container terminal in the area. The
game can be divided into non-cooperative game and cooper-
ative game. Under the cooperative game, the three different
scenarios are considered. The game results will verify the impli-
cation of price competition among local container terminals and
present the outcome of each coalitional scenario for further
discussion.

5. Implications and conclusion

According to the game results, there are some implications Conflict of interest
which can be suggested to related parties. The current handling
charges offered by container terminals in Northern Vietnam are The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
lower than the equilibrium handling charges in case each terminal
competes independently. However, the bargaining power is cur-
rently in the hand of foreign shipping lines and all the terminals
in the area need a representative organization to set the hand-
ling charges at higher level. Vietnam Port Association (VPA) and
Vietnam Maritime Administration (Vinamarine) are organizations Acknowledgement
which should be in charge to issue appropriate policies. In such
case, the equilibrium price in this study can be taken as refer- This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the
ence. Various synchronized policies should be applied by terminal Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea
operators to improve terminals’ services both in the perspective of (NRF-2018S1A6A3A01081098).
shipping lines and shippers. From the perspective of shipping lines,
terminals’ competitive advantages, which should be considered,
are the handling charges, vessels’ facilities and services, and cargo
handling speed, among others. From the perspective of shippers,
the terminals’ competitive advantages, which should be consid- Appendix A.
ered, are cargo value added services, distribution costs, and storage
services, to name some. The general purpose is to increase the ter-

Table 3
Input parameters for the game models.

a 15.79
b −0.078
 0.01
Total demand (TEUs) 4,190,000

Terminals Capacity (,000 TEUs) Current market share Current handling charge Marginal cost (USD)

Chua Ve 550 0.064439 35 29

Tan Vu 1000 0.188067 33 25
Dinh Vu 500 0.155131 33 25
Doan Xa 250 0.057279 37 29
Nam Hai 150 0.060859 33 27
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 500 0.11074 33 25
Hai An 250 0.069928 36 29
PTSC 250 0.058473 37 27
Green Port 350 0.066826 33 25
VIP Green Port 550 0.083532 33 25
SNP 250 0.053222 33 27
Transvina 250 0.02864 36 27
18 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19

Table 4
The results of non-cooperative game.

Terminals Current market Current handling Eq. market share Eq. handling charge Current Profit (mil Eq. Profit (mil USD)
share charge (USD/TEU) (USD/TEU) USD)

Chua Ve 0.06443 35 0.0808 42.83 1,619,996 4,716,943

Tan Vu 0.18806 33 0.1198 41.27 6,304,005 7,478,392
Dinh Vu 0.15513 33 0.1136 39.39 5,199,991 7,066,469
Doan Xa 0.05727 37 0.0619 42.55 1,919,992 3,497,309
Nam Hai 0.06085 33 0.0689 40.65 1,529,995 3,940,632
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 0.11074 33 0.1128 39.37 3,712,004 6,996,437
Hai An 0.06992 36 0.0731 42.71 2,050,988 4,210,711
PTSC 0.05847 37 0.0698 40.66 2,450,018 3,995,031
Green Port 0.06682 33 0.0845 38.89 2,240,007 4,946,924
VIP Green Port 0.08353 33 0.1076 39.28 2,799,992 6,593,619
SNP 0.05322 33 0.0539 40.43 1,338,001 3,016,163
Transvina 0.02864 36 0.0533 40.42 1,080,014 2,985,802

Table 5
The results of cooperative game, Scenario 1.

Terminals Current market Current handling Eq. market share Eq. handling charge Current Profit (mil Eq. Profit (mil USD)
share charge (USD/TEU) (USD/TEU) USD)

Chua Ve 0.0644 35 0.0758 45.11 1,619,996 5,116,568

Tan Vu 0.1880 33 0.1181 41.04 6,304,005 7,937,218
Dinh Vu 0.1551 33 0.1119 40.94 5,199,991 7,473,644
Doan Xa 0.0572 37 0.0604 44.08 1,919,992 3,816,386
Nam Hai 0.0608 33 0.0701 40.67 1,529,995 4,015,139
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 0.1107 33 0.1089 41.26 3,712,004 7,419,292
Hai An 0.0699 36 0.0752 42.74 2,050,988 4,329,309
PTSC 0.0584 37 0.0711 40.68 2,450,018 4,075,395
Green Port 0.0668 33 0.0867 38.91 2,240,007 5,053,127
VIP Green Port 0.0835 33 0.1138 39.33 2,799,992 6,832,859
SNP 0.0532 33 0.0543 40.44 1,338,001 3,057,828
Transvina 0.0286 36 0.0538 40.43 1,080,014 3,027,417

Table 6
The results of cooperative game, Scenario 2.

Terminals Current market Current handling Eq. market share Eq. handling charge Current Profit (mil Eq. Profit (mil USD)
share charge (USD/TEU) (USD/TEU) USD)

Chua Ve 0.06443 35 0.0783 45.32 1,619,996 5,354,217

Tan Vu 0.18806 33 0.1243 41.23 6,304,005 8,452,860
Dinh Vu 0.15513 33 0.1167 41.1 5,199,991 7,872,465
Doan Xa 0.05727 37 0.0617 44.18 1,919,992 3,924,379
Nam Hai 0.06085 33 0.0681 42.72 1,529,995 4,485,529
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 0.11074 33 0.1065 42.51 3,712,004 7,813,575
Hai An 0.06992 36 0.0773 42.77 2,050,988 4,459,924
PTSC 0.05847 37 0.0726 40.7 2,450,018 4,167,458
Green Port 0.06682 33 0.081 42.16 2,240,007 5,823,932
VIP Green Port 0.08353 33 0.1037 42.13 2,799,992 7,443,036
SNP 0.05322 33 0.0551 40.46 1,338,001 3,107,497
Transvina 0.02864 36 0.0546 40.45 1,080,010 3,077,010

Table 7
The results of cooperative game, Scenario 3.

Terminals Current market Current handling Eq. market share Eq. handling charge Current Profit (mil Eq. Profit (mil USD)
share charge (USD/TEU) (USD/TEU) USD)

Chua Ve 0.06443 35 0.0771 44.93 1,619,996 5,146,171

Tan Vu 0.18806 33 0.1205 40.93 6,304,005 8,042,977
Dinh Vu 0.15513 33 0.1227 39.48 5,199,991 7,444,356
Doan Xa 0.05727 37 0.0631 42.57 1,919,992 3,587,759
Nam Hai 0.06085 33 0.067 42.61 1,529,995 4,382,195
Nam Hai Dinh Vu 0.11074 33 0.1142 40.61 3,712,004 7,469,354
Hai An 0.06992 36 0.0756 42.75 2,050,988 4,355,505
PTSC 0.05847 37 0.0714 40.69 2,450,018 4,095,583
Green Port 0.06682 33 0.0795 42.06 2,240,007 5,682,771
VIP Green Port 0.08353 33 0.1004 42.03 2,799,992 7,164,112
SNP 0.05322 33 0.0545 40.45 1,338,001 3,071,375
Transvina 0.0286 36 0.0539 40.44 1,080,014 3,035,303
 M.D. Nguyen and S.J Kim / The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics 36 (2020) 13–19
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