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RICU t5 Seguridad
RICU t5 Seguridad
-
Seguridad
Problemas
Soluciones
key)
Easier for trouble-makers to insert themselves into a mobile ad
hoc network (as compared to a wired network)
Open medium
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Dynamic topology
Distributed cooperation
(absence of central authorities)
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Constrained capability
(energy)
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Securing Ad Hoc Networks
Classification:
External attack vs. Internal attack
External: Intruder nodes can pose to be a part of the network injecting
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¾
erroneous routes, replaying old information or introduce excessive traffic to
partition the network
¾ Internal: The nodes themselves could be compromised. Detection of such
nodes is difficult since compromised nodes can generate valid signatures.
Redes Inalámbricas
(RFC 2828)
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Redes Inalámbricas
Inalámbricas yy Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
source
Information
destination
Information
Normal Flow
Inalámbricas yy Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Passive Attacks
Sniffer
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Passive attacks
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Interception (confidentiality)
frames transmitted on the local area network segment
Risks of Sniffers:
¾ Serious security threat
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Information Information
source destination
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Traffic analysis
¾ Intruder is not able to interpret and extract the transmitted
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information
¾ Intruder is able to derive (infer) information from the traffic
characteristics
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Protection against passive attacks
¾ Onion routing
Modern switch technology: network traffic is directed to the
destination interfaces
Detect and eliminate sniffers
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Active attacks
Active attacks
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Information Information
source destination
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E-mail bombing attack: floods victim’s mail with large bogus
messages
¾ Popular
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¾
¾ Full: no new connections can be established
¾ Time-out, reset
Attack:
Attacker: send SYN requests to server with IP source that unable to
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¾
response to SYN-ACK
¾ Server’s backlog queue filled
¾ No new connections can be established
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¾
¾ Avoid established state until confirmation of client’s identity
Internet trace back: determine the source of an attack
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Redes
Inalámbricas yy Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Modification
Information Information
source destination
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¾
be inserted in the ad-hoc network
How ?
¾ Redirection by changing the route sequence number
¾ Redirection with modified hop count
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Node C
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Intruder
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using modification
Node E
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Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Fabrication
Information Information
source destination
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¾ How ?
Falsifying route error messages
header it overhears
¾ A hacker can easily broadcast a message with a spoofed IP address such
as the other nodes add this new route to reach a special node S
¾ It’s the malicious node which will receive the packets intended to S.
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using fabrication
¾ A hacker can send in the network a lot of route to non-existent nodes until
overwhelm the protocol
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using fabrication
Replay attack:
¾ A hacker sends old advertisements to a node
¾ The node updates its routing table with stale routes
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¾ How ?
Spoofing MAC address of other nodes
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using impersonation
¾ Node M first changes its MAC address to the MAC address of the node A
¾ Node M moves closer to node B than node A is, and stays out of range of
node A
¾ Node M announces node B a shorter path to reach X than the node D
gives
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A C
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B D E X
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using impersonation
¾ Node M moves closer to node D than node B is, and stays out of range of
node B
¾ Node M announces node D a shorter path to reach X than the node E
gives
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A C
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M
B D E X
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Attacks using impersonation
A C
M
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B D E X
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Other Routing attacks
The attackers take control of the route by claiming a shorter
path
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tunnel
N
M ……..….
D
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S C
B
A
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Invisible node attack
Attack on DSR
Malicious does not append its IP address
M becomes “invisible” on the path
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S B M C D
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 The Sybil attack
B
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M1
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M2 M5
M3 M4
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Rushing attack
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Tema 5.-
Seguridad
Problemas
Soluciones
message
¾ Requires asymmetric primitive to prevent others from forging MAC
TESLA achieves asymmetry through clock synchronization and
delayed key disclosure
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 TESLA Overview (cont.)
1. Each sender splits the time into intervals
2. It then chooses random initial key (KN)
3. Generates one-way key chain through repeated use of a one-way
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¾ As long as the key is still secret, the receiver buffers the packet
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Security Assumptions
¾ Pre-loading at initialization
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Route Discovery
¾ Initiator includes a MAC computed with end-to-end key
¾ Target verifies authenticity and freshness of request using shared key
Data authentication using TESLA keys
Each hop authenticates new information in the REQUEST
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¾
¾ Target buffers REPLY until intermediate nodes release TESLA keys
TESLA security condition is verified at the target
Target includes a MAC in the REPLY to certify the condition was met
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Assume all nodes know an authentic key of the TESLA one-way key
chain of every other node
Securing ROUTE REQUEST
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¾ Target can authenticate the sender (using their additional shared key)
¾ Initiator can authenticate each path entry using intermediate TESLA keys
¾ No intermediate node can remove any other node in the REQUEST or REPLY
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Route Discovery (cont.)
ROUTE REQUEST packet contains eight fields:
¾ ROUTE REQUEST: label
¾ initiator: address of the sender
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¾
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Route Discovery (cont.)
This waiting does delay the return of the ROUTE REPLY but does not consume
extra computational power
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Route Discovery (cont.)
3. Verifies that each MAC in the MAC list is valid using the TESLA keys
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Route Maintenance
Based on DSR
¾ Node forwarding a packet to the next hop returns a ROUTE ERROR to the
original sender
Inalámbricas yy Computación
G
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C M3
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M1 B M2 E
F
A
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Mix Nodes
G
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C M3
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M1 B M2 E
F
A
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Mix Nodes
Node A transmits to M1
message K1(R1, K2(R2, M))
where Ki() denotes encryption using public key Ki of Mix i, and Ri
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is a random number
G
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C M3
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M1 B M2 E
F
A
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Inalámbricas yy Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
M1
D
A
C
B
M1 recovers K2(R2,M) and send to M2
M2
M3
E
G
F
Mix Nodes
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Inalámbricas yy Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007
M1
D
A
C
B
M2 recovers M and sends to G
M2
M3
E
G
F
Mix Nodes
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Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Mix Nodes
the source-destination pair without compromising M1 and M2
both
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Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Alternative Mix Nodes
G
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C M3
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M1 B M2 E
F
A
Ubicua/2006-2007
Computación Ubicua/2006-2007 Mix Node Selection