Return Crozier to the Roosevelt, Restore Faith in the

Navy
I began a recent op-ed I wrote with a nod to then-Lieutenant General George
Washington’s thoughts on good order and discipline. In a 1757 letter to his
Virginia Regiment captains, Washington commented on the importance of good
order and discipline when he wrote that, “Discipline is the soul of an army. It
makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak and esteem to
all.”

Discipline is critically important, a position retired U.S. Navy Captain Kevin Eyer
makes clear in his recent USNI blog post when stating his belief that Captain
Brett Crozier, the recently relieved USS Theodore Roosevelt commanding officer,
should not be reinstated.

I have long respected Captain Eyer and his writings. He makes another fair
assessment when he writes that, “to quell the noise, the Navy may be forced to
take actions which may be contrary to either the ‘good order and discipline’ so
vital to an effective fighting force or decisions which lead to unintended,
unwanted other consequences.”

This, however, is where my agreement ends.

Contrary to Captain Eyer’s belief, the Navy should absolutely restore Captain
Crozier as the Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer for three reasons: to
restore faith with the ship’s crew, to restore trust and faith in senior Navy
leadership, and to heal the breach of faith his firing created with the American
public.

But first, a recap of the situation that brought us here.

Then-Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly, like Eyer, no doubt

considered good order and discipline to be his primary rationale when
announcing his quick decision to remove Captain Brett Crozier from command
of the Theodore Roosevelt, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with an active—and
growing—coronavirus outbreak.

Crozier had crafted a four-page memorandum to memorialize his concerns about

the coronavirus spreading throughout his ship, a memo he emailed to his chain of
command. Unfortunately, the memo subsequently made its way to the San
Francisco Chronicle—who promptly published it—setting off a tumultuous week
of intense scrutiny for the Navy as members of the media descended to
scrutinize coronavirus response efforts for the Theodore Roosevelt and the fleet.
Modly undoubtedly intended the firing to signal a restoration of good order and
discipline by holding Crozier accountable for circumventing the chain of
command. As Facebook videos and countless social media posts demonstrated,
Modly’s decision had the opposite effect, with sailors visibly cheering Crozier as
he departed the aircraft carrier.

Since then, we’ve borne witness to Modly’s profanity-laced speech to the crew
of the Theodore Roosevelt, learned that more than 650 sailors from the aircraft
carrier’s crew have tested positive for COVID-19, and that one sailor has tragically
passed away. Captain Crozier himself tested positive after his relief and remains
in isolation in Guam.

Some, like Eyer, point to Crozier’s leaked memorandum as proof his relief is
warranted, as “Captain Crozier precipitated the removal of one of the Navy’s few,
most strategic assets from the playing board.” Unfortunately, this is a false and
misleading narrative.

Navy leadership in the Pentagon and in Pearl Harbor already had approved
sidelining the Theodore Roosevelt in Guam. On 26 March, UPI—among other
news outlets—released an article stating, “The Navy has ordered the aircraft
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt to pull into Guam and have its 5,000-strong crew
of sailors tested for the novel coronavirus, according to acting Navy secretary
Thomas Modly.” The San Francisco Chronicle did not report on Crozier’s letter
until 31 March 31, five days after Navy leadership removed “one of the Navy’s few,
most strategic assets from the playing board.”

Then, yesterday, the Washington Post published a story containing a copy of

Crozier’s original email. Modly cited Crozier’s gross neglect as part of his relief,
claiming Crozier emailed his memorandum of concerns to “dozens” of other
people. According to the email obtained by the Washington Post, Crozier
addressed the email to only three people, all in his chain of command:

Admiral John Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet

Vice Admiral DeWolfe Miller, Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet
Rear Admiral Stu Baker, Commander Carrier Strike Group 9

Crozier also, per standard practice, copied a small group of immediately relevant
captains for their awareness:

Captain Dan Keeler, USS Theodore Roosevelt executive officer (on board)
Captain Michael Langbehn, Commander Carrier Air Wing 11 (on board)
Captain Jeff Heames, Commander Destroyer Squadron 23 (on board)
Captain John York, on board the Theodore Roosevelt
Captain Marc Miguez, executive assistant to Admiral Aquilino
Captain Robert Westendorff, executive assistant to Admiral Miller

As this list of ten people demonstrates, Crozier’s letter was hardly addressed in a
manner that unduly highlighted the aircraft carrier’s plight (not withstanding my
previous point that official U.S. Navy channels had already done so). Rather, these
are exactly the right people to send this email to. Unless a smoking gun suddenly
appears, it would seem Crozier took the right steps, acknowledging in his own
email that, “I believe if there is ever a time to ask for help it is now regardless of
the impact on my career.”

It is in this spirit that the U.S. Navy should immediately reinstate Captain Crozier
as the Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer, a possibility left open by Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.

No, this is not an impassioned plea for justice or a call to action. Rather, it is to
highlight the positive strategic outcomes the Navy would benefit from by
restoring Crozier to command—a decision that would also restore faith with
sailors fleetwide. Acting Secretary Modly’s resignation on 7 April offers an
opening . . . and the Navy should take it.

So, how can restoring Crozier rebuild faith with the crew, the Navy, and the
American public?

First, restoring Captain Crozier would demonstrate unequivocally that even senior
leaders make mistakes, learn from them, and are willing to acknowledge and
correct them when the situation warrants. Senior leaders in the Pentagon
routinely claim that this is the case, but actions speak louder than words ever
can, and decades of swift reliefs prove otherwise.

Modly’s resignation provides senior Navy leaders room to maneuver, as they can
rightly point to his ouster as proof that the decision to remove Crozier was rash,
irresponsible, and tone deaf. His restoration to command would close the “say-
do” gap with sailors, confirm that the Navy is a learning organization, and
reinforce the desire for commanding officers to make difficult decisions under
incredible pressure regardless of the consequences.

Second, placing him back in command sends a signal far and wide that we’ve
begun to learn the lessons of the tragic 2017 USS McCain (DDG-56) and
Fitzgerald (DDG-62) collisions, when commanding officers were blamed for being
too passive when it came to making tough decisions surrounding readiness
shortfalls, a passivity that led to deaths of 17 sailors. Following the collisions,
then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson famously walked into a
meeting with ship commanding officers to proclaim that “they” [the COs of the
McCain and Fitzgerald] were to blame for the collisions, not the Navy senior
leadership who had consistently underresourced and overutilized Seventh Fleet
(a point that then-Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin made
after having raised the flag regarding readiness on numerous occasions.)

Third, the Navy now has an opportunity to restore faith with nearly 5,000 sailors
on board the Theodore Roosevelt. It would go a long way to demonstrating that
the Navy’s actions align with its stated principles of “Honor, Courage, and
Commitment,” which would in turn inform sailors as they consider their “stay”
versus “go” decisions as enlistments and commissions expire. Placing Crozier
back in the captain’s chair also helps narrow the wide rift generated between the
Navy and the American public it serves following years of misconduct: the
multiyear “Fat Leonard” scandal, pushing out nascent-Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Bill Moran, and Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher’s misconduct.

Finally, as a student of history, I like the signal Admiral Gilday would send by
restoring Crozier to the Theodore Roosevelt. As a three-star admiral elevated to
serve as Chief of Naval Operations, Gilday started his tenure with a fleet
perception that he is different. Why else would he jump so many eligible four-star
admirals to take the Navy’s helm?

Clearing Crozier and placing him back onboard the Theodore Roosevelt is an

elegant solution for Gilday. He can free Rear Admiral-select Sardiello, Roosevelt’s
interim commanding officer, to resume his career. He can fill the seat by restoring
a proven leader (and one the crew obviously embraces). He leaves unaffected the
rigid and carefully orchestrated career pipeline of aircraft carrier commanding
officers. Above all, restoring Crozier cements Gilday’s legacy as a CNO willing to
challenge the Navy’s status quo—doing what is right over doing what is easy or
expected.

The downside to restoration? Navy leadership would have to admit they made a
mistake.

But rarely are lessons more powerful than when leaders demonstrate humility
and a true love for the organizations they lead than when they say, clearly, “We
were wrong.”

Then they correct the error.

Return Captain Crozier to the Theodore Roosevelt. There are hundreds of good
reasons to do so . . . and only one bad reason not to.

One thing is certain: Gilday’s actions will speak far louder than his words ever
can.