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Plato's Greatest Accusation

against Poetry
a
ELIZABETH BELFIORE
a
University of Minnesota
Published online: 01 Jul 2013.
To cite this article: ELIZABETH BELFIORE (1983) Plato's Greatest Accusation against
Poetry, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 13:sup1, 39-62
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1983.10715862
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Supplementary Volume IX
Plato's Greatest Accusation

against Poetry
ELIZABETH BELFIORE, University of Minnesota
In Republic X.605c-607a, Plato makes what he says is the greatest ac-

cusation against imitative poetry: We have not yet made the greatest
accusation against it [sc. mimetike]. For the fact that it is able to harm
reasonable people, except for a very few, is surely most terrible'
(605c6-8). What follows is a subtle theory of audience psychology.
Plato accuses the poet of creating special circumstances in which
knowledge of what constitutes moral virtue is not an adequate protec-
tion against wrong-doing. The poet does not merely give us false
beliefs, as a sophist does, he attacks the very order of the soul.
This new charge depends on those preceding it, in which the poet
was said to make things 'third from the truth' and to deceive the ig-
norant in a way analogous to that in which the painter makes children
and fools think that a painted carpenter is a real carpenter, if they see
it from afar (598c). We must begin by examining this important
analogy.
39
Elizabeth Belfiore
The Painter-Poet Analogy
The poet is said to be analogous to the painter in that he 'makes things

inferior in respect to truth' (605a9-10): 'tit> cpcxuJ..cx 1tOLt1'v 1tpo~ &J..Tj8tLcxv,
and thus causes people to have false beliefs. But what is the relevant
sense of 'false'?
There are two very different senses in which a work of art may be
said to be false. It may be false because it is only a copy or an image
and not the original. In this case it is false in an ontological sense. On
the other hand, it may be false because it does not represent, corres-
pond to or contain a general truth of a moral, scientific, historical or
other kind that has nothing to do with its status as a representation. In
this case it is false in a veridical sense. Corresponding to these two
senses of 'false' are two kinds of mistakes the audience or viewer may
make about works of art. It may believe that an image is the reality, as
when, for example, a child believes that an actor really is the character
he portrays. Let us call this an ontological mistake. Or the audience
may believe that an art work is true in the veridical sense when it is
not. For example, it may falsely believe that a novel is historically ac-
curate, that a painting was inspired by God, that a hero is morally im-
peccable, or (if we accept an objective theory of beauty) that a statue
is beautiful. Let us call these veridical mistakes.
These two kinds of errors must be carefully distinguished from
another kind of audience response that Coleridge called the 'willing
suspension of disbelief .'1 In this kind of reaction, the audience
necessarily has the true belief that a work of art is only an image, but
reacts in some way and to some aspect of the image as though it had
the false belief that the image is the reality.
In Republic X Plato is concerned with veridical mistakes. He says
nothing that could lead us to think that he has a concept of suspension
of disbelief. Nor is he thinking of ontological mistake in drawing the
painter-poet analogy. 2 The evidence does not support the view held,
1 Biographia Literaria 2.6. Cited in M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp
(Oxford 1953) 324.
2 These distinctions between ontological and veridical falsehood are, of course,
mine and not Plato's. I do not mean to imply that he did, or would have
40
Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry
for example, by W.O. Ross, who says that those viewing art works in
the Republic
... are not merely apprehending images, but are constantly supposing the
images to be originals (598cl-4) .... Plato is no doubt in error in supposing
that the purpose of art is to produce illusion; and Charles Lamb [sic] was
nearer the truth when he described the condition of spectators at a play not
as illusion but as willing suspension of disbelief. 3
Evidence from outside Republic X will not help those who hold this
view. Attempts have been made to connect Republic X with other
passages in Plato, especially with the Divided Line passage (Republic
VI.S09-Sll), where images and reflections are said to be the objects of
the mental state of eikasia ('conjecture'). But even if this connection
were legitimate, it would be difficult to prove that those in the state of
eikasia in the Divided Line passage suppose images to be originals,
since Plato never says this. 4
On the other hand, there is evidence that Plato may have veridical
mistakes in mind when he describes people as mistaking shadows for
realities. At Republic VII.SlScl-2, the prisoners in the Cave are said to
believe that 'the truth is nothing but the shadows of artefacts' ('t<X~ 'tWII
axtucxcnwv axt<X~). While it might at first seem that Plato has ontological
mistakes in mind, his later explanation of the Cage image makes it
clear that the prisoners' mistakes are about virtues. At 517d8-9 Plato
compares the man who is compelled to return to the Cave and its
shadows after having seen realities outside it to someone 'compelled in
wanted to, make them. They can, however, help us to focus more clearly on
his own distinction between appearance and reality as it concerns works of art.
3 W.O. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951), 78
4 Plato's use of eikasia in the Line passage is so difficult a problem in itself as to

be of little use to us here. Even Ross admits that supposing images to be
originals is a 'feature of eikasia which was not emphasized in the Line passage'
(78). Plato is not at all explicit. Perhaps the best known of the many attempts
to connect Republic X with the Divided Line is that of H.}. Paton, 'Plato's
Theory of Eikasia,' Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 22 (1921-22) 69-104. Paton does
not, however, agree with Ross that eikasia involves supposing images to be
originals.
41
Elizabeth Belfiore
courts or elsewhere to contest about the shadows of justice' ('tWY "tou

8LXcx(ou axLwll). In this passage, then, to mistake the shadows of
artefacts for realities is to make mistakes about virtues.
Moreover, a study of Republic X itself indicates that the audience
does not mistake images for originals, but instead mistakes the merely
pleasing for the truly beautiful and the painful for the truly evil. That
is, it makes veridical mistakes. Plato ascribed several mistakes to the
audience prior to the greatest accusation:
1. Children and fools think that a painted carpenter is a real

carpenter if they see it from a distance (598cl-4, 600e6-
601al).
2. Simple men think that the imitator knows all the crafts
(598c6-d5).
3. People think that Homer knows aret~, (virtue), and vice,

human and divine matters (598d7-e2).
4. People think that the imitator's works are the reality (onta)
and not appearances (phantasmata) (598e5-599a3). Since
this mistake is listed as a corollary of #3, the belief that the
imitator knows arete, we can identify these appearances
with the 'shadows of arete' (eidola aretes) mentioned at
599d3 and 600e5.
5. The many and the ignorant think that the poet speaks well
(599a4, 60la4-bl).
(#2, #3 and #5 are all the error of thinking that the ignorant
imitator is someone with the knowledge required to make
the things a craftsman makes. 5 Since these are mistakes
5 Plato's argument involves a pun on the noun poietes, meaning both 'maker'
(craftsman) and 'poet,' and on the verb poiein ('to make' and 'to write poetry'):
The good poiites ... must poiein with knowledge or he won't be able to poiein
at all' (598e3-5). A similar pun is involved in the criticism of painting as 'far
from the truth' (598b6). Aletheia, 'truth,' is a technical term in painting mean-
42
about the imitator, not about his products, we may leave

them out of consideration for the present.)
6. The many and the ignorant think that what appears

(phainetai) to be beautiful really is beautiful (602bl-4 with
601d4-6).
7. In the sphere of sight, the inferior part of the soul opines ac-
cording to the appearance (to phainomenon), contrary to
measure and calculation, logismos (602c7-603a8). For exam-
ple, it opines that a stick that looks bent in water really is
bent, though measurement opposes this view (602c10-d9). 6
8. In the sphere of 'hearing,' that of poetry (603b7), the inferior

part of the soul is drawn towards weeping and the memory
of sorrow, contrary to the calculation (logismos) of law and
reason, logos (604al0, 604d5-10).
#7 and #8 are clearly not cases of mistaking images for originals.

At 602c-d skiagraphia (shadow-painting) and puppetry are indeed
said to make use of the optical illusions included in #7, but these illu-
sions are explicitly said to be about the qualities an object has: what is
straight looks bent, what is light looks heavy, etc., and there is never
any question of mistaking images for originals. 7 #7, then, is a form of
veridical mistake.
#8 is particularly difficult. First, Plato never spells out for us the
actual mistakes he has in mind. He merely allows us to infer what
ing 'accurate representation.' Thus, the painting that is 'far from the truth' is a
bad painting. For a discussion of aletheia in the visual arts see J. Pollitt, The
Ancient View of Greek Art (New Haven and London 1974), 125-38.
6 For the sake of convenience I treat #7 and #8 as forms of belief here. I do not
mean to assume, however, that the lower part of the soul is simply concerned
with making intellectual judgments. See further below, The City-Soul
Analogy.'
7 On skiagraphia see E. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting (leiden 1978), 59-87
and note 12, below.
43
Elizabeth Belfiore
these are by listing the corresponding correct views (604b9-c3), and by

drawing an analogy between the painter and the poet, who is said to
be the painter's 'antistrophe' (605a9). It is clear, however, that the
mistakes in #8 are veridical rather than ontological, for they are not
auditory hallucinations but mistakes in the moral sphere. The
reasonable man, when he loses a son, 'will be measured with respect to
grief,' !J.e:tpt&.att 8£ 'ltWt; 1tpot; AU'ItTJV (603e8), for he will follow the dictates
of nomos (law) and logos (reason) that say that excessive lamentation
is not only bad for us but is also the result of two false beliefs: 1) that
what is painful is evil, and 2) that human affairs are worth great con-
cern (604b9-c3). Though the beliefs concern only pain in this example
(Plato's main concern is with tragic poetry), pleasure is also included,
as the generalizations show: 'feeling pain or rejoicing' (603c7); 'concer-
ning all the desires and pains and pleasures in the soul' (606d1-2). We
can infer that these false beliefs would be those of #8, and we can also
infer that, since the topic is after all poetry, when the poet deceives us,
he gives us these false beliefs. The poet, in fact, leads us to judge good
and evil by the false standard of pleasure and pain, to take images of
virtue, eidola aretes, for the real thing.
This interpretation of the kinds of mistakes in question in #8 also
sheds considerable light on #4, the appearances and shadows of arete
made by the imitator. These are, like the things that deceive the au-
dience in #8, appearances and images not in an ontological sense
(plays, paintings) but in the sense of things that appear, because they
give pleasure (601a-b), to have virtues, aretai, they do not actually
possess. Thus, the real things (onta) to which they are opposed
(599a2) are veridically, not ontologically, true. And since it is arete
and not ontological status that matters, Plato can call the imitator in-
discriminately an imitator of the shadows of arete (600e5) and a maker
of these shadows (599d3).
#1, mistaking a painted carpenter for a real carpenter, is the most
problematic, for it does seem at first sight to attribute an ontological
mistake to the audience. It is true that Plato does not explicitly rule
this out. However, an interpretation according to which children and
fools make veridical mistakes makes better sense of the painter-poet
analogy, is more consistent with what we find to be Plato's concern
throughout Republic X, and can be well supported by the text. Accor-
ding to this view, the mistake is not about ontology, but about a craft,
44
carpentry. Plato's painted carpenter is a painting that appears to the

ignorant to represent someone doing carpentry, someone who func-
tions well as a carpenter, while actually it represents someone doing
things no skilled carpenter would do.
This interpretation explains the otherwise unaccountable fact that
Plato does not say simply that children and fools mistake a painted
man for a real man. He says instead that they mistake a painted
carpenter for a real carpenter, because this kind of mistake is made by
those ignorant of carpentry. We can only tell that something is a

representation of a carpenter if it shows tools, products (beds and
tables) and actions appropriate to carpenters and to no one else. It is
these things, and not clothes, hair color or facial expressions that
distinguish the appearance of a carpenter from that of another man. 8
The passage is in fact constantly concerned with craft knowledge
rather than with ontology. Plato says that The painter will paint a
shoemaker, a carpenter, the other craftsmen, though he doesn't know
about the crafts of any of these.'9 Again, the children and fools are not
said to mistake a painting of a bed for a real bed, but to mistake a
painted carpenter for a real carpenter, and this mistake in turn is said
to lead them to mistake an ignorant person (the imitator) for a crafts-
man (598c-d, cf 601a). Craft knowledge can only be so important in
this context if Plato's distinction between a painted carpenter and a
real carpenter is not that between a painting and a real man but rather
8 I owe this point, and some valuable discussion of the problems of color and
distance, to James Bogen, in conversation.
9 598b8-cl. I follow James Adam's translation of this passage, in The Republic of

Plato 2 (Cambridge 1963), ad Joe. Adam notes that he was puzzled by this
passage and once tried to amend it. P. Shorey calls the shift from talk of
artefacts and ontology to talk of people and craftsmanship an 'inconcinnity' in
'Illogical Idiom; TAPA. 47 (1916) 207. J. Moravcsik, in Noetic Aspiration and
Artistic Inspiration; (in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko, eds. Plato on Beauty,
Wisdom and the Arts [Totowa, NJ 1982], 29-46), points out that the artist dif-
fers from the craftsman in not knowing the functional specifications of the ob-
jects he represents. See also V. Menza, 'Poetry and the Techne Theory: An
Analysis of the Ion and Republic, Bks. III and X; (diss., Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity 1972) 263-4, 282-4, who has correctly seen that Plato's chief concern in
Republic X is with craftsmanship.
45
Elizabeth Belfiore
that between a representation of someone who only appears to be do-

ing carpentry and a representation, made by someone with
knowledge, of a person who is actually doing carpentry.
The fact that Plato says that children and fools make these
mistakes because they judge falsely by means of 'colors and shapes'
(601a2) when they are shown a painting 'from afar' (598c3) does not
tell against our interpretation. Plato means that they judge falsely that
the ability to make shapes that have merely a pleasing appearance is
the ability, that comes from knowledge of a craft, to make those

shapes that have a useful function. The correct standard by which to
judge the virtue and beauty of an artefact is that of function: 'Do not
the arete and beauty and rightness of each artefact and deed depend
on nothing but the use for which each was made or suited by nature?'
(601d4-6). The imitator, however, and the children and fools he
deceives, judge beauty by the standard of appearance, believing that
those shapes and colors that give pleasure are beautiful, while those
that do not are not beautiful. Thus, the pleasingly-shaped hammer
made by the imitator will appear to have a beautiful shape to children
and fools. But a true craftsman will be able to see that such a shape is
really not beautiful, for it would be awkward to handle and would not
give the balance needed to hit nails properly. Again, children and
fools falsely believe that the painter's ability to make the pleasing col-
ors that are merely incidental to the proper function of a craftsman or
artefact involves knowledge of the qualities essential to proper func-
tion. For example, a carpenter's tools are often shiny because they are
polished and sharpened; his products may gleam with smoothness,
and his face may be rosy with effort as he works. However, the bright
and pleasing colors with which the painter represents the carpenter at
his trade are all merely incidental to the sharpness, smoothness and
physical effort of a certain kind that are essential to the function of
capentry, its tools and products. In taking the incidental for the essen-
tial, or that which is dependent on appearance for that which is depen-
dent on function, children and fools are like the people in #4 and #8
who take the appearances of virtue - the eidola aretes - for the real
thing. All of these people make mistakes about virtue (arete can of
course mean skill of the sort a craftsman has as well as moral virtue)
because they judge by the standard of pleasure rather than by the true
standard of the useful.
46
When Plato says that children and fools are only deceived at a
distance (59&3) we need not take him to mean that an image may
look like the original from a distance. The point made at 600a9-cl,
that the poet deceives people only when they are removed from him in
time can give us a clue to Plato's meaning here. Plato goes out of his
way to demonstrate that no one, not even the ignorant, was ever per-
suaded by Homer in Homer's own lifetime to treat him as legislator,
educator or doctor (600a10, cl, dS). In contrast to the Pericles of the

Gorgias who was dangerous because he was able to persuade so many
people to treat him as a statesman when he was actually only a
rhetorician, Homer of Republic X was much neglected in his own time
(600cl). 10 Homer, who can deceive only at a distance, is inferior even
to the sophists Protagoras and Prodicus, who actually did induce
young men to treat them as educators (600c-d). 11
Those close in time to Homer were not deceived because they
10 Gorgias SlSd-e makes the point about Pericles. Cf. Gorgias 456b-c, 464d-e, for
a similar point about the triumph of the rhetorician over the doctor, among the
ignorant. The parallels between rhetoric in the Gorgias and imitative poetry in
Republic X are striking. Rhetoric in the Gorgias is a 'technique of persuasion'
(459b-c), a form of flattery that achieves its ends by means of pleasure (462c-e,
464d and passim). It is analogous to cosmetology, a form of flattery imper-
sonating gymnastics, appealing to us by means of an 'alien beauty' that makes
us neglect the natural beauty produced by health and exercise (465b). This
comparison with cosmetics is also evident in Republic X.601a-b, where poetry
stripped of its 'colors' (meter, rhythm and harmony) is compared to an ugly old
face. In the Gorgias, however, Plato accuses the rhetorician of immediate and
straightforward deceit. The more sophisticated psychology of the Republic
allows him to give a more subtle account of the effects of imitative poetry on its
audience.
11 In this passage the sophists 'induce' the young men to follow them (600c8). In a
very similar passage in the Apology, Gorgias, Hippias and Prodicus 'persuade'
young men (19e6). Plato would seem to be deliberately avoiding mention of
Gorgias and persuasion in the Republic passage. In fact, peitho and its cognates
are never used of the imitator in Republic X. The verb cognate with peitho oc-
curs at 604b6 and at 600el, where, in an interesting reversal, Plato says that
people did not try to persuade poets to teach them. Pistis ('belief') and cognates
occur at 601e5, 601e7, 603a4, 603b9. They also are not used of the effects of the
imitator on his audience. Mimetike is not simply a technique of persuasion,
and Plato's use of language underlines this fact.
47
Elizabeth Belfiore
could question him in the flesh, just as Plato does in imagination,

about the 'greatest and best things' (599c7), that is, about arete, and
discover that he has nothing to say (599e4-S). Similarly, those who are
physically near the painter can ask him and his paintings, as Plato
does at 602a3-6, what makes a good or bad artefact of a certain kind
and what user or maker they have associated with, so as to discover
that they have no answer. Phaedrus 27Sd-e makes this very point:
writing is like painting, that seems to be alive, but when questioned
maintains a marvelous silence .12

Those who fail to question the imitator are, of course, 'at a
distance' in another sense also, for they are far from the truth about
the realities imitated. In the Sophist, the painter is said to be able to
deceive 'the foolish among the young children by showing his painting
from afar,' while the sophist deceives the young who are 'still far from
the truth about things.'13 In the Sophist also, mistakes about imita-
tions are mistakes about a craftsman's ability. The painter makes
children think he can do 'whatever he wants' (234b9-10) and the
sophist makes them think he is 'wisest of all in all things' (234c7).
12 Keuls discusses color and distance in skiagraphia and concludes that

skiagraphia uses the juxtaposition of patches of contrasting colors to produce
the ,illusion of a single color when seen from a distance. Plato mentions
skiagraphia at 602d2 and may well be thinking of it at 598c. We should not,
however, think that his point at 598c is that what accurately reproduces an ap-
propriate color or shape under distant viewing conditions does not do so under
nearer viewing conditions, and that only children and fools fail to realize this
fact. Plato's point is rather that both painter and viewer are ignorant of the true
standard of function and judge instead by appearances alone. The one cannot
make or the other judge what reproduces appropriate color or shape under any
viewing conditions. The nearer view does not, then, by itself lead children and
fools to recognize that the painter has distorted true shape and color, for they
have no knowledge of these, but it may lead them to question the standard of
appearances that leads them to have different views of the same thing. They
are then more ready to turn to the true standard of function, questioning the
painter and his works.
13 Sophist 234b-c, cf. Republic X.603a12: 'far from wisdom.' Plato uses the con-
cept of distance in several different ways in the Sophist and in Republic X, as
G. Else points out in The Date and Structure of Book X of Plato's Republic
(Heidelberg 1972), 38-9.
48
Thus, parallels in the Sophist and analysis of Republic X itself

make it reasonable to conclude that #1 attributes veridical mistakes
about arete to children and fools.
We can now see what Plato means by #6, mistaking apparent
beauty for true beauty. Since beauty depends on function (601d4-6) a
truly beautiful artefact, deed or man is one that functions well.
Something that only appears beautiful, however, is something that is
merely pleasing to the eye or ear. In distinguishing the real from the
apparent, knowledgeable from ignorant people, Plato is not con-

cerned with ontology, with images and originals. He is instead
distinguishing two standards by which to judge that something has or
does not have beauty and arete: the true standard of function and the
false standard of pleasure and pain. Children and fools and the im-
itator, who judge beauty by the standard of pleasure alone, do not
confuse images and originals but make veridical mistakes about beau-
ty and arete. 14 Plato's main concern is with moral beauty and arete,
carpentry and shoemaking being used partly as analogies for the craft
of moral arete and partly in order to ridicule the poet.
Seen in this way, then, the painter-poet analogy is very close. It
depends on an appearance-reality (phainomena-onta) distinction not
between images and originals but between apparent and real arete.
The poet is analogous to the painter not in his ability to make convinc-
ing representations but in his ability to make people judge by ap-
pearance. In painting, the imitator deceives us by making us take the
pleasing for the good, while in tragic poetry he deceives us by making
us take the painful for the evil. The objects of painting, colors and
shapes that give pleasure, are thus analogous to the objects of tragedy,
the painful.
Once Plato has made this point, however, he drops the analogy
and does not include the painter in the poet's exile. 15 The poet is more
dangerous than the painter because he can create special cir-
cumstances, the theatrical experience, in which even people who nor-
14 A similar point is made by Moravcsik.

15 On the painter-poet analogy see further my The Role of the Visual Arts in
Plato's Ideal State,' The Journal of the Theory and Criticism of The Visual Arts
(Tempe, Arizona), 1 (1981) 115-27.
49
Elizabeth Belfiore
mally have true beliefs about arete are injured. Children and fools are
subject to an immediate, straightforward deception that even the
painter can contrive. However, Plato makes use of a more subtle
psychological theory to account for the harm the poet does to the
'reasonable people,' -roue; &mt~xt'Lc; (603e3, 605c7), in the circumstances
peculiar to the production of his art.
The City-Soul Analogy
In order to understand Plato's distinction between the reasonable peo-

ple and the children and fools we must follow his analogy between the
human soul and a city in which there is stasis, conflict, between
superior and inferior classes of people (605a8-c4). This analogy
depends on a distinction between two elements in the soul.
The division of the soul into superior and inferior elements first ap-
pears, in Republic X, at 602e-603a. It depends on a distinction we have
already noted, between appearances (phainomena) and realities
(onta). Plato begins the discussion of the parts of the soul by asking,
'Over what sort of thing in a human being does it [sc. imitation] have
the power (MvcxfLtv) that it exerts?' (602c4-5). He then answers that im-
itation influences that inferior part in us over which appearances 'rule,'
and that the superior element in us is that over which realities 'rule.'16
In the visual sphere, that of painting, the phainomena are what ap-
pear 'bigger or smaller or more or heavier,' while the realities are what
measurement or calculation or weighing demonstrates to be bigger or
smaller or more or heavier (602d6-9). Plato does not contrast here the
apparently beautiful, that which 'appears beautiful to the many and
the ignorant' (602b2-3), and the truly beautiful, the useful. The con-
text, however, justifies our inferring that the distinction made here
between optical illusions and realities is used as an analogy for the
16 The metaphor of 'rule' occurs frequently: dtpxtLII (602d7), lyxpcx"ttt~ (605b5),

OtpXOII'tOL ••• dtpxta9cxL (606d5), ~OL<JLA&UCI&'t0\1 (607a6).
50
Plato 5 Greatest Accusation against Poetry
distinction between the pleasing and the useful that is Plato's main
concern. 17
The sphere of poetry, that of 'hearing,' is analagous to that of pain-
ting (603b6-c2, 605a8-9). Here also, there are phainomena and onta.
Just as physical objects may only appear or really be bigger or smaller,
so too 1tpli~t~~. human experiences, (603c4-8) may only appear or really
be 'bigger' or 'smaller,' that is, important or trivial. This analogy is
drawn at 60Sb8-c4, where the poet is said to please the senseless part
of the soul that cannot distinguish the bigger or the smaller (oun -ra
fLEL~w oun -ra lJ.&-r-rw otcxr~rvwaxOim). And just as an object may be
judged beautiful or not beautiful by the true standard of function or
by the false standard of pleasure, so an experience, like losing a son
(603e3-5), may be judged by the false standard of appearance, that of
pleasure and pain, or according to the realities in the moral sphere.
The realities, onta, are the facts that human affairs are not worth great
concern and that the good and evil in cases such as losing a son are not
clear. The appearances, phainomena, are that human affairs are
worth great concern and that what is good causes pleasure while what
is evil is the painful (604b9-c3). 18
Given these phainomena and onta, then, we can define the
superior and inferior elements of the soul, in the visual and auditory
spheres. In the visual sphere, that of painting, the element in the soul
'trusting in measure and calculation (logismo)' is the 'best element in
the soul' (603a4-5), the logistikon (602el). It is ruled by realities in this
sphere and by the true standard of the useful. On the other hand, the
element of the soul 'opining contrary to measure' (603al) is 'one of the
inferior elements in us' (603a7-8). 19 lt is subject to all the illusions used
17 See the discussion of mistake #6 (mistaking the apparently beautiful for the
really beautiful) of the children and fools, above, 49.
18 604b9-c3. See the discussion of mistake #8 above, 43-4.
19 While the superior part of the soul is twice called to logistikon (602e1, 605b5),
the inferior part of the soul is never given a name. (I take &A6yL<TCov at 604d9
and civof!'t<!l at 605b8 to be descriptions rather than names.) It is simply con-
trasted with the superior part and defined as the opposite of this part. At 603a1
it is 'tO 1tcXp<X 'tOt iJ.t'tp<X oo~ci~ov; at 603a7 it is 'tO 'tOU't<!>lV<XV'tLOUIJ.EVov; at 603a12 it is
51
Elizabeth Belfiore
by shadow-painting and puppetry (602c-d). Painting, Plato writes,

associates with this inferior element in the soul that is 'far from
wisdom' (603al2), and it 'begets inferior things' (603b4).
In the sphere of poetry also, the logistikon follows 'calculation'
(logismo: 604d5) and leads the person ruled by it to use measure
(!J.E'tpt&.att o& 'lt(l)~ 1tp0~ AU'ItTjV :603e8). It is what has true beliefs about
human affairs. It follows the guidance of the nomos (law) and logos
(reason) that bid us resist pain (604a10) and keep as calm as possible
(604b9-10). The inferior element, however, is that which opposes

reason, following the lead of the suffering that draws us to wailing
(604bl) and having false beliefs about human affairs. Plato writes fur-
ther that there are two 'characters' (iJOTl) corresponding to the superior
and inferior parts of the soul: the wise and calm character, and the
manifold and complaining one (604el-3). Imitative poetry, he writes,
imitates people acting voluntarily or under compulsion, in all of
which cases they opine that they are well off or the contrary, and ex-
perience pain or pleasure (603c4-8). Instead of portraying the calm
and wise character undergoing these experiences, imitative poetry
chooses to imitate the inferior 'character' (TjOo~ also means dramatis per-
sona) that is easily imitated and is not, like the superior character,
hard for the many to understand (604e-605a). By so doing, poetry,
like painting, produces things that are 'inferior compared with the
truth' (605a9-10), and associates with a part of the soul that is 'not the
best' (60Sbl). Plato concludes that the imitative poet produces eidola
(tt'&>A.at dowAo'ltotouv'tat), that is, eidola aretes, appearances of virtue,
and that he is 'far from the truth.'20
We will be misled if we see the distinction between the inferior and
superior elements in the soul in Republic X as a variation on the tripar-
tite division of Republic IV. First, the distinction in Book X depends
on the phainomena-onta distinction between apparent and real
qualities. In Republic IV, however, the distinction among the three
parts of the soul does not depend on a similar distinction among
the part n:6ppw cppovfjatw~. and at 605bl the poet associates with a part of the
soul 'which is not the best': fl.~ n:po~ 'to ~O.'tLG'tov.
20 603b7-c4. I read t!liw/..on:mouv'tcx, following Adam. Compare eidola in this
passage with eidola aretes at 600e5.
52
'qualities' that 'rule' over them. Reason is said to love learning, ap-
petite to love money (435e-436a, cf. Republic IX.S80dl0-581al), and
spirit to fear the terrible (429b-c). These are classes of things that are
not parallel to the phainomena and onta of Book X and that are not
used in a similar way to distinguish elements in the soul.
Moreover, the relationship among the parts of the soul in Republic
IV is different from that of the superior and inferior elements of Book
X. In the earlier book, the parts of a just and moderate soul all agree
and there is no stasis. 21 No such possibility is envisioned in Book X.

The inferior element is defined as 'that which opines contrary to
measure' (603a1). 22 It is that which makes mistakes and is fundamen-
tally opposed to the logistikon. Moreover, in the psychology of
Republic IV, VIII and IX, two parts of a soul, whether just or unjust,
'serve' the dominate third part (Republic VIII, 553b-d) and
IX.581b12-cl. Such a ruler-servant relationship is not consistent with
the account of Republic X. Finally, Plato writes, seriously and not
metaphorically, that the poet 'destroy the logistikon' (a1t6Auaat 'tO
J.oytO"ti.X6v: 60Sb4-S). This element, then, cannot be, like the 'reason' of
Republic IV, a necessary part of every living soul.
Third, both the superior and the inferior element of Republic X
range over the entire personality in a way inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of division in Republic IV. The superior and the inferior
elements of Republic X are distinguished on the basis of their follow-
ing or failing to follow the 'law' (nomos) that bids us have true beliefs
about human affairs, and that also bids us control our emotions
(604b9-c3). 23 And the 'best part of us' in Book X is said to be educated
by both logos and ethos, 'habit' (606a8, cf. 604c9: ethizein). These
21 Republic IV.432a-b, 442c-d. See especially the definition of sophrosyne as

'agreement of better and worse as to which should rule' at IV.431d-e, and com-
pare Republic Ill.401a-402a, where Plato discusses the role of musical educa-
tion in leading children to love the noble and hate the shameful before they are
able to receive logos, reason.
22 See note 19, above.
23 See the discussion by R. Hall, 'Plato's Theory of Art: A Reassessment,' Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 33 (1974) 78-80, noting the importance of both
emotion and reason in Plato's theory.
53
Elizabeth Belfiore
methods of education are elsewhere said to be those of 'parts of the

soul' that differ greatly. 24 At another point in Book X, all the vices of
the three distinct parts of the soul in Republic IV are attributed to the
inferior element: it is 'insatiable,' 'unreasonable,' and 'a friend to
cowardice' (a1tATja-tw~ lxov, &My~a-tov, ot~AL«~ <p(Aov: 604d8-10).
Thus, while the psychological distinction between the logistikon
and the inferior element in Book X is not inconsistent with the
psychology of Republic IV, it is made along different lines in accord

with different principles. 25 Instead of being 'parts' of a soul like those
of Republic IV, the superior and inferior elements of Republic X can
each determine by itself a 'character' ~Oo~, of a whole soul made up of
reason, appetite and spirit. zo
Since the superior and inferior elements of Republic X can never
agree, there are three psychological possibilities: 1. the superior ele-
24 Republic Vlll.S1Sd9-519a6 contrasts the production of the 'other virtues of the

soul' by means of ethos with the education of the intelligence.
25 Among the many discussions of the question of the consistency of the
psychology of Republic X with that of Republic IV are those of Adam, ad
602df; T. Penner, Thought and Desire in Plato,' in G. Vlastos, Plato II (New
York 1971), 96-118, especially 100-103; J. Moline, 'Plato on the Complexity of
the Soul; AGPH. 60 (1978) 1-26; N.R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's
Republic (Oxford 1951), 239-43.
26 It is equally misleading to identify the superior and inferior elements of the soul
of Book X with the dunameis of the soul, doxa and episteme, of Republic V. It
is true that the objects of doxa - the many beautiful things, and especially the
beautiful sights and sounds of the rural dramatic festivals (5.47Sd-e) - are
very much like the phainomena that dominate the inferior part of the soul in
Republic X. However, while the objects of epistemi! are the Forms, the onta
that rule the logistikon are not Forms but qualities of particular objects and ac-
tions that do not seem to be different from the 'actions and bodies' with which
the Forms associate at 476a. Again, those concerned with realities in Book X
live very much in the practical world, unlike the philosopher of Book V. And,
finally, the statement at X.602e6 and 602e8 that the soul has opposite opinions
about the same things at the same time (&fLex 7ttp! "teto"tci) should be contrasted
with the statement at 5.478a-b that doxa and episteme are distinguished
precisely by their concern with different objects (l7t' cOJ..<!l cO..)..Tl: 478a12-13). See
below, note 31 for a parallel of another sort between Republic X and Republic
VIII.
54
ment can rule alone, destroying the inferior element; 2. the inferior
element can rule alone; and 3. each can rule in tum or in part, creating
stasis in the soul. In the first case, we have the 'wise and calm
character,' ruled entirely by the logistikon. In the second, we have the
'complaining and manifold character,' ruled entirely by the inferior
element. And the third case, that in which there is stasis, is that of the
'best of us' (605c10), the 'reasonable people.' Poetry affects each of
these characters in different ways.
The wise and calm character is mentioned only in passing

(604e2-605a4), to provide a contrast with the complaining character.
Since this is one of the 'very few' that poetry cannot harm (605c6-8),
it is not much discusses here.
The complaining and manifold character, however, in which the
inferior element has seized power and driven out the logistikon, is in
fact that of Plato's 'children and fools' who make all the veridical
mistakes encouraged by the imitator. Just as children and fools can be
deceived 'from afar' (598c3), and just as imitation is 'far from the truth'
(598b6), so the inferior part of the soul determining the inferior ethos
is 'far from wisdom' (603a12). Whatever superior element those with
the inferior ethos may have had, by nature or by some small chance
good training, has been destroyed by their education by the poets. 27
The poet strengthens the inferior element and destroys the superior
(&7t6AAuat -ro :Aoyta-rtx6v :605b4-5) by imitating the inferior character
and encouraging the audience to judge by the standard of pleasure and
pain. The destruction of the superior element is the end result, in this
extreme case, of the poet's pandering to the many in a theater crowd
(604e) who love the complaining character that is like that of children
(604c8), but who find the calm and wise character alien (604e5-6). The
corruption of the children and fools is complete, resulting in the whole
personality's making veridical mistakes on every occasion, whether at
the theater or in everyday life, judging all the time by the standard of
pleasure and pain. Their souls are analogous to a city in which an 'evil
polity' reigns supreme (605b7-8).
This extreme case is of course fairly rare, and is largely
hypothetical here. The children and fools are not so much real people
27 See 606el-3: 'Homer has educated Greece.'
55
Elizabeth Belfiore
as representations of the inferior element in a soul in which there is

stasis. 28 Plato's concern with them, in the sections of Republic X
preceding the greatest accusation, has thus been with the inferior ele-
ment in the 'city in the soul.'29 Because the children and fools are used
primarily as an analogy for the inferior element in the whole soul,
Plato has not yet made the greatest accusation against the poets. This
is one reason for the comparative lightness in tone of the first sections
of the book, and for the fact that mimesis is called 'play and not
serious' at 602b8.
Plato's third possibility, that in which the superior and inferior
elements co-exist in the same soul, creating stasis, is the most common
and the most important. This is the case of the 'reasonable people,'
that is, most of us. This soul contains a childish and foolish element
and is analogous to a city in which conflict is unresolved. Though the
superior element rules for the most part, the inferior element cannot
be completely eradicated (603d-e, cf. Republic IX. 571bff). When in the
company of others like themselves, the reasonable people behave calm-
ly, but when they are alone, the inferior element can gain control
(604a6-8). In the next section, the greatest accusation, Plato describes
how the poet uses the special circumstances of the theater in order to
take advantage of this internal conflict, not to destroy but to harm the
order in the souls of the best people. 30
28 Elsewhere Plato frequently compares the lower part of the soul and inferior
things to children and the many. For some examples see Adam, ad 379c and P.
Boyance, Le Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes Grecs (Paris 1936) 155ff.
Boyance cites Phaedo 77e, where Cebes says that there is 'a child in us' that
fears death, though 'we' don't do so: ~>.ov 8t I'~ W< lg£iiiv lll816=v !XU' LCJ(o)~ l111
"1:1~ mt lv lg£rv =it;.
29 Republic X.S9Sa2, 607a5-6, 607d8-9 mention 'the city.' 608bl and 60Sb7-8
speak of 'the city in us.'
30 'To harm' (Abll3&cs9ul) occurs at 60Sc7. Compare 'harm' ().6:.~1\l at 59Sb5 and con-
trast 'destroys' (cbt6Uucn) at 60Sb4.
56
The Greatest Accusation
Mimetic poetry takes advantage of the conflict in the souls of the

reasonable people, that is, 'the best of us' (607c7, clO), who, though
basically decent, are 'insufficiently educated in reason and habit,' in
logos and ethos (606a7-8). At 604a, Plato had described the conflict in
terms of behavior when alone and when in the company of other
reasonable people. Now he describes it in terms of behavior in one's
everyday life (60Sd7-e6, 606a3) when the superior element dominates,

and behavior at the theater, when the inferior element revolts and, for
the moment, gains the upper hand. Republic X.605-607 gives a de-
tailed psychological account of this revolution.
The reasonable people, being fairly well educated in reason,
though insufficiently, are generally capable of making correct
judgments about what is shameful and noble, not only in everyday
life, but also about what is represented on the stage, for they are, in
calm moments, able to realize that a character on the stage who wails
and beats his breast 'laments out of season' (606b2-3). They are also
fairly well educated in ethos, though again insufficiently. They have
been 'habituated' (ethizein: 604c9) to resist wailing (604d2), to be 'calm
and enduring' (60Sd8-el). They are ashamed to resemble someone
who does not do these things (605e5) or to be seen failing to do so
(604a6-8). In general, then, the superior element, 'that which is by
nature best in us' (606a7), has the upper hand.
The inferior element, however, is also present, creating stasis, even
in everyday life. Thus, the inferior element, that which judges by the
standard of pleasure and pain, is said to co-exist with the superior ele-
ment in the reasonable people (603c10-e5). It is held down by force
(606a3), by fear (606c6), and is made fierce by enforced starvation
(606a4) instead of being ruled and weakened (606d4-5). This element
is the 'wailing part' of the soul (606bl, cf 9pT)v~8£cxv at 604d2), that
which 'by nature desires' (606a5) to follow the lead of pleasure and
pain. This inferior element is always ripe for a rebellion, that can suc-
ceed when given aid from without by mimetic poetry. 31
31 The corruption of the reasonable man by mimetic poetry in some ways closely
parallels the transformation of the oligarchic man and city into the democratic
57
Elizabeth Belfiore
This happens when the best part of the soul, that following reason
and the law, 'lets down its guard' (606a8) and thus connives at its own
defeat. It does so because it fails to understand that the theater is a
case requiring, like any everyday experience, the rule of realities.
While it is certainly capable of following the rule of realities, onta, in-
stead of that of appearances, phainomena, it thinks that in the theater
there are no realities to be followed. It thus abdicates in favor of the
inferior element: it 'lets down its guard.'
The mistakes made by the audience of reasonable people are thus

quite different from those of the children and fools. They are mistakes
not about the arete imitated by the poem but about the nature of
mimetic poetry. Plato lists them in the greatest accusation passage:
1. We praise as a good poet he who most affects us in this way';
(605d4-5), that is, who causes us to sympathize most with a
character demonstrating excessive grief (605c10-d4).
2. We praise a man on the stage whom we would be ashamed
to resemble ourselves (605e3-6).
man and city in Republic VIII.555b-560d. The oligarchic man is ruled by

necessary desires (559c-d) but also has unnecessary desires that he rules by
force (558d4, d. 606a3: 'that which is held down by force'). He is raised
'without education' (559d7, d. 606a7-8: 'insufficiently educated') and so is
tempted by 'all sorts of manifold pleasures' (559d9-10, d. 604e5: 'all sorts of
men,' and 605a5: 'the complaining and manifold character' imitated by the
poet). Stasis arises in the soul of the oligarchic man (560al-2, cf. 603dl and 3:
'he is in stasis). The oligarchic man is transformed into a democratic man when
his unnecessary desires are given aid 'from without' (559e6, d. 606a6-7: 'this is
the part of us filled and pleased by the poets'). If the manifold democratic
desires win the battle and seize the acropolis of the oligarchic man's soul, they
drive out sophrosyne and 'measure' (560b-d, d.603a4: 'measure and calcula-
tion'), setting up the 'pleasant and manifold polity' of democracy (55&4-5, cf.
the 'evil polity' of 605b7-8). The oligarchic man then becomes a democratic
man, ruled by unnecessary desires (561a), each in turn (d. 606a5-8: the
'sweetened Muse' makes pleasure and pain rule in the city). The parallel bet-
ween the two passages is not exact, for there is nothing in Republic VIII com-
parable to the 1etting down one's guard' of Republic X; the contrast in Republic
X is not made in terms of necessary and unnecessary desires, as it is in Republic
VIII, and the soul of the reasonable man in Republic X is only temporarily rul-
ed by the inferior democratic element.
58
3. We think it is not shameful to pity and praise someone else

who says he is a good man even if he laments out of season
(606bl-3).
4. We don't think the enjoyment of this sort of poetry is harm-

ful (cXAA' tXE.LVO xtp8ettVE.LV TJjf.L'tOtL, 'tTJV Tj8ovijv ... : 606b3-5).
5. We don't reason that others' experiences, allotria pathe,

necessarily affect our own ().oy(~tcr6etL ... ihL et7tOAOtUtLv dtvci.yxT)

tim) 'tWV &AAo'tp(wv £.1~ 'til olxdet: 606b5-7). 32
#1 and #4 are the same mistake: that of thinking that poetry should
be judged by the pleasure it gives. #2 and #3 are also the same mistake:
that of thinking that the experience of a character on the stage should
be judged by the standard of pleasure and pain. 33 Plato thus mentions
each of these two mistakes twice, in chiastic order. He then ends with
#5, the mistake from which the others result and the grounds for the
greatest accusation. This is the greatest mistake, that which allows
mimetic poetry to 'harm ... the mind of those who don't have the drug
of knowing the truth' about mimetic poetry (59Sb5-7). It is this that
32 Cf Republic III.395c7-dl, where Plato says that the guardians should not im-
itate bad models 1est from the imitation they get the reality.'
Allotria pathe is a nice pun here, as it was at 604e5-6. On the one hand it
means 'alien affections,' that is, emotions proper to a kind of disposition alien
to one's own. The many in the theater find the superior disposition alien (604e)
and the reasonable man finds alien the disposition of someone who 1aments
out of season' (606b). On the other hand, allotria pathi! deliberately alludes to
Gorgias' theory that the soul experiences an affection of its own on hearing of
others' experiences in poetry: l1t' &JJ.o~piwv ~t 1tp<Xjf.l&~wv xcxl awf.L&~wv tU'tu)(tOtt~
xcxlllua~tpcxr£cxt~ ~t6v ~t ~t&97Jf.L<X lltdt ~wv A6rwv &~tcxOt ~ tl>uxi) (Encomium of Helen,
OK Bll.9). Max Pohlem, 'Die Anfiinge der griechischen Poetik,' NGG 1920,
169 = Kleine Schriften II (Hildesheim 1964), 463, notes Plato's allusion to
Gorgias at 604e and in other passages. We may also compare Gorgias' ~t69o~
q>tA01ttv9ij~ (Hel. 9) with Plato's 1tt1tttV7JXO~ ~oil llcxxpiiacxt (606a4); Gorgias' &Atov
l~tcxueTjacxt (Hel. 8) with Plato's Opltl>cx~cx ... 1axupov ~o lAttv6v (606b7-8). Examples
could be multiplied.
33 This mistake is one we make only in the theater, as is clear from the context of
605c10-606b8.
59
Elizabeth Belfiore
causes us reasonable people to make the other mistakes and therefore

to let down our guard, allowing the inferior element in our souls to
rule the entire personality, when we are at the theater. We thus 'giving
ourselves over, follow along sympathizing' (crufL1tli.oxovu~) with an in-
ferior character (60Sd3-4). Temporarily, we make the inferior allotria
pathe our own.
We see, then, that the reasonable people do not make ontological
mistakes. Those who praise Homer as a good poet (60Sd4-S) necessari-
ly realize that they are watching a play. Nor do they, in normal cir-
cumstances, make the veridical mistakes about the poem's contents
that the children and fools make. When they think the rules apply
they are capable of judging correctly. The mistake they make, instead,
is that of thinking that the theater is a special circumstance in which
the rules do not apply. They are not compelled to let down their
guard. But once they do so voluntarily, because of this great mistake,
they cannot escape the laws of psychology that necessitate
(dtv&.yx7J:606b6) that no experience can fail to affect the order of the
soul. When they give themselves over, however temporarily, to the
inferior element, allowing appearances to rule the entire city in the
soul, they increase stasis permanently.
In Plato's view there are no 'special circumstances' in which the
rules do not apply. Poetry, like everything else, must be judged by the
standard of the useful rather than by that of the pleasant (607d6-e2).
When we 'follow along sympathizing and seriously (a7touO&.~ovu~)3 4
praise as a good poet' (60Sd3-S) the imitator who follows the 'sweet-
ened Muse' (607a5), the standard of pleasure in poetry, we are not in the
realm of what is 'play and not serious' (602b8), of that which is a
danger only to children and fools. When we best people sympathize in
this way with someone acting badly, we feed and strengthen the in-
ferior element of the soul even though we are in normal circumstances
fully aware of what is morally right and wrong. In fact, our very
knowledge of moral truth will lull us into a false sense of security, a
belief that we cannot be harmed by what we know to be wrong. For
34 Note the change from 'play and not serious' (1tatLOL<iv 'tLYOt xatl ou <mouoijv: 602b8)
of the section dealing with the children and fools to 'serious' in the later section
(<mouM~oY'tt~: 605d4, GltOUOOtetttOY: 608a6).
60
this reason, ironically, we best people are easy prey. And once we let
down our guard at the theater we will have trouble not yielding to 'lust
and anger and all the desires and pains and pleasures in the soul'
(606dl-2) in our own experiences as well. We will be aiding the
rebellious inferior element that follows the lead of pleasure and pain,
and in this way helping to establish the rule of pleasure and pain, of
phainomena, instead of that of onta, of reason and law (607a6-8).
Sympathy with what we know to be shameful, mimesis of the sort the
theater audience of reasonable people experiences, works, insidiously,

on those normally least subject to delusion. This is why the poet must
not be allowed power in the city.
Plato's greatest accusation against poetry is thus based on a
psychological theory of considerable interest and importance. The
poet not only appeals directly to the childlike and foolish element in a
soul divided against itself, he also takes advantage of the knowledge
of the superior element of this soul about what is right and wrong in
normal circumstances. By creating what appears to be a special cir-
cumstance in which ordinary rules do not apply, he causes the
superior element, because it believes the order in the soul is not
threatened, to abdicate temporarily in favor of the inferior element.
This, however, necessarily strengthens the inferior element, not only
at the theater, but also in daily life.
Thus, Plato's reasons for banishing the imitative poet have often
been misunderstood. 3 s In the important case of the reasonable people,
35 Though it does not mention Republic X, Freud's 'Creative Writers and

Daydreaming,' Neue Revue, 1 (1908) 716-24, rpt. in The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9, ]. Strachy, ed.
(London 1959), 143-54, can in many ways be read as a perceptive analysis of
Plato's theories: 'The creative writer does the same thing as the child at play.
He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously - that is, which
he invests with large amounts of emotion - while separating it sharply from
reality ... Many things, which if they were real, could give no enjoyment, can
do so in the play of phantasy, and many excitements which, in themselves, are
actually distressing, can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spec-
tators at the performance of a writer's work' (144). 'Our actual enjoyment of an
imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds. It may
even be that not a little of this effect is due to the writer's enabling us thencefor-
ward to enjoy our own daydreams without self-reproach or shame' (153).
61
Elizabeth Belfiore
the poet does not appeal solely to the emotions. Nor does he deceive
the reason in any straightforward way, causing it to mistake images
for originals. Finally, it is wrong to conclude that Plato is concerned
with banishing all representational art from the ideal city. He is con-
cerned with liberating the city in the soul from the eros of what reason
tells us is not useful. 36 He is concerned with defending us against an
uncritical acceptance 37 of the pleasures of imitative poetry. Plato con-
cludes that we may listen to mimetic poetry if we can do so without
letting down our guard: 'We will listen to it chanting to ourselves this
argument and this spell' (608a3-4). The argument of Republic X itself is
the drug and spell that, by revealing the truth about mimetic poetry's
psychological effects on us, 38 can keep us from yielding to the en-
chantment of Homer. 39
36 Republic X.607e7 speaks of the eros of mimetic poetry that we have been given
by our upbringing in 'these fine cities.' We must, says Plato, refrain from this
eros if we discover that it is not useful (607e5). This passage recalls the discus-
sion of the standard of the useful at 601-602.
37 This is the meaning of the verbs '1totpot81.xta0otL (595a5, 595a6, 607a4) and
xat'tot81.xta0otL (607c6) that Plato uses of receiving poetry into the city.
38 This is the avowed aim of Republic X. The book begins with the statement that
knowledge of psychology, of the "parts of the soul' (595a7-8), can help us
understand why poetry harms 'those who don't have the drug of knowing the
truth about these matters' (59Sb5-7).
39 An earlier version of this paper was read at Cornell University, The University
of Minnesota and Claremont Graduate School, where I benefited from much
helpful discussion. I am particularly indebted to James Bogen of Pitzer College,
Charles Young of Claremont Graduate School and to the anonymous referees
of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for criticism and advice.
62

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This article was downloaded by: [New York University]

On: 17 October 2014, At: 09:19

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Plato's Greatest Accusation

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1983.10715862

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Plato's Greatest Accusation

In Republic X.605c-607a, Plato makes what he says is the greatest ac-

The Painter-Poet Analogy

The poet is said to be analogous to the painter in that he 'makes things

4 Plato's use of eikasia in the Line passage is so difficult a problem in itself as to

courts or elsewhere to contest about the shadows of justice' ('tWY "tou

1. Children and fools think that a painted carpenter is a real

3. People think that Homer knows aret~, (virtue), and vice,

about the imitator, not about his products, we may leave

6. The many and the ignorant think that what appears

8. In the sphere of 'hearing,' that of poetry (603b7), the inferior

#7 and #8 are clearly not cases of mistaking images for originals.

these are by listing the corresponding correct views (604b9-c3), and by

carpentry. Plato's painted carpenter is a painting that appears to the

those ignorant of carpentry. We can only tell that something is a

9 598b8-cl. I follow James Adam's translation of this passage, in The Republic of

that between a representation of someone who only appears to be do-

the ability, that comes from knowledge of a craft, to make those

educator or doctor (600a10, cl, dS). In contrast to the Pericles of the

could question him in the flesh, just as Plato does in imagination,

maintains a marvelous silence .12

12 Keuls discusses color and distance in skiagraphia and concludes that

Thus, parallels in the Sophist and analysis of Republic X itself

apparent, knowledgeable from ignorant people, Plato is not con-

14 A similar point is made by Moravcsik.

The City-Soul Analogy

In order to understand Plato's distinction between the reasonable peo-

16 The metaphor of 'rule' occurs frequently: dtpxtLII (602d7), lyxpcx"ttt~ (605b5),

by shadow-painting and puppetry (602c-d). Painting, Plato writes,

(604b9-10). The inferior element, however, is that which opposes

and there is no stasis. 21 No such possibility is envisioned in Book X.

21 Republic IV.432a-b, 442c-d. See especially the definition of sophrosyne as

methods of education are elsewhere said to be those of 'parts of the

psychology of Republic IV, it is made along different lines in accord

24 Republic Vlll.S1Sd9-519a6 contrasts the production of the 'other virtues of the

The wise and calm character is mentioned only in passing

27 See 606el-3: 'Homer has educated Greece.'

as representations of the inferior element in a soul in which there is

The Greatest Accusation

Mimetic poetry takes advantage of the conflict in the souls of the

everyday life (60Sd7-e6, 606a3) when the superior element dominates,

The mistakes made by the audience of reasonable people are thus

man and city in Republic VIII.555b-560d. The oligarchic man is ruled by

3. We think it is not shameful to pity and praise someone else

4. We don't think the enjoyment of this sort of poetry is harm-

5. We don't reason that others' experiences, allotria pathe,

necessarily affect our own ().oy(~tcr6etL ... ihL et7tOAOtUtLv dtvci.yxT)

causes us reasonable people to make the other mistakes and therefore

theater audience of reasonable people experiences, works, insidiously,

35 Though it does not mention Republic X, Freud's 'Creative Writers and

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