Predicting Peak Discharge from Gradually

Breached Embankment Dam

David C. Froehlich, Ph.D., P.E., D.WRE, M.ASCE 1

Abstract: Two nonlinear mathematical models are presented to predict peak discharge from a breached embankment dam based on
evaluation of measured outflows from 41 dam failures. Reported outflow rates from these failures have been examined carefully for accuracy
and are believed to be reliable. The first model is purely empirical, while the second is based on a semitheoretical approach that reduces the
maximum possible peak discharge that would be produced by instantaneous formation of a breach having prescribed dimensions. Results
given by the models are compared to those from other breach peak discharge calculation methods and are shown to produce considerably
more accurate predictions of peak discharge from breached embankment dams. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)HE.1943-5584.0001424. © 2016
American Society of Civil Engineers.
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Introduction
The National Inventory of Dams (NID) is a database maintained
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) that contains facts
about more than 87,000 dams located in the United States and its
territories (USACE 2013). The data repository includes informa-
tion about a dam’s location, size, purpose, type, last inspection,
regulatory facts, downstream hazard potential, and other technical
data. About 75,000, or nearly 86%, of these dams are formed by
embankments constructed from natural erodible materials (earth
and rock) that rely on their weight to hold back the force of water.
Because embankment dams are so numerous, potential flood haz-
ards that would be created by uncontrolled releases of impounded
water through a breach need to be evaluated to select spillway
design floods and to prepare emergency action plans.
Downstream exposure to danger created by a dam in the event
of failure or misoperation leading to uncontrolled release of im-
pounded water (that is, a dam-breach flood) is classified in the NID
as either a high, significant, or low hazard. Dams whose failure will
create catastrophic flooding that would probably result in fatalities,
if sufficient warnings were not issued and other emergency actions
not taken, are assigned a high hazard potential. Those that pose
little threat to human life in the event of a failure, but would cause
large economic and/or environmental losses, are considered to have
a significant downstream hazard potential. Low hazard potential
classification is assigned to dams where failure would not endanger
lives and would cause only small amounts of damage limited pri-
marily to the dam owner’s property.
Failures of large embankment dams (measured either by their
height or by the volume of water they store) are comparatively rare,
but can cause immense destruction and numerous fatalities when
they do occur. Small dams, for which spillway capacities may be
able to accommodate floods having annual return periods of no
more than 100 years, fail considerably more often. The exact
1 ported peak discharges are impossibly large based on measured fi-
Consultant, 303 Frenchmans Bluff Dr., Cary, NC 27513. E-mail:
dcfroehlich@aol.com
Note. This manuscript was submitted on December 1, 2015; approved
on April 14, 2016; published online on July 5, 2016. Discussion period
open until December 5, 2016; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Hydrologic En-
gineering, © ASCE, ISSN 1084-0699.
number of dam failures that have occurred in the United States is
unknown, but failures have been documented in every state. From
January 2005 through June 2013, state dam safety programs re-
ported 173 dam failures (about 20 per year) and 587 dam incidents
(about 70 per year), which are events that, without intervention,
would probably have resulted in uncontrolled releases of im-
pounded water (ASDSO 2015).
The level of detail of hydrologic and hydraulic analyses needed
to evaluate the consequences of dam-breach floods depends on the
downstream hazards they present. If fatalities are unlikely and prop-
erty damage potential is not significant, a simple procedure may
provide an adequate description of the extent and timing of down-
stream flooding resulting from a failure. Uncomplicated flood-
routing methods requiring small amounts of data and effort to
estimate peak flow rates at locations downstream from a breached
dam have been presented by the Soil Conservation Service (SCS
1981), Hagen (1982), Costa (1985), Barker and Schaefer (2007),
and Environment Agency (2014). Each of these methods requires
an estimate of the maximum outflow rate from the reservoir.
Empirical and semitheoretical numerical models for determining
the peak discharge from a gradual embankment dam failure have
been developed by Kirkpatrick (1977), MacDonald and Langridge-
Monopolis (1984), Costa (1985), SCS (1985), Froehlich (1995),
Webby (1996), Walder and O’Connor (1997), Thornton et al.
(2011), Hooshyaripor et al. (2014), De Lorenzo and Macchione
(2014), and Azimi et al. (2015).
All of the methods cited for estimating peak discharge rely on
reported flow rates from past embankment dam failures, or from
small-scale laboratory experiments, to evaluate model coefficients.
Techniques applied to determine some of the peak discharges used
for this purpose are undocumented, which by itself does not render
a measurement unfit, but does warrant disbelief when the reported
value is far from most others in an assembled data set and appears
to be an exception. Other flow rates have been measured substantial
distances downstream from the failed dams and probably do not
represent accurately the true breach peak outflow rates, or the re-
nal breach dimensions and the assumption of instantaneous breach
formation.
Two nonlinear mathematical models are presented here to pre-
dict the peak discharge from a breached embankment dam based
on examination of measured outflows from 41 past dam failures.
Reported outflow rates from these failures have been examined

© ASCE 04016041-1 J. Hydrol. Eng.

J. Hydrol. Eng.
 carefully for accuracy and are believed to be reliable. The first
model is purely empirical, while the second is based on a semi-
theoretical approach. Results given by the models are compared to
those from the breach peak discharge calculation methods cited
previously. Both models are shown to produce considerably more
accurate predictions of peak discharge from a breached embank-
ment dam than other approaches.
Embankment Dam Failure Data
Peak discharges and other pertinent data for 41 embankment dam
failures were assembled from a variety of sources and are summa-
rized in Table 1. These data include a brief description of each dam,
the mode of failure, average width of the embankment (between
toes of the downstream and upstream slopes) W avg , water volume
above the breach bottom at the time of failure V w , height of water
above the breach bottom at the time of failure Hw , height of
the embankment above the breach bottom Hb , the width of flow
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approaching the dam La , the measured peak discharge Qp , and
the method used to calculate the peak discharge. The ranges of
variables contained in the data set are given in Table 2.
Dam Description
The name and general location of each dam is provided along with
the year construction was completed and the year of the failure.
Materials used for embankment dams include natural soil or rock,
or waste materials obtained from mining or milling operations. The
embankment type is classified as either an earth-fill or rock-fill,
depending on whether it has been built with only compacted soil,
or mostly compacted or dumped rock. Erosion resistance is deter-
mined primarily by the type of materials from which the embank-
ment is made, and by the quality of construction.
Embankments can by constructed of only a single material
(homogeneous) or of different materials (zoned), which usually
contain a compacted clay core to restrict seepage. Nearly all rock-
fill dams depend on an impervious upstream blanket or on a clay
core to limit leakage. Some dams have been built with slender solid
core walls, made from concrete, masonry, or steel, to control seep-
age through the embankment.
Failure Mode
Breaches form in embankment dams in several different ways. For
some of the cases in Table 1, deciding on the mode of failure was
difficult, especially if eyewitness accounts of the failure were not
available. The International Commission on Large Dams (1974)
finds that about one-third of all embankment-dam failures have
been caused by inadequate spillway capacities that result in over-
topping of the embankments. Roughly another third were attrib-
uted to internal erosion caused by concentrated seepage through
the embankments that erodes soil particles along the path of leak-
age, gradually enlarging the flow passage until failures occur.
Other failures were created by embankment slides that lower the
dam crests and allow overtopping or overflow, foundation settle-
ment, and insufficient protection against wave action. On the basis
of these findings, failure modes have been classified either as
overtopping or as internal erosion (IE). Overtopping can be caused
in several different ways, which are identified as follows: inflows
exceeding spillway capacities (OF), outlet works failure (OG),
wave action (OW), or lowering of the crest because of embank-
ment sliding (OS).
© ASCE 04016041-2
J. Hydrol. Eng.
Breach Height and Reservoir Volume
The bottom of a fully formed breach usually is the dam foundation,
which is more resistant to erosion than the embankment material.
However, the maximum height of a breach, Hb , might be limited
by the volume of water in the reservoir at the time of failure, or by
the presence of a layer of erosion-resistant material located in the
embankment. The maximum height of a breach, or the minimum
bottom elevation of the trapezoidal breach approximation, needs to
be presupposed with reasonable certainty. The volume of water
contained in the reservoir at the time of failure, V w , is the amount
above the final breach bottom that will eventually flow out of the
reservoir. Depending on the embankment design and the elevation
of the breach bottom, V w might be substantially less than the res-
ervoir capacity.
Depth of Impounded Water and Approach Flow Width
Because most embankment dam breaches erode vertically to the level
of the excavated foundation, which is highly resistant to further
downward breach growth, estimating the final bottom elevation of
a potential trapezoidal breach, and thus Hw and Hb , for a potential
failure is straightforward. However, determining approach flow
width might require subjective evaluation for dams that do not span
a straight river valley perpendicular to its longitudinal axis. This is
particularly true when the embankments form a completely closed
reservoir, such as the FP&L Martin Plant Dam described by the
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD 1980), or the
Taum Sauk Dam described by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC 2006a, b). Values of La were determined for each of
the dam failures in Table 1 by measurement from satellite images.
Peak Discharge
All peak discharges have been determined by indirect means rather
than by direct measurement using current meters or other flow
measurement devices. The several indirect methods used to calcu-
late the peak flow rates are described as follows:
1. The technique used most often, and perhaps the most accurate if
carried out by knowledgeable analysts, is the slope-area method
(Dalrymple and Benson 1967). Accuracy of the calculated peak
discharge depends on reliability of measured high-water marks,
correctness of estimated roughness coefficients, appropriateness
of the one-dimensional flow supposition, and distance of the
measurement downstream from the breached dam.
2. Estimation based on reservoir volume change during a short
time interval is the second most frequently used approach,
which is based on the assumption of a nearly level water surface
upstream of the dam and, in most cases, zero inflow to the re-
servoir. Discharge accuracy is reduced by the latter assumption
for overtopping failures caused by large floods. Length of the
time interval used in the calculation, and location of the gauge
used to record water levels, also have unfavorable effects on
accuracy of the computed discharge.
3. A number of peak discharges have been calculated as twice the
average outflow rate needed to empty the reservoir within a spe-
cified time period. Measurement accuracy depends largely on
reliability of the reported time, and on inflows to the reservoir
during the failure. This approach is probably the least accurate
of all methods used to determine peak discharges.
4. Unsteady flow numerical modeling of reservoir outflows uses
measured values of final breach dimensions and observed
breach formation times. This approach was used to estimate
peak discharge from the Big Bay Lake Dam (Yochum et al.
2008) and the Lake Dehli Dam (Holman 2011).
J. Hydrol. Eng.
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Table 1. Embankment Dam Breach Peak Discharge and Failure Characteristics

Volume of

© ASCE
Average water above Height of Approach Measured
Embank- embank- breach water above Height flow peak
Dam name and ment Year Year Failure ment width bottom breach bottom of breach width discharge Peak discharge
Number location typea completed failed modeb W avg (m) V w (Mm3 ) H w (m) H b (m) La (m) Qp (m3 =s) calculation method References
1 Apishapa, Colorado E, H, C 1920 1923 IE 82.4 22.8 28.0 31.1 200 6,850 Rate of reservoir volume “Failure of Apishapa”
change, 15 min time (1923), and Field et al.
interval (1923)
2 Baldwin Hills, E, H 1951 1963 IE 59.6 0.950 12.2 21.3 200 420 Twice the average flow California Department of
California rate needed to empty the Water Resources (1964),
reservoir in 1.25 h Jessup (1964), and Warne
(1964)
3 Banqiao, Henan E, H 1953 1975 OF 97 701 31.9 29.5 2,100 56,300 Twice the average flow Fujia and Yumei (1994),
Province, China rate needed to empty the Qing (1998), Henan Water
reservoir in 6.0 h Resources Authority (2005),
Courivaud (2007), and Xu
et al. (2009)
4 Bass Haven Lake, E, H — 1984 OX 22.9 0.641 4.90 9.20 — 240 Twice the average flow USCOLD (1988, pp. 46);
Texas rate needed to empty the Warren Samuelson, Dam
reservoir in 1.5 h Safety Program, Texas
Commission on
Environmental Quality,
written communication
(2015)
5 Belci, Bacău County, E, Z 1963 1991 OF 37.8 12.7 15.5 15.0 400 4,700 Twice the average flow Diacon et al. (1992), Vogel
Romania rate needed to empty the and Klein (1993), Graham

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reservoir in 1.5 h and Hilldale (2002), and
Marcello et al. (2009)
6 Bila Desna, Czech E, H 1915 1916 IE 29.6 0.290 10.7 14.6 170 320 Twice the average flow Jansen (1983, pp. 125–126),
Republic rate needed to empty the and Raška and Emmer (2014)
reservoir in 30 min
7 Bilberry, England E, Z 1845 1852 OS 62.5 0.327 23.6 23.0 800 725 Twice the average flow Saxena and Sharma (2005,
rate needed to empty the pp. 19–20), and Binnie
reservoir in 15 min (1981, pp. 49–69)
8 Big Bay Lake, E, H 1992 2004 IE 20.4 17.5 13.6 14.0 200 4,160 Numerical modeling of Yochum et al. (2008)
Mississippi breach outflow using
measured final breach
geometry and observed
formation time
9 Bradfield (Dale E, Z 1863 1864 IE 76.0 3.20 28.0 29.0 300 2,370 Twice the average flow “The Bradfield inundation.”
Dyke), England rate needed to empty the
(1874), Binnie (1981,
reservoir in 0.75 h pp. 256–265), Jansen (1983,
pp. 129–132), and Singh
(1996, pp. 80–81)
10 Butler Valley, E, H — 1982 OF 9.63 2.38 7.16 7.16 850 810 Slope-area measurement Byron N. Aldridge, U.S.
Arizona 600 m downstream Geological Survey, written
communication (1987)

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Table 1. (Continued.)
Volume of

© ASCE
Average water above Height of Approach Measured
Embank- embank- breach water above Height flow peak
Dam name and ment Year Year Failure ment width bottom breach bottom of breach width discharge Peak discharge
Number location typea completed failed modeb W avg (m) V w (Mm3 ) H w (m) H b (m) La (m) Qp (m3 =s) calculation method References
11 Castlewood, E, M 1890 1933 OF 47.4 6.17 21.6 21.3 180 3,570 Rate of reservoir volume “Castlewood dam” (1933),
Colorado change, 15 min time Field (1933), Houk (1933),
interval and Follansbee and Sawyer
(1948)
12 Centralia (Seminary E, H 1914 1991 OS 10.1 0.01333 5.50 6.10 40 71 Slope-area measurement Costa (1994) and Costa and
Hill) Reservoir No. 275 m downstream O’Connor (1995)
3, Washington
13 Delhi, Iowa E, H, C 1929 2010 OF 31.5 12.2 11.2 11.0 170 1,950 Numerical modeling of Fiedler et al. (2010, 2013),
breach outflow using and Holman (2011)
measured final breach
geometry and observed
formation time
14 FP&L Martin Plant, E, H 1977 1979 IE 27.7 125 5.09 9.14 4,100 2,750 Rate of reservoir volume SFWMD (1980)
Florida change based on three
stage recorders. Time
interval is not specified
15 Fred Burr, Montana E, H 1948 1948 IE 30.8 0.750 10.2 10.2 100 654 Slope-area measurement Boner and Stermitz (1967)
“a short distance”
downstream
16 French Landing, E, H 1925 1925 IE 34.3 3.87 8.53 14.2 350 929 Rate of reservoir volume “Undermining causes
Michigan change, 1 h time interval failure” (1925)

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17 Frenchman Creek, E, H 1952 1952 IE 37.3 16.0 10.8 12.5 600 1,420 Unknown. Probably rate Oltman (1955), Babb and
Montana of reservoir volume Mermel (1963); Mike Ulrick,
change Mont. Water Resources
Division, Dam Safety
Section, written
communication (1992)
18 Hästberga, Sweden E, H, C 1950 2010 OG 12.7 30.0 7.35 7.00 200 600 Rate of volume change Ekström (2012), and Rosvall
(15 min time interval) of and Dahlberg (2011)
a reservoir located 4 km
downstream
19 Hatchtown, Utah E, Z 1908 1914 OS 44.8 16.0 16.8 18.3 200 4,440 Twice the average flow Sterling (1914), “Ninth
rate needed to empty the biennial report.” (1915,
reservoir in two hours pp. 13–14)
20 Hell Hole, California R, Z 1964 1964 IE 103 30.6 35.1 56.4 470 17,000 Twice the average flow “Hell Hole Dam” (1965),
rate needed to empty the “The failure of Hell Hole
reservoir in one hour Dam” (1965), and Scott and
Gravlee (1968)
21 Ireland Reservoir E, H — 1984 IE 18.0 0.160 3.81 5.18 370 110 Slope-area measurement L. H. DeGrave, Colorado
No. 5, Colorado “a short distance” Department of Natural
downstream Resources, written
communication (1986)
22 Kelly Barnes, E, H 1948 1977 IE 19.4 0.777 11.3 12.8 80 680 Slope-area measurement Crisp et al. (1977), “Dam
Georgia 250 m downstream collapses” (1977), and
Sanders and Sauer (1979)

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Table 1. (Continued.)
Volume of

© ASCE
Average water above Height of Approach Measured
Embank- embank- breach water above Height flow peak
Dam name and ment Year Year Failure ment width bottom breach bottom of breach width discharge Peak discharge
Number location typea completed failed modeb W avg (m) V w (Mm3 ) H w (m) H b (m) La (m) Qp (m3 =s) calculation method References
23 Lake Avalon, New E, R 1894 1904 IE 42.7 31.5 13.7 14.6 370 2,320 Unknown Murphy (1905, pp. 172–
Mexico 173), and Middlebrooks
(1953)
24 Laurel Run, E, H — 1977 OF 40.5 0.555 14.1 13.7 160 1,050 Slope-area measurement Brua (1978), Chen and
Pennsylvania 1.6 km downstream Armbruster (1980),
“Johnstown” (1977), Hoxit
et al. (1982), and on-site
inspection by author
(September 1978)
25 Lily Lake, Colorado E, H 1913 1951 OW 13.2i 0.0925 3.35 3.66 60 71 Slope-area measurement W. J. Graham, U.S. Bureau of
at unknown location Reclamation, Denver, CO
written communication
(1987)
26 Little Deer Creek, E, H 1962 1963 IE 63.1 1.36 22.9 27.1 400 1,330 Slope-area measurement Collins (1964), Rostvedt
Utah at unknown location (1968, pp. B84-B87), and
Lindon (2004)
27 Lower Latham, E, H 1926 1973 IE 25.7 7.08 5.79 7.01 120 340 Slope-area measurement L. H. DeGrave, Colorado
Colorado at unknown location Dept. of Natural Resources,
written communication
(1986)
28 Lower Otay, R, C 1897 1916 OF 53.3 56.9 39.6 39.6 200 15,800 Twice the average flow Jansen (1983, pp. 151–153),

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California rate needed to empty the Justin (1932, pp. 41–43),
reservoir in 2.0 h Justin et al. (1950),
McGlashan and Ebert (1918),
and Silent (1916)
29 Lower Two E, H 1913 1964 IE 33.3i 29.6 11.3 11.3 350 1,800 Slope-area measurement Boner and Stermitz (1967)
Medicine, Montana 4 km downstream and USBR (1965, 1986)
30 Orós, Brazil E, R, Z 1960 1960e OF 110 660 35.8 35.5 2,000 58,000 Rate of reservoir volume “The breaching of the Orós
change, unknown time earth dam” (1960),
interval International Commission on
Large Dams (1974, pp. 68–
70 and 510–512), Jansen
(1983, pp. 166–167), and
Wahl (2014, p. 81)
31 Porter Hill, Oregon E, H 1990 1993 OS 12.0 0.015 5.00 5.80 80 30 Slope-area measurement Costa and O’Connor (1995)
150 m downstream
32 Prospect, Colorado E, H 1914 1980 IE 13.1 3.54 1.68 4.42 900 116 Rate of reservoir volume L. H. DeGrave, Colorado
change, unknown time Dept. of Natural Resources,
interval written communication
(1986)
33 Puddingstone, E, H 1926 1926 OF 43.0i 0.432 13.7d 13.7 420 960 Twice the average flow “Flood damage” (1926),
California rate needed to empty the International Commission
reservoir in 15 min on Large Dams (1974,
pp. 867–869), and Singh
(1996, pp. 94–95)

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Table 1. (Continued.)
Volume of

© ASCE
Average water above Height of Approach Measured
Embank- embank- breach water above Height flow peak
Dam name and ment Year Year Failure ment width bottom breach bottom of breach width discharge Peak discharge
Number location typea completed failed modeb W avg (m) V w (Mm3 ) H w (m) H b (m) La (m) Qp (m3 =s) calculation method References
34 Quail Creek, Utah E, Z 1986 1989 IE 56.6 30.8 16.7 21.3 550 3,110 Rate of reservoir volume “Investigation” (1989),
change, 15 min time Richard Hall, Utah Dept. of
interval Natural Resources, written
communication (1989),
O’Neill and Gourley (1991),
Carlson and Meyer (1995),
and Interagency Committee
on Dam Safety (2015)
35 Rito Manzanares, E, H — 1975 IE 13.4 0.120 4.57 7.32 75 83 Slope area measurements Watson (1975), and on-site
New Mexico at several locations from inspection by author
90 m to 13.5 km (September 2015)
downstream
36 Schaeffer, Colorado E, H — 1921 OF 80.8 4.44 31.9 30.5 350 4,930 Twice the average International Commission on
outflow rate needed to Large Dams (1974,
empty the reservoir in pp. 769–770), Follansbee and
30 min; Peak flow rate Jones (1922), and on-site
13 km downstream was survey by author
4,380 m3 =s from (September 1985)
slope-area measurement
37 Shimantan, Henan E, H — 1975 OF 58.0 167 27.4 25.8 900 25,300 Rate of reservoir volume Fujia and Yumei (1994),
Province, China change, unknown time Qing (1998, p. 26), and Xu

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interval et al. (2008)
38 South Fork, E, H 1853 1889 OF 64.0 18.9 24.6 24.4 300 8,500 Rate of reservoir volume “Another Reservoir” (1889),
Pennsylvania change, 30 min time Francis et al. (1891), Water
interval Supply Commission of
Pennsylvania (1914), Jansen
(1983, pp. 184–191),
McCullough (1987), and
on-site survey by author
(May 1989)
39 Taum Sauk E, Z 1962 2005 OF 46.8 5.39 36.5 36.3 250 8,180 Rate of reservoir volume FERC (2006a, b) and
Reservoir, Missouri change, 1 min time Rydlund (2006)
interval
40 Teton, Idaho E, Z 1975 1976 IE 250 310 77.4 86.9 500 65,120 Slope-area measurement Brown and Rogers (1977)
4 km downstream and Jansen (1983,
pp. 191–213)
41 Zhuguo, Henan E, Z 1970 1975 OF 99.0 18.5 23.8 23.5 300 11,200 Unknown Shuibo et al. (1993), and
Province, China Xu et al. (2008)
a
C = solid corewall (either concrete, masonry, or steel); E = earthfill; H = homogeneous, M = masonry; R = rockfill; and Z = zoned.
b
IE = internal erosion; OF = overtopping by floodwaters; OG = overtopping caused by outlet works failure; OS = overtopping caused by embankment sliding; OW = overtopping caused by wave action; OX =
intentional breaching by excavation (analyzed as an internal erosion failure).

J. Hydrol. Eng.
 Table 2. Range of Variables in Dam Breach Peak Discharge Data Set where
Minimum Maximum 
1; for nonovertopping failure modes
Variable Units value value kM ðθ2 Þ ¼
θ2 ; for overtopping failure modes
Average embankment width (W avg ) m 9.63 250
Volume of water above breach bottom (V w ) Mm3 0.0133 701 is a failure mode factor,
Height of water above breach bottom (H w ) m 1.68 77.4
8
Height of breach (H b ) m 3.66 86.9
<
1; for H b ≤ θ3
Approach flow width (La ) m 40 4,100 
m3 =s 30
kH ðθ3 ; θ4 Þ ¼ H b θ4
Measured peak discharge (Qp ) 65,120 : ; H b > θ3
θ3

is an embankment height factor, g = gravitational acceleration, and

Methods used to determine peak discharge from three dams
θi is the ith model parameter. The model given in Eq. (1) has
(Frechnman Creek, Lake Avalon, and Zhuguo) are unknown. How-
evolved from a previous analysis by the writer (Froehlich 1995)
ever, because the persons or organizations reporting the discharges
based on dimensional similitude and multiple regression analysis
are considered reliable sources of information, and because the
of a smaller set of peak discharge than is evaluated here. The rela-
flow rates do not appear to be extreme exceptions, the values have
tion includes physically relevant variables that were able to be col-
been accepted for use in the analysis carried out here.
lected from a wide variety of sources. However, noticeably absent
Some of the peak discharges in Table 1 differ from values re-
are data describing soil characteristics of the embankments, which
ported previously because of discovery of new information or
might have significant influence on the speed and extent of breach
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reevaluation of existing data, as described in the following:

development. Because detailed soil characteristics are available for
1. Outflow from Hell Hole Dam used by the author in an earlier
so few of the dam failures reported in Table 1, they have not been
analysis (Froehlich 1995) has been increased to 17,000 m3 =s,
included in the data summary or evaluated in this analysis.
which is twice the average flow rate needed to empty the reser-
The generalized reduced gradient algorithm (Lasdon et al. 1976)
voir in 1 h.
was used to find the following optimal values of model parameters
2. Courivaud (2007, pp. 6–10) and Wahl (2014, p. 81) report that a
that provided a best fit to the 41 measurements of peak discharge:
recent evaluation of the Oros Dam failure drawdown records by
Électricité de France (EDF) as part an investigation by the Cen- θ1 ¼ 0.0175; θ2 ¼ 1.85; θ3 ¼ 6.1 mð20 ftÞ;
tre for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation
1 1 1 1
(CEATI) Dam Safety Interest Group determined a peak outflow θ4 ¼ ; θ5 ¼ ; θ6 ¼ − ; and θ7 ¼
rate of 58,000 m3 =s, which is about 6 times greater than the 8 2 2 2
previously reported value (9,630 m3 =s), and which conforms Parameters in Eq. (1) were found by minimizing the root-mean-
much more closely with measurements of peak discharge from square error (RMSE) of the logarithms of Qp to reduce dependence
other large dam failures. on extremely large values, such as those of the Teton, Banqiao, and
3. Peak discharge caused by breaching of Rito Manzanares Dam Oros dam failures. Some of the parameters (θ3 to θ7 ) were adjusted
calculated by Watson (1975) has been revised based on reeva- slightly to nearby simple fractions. Inserting parameters and sim-
luation by the writer of roughness coefficients that characterize plifying Eq. (1) leads to the following expression for the expected
flow resistance of the downstream channel made during an value of Qp :
on-site inspection in September 2015.
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4. The commonly reported peak discharge from the Banqiao
gV w Hw H 2b
Dam failure has been reduced to 56,300 m3 =s, which is twice Q̂p ¼ 0.0175 × kM × kH × ð2Þ
the average flow rate needed to empty the reservoir in 6.0 h. W avg
Reasons for the decrease are explained in Appendix I.
where

1; for non-overtopping failure modes
Peak Discharge Relations kM ¼ ;
1.85; for overtopping failure modes
Two mathematical models are presented for predicting peak dis- 8
charge from gradually breached embankment dams. The form of < 1;

1=8
for Hb ≤ Hs
kH ¼ Hb ; and
the first model is based on previously developed statistical relations : ; for H b > Hs
using measures of embankment and reservoir properties as pre- Hs

dictors. The second model reduces the maximum possible dis- 6.1 m ðfor SI unitsÞ
charge from an instantaneous reservoir breach having prescribed Hs ¼
dimensions. 20 ft ðfor U:S: customary unitsÞ

The effect of embankment height given by the factor kH changes

Empirical Formula noticeably for Hb < 6.1 m (20 ft) as shown in Fig. 1. The coeffi-
A nonlinear mathematical model, in which variables are normalized cient of determination Eq. (2) is 0.922, and the RMSE of ln Qp is
to create dimensionless quantities, for peak discharge from gradu- 0.277. Inclusion of La in the nonlinear model offered no significant
ally breached embankment dams is proposed as follows: improvement. A comparison of measured and predicted values of

θ
 Qp given by Eq. (2) for the 41 dams studied is shown in Fig. 2.
Vw 5 W avg θ6 Failure mode has a significant effect on peak discharge as
Q̂p ¼ θ1 × kM ðθ2 Þ × kH ðθ3 ; θ4 Þ × × shown by the factor kM , which predicts outflows produced by over-
H 3b Hb

θ qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi topping to be 85% larger than those caused by internal erosion, all
Hw 7
× × gH 5b ð1Þ other factors being the same. Erosion of embankment material by
Hb overflows will remove masses of material whose weight holds the

© ASCE 04016041-7 J. Hydrol. Eng.

J. Hydrol. Eng.
 dam in place against the hydraulic forces acting to move the dam.
Even small sustained overtopping flows having depth of only a
few centimeters can erode large amounts of soil from downstream
embankment slopes protected by vegetation within hours in single
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by La Trobe University on 07/06/16. For personal use only.
Fig. 1. Embankment height factor, kH
Fig. 2. Comparison of measured embankment dam breach peak
discharges and those predicted by Eq. (2)
Fig. 3. Trapezoidal dam breach representation
© ASCE 04016041-8
J. Hydrol. Eng.
or multiple locations, or along the entire structure. When a breach
does eventually occur, lateral erosion of the opening can proceed
faster than if the dam had not been overtopped because of the large
amount of downstream embankment material that has already been
removed. Furthermore, when spillway capacities are exceeded dur-
ing extreme floods and embankment overflows occur, additional
water volume will be added to the reservoir during the failure,
thereby increasing the rate and ultimate extent of breach enlarge-
ment. Generally, internal erosion failures do not occur during large
floods; therefore, reservoir inflows will be small when dams that
are not overtopped do fail.
The effect of embankment height on peak breach discharge is
shown by the factor kH to change significantly for H b < 6.1 m
(20 ft). Peak discharge from breaches of smaller dams will be
greater than would otherwise be expected. Most probably soil prop-
erties including degree of compaction, cohesion, and particle size
have more pronounced influence on the rate of erosion of the em-
bankments, thus causing breach growth to speed up and peak dis-
charge to be increased.
Semitheoretical Formula
Instantaneous and complete failure of a dam in an ideal channel
both with and without tailwater and initially motionless water
is analyzed in a number of texts (see, for example, Stoker 1957,
pp. 333–341; Henderson 1966, pp. 304–309; Liggett 1994,
pp. 285–289, 293–298). The general problem considers a horizon-
tal frictionless channel with a wide rectangular cross-section of
constant shape extending longitudinally to infinity. With the dam
located at longitudinal channel distance x ¼ 0, initially water has
constant depth h0 for x > 0, and h1 for x < 0, with h0 ≤ h1 , and
zero velocity everywhere. At time t ¼ 0, the dam is suddenly
destroyed.
For the special case with h0 ¼ 0, which was analyzed first by
Ritter (1892), the discontinuity at x ¼ 0, t ¼ 0 is instantly wiped
out when the dam is removed resulting in a p positive
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi wave moving
downstream in the dry channel with velocity 2gh1, and a negative
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
wave traveling upstream in the reservoir with velocity gh1. Water
depth p h ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
along p
the
ffiffiffiffiffi portion of water in motion is given by
x ¼ ð2 gh1 − 3 ghÞt, which is a concave p upwards
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi parabolic pro-
file tangent to the channel bottom p x ¼ 2 pgh
atffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffiffiffiffiffi1 t. Velocity at any
location along the profile is V ¼ 2 gh1 − 2 gh. At the dam sec-
tion (x ¼ 0)
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4 2 pffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 8
h ¼ h1 ; V ¼ gh1 ; and q¼V×h¼ gh31 ð3Þ
9 3 27
where q = unit discharge, which along with h and V, is independent
of time.
Because of resistance from bed friction and turbulence in real
channels, the downstream end of the profile is found to have
a rounded shape terminating in a near vertical face. However,
Schoklitsch (1917) finds good agreement between the theoretical
solution for the upstream end of the wave profile and experimental
measurements. Other experiments (Arbuthnot and Strange 1960)
also show that resistance has little effect on waves propagating up-
stream into the reservoir. For this reason, the theoretical maximum
discharge in a unit width channel will be calculated using Eq. (3).
The maximum peak discharge that would be produced by an
instantaneous partial breach (that is, a breach that does not encom-
pass the entire length of a dam) that forms in the shape of a trap-
ezoid (Fig. 3) is found by integrating q across the breach section to
obtain the following relations:
J. Hydrol. Eng.
 8
 
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
>
> 8 La 0.28 4
>
< 27 Bavg B − m H b − H gH 3w ; for H w ≤ Hb
avg
5 w
Qpmax ¼
  
 qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ð4Þ
>
> 8 La 0.28 4 H 5=2
>
: ðBavg − mH b Þ − mH w 1 − b −1 gH 3w ; for H w > Hb
27 Bavg 5 Hw

where Bavg = average width of the final breach and m = average Critical Overtopping Depth
side-slope ratio (horizontal to vertical) of the trapezoidal opening.
Prediction of peak discharge from potential overtopping failures
The factor ðLa =Bavg Þ0.28 has been added to account for the effects
using Eqs. (2) and (5) requires an estimate of the critical overtop-
of a partial breach (that is, a breach that does not extend across the
ping depth at which breaches are considered to begin forming
entire width of the approach channel) based on the experimental
so that Hw and V w can be determined. The Federal Emergency
findings of Arbuthnot and Strange (1960) and Schmidgall and
Management Agency (FEMA) provides critical depths of overtop-
Strange (1961).
ping Hc ranging from 0 to 0.6 m that depend on the physical con-
Breach formation is considered to begin after water, either over-
dition of the embankment as described in Table 3 (FEMA 1987).
topping the embankment or seeping through it, has eroded the
Presumably, embankment slopes for these dams are covered by
downstream slope and crest width to the point of the upstream face.
normal protective measures such as grass and loose rock. However,
At this stage of a failure, outflows through the breach will increase
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special overtopping protection that can withstand significantly

quickly. Recorded water levels in the reservoir or in the down-
stream channel will show sudden changes soon after the breach
has begun to form. The time taken from initiation of the breach
until it has formed completely is known as the breach formation
time tf (Froehlich 2008).
Wetmore and Fread (1984) presented a formula for peak dis-
charge through a breach that reduces the maximum possible value
based on tf . A similar equation for expected peak discharge is pro-
posed here as follows:
0 1β
B 1 C
Q̂p ¼ Qpmax × @ qffiffiffiffiffiA ð5Þ
g
1 þ α × tf Hb

where Qpmax is given by Eq. (4); α and β are parameters that need to
be determined; and values of Bavg , m, and tf are calculated using
the following expressions developed previously by the author
(Froehlich 2008):
Bavg ¼ 0.27 × kM × V 1=3 w ; where

1.3; for overtopping failures
kM ¼ ;
1.0; other failure modes

1.0; for overtopping failures Fig. 4. Comparison of measured embankment dam breach peak dis-
m¼ ; and charges and those predicted by Eq. (5)
0.7; other failure modes
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Vw
tf ¼ 63.2 × ð6Þ
gH 2b Table 3. Critical Overtopping Depth for Embankment Dams of Varying
Condition
Just as in evaluation of Eq. (1), nonlinear optimization was used Critical
to minimize the root-mean-square error (RMSE) of logarithms Condition overtopping
of values of Qp . using the 41 measurements of peak discharge of dam Description of dama depth H c (m)
presented in Table 1. The following expressions provide optimal Good Practically no seepage, no noticeable 0.61
values of αand β∶ settlement, and embankment slopes in
good condition
α ¼ 0.000045 and β ¼ 500 × ½ðW avg × H 2b Þ=V w 2=3 ð7Þ Fair Moderate seepage, some settlement of 0.3
crest, and some erosion on embankment
With α and β obtained from Eq. (7), the coefficient of determina- slopes
tion Eq. (5) is 0.917, and the RMSE of ln Qp is 0.313. Poor Excessive seepage, significant slump of 0.0
A comparison of measured and predicted values of Qp given by crest, cracks in embankment, and
Eq. (5) for the 41 dams analyzed is shown in Fig. 4. The effect of erosion of slopes
embankment width on peak discharge is shown by its influence on Note: Data from FEMA (1987).
the exponent β, which increases along with W avg . Accordingly, a
Presumably, no special overtopping protection is used to resist erosion of
with all other factors held constant in Eq. (5), increasing W avg re- embankment downstream slopes. Normal embankment coverage includes
duces Qp , as would be expected. grass and loose rock.

© ASCE 04016041-9 J. Hydrol. Eng.

J. Hydrol. Eng.
 larger overflow depths than those given in Table 3 is installed on
some embankment dams. These defensive measures include roller-
compacted concrete, precast concrete block systems, continuously
reinforced concrete slabs, gabions, reinforced rockfill, and geotex-
tiles (Task Committee on Overtopping Protection 1994, p. 116;
FEMA 2014; Gosden et al. 2014).
Comparison of Peak Discharge Predictions
Several other methods that have been developed for predicting
peak discharge from gradually breached embankment dams are
compared using the assembled data. Mathematical expressions
for determining the peak discharge from a gradual embankment
dam failure developed by Kirkpatrick (1977), MacDonald
and Langridge-Monopolis (1984), Costa (1985), SCS (1985),
Froehlich (1995), Webby (1996), Walder and O’Connor (1997),
Thornton et al. (2011), Hooshyaripor et al. (2014), De Lorenzo
and Macchione (2014), and Azimi et al. (2015) are presented
in Table 4. The RMSE of values of ln Qp predicted for the failures
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by La Trobe University on 07/06/16. For personal use only.
from actual full-scale dam failures and from small-scale experimen-
tal studies. Even the semitheoretical formulations by Walder and
O’Connor (1997) and by De Lorenzo and Macchione (2014), as
well as the neural network model of Hooshyaripor et al. (2014),
rely on observed failure data to establish model parameters.
Ratios of predicted to measured Qp given by all of the methods,
along with those from Eqs. (2) and (5), are compared visually in the
box-and-whisker diagrams shown in Fig. 5. A box-and-whisker
diagram provides a convenient way of depicting graphically the
prediction error (that is, the predicted value minus the measured
value) through their five-number summaries: the smallest observa-
tion (sample minimum, not including outliers), lower quartile (Q1),
median (Q2), upper quartile (Q3), and largest observation (sample
maximum, not including outliers). Outliers are those measure-
ments not within 1.5 × IQR of the lower and upper quartiles, where
IQR ¼ Q3 − Q1 = interquartile range (IQR). The minimum and
maximum outliers are also shown in the diagram, along with the
average. Spacing between different parts of the boxes helps indicate
the degree of dispersion (spread) and skew (asymmetry) of the pre-

in Table 1 are also provided in Table 4. diction errors.

Most of the formulas have been developed by multiple regres- From the box-and-whisker diagrams, predictions given by
sion analysis or nonlinear model fitting based on assembled data Eq. (2) are shown to be consistently accurate (the IQR extends from

Table 4. Summary of Formulas for Predicting Peak Discharge from Gradually-Breached Embankment Dams
Source Formulaa RMSEb

pffiffiffi 0.3 m; for SI units 1.166
Kirkpatrick (1977) Qp ¼ 0.4 × gðH w þ ηÞ2.5 , where η ¼
1.0 ft; for U.S. customary units
MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis (1984) Qp ¼ 1.175 × ðV w H w Þ0.41 , where V w ¼ m3 , and H w ¼ m 0.730

Costa (1985) Qp ¼ 0.763 × ðV w H w Þ0.42 , where V w ¼ m3 , and H w ¼ m 0.696


maxf0.000421 × ½ðV w H w Þ=ðW avg H b Þ1.35 ; 1.77 × H 2.5
w g; if H w < 31.4 m 1.612
SCS (1985) Qp ¼
16.6 × H 1.85
w ; if H w ≥ 31.4 m
where V w ¼ m3 , H w ¼ m, H b ¼ m, and W avg ¼ m
Froehlich (1995) Qp ¼ 0.607 × V 0.295
w H 2.24 3
w , where V w ¼ m , and H w ¼ m 0.488
pffiffiffi
Webby (1996) Qp ¼ 0.0443 × gV 0.365
w H 1.405
w 0.386
pffiffiffi 0.47 0.15 0.94
Walder and O’Connor (1997) Qp ¼ 0.031 × gV w H w H b 0.608

Thornton et al. (2011) Eq. (1): Qp ¼ 0.12 × L1.785 a 1.688

Eq. (2): Qp ¼ 0.863 × V 0.335 w H 1.833
b W −0.663
avg 0.591
0.493 2.205 0.226
Eq. (3): Qp ¼ 0.012 × V w H b La 0.628
pffiffiffi
Hooshyaripor et al. (2014)c (1) Qp ¼ 0.0068 × gV 0.543 w H 0.871
w 0.756
The following formulas represent the neural network. Unity-based normalization is used 1.628
to bring all input and output values into the range ½−1,1
(2) Qp ¼ ðQp0 þ 1Þ½ð78100 − 2.12Þ=2 þ 2.12, where Qp0 ¼ −2.5417 ×
tanhð−9.0885 × V w0 − 5.7519 × H w0 þ 3.357Þ − 2.8054 × tanhð2.4520 × V w0 þ 1.5365 ×
H w0 − 1.0821Þ þ 0.1740 × tanhð2.6086 × V w0 þ 1.967 × H w0 þ 3.0178Þ − 0.0062 ×
tanhð1.4053 × V w0 − 7.6159 × H w0 − 3.386Þ − 1.1008
V w0 ¼ 2½ðV w − 0.0037Þ=ð660 − 0.0037Þ − 1, H w0 ¼ 2½ðH w − 1.37Þ=ð77.4 − 1.37Þ − 1,
V w ¼ Mm3 , H w ¼ m, and Qp ¼ m3 =s

De Lorenzo and Macchione (2014) 0.321 × g0.258 ðve V w Þ0.485 H 0.802
b ; for over topping failures 0.714
Qp ¼
0.347 × g0.263 ðve V w Þ0.474 H 2.992
w H b−2.151 ; for piping failures

0.07 m=s for SI units
where ve ¼
1.46 ft=s for U.S. customary units
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Azimi et al. (2015) Qp ¼ 0.0166 × gV w × H w 0.365
a
Unless noted otherwise, any consistent set of units can be used. For example, for SI units, Qp ¼ m3 =s, g ¼ 9.807 m=s=s, V w ¼ m3 , H w ¼ m, and H b ¼ m;
and for U.S. customary units, Qp ¼ ft3 =s, g ¼ 32.174 ft=s=s, V w ¼ ft3 , H w ¼ ft, and H b ¼ ft.
b
Root-mean-square error between predicted values of ln Qp and the values actually measured.
c
Coefficients of the neural network model given in Hooshyaripor et al. (2014) are incorrect. The proper coefficients obtained from Farhad Hooshyaripor
(written communication, September 2015) are used here.

© ASCE 04016041-10 J. Hydrol. Eng.

J. Hydrol. Eng.
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by La Trobe University on 07/06/16. For personal use only.
Fig. 5. Box-and-whisker diagrams of ratios of predicted to measured values of embankment dam breach peak discharge given by several methods
about 0.8 to 1.2), with median and average values both near one,
and with little skew. The IQR of predictions from Eq. (5) is slightly
smaller, but the results are somewhat skewed. A single outlier is
generated by Eq. (2), and Eq. (5) produces none. The two formulas
also yield the smallest RMSE values, which is not unexpected
considering that the expressions were fit specifically to the 41 mea-
sured peak discharges.
Predictions given by Froehlich (1995), Webby (1996), and
Azimi et al. (2015) provide generally good results, although all
of these formulas tend to underpredict peak discharge, are slightly
skewed, and, except for Webby (1996), generate high outliers. Even
though the formula given by Hooshyaripor et al. (2014) has the
smallest IQR of all the methods, it underestimates peak discharge
by about 50% and produces a comparatively large RMSE.
All of the other methods produce results that are lower in ac-
curacy than those just mentioned. Notably poor predictions are
given by the SCS (1985) and the Thornton et al. (2011) formulas.
Semitheoretical models developed by Walder and O’Connor (1997)
and by De Lorenzo and Macchione (2014) both overestimate Qp ,
have a comparatively large interquartile range, and generate high
outliers. The neural network model of Hooshyaripor et al. (2014)
yields several high outliers and produces a comparatively large
RMSE.
Summary and Conclusions
Two nonlinear mathematical models were developed to predict the
peak discharge from a breached embankment dam based on analy-
sis of measured peak outflow rates from 41 dam failures ranging in
size from small to large. The first model is purely empirical, pro-
viding optimal values of coefficients to fit measured discharges
best. The second model is based on a semitheoretical approach that
reduces the maximum possible peak discharge through a breach of
prescribed dimensions that forms instantly. Both formulas are
shown to provide more accurate estimates of peak outflow rates
from failed dam used in the analysis than several other approaches.
© ASCE 04016041-11
J. Hydrol. Eng.
A previous evaluation of dam breach peak discharge by the
author (Froehlich 1995) was based on measured flows from only
22 embankment dam failures. The effect of embankment dam
width on peak discharge could not be determined with certainty
from this limited set of data, although with all other factors held
constant, increased embankment width would certainly lead to a
smaller peak outflow because of the additional volume of material
that needs to be eroded. The expanded data set evaluated here has
allowed the effect of embankment width to be determined with
greater certainty, and the effect is taken into account in both of the
developed expressions.
Although care should always be taken when applying a math-
ematical model to dams whose characteristics are outside the range
of those used to develop the expression, the predicted peak dis-
charge given by the semitheoretical relation is bounded by the po-
tential maximum flow that would be produced by instant formation
of a breach. For this reason, one should not hesitate to apply the
formula to dams for which stored water volumes or embankment
heights exceed those of the 41 failures included in the evaluation
data set. It is also for this reason that this peak discharge formula is
preferred by the author even though the purely empirical expression
provides a slightly better fit to the assembled data.
Several uncomplicated flood-routing methods requiring small
amounts of data and effort to estimate peak flow rates at locations
downstream from a breached dam are currently used to develop
approximate inundation maps. Each of these methods requires
an estimate of the maximum outflow rate from the reservoir.
The findings of this paper will help improve peak discharge calcu-
lation and delineation of areas likely to be affected by dam-breach
floods.
Appendix I. Banqiao Dam Peak Breach Outflow Rate
During 4–8 August 1975, an extreme storm occurred in Henan
Province, China, producing a record-setting 5-day total rainfall of
1,631 mm. Two large dams, Banqiao and Shimandan, failed from
overtopping as the result of flooding produced by the storm.
J. Hydrol. Eng.
 The commonly reported peak outflow from the Banqiao Dam
failure is 78,100 m3 =s based on a single recording gauge measure-
ment of the reservoir level and level-pool flood routing calculation
(Yi 1998; Henan Water Resources Authority 2005).
From information provided by Xu et al. (2008), the final
breach in the Banqiao Dam is approximated closely as a trapezoid
with a top width of 372 m at elevation 116.3 m, and a bottom
width of 210 m at elevation 86.8 m, giving Bavg ¼ 291 m, Hb ¼
29.5 m, and m ¼ 2.75. The maximum water-surface elevation
recorded was 117.9 m, giving H w ¼ 31.1 m. From Eq. (4), using
measured values of Bavg and m, the maximum possible outflow
though the breach is Qpmax ¼ 76,900 m3 =s. Adding to this amount
the combined spillway discharge (about 3,850 m3 =s) at the peak
0 1500×½ðW
B 1 C
Q̂p ¼ Qpmax × @ qffiffiffiffiffiA
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by La Trobe University on 07/06/16. For personal use only.
g
1 þ 0.000045 × tf Hb
2 3500 × f½59.6 m×ð30.3 mÞ2 =701 Mm3 g2=3
¼ 76,900 m3 =s × 4
1 þ 0.000045 × ð5.5 h × 3,600 s=hÞ 9.807
¼ 76,900 m3 =s × 0.6610.913 ¼ 52,700 m3 =s
After subtracting the combined spillway discharge (which was
about 600 m3 =s at the time of the peak discharge based on level-
pool drawdown rate) from the calculated total peak outflow
(78,100 m3 =s), the estimated peak discharge through the breach
remains significantly less than the commonly reported value, and
close to the value used here (56,300 m3 =s).
An explanation for overestimation of the peak outflow rate at
Banqiao Dam based on level-pool calculations may lie with the
position of the gauge used to record reservoir water-surface levels,
which is unknown. If it was located within the rapid drawdown
zone near the breach, the measured water level would have re-
flected a much faster outflow rate than if the gauge had been sit-
uated far away from the breach. Need for a more comprehensive
evaluation of reservoir drawdown is another reason. Goodell and
Wahlin (2009) studied differences in calculated peak discharge
given by a level-pool flood routing approach and by dynamic flood
routing (that is, numerical solution of the one-dimensional cross-
section averaged flow equations.) Their findings presented graphi-
cally suggest that dynamic flood routing might produce a peak
discharge about 20% less than level-pool routing.
For the aforementioned reasons, the commonly reported peak
discharge produced by the Banqiao Dam failure seems excessive.
Consequently, the significantly smaller value calculated as twice
the average outflow rate over a 6-h period is used in the analysis
presented here.
Notation
The following symbols are used in this paper:
Bavg = catchment area;
g = gravitational acceleration;
Hb = height of trapezoidal dam breach;
© ASCE
J. Hydrol. Eng.
reservoir level gives a maximum possible total outflow rate of
80,750 m3 =s (with a small additional quantity of water overflow-
ing the 1.3 m high parapet wall running along the crest of the
dam), which assumes an instantaneous breach at the maximum
reservoir level.
Banqiao Dam breach formation was actually rather gradual,
taking about 5.5 h. The reservoir is reported to have “drained com-
pletely” in about 6 h. For these reasons, peak breach discharge was
certainly considerably less than the maximum possible value, which
is only slightly greater than the commonly reported peak outflow rate
obtained from level-pool rate-of-drawdown calculations.
Estimated peak discharge through the breach is given by Eq. (5)
using measured values of Bavg , m, and tf as follows:
2 2=3
avg ×H b Þ=V w 
1
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi5
m=s=s
29.5 m
ð8Þ
H c = critical overtopping depth;
Hs = Height of small embankment dam;
Hw = height of water above breach bottom at time of breach
initiation;
h = water depth;
kH = factor that accounts for embankment height;
kM = factor that accounts for failure mode;
La = approach flow width;
m = average breach side-slope ratio (horizontal:vertical);
Q
⌢ p = measured dam-breach peak discharge;
Qp = predicted dam-breach peak discharge;
Qpmax = maximum possible peak discharge from a breach of
specified dimensions that forms instantly;
q = unit width flow rate;
tf = breach formation time;
V = water velocity;
V w = volume of impounded water above breach bottom at time
of failure;
W avg = average width of embankment above breach bottom;
α = coefficient in semitheoretical formula;
β = coefficient in semitheoretical formula; and
θ = coefficient in empirical formula.
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