Freedom of Religion

Sec. 5 Bill of Rights

Non-establishment clause- No law shall be made respecting the establishment of
religion
Freedom of religion clause- Or prohibiting the free exercise thereof

Philippines abides to benevolent neutrality when it comes to separation of church

and state.

If a government action interferes with the exercise of a religious conduct (as

opposed to religious speech), we use
the compelling state interest test (as opposed to the clear and present danger
test).
Step 1: Determine the sincerity of the belief of the religious practice
Step 2: If step 1 answer is yes, determine if there is a compelling state interest
pursued by the State
Step 3: If step 2 answer is yes, determine if the least restrictive means is used
to achieve the compeeling state interest.

Benevolent neautrality or accomodation is the making of an exemption of a religious

practice from a government action as long as such exemption
does not aid or burden religious exercise. It is not to promote the government's
aid of any religion but to allow the exercise thereof without hindrance.

Example: allowing INC children not to salute the flag.

Compelling state interest: to make patriotic citizens. Ok
Least restrictive means? No. You can make patriotic citizens through other means
like teaching history, the Constitution, National heroes' lives etc.

Example:
Estrada vs Escritor
No immorality against a SC clerk because her religion allows cohabitation of 2
people married to separate people.

An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and

its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. Examples of these affairs in which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments, and other activities to which is attached
religious significance. In this case, what is involved is the relationship of the
church
as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrine of the church.
-Austria vs NLRC

Liberty of Abode and of Travel

Upon the evidence, there is no question that Estelita is restrained of her personal
liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her will. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of Julia Salazar, at 1343 Felix
Huertas St., or to stay in Silang, Cavite, in the house of Julia Salazar's cousin,
a place that Estelita could not identify better than just describing it as a place
very far from Manila, does not make less real the deprivation of Estelita's
personal freedom which includes the freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from
one place to another, freedom to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in
the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of
choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is
illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
-Cauca vs Salazar

LIMITATIONS
The liberty of abode may only be impaired by:
a lawful order of the court

The right to travel may only be impaired b:

a law that concerns national security, public safety or public health.

Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to
travel, the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the
restriction in a law. This is in deference to the primacy of the right to travel,
being a constitutionally-protected right and not simply a statutory right, that it
can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.
---referring to constitutional deliberations.

Watch-list and hold departure orders

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as

delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry
their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SOFIA 633, the Court further

clarified the foregoing principles, saying: [i] The hold-departure order is but an
exercise of the respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused;
[ii] By posting bail, the accused holds herself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court, thus, she may be legally prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case; and [iii] Parties with pending cases
should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which,
in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and
to
impose the appropriate conditions therefor, since they are conversant with the
facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

Circular No. 39-97 clearly states that hold-departure orders may be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Pertinent portions thereof read as follows:
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-
Departure Orders which are issued contain complete and accurate information, the
following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
…

Marcos vs Manglapus: Pro Hac vice because of the uniqueness of the case. Dictator
not allowed to return despite a citizen's rights to return to country. President's
residual powers to protect the general welfare of the people.

Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides that

everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his
country. Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provides that no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country

EMINENT domain

It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State

that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the
Constitution, in mandating that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation”, merely imposes a limit on the government’s exercise
of this power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s right to
property. An ejectment suit should not ordinarily prevail over the State’s power of
eminent domain.

IN RE: EJECTMENT
It would be circuitous, if not legally absurd, for this Court to require petitioner
to first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgement in the unlawful
detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to issue in petitioner's
favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings. Such a
scenario is a bureaucratic waste of precious time and resources.

Citing J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 17 and Cuatico v. Court of
Appeals, 18 private respondent further submits that "the eminent domain case, much
less the writ of possession, cannot be entertained to defeat the ejectment case."
19

Such argument is untenable. It is well-settled that eminent domain is an inherent

power of the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law." 20
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, in mandating that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," merely imposes a
limit on the government's exercise of this power and provides a measure of
protection to the individual's right to property. 21 Thus, in J. M. Tuason & Co.
and Cuatico, the Court merely enforced the constitutional limitation regarding the
payment of just compensation. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not
prevail over the State's power of eminent domain.

JURISDICTION OF EMINENT DOMAIN CASES

Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the Regional
Trial Court. While the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in
monetary terms — for the court is duty bound to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property — it is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit

EMINENT DOMAIN vs SALE

In Republic v. Roque, Jr., the Court recognized that the State may acquire property
through expropriation or voluntary sale, each having a different consequence or
implication, to wit:
On a final note, we point out that the parties entered into a negotiated sale
transaction; thus, the Republic did not acquire the property through expropriation.

In expropriation, the Republic's acquisition of the expropriated property is

subject to the condition that the Republic will return the property should the
public purpose for which the expropriation was done did not materialize. On the
other hand, a sale contract between the Republic and private persons is not subject
to this same condition unless the parties stipulate it.

The respondents in this case failed to prove that the sale was attended by a
similar condition. Hence, the parties are bound by their sale contract transferring
the property without the condition applicable in expropriation cases.

In a long line of cases where the Court awarded legal interest, there was either an
absence of concurrence between the landowner and the government with regards to the
value of the property taken or the state had commenced expropriation proceedings.

In the cases of Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[22] Republic v. Court of

Appeals,[23] and Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[24] the government,
through different bodies and agencies, instituted expropriation proceedings to
acquire private property for public use. Meanwhile, in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Imperial,[25] the landowner filed a complaint for determination and payment of
just compensation after the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) distributed its
properties to farmer-beneficiaries. On the other hand, in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco,[26] the landowner initially offered to sell its property to
DAR but the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board after the former
disagreed with the valuation of its property.

Association of small landowners case:

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of

compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly

acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to
the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing
to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary
deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties.[35] It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the
time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of
the people is the supreme law

PUBLIC USE and JUST COMPENSATION

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means
absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from
the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,[42] there is COMPENSABLE

TAKING when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the
entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

ONLY COURTS CAN DETERMINE JUST COMPENSATION (EMPHASIS) WITH FINALITY

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer
from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally
objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landower and
other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence
on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the
just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

GEN. RULE: MONEY OR READY CASH IS THE MEDIUM OF JUST COMPENSATION. EXCEPTION: CARP

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal
here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the
laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far
more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already
staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even
fully available at this time.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to
the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money,
primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value

PPI vs COMELEC

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. - The Commission shall procure free print space of not
less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence
of said newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions

specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page),
amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.
Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:"
only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995?
or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same
period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not
a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or
in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under
the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to
be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space
lies at the heart of the problem.[3] Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec
in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises
to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

Republic vs Sps Cancio:

A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
Specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation
thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession.

Clearly, there was a confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for
the issuance of a writ of possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority,[16] we clarified that the payment of the provisional value as
a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment
of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is
based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the
prevailing fair market value of the property.

In that case, we agreed with the CA's explanation[17] that:

The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of
the property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. It
is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be
equivalent to the prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may
be a factor to be considered in the determination of just compensation.

Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair market
value of the property. It has been described as "the just and complete equivalent
of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation." Market value[s,] has also been described in a variety of ways
as the "price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article
established as shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business;
the fair value of the property between one who desires to purchase and one who
desires to sell; the current price; the general or ordinary price for which
property may be sold in that locality." (Emphasis in the original)

Lastly, RA 8974 provides that "the court shall determine the just compensation to
be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the
expropriation case."[24] In this case, almost eight years have passed since
petitioner commenced the expropriation proceedings on August 27, 2001. We, however,
hold that it is still feasible to comply with the spirit of the law by requiring
the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finalityof
this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in RA 8974 and its
implementing rules.

LBP vs Martinez:
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the
guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in
Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision
in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the
SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision but an
original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the
DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator's decision will attain finality. This rule
is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the
principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g.,
one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR
adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as
to the true value of his property.

ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC USE AND RIGHT OF REPURCHASE

In Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan[11], this Court had occasion to rule on the
same issue as follows:
"The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by
the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent
domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the
condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the
former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition
that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city
abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there
is some statutory provision to the contrary. Many other similar examples might be
given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the
entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property
of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in
that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by
the expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted
to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner."[12]

CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court
of Appeals[14] wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the
existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did
not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court
consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of
an agreement allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination:
"Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there
can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent of the parties thereto. In the case at bench, the fact which
private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consists of the agreement
or representation made by the NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute the deed of
sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should the
government no longer need the property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was
the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part
of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written
contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such
evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral
parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract
though it may relate to the same subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence
to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission
of existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or
not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and
whether the action is at law or in equity.

More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents

introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez
Ouano. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived.

EMINENT DOMAIN COVERS EASEMENTS

The acquisition of an easement of a right of way falls within the

purview of the power of eminent domain [Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000]. In National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Develoment Corporation,437 SCRA 60, it
was reiterated that an action for a right of way filed by an electric power company
for the construction of transmission lines falls within the scope of the power of
eminent domain. As held in Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620, the power of eminent
domain normally results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of,
the expropriated property. But no cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned
property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real
property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of a right of way.

LGU EMINENT DOMAIN

The additional limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent

domain by local government units are, as follows:
i) Exercised only by the local chief executive, acting pursuant to a
valid ordinance;
ii) For public use or purpose or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and
the landless;
iii) Only after a valid and definite offer had been made to, and not
accepted by, the owner.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the

State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights.
Hence, strict construction will be made against the agency exercising the power.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its
complaint,
it made a written, definite and valid offer to acquire the property, as required
under

There are basic differences between an ordinance and a resolution, viz: an

ordinance is a law while
a resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter; a third reading is needed for an ordinance, not for a
resolution
unless decided otherwise by a majority of the members of the Sanggunian.

WHO MAY EXERCISE:

Under existing laws, the following may exercise the power ofexpropriation:
(1) The Congress.
(2) The President ofthe Philippines.
(3) The various locallegislative bodies.
(4) Certain public corporations, like the LandAuthor
ity and the National HousingAuthority.
(5) Quasi-publiccorporationslikethe PhilippineNa
tional Railways, the Philippine LongDistance Telephone
Co. and the Meralco.

COURTS ARE MORE LIBERAL IN QUESTIONING EMINENT DOMAIN WHEN EXERCISED BY DELEGATES
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular
case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corpo
rations and other entities within the State, general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular in
stances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts
to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the condi
tions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercis
ing the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by
the general authority, is a question which the courts have the
right to inquire into.

RIGHT IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST EXPROPRIATOR

Cite: due process clause. Bill of Rights.