PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

INVESTIGATION OF AN EXPLOSION AT 8865 STANFORD BOULEVARD

IN COLUMBIA, MARYLAND ON AUGUST 25, 2019

STAFF REPORT

OF THE

ENGINEERING DIVISION

OF THE

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

AUGUST 6, 2020
 Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
EVENT TIMELINE........................................................................................................................ 3
PROBABLE CAUSE...................................................................................................................... 8
COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ............................ 15
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 23
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 26
APPENDIX A Building Damage Photos Taken By the PSCED ................................................. 29
APPENDIX B Trench Measurements and Configuration [CONFIDENTIAL] .......................... 34
APPENDIX C BGE National Response Center Report [CONFIDENTIAL] ............................. 49
APPENDIX D Selected BGE Special Information Request Responses [CONFIDENTIAL] .... 54
APPENDIX E Howard County Fire & Rescue Case Initiation Report [CONFIDENTIAL] ...... 61

2
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide Staff’s findings and recommendations to the

Public Service Commission (“Commission”) concerning Baltimore Gas and Electric Company’s

(“BGE” or “the Company”) Accident Notice and Investigation Report (“EN-6”) for an incident

involving a gas explosion at 8865 Stanford Blvd. (“the building’) in Columbia, Maryland. BGE

notified the Commission of the accident as required by Code of Maryland Regulations

(“COMAR”) 20.50.03.04G1 and Maryland Public Utilities Article (“PUA”) § 5-304.2

EVENT TIMELINE

Pursuant to COMAR 20.50.03.04G and Maryland PUA § 5-304, BGE notified the

Maryland Public Service Commission Engineering Division (“PSCED” or “Staff”) that an

accident had occurred on August 25, 2019 at 8865 Stanford Blvd. Columbia, Maryland. The

accident involved BGE’s gas and electric facilities resulting in a gas explosion on site.

According to Washington Post reports and PSCED observations on-site, other nearby buildings

sustained minor damage from the blast, including broken glass.3 [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]

1
COMAR 20.50.03.04G provides: “Each utility shall file with the Commission an “Accident
Notice” report, on forms provided by the Commission, within 30 days after the end of any month
during which an accident occurred.”
2
PUA § 5-304(a)(1) provides that: “A public service company shall notify the Commission of
any accident involving the public service company that results in: (i) personal injury requiring
hospitalization; (ii) property damage exceeding $50,000; or (iii) loss of life.” PUA § 5-304(a)(2)
goes on to require that: “The public service company shall notify the Commission within 30 days
after the day the accident occurs or within a period that the Commission prescribes.”
3
See https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/emergency-crews-respond-to-gas-explosion-in-
columbia-md/2019/08/25/c75acd7e-c734-11e9-be05-f76ac4ec618c_story.html
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█████████ [END CONFIDENTIAL] BGE’s gas and electric service equipment supplying

8865 Stanford Blvd. were found by the PSCED to have sustained damage.5 No injuries or

fatalities were reported as a result of this accident but the safety impact could have been much

worse. Per news sources, “the roughly 40,000-square-foot, L-shaped building’s office and retail

space is fully occupied.”6 “Social Security leases nearly half that space for an office.”7 “Other

tenants include an Indian grocery store, a nail salon, a coffee shop, a sushi restaurant and a

pizzeria.”8 “Fortunately it was 7:30 on a Sunday, not 7:30 on a Monday,”9 [the building’s leasing

agent] said. “The time of day played a factor,” said [the fire battalion chief]. “None of the

businesses were open.”10

On September 24, 2019, BGE filed an Electric Utility Accident Notice and Investigation

Form EN-611 report in regard to a gas explosion that had occurred at 8865 Stanford Blvd. in

Columbia, Maryland, since this event also involved BGE underground electric facilities in close

proximity to the underground gas service line for the building. These underground electric and

gas facilities were directly buried and not in conduit. BGE has also responded to three Specific

4
Howard County Fire Department Case Initiation Report Case No. 19kf08, Close Date October
17, 2019. This report, without attachments, is contained in Appendix C.
5
See Photographs taken by PSCED in Appendix A.
6
See https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/howard/cng-ho-gas-explosion-colunbia-
20190825-cvetedaecvfihihejka2tyvuou-story.html
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Pursuant to COMAR 20.50.03.04G, each utility is required to file with the Commission an
Electric Utility Accident Notice and Investigation Form EN-6, within 30 days after the end of
any month during which an accident occurred.
4
Information Requests (“SIRs”)12 from Commission Staff on November 27, 2019, February 24,

2020, and July 1, 2020.

After compiling data from the BGE SIRs, the HCFR, the National Response Center

(“NRC”) report13 and news reports, the significant milestones in the BGE event timeline the

morning of August 25, 2019, are described in Table No. 1 below:

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12
Per COMAR 20.57.02.02C, a gas company shall respond within 30 days after receipt of a
specific information request from the PSCED.
13
The NRC is a part of the federally established national response system that is the designated
federal point of contact for reporting all hazardous material discharges into the environment in
the United States and its territories.
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BGE has been working with other interested parties21 to conduct a joint investigation of

the scene. A joint investigation of the accident and analysis of all the facilities and other evident

in the area are still ongoing by BGE and a full BGE report will be issued at an unspecified future

date.

PROBABLE CAUSE

BGE has been working with the interested parties to conduct a joint investigation of the

scene. Evidence from the scene has been documented and reviewed and subsequently removed

from the scene such that additional evaluations by BGE can be conducted. A joint investigation

of the accident and analysis of all the facilities and other evidence in the area are still ongoing by

BGE, for which a full report will be issued at a later date. As the investigation is a joint effort

involving multiple interested parties and remains ongoing, further investigation protocols will

need to be negotiated and agreed upon by all parties if there is to be any destructive testing at a

laboratory facility.

Electric service was supplied to the building from a BGE 13 kV primary feeder that

extended below grade to a pad-mounted transformer located on the side of the building, between

the parking lot and Stanford Boulevard. The transformer supplied electrical service via multiple

direct buried underground service laterals into the mechanical room of the building. The

20
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21
Outside Counsel and consultants are retained by BGE to assist with the joint scene
investigation including the following: Electrical engineering Consultation – Christoph Flaherty,
Flaherty Engineering Consulting; Cause & Origin Consultation – Michael Schaal, Jim Sobota &
Scott Eberts, Fire and Arson Investigation Consultants, Inc; Legal Consultation – Anne
Chisholm, Esq., Chisholm Passeggio, PLLC; various experts regarding fire and explosion –
Engineering and Scientific investigations (“ESI”) and Geotechnical work – EN Engineering.
8
operation voltage was 208 volts phase to phase and 120 volts phase to ground. The gas service

line extended underground through the parking lot of the structure into the mechanical room of

the building. The two inch gas service lateral, operating at a pressure of 90 psi, ran in the same

direction and through the same general area as the electrical conductors that serviced the

building. Other underground facilities, such as a Verizon 600 pair cable were also located in the

trench, which was originally installed in 1997, but was deactivated approximately one year prior

to the date of the explosion. Verizon FIOS cables were installed sometime after 1997 and entered

a vault through a conduit. The vault was located above the electric cables and gas service line

just prior to where they entered the building.

During the investigation of this accident, BGE interacted with the PSCED at the accident

site on several occasions. The PSCED witnessed three pressure tests for the service line that

served the building. The testing was conducted in three parts due to accessibility issues at the

accident site. The first test was conducted for the gas service section from a street light to the

service connection to the main on August 25, 2019. The test pressure was at the operating

pressure, at the time of the accident, for ten minutes and the pipe held the pressure test which is

indicative of a non-compromised pipe. The second part of the pressure test was conducted from

the bullnose connector22 at building side to the bullnose connector at the street light on August

29, 2019. The pressure test failed as the pipe was not able to hold air, which is indicative of a

pipe leak or failed pipe. The failed gas service line between the two bullnose connectors was

excavated and visually inspected and a hole was found in the gas service line. The third portion

of the pressure test was conducted on October 15, 2019, from the bullnose connector at the

22
A gas fitting in the shape of a rounded cylinder used to prevent leaks at the connection.
9
building to the gas service riser23 in the building. The test was conducted at the operating

pressure and the pressure held.

BGE’s SIR responses24 to the PSCED are based on the information that it has learned

from the joint scene investigation and this information is subject to updating supplementations

and revisions as any other relevant evidence uncovered during the course of the investigation.

During the course of the investigation, the condition of multiple facilities that were located in

close proximity and/or cross BGE’s facilities was evaluated, along with the BGE’s facilities. An

electrical fault in a BGE electrical service cable supplying the building appears to have been

discovered while excavating for the gas line pressure testing. Several holes were found25 in the

gas pipe during the excavation. It is unclear as to what impact the damage to BGE’s facilities and

the explosion could have had relating to the facilities in the joint trench26 at this time. The

Company indicates it is still evaluating whether a laboratory testing can be done to replicate the

damage to the electric lines, gas line and/or the explosion and its impact. Currently almost a year

after the accident, BGE is unable to provide a more detailed root cause analysis of what triggered

the event or accurately estimate a date of completion at this time.

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23
The gas service riser is a piping component of the natural gas service line that protects the
plastic gas service pipe as it transitions from below ground to above ground.
24
See Appendix D for Selected BGE SIR Responses. [CONFIDENTIAL]
25
See “Diagram of Pipe Damage Locations” in Figure No. 2 in Appendix B. [CONFIDENTIAL]
26
Joint trench refers to multiple utilities supplying the building being buried in close proximity
in the same trench.
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[END CONFIDENTIAL]

While the PSCED acknowledges that BGE’s investigation is still ongoing, we have

received no firm timeline for its conclusion. In fact, BGE’s most recent response to PSCED SIR

No. 3 on July 1, 2020, indicates no changes to information previously supplied to the PSCED

27
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11
since the Company’s response to PSCED SIR No. 2 on February 24, 2020. Despite the ongoing

BGE investigation, Staff concludes that it possesses enough facts about this accident to reach

some conclusions. While Staff’s conclusions contain some unknown knowledge gaps that would

benefit further from BGE’s ongoing forensics investigation and analysis, there is enough known

at this point to also reach a conclusion on BGE’s compliance with applicable statutes and

regulations.

During the course of the investigation, the PSCED determined that multiple utility

facilities in the building’s joint trench were located in close proximity and/or cross each other.

These facilities were evaluated by the PSCED on-site as the trench was excavated and facilities

uncovered. During the PSCED inspection, it was discovered that an electrical fault in a BGE

electrical service cable supplying the building appears to have occurred. Several holes were

found in the gas pipe during the excavation. The electrical fault appears to have melted holes

into the gas service causing a gas leak. Additional excavations and inspection revealed several

locations along the polyethylene gas service where damage appears to have occurred due to

interaction with the electric fault. Upon uncovering the buried facilities, several charred burns

were found in the electric cables. These damaged locations are shown in photographs in Figure

No. 2 - Diagram of Pipe Damage Locations in Appendix B [CONFIDENTIAL].

[BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]

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29
See SIR No. 1-7a in Appendix D. [CONFIDENTIAL]
30
Data collection points on the AMI communications network.
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CONFIDENTIAL] In summary, while there are still some aspects of this event that remain

uncertain, Staff notes that the preponderance of evidence and analysis to date, including the

conclusions in the HCFR Report and BGE’s own preliminary findings point to the sequence of

events on August 25, 2019 being initiated by an underground secondary cable fault of unknown

cause, which resulted in thermal degradation of the polyethylene gas service piping from this

electrical failure that persisted either consistently or intermittently [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]

█████████████████████████████ [END CONFIDENTIAL] until the building

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explosion. Natural gas migrated into the building as a result of a breech in the lateral

underground service line to the building. This gas was then ignited from an undermined ignition

source within the structure. Although methane of high concentration appears to have been in the

proximity of an arcing electric cable due to the thermal degradation in the polyethylene pipe, it is

unclear if this gas interacted directly with the faulted electric cable. However, only methane

concentrations between 5 percent and 15 percent will support ignition. The explosion originated

in the building structure and not the parking lot.

COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The underground facilities at the accident scene involve electric cables supplying the

building which were manufactured in 1996. There were five cables for each of the three phases

and neutral consisting of 20 total cables in five 4 conductor “quadraplex” groupings. The

operation voltage was 208 volts phase to phase and 120 volts phase to ground. Other

underground facilities, such as a Verizon 600 pair cable, were also located in the trench which

was originally installed in 1997, but was deactivated approximately one year prior to the date of

the explosion. Verizon FIOS cables were installed sometime after 1997, which entered a vault

through a conduit. The vault was located above the electric cables and gas service line just prior

to where they entered the building.

During Staff’s review of the BGE accident, we learned of a similar accident involving the

Washington Gas Light Company in Virginia. This “Loudoun County” accident occurred on July

7, 1998 resulting in an explosion and fire at 25905 Rickmansworth Lane in the South Riding

Subdivision in Loudoun County, Virginia. The Loudoun County accident resulted in the death of

one person, severe burns to another, and slight injuries to two others. During the National

Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigation of the accident, a hole was found in the gas

15
service line owned and operated by the Washington Gas Light Company, serving the house in

close proximity to the faulted electric service lines owned and operated by the Northern Virginia

Electric Cooperative. The NTSB results of the laboratory analyses on various sections of the

electric and gas facilities that may have contributed to the accident found that the hole in the gas

service line was caused by heat.

This accident resulted in the Virginia State Corporation Commission ("VSCC")

submitting a report on December 28, 1999, to the Virginia General Assembly in response to

Senate Joint Resolution 480. The VSCC found no specific requirement for separation distances

for underground gas and electric utilities after a review of local, state, and national codes,

standards, laws, and regulations. Regulations were found to exist for the separation of gas

transmission lines and mains from other underground structures,34 and certain industry standards

such as the National Electric Safety Code (“NESC”) that address the separation of underground

electric facilities from other underground structures, but none specifically addresses separation

between electric and gas service underground utility lines. This resulted in a bill being approved

in April 2000 to amend and reenact § 56-257 of the Code of Virginia, relating to separation

standards for underground utility lines.

34
Section 192.325(a) of Title 49, C.F.R., states “[e]ach transmission line must be installed with
at least 12 inches of clearance from any other underground structure... [and] if this clearance
cannot be attained, the transmission line must be protected from damage that might result from
the proximity of the other structure." Section 192.325(b) of Title 49, C.F.R., speaks to the
installation of natural gas mains by stating, in part, “[e]ach main [to] be installed with enough
clearance from any other underground structure to allow proper maintenance and to protect
against damage that might result from proximity to other structures.” These regulations do not
contain any requirement for the separation of natural gas service lines from other underground
structures.
16
 As demonstrated in the Loudoun County accident, inadequate separation of underground

gas and electric services can result in a melt-through35 incident from an electric fault; similar to

the accident that occurred at 8865 Stanford Boulevard. Over twenty years since the Loudoun

County accident, there are still no federal regulations or national standards that specifically

address separation between electric and gas service underground utility lines. However,

Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

(“PHMSA”) regulations require that gas “Operators” like BGE to follow their own internal

procedures. The general requirements that apply to pipelines in 49 CFR §192.13(c) state: “Each

operator shall maintain, modify as appropriate, and follow the plans, procedures, and programs

that it is required to establish under this part.”

There are also sections of the NESC which address separation of electric utilities with

other underground structures at the time of initial construction. All applicable sections come

from the 1997 version of the NESC36 which was the version of the code in effect during

construction at 8865 Stanford Blvd. The applicable sections are:

• NESC Rule 352.A - Separations from Other Underground Structures – Horizontal

Separation

The horizontal separation between direct-buried cable and other underground

structures should be not less than 300 mm (12 in.) to permit access to and

maintenance of either facility without damage to the other. Installations with

35
A melt-through denotes a situation where heat from a cable fault will cause thermal
degradation of other underground utility facilities in close proximity.
36
The NESC Rule 013B is a “grandfathering clause” that permits existing structures and
attachments to comply with the NESC code in existence at the time of construction unless that
structure is updated, in which case, the newest code provisions apply. Therefore, the 1997 NESC
requirements are applicable to this installation.
17
 less than 300 mm (12 in.) horizontal separation shall conform with the

requirements of Rule 352C, Rule 354,37 or both;

• NESC Rule 352.C - Separations from Other Underground Structures – Parallel Facilities

If conditions require a cable system to be installed with less than 300 mm (12

in.) horizontal separation or directly over and parallel to another underground

structure (or another underground structure installed directly over and parallel

to a cable), it may be done providing all parties are in agreement as to the

method. Adequate vertical separation shall be maintained to permit access to

and maintenance of either facility without damage to the other.

To provide for safe operation and maintenance of the utilities in a joint trench, proper

separation is essential for all underground utility lines. Damage to these lines, regardless of who

owns or operates them, or where they are located, poses a threat to public health and safety. The

primary focus of NESC Rules 352.A and 352.C is to permit access to and maintenance of either

facility without damage, and these rules are not targeted specifically for the separation of gas and

electric services. This electric industry standard is not limited to gas facilities; it applies to all

other underground structures. The NESC addresses the separation distance of direct-buried cable

and other underground structures. The NESC Rule 352.C specifies a minimum of 12 inches of

horizontal clearance “providing all parties are in agreement as to the method.” In BGE’s case,

since they own both the gas and electric service, Staff concludes the clearance required by the

37
NESC Rule 354 - Random Separation-Additional Requirements allows communication cables
and conductors, and [electric] supply cables and conductors buried in random separation to be
treated as one system and they may be buried together at the same depth with no deliberate
separation between facilities, provided all parties involved are in agreement and other applicable
rules in NESC Rule 354 are met.
18
aforementioned “agreement as to the method” by all parties are the clearances specified in the

Company’s internal BGE Underground Construction Standards.

[BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] █████████████████████████████████

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███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

█████████████████ [END CONFIDENTIAL] Staff concludes that NESC Rule 352.C

applies in this case rather than NESC Rule 352.A because NESC Rule 352.C addresses both

horizontal and vertical separations from other underground structures for parallel facilities, such

as existed in this case. Therefore, to be compliant with both 49 CFR §192.13(c) and NESC Rule

352.C in a situation where the horizontal clearance is less than 12 inches, the PSCED would

expect to see a minimum vertical separation of [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] ███████████

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 ████████████

████████████39████████████40████████████

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[END CONFIDENTIAL]

Pursuant to COMAR regulations, the electric plant of the utility shall be constructed,

installed, maintained, and operated in accordance with accepted good engineering practice in the

electric industry to assure, as far as reasonably possible, continuity of service, uniformity in the

quality of service furnished, and the safety of persons and property.

39
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 Staff concludes that BGE’s gas and electric facilities involved in the accident did not

conform to the minimum safety standards. COMAR 20.50.02.02A specifically states:

Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, the utility shall use the

applicable provisions in the latest revised version of the incorporated by

reference publications listed below as standards of accepted good engineering

practice in this subtitle:

A. National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2 - 2002.43

COMAR 20.50.02.02A specifically requires the utility to conform to the applicable

NESC Rules. As indicated above in Table No. 2, Staff concludes that BGE did not conform to

NESC Rule 352.C [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] ████████████████ [END

CONFIDENTIAL] Therefore the Company appears to be in violation of COMAR20.50.02.02A,

which requires NESC compliance. There is sufficient evidence in this record to demonstrate that

BGE appears to have failed to provide safe facilities, to maintain, and operate in accordance with

accepted good engineering practice because the applicable NESC Rule 352.C was not met.44

BGE also provides the “point to point” separation measurements and defects (i.e., melt-

throughs) found at the scene.45 Several measurements including melt-through holes were

witnessed by the PSCED in different sections of the polyurethane gas line that the PSCED

concludes resulted from inadequate separation. [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] ██████████

43
Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, the utility shall use the applicable provisions
in the latest revised version of the incorporated by reference publications listed below as
standards of accepted good engineering practice in this subtitle
44
Rule 352.C allows a cable system to be installed with less than 300 mm (12 in.) horizontal
separation or directly over and parallel to another underground structure (or another underground
structure installed directly over and parallel to a cable) providing all parties are in agreement as
to the method.
45
See Figure No. 2 - Diagram of Pipe Damage Locations [CONFIDENTIAL] and Figure No. 4 –
Trench Dimensions Supplied By BGE [CONFIDENTIAL] in Appendix B [CONFIDENTIAL]
22
███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

█████████████████████████ [END CONFIDENTIAL]

Acceptable Standards under COMAR 20.55.02.02A(3) include PHMSA 49 CFR 192,

“Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety Standards,” as

amended. Staff concludes that BGE was in violation of 49 CFR §192.13(c) since the Company

did not comply with its specifications in the BGE Underground Construction Standards [BEGIN

CONFIDENTIAL] ███████████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████ [END CONFIDENTIAL]

CONCLUSION

The PSCED investigation reveals that the BGE’s gas and electrical facilities involved in

the accident did not conform to the minimum safety standards under COMAR regulations and

PHMSA regulations. These failures are considered to be safety violations. Based on the response

and evidence submitted by BGE, Staff concludes that BGE failed to provide for safe operation

and maintenance of the facilities. Upon consideration of all relevant evidence, Staff asserts that

the Company has violated the following applicable PUA Statutes, NESC Standards, Code of

Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”), and 49 Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”):

• PUA § 5-303 which states: “A public service company shall furnish equipment, service,

and facilities that are safe, adequate, just, reasonable, economical, and efficient,

considering the conservation of natural resources and the quality of the environment”

• COMAR 20.50.02.01 which states: “The electric plant of the utility shall be constructed,

installed, maintained, and operated in accordance with accepted good engineering

practice in the electric industry to assure, as far as reasonably possible, continuity of

23
 service, uniformity in the quality of service furnished, and the safety of persons and

property”

• COMAR 20.50.02.02A which requires: “unless otherwise specified by the Commission,

the utility shall use the applicable provisions in the latest revised version of the

incorporated by reference publications listed below as standards of accepted good

engineering practice in this subtitle: A. National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-2002.”

• NESC Rule 352.C - Separations from Other Underground Structures – Parallel Facilities

• 49 CFR § 192.13(c) - Each operator shall maintain, modify as appropriate, and follow the

plans, procedures, and programs that it is required to establish under this part.

• COMAR 20.55.02.02A(3) which lists 49 CFR 192, “Transportation of Natural and Other

Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety Standards,” as amended, as an Acceptable

Standard.

Staff also concludes that there are unanswered quality control process questions with this

particular contracted installation as evidenced by the investigation’s probable cause

determination since a quality control inspection process should have prevented the installation

defects that have been discovered in this investigation. Staff also concludes that the “extent of

condition”46 for this installation defect among the total population of BGE joint trench

installations is unknown. Was this an isolated incident with one contractor or are there other

similar defects among the total population of BGE joint trench installations? Were BGE quality

control practices and related contractor inspections insufficient at the time of installation or was

this a “point off the curve” involving an isolated human error? If BGE’s quality control practices

46
Extent of condition is generally defined as a generic implication of a failure, malfunction,
deficiency, defective item, weakness or problem; i.e., the actual or potential applicability for an
event or condition to exist in other activities, projects, programs, facilities or organizations.
24
were insufficient, have BGE’s quality control practices since been corrected and how long did

these deficiencies persist? Therefore, Staff is not able to conclude if this was an isolated defect,

or if other BGE joint trench facilities have similar defects? Since this was a direct buried joint

trench installation, gas and electric utility inspections of utilities separations will likely require

excavations. Staff notes that the type melt-through event that occurred at 8865 Stanford

Boulevard appears to be a rare occurrence in the industry based on a brief internet search.

Although a rare occurrence, Staff concludes that a corrective action plan effort to determine

extent of the unsafe condition may be warranted to uncover other latent problems with BGE joint

trench installations that could exist.

Regarding the Company’s response to the incident itself, Staff concludes that on the day

of the accident BGE took the necessary steps to respond to the accident effectively including its

ICS implementation and mobilization of ICS resources and outreach. The BGE notification and

response protocols for this accident were followed, conforming to the Company’s Gas

Emergency Manual Section - 206 Building Explosion procedures.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Pursuant to PUA § 13-202 for Public Service Companies; the maximum civil penalty for

safety violations is $25,000 for each violation for each day that the violation persists. This

section does not apply to a safety violation by a gas company that is subject to PUA § 13-203.

Pursuant to PUA § 13-203(a), a gas company or gas master meter operator that violates any of

the Commission's standards of safe service or other regulation related to safety adopted under

PUA § 5-10147 of this article is subject to a civil penalty determined by the Commission that

47
§ 5-101. Regulation of Services.
25
does not exceed the maximum penalties provided in Title 49, Chapter 601 of the U.S. Code

(Federal Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act):

(1) for each violation for each day or part of a day that the violation continues;  and

(2) for a related series of violations.

Pursuant to 49 CFR §190.223(a), any person found to have violated a provision of 49

U.S.C. 60101, et seq., or any regulation or order issued thereunder, is subject to an administrative

civil penalty not to exceed $218,647 for each violation for each day the violation continues, with

a maximum administrative civil penalty not to exceed $2,186,465 for any related series of

violations.

Normally the Commission’s Pipeline Safety Manager would issue BGE a Notice of

Probable Violation (“NOPV”) under the enforcement authority for pipeline safety regulations the

Commission has previously delegated to the PSCED as described in COMAR 20.57.02.05A(1).48

However, in this particular case there are also electric safety violations for which the PSCED

does not have similar enforcement authority delegated. Therefore, Staff’s recommendations for

this event are being offered to the Commission for consideration of enforcement actions.

With BGE failing to comply with both gas and electric safety regulations, Staff could

recommend multiple “pancaked” penalties. However, since this accident was primarily a gas

safety accident that appears to have been triggered by an electric fault, Staff recommends that a

civil penalty only be issued for BGE under PUA § 13-203 for a safety violation by a gas

company. Also, under the 49 CFR §190.223(a), any person found to have violated any standard

or any regulation may be subject to a maximum civil penalty of $218,647. In consideration of the

48
20.57.02.05A(1) Notice of Probable Violation states that “The Division may issue a NOPV
upon finding good cause to believe a violation of the Federal Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49
U.S.C. §1671 et seq., as amended, which is incorporated by reference, or Public Utilities Article,
Annotated Code of Maryland, has occurred.”
26
fact that this is the second time in recent years that BGE has experienced a gas explosion

incident49 which had the potential to result in injuries or fatalities, Staff recommends that the

Commission issue a show cause order on whether the maximum civil penalty of $218,647 should

be imposed under PUA § 13-203 for the aforementioned safety violations described in this

report.

Staff also recommends that the Commission order BGE to file a proposed corrective action

plan with the Commission within 60 days of any Commission Order that addresses Staff’s

concerns about potential extent of condition of this defect. At a minimum BGE’s response

should demonstrate to the Commission whether BGE’s quality control processes for joint trench

installations are currently adequate. Also BGE should address whether further quality control

process improvements are currently warranted. Although as previously mentioned, this type

melt-through event that occurred at 8865 Stanford Boulevard appears to be a rare occurrence,

BGE should also address Staff’s concerns about extent of condition by proposing an appropriate

number of joint trench candidate sites for joint trench site inspections as part of a corrective

action plan. The list of site candidates for inspection should include an explanation of the

rationale for each site’s inclusion that considers factors such as the vintage of the installations

where installation problems may have occurred, locations where installation problems may have

occurred, the contractor(s) for which installation problems may have occurred and the

49
On September 23, 2015, a gas explosion at 12218 Sleepy Horse Ln. in Columbia, MD
occurred. The gas explosion was the result of a resident at 12218 Sleepy Horse Ln. backing out
of their townhome garage and striking the gas piping, attached to the outlet side of the gas meter,
and damaging the gas meter and associated piping. As a result the gas accumulated inside the
garage, after the resident left, and finally ignited resulting in a gas explosion. The resulting gas
explosion destroyed the building and damaged the remainder of the connected townhouses in
that unit as well as damaging other townhouses in the immediate vicinity. The PSCED did issue
BGE a NOPV on February 24, 2016, resulting in acceptance of a $25,000 penalty and a consent
agreement with the Commission for BGE to implement a Meter Protection Program as a
corrective action plan.
27
inspector(s) for which installation problems may have occurred, among other factors that BGE

proposes are appropriate. It is proposed that the PSCED select a reasonable number of locations

for inspections from the list of candidate sites BGE determines and accompany BGE on these

inspections. These inspections would consist of excavating one or more test pits per joint trench

location, dependent on site conditions and length of the trench, to verify horizontal and vertical

clearances. The results of the inspections performed by BGE and witnessed by the PSCED

under this corrective action plan will indicate whether a wider set of inspections is necessary.

Based on the corrective action plan inspection results Staff will make additional

recommendations to the Commission, if necessary.

BGE should also be ordered to set up a regulatory liability with carrying charges for its

investigation expenses and all corrective action plan inspections and corrections for a prudency

determination at a later date. BGE should also be ordered to provide a report to the Commission

upon completion of their corrective action plan in a report format to be agreed by BGE and Staff.

28
 APPENDIX A
Building Damage Photos Taken By the PSCED

29
Photo No. 1 - 8865 Stanford Blvd. Building Damage

30
Photo No. 2 – Adjacent View of 8865 Stanford Blvd Building Damage

31
Photo No. 3a - Damage inside 8865 Stanford Blvd.

32
Photo No. 3b - Damage inside 8865 Sanford Blvd.

33
APPENDIX B THROUGH APPENDIX E

REMOVED IN PUBLIC VERSION

[CONFIDENTIAL]

34