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Right Aginst Self Incrimination
Right Aginst Self Incrimination
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States,[26] "x x x is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x." It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]’s own
lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.[27] It does not apply to the
instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating
statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in
his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
"If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever
form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in
his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of
the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles
- a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that
is the kernel of the privilege, ***
The Supreme Court quoted Justice Holmes in the case of Holt v. United States,23
where he said: "The
prohibitionofcompelling a man in a criminalcourtto be a witness against himself is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
However, in Almonte v. Vasquez, supra., it was held that where the subpoena duces
tecum is directed to
government officials required to produce official documents/public records which
are in their possession or custody, then there is no violation of the right against
self incrimination
WHEN AVAILABLE:
As a rule, the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked only when and as
the incriminating question is
asked, since the witness has no way ofknowing in advance the nature or effectofthe
question to be put to him.
This istrue, however, only of the ordinary witness. In the case of
the accused himself, it is settled that he can refuse at the
outset and altogether to take the stand as a witness for the
prosecution, on the reasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation
will to be incriminate him.
APPLICATION:
The accused may be released via habeas corpus if this constitutional right was
violated
-Chavez vs CA
Exclusionary Rule:
Sec. 12 Art III
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof
(right against self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Immunity from suit is the only consequence flowing from a violation of one's
constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure, his
right to counsel and his right not to be coerced into confessing.
IMMUNITY STATUTES:
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity".
The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of
witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the
criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity"
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his
compelled testimony relates.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority
to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom
immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the process and is essentially
an executive function. Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[63] is instructive on this point:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of
a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of
having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the
State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will
probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be
exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are
questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to
prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary
right to decide whom not to prosecute.
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.[64] This provision requires that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
WAIVER
The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly
or by a failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and
intelligently made. Thus, the accused who takes the witness stand voluntarily and
offers testimony in his behalf may be cross-examined and asked incriminating
questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination