1. G.R. No.
L-63915 April 24, 1985 1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant
to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171,
179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326,
337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594,
599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130,
136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199,
202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289,
291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346,
349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-
440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702,
712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270,
1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-
1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-
1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457-
471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536,
538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39,
50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378,
380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the
1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held
that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would
be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he
has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority
supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to
be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we
think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for
the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from
those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be,
as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's
legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to
the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4
this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1]
all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature
of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may
be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability
and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden
a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters
of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether
the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act
of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court,
it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication
is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views
expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force
and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a
due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to
a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law.
My point is that such publication required need not be
confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however,
that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend
itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement
in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind,
needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate
opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to
me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus:
"The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication
of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as
the command of the government "must be ascertainable in
some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to
reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice
Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe
to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of
determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that
does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published.
For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their
existence could have conducted themselves in accordance
with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared
to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post
facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process
aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case
be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there
could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes
no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself
in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the
opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,

Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What
I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the
decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of
they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
"before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published
not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
and the people officially and specially informed of said
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of
contents and its penalties.
laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for
their effectivity date.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required
by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect
rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
and official repository where they are duly published) that
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will
therewith.
take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity
date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
Official Gazette.
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for
their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support
the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act
to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the
proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect
of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
[only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To
sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a
specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior
that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as
it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application
such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict
the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of
its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher
law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote
as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official
Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished
decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
2. G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC.,
APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and
MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer
and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated
March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated
November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta
City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation,
Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by
petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the
protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its
objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous
materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in
1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016 which it rented out
to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and
Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor
Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official
Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building
permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise known as the
"National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop
all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL
failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a
building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction
was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still
the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez
Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of
200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others:
(a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction
of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises,
except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12,
2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the
same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint
hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the
designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the
premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and
egress thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was
served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built
on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation
of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served
against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction and
damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights
to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since
1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping,
tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the
subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were
deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the
validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a)
it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise known as
"The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not
approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be
enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have
no cause of action against them since they are not the lawful
owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as
timberland and property belonging to the public domain.
Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the
publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the
subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation
of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon
as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19
declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on the
following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved
and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the
SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c)
Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to
be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control
over timberlands belong to the national government, through
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered,
among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the
public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove
the structures they built thereon without valid building
permits22 since they were found to have no title over the
disputed property.23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing
pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24
granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance
was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the
same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance
with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s
testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and
published in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in
the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were
conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance
was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of
Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to
pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in
relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the
DENR that could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having
enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a
municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is
valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that
petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the Capayas Island,
thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was
denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject
ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances
or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within
three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or
provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days
from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations,
which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an
ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid
in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter
its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding
city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance
cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of
time considering that the same is still pending with the
Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It,
however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already
elapsed from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the
latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed
approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As
properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to
arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear,
based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be
entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the
ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule
of statutory construction that the parts of a statute must be
read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them
and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting
each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such
that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and
given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the
moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’
contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor
posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is
noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a
public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of
the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare
allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show
that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was
made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting requirements.40
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence
that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its
enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the
similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v.
Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the
ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence
on the part of the local government to show that public
hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal
lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing;
and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance
was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of
action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions,
petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show
that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment
of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the
Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were
indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were
adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to
establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was
not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United
States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it
a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been
submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233
of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the
Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant
appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in
question was adopted without authority on the part of the
municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The
appellant argues that
there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause
showing that said ordinance had been approved by the
provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the
duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove
ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different
municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, that the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which
the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof
to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative
allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she
has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and
to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings
were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.43
(Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the
CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to
the property in dispute to be entitled to its possession.
Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the
structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without
building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should
now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 promulgated on
29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President
Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities
of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City
for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known
as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation
No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February
1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which
substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said
lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and
730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No.
172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied
some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay
(TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation
and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort
Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with
the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The
Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the
areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of
Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable
land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of
the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land
Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale
of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied
covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6
granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in
question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No.
2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or
inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising
legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or
superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus,
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less
displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on
October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power
had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina
AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil
Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she
held that when the provision of the law is clear and
unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look
into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that
the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum
originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No.
2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the
field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and
24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division
rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and
January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement
of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for
lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent
motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by
filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS
THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON
THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172
LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS
BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
>INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT
DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN
ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS
INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476
on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of
Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President
intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification
of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he
made a notation just below the printed version of
Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was
not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of
whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has
the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the
Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided"
refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of
publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the
landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the
occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result;
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with
it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice.
In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say,
those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if
they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.
The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court
cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the
note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or
other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President
Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule
that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none.
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers,
inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or
interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto
itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation
that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009
is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order
dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending
motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having
been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or
credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue
District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good
during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses
amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was
not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its
quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its
claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted
upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected.
-- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner;
but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or
not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or
duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax
or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner
may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax,
where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously
paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return
on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights,
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-
five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period
under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims
was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap
year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after
respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16
Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According
to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the
fact that a particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the
periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April
15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days
each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit
shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21
Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22
Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or
before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for
review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis,
however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned
from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should
the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that
when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v.
Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof
provides:
 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
computed according to the number of days the specific month
Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period
contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
(reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar

without regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is
Year 1
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and 1st
including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one
calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January
1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January calendar month
31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29,
2008.30
April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration

that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly 2nd
(when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31 Section 27,
Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
calendar month
states:

May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
3rd

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express

repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the calendar month
laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only
impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1 June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal 4th

must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the
legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and calendar month
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the 5th
Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
calendar month
Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
number of days is irrelevant.

August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the
manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that 6th
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
calendar month

calendar month

September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

7th

14th

calendar month

calendar month

October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

8th

15th

calendar month

calendar month

November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

9th

16th

calendar month

calendar month

December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

10th

17th

calendar month

calendar month

January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

11th

18th

calendar month

calendar month

February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

12th

19th

calendar month

calendar month

March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2 October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

13th
20th 5. G.R. No. 183449 March 12, 2012

calendar month ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, Petitioner,

vs.

November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

21st DECISION

calendar month PERALTA, J.:

December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
Resolutions dated September 21, 20071 and May 19, 2008 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410 which
22nd dismissed the petition for review filed by petitioner Alfredo
Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time, and denied
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
calendar month

In an Information3 dated June 5, 2003, petitioner was charged

with the crime of Direct Assault before the Municipal Trial
January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
Court (MTC) of Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

23rd

That on or about the 8th day of December, 2002, at 1:00 early

morning, more or less, in Purok 10, Barangay Abilan,
calendar month Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000 hack one JOSE B. RELLON, an elected Punong Barangay, while
in the performance of his duties, and accused fully know that
Jose B. Rellon is a Barangay Official, to the damage and
24th prejudice of said Jose B. Rellon.

calendar month CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 148 of the revised Penal Code.4

March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000 When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,

2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month
Thereafter, trial ensued.
from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence,
it was filed within the reglementary period.

The evidence of the prosecution and the defense is

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled
Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
summarized by the MTC as follows:
To substantiate the alleged commission of the crime of direct
assault by the accused, complaining witness Jose B. Rellon
declared inter alia, that he has been the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte since the year
2002. On December 8, 2002, at about 1:00 o'clock in the early
morning, he was at the benefit dance sponsored by the
Sangguniang Kabataan at Purok 4, Barangay Abilan,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. He met accused Alfredo
Montajes who uttered to him the words "YOU'RE A USELESS
CAPTAIN." Other words of similar import were likewise uttered
by the accused against him which he could no longer recall.
After uttering the said words, the accused then drew his bolo
locally known as "lagaraw" and approached him. He then
moved backward, but the accused came near to him and struck
him once with the "lagaraw." Luckily, complainant was not hit
as he managed to move backward. Complainant's daughter
named Vilma Dector and his wife, approached him and
brought him home. Many people, including two (2) CVO
(Rodelio Laureto and Victorio Trinquite), witnessed the
incident.
During the mediation in the barangay hall, an investigation was
conducted. The accused, according to the complainant, asked
for forgiveness from him which he declined, as he was of the
impression that the law must be applied and the accused
should instead ask for forgiveness in court.
As proof that the accused asked for forgiveness, complainant
presented a document (Exh. "B") to that effect.
Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as
evidenced by an extract thereof.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that he went to
the benefit dance to stop it since it was already 1:00 o'clock in
the early morning and the benefit dance was still going on
when it was supposed to end at 12:00 o'clock midnight as the
permit he gave was only up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. As a
result of the stoppage of the benefit dance, many persons got
angry, and he heard that the house of the accused was stoned
which made the accused angry. In fact, he saw the accused
murmuring as his house was stoned by unknown persons.
When the accused came near to him, the former did not ask
for assistance from him.
Prosecution witness Rodelio Laureto corroborated the
declaration of the complainant that it was the accused who
hacked the complainant with the use of a "lagaraw," but failed
to hit him.
Accused Alfredo Montajes testified that in the evening of
December 7, 2002, he was at home listening to the disco as
there was a benefit dance near their house. The benefit dance
started at 7 o'clock in the evening and ended at 1 o'clock in the
early morning of December 8, 2002 when it was stopped by
Barangay Captain Jose Rellon. It was then that trouble started
because many of those who have paid but were not anymore
allowed to dance complained to the Barangay Captain and
requested that they be given one more music so that they
could avail for what they have paid for on that benefit dance,
as they were not refunded with their payments. When this
protest went on, the CVO's reacted by clubbing them using
their jackets. Then a stoning incident followed. One of those
hit by stones was his house. This made him wild prompting him
to get his "lagaraw" to look for the people responsible for
stoning his house. While looking for these persons along the
road, he saw Barangay Captain Jose Rellon who was then two
(2) meters away from him, and he responded by telling him
that he was looking for those persons responsible for the
stoning of his house. The complainant wanted to get the
"lagaraw" from him but he refused.
The accused explained, when confronted with a document
(Exh. "B") wherein it was stated that he asked for apology from
the Barangay Captain during the barangay level conciliation,
that it was for the sole purpose of not elevating this case and
that they would settle amicably.
The accused also vehemently denied the accusation that he
attacked the barangay captain.
Defense witness Luis A. Cajeles, Jr., a Barangay Kagawad of
Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, testified that
at about 1:00 o'clock in the early dawn of December 8, 2002,
he heard of stoning and shouting, in fact the window grill of his
house was hit and he heard the people in panic. As a barangay
kagawad assigned to the Peace and Order Committee, he went
out immediately from his house and went to the road across
the basketball court where the stoning was. He then saw
accused Alfredo Montajes holding a bolo. The accused was
shouting that he was looking for the persons who stoned his
house. He also witnessed that the barangay captain asked the
accused why he was bringing a bolo and the accused replied
that he was looking for the persons who stoned his house. He
did not know what else happened because he tried to drive the
teenagers to their homes, because it was already very late in
the evening.
On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for
forgiveness during the confrontation at the Barangay because
of the disturbance he made to the barangay captain and to the
community because some people were in panic as he was
bringing a bolo, and not for attacking the Barangay Captain.
Anatolio Lozada Bangahon, another defense witness, testified
that he saw the accused coming out from his house carrying a
bolo, and when he asked him why he was bringing a bolo, the
accused replied that he was going to look for the persons who
stoned his house. The accused was roaming around to look for
the persons who stoned his house, but he was not looking after
the Barangay Captain.6
On December 29, 2005, the MTC issued its Judgment7 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault. The dispositive
portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALFREDO MONTAJES y
JACA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct
Assault as defined and penalized under Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indefinite
prison term of FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE DAY of arresto
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS,
NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of prision correccional in its
medium period, as maximum, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the
offense charged. The accused is likewise ordered to pay a fine
of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,000.00) Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Butuan
City, rendered its Decision9 dated January 23, 2007 affirming
in toto the judgment of the MTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC
denied in an Order10 dated May 4, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for
extension of time to file petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days
from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file
his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for
review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution
dismissing the petition outright for being filed out of time. In
so ruling, the CA said:
As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of
the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on May
4, 2007, Thus, the 15-day reglementary period within which to
file a petition for review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday)
considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007.
It appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May
21, 2007 (Monday) and not from May 19, 2007 (Saturday).
Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from
May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is well settled that
when the day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a
legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time, the
extension should be counted from the last day which is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated May 19, 2008.
Petitioner is now before us on the issue of whether the CA
erred in denying due course to his petition for review for being
filed out of time.
Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time
to file a petition for review with the CA pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; that based on such provision, if
the last day to file a petition falls on a Saturday, the time shall
not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the
reglementary period within which to file the said petition for
review with the CA fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file
the petition was moved to the next working day which was
May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in asking the
CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition
and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. Nonetheless, petitioner
asks for liberality in the interest of justice taking into
consideration the merit of his petition claiming that his
conviction was not supported by the evidence on record.
Moreover, he claims that his petition for review was filed with
the CA on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA
dismissed the same on September 21, 2007 for being filed out
of time. He prays that the CA resolutions be reversed and set
aside and the CA be directed to give due course to his petition
and to resolve the case on the merits.
We grant the petition.
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by
petitioner provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to
be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last
day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re:
Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next
Working Day is Granted) which reads:
xxxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in
courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the
next working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is
extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately
following where the last day of the period is a Saturday,
Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension
of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from
the next working day and not from the original expiration of
the period.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the
Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks
only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks
an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to
be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any
extension of time to file the required pleading should
therefore be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday
or legal holiday.
In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,12 we said:
Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a
party desire to file any pleading, even a motion for extension
of time to file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the next working
day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.
However, according to the same circular, the petition for
review on certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The provision
states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due
date for the extended period shall be counted from the original
due date, not from the next working day on which the motion
for extension was filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty
Commission, we had occasion to expound on the matter. In
that case, we held that the extension granted by the court
should be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period.
In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for
extension was within the period provided by law, the filing of
the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an
additional period of 30 days within which to file the petition.
Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on
May 8, 2006. Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is,
3 days late.13
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the
last day of the period for doing any act required by law falls on
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In
this case, the original period for filing the petition for review
with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing
of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last
day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time.
However, petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he
be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007
within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for
review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for
extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated September
21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out
of time.
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review
was filed out of time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-
2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be
tacked to the original period and commences immediately
after the expiration of such period.14 Thus, counting 15 days
from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007,
the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late.
However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to
merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice
and fair play.1âwphi1
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5,
2007, which was long before the CA issued its Resolution dated
September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for
being filed out of time. There was no showing that respondent
suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by
reason of such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was
sought to be reversed in the petition for review filed in the CA
had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting petitioner of direct
assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioner’s
liberty.15 We do not find anything on record that shows
petitioner's deliberate intent to delay the final disposition of
the case as he had filed the petition for review within the
extended period sought, although erroneously computed.
These circumstances should have been taken into
consideration for the CA not to dismiss the petition outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the
petition for review does not automatically warrant the
dismissal thereof.16 And even assuming that a petition for
review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of
substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax
the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of
our equity jurisdiction.17
Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice.18 After
all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected.19 Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case,
free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is
ORDERED to reinstate the Petition for Review filed by
petitioner in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2, 20062 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No.
05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and
Tessie Sy.

The antecedents are as follows—
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the
RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses William and
Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to
her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762
and 71860 for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan,
both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having
been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January
20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos.
341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the
estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No.
98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of
Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No.
98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any
liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal
in nature."4
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer,
the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order5 dated February 7, 2005 on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.1avvphi1
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents
before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6 for collection
of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452)
based on the same loaned amount of ₱600,000.00 covered by
the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg.
22 cases.
In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch
18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of
₱600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in
the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court
denied in its Order9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition,
raising the sole legal issue –
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on
the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of
criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present
case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the
failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused
(respondents herein)?10
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases
were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should
not apply, as it must be given only prospective application. She
further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to
the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter—
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is
necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even
more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where
the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the
right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu
and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the Civil Code;
and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under
Article 2912 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any
private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases
against respondents, where the petitioner has not made any
waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not
instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount
of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the
civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.13
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of
both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover
the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending
before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our
ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civil
liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be
the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the
estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
simultaneously available to the complaining party, without
traversing the prohibition against forum shopping.15 Prior to
the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case,
petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have
elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in
the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other.16
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution
to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no
pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused and
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared
that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature—
produced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of
her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly
instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code.17
However, although this civil action could have been litigated
separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on
reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also
elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the
BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to
establish the identity of the accused, the question that arises
is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as
the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s
action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to
prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states –
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing
fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP
Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.18
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action
for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil
action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be
stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file
a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in
court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the
civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be
fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the
BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for
failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In
view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP
Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.19
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the
courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient,
and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be
adhered to in order to attain this objective.20
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it
appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to
recover from respondents the ₱600,000.00 allegedly loaned
from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of
Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings
No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin
Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was
reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents
would raise the same defense that petitioner had already
elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the
checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she
was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22
proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the
public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause
when he failed to have her establish the identities of the
accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil
action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s
recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would
have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount
loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks.
Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her
failure to appeal within the reglementary period was
tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover
the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross
mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are
constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel.22 But this rule admits of exceptions
– (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that
the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2)
where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law.23 Tested against these guidelines, we hold that
petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-
informed of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.
Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be
able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations
as members of the Bar.24 Further, lawyers in the government
service are expected to be more conscientious in the
performance of their duties as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also
public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.25
Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself
with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22
cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he
failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP
Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to
petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to
respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on
demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in
court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay
their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s
observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part
of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be
proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned
amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of
respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of
their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied
against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a
person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking
this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party
has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth,
and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which
will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is
the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice
and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred
by technicalities.27 For reasons of substantial justice and
equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks
to dispense justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-
112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie
Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC.,
Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME
VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO,
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES
MAY SUE IN PHILIPPINE COURTS; LICENSE NOT NECESSARY. —
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the
Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by
foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted
provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is
understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have
the license required by law, and until it complies with the law
in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to
maintain any suit in local courts. As thus interpreted, any
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may
maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action,
provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within
the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines
without such license which debars the foreign corporation
from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign
corporation is without license to transact business in the
Philippines, it does not follow that It has no capacity to bring
an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in
business in the Philippines. Based on Article 133 of the
Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards,
petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present
action. There is no showing that, under our statutory of case
law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying
on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a
license before they can seek redress from our courts. No
evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have
performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific
act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business
in the Philippines.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREIGN CORPORATION; "DOING BUSINESS" OR
"TRANSACTING BUSINESS", CONSTRUED. — No general rule or
governing principle can be laid down as to what constitutes
"doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case
must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental
circumstances. The true tests, however, seem to be whether
the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of
the business or enterprise for which it was organized or
whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over
to another. As a general proposition upon which many
authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as
may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms
of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign
corporation is "doing", "transacting", "engaging in", or carrying
on "business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it
has entered the State by its agent and is there engaged in
carrying on and transacting through them some substantial
part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous
in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual,
sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts. The
Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts
constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a
continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works
or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to
or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its
organization.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT PETITIONERS ARE COPYRIGHT
OWNERS OR OWNERS OF EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS
OF FILMS, NOT AN INDICATION OF "DOING BUSINESS." - The
fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or
owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines
motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into
an indicium of doing business which would require them to
obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in
local courts.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
CANNOT BE DEEMED AS "DOING BUSINESS." — With express
authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, tantamount
to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how
exercising one’s legal and property rights and taking steps for
the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the
appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of
themselves to be doing business here.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENGAGING IN LITIGATION, NOT WITHIN THE
MEANING OF "DOING BUSINESS." — In accordance with the
rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of
the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it
is held that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of
a suit, particularly if the transation which is the basis of the suit
took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of
business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal
thereof is neither the making of contract nor the doing of
business within a constitutional provision placing foreign
corporations licensed to do business in the State under the
same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to
such acts as domestic corporations. Merely engaging in
litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum
contact to warrant the exercise of Jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF
LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, DISTINGUISHED FROM LACK OF
PERSONALITY TO SUE. — Among the grounds for a motion to
dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to
sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of
legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the
character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a
case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that
the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded
on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity
to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any
other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to
the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue,
whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, NOT LACK OF
PERSONALITY TO SUE, PROPER GROUND AGAINST A FOREIGN
CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE. — As a
consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private
respondents’ basis for arguing that petitioners are barred from
maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines without a
license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their
pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to
bring an action before Philippine courts. Applying the above
discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for
barring recourse, to our courts by an unlicensed foreign
corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines
should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of
personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights
have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real
party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to
comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to
maintain any suit before our courts.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE; NEVER
INTENDED TO INSULATE FROM SUIT UNSCRUPULOUS
ESTABLISHMENT FOR VIOLATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS OF
UNSUSPECTING FOREIGN FIRMS. — The doctrine of lack of
capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license
is based on considerations of public policy. It was never
intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous
establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid
obligations or violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign
firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do
business in the country.
9. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN
CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655), WITH NO RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION. — Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the
doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our
considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling (164 SCRA
655) calling for the production of the master tape of the
copyrighted films for determination of probable cause cannot
be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the
quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that" (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the
same Code declares that" (j)udicial decisions applying the laws
or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." Jurisprudence, in our system of government,
cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it
cannot create law. While it is true that Judicial decisions which
apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the
legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial
decision, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the
legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil
Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court
emphatically declared in Co v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. that the
principle of prospectivity applies not only to original or
amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars,
but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — Our holding in the earlier
case of People v. Jabinal echoes the rationale for this judicial
declaration, viz.: Decisions of this Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system."
The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally
passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim
"legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. . ., but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof .
11. ID.; COURTS; JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION BECOMES PART
OF THE LAW OF THE LAND AS OF THE DATE THAT LAW WAS
ORIGINALLY PASSED; QUALIFICATION. — It is consequently
clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as
of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the
qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a
reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then,
if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
12. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN
CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655) SERVES AS A GUIDEPOST
IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES ONLY WHERE THERE IS
DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE NEXUS BETWEEN THE MASTER TAPE
AND THE PIRATED COPIES. — The supposed pronunciamento
in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the
master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a
guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in
copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the
true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies.
An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case
could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was
hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement
in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta
should always be construed within the factual matrix of their
parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could
unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the
reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655)
DOES NOT RULE OUT USE OF TESTIMONIAL OR
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. — It is evidently incorrect to
suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do,
that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of
master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to
meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the
absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master
tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of
evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made
through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses
of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure,
however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or
documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other
classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,
especially where the production in court of object evidence
would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of
proportion to its evidentiary value.
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS. — Of
course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance
except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants
on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the
purpose to protect against all general searches. Indeed, Article
III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the Judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof
provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
15. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH
WARRANT; MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE. — The constitutional (Sections 2 and 3,
Article III) and statutory (Sections 3,4,5 of Rule 126 of the Rule
of Court) provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing
of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are
mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing
has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the
issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable
cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED. — At best, the
term "probable cause" has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in
the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, or the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable
mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the
applicant for the warrant is true. Probable cause does not
mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute
certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is not concerned with the question of whether the
offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether
the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. The
requirement is less than certainty or proof , but more than
suspicion or possibility. In Philippine jurisprudence, probable
cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. It being the duty of the
issuing officer to issue, or refused to issue, the warrant as soon
as practicable after the application therefor Is filed, the facts
warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed
at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using
legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and
not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE
THEREOF. — The prescribed procedure for the issuance of a
search warrant are: (1) the examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the
judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on
facts personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which
were duly attached to the records.
18. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY); INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT,
CONSTRUED. — The essence of intellectual piracy should be
essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity
by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy,
which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the
copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred
by statute on the owner of the copyright.
19. ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT; COPY OF A PIRACY IS AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL. — A copy of a piracy is an
infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the
pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was
indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he was
infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he was
copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining
the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied
from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To
constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or
even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so
much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.
20. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH
WARRANT; MUST PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THINGS TO BE
SEIZED. — A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the description therein
is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People
v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent
of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited
to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court). If the articles desired to be seized have any direct
relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence.
21. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY); REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT
REQUIREMENT, PREREQUISITE ONLY TO A SUIT FOR
DAMAGES. — It is pointless for private respondents to insist on
compliance with the registration and deposit requirements
under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking
the court’s protective mantle in copyright infringement cases.
As explained by the court below: As correctly pointed out by
private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice
has resolved this legal question as far back as December 12,
1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do
not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49 "had done
away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic
works" and that "even without prior registration and deposit
of a work which may be entitled to protection under the
Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its
rights." He cannot demand, however, payment of damages
arising from infringement. The same opinion stressed that "the
requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained
under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of
copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for
damages." The statutory interpretation of the Executive
Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.
22. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS THEREUNDER SUBSISTS FROM MOMENT
OF CREATION. — Section 2 of the decree prefaces its
enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit
statement that "the rights granted under this Decree shall,
from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of
the following classes of works." This means that under the
present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired
by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in
the absence of registration and deposit.
23. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY OR CONSENT TO SELL,
LEASE, DISTRIBUTE OR CIRCULATE COPYRIGHTED FILMS
CONSTITUTES FILM PIRACY; LICENSE FROM THE VIDEOGRAM
REGULATORY BOARD, NOT A BAR TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION. — This case has been fought on the basis of,
and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a
virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without so
much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing
that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The
fact that private respondents could not show proof of their
authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners
for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners’
copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower courts
initial finding of probable cause. That private respondents are
licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate
from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business
practices.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its
resolution 2 of May 10, 1993 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, both of which sustained the order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated
November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-
053 earlier issued per its own order 4 on September 5, 1988
for violation of section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Decree on the Protection
of Intellectual Property."cralaw virtua1aw library
The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as
amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy
drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet
surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila
including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),
owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at
No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes
applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against
Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video
tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a
list attached to the application; and, television sets, video
cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other
machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the
unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or
disposition of videograms tapes in the premises above
described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior Agent
Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated
in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was
corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty.
Rico V. Domingo’s deposition was also taken. On the basis of
the affidavits depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes,
Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant No
87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 9, as amended, was
issued by the court a quo.
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on
December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives.
In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the
search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video
tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or
exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines,
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials,
accessories all of which were included in the receipt for
properties accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the
receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A.
Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home
Video.
On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed
with the Court.
A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but
was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed.
The court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration
and justified it in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films
from which the pirated films were allegedly copies (sic), were
never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the
search warrants in question. The orders of the Court granting
the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift
order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in error.
Consequently, they must be set aside." (p. 13, Appellant’s
Brief) 5
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial, court
granting private respondents’ motion for reconsideration, thus
lifting the search warrant which it had therefore issued, to the
Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this Court
particularly challenging the validity of respondent court’s
retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 6 in dismissing
petitioners’ appeal and upholding the quashal of the search
warrant by the trial court.
I in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on
the matter of and the challenge to petitioners’ legal standing
in our courts, they being foreign corporations not licensed to
do business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations,
petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain an
action in Philippines courts. In so challenging petitioners’
personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that
petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive
rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion
pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V.
Domingo as their attorney-at-fact, as being constitutive of
"doing business in the Philippines" under Section 1(f)(1) and
(2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of
Batas Pambansa Bldg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in
Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business.
Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a
search warrant. 7
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing
business in the Philippines, 8 and contend that private
respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that
petitioners are doing such business here, as would require
them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, other than averments in the quoted portions of
petitioners’ "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of
Search Warrant" dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V.
Domingo’s affidavit of December 14, 1987. Moreover, an
exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such
exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing
business nor establish the presumption of doing business. 9
The Corporation Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause
of action recognized under Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the
Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a
foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted
provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is
understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have
the license required by law, and until it complies with the law
maintain any suit in local courts. 10 As thus interpreted, any
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may
maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action,
provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within
the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
prescribed license bud "doing business" in the Philippines
without such license which debars the foreign corporation
from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign
corporation is without license to transact business in the
Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring
an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in
business in the Philippines. 11
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of
what constitutes "doing business" or "transacting business"
within that forum, in which case said provisions are controlling
there. In others where no such definition or qualification is laid
down regarding acts or transactions falling within its purview,
the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held
that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State
must be considered, and every circumstance is material which
indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage
in some part of its regular business in the State. 12
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to
what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting"
business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own
peculiar environmental circumstances. 13 The true tests,
however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is
continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise
for which it was organized or whether it has substantially
retired from it and turned it over to another. 14
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in
principle, subject to such modifications as may be necessary in
view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute
involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is "doing,"
"transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the
State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State
by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and
transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary
or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it
may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or
occasional transactions and isolated acts. 15
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what
acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a
continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works
or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to
or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its
organization. 16
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory
definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in
various pieces of legislation in our jurisprudence.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides:chanrob1es
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SECTION 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. — (1) . . .; and the
phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders,
purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called
"liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or
distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any
calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods
totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business
firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act
or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, and in-progressive prosecution
of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the
business organization.
Presidential Decree No. 1789, 18 in Article 65 thereof, defines
"doing business" to include soliciting orders, purchases,
service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison"
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors
who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar
year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one
hundred eighty days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business
firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act
or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution
of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the
business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential
decree conclude the enumeration of acts constituting "doing
business" with a catch-all definition, thus:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sec. 1(g).’Doing Business’ shall be any act or combination of
acts enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular ‘doing
business’ includes:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to the
extent the performance of acts or, works, or the exercise of
some of the functions normally incident to, or in the
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose
and object of the business organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042 19 embodies such concept in
this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 3. Definitions. — As used in this Act:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
x x x
(d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting orders,
service contracts, opening offices, whether called ‘liaison’
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors
domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay
in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred
eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the management,
supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or
corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that
imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements,
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or
works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain
or of the purpose and object of the business organization:
Provided, however, That the phrase "doing business" shall not
be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a
foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do
business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investors; nor
having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests
in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or
distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts
business in its own name and for its own account.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by
such statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from
maintaining the present action. There is no showing that,
under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing,
transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the
Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they
can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been
offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an
intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission 20 stating that its records do not show
the registration of petitioner film companies either as
corporations or partnerships or that they have been licensed
to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true,
is of no consequence to petitioners’ right to bring action in the
Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners
can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign
film corporations do not transact or do business in the
Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order
to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code lists, among
others —
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts.
Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an
agent of such foreign firm, not acting independently of the
foreign firm amounting to negotiations or fixing of the terms
and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of
where the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall
constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office
or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements
agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the
goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign
firm which does business through the middlemen acting in
their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or
commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in
the Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or
commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing
business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled
in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has
an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name
and for its own account, and not in the name or for the account
of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the
Philippines by a person or local company which does not act in
its name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing
business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that
petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of
exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion
pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an
indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain
a license before they can use upon a cause of action in local
courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as
attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express authority
pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia —
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and
to provide evidence in support of both civil and criminal
proceedings against any person or persons involved in the
criminal infringement of copyright, or concerning the
unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or
distribution of any cinematographic work(s) — films or video
cassettes — of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner
of exclusive rights of owner or copyright or the owner of
exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to
any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of
copyright in such cinematographic work(s), to initiate and
prosecute on behalf of . . . criminal or civil actions in the
Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully
distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any films or
video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the
owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines
pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective
owners of copyright in such works. 21
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see
how exercising one’s legal and property rights and taking steps
for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the
appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of
themselves to be doing business here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as
doing business in the State simply because it enters into
contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are
consummated outside the State. 22 In fact, a view is taken that
a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state merely
because sales of its product are made there or other business
furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent,
whether a corporation or a natural person, where such
activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign
corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an
independent business. 23
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State
by an independent dealer who has purchased and obtained
title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing
of business by the corporation. 24 Likewise, a foreign
corporation which sells its products to persons styled
"distributing agents" in the State, for distribution by then, is
not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to
service of process therein, where the contract with these
purchasers is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign
corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them
at trade prices established by it.25cralaw:red
 failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not
capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation
in engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting
in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court’s rejection of the
the minimum contact test. 26 With much more reason should
common procedural tactics of erring local companies which,
this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for
when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in
legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
business in the Philippines, invoke the latter’s supposed lack of
capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based
on failure to first acquired a local license is based on
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only
considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor
acts in furtherance of the purposes for which a foreign
nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or
corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violations of
and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply
transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the
because they are not licensed to do business in the country. 35
State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The
institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the
making of a contract nor the doing of business within a
constitutional provision placing foreign corporations licensed II
to do business in the State under the same regulations,
limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been
considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive
exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 27
application to the present controversy of the ruling in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al.,
promulgated on August 19, 1988, 36 that for the
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a
private respondents’ basis for arguing that petitioners are search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison
being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary.
without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in
all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal
personality to bring an action before Philippine courts. 28
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is
addressed to the discretion of the court subject to the
determination of probable cause in accordance with the
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of procedure prescribed therefor under Section 3 and 4 of Rule
Court are lack of legal capacity to sue 29 and that the 126. as of the time of the application for the search warrant in
complaint states no cause of action. 30 Lack of legal capacity question, the controlling creation for the finding of probable
to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil cause was that enunciated in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 37 stating
rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
in the case, or does not have the character or representation
he claims. 31 On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack
of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts
party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and
action. 32 The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as
in the place sought to be searched.
on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a
party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a According to petitioners, after complying with what the law
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of then required, the lower court determined that there was
legal capacity to sue, 33 whereas the second can be used as a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and which
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the determination in fact led to the issuance and service on
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further
argued that any search warrant so issued in accordance with
action. 34
all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court
could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis
for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the
warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms,
ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an
a pronouncement which was not existent at the time of such
unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business
determination, on December 14, 1987, and is, the doctrine in
in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue,"
the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on
not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose
August 19, 1988, or over eight months later.
legal rights have been violated is undeniable such, if not the
only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling
of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search
warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th
Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very
essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the
search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox
case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing
law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely
an application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit
that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since
the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the
20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine
promulgated at the time of the solution of private
respondents’ motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal
of the search warrant for failure of the trial court to require
presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the
search warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of
discretion. 38
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the
20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal
of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:chanrob1es
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And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must
be noted that in the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court
quashed the earlier search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among
others that the master tapes or copyrighted films were not
presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the
warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme Court would have
invalidated the warrant just the same considering the very
strict requirement set by the Supreme Court for the
determination of ‘probable cause’ in copyright infringement
cases as enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so
because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in the said case,
the master tapes and the pirate tapes must be presented for
comparison to satisfy the requirement of ‘probable cause.’ So
it goes back to the very existence of probable cause. . . . 39
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare
decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view
that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively
applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners’ consistent position
that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying
therein defendants’ motion to lift the order of search warrant
was properly issued, there having been satisfactory
compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law
for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The
lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence
from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other
than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and
judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that" (l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that"
(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines."cralaw
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Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be
considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create
law. 40 While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or
interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal
system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial
decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the
legal system of the Philippines. 41 Judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.
42
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil
Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court
emphatically declared in Co v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 43 That
the principle of prospectivity applies not only to originator
amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars,
but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in
the earlier case of People v. Jubinal 44 echoes the rationale for
this judicial declaration, vis.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system." The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of
the date that the law was originally passed, since this Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. . . ., but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof . . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 45 where the Court expounded:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
. . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maximum lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional
(Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA (565 [1961]). The same
consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective
effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. . . .
The reasoning behind Senarillos v. Hermosisima 46 that judicial
interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the
date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar.
Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new
law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of
a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining
in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes
a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more
so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. 47 To hold
otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication. 48
There is merit in petitioners’ impassioned and well-founded
argumentation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter
20th Century Fox) was inexistent in December of 1987 when
Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by the lower court. Hence,
it boggles the imagination how the lower court could be
expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in
finding probable cause when the formulation was yet non-
existent.
x x x
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after
conducting searching examination questions of the applicant
and his witnesses that "an offense had been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense (were)
in the place sought to be searched" (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, Et
Al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the
time of the application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower
court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with
any legal requirement for the valid issuance of search warrant.
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as
having followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search
Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant is therefore valid and
binding. It must be noted that nowhere is it found in the
allegations of the Respondents that the lower court failed to
apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it
absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is
simply impossible to have required the lower court to apply a
formulation which will only be defined six months later.
Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with
legal and/or doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the
time they were supposed to have been complied with.
x x x
. . . If the lower court’s reversal will be sustained, what
encouragement can be given to courts and litigants to respect
the law and rules if they can expect with reasonable certainty
that upon the passage of a new rule, their conduct can still be
open to question? This certainly breeds instability in our
system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special
effort to redress their grievances and to protect their property
rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is
most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures then
obtaining would bear but fruits of injustice. 49
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial
decisions imports application thereof not only to future cases
but also to cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision
was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the jural
sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions.
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the
added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the
production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for
determination of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases needs revisiting and clarification.
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from
search warrant proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a
case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted
films in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause
within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures, as applied to copyright infringement
cases involving videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that —
The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from
which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary
for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner’s argument
to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the
time of application may not be necessary as these would be
merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether
or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume
that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video
tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized
sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at
least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to
the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to
the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction
of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual
antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the
decision therein are quoted hereunder, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned
search warrants against the private respondents on the
ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the
said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations
of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed.
Thus the lower court stated in its questioned order dated
January 2, 1986:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"According to the movant, all three witnesses during the
proceedings in the application for the three search warrants
testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino
Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of
the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video
cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal
knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said
that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the
manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has
knowledge of that fact.
"On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the
allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly
belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to
him it is of his personal knowledge.
"At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI
Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for
infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man
Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the
application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare
statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.
"Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude
to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright
infringement law, and although what is required for the
issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause,
that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is
a time-honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task
as an offender under our laws should be interpreted in
strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor
of the alleged offender.
x x x
"This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of
fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973
Constitution.
"So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master
tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to the
purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents’
establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause
hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and
white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
"But the glaring fact is that ‘Cocoon,’ the first video tape
mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly registered
or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition p.
152 record.) So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to
the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of
comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there
was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or
copying of the film of the complainant Twentieth Century
Fox."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned
search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the
private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found by the court,
the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was
the alleged commission of the offense by the private
respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a
witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the
confiscated tapes owned by the private, respondents were
pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much
credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application." (Emphasis ours).
The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial
court therein required the presentation of the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the
existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar
to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court
itself observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is
that the pirated copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the
other types of personal properties which may be seized, were
available for presentation to the court at the time of the
application for a search warrant to determine the existence of
the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones.
Thus, there is no reason not the present them (Italics supplied
for emphasis). 50
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding
the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at
most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus
between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective
and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to
no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly
intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or
similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should
always be construed within the factual matrix of their
parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could
unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the
reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed
the application for search warrant with the lower court
following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging
from his affidavit 51 and his deposition, 52 did testify on
matters within his personal knowledge based on said
complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and
surveillance of the private respondents’ video rental shop.
Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-at-
fact, stated in his affidavit 53 and further expounded in his
deposition 54 that he personally knew of the fact that private
respondents had never been authorized by his clients to
reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of
the copyrighted films.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were
corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private researcher
retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc.
(MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during
the search warrant proceedings. 55 The records clearly reflect
that the testimonies of the above named witnesses were
straightforward and stemmed from matters within their
personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence
and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox
case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their
statements, among others, was what initially and correctly
convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of
probable cause.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents
against the validity of the search warrant, obviously borrowed
from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners’ witnesses — NBI
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C.
Baltazar — did not have personal knowledge of the subject
matter of their respective testimonies and that said witnesses’
claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the
manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact
without basis. 56 The difference, it must be pointed out, is that
the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no
allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by
the lower court, on the part of petitioners’ witnesses; (2) there
is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes
seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones nor
have they shown that they were given any authority by
petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at
least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said
video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the
suspected area was undertaken by petitioner’s witnesses
sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and
depositions regarding matters discovered in the course
thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century
Fox may appear to do, that in copyrighted films is always
necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and
that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true
that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that
in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted
fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use
of the senses of the presiding magistrate. 57 Such auxiliary
procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial
or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other
classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,
58 especially where the production in court of object evidence
would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of
proportion to its evidentiary value. 59
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to search warrants prohibits their issuance
except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants
on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the
purpose to protect against all general searches. 60 Indeed,
Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that
no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3
thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the
following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is
thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be
substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various
jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause before a
search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be
complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an
unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant.
A search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is
void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation,
arbitrary. 61 It behooves us, then, to review the concept of
probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the
American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines
on the matter.
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a
well-defined meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly
difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision;
indeed, no definition of it which would justify the issuance of
a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every
state of facts which might arise, and no formula or standard,
or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be applied
to the facts of every situation. 62 As to what acts constitute
probable cause seem incapable of definition. 63 There is, of
necessity, no exact test. 64
At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged; 65 or the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief
in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances
within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made
by the applicant for the warrant is true. 66
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor
does it important absolute certainty. The determination of the
existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question
of whether the offense charged has been or is being
committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds
for his belief. 67 The requirement is less than certainty or
proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 68
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been
uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. 69 It being the duty of the issuing officer to
issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable
after the application therefor is filed, 70 the facts warranting
the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time
of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal
standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not
those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated
in Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, Et Al., supra, vis-a-vis the
provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing
and controlling legal standards, as they continue to be, by
which a finding or probable cause is tested. Since the
proprietary of the issuance of a search warrant is to be
determined at the time of the application therefor, which in
turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of
the offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing judge,
in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should
logically look to the touchstones in the laws therefore enacted
and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not to
those which had not yet even been conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of
Court attempt to define probable cause, obviously for the
purpose of leaving such matter to the court’s discretion within
the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitution
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of
probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not
command the legislature to establish a definition or formula
for determining what shall constitute probable cause. 71 Thus,
Congress, despite its broad authority to fashion standards of
reasonableness for searches and seizures, 72 does not venture
to make such a definition or standard formulation of probable
cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up
the same, much less limit the determination thereof to and
within the circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all
in deference to judicial discretion and probity. 73
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by
adding a particular requirement (the presentation of master
tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor
implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the
realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no
purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a
court’s prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of
determining the existence of probable cause to a mere
ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law
or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is
or should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence.
Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court
intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master
tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement
cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the
records that the lower court followed the prescribed
procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination
personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the
complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them;
and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings
leading to the issuance of the search warrant now subject to
this controversy:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the instant case, the following facts have been established:
(1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in
Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being sold, leased,
distributed or circulated, or offered for sale, lease, distribution,
or transferred or caused to be transferred by defendants at
their video outlets, without the written consent of the private
complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated
from defendants’ possession were video tapes containing
copyrighted motion picture films without the authority of the
complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or
unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact
reproductions of the film listed in the search warrant whose
copyrights or distribution rights were owned by complainants.
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of
NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and
Rene C. Baltazar. Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc.
(MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against
certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for
violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No. 1988. Atty. Lauro
C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance operations
on said video establishments. Per information earlier gathered
by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale,
rental, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of
copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its
members. Knowing that defendant Sunshine Home Video and
its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized by
MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the purpose of
selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, he instructed his
researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from
said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar
proceeded to Sunshine Home Video and rented tapes
containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No.
26362 dated October 21 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of
P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, he returned to
Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with rental slip No.
25271 also for P10.00. On the basis of the complaint of MPAA
thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine
Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial
Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987. There,
he found the video outlet renting, leasing, distributing video
cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the
authority of MPAA.
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . . 74
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite
its prior detailed and substantiated findings, by stating in its
order of November 22, 1988 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that —
. . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both
involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of private
complainants which were found in the possession or control of
the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the presentation of
the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly
copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish the
existence of probable cause. 75
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper
retroactive application of the master tape requirement
generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation
completely different from that in the case at bar, and without
anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair
play and is a gross reversible error. in fact, this observation of
the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, Et Al.,
supra, may just as easily apply to the present case:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to quash the
search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate
for quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of case. . . .
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the
requisite of presentation of the master tapes in copyright
infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable
cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be
complied with in a search warrant application which, it must
not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on
realistic considerations, a strict application of said requirement
militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which
underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in
police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality,
considering that the master tapes of a motion picture required
to be presented before the court consists of several reels
contained in circular steel casings which, because of their bulk,
will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive objects like
video tapes which can be easily concealed. 76 With hundreds
of titles being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition
would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging
and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over
violations in large scale of intellectual property rights, calling
for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind the Court’s
admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that —
. . . Judges all over the country are well advised to remember
that court processes should not be used as instruments to,
unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual
pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the
Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and
administrative implementation of solemn commitments
pursuant to international conventions and treaties.
III
The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, 77 which would here be
publicized judicially, brought about the revision of its penalty
structure and enumerated additional acts considered violative
of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or
indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any sound
recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so
recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to
be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be
used for profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures,
or other audio-visual works are so transferred without the
written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling,
leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering
for sale, lease, distribution, or possessing for the purpose of
sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of
the abovementioned articles, without the written consent of
the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly
offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form
of compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or
any material with the knowledge that such equipment,
machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another
to reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on
which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual
recordings may be transferred, and which provide distinct
bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes independently
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended,
aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such
infringement under Section 29.
The trial court’s finding that private respondents committed
acts in blatant transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all
the more bolsters its findings of probable cause, which
determination can be reached even in the absence of master
tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The
executive concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing
amendments to the decree for the protection of intellectual
property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial
vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to
technicalities in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in
conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an
appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy,
which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the
copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred
by statute on the owner of the copyright. 78
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no
defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not know what
works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or
not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what
he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In
determining the question of infringement, the amount of
matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important
consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary
that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have
been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original
is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.
79 The question of whether there has been an actionable
infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion
pictures, radio or television being one of fact, 80 it should
properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage
calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the
summary proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant
wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master
tapes.
In disregarding private respondent’s argument that Search
Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, the lower court
observed that "it was worded in a manner that the
enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense
of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only
the seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be used in the
unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts in violation of
PD 49 as amended. . . ." 81
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., Et. Al. v. Ruiz, Et Al.,
82 instructs and enlightens:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of
Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued (Sec 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct
relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence. . . .
On private respondents’ averment that the search warrant was
made applicable to more than one specific offense on the
ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as
there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search
warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the
rule that a search warrant must be issued only in connection
with one specific offense, the lower court said:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
. . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was
issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The
specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of
the copyrighted motion pictures/films belonging to private
complainants which defendants were in control/possession
for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in
contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended. 83
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirate video tapes is not to be
confused with the number of offenses charged. The search
warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance
with the registration and deposit requirements under
presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the
court’s protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As
explained by the court below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers
only producers who have complied with the requirements of
deposit and notice (in other words registration) under Sections
49 and 50 thereof. Absent such registration, as in this case,
there was no right created, hence, no infringement under PD
49 as amended. This is not well-taken.
As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors,
the Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as
far back as December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the
then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated
that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works
and PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration and
deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even without
prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled
to protection under the Decree, the creator can file action for
infringement of its rights." He cannot demand, however,
payment of damages arising from infringement. The same
opinion stressed that "the requirements of registration and
deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions
for the acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as
prerequisites to a suit for damages." The statutory
interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is
entitled (to) weight and respect.
x x x
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his
witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime existed when in
fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49
as amended, does not require registration and deposit for a
creator to be able to file an action for infringement of his
rights. These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an action
for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are shown to
exist, an action for infringement may be initiated. 84
Accordingly, the certifications 85 from the Copyright Section of
the National Library, presented as evidence by private
respondents to show non-registration of some of the films of
petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance,
whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49
reveals that even with respect to works which are required
under Section 26 thereof to be registered and with copies to
deposited with the National Library, such as books, including
composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and
gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and
newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations
prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply
with said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner
of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance
merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects him
to the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree
which prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with
the explicit statement that "the rights granted under this
Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with
respect to any of the following classes of works." This means
that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a
work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment
of creation even in the absence of registration and deposit. As
has been authoritatively clarified:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or
reproductions of the work with the National library within
three weeks after the first public dissemination or
performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D.
No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing a
copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-
compliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to
recover damages in an infringement suit. 86
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the
basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to,
technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private
respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any
credible evidence showing that they conduct their business
legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could
not show proof of their authority or that there was consent
from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or
circulate petitioners’ copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters
the lower court’s initial finding of probable cause. That private
respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board
does not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their
unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that
the reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters have
stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a
hub for intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in
the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not
be glossed over but should be denounced and repressed lest
the Philippines become an international pariah in the global
intellectual community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the
order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of
September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant
No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED
to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate
proceedings as may be called for in this case. Trebles costs are
further assessed against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976
J. AMADO ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO DORONILA, A.
DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976
ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H.
AQUINO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA, Respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for J. Amado Araneta.chanrobles virtual
law library
Mariano Aguilar and Alfonso A. Doronila for Alfonso Doronila
and A. Doronila Resources Development, Inc.
BARREDO, J.:
Two separate but related petitions, that in G.R. No. L-34882
being for certiorari and prohibition against the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of said
court in refusing to dismiss the appeal of private respondents
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a civil
action between the private parties herein, notwithstanding
allegedly that the record on appeal of said private
respondents, Alfonso Doronila et al. does not show on its face,
in violation of Section 6 of Rule 41 and Section 1 of Rule 50,
that their appeal was made on time, and that in G.R. No. L-
35643 being also one for certiorari and prohibition against the
same Court of First Instance of Rizal for having issued a writ of
execution of the decision, the finality of which is in issue in G.R.
No. L-34882, said Court of First Instance having assumed that
because of the restraining order of this Court in said G.R. No.
L-34882 enjoining the appellate court from enforcing its
resolutions refusing to dismiss the appeal of the Doronilas and
from further acting on said appeal until further orders, the
result was that the judgment of said trial court could already
be executed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In connection with the second petition (G.R. No. L-35643), on
November 23, 1974, counsel for therein private respondent J.
Amado Araneta f filed a motion for dismissal of the petition
upon the ground basically that said private respondent "would
prefer to wait for the finality of the decision before availing of
the execution thereof." The Doronilas opposed such dismissal,
unless it is coupled with a final injunction of this Court against
the questioned execution orders of the trial court. Accordingly,
said petition may be disposed of without elaborate
discussion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As regards the first petition (G.R. No. L-34882), it appears that
in Civil Case No. 9856 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an
action filed by J. Amado Araneta for specific performance of an
exclusive option to buy granted by him to Alfonso Doronila, for
himself and for A. Doronila Resources Development
Corporation, over two big parcels of land situated in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, at a total price of
P13,071,215.00, and for damages, the said court, after due
trial, rendered on April 28, 1971 a decision the dispositive part
of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrobles virtual
law library
1. Ordering the defendant Alfonso Doronila to clear the
cadastral survey of Montalban, Rizal, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 7924 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
of all liens and encumbrances, including the mining claims of
Republic Cement Corporation and Silangan Mining
Association, and the claim of Cesario C. Bandong over the
13.6420 hectares thereof; chanrobles virtual law library
2. Ordering defendant A, Doronila Resources Development,
Inc. to clear the San Mateo, Rizal property, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42999, Register of Deeds of Rizal, of
squatters within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision,
and thereafter, within thirty (30) days, to execute in favor of
plaintiff, a deed of sale of said properties, free from all liens
and encumbrances upon the payment of P4,071,215.10, minus
the P40,000.00 option money, in accordance with the option
contract dated February 10, 1966; chanrobles virtual law
library
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P63,448.00
as actual damages and P7,242,250.00 for damages arising from
unrealized profits, with legal interest, from the filing of the
complaint; chanrobles virtual law library
4. Dismissing the counterclaim, with costs against the
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED. (Pp. 168-169, Rec. on Appeal )
From this judgment, the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the
Court of Appeals, but in the said appellate court, J. Amado
Araneta moved to dismiss said appeal. Acting on that motion,
the Court of Appeals resolved as follows:
Plaintiff Appellee, J. Amado Araneta, filed before us a motion
to dismiss appeal of defendants-appellants on the ground that
the record on appeal does not show on its face that the appeal
was perfected on time. Acting upon said motion to dismiss, this
Court in its resolution dated January 27, 1972, required the
defendants appellants to comment thereon within 10 days
from notice. On January 26, 1972, defendants- appellants thru
counsel filed a manifestation asking for a 20-day period within
which to file an answer, which manifestation was favorably
granted by this Court in its resolution dated January 28,
1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On February 10, 1972, defendants-appellants filed their
answer alleging among others that they filed their appeal on
time. In support thereof, they submit a copy of notice of the
trial court (Annex A, Answer) giving them an additional ten day
period within which to file their amended record on
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
An examination of the record shows that on April 28, 1971, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of
J. Amado Araneta, copy of which was received by the
defendants appellants on May 14, 1971. As a consequence,
defendants-appellants immediately filed on May 31, 1971, a
notice of appeal and an appeal bond in the amount of P120.00.
However, due to some deficiencies, the original record on
appeal was ordered amended. So that it was only on June 22,
1971, that the amended record on appeal was filed by the
defendants-appellants. On July 19, 1971, the trial judge
approved the amended record on appeal, thus -
It appearing that the defendants have already included the
motion to dismiss, opposition filed thereto and the resolution
of the court thereon, in the amended Record on Appeal filed
by the defendants, and for want of any further objection on
the part of the plaintiff, AS PRAYED FOR, the amended record
on appeal filed by the defendants is hereby approved. (R.A. p.
172).
From the foregoing data submitted by the defendants-
appellants, we could reasonably infer that the approval was
perfected on time, not to mention in this connection that
plaintiff did not object to the approval of the record on appeal.
The statement of the trial court that 'for want of any further
objection on the part of the plaintiff', is of vital significance
which cannot just be ignored, especially, since, as in this case,
the supreme interest of justice is at stake, considering that the
subject matter of the appeal consist of big parcels of land, with
an aggregate are of 21, 549, 183 square meters, excluding 8
mineral rights and claims of limestones, shale,
etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, considering that the paramount interest of
justice would be best served if we allow the parties to litigate
the facts in issues, the instant motion to dismiss appeal is
hereby denied. (Pp. 33-35, Record.)
And when Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing
resolution, the motion was denied thus:
Acting upon plaintiff-appellee's 'Motion for Reconsideration'
filed on March 9, 1972 of the is Court's resolution dated
February 24, 1972 denying the motion to dismiss appeal; the
Court RESOLVED to DENY the motion for reconsideration. The
instant case can well be an exemption to the rule laid down by
the Supreme Court in the cases cited by the appellee because
of the nature of the issues involved in this litigation. (p. 46,
Record.)
In the present petition with Us, Araneta maintains that under
this Court's rulings in Valera vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 80,
Reyes vs. Carrascoso, 38 SCRA 311, Dominguez vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 SCRA 316, The Director, Bureau of Building and
Real Property Management vs. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 317,
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 333, Imperial Insurance
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 97, Luzon Stevedoring vs.
Court of Appeals, and other cases of similar vein, the
respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal
of the Dornilas, there being no showing on the face of their
amended record on appeal as to when their original record on
appeal was filed, hence said amended record "fails to show on
its face that their appeal was perfected within the period fixed
by the rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
50.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under date of July 29, 1976, however, with commendable
candidness, Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales, counsel for Araneta,
filed a manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal
rulings of this Court in Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53
SCRA 228, Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475 and
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 262, cited by the
Dornilas in their motion in this Court of May 3, 1976, but also
of Our decisions in Heirs of Serafin Morales vs. Court of
Appeals, 67 SCRA 309, Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA
322 and Krueger vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 50, which
abandoned the strict line pursued in the earlier cases cited by
him, albeit insisting just the same that the impugned
resolution of the Court of Appeals is erroneous in the light of
the following observations:
As may be seen, Berkenkotter and Pimentel and subsequent
cases have overruled Valera vs. Court of Appeals, Reyes vs.
Carrascoso, and other cases adhering to the strict construction
of material data rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
But Berkenkotter and Pimentel were promulgated only on
September 28, 1973 and June 25, 1975 respectively, hence, it
can only operate prospectively and will not affect previous
cases appealed before that date, relying on the old doctrine.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law
as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that construed law
purports to carry into
effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the time of Liceria's designation as secret agent in 1961 and
at the time of his apprehension for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit
therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule - the Court's
interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this
jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang
precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine
abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon
and acted on the faith thereof. (People vs. Licera, L-39990, July
22, 1975, 65 SCRA 270, 272, 273)
Therefore, Berkenkotter and Pimentel cannot retroactively
affect the present case, whose appeal was perfected on June
21, 1971.
Leaving aside for the moment, the well thought of issue thus
rather ingeniously raised by distinguished counsel, it is Our
considered opinion that in the particular case on hand, the
omission in the Doronila amended record on appeal of any
reference to the date of the filing of their original record on
appeal is not fatal, even from the point of view of the former
rule of strict "literal adherence to the 'material data rule'", to
borrow Justice Munoz Palma's expression in Krueger, supra.
For here, there is no dispute that within seventeen days, from
May 14, 1971, when Doronila's co-counsel was served with the
decision to May 31, 1971, the date the notice of appeal and
appeal bond were filed, the Doronilas already clearly
manifested their determination to appeal from the evidently
onerous decision which ordered them not only to comply with
the option given them by Araneta but to additionally pay over
P7.8 M to their adversary for actual damages and unrealized
profits, so much so that when an objection was filed to their
original record on appeal, they lost no time in amending the
same by inclusion of the papers referred to in the objection
without waiting for any corresponding order of the court.
1chanrobles virtual law library
Now under the rules (Sec. 7 of Rule 41), unless the court fixes
a period for the filing of the amended record on appeal, the
same may be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order for amendment. We take judicial notice of the fact that
ordinarily, appellants are given not less than said period of ten
days within which to comply with an order to amend the
record on appeal and that it would take at least one week
before the court can consider and rule on the objection of
appellee plus another one week to issue and serve the
corresponding order. So, assuming that the Doronilas filed
their original record on appeal as early as May 31, 1971, which
is already rather extraordinary, since generally, the record on
appeal is filed some days later, they still had a total of 24 days
from May 31 to make a timely appeal by filing their amended
record on appeal. In other words, their reglementary period
would have expired on June 24, 1971. And since the Doronila
amended record on appeal was filed on June 22, 1971, it is
almost Beyond question that their appeal was perfected on
time. Surely, matters of judicial notice constitute part of
whatever data is required under Section 1 of Rule 50 and
Section 6 of Rule 41. And taking the circumstances of judicial
notice already referred to together with the absence of any
further objection in the Part of Araneta to the amended record
on appeal in Question as well as the failure of Araneta to
alleged Categorically that the original record on appeal of the
Doronila was filed out of time or to deny that it was filed within
the reglementary period, We are persuaded that the amended
record on appeal here in dispute sufficiently complies with the
requirements of the
rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It may be added here that when Araneta objected to the
original record on appeal. It was only on the ground of
omission of certain papers therein, not for its being out of
time. Under the omnibus motion rule, "he objection of
untimeliness was waived by Araneta and it is reasonable to
assume that he would not have raised such a clearly
jurisdictional fatality if in fact the original Doronila record on
appeal had been filed out of time. Since the Purpose of the
strict rule of literal compliance with the "material data rule" is
to avoid debate on the timeliness of the appeal, and there is
here no occasion for such debate, such timeliness being a
matter no longer disputable by Araneta, it should follow that
the amended record on appeal may be read in the sense that
the order of the court approving the same includes the finding
that the original thereof had been filed on time. We hold that
thus read, said amended record on appeal sufficiently
complies with the rules. (Berkenkotter supra, and subsequent
rulings analogous thereto.) chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that
the same is not applicable to matters involving controversies
regarding the application of the Rules of Court, if only for the
reason that it is within the power of this Court to excuse failure
to literally observe any rule to avoid possible injustice,
Particularly in cases where, as here, the subject matter is of
considerable value and the judgment being appealed from, at
least the portion thereof sentencing the Doronilas to Pay over
P7.2 M of supposedly unrealized profits., is by its very nature,
reasonably open to possible modification, if not reversal.
Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in
substantive law may not be applied retroactively, specially
when prejudice will result to the party that has followed the
earlier law. That principle does not obtain in remedial law. 2
chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petitions in the above two cases are hereby
dismissed, without any pronouncement as to costs, and the
appeal of the Doronilas in CA-G.R. No. 49139-R, subject of the
petition in G.R. No. L-34882, may now proceed in its regular
course, and the orders of execution issued by the trial court in
Civil Case No. 9856 is hereby set aside and its enforcement is
in consequence enjoined permanently.
9. EN BANC
[ GR NO. 170236, Aug 31, 2006 ]
PEOPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA +
DECISION
532 Phil. 414
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of
qualified rape committed as follows:
On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Rowena
Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute
minor, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his
arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel
Quiachon, 11-year old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the
victim and appellant's daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana
Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.
Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however,
that he no longer wanted to use his father's surname
describing him as "masama" for raping his (Rowel's) sister
Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep in the same
bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling.
Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling while their father,
appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed.
On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of
his sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or
"kumot." His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and
Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything,
however, because he was afraid of their father. Rowel
remained in the room but the following morning, he,
forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he
called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together,
Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had
transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel executed a
sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname
Mateo.[2]
Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had
sexual intercourse with her and even touched her breasts
against her will. She was only eight years old at the time. She
cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant
did to her. She consistently declared that she does not love her
father and wants him to be punished for what he did to her.[3]
Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) General Hospital Health Services testified that she
received a letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to
conduct an examination on Rowena. While she was about to
proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena
was deaf and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate
her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to conduct a physical
examination and, based thereon, she submitted her medico-
legal report.
Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had
a "contusion hematoma" on her left cheek, which was
compatible with her claim that she was slapped by her father.
Rowena also had an "ecchymosis" or "kissmark" at the antero-
lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital injuries
suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did
not show any sign of sexual abuse, when it was opened up, the
following were discovered: "markedly hyperemic urethra and
peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis and markedly
hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to
the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch
with attenuation." Further, the labia was "very red all
throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale
navicular fossa and a very red perineum."[4] All these,
according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent
chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have
happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that
the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in
the 6 o'clock notch.[5]
For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of
appellant Roberto Quiachon.
He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the
barangay hall by their barangay chairman. He did not know
then the reason for the invitation. At the barangay hall, he was
surprised to see the two sisters of his deceased live-in partner
and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his daughter
Rowena had accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he was
taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He suffered
hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he
recovered, he was taken to the Pasig City Police Station and,
thereafter, to jail.
Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor
speech handicap. He denied raping Rowena and alleged that
Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his
deceased common-law wife, held a grudge against him
because he abandoned his family and was not able to support
them. His common-law wife died of cancer and her relatives
were allegedly all interested in his house and other properties.
The said house was being leased and they were the ones
getting the rental income. Further, the nephew of his deceased
partner was sending financial support of US$100 a month for
his child.
According to appellant, even before the death of his common-
law wife, his son Rowel was already hostile to him because he
was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of
any reason why his children, Rowel and Rowena, accused him
of a very serious offense.[6]
After consideration of the respective evidence of the
prosecution and defense, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A
and B[8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, PI00,000.00 as
moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of
the death penalty imposed on appellant. However, pursuant
to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was transferred
and referred to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August
25, 2005, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court. In affirming appellant's conviction, the CA held that
there was no justification to make a finding contrary to that of
the trial court with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.
The CA particularly pointed out that the trial court, after having
"meticulously observed" the prosecution witness Rowel and
complainant Rowena, had declared that "their narration
palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the
material points involved. When the testimony of a rape victim
is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-
examination, and unflawed by an inconsistency or
contradiction as in the present case, the same must be given
full faith and credit."[12]
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and
Rowena recounting the bestial act perpetrated by appellant on
the latter were corroborated by physical evidence as
presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-legal report.
On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only
proffer a bare denial. On this matter, it applied the salutary
rule that denial is not looked upon with favor by the court as it
is capable of easy fabrication. Consequently, the CA held that
appellant's bare denial could not overcome the categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including Rowena,
the victim herself.
The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a
charge so grave as rape against her father because "it is very
unlikely for any young woman in her right mind to fabricate a
story of defloration against her own father, undergo a medical
examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the
trauma and scandal of public trial, put to shame not only
herself but her whole family as well unless she was motivated
by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her."[13]
In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty of death
upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated September 10, 2001,
the prosecution and the defense agreed on the following
stipulation of facts:
The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;
That the accused is the father of the victim; and
The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]
According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the
victim's minority and her relationship to the offender were
alleged in the Information and were duly proved during trial.
These circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim and her
relationship to appellant, are special qualifying circumstances
in the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death.
The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with reached arbitrarily or when the trial court misunderstood or
respect to the damages awarded to conform to prevailing misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if
jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads: considered, might affect the result of the case.[19]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003

of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal
In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and
Case No. 120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto
credence to the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The trial
Quiachon y Bayona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
court observed that Rowel and Rowena "never wavered in
qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the accused- their assertion that accused sexually abused Rowena. Their
appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Quiachon, narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord
the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral with the material points involved."[20] Further, the trial court
accorded great evidentiary weight to Rowena's testimony. It
damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
justifiably did so as it characterized her testimony to be
"simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-
examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on
contradiction."[21]
October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of
this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were
corroborated by Dr. Guialani's medico-legal report:[22]

Costs de oficio. PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS/PHYSICAL INJURIES

SO ORDERED.[15] Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm noted at the left

mandibular area of the left cheek compatible with the
In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the
disclosed slapping of the cheek by her father; 2x2 cm
parties were required to submit their respective supplemental
ecchymosis (kissmark) noted at the antero-lateral border of
briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it
the left breast
would no longer be filing a supplemental brief. Similarly,
appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
that he would no longer file a supplemental brief.
EXTERNAL GENITALIA

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court

Tanner 2
affirms the conviction of appellant.
Pubic hair - none

Labia majora - no evident sign of injury at the time of

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by
three (3) well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape examination
can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult Labia minora - no evident sign of injury at the time of
to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, examination
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the URETHA
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
AND
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be ERIURETHRAL AREA
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial consideration
in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus and periurethral area
credibility of complainant's testimony.[17]
PERIHYMENAL

AREA
Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of
credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in a better position AND
than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
FOSSA NA VICULARIS
evidence having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying.[18]

Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area, and pale fossa

navicularis
In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on
the record that would impel this Court to deviate from the HYMEN
well-entrenched rule that appellate courts will generally not
disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless these were
Tanner 2
Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted at 5 o 'clock with
attenuation of the hymenal rim from 5 o 'clock to 7 o 'clock;
very hyperemic hymen
PERINEUM
Hyperemic perineum
DISCHARGE
Whitish, foul-smelling discharge, minimal in amount noted
IE AND SPECULUM EXAM
Not indicated
ANAL EXAMINATION
No evident sign of injury at the time of examination;
REMARKS
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
COLLECTED
None
LABORATORY
EXAMINATION
Requested a) Urinalysis
b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
IMPRESSIONS
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)
For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage
and competence to appear in court.
Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark)
and ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border of the left breast
show clear evidence of Physical Abuse.
Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing
findings were consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual abuse.
Specifically, her internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse
such as: "markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area
with fossa navicularis, markedly hyperemic perineum,
markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal
margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation."
Further, Rowena's labia was "very red all throughout, with
hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a
very red perineum."[23] All these, according to Dr. Guialani,
were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma
and recent injury which could have happened a day before the
examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation
sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[24] Dr.
Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute.
Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution,
appellant's simple denial of the charge against him must
necessarily fail. The defense of denial is inherently weak. A
mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[25]
All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant
guilty of raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying
circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to
appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and
their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of
facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on appellant.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is
reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which
reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this
case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable
to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is
embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.[28]
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3
of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not
be eligible for parole."
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court,
following prevailing jurisprudence,[29] correctly awarded the
following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is
awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral
damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages
even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in light of the presence of the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the
appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but
on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of
the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A.
No. 9364, the Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to
maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No.
9346.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August
25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto
Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.
10. EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18649. February 27, 1965.]
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco for
Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. TAXATION; AD VALOREM MINING TAXES ON CEMENT;
BASED ON ACTUAL MARKET VALUE OF QUARRIED MINERALS.
— The collectible ad valorem tax on cement under Sections
243 and 246 of the Tax Code is based on the actual market
value of the quarried minerals, like limestone and shale, and
not on the selling price of the cement produced.
2. ID.; AD VALOREM MINING TAXES; NATURE AS TAX ON
PRIVILEGE OF MINING. — The ad valorem tax on mining is a tax
not on the minerals, but upon the privilege of severing or
extracting the same from the earth, the government’s right to
exact the said impost springing from the Regalian theory of
State ownership of its natural resources.
3. ID.; MINERAL PRODUCTS; NATURE OF, FOR AD VALOREM
TAX. — The inclusion of the term mineral products is intended
to comprehend cases where the mined or quarried elements
may not be usable in its original state without application of
simple treatments, such as washing, or cutting them into sizes,
which process does not necessarily involve the change or
transformation of the raw materials into a composite, distinct
product.
4. ID.; CEMENT NOT CONSIDERED MINERAL PRODUCTS FOR
PURPOSES OF AD VALOREM TAX. — While cement is
composed of 80% mineral, it is not merely an admixture or
blending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. It is
the result of a definite process, the crushing of minerals,
grinding, mixing, calcining, cooling, adding of retarder or raw
gypsum. In short, before cement reaches its saleable form, the
minerals had already undergone a chemical change through
manufacturing process. This could not have been the state of
"mineral products’ that the law contemplates for purposes of
imposing the ad valorem tax. While the selling price of cement
may reflect the actual market value of cement, said selling
price cannot be taken as the market value also of the minerals
composing the cement. And it was not the cement that was
mined, only the mineral composing the finished product.
DECISION
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition filed by the Cebu Portland Cement Company
(CEPOC) for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
(in CTA Case No. 708) denying its claim against the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for refund of the sum of
P476,208.50, representing alleged overpayments of ad
valorem taxes for the period of from January 1, 1957 to June
30, 1959, on the ground that said court erred in upholding the
assessment and collection thereof based on the selling price of
the cement petitioner produced and not on the value of the
limestone and shale it quarried and used in the production of
the cement.
There is no controversy as to the fact that for the period of
from April 16, 1957 to July 20, 1959, for the cement it
produced and sold, petitioner was assessed and paid ad
valorem taxes in the total sum of P502,975.28; that its demand
for refund of alleged overpayment having been denied,
petitioner filed on October 15, 1959, a corresponding petition
in the Court of Tax Appeals against the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that after due hearing,
the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision on June 21, 1961,
declaring the collection of the ad valorem tax based on the
selling price of cement to have been made in accordance with
Section 243 in relation to Section 246 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 1
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 243. Ad valorem taxes on output of mineral lands not
covered by lease. — There shall be assessed and collected on
the actual market value of the annual gross output of the
minerals or mineral products extracted or produced from all
mineral lands, not covered by lease, an ad valorem tax payable
to the Collector of Internal Revenue, in the amount of one and
one-half per centum of the value of said output.
"Before the mineral products are removed from the mines, the
Collector of Internal Revenue or his representative shall first
be notified of such removal on a form prescribed for the
purpose.
"SEC. 245. Time and manner of payment of royalties or ad
valorem taxes. — The royalties or ad valorem taxes, as the case
may be, shall be due and payable upon removal of the mineral
products from the locality where mined. However, the output
of the mine may be removed from such locality without the
prepayment of such royalties or ad valorem taxes if the lessee,
owner or operator shall file a bond in the form and amount
and with such sureties the payment of such royalties or ad
valorem taxes, . . .
"SEC. 246. Definitions of the terms ‘gross output’, ‘minerals’
and ‘mineral products’ — Disposition of royalties and ad
valorem taxes. — The term ‘gross output’ shall be interpreted
as the actual market value of minerals or mineral products, or
of bullion from each mine or mineral lands operated as a
separate entity without any deduction from mining, milling,
refining, transporting, handling, marketing, or any other
expenses: Provided, however, . . . The word ‘minerals’ shall
mean all inorganic substances found in nature whether in
solid, liquid, gaseous, or any intermediate state. The term
‘mineral products’ shall mean things produced by the lessee,
concessionaire or owner of mineral lands, at least eighty per
cent of which things must be minerals extracted by such
lessee, concessionaire, or owner of mineral lands. Ten per
centum of the royalties and ad valorem taxes herein provided
shall accrue to the municipality and ten per centum to the
province where the mines are situated, and eighty per centum
to the National Treasury." (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner contends that the collectible ad valorem tax
should be based on the actual market value of the quarried
minerals that were used in the production of cement; whereas,
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue maintains that,
as the cement produced by petitioner consists of 80%
minerals, the same is a mineral product pursuant to the
definition given in Section 246 of the Tax Code, and the ad
valorem tax should be based on its selling price.
It is noteworthy that under Section 242 of the same Code, with
respect to leased mineral lands, the lessee shall pay to the
government, not only rentals for the use of the land, but also
royalty, on the minerals extracted therefrom. These imposts
are levied "for the privilege of exploring, developing mining,
extracting and disposing of the minerals" from said land. With
respect to mineral lands not under lease. Section 243 governs,
and imposes ad valorem tax on the actual market value of the
gross output of the minerals or mineral products extracted
therefrom. Both sections 242 and 243 are under Title VI of the
Tax Code which refers to Mining Taxes. As under Section 242,
the rentals and royalties collectible from the lessees and
concessionaires of the leased lands are for the privilege of
mining and extracting minerals therefrom, so it may be said
that the ad valorem tax imposed by Section 243 upon those
extracting minerals and mineral products from lands not under
lease, is also for the same purpose, i.e., the privilege of mining
and extracting minerals from said lands. In other words, ad
valorem tax is a tax not on the minerals, but upon the privilege
of severing or extracting the same from the earth, the
government’s right to exact the said impost springing from the
Regalian theory of State ownership of its natural resources.
There can be no question that quarried minerals have their
own market value. The dispute here arose, however, from the
construction given to the term mineral products, which was
defined in Section 246 of the Tax Code, as "things produced by
the lessee, concessionaire, or owner of mineral lands, at least
eighty per cent of which things must be minerals extracted by
such lessee, concessionaire or owner of mineral lands."
Respondent argues that since the portland cement produced
by petitioner 2 consists of 8% minerals quarried from its mines,
such cement falls within the definition of a mineral product
and the imposable ad valorem tax should be based on its
selling price which is its actual market value.
This line of argument suffers from two infirmities: First, while
cement is composed of 80% minerals, it is not merely an
admixture or blending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale
and others. It is the result of a definite process — the crushing
of minerals, grinding, mixing, calcining, cooling, adding of
retarder or raw gypsum. In short, before cement reaches its
saleable form, the minerals had already undergone a chemical
change through manufacturing process. This could not have
been the state of "mineral products" that the law
contemplates for purposes of imposing the ad valorem tax. It
must be remembered that, as aforestated, this tax is imposed
on the privilege of extracting or severing the minerals from the
mines. To our minds, therefore, the inclusion of the term
mineral products is intended to comprehend cases where the
mined or quarried elements may not be usable in its original
state without application of simple treatments, such as
washing, or cutting them into sizes, which process does not
necessarily involve the change or transformation of the raw
materials into a composite, distinct product. Secondly,
respondent cannot use the selling price of the product in this
case as gauge of its actual market value. The cement here is
manufactured by petitioner itself out of materials quarried
from its mines. While the selling price of cement may reflect
the actual market value of cement, said selling price cannot be
taken as the market value also of the minerals composing the
cement. And it was not the cement that was mined, only the
minerals composing the finished product.
Anent respondent’s contention, however, that the taxes
collected and paid two years before the filing of the action in
the Court of Tax Appeals are barred by prescription, the same
must be sustained. By specific provision of Section 308 of the
Internal Revenue Code, action for recovery of tax payments
erroneously or illegally collected must be filed within 2 years
from such payments. As the action in this case was instituted
only on October 16, 1959, over payments made prior to
October 15, 1957 are no longer refundable.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals under
review is hereby modified, by holding petitioner entitled to the
refund of the corresponding overpayments of ad valorem
taxes made after October 15, 1957. No costs. So ordered.
11. G.R. Nos. L-8562-8563 December 17, 1955
Intestate Estate of Claro Bustamante, deceased. JOSEFA
MENDOZA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
TEODORA CAYAS, oppositor-appellee.
Miguel Tolentino for appellant.
Saturnino D. Ramirez for appellee.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the petition of Josefa Mendoza to be declared the
acknowledged natural daughter of the late Claro Bustamante
and seeking the appointment of an administrator of his estate.
Born in 1893, allegedly begoteen out of wedlock by Claro
Bustamante, widower, and Paula Mendoza, single, the
claimant Josefa Mendoza was supported and reared by said
Claro Bustamante and was openly introduced as his daughter
to his acquaintances. Shortly before his death in March 1929,
Claro delivered to Josefa a private document (Exhibit G) signed
by him and attesting that she was his natural daughter. This
document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the second world
war in 1941; then, in the confusion caused by the hostilities,
she lost the paper, and did not find it again until 1953. In the
meantime, Claro Bustamante's widow by a second marriage,
Teodora Cayas, and his legitimate son, Nicasio Bustamante,
had extrajudicially partitioned his estate, composed of lots
1776, 1777, 1778 and 1806 of the Naic Friar Lands.
On May 6, 1953, the natural child, Josefa Mendoza, instituted
these proceedings against Teodora Cayas and Monica
Nazareno (heir of he late Nicasio Bustamante), for the judicial
administration and settlement of the estate of her natural
father, Claro Bustamante, and for the recovery of her
corresponding share therein as his acknowledged natural
child; but the defendants-oppositors resisted her claims,
alleging that she was never duly acknowledged and that her
action for acknowledgment was instituted too late. The court
below having sustained the defense, Josefa Mendoza appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified the case to us
because only questions of law are involved.
The first question to be decided is whether appellant Josefa
Mendoza was properly recognized by Claro Bustamante as his
natural daughter. The Court below correctly ruled that she was
not. Having been born in 1893, her recognition had to be
governed by the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which abolished
the implied recognizations permitted by the Law XI of Toro.
1Under the Code of 1889 (Arts. 131, 135, 136), an
acknowledgment or recognition, in order to confer any rights
to the natural child, must indispensably appear either in a
record of birth, in a will (testament), in a public document, or
in a final judgment rendered in an action brought to compel
recognition. Appellant Josefa has none of these in her favor; all
that she was able to show was a private (not public) document
(Exhibit G) and evidence of acts indicating possession of status
of a natural child of Claro Bustamante. These document and
acts do not per se constitute a legal and operative
acknowledgment, and do not confer upon appellant any of the
rights (to paternal surname, support and succession) granted
by Article 134 of the Code. At most, they constituted grounds
upon which Josefa might have based an action to ask the Court
to compel her father (or his heirs) to grant her recognition. 2
But, and here lies the second issue in this appeal, the action to
compel recognition is expressly conditioned by law upon its
being commenced during the lifetime of the natural parent,
unless the latter dies while the claimant was a minor, or unless
a document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered
after the parent's death (Art. 137).
Articulo 137. Las acciones para el reconocimiento de hijos
naturales solo podran ejercitarse en vida de los presuntos
padres, salvo en los casos siguientes:
1. Si el padre o la madre hubiesen fallecido durante la menor
edad del hijo, en cuyo caso este podra deducir la accion antes
de que transcurran los primeros cuatro anos de su mayor edad.
2. Si despues de la muerte del padre o de la madre apareciere
algun documento de que antes no se hubiese tenido noticia,
en el que reconozcan expresamente al hijo.
En este caso, la accion debera deducirse dentro de los seis
meses siguientes al hallazgo del documento.
Has appellant brought herself within the rule thus expressed?
The trial Court decided that she has not, and the record amply
sustains the ruling.
In the first pla,ce there is no doubt that appellant Josefa
Mendoza never brought actio against the late Claro
Bustamante to compel her recognition as his natural child.
Hence, she now is debarred from instituting such proceedings
against his successors in interest, unless she comes under any
of the two exceptions declared in Article 137 of the Civil Code
of 1889. Josefa Mendoza does not come under the first
exception, because she was already 36 years old when her
father died in 1929 (she was admittedly born in 1893. She
avers coming under the second exception, because the lost
document of recognition was only redis-covered in 1953. Even
so, she had full knowledge of its existence for 12 years, from
1929, when her father delivered it to her, down to 1941, when
she first mislaid it. The second exception of Article 137 requires
that the document of recognition should be previously
unknown ("de que antes no se hubiese tenido noticia"); and
such terms do not include documents that the claimant once
possessed and subsequently lost or mislaid.
Assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last
paragraph of Article 137 was repealed by the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190) in force in 1929, still, ten years being the
maximum period of limitation of actions fixed by said Act,
Josefa Mendoza's time limit to institute proceedings for the
recognition expired in 1939, at the latest. During all these ten
years she had the document (Exhibit G) in her hands, but she
made no more to sue upon it. Her laches and delay can lead to
only one conclusion: her action is now barred. It has been
barred at least since 1939; and the new Civil Code of 1950
cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the vested rights of
the appellees who have held the property as owners for the
last fifteen years (Art. 2253). Once more, vigilantibus sed non
dormientibus jura subveniunt: the laws aid the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights.lawphi1.net
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs
against appellant. So ordered.
12. EN BANC
[ GR No. 120295, Jun 28, 1996 ]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC +
DECISION
327 Phil. 521
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin
cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon--
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes in three successive elections but who was
twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have
re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but
who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be
considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he
secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who
obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor,
but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take
over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo,
a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on
repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules
of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and
annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division,[1] promulgated on December
19,1995[2] and another Resolution of the Comelec en bane
promulgated February 23, 1996[3] denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition[4]
with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled.
On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution[5] granting the petition with the
following disposition:[6]
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and
declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office
of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen
of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of
candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc[7]
affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and a Certificate of Votes[8].dated May
27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.
51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
RaulR.Lee
53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo
1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
(supplemental) petition[9] praying for his proclamation as the
duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order[10] dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec
en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in
the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly,
at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition,[11] docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D.
725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x
x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x
x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec,[12] the Vice-Governor-- not Lee --
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution[13] holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor;
and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of
votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office
of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division),
therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby
ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his
proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul
R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest
number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified
to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify
His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due
implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution[14]
promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the
present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27,
1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this
petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be
capsulized in the following propositions":[15]
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in
form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding
said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent
was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run
for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither
valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully
supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent
Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No.
123755, as follows:
1. Resolution[16] of the Second Division, promulgated on May
1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he
is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution[17] of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on
May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution[18] of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on
May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others,
Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R.
No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned
resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy.-- A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics
supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions
because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by
law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the
period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law
is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions
null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R.
Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in
their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the
parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may
be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for,
be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the
initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said
petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or
a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of
which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the
period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis
mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other
matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991[19] expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications.--(a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court[20] as a
non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that
he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,[21] citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654[22] and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing
him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of
his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at
naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections,
57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent
Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and
thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a
fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable
decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover,
he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third
and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under
P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself,
who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing
the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under
the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is
not disputed. Hence, he insists that he--not Lee--should have
been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon
when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on
the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered
the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that
time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted
; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively
repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses
a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion,
should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree
No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended."[23]
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any
stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was
made because then President Aquino in her memorandum--
based on the copy furnished us by Lee-- did not categorically
and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was
being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not
even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other
hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."[26]
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should
be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best,
it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In
other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but
left it to the first Congress--once created--to deal with the
matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress.
Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by
Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities
flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's
application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was
approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which
"prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits
thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacanang
Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated
only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled
up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the
Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for
the personal interest of respondent,"[27] the Solicitor General
explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that
such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others
who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation[28] filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere
fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a
ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D.
No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious
and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725[29] itself requires very little
of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee
to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully
served his country and his province prior to his naturalization
in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made
necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who,
after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of
democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country
of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the
Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any
contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have
been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there,
in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective
as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must
exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654[30] which
held that "both the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and
be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a
mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether
Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the
effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization
to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public
office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective
local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify
any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office,[31] and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995--the very day[32] the
term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began-
-he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our
law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which
such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted
that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.
Why then should such qualification be required at the time of
election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications --
unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age
and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June
30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs.
Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,[33] if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons
owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would
not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised
during the oral argument[34] to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or
for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After
all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen,
also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter." And, under the law[35] a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have
been a voter--much less a validly registered one -- if he was not
a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose
of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship
qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with
the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the
law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from
being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen
first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the
official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he
seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends
to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a
registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually.
Hence, registration--not the actual voting--is the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern--and not
anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized--and
Lee has not disputed--that he "was and is a registered voter of
Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his
precinct on May 8, 1995."[36]
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly
maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered
voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8,1995.[37]
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province
where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship
should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code[38] gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code
that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the
Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to
meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be
availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of
ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.
And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30
p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and
indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier
in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been
the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the
highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no
longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold
that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of
the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,[39]
"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." But there are settled exceptions[40] to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,[41] curative statutes are those which
undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating
judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and
are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,[42] on the
other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By
their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and)
reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and
to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes.[43]
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new
right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling
certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725
expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who)
had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and
who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their
husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who
could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus,
P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women--the right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand,
said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in
favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious
and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the
advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General[44] argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP
vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils
(Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the
existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein
married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon
the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced
the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of
the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was
precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment
where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from
a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof."[45] It is obvious to the Court that the statute was
meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and
transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as
the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent
to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial
statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not
in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested
right or violate some constitutional guaranty."[46] This is all
the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation
granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said
law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time
that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is
not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted
to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The
reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past
events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before
the law came into being-- in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason
to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner
to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take
effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there
is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and
there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly,
Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that
it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not
to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos
who may be stateless, as Frivaldo--having already renounced
his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes
outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.[47]
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able
to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation
within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.[48] The fact that such interregna were relatively
insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation.
Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the
government is possible only where a person's repatriation has
the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government
arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien,
and accruing only during the interregnum between application
and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people,
already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the
date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so,
all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification-- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30,
1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's
status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled.
Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated--i.e.,
his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his
previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as
of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the
Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?"[49] We answer this question
in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo
was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in
1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-
-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."[50]
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:[51]
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.[52]
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing
Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the
Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto
by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became
final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no
restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court."[54] Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected
governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this
Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally
"correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final
and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these
"judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from
running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection
with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of
the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:[55]
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had
decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus
disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995
elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21,
1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in
its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however,
was in connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,[56] we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as
the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only
"possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a
quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he was
proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-
317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -
- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according
to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election
protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution[57] has
given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials."
Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that
Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the
Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one.[58] Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,[59] we
ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption
of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable.
Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC
after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, (citing
Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC,
170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule,
however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation
is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs.
COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA
484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only
six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that
the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold
him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,[60] "the
fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign
will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,[61] Lee is "a second placer,
xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on
the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo[62]
case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as
to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It
has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner
Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much
less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the
contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the
Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted
for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May
9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is
the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995
in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not
yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending
motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued
an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in
1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8,
1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented
to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in
fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to
"bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots
knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and
not Lee--should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee
was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the
people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
he--not Lee--should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation
was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution
of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the
confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying
him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they
were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed
by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as
follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy.-- A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics
supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these
resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones
issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19,
1995, affirmed en banc[63] on February 23, 1996, which both
upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications
even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.-- Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics
supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated
March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a
repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because
the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate
an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were
recognized in the first Frivaldo case;[64] viz, "(u)nder CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also
contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as
a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted
a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a
non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally
cured whatever defects there may have been in his
registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections.
Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988
and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the
sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing
the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy
on the ground of a false material representation therein as
required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely
directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo
was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995
were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because
"Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and
decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is
merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other
point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition
to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the
25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide
such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule
that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond
the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that,
given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that
such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo
case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did
not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled.
But his supervening repatriation has changed his political
status--not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo
was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of
the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule
on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It
is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY
those who are its own citizens--not who are the citizens of
other countries.[65] The issue here is: the Comelec made a
finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has
not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus,
following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by
chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections,
should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known." First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto
only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the
Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How
then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local
officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be
possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of
the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local
official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would
have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of
the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or
prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of
candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive
effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others,
that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the
oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the
provision states. We hold however that the provision should
be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship,
which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes
and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal
meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of
the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice
Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-
retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier
in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court
must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we
must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here.
The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in
this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws
relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit;
the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better
to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a
thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the
term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold
P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not
having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and the
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of
his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was
stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee.
Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding
that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing
disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office.
And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed
the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the
manifest will of our people,[66] for in case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted)."[67]
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular
will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it
is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be
filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic[68] to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find
fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time
he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of
the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice
in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the
clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously
entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this
country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of
allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not
be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and
in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even
now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would
have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease
and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the
world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning
to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the
law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis,
over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of
their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being
moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the
Testate Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM,
petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.
The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem
is in reality a very simple question from the viewpoint of the
Solicitor General. We agree with the latter. There is actually
only one issue to be resolved in this action. That issue is
whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in
dismissing the petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction
and lack of a cause of action.
Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.
But first the facts.
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American
national formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon,
U.S.A. 1 As he left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his
son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16,
1976, with the Philippine Revenue Representative in San
Francisco, U.S.A. 2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax
in the amount of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978.3 This
assessment was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm
of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The
protest was denied by the Commissioner on July 7, 1978.5 No
further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that
protest.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been
admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon 6 Ward
Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso
Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the
allowance of the will in the Philippines.7
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced
probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8
The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the
petitioner as ancillary administrator. 9 As such, he filed a
second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
on June 4, 1980.10
On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed
an assessment on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87.11
This was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava,
Lucero and Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980.12
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the
probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic
estate tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978.13
He said that this liability had not yet been paid although the
assessment had long become final and executory.
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the
protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second
assessment of P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he filed
on September 15, 1981, a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the
petitioner stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of 195
days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested
assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate dated March
31, 1982.16 This cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax
Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest
had become moot and academic.17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April
25, 1984.18 The petitioner then came to this Court on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether
the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as
his exclusive, and not conjugal, property; (2) whether the said
stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death
or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal filed with
the respondent court should be considered moot and
academic.
We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.
In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote as follows:
Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O.
ELEGADO Ancillary Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton &
Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila
Sir:
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR
GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon, U.S.A. on March 14,
1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand were issued by
this Bureau. One is for the amount of P96,509.35 based on the
first return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87,
based on the second return filed.
It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued
on February 9, 1978 on the basis of the estate tax return filed
on September 16, 1976. The said assessment was, however,
protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but was denied on
July 7, 1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory
period, the same has become final.
In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid
assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15) days upon
receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this
Bureau, BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. The
assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to
above is hereby cancelled.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second
assessment for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been
deprived of a cause of action as it was precisely from this
assessment that he was appealing.
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition
questioning the assessment of July 3, 1980, was "premature"
since the protest to the assessment had not yet been
resolved.20 As a matter of fact it had: the said assessment had
been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The
respondent court was on surer ground, however, when it
followed with the finding that the said cancellation had
rendered the petition moot and academic. There was really no
more assessment to review.
The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second
assessment on July 3, 1980, had the effect of canceling the first
assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent
cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect
of automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first
assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a
return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our
tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The petitioner is clutching at straws.
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second
assessment of P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it clear
that "the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only
based on the estate tax return filed subject to investigation by
this Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due
from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after said
investigation will be assessed and collected later." 21 It is
illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can
supersede an earlier assessment which had clearly become
final and executory.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot
be serious when he argues that the first assessment was
invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on
which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and
procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused
from compliance therewith because of their ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar
preference because they are not allowed to claim a like
ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any
less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more
obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the
petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact
that the first assessment is already final and executory and can
no longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was
made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978.
The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action
was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no
question that the assessment has become final and executory.
In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to
have accepted its denial. In his motion with the probate court,
the respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a letter dated
January 29, 1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor Graham thru the
aforesaid foreign law firm informed claimant that they have
paid said tax liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and
Puno, Philippine law firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext., Makati,
Metro Manila that initiated the instant ancillary proceedings"
although he added that such payment had not yet been
received.22 This letter was an acknowledgment by the estate
of the validity and finality of the first assessment. Significantly,
it has not been denied by the petitioner.
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner
cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court
any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax
Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should have done
earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was
to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary
period of 30 days after it received notice of said denial. It was
in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the
first two issues he now raises without basis in the present
petition.
The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the
decedent should be considered conjugal property or belonging
to him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. So too is the
time at which the assessment of these shares of stock should
have been made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved
by the Court of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to
act on the petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had
already been cancelled. The assessment being no longer
controversial or reviewable, there was no justification for the
respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it.
If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an
error in the computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner
insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the
original assessment has long become final and executory. If
that assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was —
was committed not by the respondents but by the decedent's
estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he
now complain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered,
14. G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and
BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615
dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31,
1998 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for payment of
disability and other benefits for lack of merit and the
Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc.
hired the services of petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as
Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by
its principal and co-respondent, Barbership Management
Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of
Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in
the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache.
Petitioner experienced dizziness and he subsequently
collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a
sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured
cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a brain operation
and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland,
Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain
operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was
repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21, 1990, he was
examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila
where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared
that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for
120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled."
6 in labor cases where the doctrine applies with greater force.
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents
convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the
amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as
evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release dated
February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard
Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC
which was docketed as NLRC OCW Case No. 6-838-97-L praying
for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance
proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees. On September
29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner appealed the decision with the NLRC. On March 31,
1998, the NLRC promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal
to be without merit and ordered its dismissal. When the
motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor
Relations Commission. 13
On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
assailed decision which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the
present petition for review raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT
AND RELEASE SINCE PETITIONER’S CONSENT THERETO WAS
VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD
APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR
PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release
voluntarily or freely because he was permanently disabled and
in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his
consent which makes the Receipt and Release void and
unenforceable.
The petition lacks merit.
It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to
errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so
14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined
the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, they are accorded not only great respect but
also finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We reviewed
the records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from
the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court of
Appeals.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and
unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. 16 If
consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of
consent, the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is
binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability
vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby
rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not
among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for
petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record
that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the
absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the
Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the
findings of the Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner’s consent was vitiated when he signed the
agreement. Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his
health at the time he signed the subject document, the same
cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y
accept the agreement, for his wife and another relative
witnessed his signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which
was attached by petitioner in his appeal does not show on its
face any violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did
not present any proof to show that the consideration for the
same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence
to support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord,
decide against the unreasonableness of the consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned
upon and are considered as ineffective in barring recovery for
the full measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of
the benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. 20 The
reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not
stand on the same footing. 21 However, not all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul
the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, 22 as in this
case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of
those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to
them. 23 We have reviewed the terms and conditions
contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to
be clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by
petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T.
Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS (US$13,200.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full and
complete satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x
hereby remise, release and forever discharge said vessel
"HANSA RIGA", her Owners, operators, managers, charterers,
agents, underwriters, P and I Club, master, officers, and crew
and all parties at interest therein or thereon, whether named
or not named, including but not limited to BARBER SHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING
AGENTS, INC. and ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and
all claims, demands, debts, dues, liens, actions or causes of
action, at law or in equity, in common law or in admiralty,
statutory or contractual, arising from and under the laws of the
United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic
of the Philippines and/or any other foreign country now held,
owned or possessed by me or by any person or persons, arising
from or related to or concerning whether directly or indirectly,
proximately or remotely, without being limited to but
including the said illness suffered by me on board the vessel
"HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at Portland, Oregon
and disability compensation in connection therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all
liabilities of any character and/or claims or damages and/or
losses and/or any other liabilities whatsoever, whether
contractual or statutory, at common law or in equity, tortious
or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or
occurring as a consequence of the illness suffered by me as
Messman of the vessel "HANSA RIGA", including but not
limited to all damages and/or losses consisting of loss of
support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all benefits of
whatsoever nature and extent incurred, physical pain and
suffering and/or all damages and/or indemnities claimable in
law, tort, contract, common law, equity and/or admiralty by
me or by any person or persons pursuant to the laws of the
United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic
of the Philippines and of all other countries whatsoever.
I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand
this instrument which was read to me in the local dialect and I
agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE
of all parties and things referred to herein, and I further agree
that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and final bar
to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be
prosecuted by me or by any one claiming by, through, or under
me, against any of the persons or things
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing referred
to or related herein. 24
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent
and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire
necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt
and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was
forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for
the money claims against the respondents is the three year
period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which
provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
xxxx
Since petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is
a money claim arising from his employment, Article 291 of the
Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared
permanently and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which
gave rise to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the time
that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three
years have elapsed thereby effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615
which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dismissing petitioner’s complaint for disability
and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
15. G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO,
PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO,
DECEASED, PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG,
FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B.
MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., heirs-
appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P.
BURGOS, As presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial
Court, Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as
Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No.
916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA,
respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO,
Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding
Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a
formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ
and NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE
CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO,
respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA
BORROMEO, and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES,
Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc.
No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu
City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of
88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties
in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page
document as the last will and testament left by the said
deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and
Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided
shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The
document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and
thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio
Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who
acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28,
1960, after due trial, the probate court held that the document
Vito Borromeo
presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery.

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court Paulo Borromeo
disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed in Testate
Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin
Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). Anecita Borromeo

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate Quirino Borromeo and
proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. Julian Borromeo

The following petitions or claims were filed: 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without
any issue, and all his brothers and sisters predeceased him.

1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and

Cosme Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the
determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed following children:
against said petition.

a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939

2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a
petition for declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo
and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition. b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after
the death of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios
Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners
de Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, herein.
Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre,
Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for
declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.

4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of

4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz him and left an only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on
Borromeo, Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following children:
Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the
heirs of Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
oppositions to this claim.

b. Ramon Ocampo
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard
jointly, the following facts were established:

c. Lourdes Ocampo
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and
wife (the latter having predeceased the former), were survived
by their eight (8) children, namely, d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and

Jose Ma. Borromeo e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by

claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.

Cosme Borromeo
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died
before the war and left the following children:
Pantaleon Borromeo
a. Marcial Borromeo d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946

b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by
wife, Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda his children:
Borromeo Talam

aa. Maria Borromeo Atega

c. Asuncion Borromeo

bb. Luz Borromeo

d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.

cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp

e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.

dd. Rosario Borromeo

f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.

ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz

The last three died leaving no issue.

On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died Code, issued an order declaring the following, to the exclusion
before the war and left the following children: of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo:

a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949

1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo

b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the

following children: 2. Judge Crispin Borromeo

aa. Federico Borromeo 3. Vitaliana Borromeo

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85) 4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. 5. Salud Borromeo

dd. Jose Borromeo 6. Asuncion Borromeo

ee. Consuelo Borromeo 7. Marcial Borromeo

ff. Pilar Borromeo 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

gg. Salud Borromeo 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo

hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate
of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the
exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of
partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo
which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August
15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the
properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are
divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and
further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and
5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall
be taken and paid from this segregated portion.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who
had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion
before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of
heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of
the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime
like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every
case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural
child.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set
aside the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974,
declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of
the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato
Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the
decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which
constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's
estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The
claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement,
according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor
of the heirs which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the
private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed
beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only
sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration of heirs
(April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the
approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing
the administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969),
when in a mere memorandum, the existence of the waiver
agreement was brought out.

Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already

barred by the order of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring
the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased It is further argued by the petitioner that the document
entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31,
Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25,
1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June
1973.
29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there
can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to
memorandum he submitted to support his motion for
transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make
reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a
acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person
portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver
must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to
of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by
inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V.
and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera,
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs
Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an
The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court,
order for the distribution of the estate.
acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo
is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends
waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the
that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a
declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been
person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or
executed before the distribution of the estate and before the
repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first
acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to
inexistent for lack of subject matter.
inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the
inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the
waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court
waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already
concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in
agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato
the waiver document itself.
Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to

pass upon the validity of the waiver of hereditary rights,
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July
respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or
7, 1975. renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court
assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it
partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the
estate needing approval of the court because it was executed
in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the
probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the
payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate
is distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is
that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot
be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the
heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the
former. Nor do such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from
the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by
the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the
moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in
any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance
with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary
Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to
exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right;
(2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53
O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when
the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an
intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct
is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil.,
151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the
waiver document did not have the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27,
1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for
the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they
proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito
Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash
and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator,
as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in
any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14
contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes
and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to
the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the
"Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the
respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been
otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer
to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts
of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the
majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how
the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement
of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15,
1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to
transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and
Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights,
interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of
the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said
assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29,
1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees
in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a
"Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named
in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and
Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato
Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial
court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No.
916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and
declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-
18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower
court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of
the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment
to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said
claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court
dated December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11,
dated December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver document
earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court
certified this case to this Court as the questions raised are all
of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver
agreement but they also question the jurisdiction of the lower
court to hear and decide the action filed by claimant Fortunato
Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right
was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her
children did not yet possess or own any hereditary right in the
intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because said
hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on April
10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.

They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no
such contract of waiver of hereditary right in the present case
because there was no object, which is hereditary right, that
could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said
waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio
but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants
contend that without any formal pleading filed by the lawyers
of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver
agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two
things which are necessary so that the lower court would be
vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the
validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower
court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without
asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance
of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved
the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend
that this constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving
their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the
signatories to the waiver document tacitly and irrevocably
accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they
lost their rights because the rights from that moment on
became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the
Civil Code there is no need for a person to be declared as heir
first before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he is certain of the death of the person from
whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the
time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967,
the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito
Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their
right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver document
itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack
of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the
appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court
issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors to the
waiver document to submit their comments within ten days
from notice and setting the same for hearing on September 25,
1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share
in the inheritance involves no question of title to property and,
therefore, the probate court can decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R.
No. 41171. The appellants in this case, who are all declared
heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are contesting the validity of
the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring
Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo under the waiver agreement.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary
rights can not be validated. The essential elements of a waiver,
especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
hereditary rights, are not found in this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement
conceding to all the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties
in consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent and to
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots
was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the
heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary
rights to the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June
29, 1968 deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and
the subsequent cancellation of the deed of assignment and
deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver
of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in
G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the waiver agreement because the trial
court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M.
Sesbreno, representative of some of the heirs-distributees,
praying for the immediate closure of Special Proceeding No.
916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty.
Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the fact that
there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all
the obligations of the estate since the order of partition and
distribution had long become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or
refused to resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose
Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus before the
Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate
and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to
pending motions to compel the petitioner, as co-
administrator, to submit an inventory of the real properties of
the estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending
claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not lie to
compel the performance of a discretionary function, the
appellate court denied the petition on May 14, 1982. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent
judge on the motion filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of
the administration proceeding cannot be justified by the filing
of the motion for inventory and accounting because the latter
motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under
the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to
decide or resolve a case or matter within three months from
the date of its submission.
Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-administrator Jose
Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of
the estate and to render an accounting of cash and bank
deposits realized from rents of several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No.
65995.

The respondents contend that the motion to close the

administration had already been resolved when the Considering the pronouncements stated in:
respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents
previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979,
pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by the
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of
Court of Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the
the trial court dated December 24, 1974;
case.

2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera,
insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos
signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the
from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and
deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial
ordering the remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of the
court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order,
Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya,
Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and
manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement
of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value 3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the
of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
reserved for attorney's fees. Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the affirmation of
the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No.
63818.

According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos

dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has
not finally distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the
properties due to the following circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate
in order to segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
the trial court may now terminate and close Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an
inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as
co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as
required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983.
This must be effected with all deliberate speed.

2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato

G.R. No. 63818
Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of
the waiver agreement signed by the heirs representing the 5/9
group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R. No.
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and
4117 1);
Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge
Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among
render his accounting; and
others, the following:

4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing

xxx xxx xxx
annotations of notices of lis pendens on the different titles of
the properties of the estate.

6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a

motion for the production of the certificates of title and to
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not
deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably
vet distributed to some of the declared heirs, particularly the
for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said motion was
5/9 group of heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver
granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978
agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983,
which, however, became the subject of various motions for
required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that
as owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy
reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for
reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions
for production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered
another incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was
then the counsel of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and
Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident, Atty.
Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion. presiding, Judge
Considered direct contempt because among others, Atty.
Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to
receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire property.
Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being
declared in contempt of court with the dim prospect of
suspension from the practice of his profession. But obviously
to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and
suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and
ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who,
together, continued to harass administrator
xxx xxx xxx
9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a
brother of the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et
al. who are agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy
out the individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein
movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell their
distributive shares under the terms and conditions presently
proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has
become apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose
Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed by Atty
Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces
tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the
privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and
the other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More
harassment motions are expected until the herein movants
shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the
herein movants beg for an entirely independent and impartial
judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take
cognizance of this proceeding, including the incidents above-
mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein
movants. Incidents which may create this impression need not
be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P.
Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among
others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of
having to state herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing the sale initiated
by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the
estate cannot be legally done without the conformity of the
heirs-distributees because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to
sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-
distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale
that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest
more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of
the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to
say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco
Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse the
proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco
P. Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of
the shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as
other incidents now pending in the court below which smack
of harassment against the herein petitioners. For, regardless
of the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend
that it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by
reason of the following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties
as initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married
to a brother of respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the
conformity of the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have
openly refused the sale, to the great disappointment of
respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents
are clearly intended to harass and embarrass administrator
Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding
to the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against
petitioners by failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees
filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo.
Similar claims by the other lawyers were resolved by
respondent after petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp.
41-43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision
granting the petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and
disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also
ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-
raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
appellate court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition
for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-
raffling.
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic
because Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest
reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the
petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom
this case will be reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo
has been harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn
shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the entire
estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty.
Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the judge's
order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the
administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to
pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the
inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been unreasonable
because his orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and
inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate
court. They claim that the respondent court, should also have
taken judicial notice of the resolution of this Court directing
the said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of
the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing
of the administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is
conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been
harassed. countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V.
Reyes as co-administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972,
yet Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what
t he was supposed to have received as rentals for the land
upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January,
1977 to February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to
bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L.
Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series
of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the
conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the
shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the
projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion
was filed by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose
Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an inventory when he has
already filed one to account for cash, a report on which the
administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be
examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge
Burgos lt was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be
issued for the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name
of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the
appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam
and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo.
Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo
Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance
of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of Consolidated
Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City;
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another
subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the Managert of the bank, the Register of
deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the
Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v.
Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who
had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the
administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to private respondent
Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners"
copies of the titles in the court presided order by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena
duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
bring and produce the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979
but on June 14, 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge
Burgos issued an order denying the private respondents'
motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the
subpoena.1avvphi1
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge
Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying
Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage of justice
Because for the past twelve years, he had not done anything
towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to sell
the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the
Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for
inhibition, more specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to
sell the entire estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of
heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality
on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the
case of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and
suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his
actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other
alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not
be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest
actuations and probity in favor or of either partly or incite such
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The better course
for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself
"That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important,
the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is
based on sound reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the
petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and
inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not
only valid but the issue itself has become moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further
acting on any and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-
R during the pendency of this petition and No. 63818. They
also pray that all acts of the respondents related to the said
special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent
Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null
and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for
hearing all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to the
estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their
names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending
inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as
G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special
Proceeding No. 916-R requires only the appraisal of the
attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants who were individually
hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees
should be legally charged against their respective clients and
not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition
is a dilatory one and barred by res judicata because this Court
on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent
Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the
decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which was
already final and executory, was in effect reversed and
nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in its case-AC
G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it granted the petition for
certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco
P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the transmission of
the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which
was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review
(G.R. No. 63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees
are not the obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs
who individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion,
therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the
exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value of
the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid
should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.
WHEREFORE, —
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9
of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated
July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET
ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the
waiver document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue
in the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is
declared moot and academic. The judge who has taken over
the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately
conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings.
In the event that the successor-judge is likewise disqualified,
the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle
the case shall be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The
issue seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to
speedily terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties
of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits
by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by
this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating
40% of the market value of the estate from which attorney's
fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED.
The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who
individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the
nature of the services rendered but in amounts which should
not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property
the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.
Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to
defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's
whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of
Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as
provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that
defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an
answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his
evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court
referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the
purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion,
the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter,
decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without
costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a
marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do
not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal.
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to
the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said
conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case could be
validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction
over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of
the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem,
the res.1
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the
jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,2 and, in Manila, of
its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.3
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his
submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the
complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by
publication.5
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties
herein, and status affects or binds the whole word. The res in
the present case is the relation between said parties, or their
marriage tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the
nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of
celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff
here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status
is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True
that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a
non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower
court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her
marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that
the status therein involves and affects two persons. One is
married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to
somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status
of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and
the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly,
that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is
domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a
Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower
court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it
could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between
the parties herein.
As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff
testified that he met the defendant in Pusan Korea, sometime
in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub; that they lived
together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were
married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by
their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding
she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in
Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was
necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on
June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant,
then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October,
1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A,
and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed
that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already married,
according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the
defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was
that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea;
that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953,
defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two
(2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was
no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that,
later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now
unknown to him.
The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to
establish that defendant was married to another person prior
to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this conclusion. To begin
with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely purports to bear the seal
of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the record
does not show who prepared it, much less that he had
personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein
concerning defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It should
be noted, that defendant was a native, not of Pusan but of
Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than
hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted
the defendant with the contents of Exhibit B, defendant did
not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared
that she admitted having previously lived with several other
men, adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in
effect, negating the alleged previous marriage.
Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in
order to establish defendant's qualification to contract
marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the
entry in said document to the effect that defendant was
married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect
that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the
presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori,
or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9 In fact, the
statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect
that, although she had cohabited before with other men, there
was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that
a previous marriage on her part would have been, in her
opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs.
Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for
the entry of data on whether any of the contracting parties had
been previously married; whether the prior marriage had been
dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such
decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be
absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea.
And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that defendant had
had no previous marriage?
Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief
prayed for unless full faith and credence are given to his
testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show
that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose.
Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the
defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted,
this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in
Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would,
also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was
illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than
sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain
documents the contents of which he did not read.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.
17. DIVISION
[ GR No. 178551, Oct 11, 2010 ]
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION v. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN +
DECISION
647 Phil. 43
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the
position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,[1] all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondent's request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17,
2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint[2] for illegal
dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the
Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision[3] of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter,
finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just
cause to warrant respondent's dismissal nor that she failed to
qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was
illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay
her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter's decision by Resolution[4] of January 26, 2004.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution[5] of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a
foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such,
the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was
validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance
rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait's
Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision[6] of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed
the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners' contention that they only acted
as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly
and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that
under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued
jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation
of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdal's liability, the appellate court held that under Sec.
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas
Filipinos' Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and
partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly
and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money
claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the appellate court by Resolution[7] of June 27, 2007, the
present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable
because respondent's employment contract specifically
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude
that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies
and labor laws and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that
Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign
principal is a government agency which is immune from suit,
as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held
jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be
held liable, more so since the Ministry's liability had not been
judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that
such foreign principal's liability must first be established
before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private
recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic
Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad[8] explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement
so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end,
but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for
which the law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the
policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
working class.[9] Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke
the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the
judicial determination of the foreign principal's liability before
petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and
solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners' contentions that Philippine labor laws on
probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondent's employment contract,
which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil
Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host
country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including
the laws which they wish to govern their respective
obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this
case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court's ruling in EDI-
Staffbuilders Int'l., v. NLRC[10] illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. -- Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:
MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country's
Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy[11]
(Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination,[12] both of which documents were
certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of
Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification
and Translation Unit; and respondent's letter[13] of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her
first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
"Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.
Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor
laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials
thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil
service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the
subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from
Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
presented to this Office for review and certification and the
same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested
party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
supplied)
Respecting Ikdal's joint and solidary liability as a corporate
officer, the same is in order too following the express provision
of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.--Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may
be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
18. G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,1
petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, prays that the
Resolution2 dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed
Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award3 against respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc.
(Kingford), a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines,4 on the ground that petitioner lacked
legal capacity to sue.5
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred
to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619,
Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent
No. ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka
Patent"),6 and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely,
Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy
Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and
respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the
"sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent provisions of which read:
1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of
U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three
aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those
patents, and collecting royalties.
The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned
patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia,
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with
Licensor.
xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto
agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a
corporation established in the State of California, in order to
implement the objectives of this Agreement.
5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in
the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit
funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated
to spend in connection with the implementation of this
Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the
purpose of being elected as member of the board of directors.
The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors
according to their respective equity shares. 9
xxx
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum
of Agreement10 dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to
Amend Memorandum of Agreement11 dated 14 July 2003.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the
licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from
petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their
obligations.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the
State of California, United States and won the case against
respondent.13 Pertinent portions of the award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this
Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the
total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT
TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN
CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90)
which is 20% of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with
CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;]14 and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the
YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay
CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00).
xxx
xxx15
To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007
a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The
petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M.
Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to
Dismiss.16 After the court denied the motion for lack of
merit,17 respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge
Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order
denying the motion.18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself
notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions in the motion."19 Judge Cedrick O.
Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn,
granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked
legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court
dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo
was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of
petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause
of action recognized under Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo
dismissed the petition. Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a
foreign corporation established in the State of California" and
"was given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the
Yamaoka Patent" and "was assigned the exclusive right to
enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties" in
the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it does not have a
license to do business in the Philippines.
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI
has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license
to do so issued by the concerned government agency of the
Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from
"five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent
Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real situation, TPI
cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action,
suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff
TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal
personality to sue in the Philippines.21
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for
the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral
award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
drafted during the United Nations Conference on International
Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these specifically
requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should
have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the
following:
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused
on a ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this
reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most
Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the
Philippines’ international obligations and State policy to
strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution may be
defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in
the relevant laws.24
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York
Convention and the Model Law on the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the
nature and applicability of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, a general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus, in
Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,25 this Court rejected the application of
the Corporation Code and applied the New Central Bank Act.
It ratiocinated:
Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code
is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we
ruled that:
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to
all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act
regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions,
including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between
a general and special law, the latter shall prevail – generalia
specialibus non derogant." (Emphasis supplied)26
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,27 this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law
providing for the formation, organization and regulation of
private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special
law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law,
the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.28
Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its
title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish
the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other
Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to
actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes
or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements
to resolve their disputes."29 It specifically provides exclusive
grounds available to the party opposing an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.30
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a
municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see
the need to discuss compliance with international obligations
under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all,
both already form part of the law.
In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by
specifically providing:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New
York Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.
xxx
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a
foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in
accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by
the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under
Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground raised
shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration. International commercial arbitration
shall be governed by the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (the "Model Law") adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
June 21, 1985 xxx."
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer
in the affirmative.
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
provides that the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise
only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of
the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those
not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the
capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and
enforcement of the award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution,31 which was promulgated by
the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a
foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and
enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition
are enumerated in Rule 13.5.32 Capacity to sue is not included.
Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations
in instances where "the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines,"33 it is specifically required that a petition "to
determine any question concerning the existence, validity and
enforceability of such arbitration agreement"34 available to
the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a
petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral
tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its
jurisdiction"35 after arbitration has already commenced
should state "[t]he facts showing that the persons named as
petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be
sued."36
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the
enforecement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment
by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations
not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining
a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract
containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in
fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the
contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration,
conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into
the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with
the instant case, also worthy to consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals,37 to wit:
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is
gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad.
If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved
party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality
inherent in consensual contracts.38
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral
award should be respected not because it is favored over
domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No.
9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the
court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the
New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,39
petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the
award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes
substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing
recognition or enforcement.40
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to
do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with
the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court
2004. dockets. xxx

II Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability

of the foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the
court a quo where its recognition and enforcement is being
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise sought.
unmeritorious.

Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the

First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention
that petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it
posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be
considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose
of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign
corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material
insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award is concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21
November 2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again,
ruled that the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not
required in certiorari under Rule 45.41
Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary
circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the case,42
we opt to relax the rules following the pronouncement in Chua
v. Ang,43 to wit:
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of
courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual
allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers
of facts.44 A strict application of this rule may be excused
when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in
the present case, where the issues are not factual but purely
legal.1âwphi1 In these types of questions, this Court has the
ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the review process
if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose
to hear and decide the legal issues outright.45
court of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for
review on certiorari before the petition was filed with this
Court.47 We, however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s
"Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45" is a typographical error. As correctly pointed
out by respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed
originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was
received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.48
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation
not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that
reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special
Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the

issue herein raised should be seriously considered.46 Surely,
there is a need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide
the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as
a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy of the
State embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004, to wit:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy

of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make
their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this
end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means
 19. G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.
A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident
of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate
in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's
Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project
of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar
v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless,
if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3
Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed
by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph

three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,

and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code

afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph
of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this
 20. G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased.
RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-
appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the
domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New
York, United States of America, of the estate of the deceased
Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27,
1960, to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine
corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the
legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court, then
presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued
on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering the
motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11,
1964, as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all
purposes in connection with the administration and
liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the
stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing
in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2)
orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said
corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same
to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent
ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this
Court."1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by
the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of
New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The
challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy,
to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem,
addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of
specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal
doctrines of weight and significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on
March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock
certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the
certificates being in the possession of the County Trust
Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased.2 Then came this
portion of the appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero
Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was
appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he
was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute
arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and
the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of
them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust
Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary
administrator did not comply with the order, and on February
11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to
"issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks
covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade
Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or]
considered as lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. admits that "it is immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to
"who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary
administrator because the said stock certificates are in
existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York,
U.S.A...."4
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock
certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost.
Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe
certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock
certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal
lacks merit. The challenged order constitutes an emphatic
affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by
the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing
to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this
order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a
response was called for by the realities of the situation. What
cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance,
if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of
judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not
so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such
a solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear
its being buttressed by indisputable principles and supported
by the strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and
vindicated the honor of the judiciary no less than that of the
country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled
the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by
the persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to
the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by
entering its appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and
filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15,
1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart
vitality and effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it,
what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified.
Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary
administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously
ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would
have entailed, insofar as this matter was concerned, not a
partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the
power of the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control
and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is
inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims
of local creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court
made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that
administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly
"extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or
country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power
over property in another state or country."6
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary
administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a
foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile
is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does
not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
[Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever
a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets
of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs."7
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to
require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name
in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be
respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a
Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from
lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of
Internal Revenue8 finds application. "In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It
does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it
were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a
rather conclusive fashion for the legality of the challenged
order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of
precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the
basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its
"considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade
Perkins, ..."9 More specifically, appellant would stress that the
"lower court could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates
in question when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge
knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that
the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in the
possession of the domiciliary administrator in New York."10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the
lower court. That certainly does not suffice to call for the
reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal,
persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in
New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant
corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing
unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and
requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof.
Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility
fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid
judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad,
which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to
yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to
contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be
treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it being
powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by
the lower court did not correspond exactly with the facts. To
be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a
conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again
to borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may
rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an
important part in its development."11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo
could state fictions "were devices to advance the ends of
justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive."12 Some of
them have persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist,
noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive
trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if"
today."13 He likewise noted "a class of fictions of another
order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which
at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have
brought it to the light."14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times
indispensable role that fictions as such played in the law. There
should be then on the part of the appellant a further
refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such
judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the
employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous
situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with
apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that
this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster
the above contention by its invoking one of the provisions of
its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed
in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would
stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an
action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of
stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new
certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by [a]
court regarding the ownership [thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such
occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign
domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now
in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission
of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ...
who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to
impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality.
Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law
and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be
followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the
Constitution overrides a statute, to which, however, the
judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked
and deemed applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox,
however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded such a high
estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note
of it but yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it
could be saddled unless the appealed order be set aside for its
inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its
obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid
defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court
action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in
the circumstances as they have developed gives substance to
such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to
appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial
authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with implications at war with the
basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is
an artificial being created by operation of law...."16 It owes its
life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. As
Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived
as an artificial person, owing its existence through creation by
a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the statutory
language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who
in the Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation
precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the
matter thus: "A corporation is not in fact and in reality a
person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by
process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person
distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It
owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by
law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose
existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its charter."19 Dean
Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an
association of human beings granted legal personality by the
state, puts the matter neatly.20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the
basic theme of which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality
of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
recognition and concession."21 A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence
until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to
law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights
and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More
than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to
acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary,
whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being,
following American law still of persuasive authority in our
jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary
than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the
appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is
not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a
duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal
proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and
which to disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy which
may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is
to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the
source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of
its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored
at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans
Affairs,22 it was shown that in a guardianship proceedings
then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum
of money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that
the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider
the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits
according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the
United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a
reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an
American federal statute making his decisions "final and
conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other
American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge
or judges of the United States court."23 Reconsideration was
denied, and the Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower
court. Thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal should be
rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans'
Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims
property submitted to him for resolution; but they are not
applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not
acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference
between actions against the Administrator (which must be
filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are
imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review
by United States courts), and those actions where the
Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and
submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our
attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would
make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions
where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect,
would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render
them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans'
Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our
judiciary to accept as final and conclusive, determinations
made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over
juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and
effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the
whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a
situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the
honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the
proposition to which appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to
be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the
validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal.
Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed.
The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant
prevailing attest to the necessity of negative response from us.
That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the
appeal cannot succeed. It is always easy to conjure extreme
and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does
not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the
result arrived at, the just solution obtained, grounded in the
soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its
correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For
through the appealed order, the imperative requirement of
justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity and
honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio
Santos, the Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18,
1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
21. G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827,
and the July 25, 2001 Resolution2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants
Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects of foreign governments,3 entered into an
Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent
Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in
the Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was
to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on
April 1, 1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time
for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of
the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.7
Respondent was named as the project manager in the
contract's Appendix 3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's
general manager for its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged
by the company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.9
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,
through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of
had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal
denials, petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review
of the ICA.10
on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the appellate
court:

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the

petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been
TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-
termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAWS.26
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved
Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain
Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project.13
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is
whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in
civil cases for specific performance and damages involving
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
Government v. Frank14 that matters connected with the
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing
contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
at the place of performance,15 denied the motion to
or forum non conveniens.
dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the
appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of
Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the the procedural matters raised by the respondent.
petition on procedural grounds—for lack of statement of
material dates and for insufficient verification and certification
against forum shopping.19 An Entry of Judgment was later Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's
issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000.20 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing
of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827
(fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, one) and the instant petition for review thereof.
on September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary period, a
second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating
therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205
verification and certification. This second petition, which on account of the petition's defective certification of non-
substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was forum shopping, it was a dismissal without prejudice.27 The
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21 same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to
defects in the formal requirement of verification28 and in the
other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court statement of the material dates.29 The dismissal being
without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a
rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision22 finding no
second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification
grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the
and certification—as they, in fact did—and stating therein the
motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the
material dates, within the prescribed period30 in Section 4,
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the
case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the Rule 65 of the said Rules.31
written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the
trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex
loci solutionis.23 The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence
of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the
dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words,
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently
the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar
denied by the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.24
another action involving the same parties, on the same subject
matter and theory.32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice
and has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still
indicated in the verification and certification of the second
certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on
procedural grounds,33 petitioners are no longer required by
the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum
shopping in the instant petition for review of the second
certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition
before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of
non-forum shopping about any event that will not constitute
res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a
fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification
of the entire proceedings, considering that the evils sought to
be prevented by the said certificate are no longer present.34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that
petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on
behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed with the CA and
not the instant petition. True, the Authorization35 dated
September 4, 2000, which is attached to the second certiorari
petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for
review, is limited in scope—its wordings indicate that
Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and act on behalf
of the company only in the petition filed with the appellate
court, and that authority cannot extend to the instant petition
for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has
liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its application
whenever a satisfactory explanation and a subsequent
fulfillment of the requirements have been made.37 Given that
petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on
this point and appended to their Reply38 an updated
Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company
in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient
compliance with the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment
to the defect in the verification and certification. As
respondent pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is
truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The
aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the
subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by
Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the
company's board of directors. In not a few cases, we have
ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of
directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can bind the
corporation, in the absence of authority from the board.40
Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition
only on his behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner,
the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of
the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in
a matter that demands strict observance of the Rules.42 While
technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the
ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent
the clogging of court dockets.43
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly
filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of
their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot
be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or
mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and
to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion,
to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to
elevate the entire case by appeal in due course.44 While there
are recognized exceptions to this rule,45 petitioners' case does
not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the
case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum,
petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil
case for specific performance and damages filed by the
respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into
and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and
written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners
posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the
parties46 following the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule in Private International Law.47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but
different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate
court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial court,
petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient
forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will
determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is
that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their
petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari
significantly invoked the defense of forum non conveniens.50
On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped
their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens
defense, and introduced their new argument that the
applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule.51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition
merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained in
Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed
out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize
their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,
three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1)
Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will
the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be
enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts.54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide,
the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the
necessary "significant contacts" for the other.55 The question
of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate
a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the thing which is the
subject of the litigation.57 In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject
matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law.58 It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in
its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show
that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted
to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do
not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil
Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable
by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as grounds to
question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex
loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the
ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a contract is
made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus
means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to
be performed."65 It controls the nature, construction, and
validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the
most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law
to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state
has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was
to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place
of incorporation of the parties.68 This rule takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be
resolved.69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference
to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of law.70 They determine which
state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues
of a conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law
rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out
any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, first there should exist a
conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the
conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign country
is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case,
the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a
foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other State or States.74
The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
foreign sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76
be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First,
it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section
1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to
entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the
grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied
the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
22. G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil
case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following
antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney
C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6
Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed
in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as
Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner
Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor
case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the
sale of services in government projects and that respondent
was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The
complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one
company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s
claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement
with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money.
Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the
purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision
which disclosed that per the written agreement between
respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special
Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of
the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and
forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for
Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint
on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a
cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the
resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter
Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General
in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied
petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the
factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be
admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid
judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non
conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order,
which motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order
dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s
motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of
Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a
writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court
dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the
trial court from conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should
not have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and
should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving
petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented
by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning,
insufficient for purposes of determining whether the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court
also stated that it could not rule one way or the other on the
issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named
as defendants in the case had indeed merged together based
solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held
that the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover,
the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court
when the latter decided not to desist from assuming
jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle
of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite
repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on
record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling
the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with
the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and
that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag
or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution25
dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with
the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses
involved are American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines –
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner
theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate
the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-
of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the
instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a
foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
the power to enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules
of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of
the country where the case is filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the
material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an
action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by
its voluntary appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does
not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil
action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.33 The
choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in
conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the
parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.35
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the

Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume
jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound
discretion of the lower courts because their findings are
binding on this Court.

Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No.

1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
allegation in the pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary
test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded.37

The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI

and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends
that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this
allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals
is instructive, thus:

x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter

Browning as well as other documents produced in the hearing
shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for
us to mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action.

Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial,

convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and
Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of
defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in
General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist
after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already
submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly
conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust
International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have
combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon
International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held
liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for
unpaid commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak
otherwise.38

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question

of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together
requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a
full-blown trial on the merits can afford.