G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-
1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
 g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality
to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen,
79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to
the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position
of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that
the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be,
it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS
MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The
categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to
prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to
due process and to information on matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1
Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the
subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4
refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."cralaw
virtua1aw library

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on
the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.cralawnad

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no
less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency
on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date
of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This
is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act
for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the
Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership
of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering
its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a
wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one
required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the
Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it
does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with
the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.chanrobles law library
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the
law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that
a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all
the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be
so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of
suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 102316. June 30, 1997.]

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is a stipulation in a charter party that the" (o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing,
breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo" 1 valid? This is the main question raised in this petition for
review assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. No. CV-20156 promulgated on
October 15, 1991. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 171, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., to pay
plaintiff the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) representing the value of the policy of the lost logs
with legal interest thereon from the date of demand on February 2, 1984 until the amount is fully paid or in the
alternative, defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) representing the value of lost logs plus legal interest from the date of demand on April
24, 1984 until full payment thereof; the reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to five (5) percent
of the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation the sum of TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the balance of the stipulated freight charges.

Defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed."cralaw virtua1aw
library

In its assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED except in so far (sic) as the liability of the Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation to the plaintiff is concerned which is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE." 3

The Facts

The factual antecedents of this case as narrated in the Court of Appeals Decision are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff (Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.) entered into an
agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers (Shipping Corporation) whereby the latter undertook to load on
board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of
Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.

On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with defendant South Sea Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 and the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No.
84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said date.

On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the insurance policy to Mr.
Victorio Chua.

In the meantime, the said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank on 25 January 1984 resulting in the loss of the
plaintiff’s insured logs.

On 30 January 1984, a check for P5,625.00 (Exh.’E’) to cover payment of the premium and documentary
stamps due on the policy was tendered due to the insurer but was not accepted. Instead, the South Sea Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc. cancelled the insurance policy it issued as of the date of the inception for non-payment
of the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the Insurance Code.

On 2 February 1984, plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. the
payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a
formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter
denied the claim.

After due hearing and trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants. Both
defendants shipping corporation and the surety company appealed.

Defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation impute (sic) to the court a quo the following
assignment of errors, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘A. The lower court erred in holding that the proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel Seven Ambassadors,
was not due to fortuitous event but to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board,
causing the iron chains to snap and the logs to roll to the portside.

B. The lower court erred in declaring that the non-liability clause of the Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
from logs (sic) of the cargo stipulated in the charter party is void for being contrary to public policy invoking
article 1745 of the New Civil Code.

C. The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation liable in the
alternative and ordering/directing it to pay plaintiff-appellee the amount of two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos
representing the value of the logs plus legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.

D. The lower court erred in ordering defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to pay appellee
reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to 5% of the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit.

E. The lower court erred in not awarding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Corporation its counter-claim for
attorney’s fees.

F. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint against Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation.’

Defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. assigns the following errors:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

A. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua was an agent of defendant-appellant South Sea Surety
and Insurance Company, Inc. and likewise erred in not holding that he was the representative of the insurance
broker Columbia Insurance Brokers, Ltd.

B. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua received compensation/commission on the premiums paid
on the policies issued by the defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company,
Inc.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

C. The trial court erred in not applying Section 77 of the Insurance Code.

D. The trial court erred in disregarding the ‘receipt of payment clause’ attached to and forming part of the
Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229.

E. The trial court in disregarding the statement of account or bill stating the amount of premium and
documentary stamps to be paid on the policy by the Plaintiff-Appellee.
F. The trial court erred in disregarding the indorsement of cancellation of the policy due to non-payment of
premium and documentary stamps.

G. The trial court erred in ordering defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. to pay
plaintiff-appellee P2,000,000.00 representing value of the policy with legal interest from 2 February 1984 until
the amount is fully paid.

H. The trial court erred in not awarding to the defendant-appellant the attorney’s fees alleged and proven in its
counterclaim.’

The primary issue to be resolved before us is whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety
company are liable to the plaintiff for the latter’s lost logs." 4

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Sea Surety and
Insurance Company ("South Sea"), but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
("Seven Brothers") was not liable for the lost cargo. 5 In modifying the RTC judgment, the respondent appellate
court ratiocinated thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appears that there is a stipulation in the charter party that the ship owner would be exempted from liability in
case of loss.

The court a quo erred in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to establish the liability
of the shipping corporation. The provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not
acting as such but as a private carrier.

Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special
person only, becomes a private carrier.

As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its agent is valid
(Home Insurance Company, Inc. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA 24).

The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the loss of the logs." 6

South Sea and herein Petitioner Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. ("Valenzuela") filed separate
petitions for review before this Court. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1995, this Court denied the petition of
South Sea. 7 There the Court found no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that Chua was indeed an authorized agent of South Sea when he received Valenzuela’s premium
payment for the marine cargo insurance policy which was thus binding on the insurer. 8chanrobles.com :
virtual lawlibrary

The Court is now called upon to resolve the petition for review filed by Valenzuela assailing the CA Decision
which exempted Seven Brothers from any liability for the lost cargo.

The Issue

Petitioner Valenzuela’s arguments revolve around a single issue: "whether or not respondent Court (of
Appeals) committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the stipulation in the charter party executed
between the petitioner and the private respondent exempting the latter from liability for the loss of petitioner’s
logs arising from the negligence of its (Seven Brothers’) captain." 9

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Validity of Stipulation is Lis Mota

The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the" (o)wners shall not be
responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo." 10 The validity of
this stipulation is the lis mota of this case.

It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute between the parties that the proximate cause of the
sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo was the "snapping of the iron chains and
the subsequent rolling of the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing
the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event." 11 Likewise undisputed is the status of Private
Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner
Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its petition. 12

The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for being contrary to public policy, 13 citing Article
1745 of the Civil Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to
public policy:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;

(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods;

(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods;

(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good father of a family, or
of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;

(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its employees;

(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;

(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of
the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in the contract of
carriage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for being contrary to Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of
Commerce 14 and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code. Citing Article 1306 and paragraph 1, Article 1409
of the Civil Code, 15 petitioner further contends that said stipulation "gives no duty or obligation to the private
respondent to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the custody and transportation of the
cargo."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a
private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on
common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties
in their charter party. 16

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on
the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the
negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it
is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a
contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would
be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the
general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general
public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently,
the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove
the protection given by law in contacts involving common carriers.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The issue posed in this case and the arguments raised by petitioner are not novel; they were resolved long ago
by this Court in Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. 18 In that case, the trial court
similarly nullified a stipulation identical to that involved in the present case for being contrary to public policy
based on Article 1744 of the Civil Code and Article 587 of the Code of Commerce. Consequently, the trial court
held the shipowner liable for damages resulting from the partial loss of the cargo. This Court reversed the trial
court and laid down, through Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the following well-settled observation and
doctrine:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under American
jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only,
becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed valid.

Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where
the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner
from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing
common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in this case
of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party." 19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, where the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply. The general public enters into a
contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding
public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the
approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-
sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no
understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private
carriage is not similarly situated. It can — and in fact it usually does — enter into a free and voluntary
agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and
liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a
charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on
common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.

Petitioner contends that the rule in Home Insurance is not applicable to the present case because it "covers
only a stipulation exempting a private carrier from liability for the negligence of his agent, but it does not apply
to a stipulation exempting a private carrier like private respondent from the negligence of his employee or
servant which is the situation in this case." 20 This contention of petitioner is bereft of merit, for it raises a
distinction without any substantive difference. The case of Home Insurance specifically dealt with "the liability
of the shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain and crew" 21 and a charter party stipulation which
"exempts the owner of the vessel from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source, even from
the neglect or fault of the captain or crew or some other person employed by the owner on board, for whose
acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said paragraph." 22 Undoubtedly, Home Insurance is
applicable to the case at bar.

The naked assertion of petitioner that the American rule enunciated in Home Insurance is not the rule in the
Philippines 23 deserves scant consideration. The Court there categorically held that said rule was "reasonable"
and proceeded to apply it in the resolution of that case. Petitioner miserably failed to show such circumstances
or arguments which would necessitate a departure from a well-settled rule. Consequently, our ruling in said
case remains a binding judicial precedent based on the doctrine of stare decisis and Article 8 of the Civil Code
which provides that" (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

In fine, the respondent appellate court aptly stated that" [in the case of] a private carrier, a stipulation
exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its agent is valid." 24
Other Arguments

On the basis of the foregoing alone, the present petition may already be denied; the Court, however, will
discuss the other arguments of petitioner for the benefit and satisfaction of all concerned.

Articles 586 and 587, Code of Commerce

Petitioner Valenzuela insists that the charter party stipulation is contrary to Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of
Commerce which confer on petitioner the right to recover damages from the shipowner and ship agent for the
acts or conduct of the captain. 25 We are not persuaded. Whatever rights petitioner may have under the
aforementioned statutory provisions were waived when it entered into the charter party.chanroblesvirtual|
awlibrary

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that" (r)ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a person with a right recognized by law." As a
general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to rights to personality and family rights which may
not be made the subject of waiver. 26 Being patently and undoubtedly patrimonial, petitioner’s right conferred
under said articles may be waived. This, the petitioner did by acceding to the contractual stipulation that it is
solely responsible for any damage to the cargo, thereby exempting the private carrier from any responsibility
for loss or damage thereto. Furthermore, as discussed above, the contract of private carriage binds petitioner
and private respondent alone; it is not imbued with public policy considerations for the general public or third
persons are not affected thereby.

Articles 1170 and 1173, Civil Code

Petitioner likewise argues that the stipulation subject of this controversy is void for being contrary to Articles
1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code 27 which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, shall apply.

If the law does not state the diligence which is to be observed in he performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court notes that the foregoing articles are applicable only to the obligor or the one with an obligation to
perform. In the instant case, Private Respondent Seven Brothers is not an obligor in respect of the cargo, for
this obligation to bear the loss was shifted to petitioner by virtue of the charter party. This shifting of
responsibility, as earlier observed, is not void. The provisions cited by petitioner are, therefore, inapplicable to
the present case.

Moreover, the factual milieu of this case does not justify the application of the second paragraph of Article 1173
of the Civil Code which prescribes the standard of diligence to be observed in the event the law or the contract
is silent. In the instant case, Article 362 of the Code of Commerce 28 provides the standard of ordinary
diligence for the carriage of goods by a carrier. The standard of diligence under this statutory provision may,
however, be modified in a contract or private carriage as the petitioner and private respondent had done in
their charter party.

Cases Cited by Petitioner Inapplicable

Petitioner cites Shewaram v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 29 which, in turn, quoted Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Gabino
Barreto & Co. 30 and argues that the public policy considerations stated there vis-a-vis contractual stipulations
limiting the carrier’s liability be applied "with equal force" to this case. 31 It also cites Manila Railroad Co. v.
Compañia Transatlantica 32 and contends that stipulations exempting a party from liability for damages due to
negligence "should not be countenanced" and should be "strictly construed" against the party claiming its
benefit. 33 We disagree.

The cases of Shewaram and Ysmael both involve a common carrier; thus, they necessarily justify the
application of such policy considerations and concomitantly stricter rules. As already discussed above, the
public policy considerations behind the rigorous treatment of common carriers are absent in the case of private
carriers. Hence, the stringent laws applicable to common carriers are not applied to private carriers. The case
of Manila Railroad is also inapplicable because the action for damages there does not involve a contract for
transportation. Furthermore, the defendant therein made a "promise to use due care in the lifting operations"
and, consequently, it was "bound by its undertaking" ; besides, the exemption was intended to cover accidents
due to hidden defects in the apparatus or other unforseeable occurrences" not caused by its "personal
negligence." This promise was thus construed to make sense together with the stipulation against liability for
damages. 34 In the present case, we stress that the private respondent made no such promise. The
agreement of the parties to exempt the shipowner from responsibility for any damage to the cargo and place
responsibility over the same to petitioner is the lone stipulation considered now by this Court.

Finally, petitioner points to Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Costelo, 35 Walter A. Smith & Co. v.
Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 36 N. T . Hashim and Co. v. Rocha and Co., 37 Ohta Development Co. v.
Steamship "Pompey" 38 and Limpangco Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co. 39 in support of its contention that the
shipowner be held liable for damages. 40 These however are not on all fours with the present case because
they do not involve a similar factual milieu or an identical stipulation in the charter party expressly exempting
the shipowner from responsibility for any damage to the cargo.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Effect of the South Sea Resolution

In its memorandum, Seven Brothers argues that petitioner has no cause of action against it because this Court
has earlier affirmed the liability of South Sea for the loss suffered by petitioner. Private respondent submits that
petitioner is not legally entitled to collect twice for a single loss. 41 In view of the above disquisition upholding
the validity of the questioned charter party stipulation and holding that petitioner may not recover from private
respondent, the present issue is moot and academic. It suffices to state that the Resolution of this Court dated
June 2, 1995 42 affirming the liability of South Sea does not, by itself, necessarily preclude the petitioner from
proceeding against private Respondent. An aggrieved party may still recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss in the event the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the loss. Article
2207 of the Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated
the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury."cralaw virtua1aw
library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible
error on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102881 December 7, 1992

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR. and SUN VALLEY MANUFACTURING &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This case involves a boundary dispute between Toyota Motor Phil. Corporation (Toyota) and Sun Valley
Manufacturing and Development Corporation (Sun Valley).

Both Toyota and Sun Valley are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land situated in La
Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila which they purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).

The properties in question formerly belonged to Delta Motors Corporation (DMC). They were foreclosed by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and later transferred to the national government through the APT for
disposition.

APT then proceeded to classify the DMC properties according to the existing improvements, i.e., buildings,
driveways, parking areas, perimeter fence, walls and gates and the land on which the improvements stood.
The entire DMC property is called GC III-Delta Motors Corporation, divided into Delta I, Delta II, and Delta III.
Further subdivisions for the separate catalogues were made for each division e.g. Delta I into Lots 1, 2 and 3.
After this classification, APT parcelled out and catalogued the properties for bidding and sale.

Part of the duly parcelled Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold to Toyota through public bidding on May 12, 1988
for the amount of P95,385,000.00. After its purchase, Toyota constructed a concrete hollow block (CHB)
perimeter fence around its alleged property.

On October 5, 1990, another part of the parcelled Delta I (Lot 1) covering an area of 55,236 square meters was
purchased by Sun Valley from APT for the bid price of P124,349,767.00. Relying upon the title description of
its property and the surveys it had commissioned, Sun Valley claimed that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps
Sun Valley's property along corners 11 to 15 by 322 square meters and corners 19 to 1 by 401 square meters
for a total of 723 square meters. (Rollo, p. 841)

Negotiations between the two (2) corporations for a possible settlement of the dispute bogged down. Court
battles ensued, grounded on purely procedural issues. In pursuing the resolution of the dispute, both Toyota
and Sun Valley opted to file separate actions. Much of the complications that arose and are now before us can
be traced to the two separate cases pursued by both parties. There are other cases arising from the same
dispute but which are not before us.

Culled from the records, these are the antecedents of the two cases which transpired below.

TOYOTA CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2504)

On September 11, 1991, Toyota filed a case against APT and Sun Valley docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2504
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146 presided by Judge Salvador Tensuan. The complaint was
for the reformation of the Deed of Sale executed between Toyota and APT. Toyota alleges that the instrument
failed to reflect the true intention of the parties, as evidenced by the failure of the title to include the 723 square
meters strip of land.
Toyota alleges that the discrepancy came about because of the serious flaw in the classification/cataloguing of
properties bidded out for sale by APT. Toyota was made to understand that included in its perimeter fence is
the disputed strip of land. Thus, Toyota sought the resurvey of the property to correct this error in the title. Sun
Valley was impleaded considering that it purchased the adjoining land whose title allegedly included the 723
square meters property.

On September 11, 1991, upon Toyota's application, Judge Tensuan issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) enjoining Sun Valley and APT from any act of destruction and removal of Toyota's walls and structures.
Sun Valley and APT were respectively served summons on the following day.

On September 16, 1991, Sun Valley filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the Toyota complaint failed to
state a cause of action against it (1) since it was not a party to the contract of the deed of sale between Toyota
and APT, and (2) the complaint was in effect a collateral attack on its title.

On September 27, 1991, Judge Tensuan initially denied Toyota's application for preliminary injunction on the
finding that there was no evidence of any threatened destruction, removal or dispossession of Toyota's
property.

On October 10, 1991, Judge Tensuan denied Sun Valley's motion to dismiss.

Both Toyota and Sun Valley filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Toyota moved to reconsider the
denial of its injunctive application while Sun Valley moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss.

On October 30, 1991, APT filed its answer with affirmative defenses alleging that the complaint must be
dismissed on the ground that Toyota and APT should first have resorted to arbitration as provided in Toyota's
deed of sale with APT. On December 4, 1991, Toyota filed a motion alleging that Sun Valley's long threatened
destruction and removal of Toyota's walls and structures were actually being implemented to which Judge
Tensuan issued another TRO enjoining acts of destruction and removal of the perimeter walls and structures
on the contested area.

Consequently, on December 17, 1991, Judge Tensuan reconsidered his earlier denial of Toyota's application
for injunction and granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sun Valley from proceeding with its
threatened destruction and removal of Toyota's walls and directed Sun Valley to restore the premises to
the status quo ante.

On December 11, 1991, Judge Tensuan denied Sun Valley's motion for reconsideration of its motion to
dismiss. Sun Valley elevated this denial to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No.
26942 and raffled to the Eleventh (11th) Division.

Judge Tensuan's jurisdiction to act considering the defense of prematurity of action for failure to arbitrate the
validity of the TRO issued on December 4, 1991 and the order granting injunctive reliefs were challenged in a
petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26813, assigned to the
Second (2nd) Division.

SUN VALLEY CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2550)

On September 16, 1991, Sun Valley, on the other hand, filed a case for recovery of possession of the disputed
723 square meters boundary with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati, Branch 61 presided by Judge
Fernando Gorospe, Jr.

On the same day, Judge Gorospe issued a TRO enjoining Toyota from committing further acts of
dispossession against Sun Valley.
On September 19, 1991, Toyota moved to lift the TRO and opposed Sun Valley's application for injunction.

On September 23, 1991, Toyota filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case since the complaint was a simple ejectment case cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC).
The motion to dismiss was set for hearing on September 27, 1991.

On September 27, 1991, Sun Valley filed an amended complaint to incorporate an allegation that Toyota's
possession of the alleged disputed area began in September, 1988 when Toyota purchased the property.

Ruling that the amendment was a matter of right, Judge Gorospe admitted the amended complaint. Toyota
adopted its motion to dismiss the original complaint as its motion to dismiss the amended complaint. After the
arguments to Toyota's motion to dismiss, the same was submitted for resolution. Sun Valley's application for
prohibitory and mandatory injunction contained in its complaint was set for hearing on October 1, 1991.

Protesting the admission of the amended complaint, Toyota went to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari on
October 1, 1991. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26152 raffled to the Tenth (10th) Division.

Toyota was later prompted to file two supplemental petitions, before the Court of Appeals as a result of Judge
Gorospe's alleged hasty issuance of four (4) Orders, all dated October 1, 1992. These are:

(1) First supplemental petition dated October 4, 1991 which sought to nullify the Order denying Toyota's motion
to dismiss the amended complaint.

(2) Second supplemental petition dated October 23, 1991 which sought the nullification of the orders granting
Sun Valley's application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and denying Toyota's motion to
cross-examine Sun Valley's witnesses on the latter's injunction application.

On November 27, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals' Tenth Division promulgated its questioned decision
which is primarily the subject matter of the present petition before us.

The respondent court denied due course to the Toyota petition on the finding that the amendment of Sun
Valley's complaint was a valid one as Sun Valley's action was not for unlawful detainer but an accion
publiciana. Furthermore, the supplemental petitions filed by Toyota assailing the prohibitory and mandatory
injunctive writ were not ruled upon as they were expunged from the records because of Toyota's failure to
attach a motion to admit these supplemental petitions.

Consequently, Toyota filed the present petition for certiorari on December 9, 1991.

Earlier, upon an ex-parte motion to clarify filed by Sun Valley on October 25, 1991, Judge Gorospe issued
another order dated December 2, 1991 which followed Sun Valley to break open and demolish a portion of the
Toyota perimeter walls, and eventually to secure possession of the disputed area. Toyota was constrained to
come to this Court for relief.

On December 11, 1991, we issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of Judge Gorospe's injunction and
break-open orders dated October 1, 1991 and December 2, 1991 respectively as well as further proceedings in
Civil Case No. 91-2550.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals' Second Division issued a TRO ordering respondent Judge Tensuan and all
other persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 91-2504 and
from enforcing the Order dated December 17, 1991 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated
December 19, 1991.

This prompted Toyota to file a motion to quash the TRO and file a supplemental petition with this Court
impleading the Court of Appeals' Second Division.
On January 13, 1992, we admitted the supplemental petition.

On January 10, 1992, the Court of Appeals' Second Division issued the Resolution granting Sun Valley's
application for preliminary injunction which enjoined Judge Tensuan in the Toyota case from implementing his
injunction Order and from proceeding with the case before him (Civil Case No. 91-2504).

Thus, Toyota filed its Second Supplemental Petition with this Court challenging the validity of the injunction writ
issued by the Court of Appeals' Second Division.

This Second Supplemental Petition was admitted on February 10, 1992.

On February 10, 1992, we gave due course to Toyota's petition.

Subsequently, through a manifestation dated April 29, 1992, Toyota informed the Court that on April 15, 1992,
the Court of Appeals' 11th Division (Sun Valley case) rendered a decision dismissing the case before it for lack
of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Toyota complaint was not a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title
and that misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal.

A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 10, 1992.

In the instant petition Toyota raises the following issues, to wit:

1. The Court of Appeals' 10th Division gravely abused its discretion when it ignored or pretended to ignore
Toyota's protests against Judge Gorospe's injunction orders.

2. Sun Valley is guilty of forum-shopping and Judge Gorospe of case-grabbing.

Sun Valley, on the other hand raises the following:

1. Whether or not the petitioner availed of the proper mode of elevating the case to this Court.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act upon petitioner's
supplemental petitions for certiorari.

3. Whether or not the complaint filed in the court below is an accion publiciana which is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.

4. Whether or not Judge Salvador S. Tensuan had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 2504 for
reformation of instrument.

5. Whether or not respondent Judge Gorospe, Jr. committed grave abuse of discretion in granting private
respondent's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory/mandatory injunction.

6. Whether or not Judge Tensuan committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of mandatory
injunction dated December 19, 1991.

This case is far from settlement on the merits. Through legal maneuverings, the parties have succeeded in
muddling up the vital issues of the case and getting the lower courts embroiled in numerous appeals over
technicalities. As it is now, there are three appellate decisions/resolutions before us for review and conflicting
orders issued by lower courts as a result of the separate cases filed by the parties. As in the case
of Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeal,s 193 SCRA 158 [1991], the Court is explicit in
stating that:

xxx xxx xxx

 Where there are conflicting but inextricably interconnected issues in one and the same
complicated case, it is best that these be resolved in one integrated proceeding where an
overall picture of the entirety of the case can be presented and examined. Piecemeal
determinations by several trial courts on segments of the basic issue and disconnected appeals
to different Divisions of the Court of Appeals resulting in separate decisions each dealing with
only part of the problem are discouraged. Needless multiplicity of suits is something which is
frowned upon.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Amid the clutter of extraneous materials which have certainly bloated the records of this case, we find only two
(2) issues vital to the disposition of the petition: first, is the matter of jurisdiction, who as between Judge
Tensuan or Judge Gorospe has jurisdiction over the dispute; and second, who as between the parties has the
rightful possession of the land.

Anent the issue on jurisdiction, we examine the two actions filed by the parties.

Toyota filed an action for reformation on September 11, 1991, before Judge Tensuan alleging that the true
intentions of the parties were not expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359 Civil Code). The instrument sought to
be reformed is the deed of sale executed by APT in favor of Toyota. Toyota alleges that there was a mistake in
the designation of the real properties subject matter of the contract. Sun Valley was impleaded in order to
obtain complete relief since it was the owner of the adjacent lot.

Sun Valley, however, argues that the complaint for reformation states no cause of action against it since an
action for reformation is basically one strictly between the parties to the contract itself. Third persons who are
not parties to the contract cannot and should not be involved. Thus, Sun Valley contends that it should not
have been impleaded as a defendant.

The Court of Appeals' 11th Division, in its decision promulgated on April 15, 1992 where the denial of Sun
Valley's motion to dismiss was sustained, correctly ruled that misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal.

American jurisprudence from where provisions on reformation of instruments were taken discloses that suits to
reform written instruments are subject to the general rule in equity that all persons interested in the subject
matter of the litigation, whether it is a legal or an equitable interest should be made parties, so that the court
may settle all their rights at once and thus prevent the necessity of a multiplicity of suits (Bevis Construction
Co. v. Grace [Fla App] 115 So 2d 84; Green v. Stone, 54 N.J.E. 387, 34 A 1099). As a general rule, therefore,
all persons to be affected by the proposed reformation must be made parties (American Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. Elder, 189 Ga 229, 5 SE 2d 668; Kemp v. Funderburk, 224 NC 353, 30 SE 2d 155). In an action to reform a
deed, all parties claiming an interest in the land or any part thereof purportedly conveyed by the instrument
sought to be reformed, and whose interests will be affected by the reformation of the instrument are necessary
parties to the action (Kemp v. Funderburk, 224 NC 353, 30 SE 2d 155).

From the foregoing jurisprudence, it would appear that Toyota was correct in impleading Sun Valley as party
defendant. However, these principles are not applicable under the particular circumstances of this case. Under
the facts of the present case, Toyota's action for reformation is dismissible as against Sun Valley.

Attention must first be brought to the fact that the contract of sale executed between APT and Toyota provides
an arbitration clause which states that:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the parties hereby undertake
to submit the matter for determination by a committee of experts, acting as arbitrators, the
composition of which shall be as follows:
 a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR;

b) One member to be appointed by the VENDEE;

c) One member, who shall be a lawyer, to be appointed by both of the aforesaid

parties;

The members of the Arbitration Committee shall be appointed not later than three (3) working
days from receipt of a written notice from either or both parties. The Arbitration Committee shall
convene not later than three (3) weeks after all its members have been appointed and proceed
with the arbitration of the dispute within three (3) calendar months counted therefrom. By written
mutual agreement by the parties hereto, such time limit for the arbitration may be extended for
another calendar month. The decision of the Arbitration Committee by majority vote of at least
two (2) members shall be final and binding upon both the VENDOR and the VENDEE; (Rollo,
pp. 816-817)

x x x           x x x          x x x

The contention that the arbitration clause has become disfunctional because of the presence of third parties is
untenable.

Contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Mercantile Ins. Co. Inc. v. Felipe Ysmael,
Jr. & Co., Inc., 169 SCRA 66 [1989]). As such, the parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their
contractual commitments (Quillan v. CA, 169 SCRA 279 [1989]). Toyota is therefore bound to respect the
provisions of the contract it entered into with APT.

Toyota filed an action for reformation of its contract with APT, the purpose of which is to look into the real
intentions/agreement of the parties to the contract and to determine if there was really a mistake in the
designation of the boundaries of the property as alleged by Toyota. Such questions can only be answered by
the parties to the contract themselves. This is a controversy which clearly arose from the contract entered into
by APT and Toyota. Inasmuch as this concerns more importantly the parties APT and Toyota themselves, the
arbitration committee is therefore the proper and convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in
the deed of sale.

Having been apprised of the presence of the arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by APT, Judge
Tensuan should have at least suspended the proceedings and directed the parties to settle their dispute by
arbitration (Bengson v. Chan, 78 SCRA 113 [1977], Sec. 7, RA 876). Judge Tensuan should have not taken
cognizance of the case.

But the more apparent reason which warrants the dismissal of the action as against Sun Valley is the fact that
the complaint for reformation amounts to a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title, contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals' 11th Division.

It is disputed that Sun Valley has a Torrens title registered in its name by virtue of its purchase of the land from
APT.

Toyota contends that the 723 square meters strip of land which it understood to be included in its purchase
from APT was erroneously included in Sun Valley's title. This is the reason why reformation was sought to
correct the mistake.

Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D. No. 1529).

In the case of Domingo v. Santos Ongsiako, Lim y Sia (55 Phil. 361 [1930]), the Court held that:
 . . . The fact should not be overlooked that we are here confronted with what is really a collateral
attack upon a Torrens title. The circumstance that the action was directly brought to recover a
parcel of land does not alter the truth that the proceeding involves a collateral attack upon a
Torrens title, because as we have found, the land in controversy lies within the boundaries
determined by that title. The Land Registration Law defines the methods under which a wrongful
adjudication of title to land under the Torrens system may be corrected . . .

While reformation may often be had to correct mistakes in defining the boundary of lands conveyed so as to
identify the lands, it may not be used to pass other lands from those intended to be bought and sold,
notwithstanding a mistake in pointing out the lines, since reformation under these circumstances would be
inequitable and unjust. (McCay v. Jenkins, 244 Ala 650, 15 So 2d 409, 149 ALR 746)

Assuming that Toyota is afforded the relief prayed for in the Tensuan court, the latter can not validly order the
contested portion to be taken out from the Sun Valley's TCT and award it in favor of Toyota.

An action for reformation is in personam, not in rem (Cohen v. Hellman Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 133
Cal App 758, 24 P2d 960; Edwards v. New York Life Ins. Co. 173 Tenn 102, 114 SW 2d 808) even when real
estate is involved (Agurs v. Holt, 232 La 1026, 95 So 2d 644; Vallee v. Vallee (La App) 180 So 2d 570). It is
merely an equitable relief granted to the parties where through mistake or fraud, the instrument failed to
express the real agreement or intention of the parties. While it is a recognized remedy afforded by courts of
equity it may not be applied if it is contrary to well-settled principles or rules. It is a long standing principle that
equity follows the law. It is applied in the abscence of and never against statutory law (Zabat v. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 587 [1986]). Courts are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. (See Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 40 [1986].) Courts of equity must proceed with
utmost caution especially when rights of third parties may intervene. Thus in the instant case, vis-a-vis well-
settled principles or rules in land registration, the equitable relief of reformation may not come into play in order
to transfer or appropriate a piece of land that one claims to own but which is titled in the name of a third party.

On the other hand, Sun Valley filed an action for reconveyance against Toyota to recover possession of the
strip of land encroached upon and occupied by the latter. What Sun Valley seeks in its complaint is the
recovery of possession de jure and not merely possession de facto. Toyota moved to dismiss on the
assumption that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC.

We do not find any reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals' 10th Division where it upheld Judge
Gorospe's order denying Toyota's motion to dismiss. An amendment to a complaint before a responsive
pleading is filed, is a matter of right (Rule 10, Sec. 2). Whether or not the complaint was amended, Sun
Valley's complaint was one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. Its right over the land is premised on
the certificate of title registered in its name after it had purchased said land from APT. As the registered owner
it had the right of possession of said land illegally occupied by another (Ybañez v. IAC, 194 SCRA 743 [1991]).
The case of Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc. (71 SCRA 557 [1976]) is quite instructive:

xxx xxx xxx

We deem it advisable, at this point, to reiterate the essential differences between three kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely: (1) the summary action for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer; (2) the accion publiciana; and (3) the accion de
reivindicacion.

The action for forcible entry may be brought where dispossession of real property had taken
place by any of the means provided for in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and in the case of unlawful detainer, where the possession is withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract express or implied. These
two actions must be filed within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession with the municipal or city court. These actions in their essence are mere quieting
processes by virtue of which a party in possession of land may not be, by force, dispossessed
of that land, the law restoring to him such possession in a summary manner, until the right of
 ownership can be tried in due course of law. They are, therefore, intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. The
aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands. Thus,
"whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may
maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be
owner of land." (Gumiran v. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174, 179. Cf. Medina, et al. v. Valdellon, 63
SCRA 278) Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one (1) year has
not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of ownership of
such property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegal dispossessed desires to raise
the question of illegal dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property, he may
commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal
dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is
filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, then the Court
of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. (Bishop of Cebu v. Mangoron, 6
Phil. 286; Catholic Church v. Tarlac and Victoria, 9 Phil. 450; Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618;
Medina, et al. v. Valdellon, supra) The former is an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana,
which is the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in
the Court of First Instance. (Sec. 88, Rep. Act No. 296; Rule 70, Rules of Court; Manila Railroad
Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523; Lim Cay v. Del, 55 Phil. 692; Central Azucarera de Tarlac
v. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169; Navarro v. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604; Luna v. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306;
Medina, et al. v. Valdellon, supra; Pasaqui, et al. v. Villablanca, et al., supra).

With the finding that Toyota's action for reformation is dismissable as it is in effect a collateral attack on Sun
Valley's title, Sun Valley's action for recovery of possession filed before Judge Gorospe now stands to be the
proper forum where the following dispute may be tried or heard.

We now come to the issue as to which of the parties has a legal right over the property to warrant the issuance
of the preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction.

In actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or
right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must
make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to
protect a right not in esse (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. v. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 286-287 [1984]; Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326 [1987]).

Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right to be
protected, and the facts against which the injunction is to be directed, are violative of said right. In particular,
for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the existence of the right and the violation must appear in the
allegations of the complaint and an injunction is proper also when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in his complaint. Furthermore, the complaint for injunctive relief must be construed strictly
against the pleader (Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, supra).

In the instant case the existence of a "clear positive right" especially calling for judicial protection has been
shown by Sun Valley.

Toyota's claim over the disputed property is anchored on the fact of its purchase of the property from APT, that
from the circumstances of the purchase and the intention of the parties, the property including the disputed
area was sold to it.

Sun Valley, on the other hand has TCT No. 49019 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque embracing the
aforesaid property in its name, having been validly acquired also from APT by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed in its favor on December 5, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 823-825; 826-827).
There are other circumstances in the case which militate against Toyota's claim for legal possession over the
disputed area.

The fact that Toyota has filed a suit for reformation seeking the inclusion of the 723 square meters strip of land
is sufficient to deduce that it is not entitled to take over the piece of property it now attempts to appropriate for
itself.

As early as September, 1988 prior to the construction of the perimeter fence, Toyota was already aware of the
discrepancies in the property's description in the title and the actual survey.

The letter of its surveyor company, Summa Kumagai thus reveals:

09 September, 1988

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION

10th Floor, Metrobank Plaza
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.
Makati, Metro Manila

ATTENTION: MR. FLORENCIO JURADO

Finance Officer

SUBJECT: PHASE I RENOVATION WORK

PERIMETER FENCE

GENTLEMEN:

This is in connection with the construction of the Perimeter Fence for the Toyota Motor Plant Facilities which to
this date we have not started yet due to the following reasons:

1. Lack of fencing permit which can only be applied to and issued by the Parañaque Building Official upon
receipt of the transfer certificate to title and tax declaration.

2. Although the Building Official has verbally instructed us to proceed with the renovation work and
construction of fence, we could not execute the fencing work due to discrepancies on the consolidation plan
and the existing property monuments. These discrepancies was (sic) confirmed with the representatives of the
Geodetic Engineer.

Kindly expedite the immediate confirmation with the Geodetic Engineer on the final descriptions of the property
lines.

We would appreciate your usual prompt attention regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

CESAR D. ELE
Project Manager (Emphasis supplied, Rollo, p. 811)

Despite such notification, Toyota continued to build the perimeter fence. It is highly doubtful whether Toyota
may be considered a builder in good faith to be entitled to protection under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

The records also reveal that Toyota's own surveyor, the Certeza Surveying & Acrophoto Systems, Inc.
confirmed in its reports dated April 1 and April 5, 1991 that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps the boundaries
of Sun Valley's lot (Rollo, pp. 833-383).
Even communication exchanges between and among APT, Toyota & Sun Valley show that the parties are
certainly aware that the ownership of the disputed property more properly pertains to Sun Valley. Among these
are the following:

May 28, 1991

MR. JOSE CH. ALVAREZ

President
Sun Valley Manufacturing &
Development Corp. (SVMDC)
Cor. Aurora Blvd. and Andrews Ave.
Pasay City, Metro Manila

Dear Mr. Alvarez:

Thank you for honoring our invitation to a luncheon meeting held at noon time today at Sugi Restaurant.

As per our understanding, we would like to propose as a package the settlement of differences between your
property and ours as follows:

1. Boundary Issue between TMP Main Office & Factory and the recently acquired property of SVMDC.

The boundary lines to our property lines bidded early 1988 were determined after making full payment in
August 1988 jointly by representatives of TMP/Metrobank — Messrs. Mitake, Pedrosa, Alonzo and Jurado,
APT — Mr. Bince together with representatives of Geo-Resources who installed the monuments and prepared
the technical description of the property. The construction of the fence utilized existing fence marked yellow on
Exhibit 1 and made sure that the new fence to set boundaries were on top of the monuments set by Geo-
Resources. The replacement of existing wire fence were affected by setting concrete walls on exactly the same
position.

This is the reason why we are surprised top be informed that our fence goes beyond the boundary lines set
forth in the Technical Description on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) to our property. This occurs even on
fence already existing and should have been maintained in the TCT.

Since we have manifested our intention when we set boundaries to our property, we propose the following in
relation to the excess area occupied by TMP.

1. We offer to give way to an access road 5 m. wide more or less from point 15 to 16 of Lot 2 (14.65 m. in
length) at the back of our Paint Storage Building (Exhibit 2).

2. We propose to pay for the balance of excess land inside TMP fence (contested areas) at a price mutually
agreed upon.

II. Question of ownership of certain permanent improvements (underground water reservoir and perimeter
walls/fences) located at Lot 6 which we won by bidding from APT on October 5, 1990.

We have made our position to APT that these permanent improvements are part of Lot 6 on "as is where is"
bid basis (See explanatory map — Exhibit 3). However, since you have relayed to us that the underground
water reservoir is of no use to you, as part of the total package we are proposing to pay for the underground
water reservoir, the applicable perimeter walls/fences and the water pump/pipings at a price mutually agreed
upon.

We hope that through this proposal we would settle our differences and look forward to a more cooperative
relationship between good neighbors.
We will appreciate your favorable consideration and immediate attention on the matter.

ASAO MITAKE
Presiden 

July 4, 1991

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION

Rm. 15, South Superhighway
Parañaque, Metro Manila

ATTENTION: MR. MASAO MITAKE

President

Gentlemen:

This refers to our several meetings regarding the property problems at "Lot 6" and your encroachment of
SVMD LOT I.

We wish to thank you for finally acknowledging the legitimacy of our demands on both properties. In order to
start a good business relationship, we propose that the property problem at "LOT 6" which consists of the
perimeter fence, water reservoir, water pump and systems be settled first, in the amount of P3,500,000.00
payable to CMANC.

We also would like to request you to allow us to continue usage of the MERALCO posts and lines connecting
to SVMD power station which passes thru your property and allow entry of MERALCO linemen from time to
time.

Upon acceptance of these requests, I will confer which our Japanese partners to consider the selling of the
723 sq. m. of land adjacent to your Assembly Plant which you continue to use even after said property has
been legally transferred to us from last quarter of 1990.

In view of your present good behavior, we are hoping that this first problem be settled not later than July 15,
1991, otherwise, we will consider the whole matter as unacceptable to you and we, therefore, proceed as
earlier demanded to immediately demolish the CHB fence that prevents us from using our property.

We hope for your immediate action to start the resolution of these unwanted problems.

Very truly yours,

JOSE CH. ALVAREZ

President (Rollo, p. 832; Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Sun Valley puts forth evidence that Toyota has altered the boundaries of its own property by moving
the monuments erected thereon by APT's surveyor Geo-Resources and Consultancy, Inc. when Lot 2 was
initially surveyed in August 1988:

The Asset Privitalization Trust

10th Floor, BA-Lepanto Building
9847 Paseo de Roxas Building
Metro Manila

Attention: Mr. Felipe B. Bince, Jr.

Associate Executive Trustee
Dear Sirs:

This has reference to our letter to your office dated April 8, 1991, a copy of which is attached, regarding the
check survey of Delta I. After asking some of the field men who participated in the various surveys of Delta I
from the consolidation to subdivision surveys, we found out that some more of the present corner points are
not the same points shown to them during the surveys. We shall show this during a meeting with the
representatives of the owners of Lots 1 and 2.

We hope this will clarify the discrepancies.

Very truly yours,

Exec. Vice Pres. & Gen. Manager

(Emphasis supplied; Rollo, p. 839)

There is therefore sufficient and convincing proof that Sun Valley has a clear legal right to possession in its
favor to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary/mandatory injunction. Sun Valley's TCT gives it that right
to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has not established its right over the said property except for the
assertion that there was a mistake in an instrument which purportedly should have included the questioned
strip of land.

As between the two (2) parties, Sun Valley has a better right. Under the circumstances, therefore, and
considering that the clear legal right of Toyota to possession of the disputed area has not been established
sufficient to grant the prayed for relief, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be issued pendente lite.
(See Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, 65 SCRA 471 [1975]; De Gracia v. Santos, 79 Phil. 365 [1947]; Rodulfa v. Alfonso,
76 Phil. 225 [1946] and Torre v. Querubin, 101 Phil. 53 [1957])

In view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to show reversible error, much less
grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the respondent court.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by
James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also
filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge
in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein,
that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or
to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to
but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of
the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married
to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138322 - October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized
on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and
applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner - a Filipina - and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy - respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 - or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending - respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its
Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

 First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment,
may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect,
the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil
Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx-xxx-xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document - a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be
a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of
the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts:
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional judgment of

divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that
no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish
the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower
court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit "B" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" - Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" - Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and
Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
"Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and
wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927
to September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave
by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
"Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s
name was left blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of
Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from
Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of
the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and
Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at
San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables
or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of
the province of Rizal, Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall
not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed
and disposed of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and
in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed,
signed, or published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should
ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to
any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last
Will and Testament."17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato
on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance
of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the
will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art.
739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the
intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as
conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As
such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic)
of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession
or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts,
legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when
required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier
decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they
were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3)
of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is
declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years of cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple.
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on
the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted
and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to
the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for
or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property
she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and
legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was
no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as
a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown
in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required
is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

NOCON, J.:

Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from
New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's
position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of
carriage with petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the
appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither
fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased
three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while
that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for
said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had
checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the
No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the
42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22,
were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane;
while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr.
Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated
because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two
tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court
ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which states as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the
following amounts:
 (1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the
tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to
Los Angeles from New York City;

(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine
Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,

(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages
for all the plaintiffs'

(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's
fees; and

(6) The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of
record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad
faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.

Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked and
that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight,
nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so
gross as to amount to bad faith.

Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight (48)
other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.

The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals3 dated October 25, 1991 states as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the
defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:

(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of
Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of
Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

(4) The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged the
following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
 I.

. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF

RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.

II.

. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

III.

. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT
FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.5

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board
their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6 Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact.

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar
in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in
the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,9 where passengers with
confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a
ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the
passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the
carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it
took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the
check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said
passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not allowed to
board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the allowable
period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had
arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights
under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.

In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad
faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had
the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that
she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said
flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding awarding her damages.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. So
ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.  12 This is so, for a contract of carriage
generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its
passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of
planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed economy class
passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its
first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the
interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of
moral damages. 13

Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing
its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if
there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets
issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such
eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the name of the
passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does
not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice
of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York
to Los Angeles.

Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less
priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets,
yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare
ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.

It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are
reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is
not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written
on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect.
Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked
condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that
petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New
York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to
so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over
the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion
in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket
because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not
shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter
was due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to
said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit
impliedly, to the course of action taken.

The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets purchased and
used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained
to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on
another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight
which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana
was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In
accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited
case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be
reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight
from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the
reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both
prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.

The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows
recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect
his interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in
the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00
moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in
the following amounts, to wit:

(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought by
Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(5) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154259             February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim
assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions
of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the
screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart,
who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of
the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits
which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner
was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary
thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka
na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he
was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out
of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages,
Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages
and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past
twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those
invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to
inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the
group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want
to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did
not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes
did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung
whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim
requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she
decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr.
Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na
kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her
surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on
her.33 1awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story
to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered
to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he
was not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place,
but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she
invited him.40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of
Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the
host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because
he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the
party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave
the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . .,
for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one]
cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into
the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached
Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave
the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to
approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s
invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under
Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said
acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA,
et al., 309 SCRA 603).44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon
in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in –

I.

… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"

III.

… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
REGARD

V.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to
self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such
findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim
did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr.
Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who
could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet
appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the
party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not
to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect
badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of
the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a
formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony
of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower
court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could
have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in
civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story
up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart
who invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.61 These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There
is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim
was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure.66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October
1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the
statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr.
Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that
Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited
Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-
motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If
at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and
the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was
"an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch;
and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed
that he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion
reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141309             December 23, 2008

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give
rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals. 1 The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an
individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also
involved, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-
performance.2

By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision3 in this case.

As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July
3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands 'Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local
brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More"
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-
93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654,
specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and
taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not
be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a
copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993,
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a
letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10
days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of
RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid,
and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued
pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93,
has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her
private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice
 or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in
violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the
parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping
was cured by respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's certificate authorizing its counsel to
execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x

xxxx

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However,
same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I
of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the
Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not
be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary's certificate
giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.4 [Citations and underscoring omitted.]

In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed
the trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.5

Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision.6 After
respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution,7 denied with finality petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.

Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En
Banc.8 She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The
earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the
performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial
powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain
from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.9 Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.10

In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,11 the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent consequently
moved for the reconsideration of this resolution.

We now resolve both motions.

There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public collectively" (the body
politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals, thus:

1. Of Duties to the Public. - The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing
primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act
for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.

The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will
be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly
executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of
the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which
he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were
duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise
and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to
another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the
 public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular
individual of the community.

These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define the
general doctrine.

2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe
to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by
reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity,
under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and
usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.

A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the
deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in
protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector,
each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to
the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.12

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it
must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R.
Mechem instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-
extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he
can incur no liability."13

Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a
cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or
inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or
failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty
to him as an individual.14 The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.15

The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on
account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can
never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which
he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong.16 A contrary precept (that an individual, in
the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an
improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits,
for if one man might have an action, all men might have the like-the complaining individual has no better right
than anybody else.17 If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an
individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right,
which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.18

Juxtaposed with Article 3219 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual
can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a
constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this
Court's pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that
Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for impairment of rights and liberties."20

It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law.21 Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,22 we granted the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact,
suffered the loss of his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,23 we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him
on account of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize winnings.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as
the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which,
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,24 we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance."25 A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-
making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who
would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.

Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent
must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the
public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged
to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties"26 mentioned in the
complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a "particular injury." In contrast,
the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter
did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.

With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission
attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or
tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act
or omission by which a party violates a right of another.27

A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.28

The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a
motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is
limited to the "relevant and material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom.
The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the
falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."29

The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its
annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.30

The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability
of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of
constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,31 where we said:

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.32

The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad faith, the
cause of action in the respondent's complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),33 where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance." This is a
logical inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondent's
rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the petitioner's administrative
issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the due
process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that
RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring
prior notice before RMC's could become "operative." However, this Court did not make an express finding of
violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: "Not
insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation;" a statement that does not
amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondent's constitutional right. Even if one were
to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the
constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article VI-not Section 1, Article III-of the Constitution.

This Court's own summation in CIR v. CA: "All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC
37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance," does not lend itself to an interpretation
that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaint's reliance on CIR v. CA-which is cited in, and a copy of
which is annexed to, the complaint-as suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail.

Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of respondent's complaint loses
the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is
merely the allegation that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and "More" cigarettes were reclassified.

If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondent's cause of action for
violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads:

2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
(hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically "Champion", "Hope" and "More" as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached
hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a circular and its
implementation resulted in the "deprivation of property" of plaintiff. They were done without due
process of law and in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics
supplied.)

But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of law" and "in violation of the right of
plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in
petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts.

In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,34 this Court declared that the test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In the
instant case, since what remains of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the
reclassification of respondent's cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid
judgment according to the prayer in the complaint.

Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process,
it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly
those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide
ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondent-without
even having to pay the assessment under protest-as recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.:

In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco
requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July
1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.

On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.35
The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same,
and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement.

At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive.

42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel to our own
Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, or any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding
for redress.

This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to win liability cases
against government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens.

Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation,36 has emerged as the
leading case on the victim's entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of
flagrant and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics officers broke into
Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents
handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family,
subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and
booked him. When Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges against him
were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under
color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct," the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the
agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,37 a liability suit for
money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three
students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University as they protested against
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,38 local school board members were sued by high school
students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled
from school for having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz v.
Economou,39 Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities futures trader was suspended, without
prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the suspension was
aimed at "chilling" his freedom of expression right under the First Amendment. A number of other cases40 with
virtually the same conclusion followed.

However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may
prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,41 that a Bivens
remedy will not be allowed when other "meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated
as (is the plaintiff)" are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil service
system42 or in the military justice system.43

In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America,44 petitioner
Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he
(Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes' business,
forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:

The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's remedies under the Internal
Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have
 found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly
suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens:

When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the
course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.

xxxx

Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax
assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both
administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized
taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific types of
misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the
politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by
taxpayers has not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Vennes's Bivens claims
against IRS agents for their tax assessment and collection activities.

In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation of due
process rights concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said:

In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and otherwise, for correcting and
redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection activities. Although
these provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS
personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the
overzealous officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for a refund if
forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass
the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS employees.45

American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which provides:

Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. - When an
action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in
the performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make
defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in
such action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the
same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.

No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted
negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression.

Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money
judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.46

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007
Decision and DENY respondent's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No.
CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-5930. February 17, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABELO ARAGON, Defendant-Appellant.

Amadeo D. Seno for Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. BIGAMY; NULLITY OF SECOND MARRIAGE, NO DEFENSE IN THE BIGAMY CASE. — A second

marriage contracted by a man while the first marriage is not yet dissolved is illegal and void (Act 3613, section
29). Its nullity, however, is no defense to a criminal action for bigamy filed against him.

2. ID.; CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE, NOT A DEFENSE IN THE BIGAMY
CASE. — The filing, while the bigamy case is pending, of a civil action by the woman in the second marriage
for its annulment by reason of force and intimidation upon her by the man, is not a bar or defense to the
criminal action. The civil action does not decide that he entered the marriage against his will and consent,
because the complaint therein does not allege that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second
marriage. It was he who used the force or intimidation and he may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the
action based on his criminal act.

3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, EXPLAINED. — A decision in such civil action is not
essential before the criminal charge can be determined. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. Prejudicial
question has been defined to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which (question) is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (10
Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the
second element. In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and
void, and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be
decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial
question.

4. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEALS; APPEALABLE ORDERS OR JUDGMENTS; INTERLOCUTORY

ORDERS, NOT APPEALABLE. — An order denying a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment or order, and is
therefore not appealable (Rule 118, sections 1 and 2).

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

The defendant in the above-entitled case is charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the crime of
bigamy, for having contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer on September 21, 1947, while
his previous valid marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting and had not been dissolved. The
information is dated May 22, 1951. On October 11, 1951, while the case was pending trial, Efigenia C. Palomer
filed a civil action in the same Court of First Instance of Cebu against the defendant-appellant, alleging that the
latter "by means of force, threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him", and praying that
their marriage on September 21, 1947 be annulled (Annex A). Thereupon and on April 30, 1952, Defendant-
Appellant filed a motion in the criminal case for bigamy, praying that the criminal charge be provisionally
dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
The court denied this motion on the ground that the validity of the second marriage may be determined in the
very criminal action for bigamy. Against this order this appeal has been presented to this court.

It is contended that as the marriage between the defendant- appellant and Efigenia C. Palomer is merely a
voidable marriage, and not an absolutely void marriage, it can not be attacked in the criminal action and,
therefore, it may not be considered therein; consequently, that the civil action to annul the second marriage
should first be decided and the criminal action, dismissed. It is not necessary to pass upon this question
because we believe that the order of denial must be sustained on another ground.

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(Cuestión prejudicial, es la que surge en un pleito o causa, cuya resolución sea antecedente logico de la
cuestión objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o
jurisdicción — X Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first
marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for
nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is
a prejudicial question.

There is no question that if the allegations of the complaint on time the marriage contracted by defendant-
appellant with Efigenia C. Palomer is illegal and void (Sec. 29, Act 3613 otherwise known as the Marriage
Law). Its nullity, however, is no defense to the criminal action for bigamy filed against him. The supposed use
of force and intimidation against the woman, Palomer, even if it were true, is not a bar or defense to said
action. Palomer, were she the one charged with bigamy, could perhaps raise said force or intimidation as a
defense, because she may not be considered as having freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was
forced to the marriage by intimidation. But not the other party, who used the force or intimidation. The latter
may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.

It follows that the pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Efigenia C. Palomer, is
absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-appellant. This civil action does not decide
that defendant-appellant did not enter the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint does
not allege that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage; it does not determine the
existence of any of the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

There is another reason for dismissing the appeal. The order appealed from is one denying a motion to dismiss
and is not a final judgment. It is, therefore, not appealable (Rule 118, secs. 1 and 2).

The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
PART II

G.R. No. 162994             September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,

vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones, involving the validity of
the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor
company.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated
March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.2

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between
such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the management and the employee will
explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation
for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married
Bettsy in September 1998.

In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest.
Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their
jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his
job well.

Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with
Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by
Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the
same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson
applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s "least-movement-
possible" policy.

In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.

Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance
Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply
with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of
products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in
product conferences regarding such products.

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for
voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (½) month pay for every year of
service, or a total of ₱50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between
its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory.

Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.

On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the
ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxo’s policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid
exercise of its management prerogatives.4

Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but the motion was denied by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5

Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NCMB’s
finding that the Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is
valid; and (ii) the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he
was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars and
training sessions.6

Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among
employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry.7

They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following circumstances: (1) he
was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales
area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions
for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondent’s products which were
competing with Astra’s products.8

In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a
relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecson’s reassignment from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area
does not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a
genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with
their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests
in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of
legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies.10

It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11

According to Glaxo, Tecson’s marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict of
interest. Astra’s products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo’s
enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecson’s case was a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.12 In
any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign
but to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13

Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he
signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he
also agreed to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a
competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.14

Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson’s reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion from seminars
regarding respondent’s new products did not amount to constructive dismissal.

It claims that in view of Tecson’s refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the
reassignment, it also considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Since Tecson’s hometown was in Agusan del
Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the
Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory
and minimizing his travel expenses.15

In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson’s exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug was
due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and
hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson’s receipt of his sales
paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his
paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he
already transferred to Butuan).16

The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not
holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The stipulation in Tecson’s contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by petitioners provides:

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you may have, either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose
a possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the
Company as a matter of Company policy.
 …17

The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to
study and become acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly
informs its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:

1. Conflict of Interest

Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run counter to the
responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.

Specifically, this means that employees are expected:

a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier
or other businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions
and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.

b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to
advance their outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.

c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their effective
job performance.

d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to conflict of
interest.

1.1. Employee Relationships

Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of
competing drug companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the Management. If
management perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by
management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to
another department in a non-counter checking position, or by career preparation toward outside
employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six (6)
months, if no other solution is feasible.19

No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in
the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life
to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are
also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and
protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or
employees who are married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged
an employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted
that the employer’s business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information would constitute a
competitive advantage.

The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners
erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed
only to the state or those acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however, discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only exception occurs when the state29 in any of its manifestations
or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.27 Obviously,
however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in
an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear
that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:

The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains
free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative
that belongs only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract the
employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business
success. . .28

The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondent’s
Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made
known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his
employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law
between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore estopped from questioning
said policy.

The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del
Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new products which
were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None of these
conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:

. . . In this case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the
policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid…Note that [Tecson’s] wife
holds a sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires
her to work in close coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties
include monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering
relationship with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astra’s inventory…she therefore
takes an active participation in the market war characterized as it is by stiff competition among
 pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner’s sales territory covers
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in Albay.
The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of
interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the other’s market strategies in the
region would be inevitable. [Management’s] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely
illusory and wanting in factual basis…31

In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed

by a medical representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating
his employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the
drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:

By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is expected to travel.
He should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug
corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for
opening or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such
reassignments are part of the employment contract.33

As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a
long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate
the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial
stage, Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with the
company and on the company’s interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the
conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its
desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy
to resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve
the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was
constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the
Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home
province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of
Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164774             April 12, 2006

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from
working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or
is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of paper
products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian
Chua is its Managing Director.

The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia
(Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company.1

Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should
they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995,2 viz.:

1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree
of relationship, already employed by the company.

2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a
friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of
them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.3

Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.4

Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she
married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign
should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.5

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that
Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due
to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.6

The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have no
money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of
whatever nature.7

Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign
voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she
alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but
separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an
accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She
returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was
denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a
memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to
sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance
to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation,
she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a
letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.8

Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorney’s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of
the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:

[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as management
prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it covers hiring, work
assignment, working method, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is free
to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment all the aspects of employment.9 (Citations omitted.)

On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11, 2002. 10

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution11 dated August 8,
2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition for Certiorari.

In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:

(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners’ dismissal from employment and ordering private respondents to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the
time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and
the cost of this suit.13

On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and
the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code; and

2. x x x respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.14

We affirm.

The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions, viz.:

Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.

xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers, recognizing the
right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:

Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
and decent living for the laborer.

The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:

Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may
appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the
first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses
have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than
co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only
intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of
the prerogatives of management.16

It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company takes the
nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of
unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies focus
upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.

With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies specifically
prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of employment policies
involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment
policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
company (anti-nepotism employment policies).18

Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital discrimination, 19 there are twenty state
statutes20 in the United States prohibiting marital discrimination. Some state courts21 have been confronted with
the issue of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and sex discrimination.

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two theories of
employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse
employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male
employees, but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its face.22

On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy
has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most employment policies do not
expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one sex.23

The state courts’ rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital status discrimination
within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they agree that the term "marital status"
encompasses discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they
are divided on whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.24

The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as married, single, divorced,
or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either chosen different
language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one
is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is single, married,
divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse." These
courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination
provision of their respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it encompassed the identity,
occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on
the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the
marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without
regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work performance.27 These courts also find the
no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business
necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the
business.28 They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification29 invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same
office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business
require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the
identity of the employee’s spouse.31 This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employer’s no-spouse rule,
the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling business
necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice.32 To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.33

The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the standard
of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification
requirement. In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,34 we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting
its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard
its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. We considered the prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company
policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.35
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid
exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company v. NLRC.36 In said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner’s policy of
disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company policy violates
the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but
established a permissible exception, viz.:

[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide
occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same,
but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.37 (Emphases supplied.)

The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must

be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the
existence of a reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in
PT&T.

We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.

Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees
related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity"38 is lame. That the second paragraph was
meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule39 is evidently not the valid reasonable business
necessity required by the law.

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but
were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol,
then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case
of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a
helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will
be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies
based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of
tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are
free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of
the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it
could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.40

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the
petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw
inferences from the legislature’s silence41 that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and
declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed
proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned
voluntarily has become moot and academic.

As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that her
resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus
valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that
she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was in dire need of money.
We examined the records of the case and find Estrella’s contention to be more in accord with the evidence.
While findings of fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only respect but, at
times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions,42 as in the case at bar.

Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due to her alleged
immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her
resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a married
man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral43 is incredulous. If she really
wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she
have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation,
the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the
intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. 44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to
resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of
petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is declared illegal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004
is AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally
married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus
[Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. 4 He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan
City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22,
1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared
in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were
able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of
the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own vows.8

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to
Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one
time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in
jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum,
to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage
had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability
for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for
bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must
be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private
complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that
the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the
Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the
OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first
marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to
the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry
the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the
absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to
reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.17

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been
"absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for
seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death
of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the
validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out
that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner’s
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG
cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado
con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for
the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death
like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a
third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion
fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or
voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family
Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are
three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence,
and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the
essential elements of the crime.29

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an
intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification
from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have
been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a
consideration of the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution
also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family
Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As
a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony
by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996,
he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such
judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal
intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty
of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or
useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to
serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period
provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on
a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true,"
is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive
death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43

With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of
the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to
Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to
contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is
not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re
Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or
she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he
or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390
of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of
seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the
prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively
dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is
not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349
seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if
it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the
view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code,
the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse
must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in
case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the
good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.58

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are
now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with
possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The
judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in
some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60 Before
such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of
the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of
the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that
the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for
bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce
evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act
or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must
be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must
be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article
2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party
has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not
have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to
those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as
in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender
may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner
is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are:
(a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.69

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On
the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter
provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.71

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her
that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his
parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years
or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already
married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the
fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a
single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she
did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v.
Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at
p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful
rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they
consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94,
186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was
willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the
plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24,
supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified
that because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was
embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost
quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of
$1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App.
Div.74 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery.
As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of
such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he
has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his
having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from
his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems
to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing
her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship
and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition
that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman
v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the
law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on
her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson
v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68
Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract
illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as
SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
 Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped
in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
 ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization
and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law
and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction
between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to
be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it
has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

586 Phil. 637

QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department
of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate
stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs - female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioner's body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent
records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition before the court a
quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondent's petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate
and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring
his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the
civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter
the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date
of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108
provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a
proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows
older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate
at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.
[22]
 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals
have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia
surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor truly
`female'."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subject's birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere
with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment
to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this
case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow.[28] The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear
at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios
and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG,
consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties
here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes
of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out
those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride
and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified
with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court,
through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such
to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the
relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At
present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a
couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2
of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by
way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is
a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence,
the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal
and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life
together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same
Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family
Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only
be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to
be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when
it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733             January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-
ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS
DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the
Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main
issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the
decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the
alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa,
five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union
is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against
reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa
Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of
Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by
the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple
were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert
that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of
the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son
with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the
name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the
absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed
an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact
took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were
never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in
the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to
her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not
of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their
relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the
following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by
Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa
Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their
home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession
of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was
prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card
from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. 20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of
Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new
Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for
the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr.,
namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late
brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was
grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law
from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the
only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar
as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of
the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa
Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only
legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the
oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the
intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her
collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby
required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of
sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was
not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court
of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court
of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground
that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect
which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The
pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances,
a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their
estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal
upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not
have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

 xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated
November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended
decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition
among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee
Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing
of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the
rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and
titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and
posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s
qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba
Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw
from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the
original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage,
the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to
Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at
least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under
oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in
the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually,
the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of
marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such
as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the
parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her
mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn
them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be
relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors
(now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the
surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis
as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage.
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of
her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate
child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the
former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not
apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of
the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law,
just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should
receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-
blood, they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her
half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of
them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or
their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to
participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to
determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with
Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she
may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of
the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain
successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic
writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the
death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere
ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this
case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case,
Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did
intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado
which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the
newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from
them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not
of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements
must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor
Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted
to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55)
is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado.
The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and
(b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also
surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from
her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives
of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited
by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and
whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such
amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2,
2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off
the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong
City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay,
American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in
1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution
of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No.
406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14,
1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca
filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the
motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that
Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and
that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved
for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's
Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the
grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not
operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went
to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the
assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed
Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the
presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies
in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the
essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the
union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally
secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such
divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also
doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification
of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality
status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during
her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an
American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn
petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which
follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when
she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the
divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in
the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the
RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION
IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure
of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether
petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

 Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was
born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American
citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth
certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made
of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate
No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she
has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such
recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L.
Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints

are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as
follows:

Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date of Birth:     March 5, 1953

Sex:     female                              Civil Status:     married       Color of Hair:    brown

Color of Eyes:     brown               Distinguishing marks on face:    none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,

Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio
G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen
was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee
on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No
explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of
the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the
Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the
DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
"provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of
Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of
indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No.
292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary
of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition
shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five
days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It
may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly
suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen.
The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or
on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition,
it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen
when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition
for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show
proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the
date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca
secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention
about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If
indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to
expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship
being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like
the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were
attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It
was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca
attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of
action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce,
her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court,
by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996,
signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing
him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on
February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the
alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both
parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its
proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As
this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
 SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
is subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was
duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the
foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in
this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca
and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat
the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x
x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation
under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of
Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb.
7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M.
Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second
divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement
entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in
this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed
to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited
to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of
action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion
to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss
and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a
cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does
not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With
the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in
fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of
their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged
that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November
27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her
petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.
In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support
hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness,
while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and
the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason
of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-
marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by
a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name
of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized
the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating
that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the
second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case
in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not
agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually
or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo
or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.
Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as
the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the
law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension
and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering
that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of
that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He
then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In
those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
 administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all
the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as
a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that
(1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the
couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order
to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married
on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter
has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
child."4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the
child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner
as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief
and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been,
his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during
the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s
refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be
used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the
Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted
that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in
an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court
should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant
and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this
petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as
shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license.
He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts,
the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should
never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally
argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an
ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any
case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it
was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no
necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the
parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be
presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the
legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared
to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions
about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court,
petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to
declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In
addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and
thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the
child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus,
in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we
held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
absolute nullity.22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q     But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last
five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A     Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The
law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap
of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995
at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein
he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of
their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and
"C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-
1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the
act of kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in
JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that:
they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to
her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come
to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-
in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of
said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another
woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap
case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
 petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether
or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms,
thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)

The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of
the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.

Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and
the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his
answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the
second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties,
whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid
duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding
together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family
Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that
since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law
for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for
lack of merit.5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for
being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family
Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to
remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of
the properties acquired during coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court
had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It
is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That
judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once
again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and
of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and
held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the
152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
 B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also
voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not
his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that
the provision be modified to read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however,
pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the
annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied
in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it
is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial
declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members
concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is
filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the
phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the
marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be
a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether
or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they
are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are
actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the
 liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not
be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article
39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked

only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the

absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous
marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of
the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his
prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can
conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or
of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For
such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through
records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved and annulled." 23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to
enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.

Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that
they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal
term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as
a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all
the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith
as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable;
and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one
in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply
be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7,
1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is
why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers
it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire
to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity
— that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

 Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that
the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party"
is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a
suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between
him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is
deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or
to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the
two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision  1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent
Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a
total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she
(petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of
summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic)
and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as
requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may
serve.  6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount
which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.  7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence,
the instant petition, contending that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF

THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE

INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY
THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
“death benefits” of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner
could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee.
The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.”

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having
been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner
and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned
by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not
be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence,
they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.

xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:

“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has
an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.”  21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a
prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes
of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is
patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage
from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court
explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying
said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility"
as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal
to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura
and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made
an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish
in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that
the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended
to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity'
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of
is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that
there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative
of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing
law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157610               October 19, 2007

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March
19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their
union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971,
and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.

On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains,
which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.

In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family;
their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up
their union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already
treated Orlando with contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando
started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his
business became successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a
pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and began to
interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she
also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she quarreled with her
husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business was being
given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at
reconciliation proved futile because their differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible;
in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of
their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that
their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza
Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando
submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding
the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only
consisted of her own testimony.

On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.

On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE,
PERMANENT AND INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).

2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL"
(p. 7, ibid.).

3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:

[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.5

While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 367 of the Family Code was laid
down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
 The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.8

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,9 which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of
the said Rule provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-

xxxx

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.

In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr.
Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the
behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article
36 of the Family Code.

This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following
reasons:

First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation
regarding respondent's psychological makeup:

xxxx

On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the mother
assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a
(sic) rejection.

The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change
overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and
when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.

In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with females, she
became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early
life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and
dominance, a replica of her mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection. Additionally,
she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a neurologist.

Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from
some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the
other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which
renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable
to cope with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological
inner resources.10

In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:

ATTY. VILLAREAL -

xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?

A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she could not
function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much in doubt of her own
capabilities, Sir.

Q- What about hysterical coloring?

A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to any stresses,
Sir.

Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?

A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the husband talking to
some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums. In short, she cannot control
her emotion at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.11

When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:

ATTY. RENDOR -

xxxx

Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?

A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of rejection from
the start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When the husband started having some
good relationship with his employees, then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of
their employees and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol,
Sir.

ATTY. RENDOR -

Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?

A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as
a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of
rejection, Sir.

xxxx

Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her
psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis
in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets what she wanted
in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing up stage, she was given up to
the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an
early teenager. With this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development.
Besides, she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.

Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage is concerned,
considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both
of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.12

The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always
felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she
became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her
husband having a good interaction with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection.
However, Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how
respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of
rejection, would render her unaware of the essential marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos,
"to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage." What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of
inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some
of her obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has
ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.14

Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends
that respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought
about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even
granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is no evidence to prove
that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage.

Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her
testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality
disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's
illness as shown by her following statement:

I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of
them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological
incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses
regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their
disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum
submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their
business.17 This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a
considerable period of time.18 However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.19

In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code
include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family,
which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and
expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage
null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's
business and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can
hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36
of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money
matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.

Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation
toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been
remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.20

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage.22 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.23 In the instant
case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of
petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their
different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder.1âwphi1 However, the
totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically
incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127358             March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

x-------------------x

G.R. No. 127449             March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended
his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s
fees of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;

4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiff’s
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding,
giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;

5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;

6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and

7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
 SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for
oral argument.3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit
and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered
consolidated by this Court.10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in
accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5

MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF

LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-

HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS
SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD
AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR HEARING. 12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13
 IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY
ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS
"TOO MINIMAL."14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO

PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S
SUPPORT.15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only
of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded
damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him
by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage
as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to
defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to
make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendant–appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights
not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach
in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is
correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the
performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such
award for damages may be made.

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in
the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court.16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read
as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that
Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is
willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done
willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family
Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .18

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and
hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed
the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages
was without basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand
since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.19

With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and
where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. (par. 11)20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. 21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his
act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the
private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as
explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage.
Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of
moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is
left without basis.

Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court
has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 –
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family
Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the
parties’ conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as
Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said
bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him
a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).
Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation
pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had
been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid
forfeiture of the defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and
transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T.
No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as
stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for
past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff
husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties,
be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here,
what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not
 claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila
Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half
of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding
shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the
latter’s share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that
henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President
of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank
for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court
adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at
the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in
the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that
in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned
and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a
void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144
of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
 acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership
in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
 the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity
by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages
(before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages,
leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article
147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state
the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in
Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in
said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not
of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since
he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing
to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED,
in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs are
deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and
Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties’
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.
G.R. NO. 155409              June 8, 2007

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated August 30, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which
affirmed the Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, and the RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7, 2002
(ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656.

The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the
petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both
the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as
maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT in the following terms, to wit:

1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the parties agree to the following:

a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and
deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the
parties.

The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at ₱1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally
by the parties;

b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for the
defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of ₱50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full
settlement thereof.

The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the owner of the lot on which it stands shall
construct a building thereon;

c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while
the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of ₱75,000.00 as his share
thereon and in full settlement thereof;

e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.

2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal properties that have
not been mentioned;

xxxx

The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the
assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.2

However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement.

The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002, denied the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion.

Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in
the assailed Order dated February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
(1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its
Order dated February 7, 2002 that the Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3)
when it denied petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance and participation
of the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor.4

On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property,
especially considering that she had only been sentenced with the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty that
does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain
to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not apply, considering,
too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by the respondent invoking Article 36 of
the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family
Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation, nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the
instant case since no petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the spouses
voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article 134
of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the voluntary separation of property, is
valid and binding in all respects because it had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that, furthermore,
even if it were true that the petitioner was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of
the Compromise Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the lawyer binds his
client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the
part of his client; that these exceptions are not present in the instant case; that the Compromise Agreement
was plainly worded and written in simple language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the
consequences thereof, hence, petitioner’s claim that his consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that the
Compromise Agreement was made during the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was submitted
during the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article 2035 of
the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period under Article 58 of the Family Code has no bearing on
the validity of the Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, and public policy; that this agreement may not be later disowned simply because
of a change of mind; that the presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable to the
execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the purpose of his presence is to curtail any
collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, and, with this in mind, nothing in
the Compromise Agreement touches on the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the
court to be wary of any possible collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an
agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome
of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.

Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL

SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;

II

WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS
CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;

III

WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE

BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND
PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM

SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION. 5

The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have been given judicial imprimatur since it
is against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no
appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely
repudiated; and that the respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in
the conjugal property.

The Petition must fail.

The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that
prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal
property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be
forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.

To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in
the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory.

Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for
legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case.

Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article9 shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed.

where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63
applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity
of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the
properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a
marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause,
subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly
such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary
separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other
persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the
participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the
case is also void. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties
of the spouses. The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor
did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties.

Article 48 of the Family Code states:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x

xxxx

(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.10 While
the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to
require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the
findings of the CA:

x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General
and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to see to it that their
evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the
Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary
of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement
pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal
properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. 11

Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised
Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the
rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it
that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory
penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.

Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel
about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now
claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In
Salonga v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held:

[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against them.

Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of
one's property through a technicality." x x x x13

None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all
creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las
Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an
answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25
May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and
guidance.5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution
of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also
apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional
rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties
already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their
legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus
we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is
a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are
valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or
conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p

The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law
that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab
initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.

The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were
five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its
decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;

(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.

Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.

The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the
other.

(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez,
herein petitioner.

In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
 Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares.

In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)

In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:

Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership.

The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.4

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling: he argues that:

Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.

II

Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared
void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.

III

Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

IV

It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.5

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases;6 it provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit
of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household."8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.
The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit
a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In
now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the
second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of
the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the
law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
 G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial
Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519–CEB.
The assailed Decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar’s petition for cancellation of entries in the
latter’s marriage contract; while the assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered
that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that
the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied
having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed
that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly,
a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L.
Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the
alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED.9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was
no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines.
Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned
government agencies.

SO ORDERED.12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of
entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE
ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF “ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT,” IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and represented herself
as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the
entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and
void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of
the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the
doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the
probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a
Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, to
wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date
of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.”20 An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
[is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it
mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that
the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage
was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye
Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties–respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court
where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical
conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged.
Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02–11–10–SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.25

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not
even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
“evidence” of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot
be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in
any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519–CEB, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
  

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore
the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and
the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start
a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently
from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to
so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why
is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why
it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the
very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not
know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might
not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as
if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant
to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that
it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should
be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment
is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological
incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after
the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
 marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it
is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
 (3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot
be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a

grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

 because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations
of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-
considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the
family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.