Judicial Department SYLLABUS

A. CONCEPTS (SYLLABUS)
1. Judicial Power

SEC 1- JUDICIAL POWER

DUTY OF THE COURTS
TO SETTLE ACTUAL CONTORVERSIES INVOLVING RIGHTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY DEMANDABLE AND
ENFORCEABLE
AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

NOTE:
The second clause effectively limits the “political question” area or scope which,
before, was forbidden territory for the courts.

SEC 2- JURISDICTION
DEFINE
PRESCRIBE
APPORTION
DO NOT DEPRIVE THE SC OF SEC 5
DO NOT UNDERMINE SECURITY OF TENURE

The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security
of
tenure of its Members.

RELATED: Sec. 30 Art VI. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its
advice and concurrence

Thus, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which authorizes an appeal to

the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases, was declared unconstitutional, because the provision
was passed without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court
-Fabian v. Desierto

QUESTION: Is a law which prohibits issuances of injunction constitutional?

1. No. Since under Sections 1 and 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, the
courts are given the
power of judicial review, the measure is void. Such power must be preserved.
The
issuance of restraining orders and injunctions is in aid of the power of
judicial review.
2. Also, such law violates judicial independence. The courts cannot be prevented
from exercising their judicial power.
The prohibition may however apply to administrative acts.

JUDICIAL REVIEW (SYLLABUS)

a. Requisites
b. Operative fact doctrine
c. Political question doctrine

DEFINITION:
It is the Supreme Court's power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power is
explicitly granted by Section 5(2), (a) and (b):

"The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

...
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
..."

NOTE:
Q. Does this make the Court superior to Congress and the President?
A. No. It shows the superiority of the Constitution over all.

REQUISITES:
Actual case or controversy
Legal standing
Earliest opportunity
Lis mota

1. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

The question before it must be ripe for adjudication, that is, the governmental act
being challenged
must have had an adverse effect on the person challenging it.
- PACU vs Secretary of Education

Examples:
--PETITION TO NULLIFY A BILL
The power of judicial review comes into play only after the passage of a bill, and
not before.

There is no actual case or controversy. The Court cannot speculate on the

constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not
pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial
determination. Filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is
"not subject to judicial restraint."
-In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court v. Abolition of JDF, UDK-15143

--PETITION TO LEGALIZE GAY MARRIAGE

(Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code)
Facts are the basis of an actual case or controversy. To reiterate, "there must be
sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues."
...
Despite a goal of proving to this Court that there is a continuing and pervasive
violation of fundamental rights of a marginalized minority group, the Petition is
woefully bereft of sufficient actual facts to substantiate its arguments.

A substantive portion of the Petition merely parrots the separate concurring

opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, concerning the
concept of suspect classifications. Five (5) pages of the 29-page Petition are
block quotes from retired Chief Justice Puno, punctuated by introductory paragraphs
of, at most, two (2) sentences each.

A separate opinion is the expression of a justice's individual view apart from the
conclusion held by the majority of this Court.[249] Even first year law students
know that a separate opinion is without binding effect.
...
In his separate concurring opinion in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, retired Chief Justice
Puno referred to submissions made by petitioner Ang Ladlad Party-List before
respondent Commission on Elections on the "history of purposeful unequal
treatment"[252] suffered by the LGBTQI+ community. This Court, however, cannot
recognize Ang Ladlad Party-List's allegations, since they were made by a different
party, in a different case, on a different set of facts, for a different subject
matter, concerning a different law, to a different governmental body. These are not
"actual facts" sufficient to engender a justiciable controversy here.
...
Even petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual case or
controversy.

He claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent because "it
is the instrumentality of the government that is tasked to enforce the law in
relation with (sic) marriage[.]"

His choice of the Civil Registrar General as respondent is manifestly misguided. No

factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the Petition apart from the
passage of the Family Code. Petitioner has never applied for a marriage license. He
has never even visited the premises of respondent's office, or of anyone acting
under its authority. Petitioner has never bothered to show that he himself acted in
any way that asked respondent to exercise any kind of discretion. Indeed, no
discretion was ever exercised by respondent. Without an exercise of discretion,
there could not have been abuse of discretion, let alone one that could conceivably
be characterized as "grave."
-Falcis III vs Civil Registrar General

--QUESTIONING POSSIBLE ABUSES IN THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007)
in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace”
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

The possibility of abuse in the execution of law was deemed insufficient to trigger
judicial review. This Court emphasized that there must first be an actual act of
abuse.
-Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. vs Anti-Terrorism Council et al.
--QUESTIONING AN ORDER ELIMINATING THE BOUNDARY SCHEME
Similar to the petitions in Southern Hemisphere and Roque, the present Petition
alleges no actual facts for this Court to infer the supposed unconstitutionality of
Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.

According to petitioners, implementing Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum

Circular No. 2012-001 "may [result] in [the] diminution of the income of . . . bus
drivers and conductors."[77] The allegation is obviously based on speculation with
the use of the word "may." There was even no showing of how granting bus drivers'
and conductors' minimum wage and social welfare benefits would result in lower
income for them.
-POAB vs DOLE and LTFRB

--CHALLENGING A POSSIBLE ILLEGAL TERM EXTENSION

The validity of the creation of the City of Makati is challenged on the ground that
it will allow the incumbent Mayor to extend his term beyond he three terms allowed
by the Constitution.
he challenge is premature considering that elections would not be until three years
later.
-Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

IS THE ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY RULE ABSOLUTE?

NO.
Like all procedural rules exceptions to it may be dictated
when, for instance, lack of clarity may be creating a great of confusion
detrimental to public order, as in this case, the case of the confiscation
of license plates and drivers licenses for traffic violations.
-Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not
collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not
inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as
those in the present controversy.

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great
deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned
sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being
violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also
note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license
dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their
"habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and
Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely
presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints
on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction,
allow them to fester.

The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent.
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise
of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." In proper
cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.
-Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

NOTE:
A request for an advisory opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an
action for declaratory relief is proper for judicial determination.
-PACU v. Secretary of Education

DISTINCTION:
A declaratory judgment is generally distinguished from an advisory opinion because
the latter does not resolve an actual case or controversy. Declaratory judgments
can provide legal certainty to each party in a matter when this could resolve or
assist in a disagreement.

2. LEGAL STANDING/ PROPER PARTY/ LOCUS STANDI

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on

a given question." It has likewise been defined as "the ability of a party to
demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
challenged to support that party's participation in the case."

In private suits, standing is afforded only to the real party-in-interest, one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the sui

In public suits, however, "the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of

separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation
by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government." Parties must show "a personal and substantial interest" in the case
such that they "sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged." They must allege "such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions."
-Madrilejos vs Gatdula

GENERAL RULE:

CITIZEN'S SUIT
To have standing, one must show that:
1. He has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the
government;
2. The injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and
3. The injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.
-Francisco, Jr. & Hizon v. Toll Regulatory Board

A person has "standing" to challenge the validity of governmental act only

if he has "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement."
-People v. Vera

For having asserted a public right, his being a citizen is sufficient.

Public rights include the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
-Akbayan vs Aquino
EXCEPTIONS:
TAXPAYER'S SUIT
VOTER'S SUIT
CONCERNED CITIZEN'S SUIT (TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE)
LEGISLATOR'S SUIT
THIRD-PARTY STANDING
ENVIORNMENTAL SUIT

The general rule, therefore, is that before parties can raise a constitutional
question, they must first show that direct injury was sustained or will be
sustained because of the challenged government act. Nonetheless, as discussed in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, there are exceptions:

Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to

sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
...

ALSO:
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IS A PROPER PARTY TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF ITS OWN
LAWS
Because more than any one, it should be concerned with the constitutionality of its
acts. In this case, it was held that the government has substantial interest in
having the Probation Law declared as unconstitutional, because more than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by enforcement of an invalid statute.
-People vs Vere

TAXPAYER'S SUIT
A taxpayer has a standing to sue if in cases involving expenditure of public funds,
it can be shown
(1)"that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation;" and
(2) "that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute.
-Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works

Taxpayer's suit not applicable in President's Spending

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it
is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a
taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power. If the appropriations were authorized
by the President, not by Congress, then he has no standing
to sue.
-Gonzales vs Narvasa

THIRD-PARTY STANDING
Another permissible exception is the concept of third-party standing. Actions may
be brought on behalf of third parties if the following requisites are satisfied:
1. the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
2. the litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
3. and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his
or her own interests.

In White Light vs CIty of Manila, the Court said that it was clear that the
business interests of the motel operators were likewise injured
by the Ordinance prohibiting "short term." They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups
in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to
bring suit. American jurisprudence is replete
with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke
the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.

OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted
to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on
the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly
restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
-White Light vs City of Manila

ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen, as steward of
nature, to file an action
before our courts for violations of our environmental laws. Thus, the need to give
the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules and it
is worth noting her
that the Stewards are joined as real parties in Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
-Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes

EXAMPLES OF PROPER PARTY:

In David v. Macapagal Arroyo, the Court held that all the petitioners were proper
parties.
1) David and Llamas, as they alleged “direct injury” from the “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by the police officers in the enforcement of PP 1017;
2) The opposition Congressmen who alleged usurpation of legislative powers by the
President;
3) The Alternative Law Group, under the liberality rule as the issue involved a
public right;
4) KMU as an organization for asserting the rights of their members; and
5) The other petitioners, because of the transcendental importance of the issues
raised.

Even as petitioner Chavez had not met the requisite legal standing, the Court took
cognizance of the case consistent with the principle that it will not wield
procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact on public interest
-Chavez vs Gonzales

the Court declared that non-governmental organizations, Congress persons, citizens

and
taxpayers have legal standing to file the petition for mandamus to compel the
respondents to produce a copy of the Japan Philippines Economic Package
Agreement (JPEPA), as the petition is anchored upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern which is a public right.
-Akbayan vs Aquino

The petitioner, an association consisting of rank-and-file employees in the

Commission
on Human Rights, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited
only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission, resulting in the
demoralization of rank-and-file employees. This, according to the Supreme Court,
meets the injury test.
-CHR Employees Association vs CHR

The petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, were declared proper
parties because
they stood to lose their source of livelihood by reason of the implementation of
the
PIATCO contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by the said PIATCO
contracts on them are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on them the
requisite
standing to file the instant petitions
-Agan vs PIATCO

The Supreme Court held that Senator Bias Ople was a proper party to question the
constitutionality of AO
308 in his capacity as Senator, as taxpayer and as member of the GSIS. As
Senator, he had the requisite standing to bring suit assailing the issuance of the
AO as a usurpation of legislative power; as taxpayer and GSIS member, he could
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of the GSIS
to implement the AO.
-Ople vs Torres

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE OF NOT PROPER PARTIES LOCATED IN PAGE 24 OF NACHURA

In Automotive Industry
Workers Alliance v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January 18,2005, the petitioners,
composed often labor unions, seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of EO
185, dated March 10, 2003, which transfer administrative supervision over the
NLRC from the NLRC Chairman to the Secretary of Labor, could not show that their
members sustained or were in danger of sustaining injury from EO 185. This was
because the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor did not extend to the
power to review, revise, reverse or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the
exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra.,
petitioners Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa
were declared to be without legal standing. Citing Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No.
147780, May 10, 2001, the Supreme Court said that petitioners are juridical
persons not subject to arrest. Even if they were “people’s organizations”, they
still
would have no requisite personality, as held in Kilosbayan v. Morato, infra..
Neither
were petitioners Social Justice Society Officers/Members, in their capacity as
taxpayers and citizens, proper parties. In Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065,
April 15, 2005, the petitioners failed to show any direct and personal interest in
the
COA Organizational Restructuring Plan; there was no indication that they have
sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its implementation; and they admitted that “they do not seek any affirmative relief
nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents”. Clearly,
then, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. In Cutaran v.
DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001, the Supreme Court refused to give
due course to a petition seeking to enjoin the DENR from processing the ancestral
land claim of private respondent over a property located at Camp John Hay
reservation in Baguio, on the ground that there is no actual or imminent violation
of the petitioner’s asserted right. Courts will not touch an issue involving the
validity
of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed
that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its
legality. Until such time, petitioners are simply speculating that they might be
evicted from the premises at a future time. In Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568, the
petitioners having failed to show that they were the owners of the masters’
paintings and antique silverware, were not deemed proper parties to enjoin the
PCGG from selling at public auction the aforesaid items seized from Malacanang
and the Metropolitan Museum as allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.
Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, it was held that the petitioner, an association of lawyers
of radio and television broadcast companies, was not a proper party, because the
members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered any injury as a result
of Sec. 92, B.P. 881. They do not have any interest as registered voters, because
the case does not involve the right of suffrage. Neither do they have an interest
as
taxpayers because the case does not include the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers. (However, a co-petitioner, a broadcast company, was
deemed to have locus standi because it would suffer losses from the
implementation of Sec. 92, B.P. 881, since it would be required to give free
airtime
to the Comelec.) Likewise, in Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) v. Zamora,
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the petition seeking to nullify the order of
President Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in
visibility patrols around the Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the ground that
the IBP had no legal standing to question the presidential act.

3. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity, so that if
not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. . .
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting constitutionality of a statute should be presented."
-People vs Vera
EXCEPTIONS
(1) Criminal case – It may be brought at any stage of the proceedings according to
the
discretion of the judge (trial or appeal) because no one shall be broughwithin
the terms of the law who are not clearly within them and the act shall not be
punished when the law does not clearly punish them.
(2) Civil case – It may be brought anytime if
the resolution of the constitutional issue
is inevitable in resolving the main issue.
(3) When the jurisdiction of the lower court is in question
-People vs Vera

OMBUDSMAN CANNOT ENTERTAIN QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions regarding
constitutionality of laws. Thus, when the issue of constitutionality of a law was
raised
before the Court of Appeals, which is the competent court, the contitutional
question
was raised at the earliest opportune time.
-Estarija v. Ranada

4. LIS MOTA/ NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Because of the doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect
be accorded the other departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional
questions as long as
there is some other basis that can be used for a decision. The constitutional issue
must be the lis
mota of the case
-Zandueta vs de la Costa

The Court stressed that it will not pass upon a question of

constitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law.
-Ty vs Trampe

The issue was primarily for accounting and specific performance which could be
resolved without having to
rule on the constitutionality of P.D. 579. Thus, the Court refused to exercise the
power of judicial review.
-Mirasol vs CA

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A PROVISION CANNOT BE CURED BY RE-ENACTMENT

When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation reenactment of the same or a similar
law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
-Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles

DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY--- KEYWORD: CHANGED CONDITIONS/CIRCUMSTANCES

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of
its provisions with applicable provisions of th Constitution, since the statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to another.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the
light of changed
conditions.
-Central Bank EmployeesAssociation, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

INFERIOR COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

Q. May inferior courts exercise the power of judicial review?
A. Since the power of judicial review flows from judicial power and since inferior
courts are possessed of judicial power, it may fairly be inferred
that the power of judicial review is not a power exclusive to the Supreme Court.
This same conclusion may be inferred from Article VIII,
Section 5(2) which confers on the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
As the Court said in J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696, 703-704
(1961): "Plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue."
Considering, however, the majority vote which is required for the Supreme Court to
declare a law unconstitutional, lower courts must
keep in mind "that a becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937), cited in Vera v. Area, 28 SCRA 351, 361-2
(1969).
Moreover, while a declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Supreme Court
constitutes a precedent binding on all, a similar
decision of an inferior court binds only the parties in the case.

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
1. The legislature must be willing to retain valid
portion (separability clause); and
2. The valid portion can stand independently as law

OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE (SYLLABUS)

Under this doctrine, the law is recognized as but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration null, may be left undisturbed as a
matter of
equity and fair play. It is a rule of equity.
-League of Cities vs COMELEC

The period before a moratorium law was declared unconstitutional was not
allowed to toll the prescriptive period of the right to foreclose a
mortgage.
-Agbayani vs PNB
APPLICABILITY OF EXECUTIVE ACTS
The Operative Fact Doctrine also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as
invalid.
A decision made by the president or the administrative agencies has to be complied
with because it has the force and effect of law. The term “executive act” is broad
enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the
executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question of
nullified by the Court.
-Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE (SYLLABUS)

The term 'political question’connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure
-Tanada v.Cuenco

EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial
power by
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Supreme Court stated that because of this courts of justice may decide
political questions if there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
-Marcos vs Manglapus

TWO STEPS IN DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT (CRUZ)

STEP 1. Determine if the power in question has been given by the Constitution to
the body claiming the exercise
Examples:
Express conferment:Such as the vesture of legislative power to Congress, the
executive power to the President, and judicial power to the Supreme Court and other
lower courts as established by law.
Implied conferment: Such as the power of contempt in legislative investigations,
the creation of a body in the exercise of the faithful execution clause, the power
of the electoral tribunals to promulgate its own
rules and procedure
Inherent powers (difference with implied: implied stems from express conferment,
inherent from the body itself): Such as the President's power to deport undesirable
aliens, the court's contempt power, or the
legislature's power to punish any person who impugns its integrity without proof.

If the power is not properly vested in the body that exercise it, the act in
connection thereto is unconstitutional.
The question of whether or not the power or authority has been given to a
person/body is a justiciable question.

STEP 2. Determine if the question involved is justiciable or political

DEFINITIONS
A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy sanction by
law for said breach of right.
A political question is a matter which falls under the discretion of the department
involved or especially the people themselves. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom
and not the legality of a particular measure.

Examples found in Separation of Powers Notes made in Paint

MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES

A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of a
supervening event such that deciding thereon is no longer practicable
However, courts can still decide on moot cases if:
1. There is a grave abuse of the constitution
2. Exceptional character of the situation and the paramount publci interest
involved
3. The constitutional issues require the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

Weird case:
Q: PSBank filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify the
order of the
Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, to issue a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum to PSBank and/or its representative requiring them to testify and
produce documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to
belong
to then SC Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Pending the resolution for such petition, supervening events have taken place such
as the conviction
of CJ Corona as well as his execution of a waiver against confidentiality of all
his bank accounts.
Did the Impeachment Court act arbitrarily when it issued the assailed subpoena to
obtain
information concerning the subject foreign current deposits notwithstanding the
confidentiality of such deposits?
A: The Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the merits of this
case where legal
relief is no longer needed no called for. The supervening conviction of CJ Corona
has rendered
the present petition moot and academic.
-Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeahcment Court, G. R. No. 200238, November
12, 2012, PER J. PERLAS-BERNABE

B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY (SYLLABUS)

CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO MAINTAIN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and cannot be abolished by mere
legislation.
2. The members of the Supreme Court cannot be removed except by Impeachment.
(Lol this gone now)
-ART XI Sec. 2

The SC's justification for previous rulings stating impeachment is the only way to
remove impeachable officials: "It should be stressed, however, that none of these
cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment."

VALIDITY OF A PUBLIC OFFICER'S APPOINTMENT vs COMMISSION OF IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE

Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto
action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is
predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the
validity of a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-
called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.

We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the people
have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public' office. To
construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto
petition is to deprive the State of remedy to correct a "public wrong" arising from
defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

SERENO CASE!
IS IMPEACHMENT THE ONLY WAY TO OUST THE CJ?
-No. Quo warranto may proceed independently and simultaneously with impeachment.
-They are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations
-PET rules even allow quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
V-President who are impeachable officers
-Language of the Constitution does not foreclose quo warranto against impeachable
officers as it only used the word “may”
-Subscribing to the view that impeachment is an exclusive remedy is absurd because
it will permit unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying
key positions

BUT ISN’T IT QUO WARRANTO MUST BE INSTITUTED WITHIN 1 YEAR?

-This rule only applies if the petitioner is a private individual, not when it is
the government who institutes it
-Prescription does not lie against the government

IS CJ ELIGIBLE FOR THE POSITION?

-No. She lacks the Constitutional requirement that she must be a person of
integrity

WHAT MAKES HER A PERSON NOT OF INTEGRITY?

-First, her suspicious and highly questionable circumstances surrounding the
execution of her SALNs
-Second, she engaged in private practice as a lawyer even without permit from the
UP where she was a professor
-Third, her PDS (Personal data sheet) shows that she was Deputy Commissioner of the
Commission on Human Rights only later to be disclaimed by her during the Oral
Argument
-Fourth, she said that her SALNs were infeasible to retrieve when the SALNs that
she selectively filed were available all along in U.P. and in fact the OSG was able
to get copies of the same
-Fifth, she claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position did
not comply with the SALN requirement for the application, when it was only she who
did not comply
-Sixth, she committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her income in
her income tax returns for the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT)
returns

BUT ISN’T IT THAT SHE WAS NOMINATED BY THE JBC? SO THAT WOULD MEAN SHE IS
QUALIFIED?
-She was nominated by the JBC but such was not valid
-Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC
-The JBC is within the power of supervision of the Supreme Court
-The JBC officials may be disciplined but such issue is not to be properly threshed
in this petition

CAUTION: LEONEN DISSENTS HERE IN ALL POINTS

a. Impeachment should be the only way to oust a Justice to preserve judicial
independece. There is a reason that the impeachment process is so rigorous.
b. The prescription does not lie against the government rule is "limited to actions
of reversion to the public domain of lands which were fraudulently granted to
private individuals and not in all actions instituted by the State, as the
majority has mistakenly concluded."
c. I cannot agree to this blanket finding of lack of integrity, which is based
simply on the non-existence of the Statements of Assets and Liabilities.
d. "This Court's power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council cannot be
read as authority to interfere with the Judicial and Bar Council's discretion in
performing its constitutional mandate. At most, this Court's supervision is
administrative in nature."

3. The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its minimum Jurisdiction prescribed in

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
-ART VIII Sec. 2
4. The Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be
undermined by a law reorganizing the Judiciary.
-ART VIII Sec. 2

SEC 2: THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO DEFINE , PRESCRIBE , AND APPORTION THE
JURISDICTION OF THE VARIOUS COURTS
BUT MAY NOT DEPRIVE THE SUPREME COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER CASES
ENUMERATED IN SECTION 5 HEREOF .

NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY WHEN IT

UNDERMINES THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF ITS MEMBERS

NO OTHER BODY CAN CREATE COURTS OR INCREASE OR DECREASE THEIR JURISDICTION

Implicit in the conferment of power on Congress to create
courts and to determine their jurisdiction is the denial of the same
power to other departments.

SCOPE OF CONGRESS TO LIMIT THE COURT'S JURISDICTION ONLY LIMITED TO ADMINISTRATIVE

COURTS
Q: A law is passed prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the government. Does such law violate judicial
independence?
A: Such prohibition can only refer to administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. Outside of this dimension and on issues involving questions of law, the
courts cannot be prevented from exercising their power.
-Malaga v. Penackos, Jr.

NOTE: Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority over

administrative agencies depend on the statutes governing
the subject. Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than
courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general
jurisdiction do not have authority. But where there is silence, the general rule
applies.
-Lupangco v. Court of Appeals

ABOLITION OF JUDICIAL OFFICE DOES NOT VIOLATE SECURITY OF TENURE (IF DONE IN GOOD
FAITH)
Q. Does abolition of a judicial office violate security of tenure?
A. The Supreme Court, in Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615
(1938) and Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 50 O.G. 147 (1955),
applied to abolition of courts the principle used relative to
the abolition of civil service positions.
Abolition of office is valid when done in good faith and not for political or
personal
reasons. In such a situation, properly and logically speaking
there is no removal from office because a removal implies that
the office exists after the ouster.

5. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law

without its advice and concurrence.
-ART VI Sec. 30

EXAMPLE: RA 6770
Q. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Valid?
A. No, it expands the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and consent. Consequently, "and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi- judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rule of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provision of Rule 43."
-Fabian v. Desierto

6. Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and
are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
-ART VIII Sec. 9

SEC 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.

7. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their
personnel.
-ART VIII Sec. 6

The SC is assisted by the Court Administrator and the Deputy Court Administrators
in exercising the administrative function.

Matters to be attended by the Court En Banc:

a. Disciplinary Matters involving justices and judges of all lower courts and lower
court personnel.
b. Designation of Judges.
c. Request for transfer of cases from one court, administrative area or judicial
region to another
and/or transfer of venue of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice as provided
for in Section 5(4), Article VIII of the Constitution.
d. Amendment, modification and/or revocation of Administrative Orders and Circulars
issued by the Supreme Court.
e. Matters for policy determination.

8. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts.
-ART VIII Sec. 11

The power of administrative supervision of the Supreme Court includes, according to

Section 11, "the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."

THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THIS POWER IS JEALOUSLY GUARDED BY THE COURT

Thus, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently
of any administrative action
of the Supreme Court.
-Maceda vs Vasquez

THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES IF ADMINISTRATIVE OR CRIMINAL

Likewise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a
criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein.
-Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman

SUPREME COURT NOT NECESSARILY EN BANC TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES-- ONLY DISMISSAL OR

SUSPENSION
SEC 11:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

The first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en
banc. It did not intend that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard
and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may order their dismissal by
a vote of a majority”. Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.
-People vs Gacott Jr.
A decision en banc: is needed only when the penalty to be imposed is:
dismissal of a judge
disbarment of a lawyer
suspension of either for more than one year
or a fine exceeding 10,000 pesos.
In justifying this ruling, Justice Regalado, with the approval of the Court en
banc, relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which
Regalado was also a member. Regalado admitted that there were no records to support
his recollection. He said, however, that to require
more would contravene the desire of the Constitution for a speedy disposition of
cases, which is one of the purposes for allowing the Court
to rule in divisions
-People vs Gacott Jr.

MISCONDUCT FOR A JUDGE TO RUN FOR OFFICE

Q:May a judge, while still in the Bench, present himself as a
congressional candidate?
A. No. Such a behavior constitutes misconduct.
-Vistan v. Nicolas

9. Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency performing quasi-

judicial or administrative functions.
-ART VIII Sec. 12

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION DEFINITION

Q: Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice by the Provincial Governor.
The function of the Committee is to receive complaints and
make recommendations towards the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those who are poor. May the
Judge accept the designation?

A. No. The committee performs administrative functions, that is, functions which
"involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out
the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence."
-In re Judge Manzano

10. The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.

-ART VIII Sec. 3
11. The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be decreased during their
continuance in office.
-ART VIII Sec. 3

SEC. 3. THE JUDICIARY SHALL ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
JUDICIARY MAY NOT BE REDUCED BY THE LEGISLATURE BELOW THE AMOUNT APPROPRIATED
FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND, AFTER APPROVAL, SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED

The second sentence of Section 3 states the meaning of fiscal autonomy:

"Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released."
Fiscal autonomy is granted to the Supreme Court in order to strengthen its
independence.
NOTE: President vetoing an appropriation for the payment of retired justices
pension is in violation of SEC 3
-It tantamounts to dictating the SC how to spend its funds
- Withholds the Chief Justice freedom to adjust funds appropriated for
expenditures of the judiciary, includings savings to cover deficit and shortages
(SEC 25 (5) LEGISLATIVE)
Augmentation is usually provided in the General Appropriations Act

NOTE: Pension to Retired Justices is a vested right pursuant to RA 1797. Vested

rights cannot be revoked.

NOTE: Even when it comes to acquisition of fixtures in a courtroom, the Court may
be dependent on Congress for funds, but it is SUPREME and INDEPENDENT to the
Executive.
Reason: The Court cannot maintain its independence and dignity if the
executive determines what it should purchase

FISCAL AUTONOMY GIVES THE SC AUTHORITY TO LEVY, ASSESS, AND COLLECT FEES
The Constitution has taken away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement the Rules of Court. The fiscal autonomy guaranteed the
Judiciary by Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution recognized the authority
of the
Supreme Court to levy, assess and collect fees. Congress cannot amend the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court for the payment of legal fees by granting
exemptions
-In re: Petition for Recognition of Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System from Payment of Legal Fees

12. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and admission to the practice of law
-ART VIII Sec 5(5)

SEC 5(5)
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT CAN PROMULGATE RULES AND EVEN DISAPPROVE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF OTHER
COURTS
CONGRESS CANNOT DO SO ANYMORE UNLIKE BEFORE
The 1987 Constitution enhanced the rule making power of this Court
[under] Section 5(5), Article VIII. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. [Hence the rule on amparo.] The
Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. Thus, for instance, the payment of legal fees is a
vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress.
-Baguio Market Vendors v. Judge, G.R. No. 165922, February 26,2010.

GO TO ANSWER: REPEAL, ALTER, SUPPLEMENT RULES OF PROCEDURE

The omission in Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution of the
provisions the 1935 and 1973 Constitution,
which both authorized the Legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of
procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court
means that Congress can no longer enact any law governing rules of procedure for
the courts.

HOWEVER, BE MINDFUL THAT EXPROPRIATION INVOLVES SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS,

SO IT CAN BE SUBJECT TO LEGISLATION
Q. Rules of Court require deposit of 15% of the value of the property before
an expropriator can enter. Can Congress amend this?
A. R.A. 8974, however, creates an exception in expropriation cases involving
public works and requires full payment before entry in public works
projects. In answering the question whether Congress may amend
Rules of Court, the Court said that since expropriation involves both
procedural and substantive matters, the substantive aspect is always
subject to legislation.
-Republic v. Gingoyon

LIMITS OF RULE-MAKING POWER

What are the limits on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure and admission to the practice of law?.

The Constitution imposes the following limitations and guidelines:

(1) they "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases;"
(2) they "shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade;"
(3) and they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

TEST IF THE RULE DIMINISHES, INCREASES, OR MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

"[The test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."
-Fabian v. Desierto

Q. Applying the foregoing test, is the Supreme Court's transfer of pending

cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative actions to the Court of Appeals substantive or
procedural?
A. Procedural, "because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law. The right has been preserved. Only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a
particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without
impairing vested rights, hence he can have non in rules of procedure
which relate to the remedy."
-Fabian vs Desierto
Q. Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits lawyers who
are members of a local legislative body to practice law. Is this an
infringement of the power of the Court to provide rules for pleading,
practice, and procedure and the practice of law.
A. No. The law must be seen not as a rule on the practice of law but as a rule
on the conduct of officials intended to prevent conflict of interest.
-Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government

Q. The rule that, unless a reservation to file a separate civil action is reserved,
the civil case is deemed filed with the criminal case
is challenged on the ground that the rule is about substantive rights.
A. Whether or not the two actions must be tried in a single proceeding is a
matter of procedure.
-Maniago v. Court of Appeals

ONLY THE SC CAN DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS OR STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, NO
ONE ELSE
The statutory authority granted to the administrative Board to promulgate rules and
regulations cannot encroach upon the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court to
regulate the admission to the practice of law (Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution). Thus, The Administrative Board cannot prescribe additional standards
for
admission to the practice of law, adopt a course study which is inconsistent with
the
requirements to take the bar examinations
-Philippine Lawyer’s Association v. Agrava
Since Congress has no power to repeal, alter or supplement the Rules of Court, it
cannot delegate such power to the Administrative Board.

13. Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to other stations.
-ART VIII Sec. 5(3)

14. It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and employees of the
Judiciary.
-ART VIII Sec. 5(6)
-Cruz, Philippine Political Law

C. APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY (SYLLABUS)

1. Qualifications of members of the judiciary
2. Judicial and Bar Council
a. Composition
b. Powers

QUALIFICATIONS-- CIPI
Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence
-Sec. 7 (3)

In addition:
a) SUPREME COURT: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of
age,.for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines
-Sec. 7 (1)
b) LOWER COLLEGIATE COURT: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, member of the
Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications
-Sec. 7 (1) and (2)
c) LOWER COURTS: Citizen of the Philippines, member of the Philippine Bar, but
Congress may prescribe other qualifications
-Sec. 7 (1) and (2)

PROCEDURE FOR APPOINTMENT

-At least 3 nominees, 90 days vacancy, 90 days within submission of list by JBC

a) Appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at least

three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy;
the appointment shall need no confirmation
-Sec. 9
b) Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from
the occurrence thereof
-Sec. 4 (1)
c) For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety (90)
days from the submission by the JBC of such list
-Sec. 9

BAN ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN

THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of
the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at
any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be
assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they
first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the
creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating
process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
-De Castro vs JBC

CAUTION: BAR Q and A cites De Castro and said the exception is only with the SC
appointments (Siguro because the lis mota of the case in De Castro does not apply
to other members of the judiciary)
"The President can make appointments to the Supreme Court two months before a
presidential election until the end of his term but not to the rest of the
Judiciary like the
Court of Appeals. Under Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies
in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies in the lower
courts
shall be filled within ninety (90) days from submission of the list of nominees.
These
appointments to the courts, which is what is sought to be prevented by the
prohibition"
(De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)

NOTE:
Nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, bu
this only means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not
nominated by the JBC.

It should be stressed that the power to recommend

of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's
prerogative to choose someone whom he/s considers worth appointing to the vacancy
in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end,
the President appoints someone nominated by th JBC, the appointment is valid. This
does not violate
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. To
meet the minimum requirement under said
constitutional provision of three nominees per
vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees
from the JBC for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the
minimum requirement was even exceeded herein
because the JBC submitted for the President's
consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees

FOR EXAMPLE:
There are 6 vacancies. The JBC recommended 3 persons for each vacancy. The
President can appoint any 6 of the 18 persons recommended regardless of which
vacancy they are recommended by the JBC.

THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

ALL IN SECTION 8

SEC 8
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a
term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two
years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council
and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its
annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.

FUNCTION/POWER: RECOMMENDING APPOINTEES TO THE JUDICIARY

The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.

COMPOSITION:
Ex-officio members: Chief Justice, as Chairman;
the Secretary of Justice, and
a representative of Congress.
Regular members: A representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
a professor of law,
a retired justice of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
Secretary ex-officio: The Clerk of the Supreme Court.

THE SUPREME COURT (SYLLABUS)

COMPOSITION (SYLLABUS)
A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any
vacancy
shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof

En Banc/Division Cases:
a) En Banc:
-All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law;
-All other cases which, under the Rules of Court, are to be heard en banc;
-Cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations.

These cases are decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.
-Sec. 4(2)

IN ADDITION:
-Cases heard by a division when the required majority is not obtained;
-Cases where a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down will be modified
or reversed;
-Administrative cases against judges when the penalty is dismissal

b) Division: Other cases or matters may be heard in division, and decided or

resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon, but in no case without
the concurrence of at least three (3) such members.
-Sec 4(3)

i) When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc.
-Sec 4(3)

In Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999, the Supreme Court
interpreted the provision by drawing a distinction between “cases”
on the one hand, and “matters” on the other hand, such that cases are “decided”,
while matters are “resolved”. On the basis of this distinction, only “cases” are
referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained.
ii) No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
-Sec 4(3)

iii) The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Court is purely an internal
matter in which the petitioner has no business at all. With its new
membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a
party’s case when, after its re-examination, the rectification appears proper and
necessary
-Limketkai Sbns Milling v. Court of Appeals

SUPREME COURT POWERS (SYLLABUS)

-Sec. 5, Art. VIII
a) Original jurisdiction: over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus.
b) Appellate jurisdiction: Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(i) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question;
(ii) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(iii) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
(iv) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher; and
(v) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

NOTE: NOT INCLUDED REVIEW OF ADMIN DECISIONS

that this power does not include the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions
of administrative bodies, but is limited
to “final judgments and orders of lower courts”
-Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

NOTE: ALSO NOT INCLUDED IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS DECISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of
the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.
"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."
-RA 8249

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
-Republic vs Sandiganbayan

NOTE: AUTOMATIC REVIEW ONLY FOR DEATH PENALTY

Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial court
forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic
review of the conviction
-People v. Redulosa
Where the penalty imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal
the decision of conviction, otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final
and executory
-Garcia v. People

c. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations or public

interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
d. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

e. Rule-making powers:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

NOTE:
It was held that Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91, which orders that appeals from
decisions of administrative
bodies shall now be filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal E.O. 226, and
did not diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely
transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of said agencies to the Court of
Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from notice), both of which are
merely procedural in character
-First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA

LIMITATIONS DISCUSSED IN THE SAFEGUARDS DISCUSSION ABOVE

The Constitution imposes the following limitations and guidelines:
(1) they "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases;"
(2) they "shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade;"
(3) and they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

NOTE: COURT CAN CREATE SPECIAL DIVISIONS

It is within the competence of the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement
and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which
will hear and decide the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.

NOTE: INCLUDED IN THIS POWER IS THE SC'S POWER TO CREATE SPECIAL WRITS
The Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, and it took effect on
October 24,
2007. Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity ”
An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule which
allows the grant by the court of interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary
protection order, inspection order, production order or a witness protection order

No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear

allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected. Petitioners right to their dwelling, assuming they still have any
despite
the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to
life,
liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the
writ
of amparo
-Canlas vs Napico Homeowners Association

the Supreme Court

promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2, 2008.
Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data
or information regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. ”

The writ of habeas data is an

independent remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to
informational privacy. The essence of the constitutional right to informational
privacy goes to the very heart of a person’s individuality, an exclusive and
personal
sphere upon which the State has no right to intrude without any legitimate public
concern. The basic attribute of an effective rightto informational privacy is the
right
of the individual to control the flow of information concerning or describing them.

f. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.

g. Power of Administrative Supervision

The SC is assisted by the Court Administrator and the Deputy Court Administrators
in exercising the administrative function.

Administrative Matters to be attended by the Court En Banc:

a. Disciplinary Matters involving justices and judges of all lower courts and lower
court personnel.
b. Designation of Judges.
c. Request for transfer of cases from one court, administrative area or judicial
region to another
and/or transfer of venue of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice as provided
for in Section 5(4), Article VIII of the Constitution.
d. Amendment, modification and/or revocation of Administrative Orders and Circulars
issued by the Supreme Court.
e. Matters for policy determination.

The power of administrative supervision of the Supreme Court includes, according to

Section 11, "the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."

THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THIS POWER IS JEALOUSLY GUARDED BY THE COURT

Thus, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently
of any administrative action
of the Supreme Court.
-Maceda vs Vasquez

THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES IF ADMINISTRATIVE OR CRIMINAL

Likewise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a
criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein.
-Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman

SUPREME COURT NOT NECESSARILY EN BANC TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES-- ONLY DISMISSAL OR

SUSPENSION
SEC 11:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

The first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en
banc. It did not intend that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard
and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may order their dismissal by
a vote of a majority”. Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.
-People vs Gacott Jr.

A decision en banc: is needed only when the penalty to be imposed is:

dismissal of a judge
disbarment of a lawyer
suspension of either for more than one year
or a fine exceeding 10,000 pesos.
In justifying this ruling, Justice Regalado, with the approval of the Court en
banc, relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which
Regalado was also a member. Regalado admitted that there were no records to support
his recollection. He said, however, that to require
more would contravene the desire of the Constitution for a speedy disposition of
cases, which is one of the purposes for allowing the Court
to rule in divisions
-People vs Gacott Jr.

MISCONDUCT FOR A JUDGE TO RUN FOR OFFICE

Q:May a judge, while still in the Bench, present himself as a
congressional candidate?
A. No. Such a behavior constitutes misconduct.
-Vistan v. Nicolas

ADMIN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SC ARE CONFIDENTIAL

Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are
confidential in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out
to be innocent of the charges; it can take years to build a reputation and
only a single accusation, although unfounded, to destroy it.
-Godinez v. Alano

OBLIGATION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO SUBMIT ANNUAL REPORT

The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session
of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary.
-Sec. 16

AGE OF RETIREMENT: 70 YEARS

Sec 11
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.

70 YEARS OLD HARD AND FAST RULE. NO HOLD-OVER IN CASES OF SC RETIREMENT.

A cannot hold over his position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
participate in the deliberations of the case on July 1, 1996. Under Section 11,
Article VIII
of the Constitution, Members of the Supreme Court hold office until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge their duties.
Constitutional
officers whose terms are fixed by the Constitution have no right to hold over their
positions until their successors shall have been appointed and qualified unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution.
(Mechem, A Treaties on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, p. 258.)

WHAT IF A JUSTICE DIED AFTER VOTING AND BEFORE FILING WITH THE CLERK OF COURT?
A true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly
promulgated.
Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the
Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is
always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the
decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus
confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent.
Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve
their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision,
so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit
of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice,
before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated
during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the
Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves
-Limkaichong vs COMELEC

WHAT IF MAY PRESS RELEASE OF THE VOTING RESULTS?

The decision cannot be deemed to have been promulgated simply because of the
announcement of the voting in a press release, because the decision has not yet
been
issued and filled with the Clerk of Court. Until the decision is filed with the
Clerk of
Court, the Justices still have control over the decision and they can still
change their votes
-Limkaichong v. COMELEC