RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of
law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that
if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process
of law.

1. Heard in a court of competent jurisdiction

2. Proceeded against under the orderly process of law, only punished after inquiry
and investigation
3. Notice and opportunity to be heard
4. Judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law

Other violations of due process:

1. Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint
In Roque v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999, it was held that the failure of the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years clearly
violates the constitutional command for the Ombudsman to act promptly on
complaints and the right of the petitioner to due process of law and to speedy
trial.
In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint. A
similar ruling was made in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May
18, 1999, and in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where it was held that
the unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.

2. Impartial court or tribunal

A critical component of due process of law
is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. In order
to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove
such bias by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to
adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that the respondent judge was motivated
by malice or bad faith when she issued the assailed rulings [Webb v. People, G.R.
No. 127262, July 24, 1997]

Except when the questions are merely for clarification. The judges have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence.

3. Right to a hearing
In Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998, the
Supreme Court held that the accused were denied due process of law when the
trial court convicted them (after having declared that they had waived their right
to
present evidence), but it was shown that there were deviations from the regular
course of trial, e.g., petitioners were not directed to present evidence to prove
their
defenses nor dates set for that purpose, petitioners were not given an opportunity
to present rebuttal evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and petitioners had
not
admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified any
modification in the order of the trial.

4. Plea of guilt to a capital offense must be afforded with:

[1] The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
[2] The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and [3]
The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow
him to do so if he so desires.

The rationale behind the rule is that courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form — death — for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty

5. The State and the offended party are entitled to due process:
The State, and more so, the offended party, is also entitled to due process of law.
In
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274, the judgment of acquittal was vacated upon
a finding by the Supreme Court that there was bias and partiality on the part of
the
judge and the prosecutor. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171,
March 18, 2002, it was held that the petitioner (mother of the victim in a rape
with
homicide case) was denied due process when the public prosecutor, who was
under legal obligation to pursue the action on her behalf, reneged on that
obligation
and refused to perform his sworn duty. But, in People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732,
May 29, 2002, it was held that the People could not claim that it was denied due
process, because there was a public prosecutor who represented it at every stage
of the proceedings — from arraignment to promulgation of the dismissal order —
to protect its interest.

BAIL!!!
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

“Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any
court as may be required

CASE
Bail on extradition (also lessons on warrants of arrest)

GOVT OF THE USA vs PURGANAN:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest?
NO!
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the
word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,[46] receiving facts and
arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to prepare and present such facts
and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.” The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on
the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not
as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make
an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression
-- a PRIMA FACIE FINDING-- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition
and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition
itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined
therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify
and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required
to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally
determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required
was that the “judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make
his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.”

SEGUE
PROCEDURE on Extradition:
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure:

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a)
they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who
is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform
or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter
be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

SECOND ISSUE:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the
right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly,
the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the
present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings,
shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence
in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.”[60] It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.

NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AVAILABLE
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing that,
constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due
process of law.”

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the

extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process.
We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the circumstances -- such as
those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity
to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE NO BAIL RULE:

Prove by clear and convincing evidence
1. Not a flight risk
2. There exists special humanitarian and compelling circumstances

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and
enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to due
process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees.
Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of
every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling
for its application.”[70]

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that,
after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.
 Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he
stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not
fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of
the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he
will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not
yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground
and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon
the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial
court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which
may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

CASE:
NARCISO vs STA. ROMANA-CRUZ
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be
granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended party just because he
was married to the deceased. In the interest of justice and in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the sister of the victim may be deemed to be an
"offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality to challenge the void order
of the trial court.

GRANT OF BAIL WHEN THE CRIME IS PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA REQUIRES A

HEARING:
WHY? VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS> OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion
perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence
of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his
Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence against
him was not strong.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding,
since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail — summary or
otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the
filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time
that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any
evidence. We agree with the CA.

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital

offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be
conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. 'A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross examination.' If a party is denied the opportunity to
be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

CASE:
Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez

Posting of bail requirement: CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.[13]

EXCEPTION APPLIED HERE:

Miriam is unable to appear because she was in a vehicular accident

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally
appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same
ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her
motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to
dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently
from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter
and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.

WHEN RIGHT MAY BE INVOKED and BY WHOM

The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded
to a person in custody of the law
who may by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his appearance before any
court, as required under specific circumstances [People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No.
149723, October 27, 2006].

Any person under detention, even if no formal charges have yet been filed, can
invoke the right to bail [Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil 634;
People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522],
However, it is a basic principle that the right to bail can be availed of only by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty, and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file
a
petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed [Cortes v.
Judge Catral, infra.].

But take note of the unique exception in the Defensor-Santiago case

REBELLION IS A BAILABLE OFFENSE

CASE
Enrile vs Salazar

Where the petitioners were charged with rebellion complexed with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, the Court ruled that based on the doctrine enunciated
in People v. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against the petitioners
must be read as charging simple rebellion only; hence the petitioners are entitled
to bail before final conviction as a matter of right.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of
the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of
the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas
corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The
correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition
to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same
basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his
improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent
Judge.[18]

The Hernandez doctrine: rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or
in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter.

BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT!
In Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000,
the Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error when the latter required
the arraignment of the accused as a prerequisite to the approval of the bail bond.
In the cases when bail is authorized, it should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise, the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. Furthermore,
the court would be assured of the presence of the accused at
the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage
of the
proceeding.

WHEN BAIL MUST BE DENIED:

CONVICTED BY TRIAL COURT
In People v. Fortes, and Fortes v.
Judge Guam 223 SCRA 619, it was held that if an accused who is charged with a
crime?
punishable by preclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a
matter of
discretion on the part of the court; an application fori bail must be denied. In
People v.
Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, the Supreme Court held that where a person has been convicted
by
the trial court and sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment for 22 years, the
penalty
imposed is classified as reclusion perpetua; and while the case is on appeal, bail
may be
denied, because the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of
guilt is
strong.
NO BAIL IN MILITARY
Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military. In
Comendador V. de Villa, 200 SCRA 80, it was held that traditionally, the right to
bail has not
been recognized and is not available to the military, as an exception to the Bill
of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula v. Espino, 28 SCRA 540, where the Court observed
that
"the right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does
not exist”. The denial; of the right to bail to the military does not violate the
equal protection
clause because there is substantial distinction between the military and civilians

DUTY OF COURTS!
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not
matter of right. This Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following rules in Basco v.
Judge Rapatalo 17 which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for
bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Emphasis supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
prosecutions.

IF NO SUMMARY, THE ORDER MAY BE INVALIDATED

According to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the absence of a summary in the order would make
said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an
incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot
be sustained or be a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, 23 said order
was considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated.

EXCESSIVE BAIL, HOW TO KNOW.

n Sec. 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among the
factors to be considered by the judge in fixing bail are:
the financial ability of the accused,
the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the penalty for the offense charged,
the character and reputation of the accused,
his age and health,
the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of his appearing at the trial,
the forfeiture of other bonds by him,
the fact that he was a fugitive from justice when arrested, and
the pendency of other cases in which he is under bond.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL

The failure of the accused to call the attention of the trial court to the
unresolved petition for bail is deemed a waiver of the right to bail. Furthermore,
the conviction of the accused renders the petition for bail moot and academic
[People v. Manes, G.R. No. 122737, February 17, 1999]

It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose

waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

NOTE!
Show Avatar, Spongebob, Hey Arnold to your kids

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE!!!
Easy lng pero study pa rin

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY<PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

The presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by
itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent
with guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not
sufficient to support a conviction [People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805]

BUT where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official functions may prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence [People v. Acuram, 209 SCRA 281].

PRESUMPTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY<PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314, March
28, 2001, and in Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001, it was
held that the prima facie presumption of accountability does not shatter the
presumption of innocence which the petitioner enjoys, because even if prima facie
evidence arises, certain facts still have to be proved, and the Sandiganbayan must
be satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. And this
finding
must rest upon the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness,
deficiency or absence of evidence for the defense

A LAW THAT DISQUALIFIES CANDIDATES BECAUSE OF MERE FILING OF CHARGES AGINST HIM
VIOLATES THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article TV, Section 19,1973 Constitution). An accusation according to
the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional pre
sumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil
or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that

charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessorypenalty ofsuspen
sion of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art.
44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but
prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is
'clear and present danger" that because ofthe proximity ofthe elec
tions, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of dis
loyalty from offeringcontrary proof to overcome the prima facie
evidence against him

SILENCE DOES NOT EQUAL ADMISSION. BUT COUPLED WITH NON-PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE, IT
MAY BE INFERRED THAT HE IS GUILTY
But in the later case of People v. Solis?4 it declared: "While
accused have a right to be silent, they run the risk of an
inference from the non-production ofevidence." Failure or
refusal ofthe accused to testify may prejudice him if the
prosecution has already established a prima facie case
against him, according toPeople v. Resano.

RIGHT ONLY AVAILABLE TO NATURAL PERSONS

The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an
individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no personality to
invoke the same [Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 842].

EQUIPOISE RULE
Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is
applicable only where the evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced,
in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused.

WHAT SHIFT IS THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Take for instance, the defense of the accused is
self-defense. The burden now is on him to prove
that the killing is justified

MORAL CERTAINTY OVER ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY

People vs Que:
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.

MAY BE OVERCOME BY A CONTRARY PRESUMPTION BASED ON HUMAN EXPERIENCE. BURDEN OF

EVIDENCE SHIFTS
Unexplained flight
Unexplained possession of stolen items
Possessor of dangerous drugs found during a legitimate search
Failure of an accountable officer to produce funds or property during audit
Escape from detention during the pendency of the case
UNEXPLAINED FLIGHT
Flight, with no plausible explanation therefor is a clear indication of guilt.[51]
Put another way, unexplained flight evidences guilt or betrays the existence of a
guilty conscience.
(People vs. Faco, G.R. No. 115215)

Although it is settled that unexplained flight is indicative of guilt, no law or

jurisprudence holds that non-flight per se is a conclusive proof of innocence. It
simply does not follow as a matter of logic. His pretended innocence is clearly
non-sequitur to his decision not to flee.
(People vs Galagati)

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
There is more than one circumstance
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proved
The combination of all the circumstances will produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt
Example:
a. Last seen with the victim b. In possession of the victim's wallet c. Clothes
stained by victim's blood

RIGHT TO BE HEARD!!!:

SECTION 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused… shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel…

The right to counsel in criminal cases is immutable. It exists from the moment of
custodial investigation all the way to appeal
-Cruz

Already implicit in due process, the right of the accused to be heard by himself
and counsel is still affirmed
specifically in Section 14(2), presumably to give emphasis where added emphasisis
due.

INCLUDES THREE SPECIFIC RIGHTS

o Right to present evidence and to be present at the trial
o To be assisted by counsel
o Right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses
The right to present evidence includes
a) the right to testify in one’s favor and
b) the right to be given time to call witnesses

In People v. Lumague the Supreme Court set aside the conviction ofthree co-accused
after finding that they
were denied due process because they had not been given a chance to testify and to
present additional evidence on
their behalf. The trial court was directed to receive such additional evidence and
to allow the defendants topresent
sur-rebuttal evidence in case the prosecution should present rebuttal evidence.

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
An impeachment proceeding is a sui generis but it partakes
the nature of a criminal proceeding therefore the right to counsel
and confront the witness should be available.

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL!!!
RIGHT TO COUNSEL CAN BE WAIVED IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
BUT NOT DURING TRIAL (EXCEPT IF ACCUSED IS A LAWYER)
[Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428],
because “even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish his innocence”

THE OPTION TO HIRE A LAWYER OF THE ACCUSED'S CHOICE IS LIMITED

However, while the right to be represented by counsel during the trial is absolute,
the option of the accused to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option
cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules of Court, or to prejudice
the equally important rights of the State and the offended party to speedy and
adequate justice
[People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997].

COURT CAN ASSIGN COUNSEL DE OFICIO EVEN IF THE ACCUSED ALREADY HAS A COUNSEL DE
PARTE
BUT ONLY FOR GOOD REASON
Thus, there is no denial of the right to counsel where the counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused’s counsel de parte
pursuant to the court’s desire to finish the case as early as possible under the
continuous trial system
[Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999].
This is reiterated in People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO BE

HEARD
The long standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer [Andrada v. People, G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005], except when the
negligence or incompetence of counsel
is deemed so gross as to have prejudiced the constitutional right of the accused to
be heard.

Examples:
-when counsel for the accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an
earlier plea of not guilty
-when the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time was due to the sheer
irresponsibility on the part of appellant’s counsel
-after counsel filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that his motion for
leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to present his evidence
-a new trial was ordered after a showing that counsel for the accused abandoned the
accused without explanation

FAILURE OF THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT ADVISED BY THE COURT TO HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IS NOT ENOUGH TO REVERSE A CONVICTION
But the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the
trial court advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the
procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such
presumption can be overcome only by an affirmative showing to the contrary
[People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998].

BASIC ELEMENTS OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The court is duty bound to inform the accused that he has the right to counsel
before he is arraigned
The court must ask him if he desires the services of a counsel
Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person, or he has employed
counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.
Before the counsel de officio will be assigned to the accused he must be asked if
he accepts the lawyer. There might be a valid reason for the refusal of the accused
The refusal of the accused as to the counsel de officio must be reasonable. He
cannot delay the proceedings merely on the ground that he does not like the
assigned counsel de officio

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION!!!

RATIONALE OF THE RIGHT

[1] to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to prepare for his defense;
[2] to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and
[3] to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction.

BE WARY OF DEAF-MUTE
SOMEONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE TO THEM
In People v. Crisologo,
The conviction of the accused who was a deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court
because no one who knew how to communicate with the accused was utilized by the
trial court during the entire proceedings.

Similarly, in People v. Parazo,

The judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court was vacated where there was
no showing that the accused, a deaf- mute, was aided by a competent sign language
expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of the
appellant.

DO NOT ARRAIGN THE ACCUSED WHILE IN THE STATE OF INSANITY OR IMBECILITY

SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense,
it is the
duty of the court to suspend proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place
of detention until he recovers his faculties. To arraign the accused while he
is in a state of insanity will violate the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him
-People v. Alcalde

REQUISITES OF THE RIGHT

In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him may not be violated,
The information must state:
1) the name of the accused
2) the designation given to the offense by statute
3) a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense
4) the name of the offended party
5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense
6) and the place where the offense had been committed.
The information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on
the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused can
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint
against two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such allegation is
made in the information, the court’s finding of conspiracy violates the
constitutional requirement
[People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121502, July 10, 1998].

ALSO IN RULE 110

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information. (6a)
Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information,
because the
accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense
charged [People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999],

AMENDMENT IN INFORMATION GUIDE

In form or in substance, without leave of court, anytime before arraignment.
After arraignment – formal amendment with leave of court and would not be
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

When is it prejudicial?
When a defense under the original complaint or information will no longer be
available after the amendment is made, or any evidence the accused might have will
no longer be applicable to the
complaint or information as amended.

Allowable amendments
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not
great
Corrections of the alias of the accused
Amendments that add precision to what is already contained in the original
information
Deletion of "gross neglect of duty" –beneficial to the accused

ULTIMATE FACTS ONLY AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Rule 110 Sec. 9 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

Example of insufficient averment:

...the accused wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his
daughter either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her.

TIME AND DATE NEED NOT TO BE PRECISE EXCEPT IF IT IS AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
But it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time
when the offense was committed, except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.
-People v. Marcelo,

DESCRIPTION AND NOT DESIGNATION IS CONTROLLING

Thus, in People v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 123094, January 31, 2000, where during the
trial for murder, it was shown that the mother and the brother of the victim were
also injured during the same incident, it was held that the accused-appellant could
not be convicted of the said injuries because they were not properly charged in the
information.

PRINCIPLE: VARIANCE DOCTRINE (From Cruz Reviewer)

If there is a variance between the evidence charged and the evidence proved, the
accused can be convicted on the basis of the evidence proved if that conviction
would pertain to
an offense that is necessarily included to the offense charged. (But always for the
lesser offense)

Cases:
1. The charge was for frustrated theft. There is no such crime of frustrated theft.

2. The information alleged that the victim is the stepdaughter of the accused but
the evidence showed that the accused is merely a common law
partner of the victim’s mother. He was convicted for a qualified seduction.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation.

3. An accused was charged with violation of malversation through dolo. The evidence
showed that he committed malversation through culpa.
Ruling: No violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against the accused.
Dolo or culpa are only means for committing
Either way, he committed malversation.

4. An accused was charged with illegal sale of drugs but is convicted for illegal
possession of drugs for which he was not charged.
Ruling: No violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against the accused. If one of the elements of illegal sale is not
proven, for
example, the consideration, he may still be convicted for illegal possession.
Ratio: Illegal possession is inherent in the crime of illegal sale.

5. The accused was caught selling illegal drugs. After lawful search on him,
illegal drugs were found in h pocket. He was acquitted for illegal sale but is
charged for illegal possession because of the drugs found inside his pocket.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed. He was not charged for
illegal possession of the drugs found in his pocket. He was charged only for
illegal sale.
(I don't get this but probably because the drugs object of the sale is different
from that in his pocket)

6. The accused was charged with homicide by stabbing.

He was convicted of homicide by drowning.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
Homicide by stabbing and homicide by drowning requires two different defenses.

7. The accused was charged with rape with intimidation. It was proven that the girl
was raped while sleeping.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
Again, these two charges require two different evidences

PRINCIPLE: VOID FOR VAGUENESS RULE

Wordings: A law violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.

Wordings:"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for

the statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude

DEFINITION and REASON

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in
its application.
In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects
- it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle

VOID FOR VAGUENESS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PENAL STATUTES

ONLY FREE SPEECH CASES
To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity. While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec
decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v.
Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue
delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass

acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case
and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and

requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,
is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes,

described as a manifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only as a
last resort. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

Justice Mendoza on Erap Case Deliberations:

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.

CANNOT BE A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive the right to enter a plea
and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty”
-People v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy

The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative
that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its
objectives. As such, an indictment
must fully state the elements Of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven,
unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information
-People v.Flores, Jr.

BUT IF YOU REFUSE, THE CASE WILL STILL GO ON

However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense
can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
information.
-People v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy

BUT FAILURE TO OBJECT TO MULTIPLE OFFENSES IN THE INFORMATION IS A WAIVER

ailure to object to the multiple offenses alleged in the criminal information
during the arraignment is deemed a waiver of the right
-Abalos v.People (Judge Justalero case lol)

LACK OF MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IS NOT FATAL

An information which lacks certain material allegations (in this case, rape through
force and intimidation) may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to
object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency is cured by
competent evidence presented therein
-People v. Palarca

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL!!!

SPEEDY TRIAL!!
A trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. But justice and
fairness, not speed, are the objectives.
-See Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745.
Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably
delayed.

The violation of the right to speedy trial is tantamount to an acquittal giving

rise to the defense of double jeopardy.
-Cruz

WHEN VIOLATED
The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of
the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried
-de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499; Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 131483, October 26, 1999

Unjustified postponements
Long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case tried
Witnesses are not available is not a valid reason for postponement
All the trial dates set during the Pre-trial are already used and the party has
not yet rested

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT R.A. NO. 8493

 The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from the filing of the
Information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or
court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs
 If plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least 15 days to
prepare for trial.
 The trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court
and in no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the SC.

The right of the accused-movants to the speedy disposition of their cases and the
right of the State to punish people who violated its penal laws should be balanced
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
(a) the length of the delay
(b) the reasons for the delay
(c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
(d) the prejudice caused by the delay

WAIVED WHEN NOT ASSERTED ON RECORD

R. A. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a speedy trial. The
spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of
demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in
law, to have waived the privilege
-Uy v. Hon. Adriano,

IMPARTIAL TRIAL!!!
Discussed already in due process. See Bill of RIghts for the Bar.
Just want to add:
In People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court,
citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, rejected the
appellant’s contention that he was denied the right to an impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
of the
accused to a fair trial.

PUBLIC TRIAL!!
An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to him
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves
of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

Case
Cory sued Makasiar fol libel. The press insisted that it has the right to cover the
proceedings based on the right of the accused to public trial.

Ruling: This right is a right available to the accused and not to the press. There
was a need for reconsideration of this case and this was made in the Estrada case:
Here, the Court tempered the previous ruling. Here, SC considered the right of the
press. The desire of the court to
maintain the sanctity of its proceeding should be harmonized right of the press.
The compromised was
arrived: Mass media was allowed to ver provided that cameras will be stationary
outside the courtroom.

"The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.

When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right
of the accused must be preferred to win."

Compromise by the court in Estrada:

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary
purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and
the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law

RIGHT OF CONTRONTATION!!!

Remember, the right given to the accused is merely an

opportunity to cross-examine. Failing to avail it, there is
deemed waiver.

This may be done through counsel because one may be

heard “through himself or counsel.”

PRESENT THE POSEUR-BUYER OR ELSE

Both the trial court and the appellate court gave much weight to the testimony of
Sgt. Alfiler. However the prosecution did not present as witness Pat. Triste, the
alleged poseur-buyer. Such omission casts serious doubt on appellant's guilt
because without the testimony of the poseur-buyer there is no convincing evidence
to show that the accused was a marijuana peddler and not merely a victim of
instigation. Thus in People v. Fider 10 we decreed that "[w]e have held in many
cases that the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes material and well-nigh
indispensable when the accused denies having committed the prohibited act," and
failure to present him is fatal.
-People vs Tapeda

The accused here made an accusation of instigation:

The accused, for his part, narrated that on 12 May 1989, at around four-thirty in
the afternoon, he was awakened by four (4) gun-toting men who gave him a P50-bill
and ordered him to give the money to a certain "Jojo" who was then at the side of
the city stage. He did as he was told, and in return, "Jojo" handed him something
wrapped in a stapled newspaper. After giving the package to the group, he went back
to sleep. Later he was again awakened, this time by the sudden handcuffing of his
wrists. He was brought to a hotel where he was questioned by a certain "Alfiler"
after which he was taken to the INP Ormoc Station where he was detained for
peddling marijuana.
COUNTER: NO NEED TO PRESENT POSEUR-BUYER IF:
WITNESS WITHIN EARSHOT, POSITIVE AND CLEAR WITHOUT IMPROPER MOTIVE
ACCUSED DEFENSE IS WITHOUT CREDIBLE PROOF

In other words, accused-appellant was caught in flagranti delicto. In every

prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and indispensable
is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the
seller and the poseur-buyer.

There was no need to present the poseur-buyer as PFC Rosales witnessed the whole
transaction where the marked money was exchanged for three sticks of marijuana
cigarettes. The settled rule is that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness,
as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive to
impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full credit. 15 This Court has
ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony
would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's
case.

Accused-appellant, on his part, merely denied that he sold the three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes. If he tried to use alibi as defense, he should have presented
his father in court to corroborate his version that he was in the latter's house
when he was apprehended.

Accused-appellant, through his statements implied that he was a victim of a

"frameup." However, . . . like alibi, frameup is a defense that has been invariably
viewed by the Court with disfavor as it is a common and standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear and
convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of "frameup" which,
unfortunately, are inexistent here.

Accused-appellant's claim of a "frameup" is not credible as he gave conflicting

motives of the police authorities therefor. In his direct examination, he claimed
that he was framed up by the policemen because he did not supply them with
information regarding NPAs.18 In the cross-examination conducted by the
prosecution, however, he alleged that the policemen were retaliating against him
for working for the Regional Security Unit instead of for them.19 Such failure on
the part of the accused-appellant to muster convincing proof of a frameup lends
credence to the version of the prosecution.

HEARSAY IF PERSONS WHO MADE AFFIDAVITS ARE NOT PRESENTED IN COURT

Depositions and exparte affidavits are inadmissible unless the persons making them
are presented incourt
for examination ontheir statements bythe judgeand the accused. Evidence of this
nature is hearsay and excluded
by the Rules of Court.
-Cruz

IF WITNESS DIES BEFORE CROSS-EXAMINATION CAN BE COMPLETED,

HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY CANNOT BE STRICKEN OFF THE RECORDS
PROVIDED THAT MATERIAL POINTS OF HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY IS COVERED IN CROSS
The trial court committed no error in admitting the testimony of Fajardo although
the defense had not finished its cross-examination. An examination of the
transcript of Fajardo's testimony shows that he was subjected to detailed cross-
examination on material points. In fact, the cross-examination was lengthier than
the direct examination. We adopt with approval the statement of the court a quo on
this point
-People vs Gorospe
COMPULSORY PROCESS!!!

Subpeona basically.Failure to obey the process is punishable as contempt of court;

if necessary, the witness may even be arrested so he can give the needed evidence.

In this jurisdiction, there are two kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad

testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to
compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of
books, records, things or documents therein specified.

Well- settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present:
(1) the books, documents, or other things requested must appear prima facie
relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
(2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified
(test of definiteness)
-Roco v. Contreras,

Requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production of

evidence, as follows:
[a] the evidence is really material;
[b] accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence;
[c] the evidence will be available at the time desired; and
[d] no similar evidence can be obtained.
-US vs Ramirez

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS MUST BE INVOKED DURING THE TRIAL

This right to compulsory process must be invoked
during the trial. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver that
cannot berectified or undone on appeal.

TRIALS IN ABSENTIA!!!

REQUISITES:
The requisites of trial in absentia are:
(1) the accused has already been arraigned
(2) he has been duly notified ofthe trial
(3)his failure to appear is unjustified.

THE ACCUSED CANS STILL BE COMPELLED TO APPER IN COURT

FOR IDENTIFICATION OR BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE COURT'S ORDER
Waiver of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is
thereby deprived of the right to require the presence of the accused
for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction
of the accused
-People v. Macaraeg
Even after the accused has waived further appearance during the trial, he can be
ordered arrested by the court for
non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification
-Carredo vs People

WHEN ACCUSED IS REQUIRED TO APPEAR

1. Arraignment
2. Trial for identification
3. Promulgation of sentence
UNLESS: unless for a light offense wherein the accused may appear by counsel or a
representative.
ACCUSED CANNOT IGNORE TERMS OF BOND WHEN TRIAL IS HELD IN HIS ABSENCE
"The grave abuse of discretion, to repeat, is quite apparent. There was a
deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in
the Rules of Court. It is quite categorical. As set forth above: "If the defendant
fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited . . . ." The very
caption of such section reads: "Forfeiture of bail." Respondent Judge did precisely
that, with the bondsmen, again in accordance with the Rules of Court, being given
thirty days from notice "to produce the body of the accused Dario Gamayon and show
cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their
undertaking." That order was in accordance with law. Respondent Judge should have
stood firm. He ought not to have acceded to the plea of the accused to set it
aside."
-People vs Prieto