TABLE OF CONTENTS

MODULE 1 .......................................................................................................................................9
I. LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING, AND ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................... 9
THE FOUR “CS” OF EFFECTIVE DECISION-WRITING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR NEWLY-APPOINTED JUDGES by Artemio V. Panganiban .. 9
LEGAL WRITING 201 BY MARK P. PAINTER....................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
OPEN BOOK: SUCCEEDING ON EXAMS FROM THE FIRST DAY OF LAW SCHOOL by Barry Friedman & John C.P. Goldberg.............. 16
HOW TO BRIEF A CASE by Christopher Pyle ................................................................................................................................. 20
MODULE 2 .............................................................................................................................................. 22
II. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM................................................................................................................................................. 22
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW? ...................................................................................................... 22
Lopez v. Roxas ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
Angara v. Electoral Commission .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections ............................................................................................................................................................................ 26
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 29
Fabian v. Desierto ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Republic Act No. 9282 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
Republic Act No. 8249 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 40
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 41
Republic Act No. 7691 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 43
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals.................................................................................................................................................................... 44
De Castro v. JBC ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 46
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? .........................................................49
Marbury v. Madison ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 49
Francisco v. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Tanada v. Cuenco ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 53
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation .................................................................................................................. 56
Ocampo v. Enriquez ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 58
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan ........................................................................................................................... 65
JUDGES .............................................................................................................................................................................................................69
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 69
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet ................................................................................................................................................................................ 70
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro .......................................................................................................................................................................... 72
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals................................................................................................................................................................................. 74

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 In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 75
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 77
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 85
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86
Santiago III v. Enriquez ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu ................................................................................................................................................................................. 88
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo ............................................................................................................................... 90
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 92
LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS ............................................................................................................ 93
Cayetano v. Monsod ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 93
Ulep v. Legal Clinic .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 94
In Re: Cunanan ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 95
Sebastian v. Calis ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 97
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 98
Castaneda v. Ago.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 99
In Re: Edillon ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 100
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” ...................................................................................................................................... 102
Burbe v. Magulta ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 104
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 105
Regala v. Sandiganbayan ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 106
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 107
MODULE 3 ............................................................................................................................................ 109
III. THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES IN RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH .................................................................................................................................. 109
THE EXECUTIVE ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 109
Marcos v. Manglapus ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 109
Lagman v. Medialdea ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 111
U.S. v. Nixon .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 113
Neri v. Senate ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 114
Soliven v. Makasiar ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 116
David v. Arroyo .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 118
Estrada v. Desierto ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 120
Araneta v. Gatmaitan..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 121
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 123
Belgica v. Ochoa ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 125

MODULE 4 ............................................................................................................................................ 135

IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW ............................................................................................................................................................................ 135

MUNICIPAL LAW V. INTERNATIONAL LAW............................................................................................................................... 135

Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory Construction, 2003 ed.) ........................................................................................................................................... 135
Discussion by Joaquin G. Bernas (An Introduction to Public International Law, 2002 ed.) ....................................................................................................... 141
COMMON LAW V. CIVIL LAW ...................................................................................................................................................................... 143
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A LAND WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina DeFabritiis ......................................................... 143
MIXED JURISDICTIONS: COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW (CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED) by William Tetley .................................................................... 148
MODULE 5 ............................................................................................................................................ 167
V. ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS..................................................................................................................................................... 167
STARE DECISIS .............................................................................................................................................................................. 167
Fermin v. People ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 167
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation ................................................................................... 168
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v. Pagdanganan .......................................................................................................................................................................... 170
Antonio v. Sayman ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 172
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu ...................................................................................................................................................................................................173
LIS PENDENS ................................................................................................................................................................................. 174
Lim v. Cruz .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 174
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation ...........................................................................................................................................................175
Villa v. Sandiganbayan ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 177
Padillo v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 178
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS ........................................................................................................................................................... 180
People of the Philippines v. Derilo ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 180
Co v. Court of Appeals ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................181
LANDMARK CASE ..........................................................................................................................................................................182
Santos v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 182
Ochosa v. Alano ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 184
LEADING CASE AND ABANDONMENT OF DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................................186
Ting v. Velez-Ting ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 186
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 189
DURA LEX, SED LEX / CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ............................................................................................................... 193
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 193
Dear Batch 2021,
Welcome to the Ateneo Law School!
Before you begin reading, remember that you should not
rely solely on this Primer (or any reviewer for that matter)
as you prepare for your Introduction to Law lectures. The
purpose of this Primer is to help you review and recall what
you have already read, to prepare you at the last minute
for recitations, and to help you study for the Introduction to
Law exam. We suggest that you use this in conjunction
with the carefully chosen materials provided by your
professors. You may read this after or while reading the
assigned materials to optimize your learning experience. It
may also be helpful if you annotate your copy with your
personal notes and insights from your readings. That way,
you will not have to re- read all the originals again.
We hope you appreciate our humble efforts. May this
Primer help you attain EXCELLENCE!
Study well and good luck!
-The Gentlemen of the Fraternal Order of Utopia
HOW TO READ A CASE
What are the 3 main parts of a case?
The (1) facts, (2) issues, and (3) held/ratio.
What are facts?
Facts are events or circumstances that transpired. They are usually
narrated at the beginning of the case.
What is an issue?
It is the matter in dispute in the case. It is usually in question form
and begins with the phrase “whether or not”.
What are the 2 types of issues?
(1) Substantive, and (2) Procedural.
What are substantive issues?
Issues which pertain to the rights of the parties.
Give an example of a substantive issue.
Whether or not the accused is liable for murder or homicide.
What are procedural issues?
Issues which pertain to the method or manner of carrying out a legal
dispute.
Give an example of a procedural issue.
Whether or not the case is ripe for adjudication.
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Do we have to read all the issues?
No. Read only the issue that is relevant to the subject matter.
A police officer, upon mere suspicion that Juan’s house is a drug
den, entered Juan’s house without a warrant and in the course of
the search, inflicted physical injuries upon Juan and destroyed
his personal belongings. The issues present in the case are
whether or not the police officer (1) conducted a valid search, (2)
is liable for physical injuries, (3) is liable for damages for
destroying Juan’s property. Which issue should be studied?
If the subject is Constitutional Law, study the first issue since it deals
with the Bill of Rights. If the subject is Criminal Law, study the second
issue. And if the subject is Civil Law, study the third issue.
DEFINITION OF LAW TERMS
Judicial Opinion / Opinion. A judicial opinion is a court’s reasoned
explanation of its decision. It is merely an explanation of reasons for
judgment.
En Banc Opinions. A case decided by an entire court. It is the most
persuasive opinion in our judicial system, right below a Supreme Court
Opinion.
Concurring Opinion. Agreest with the result, but for different
reasons.
Dissenting Opinion. Objects to the result of the majority opinion.
Majority Opinion. A majority opinion is one in which more than half
the court agrees with the result and the reasoning.
Plurality Opinions. A plurality opinion resolves an appeal in which a
majority agrees with the result but not with the reasoning.
Decree. A decree decides a motion or matter that sounds in equity.
Orders. An order is an oral or written court directive on a question of
law, as opposed to equity, punishable by contempt if disobeyed.
Rulings. A ruling is a court order made during litigation, and
necessarily before judgment.
Judgments. A judgment is the final resolution of an action or
proceeding.
Decisions. A decision resolves a motion, application, write, or
appeal.
Reversed, Affirmed, Reversed or Affirmed in Part, Remanded.
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Rulings and judgments, not rules or reasoning, are affirmed or Question of Law: Is Mrs. Ronhilda’s action of asking Mr. Tan to
reversed. stop singing a violation of the latter’s right of freedom of expression.
Rules and reasonings are followed or not followed.

Affirmed. The decision of a lower court is met with approval by a

higher court. If a case has more tha one decision, one can be affirmed
and another reversed.

Reversed. The decision of a lower court is reversed.

Remanded. A case is remanded when it is returend to a lower court

with directions to redo or reconsider some aspect of the case.

Disapproved. A lower court’s opinion is disapproved, not overturned

or overruled, by a later case, not reversed or modified directly.

Upheld / Overturned. A case or issue is upheld or overturned by

another later case.

Sustain / Overrule. Courts sustain (allow) or overrule (disallow)

objections.

Granted / Denied. Motions are granted or denied.

Modified. Decisions can be modified, meaning the modifications can
cover one or more aspect of a determination, but does not reverse the
judgment of the court.

Questions of Fact. Inquiries regarding facts. Must be answered by

reference to facts.

Questions of Law. Must be answered by applying relevant legal

principles, or by an interpretation of the law.

Question of Fact vs. Question of Law

Question of Fact: Did Mrs.. Ronhilda ask Mr. Tan to stop singing?

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 IMPORTANT: Be sure to read and understand this section BEFORE 4. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
proceeding to the cases. This concept appears several times
throughout different cases. This means that the issue of constitutionality must first be settled for
the case to be resolved.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial Review is an aspect of judicial power which allows the court
to decide whether or not a law, statute or provision is contrary to the
Constitution, and gives them the power to strike down the law if they
find it to be so contrary.

The Supreme Court is not given the absolute discretion to rule on

constitutionality of laws. As a mode of check and balances, the
Constitution itself has provided safeguards so that the Supreme Court
may only exercise the power of judicial review in special
circumstances. Before the Supreme Court can decide on the
constitutionality of a statute these four requisites must be present:

1. Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial

power.

Jurisprudence dictates that for a case to be ripe for adjudication, the

government act being challenged must have had an adverse and real
effect on the person challenging it.

2. Locus Standi

A party has standing if he alleges such personal stake in the outcome

of the controversy. Unless a person is injuriously affected or is about
to be affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of the
statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
3. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity.

It must be raised in the pleadings as it may not ordinarily be raised at

the trial, may not be raised in the trial court, it will not be considered
on appeal.

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 MODULE 1 In this method, the judge simply narrates what he accepts his own
I. LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING, AND ANALYSIS version, without explaining what the parties’ versions are.

What is the Combination of the Objective and Subjective

THE FOUR “CS” OF EFFECTIVE DECISION-WRITING: Methods?
AN INTRODUCTION FOR NEWLY-APPOINTED
It is when the judge reports the testimony of each witness as in the
JUDGES by Artemio V. Panganiban
Reportorial Method and then makes his own version as he sees fit.
What are the parts of a Trial Court Decision?
What must be included in the disposition in criminal cases?
(1) Caption and Title
(1) Finding of innocence or guilt
(2) Introduction (optional)
(3) Statement of the Case (2) Specific crime
(4) Findings of Facts (3) Penalty
(5) Statement of the Issues (4) Participation of the accused
(6) Court’s Ruling (5) Qualifying, aggravating and mitigating circumstances
(7) Dispositive Portion or Disposition (6) Civil liabilities costs

What are the different methods of reporting facts? In civil cases, what should the disposition include?

(1) Objective or Reportorial Method (1) Whether complaint or petition is granted or denied
(2) Synthesis Method (2) Specific relief granted
(3) Subjective Method (3) Costs
(4) Combination of the Objective and Subjective Methods
According to Justice Reynato S. Puno, what is the test of
What is the Objective or Reportorial Method? completeness of a disposition?

It is usually done by summarizing, without comment, the testimony of
each witness, and the contents of each exhibit.
What is the Synthesis Method?
In this method, the judge summarizes the factual theory of the
plaintiff or prosecution, and then that of the defendant or defense.
(1) The parties know their rights and obligations,
(2) The parties should know how to execute the decision under
alternative contingencies,
(3) There should be no need for further proceedings,
(4) It terminates the case by according the proper relief, and
(5) It must adjudicate costs.

What is the Subjective Method?

9
What does “Ponente” mean?
It is the author of the case or the ponencia.
LEGAL WRITING 201 by Mark P. Painter
This material emphasizes on complete, clear and concise legal writing.
In this material, the author stresses how atrocious legal writing has
been. Painter also emphasizes that in writing documents
– complaints, briefs, deeds, etc. – all must be in plain and
understandable language. Documents must contain all the necessary
information, and must be as brief as it can be without sacrificing its
completeness.
The author gives 30 rules on how to improve one’s legal writing
skills. These are:
RULE 1: KNOW YOUR AUDIENCE
In all writing, the first rule is to know one’s audience. For whom are you
writing? If you are communicating to a court, then know the court
– be familiar with the local rules and practices, court members and the
preferences of such members. Are you are writing an opinion or giving
advice to a highly knowledgeable person, or to a layperson or
unsophisticated client? Your writing must be able to adapt to each
individual you are writing to.
Rule 1 is also concerned mainly with persuasive writing. If you are
to persuade a judge to rule in your favor, or an adversary’s lawyer to
pay you money or demand less money, then you want to be
persuasive. And the most important step in persuasion is
communicating clearly what it is you are trying to persuade the other
person to do.
RULE 2: FRONT-LOAD YOUR DOCUMENT (CONTEXT BEFORE
DETAIL)
As with all writing, you must organize your document to be front-
loaded. This means that you must educate you reader first as to what
is coming. Put the important material up front since readers easily
understand much more easily if they have a context. Readers
understand new information based on what they already know, then
build on that with each new additional piece.
You must be able to ascertain how much your audience already knows
about the facts and the law of your case. You may have lived with your
case for perhaps years, but the judge knows only what was set out in
the pleadings until you have explained what happened. You must
strive to explain the case in a way that an average person can
understand. Do not make your writing difficult to understand, even if
your readers are sophisticated readers and can understand difficult
prose. Why would you even make it difficult? Make it easy for the
reader, sophisticated or not.
You must also build a container – context – in the reader’s mind, so
when you pour in your facts and the law of your case, the reader has
the container to hold the information, otherwise it leaks out. Important
points must also be put up front – context before detail. The reader
learns by building on prior knowledge. So if the reader starts with no
knowledge of your case, you have to give them everything. Do not
give the facts first without giving the context. Tell the reader what
kind of case it is.
RULE 3: FRAME THE ISSUE IN FEWER THAN 75 WORDS
The most important part of your trial or appellate brief, or even of a
memorandum to another lawyer, is framing the issue. What is the
question you are trying to answer for the court or the other lawyer?
What do you want the court to decide?
Do not start writing your brief or memo until you have a brief and
concise statement of what the case is about, and you must do this in
50- 75 words. If you cannot explain the case in 75 words, then you do
not understand it very well and neither will your reader.
10

Put your issue statement right up front, preferably in the first
paragraph of your brief or memo.
RULE 4: STATE THE FACTS SUCCINCTLY
In rule 3, you have already told the reader what the issue is and
generally what kind of case it is in your 75 world (or less) statement,
then expand on that. After you have done your short statement of
facts, you weave them into the discussion section of your opinion- and
you can add and expand there if you need to. Your first statement is
to give context – a roadmap.
You must be concise. The fewer the words, the more memorable the
point.
RULE 5: AVOID OVERCHRONICLING—MOST DATES ARE
UNIMPORTANT
There is nothing wrong with stating the facts in chronological order.
Your initial outline of the case should list all dates. However, in writing
your brief or memo, do not fall into the habit of starting every sentence
with a date. Over chronicling confuses the reader, because they do
not know what facts are important and what dates they should
remember.
As a general rule, most dates are not important. Unless an exact date
is important, leave it out. Say “in June” rather than “on June 14, 2000,”
or “on or about June 14, 2000”. Only include the material facts, and
why they are important.
RULE 6: HEADINGS ARE SIGNPOSTS-THEY SHOULD INFORM
Headings give context. As part of the “container”, you must have
headings that tell the reader what is coming. If possible, headings
should convey information. “Facts” convey nothing. Headings are
signposts that guide the reader. If the legal argument portion of your
opinion is five pages, you may not need to break it up; but if it is longer,
separate it into numbered headings.
Headings do not just give context, they also signal the reader when to
safely take a break. The reader needs breaks in digesting complex
material. Separate the parts—and subparts—into headings.
RULE 7: WRITE SHORT PARAGRAPHS
Short paragraphs give the reader a chance to pause and digest what
has gone before. If you put three or four sentences with new
information in each paragraph, that is enough. And remember each
new piece of information should build on the old. You may have
probably seen where paragraphs are diagramed so that each
sentence refers back to something in the last sentence. That is called
building on context, or building on prior knowledge.
RULE 8: FORM IS IMPORTANT—MAKE IT LOOK GOOD
Obviously, the substance of the case is most important— but to
communicate the substance, use the best form possible. It is so much
easier nowadays to make the document look good. During the old
days of typewriters—there were only two type styles—and margins
were difficult to change. Now, our documents can look great! Just
about the most unreadable font is Courier.
We sometimes spend thousands of dollars in technology and make
our opinions and orders look like they were typed on a 1940
Underwood. Always use a serif type for text—because the serifs direct
the reader’s eyes to the next letter. At least in America—there are
some contrary statistics for Europe (probably as a result of history)—
a serif type is best for text. Times New Roman is the standard now.
Use it, or a similar typeface. A non-serif, or sans serif, type is good for
headings because it directs the reader’s eyes downward to the
material following the heading. Ariel is a common sans-serif type.
11
RULE 9: CHECK YOUR DOCUMENT CAREFULLY
Check every page of every paper that leaves your desk. Make sure
that everything is in order – check for typos, wrong margins, blank
papers, etc.
RULE 10: KEEP IT SHORT—THE PAGE LIMIT IS YOUR FRIEND
The page limit is your friend; it requires you to refine your argument.
You must strive to write succinctly. It is much harder to write a short
brief than a long one. Too much space is a temptation to write all (or
more than) you know about the subject. Make every word count, and
your document will be much more convincing—the reader might think
that you know more than you wrote, not less.
RULE 11: USE NO TALKING FOOTNOTES
If something is important enough to be in a footnote, it is important
enough to be in the text. Footnotes detract from readability. The only
proper use for footnotes is to give citations, rather than having citations
in the middle of a sentence. Proper use of footnotes is for reference
only. If something is truly parenthetical, but you believe it needs to be
mentioned, then use parentheses.
RULE 12: CITATIONS GO IN FOOTNOTES
Citations belong in footnotes. Cluttering up your document with
jumbles of letters and numbers makes it almost totally unreadable.
This practice should cease, especially now that footnoting references
is simple.
Make sure you put only citations in footnotes; that is, no “talking
footnotes.” The readers must know that they do not need to read the
footnotes— they are for reference only.
RULE 13: USE THE OHIO FORM OF CITATION
Use the Ohio Supreme Court system of citation. For whatever reason,
Ohio has its own form, not the Uniform System. (The “Bluebook” is
only used when the Ohio form doesn’t cover an issue—remember the
sixteenth edition is now out and makes some important changes.)
Ohio’s system is not wholly different—the most immediately apparent
change is that the date is before the reporter, e.g., Blanton v. Internat’l
Minerals and Chem. Corp. (1997), 125 Ohio App.3d 22, 707 N.E.2d
960. Note that there is no space between App. and 3d—the period
serves as separation. If you do not have a copy of the Ohio formbook,
the Supreme Court reporter’s office will send one.
Also, write R.C., not O.R.C. (We know it is Ohio.) Every reported case
in Ohio is published in the Ohio Supreme Court form—your brief or
memo should conform.
RULE 14: EDIT, EDIT, EDIT
Edit, edit, edit, and edit again. Typos, bad grammar, and misplaced
paragraphs take away from your argument. With new technology
always comes new pitfalls—following the “spellcheck” or “grammar
check” blindly leads to some weird words and constructions.
If you have another person do the word processing, it is even more
important to read every word. Spellcheck can substitute wrong
words—spelled correctly, but not what you mean. You may mean
“constitution,” but spellcheck reads it as “constipation.” Always do the
final editing on your own, do not let other persons do the final edit with
spellcheck without proofing very carefully again.
RULE 15: WRITE SHORT SENTENCES— THE 1818 RULE, PART I
Write short, crisp sentences. What is the most underused punctuation
mark in legal writing? The period. The most overused is the comma.
More periods, fewer commas. Sentence length should average no
more than twenty words.
12

Long sentences are especially difficult when strung together.
Sophisticated readers can understand longer sentences—if they are
properly constructed—but no one can wade through ten in a row.
Break up the pace—follow a longer sentence with a short one.
Readability is the goal.
RULE 16: USE MAINLY ACTIVE VOICE—THE 1818 RULE, PART
II
Passive voice is not forbidden. Sometimes you do not need to name
the actor— “Many books on this subject have been published.” Or a
smooth transition from one sentence to the next requires you to put
the subject first. Or you might want to hide the actor—“Mistakes were
made;” “An accident occurred.” But usually active is better; action is
easier to understand.
In the schoolyard, “Johnny tried to hit me.” Now, after law school, we
would probably say, “An attempt was made by Johnny to assault me.”
Somehow, the attempt becomes the focus. This is called
nominalization of verbs—taking a perfectly good action verb and
turning it into a noun. Probably because we, as lawyers, categorize
and name things, “assault” becomes a noun. “A tort was committed.”
Hunt down passive voice and nominalization. If there is no good
reason, put your sentence back the way real people would talk.
RULE 17: USE “BUT” AND “AND” TO BEGIN SENTENCES
AND do not be afraid to start sentences with “and” or “but.” This
signifies good writing. The reason your grammar-school teacher told
you not to start a sentence with “and” was because you wrote, “I have
a mother. And a father. And a dog.” Use “but” rather than “however”
to start a sentence, and see how much better it reads.
RULE 18: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN “THAT” AND “WHICH”
Use “that” restrictively, and “which” non-restrictively. (In British
English, which is used both ways.) The easy way to remember—
which is preceded by a comma; that is not.
RULE 19: USE THE DASH, PARENTHESIS, AND COMMA FOR
DEGREES OF EMPHASIS
Though you should avoid cluttering up your document with too many
incidental comments, sometimes they fit nicely. A dash provides the
greatest emphasis—it is a stronger break—next in degree is the
parenthesis, then the comma.
RULE 20: ONE WORD IS USUALLY ENOUGH
Do not use two or three or four words for one (“devise and bequeath”;
“grant, bargain, and sell”; “right, title, and interest ”; “make, ordain,
constitute, and appoint”) . This goofiness originated with the Norman
Conquest, after which it was necessary to use both the English and
French words so that all could understand. Most of us now understand
plain English. A related tendency of lawyers is to use many words
when one is more understandable (“sufficient number of” = enough,
“that point in time” = then, “for the reason that”
= because).
Don’t write “filed a motion” unless the filing itself has some
significance. Write “moved.” Do not write “On October 13, 1995,
plaintiff-appellant filed a timely appeal to this honorable court.” Again,
unless the timeliness or date (or the honor of the court) is in question.
You have used so many words for nothing. “Smith appeals” is
sufficient, and even that is obvious, and hence unnecessary. Don’t
write “filed of record.” Write “filed.” Where else would it be filed?
RULE 21: NO PARENTHETICAL NUMERICALS
Especially irritating is the practice of spelling out numbers and then
attaching parenthetical numericals—a habit learned when scribes
used quill pens to copy documents. The real reason for this is to
13
 prevent fraud, by making it difficult to alter documents. An opinion that
states “There were two (2) defendants and three (3) police officers
present ” is extremely hard to read, and also looks silly. Unless you
are writing your opinion in longhand—and unless you believe the
parties will alter your numbers—skip this “noxious habit.”
RULE 22: HYPHENATE PHRASAL ADJECTIVES
The reader is confused by nouns acting as adjectives, or two
adjectives together modifying one noun. Always hyphenate phrases
like “wrongful-discharge suit,” or “public-policy exception.”
RULE 23: ALWAYS QUESTION “OF”
Write Ohio Supreme Court, not Supreme Court of Ohio. Question
prepositional phrases—“of”—“from.” There is nothing wrong with
possessive. Write “the court’s docket,” not “the docket of the court.”
RULE 24: USE THE SERIAL COMA
In a list of three or more, always insert the serial comma. Some writers
insist on omitting the last comma, before the “and.” Do not omit the
last comma—doing so can cause misinterpretation.
RULE 25: AVOID UNNECESSARY PREAMBLES
Cut the useless preambles. Unnecessary preambles can weaken or
hide the point they introduce. Some unnecessary preambles are:
• It is important to add that . . .
• It may be recalled that . . .
• In this regard it is of significance that . . .
• It is interesting to note that…
RULE 26: PURGE LAWSPEAK
Eschew legalese. “Hereinafter,” “aforesaid ,” and the like do not add
anything but wordiness and detract from readability. Many studies
show that legalese is the number one complaint of appellate judges
and clerks. Use Latin phrases sparingly. A few— res ipsa loquitur,
respondeat superior—are perhaps acceptable, but do not litter your
opinion with what Daniel Webster called “mangled pieces of murdered
Latin.”
Cut out “such,” such as “such motion.” “The” or “ that” almost always
works. “Pursuant to” usually may be translated as “under.”
RULE 27: THE PARTIES HAVE NAMES
The parties have names. Don’t go through your whole brief calling
parties plaintiff- appellant and defendant-appellee, or the like.
Appellant would be enough, but it is better to call the parties by name.
When we use procedural titles, the reader must translate to
understand what we mean. The procedural titles chance throughout
the case, but the names remain the same. Using names also
humanizes your client— even corporate names, e.g., “Smithco,”
sound much more human that “Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-
Appellee.” Be sure to be consistent and not switch back and forth
between “appellant,” “Jones” and “plaintiff.”
RULE 28: USE QUOTATIONS SPARINGLY
You should explain how the cited cases support your theory of the
case. Do not use lengthy quotations—a few lines at most. No one
reads long block quotes. People skip that single-space block and go
on. Unless the case you are quoting from is exactly on point (which is
very seldom true), just quote the most relevant and persuasive part.
And do it in the text if you can. The Ohio Supreme Court format puts
all quotes in the text. No matter how long. Just remember, long blocks
are not read. Lead into the quote with your paraphrase of what the
quote says. The reader will actually read it to see if you are telling the
truth.
14
RULE 29: USE PERSUASIVE LANGUAGE During The Month Of May In May
By Means Of By
Use persuasive language. If you can’t explain your case, how can you As A Consequence Because Of
expect the readers to understand it? Similes or metaphors are very A Distance Of Five Miles Five Miles
effective to illustrate your analysis. In one recent case, the issue was At A Later Date Later
whether a pizza delivery driver was an employee or an independent Is Of The Opinion That Believes
contractor. One side argued that, because he paid for his own gas and
Effectuate Cause
used his own vehicle, and could use whatever route he wished, he
In Violation Of Violates
was an independent contractor. The other side stated that servers in
the restaurant, admittedly employees, also were not told which way to Is Violative Of Violates
go between tables to deliver their orders, and used their own shoes. Made A Complaint Complained
The driver was simply a “waiter on wheels.” That phrase found its way Utilize Use
into the opinion. A Period Of A Week A Week
Made application Applied
RULE 30: CONTINUE YOUR RESEARCH Made provision Provided
It is contended by plaintiff Plaintiff contends
Continue your research! You might file a memorandum or a brief With regard to About
months before it is argued before the court. Check every citation In connection with With
periodically, and again the day before the case is argued. Performed a search on Searched
BAD GOOD Each and every Either one
The Means By Which How Provide responses Respond
Entered A Contract To Contracted Offer testimony Testify
Filed A Counterclaim Counterclaimed Make inquiry Ask
Filed A Motion Moved Provide assistance Help
Filed An Application Applied Place a limitation upon Limit
Adequate Number Of Enough
Make an examination of Examine
For The Reason That Because
Provide protection to Protect
In The Event Of If
Reach a resolution Resolve
In Light Of The Fact That Because
Bears a significant resemblance Resembles
Notwithstanding The Fact That Although
Reveal the identity of Identify
Notwithstanding Despite
Makes mention of Mentions
Cause Of Action Claim Are in compliance with Comply
In Order To To Make allegations Allege
At This Point In Time Now Was in conformity with Conformed
Until Such Time As Until
To effect settlement Settle
Whether Or Not Whether (Usually)

15
 Law is not about reciting legal rules or spouting information; it is about
MANY WORDS WHEN ONE WILL DO reasoning cogently and making careful and convincing arguments on
the basis of legal materials.
OLD ENGLISH LATIN OLD FRENCH
What Lawyers really do?
Rest Residue Remainder
Free Clear Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said that what counts as knowledge of the
Will Testament law is the ability to predict whether a certain course of conduct will
Final Conclusive result in the person who engages in that conduct being subjected to a
Fit Proper court-ordered sanction or penalty.
Give, Bequeath Devise
Law school is not about simply learning or memorizing black-letter law.
It is developing “judgment”, an informed feel how judges and other
“deciders” are going to resolve legal claims.
OPEN BOOK: SUCCEEDING ON EXAMS FROM THE
Think in terms of arguments, not answers
FIRST DAY OF LAW SCHOOL by Barry Friedman &
John C.P. Goldberg Law is in equal parts knowledge and ongoing analysis. Good lawyers,
no matter what the practice setting, spend their days making and
Chapter 1: The What and Why of Exams analysing arguments. Good lawyers know the difference between an
argument that is likely to be a winner and one that will fail. Great
This chapter points out why law school exams look the way they do, lawyers recognize how to take an argument that seems weak and
and to get you thinking about what that tells you about how to take make it as strong as it can be. Star lawyers think of an argument no
them. one ever has, or push an argument that most others thought couldn’t
possibly prevail, and in doing so change the path of the law.
“Thinking like a Lawyer”
Connecting the real world and the exam room
Law school exams test a very basic, yet elusive skill: the ability to think
like a lawyer. Thinking like a lawyer refers to the ability to give a client Taking exams is about identifying the issues presented by a set of
legal advice. It means being able to digest a set of facts (a client’s facts, determining the rules that guide the resolution of those issues,
story), to identify the legal problems or issues posed by those facts, to and making arguments about how those rules apply to the facts.
apply governing legal principles to those facts, and to come to a
conclusion (or prediction) about the possible consequences for the CHAPTER 2: THE PINBALL METHOD OF EXAM TAKING
client under the law given those facts.
How playing pinball is like taking law school essay exams

16
The pinball player scores points only by hitting the bumpers. Nothing
matter but hitting the bumpers. This is the only way to score points. In
exams, the professor is looking for certain things and when you write
about them, you score points. When you don’t, no points are given.
Remember, who finishes first does not matter, only how many
bumpers you hit does.
How hitting bumpers (or not) affects grades
Professors typically grade on points. They read an exam and score it,
issue by issue. Then, they total up the points for all the issues. Next,
they prepare a list of all the exams and the points received, then
another list of all the point totals, so they can be frequencies. (This is
all done anonymously)
CHAPTER 3: IRAC: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Legal analysis can be broken down into discrete steps. IRAC
represents those steps.
IRAC stands for ISSUE, RULE, APPLICATION, and CONCLUSION.
Your primary job will be to demonstrate that you can (1) identify and
frame the issue(s) posted by a set of facts; (2) identify as relevant (and
sometimes make the case for the use of) one or more legal rules that
will govern the resolution of the issues that you have identified; (3)
argue cogently about how the rules apply to the issues raised by the
facts; and (4) accurately assess the likelihood of a given argument
prevailing. Moreover, at each step, you must be prepared to anticipate
and respond to analysis that runs counter to your own.
“I” is for issue
To “issue-spot” is to translate narratives into the language of the law.
“R” is for rule
After identifying the issues, the next thing to do is to determine the rule
or rules that provide the frame for the resolution of the issues.
“A” is for application
When it comes to rule application, the professor expects you to make
arguments on both sides of the issue to which the rule is being applied.
“C” is for conclusion
Professors almost always include a host of issues that have
respectable arguments on both sides. This is why your conclusion will
and should typically be expressed in qualified or probabilistic terms.
CHAPTER 4: ISSUE SPOTTING AND ISSUE SORTING
Of the total points one can earn on an exam, a large percentage can
be obtained by correctly identifying and framing issues, irrespective of
how those issues are analysed.
When it comes to legal analysis, the ability to isolate issues is the
necessary first step.
Closely related to issue spotting is issue sorting, which is identifying
which issues require more of your time and attention, and which
require less.
Matching
Matching is a method wherein points in list A are matched with the
points in list B.
17
List A (Subject list) pertains to the summary of your course outline.
This refers to all the materials covered by the course. While list B
(Issue list) refers to the fact patterns that can be found in the exam.
Scrolling
One way to think of the matching process is in terms of scrolling. As
you write your answer to a question you should be scrolling down list
A looking for the issues contained in list B.
Ignore, mention, or analyse
In answering exams, some issues are not worth raising. While some
are key issues, which should be given more focus to be mentioned
and analysed.
Deciding how much time to spend on an issue
Facts presented to you on an exam will permit a sharp contrast
between frivolous issues that require no attention, easy issues that
require only a brief mention, and hard issues that require extensive
analysis.
CHAPTER 5: RULES
Rule provide the structure for your analysis of issue that you have
spotted. On exams, you will not be rewarded for reciting rules so much
as for using or applying them.
Splits of authority
Splits between or among different jurisdictions as to the adoption or
rejection of certain doctrine are staples of law school.
Minority or outlier rules
At some point in your classes, you will read a particularly interesting
and perhaps compelling judicial opinion, only to learn in class that
the opinion is an outlier: its result and rationales have been rejected
by most other courts.
Why do we read cases that set out the wrong rule? The answer is that
one can learn something about the path on which one is traveling by
considering paths not yet taken. To learn about decisions regarded as
“wrong turns” is to appreciate at least some of the reasons for the rules
that we now have.
CHAPTER 6: APPLICATION
You must apply the rules in a thoughtful and thorough manner. There
are two keys to the application phrase of IRAC. The first is relentless
scrutiny of the facts that have been provided to you. Your professor
will not reward you for information dumps or abstract statements of
legal rules. They want you to use the rules that you have learned. The
second key is to remember that, when it comes to the application of
law to all but the most straightforward issues, argument is the name
of the game. Even if the exam instructions ask you to defend one side
of these issues, you must identify and discuss considerations on each
side of any issue.
Arguing both sides, and when to do it
To win their cases, good lawyers spend a great deal of time thinking
about how they will lose them. They try to figure out what the other
side’s arguments will be. When a case comes before a judge or jury,
the decision maker will listen to the arguments of both sides and
determine which she believes is best.
Three examples of when you should be arguing both sides:
1. Depending on the facts, the issue could go either way.
2. The rule as applied produces bizarre result.
3. The rules invite policy analysis.
Arguing from the facts
18
Arguing both sides is very important for two reasons. First, you will
miss bumpers if you do not argue both sides when doing so is called
for, which it usually is. This is the very heart if analysing a close legal
question. Second, knowing where these arguments exist (and where
they do not) will assist you in organizing your answer effectively.
Students routinely lose critical points by writing an abstract essay on
some point of law with no attempt to establish how that doctrine might
apply under the specific, given facts. Don’t make this mistake, argue
the facts.
Forking: Avoiding jumped ships, missed opportunities, and dead
ends
Fact patterns tend to generate a handful of decision points – forks in
the road – that you must recognize. What to do when faced with a
fork? The answer is to follow every branch of a fork to its end. There
are three things that can go wrong when forking:
1. Jumped ships – if you start down one branch, get distracted by
another issue that arises alongside it, then forget to return to the
first branch.
2. Forgotten forks – roads not taken. You move on to another part of
the question, or another question altogether, forgetting to retrace
your steps back to the fork in the road and the other path that it
presents.
3. Dead ends – What to do when one path instantly takes you to a
conclusion that eliminates the need for further analysis? Always
find for a way to include the others.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Rarely will a professor be in a position to award points to you because
you got the right answer. Law professors tend to provide fact patterns
in which at least for the most complicated or interesting
issues, there are good arguments on both sides, you might not be able
to state a definite conclusion with any degree of certainty.
Some professors will ask you to adopt the role of a judge and to issue
a ruling definitive resolving the disputes before you. If so, your
conclusion should be stated in a decisive form that is responsive to
that instruction.
Writing the conclusion might help focus your mind as you go through
the steps in your analysis. By starting with the right frame of mind: You
are reasoning and arguing, rather than simply regurgitating.
CHAPTER 13: WHAT’S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Discussing cases
The professor mentions the case that is going to be discussed, and
typically fires off a bunch of questions: who are the parties? What
happened? What was the issue? What did the court hold?
The professor wants to know the rule the court used to dispose of the
case.
Exploring rules through hypotheticals
The professor asks, “how would this case be resolved if this or that
fact were different?” The reason why professor asks hypotheticals is
because you learn the contours of, and possible justifications for, a
rule.
What you’re learning
What you are learning in law school is how to make a good argument
and recognize and avoid bad arguments. You are here to learn the
law, the rules themselves, but to state basic legal rules is relatively
easy. To understand them at the level at which you can bring them to
19
bear for your client is difficult. Class is where you learn to think like a
lawyer.
The main point of the first year is to learn the methodology of law: how
law works, how to make arguments like lawyers, how to know a good
argument from a bad one.
Preparing for class: Briefing
Most of your assignments are court decisions, collected in casebooks.
Class preparation involves reading these cases and briefing them.
Class briefs are brief summaries of cases. While lawyer’s briefs are
written arguments on behalf of a client that typically cite many.
Briefing your cases and then discussing those briefs in class is the
chief way you are going to learn how to do that law. The way you are
really going to learn this skill is by dissecting the cases when you write
your briefs.
IRAC-ing the case
The core elements of a case brief are:
-Facts: What is the story at the heart of judicial opinion?
-Procedural posture: How did the case come to this court and what
court is it precisely?
-Issue: What the legal question at the heart of the case is. What did
the parties asked the court to resolve?
-Judgment: Who won?
-Rule: How did the court explain why the prevailing party prevailed?
What is the legal rule that was relied on to resolve the legal issue?
-Rationale: Here you distill in a sentence or two the reasoning that
the court used to get to its rule, its conclusion.
“Psyching” the prof
The first-year law school curriculum is fairly standardized but you can
help yourself, though, by thinking about why your professor has
chosen to present the subject of a particular class in the way in which
she has presented it. It will pay to make an effort to get inside the head
of your professor – to get a sense of how he thinks about the subject.
HOW TO BRIEF A CASE by Christopher Pyle
What is an Apellate Brief?
It is a written legal argument presented to an appellate court.
What is the purpose of an Apellate Brief?
Its purpose is to persuade the higher court to uphold or reverse the
trial court’s decision. This brief is geared to presenting the issues
involved in the case from the perspective of one side only.
Who is the Plaintiff?
The plaintiff is the one suing the defendants in a civil suit in a trial
court.
Who prosecutes defendants in criminal cases?
It is the government that prosecutes or “People of the Philippines”.
20
What is the usual ground invoked by a losing party for an (6) Separate Opinions
apellate court to review a case? (7) Analysis

That the trial court judge made a mistake. What does the Title of the Case contain?

When do lawyers ask the court for a writ of certiorari? It shows who is opposing whom.

It is usually asked if the losing party does not have a right to a higer What does the Citation tell?
court review. Under this procedurethe appellate court is being asked
to exercise its lawful discretion in granting the cases a hearing for It tells the reader how to locate the report of the case in the
review. appropriate case reporter.

Who is the Petitioner? What are the elements of the Fact Section of a good student
He is the person who seeks a writ of certiorari, that is, a ruling by a brief?
higer court that it hear the case.
(1) A one-sentence description of the nature of the case, to serve as
Who is the Respondent? an introduction;
(2) A statement of the relevant law, with quotation marks or
He is the person who must respond to the petition, that is, the winner underlining to draw attention to the key words or phrases that are
in the lower court. in dispute;
(3) A summary of the complaint or the earlier conviction plus relevant
Who is an Appellant? evidence and arguments presented in court to explain who did
what to whom and why the case was thought to involve illegal
He is the person who files a formal appeal demanding appellate conduct; and
review as a matter of right. (4) A summary of actions taken by the lower courts.

Who is an Appellee? What is the Decision or Holding?

He or she is the opponent of the Appellant. The holding or decision is the court’s answer to a question presented
to it for answer by the parties involved or raised by the court itself in
What are the elements of a comprehensive student brief? its own reading of the case.

(1) Title and Citation What is the Reasoning or Rationale?

(2) Facts of the Case
(3) Issues It is the chain of arguments which led the judges in either a majority
(4) Decisions or a dissenting opinion to rule as they did.
(5) Reasoning

21
 MODULE 2
II. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE LAW?
Lopez v. Roxas
G.R. No. L-25716
28 July 1966
Concepcion, C.J.
(Judicial Power Defined)
FACTS:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders Vice
President in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By
Resolution No. 2, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session
assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes
then cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines,
proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with
3,531,550 votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest
opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826
votes had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5,
1966, respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET),
Election Protest No, 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as
Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he,
but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for
said office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme
Court the present original action for prohibition which preliminary
injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the PET from hearing
and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground
that RA 1793, creating said Tribunal, is “unconstitutional,” and that,
“all’ proceedings taken by it are a nullity.”
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not RA1793 is constitutional. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not PET can recount votes. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not RA1793 violates constitutional tenure. (No)
(4) Whether or not Justices of SC can sit as PET members. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
JUDICIAL POWER is the authority to settle justiciable controversies
or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of
such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or
prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or
disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,” subject
to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of
the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power,
but the entirety or “all” of said power, except, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
“judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications”
of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives,
which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution).
RA 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated
candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the
President elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the
votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure
a judgment declaring that he, not the candidate proclaimed elected by
Congress, is the one elected President or Vice-President, as the case
may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached
to said office.
22

RA 1793 provides that the PET “shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court”, it has
conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an
exclusive character. It has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The PET is not inferior to the SC,
since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said
Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in
the exercise of its ordinary functions. It is like the fact that Courts of
First Instance (now RTC) perform the functions of such ordinary
Courts of First Instance, those of courts of land registration, those of
probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations.
It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal
court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law,
over a limited number of cases which were previously within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these
instances, the court (Court of First Instance or municipal court) is only
one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such—
under the very principle of separation of powers—it belongs
exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the
Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said
organic law ordains that “the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members” (Article VI, Section 11, of
the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to
exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of
Congress—which by nature is judicial—from the operation of the
general grant of judicial power to “the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law”.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or VicePresident, has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the
jurisdiction vested in the PET. Congress merely acts as a national
board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty
to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns only
certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII,
Section 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) Upon the other hand, PET
has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified
election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each,
and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of
each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in
the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.
The authority of the PET to determine whether or not the protestant
has a better right than the President and/or Vice-President to be
declared elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional
tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that
the person really elected President or Vice-President is the protestant,
not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had
legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim
no abridgment thereof.
In imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not,
through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing
power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes,
neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said
law is constitutional.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. 45081
15 July 1936
Laurel, J.
(Separation and Blending of Powers)
23
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner, Jose A. Angara and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of votes. On November
15, the petitioner took his oath of office.
On December 3, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the petitioner,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8, and
praying that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election
of said position be nullified.
On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935
On December 20, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for,
the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period;
On December 27, respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of
a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore
has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in
the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power
to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds
24
for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments.
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in
their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted,
if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII
of our constitution.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests
against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
xxx.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
25
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728
21 July 2015
Leonen, J.
(Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts)
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring
to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti -RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark.
Team Patay: Juan Edgardo Angara, Teddy Casino, Alan Peter
Cayetano, Jackie Enrile, Francis Escudero, Risa Hontiveros, Loren
Legarda, Partylist Gabriela, Partylist Akbayan, Partylist Bayan Muna,
Partylist Anak Pawis
Team Buhay: JV Estrada, Gregorio Honasan, Mitos Magsaysay, Koko
Pimentel, Antonio Trillanes, Cynthia Villar, Partylist Buhay Partylist
Ang Pamilya
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review. (No)
(2) Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
(No)
(3) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens. (No)
(4) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression. (Yes)
(5) Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based
or content-neutral regulation. (Content-Based)
(6) Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
(Yes)
(7) Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted
upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
26
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation
of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non -justiciable question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE:
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is
the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before
a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election
offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of
their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE:
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds
no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid
for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
27
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the
tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
FIFTH ISSUE:
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.
The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and
this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must
be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE:
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation
of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE:
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely
on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality- With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion
28
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form
of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.”
Lemon test
-A regulation is constitutional when:
-It has a secular legislative purpose;
-It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
-It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127245
28 June 2000
Purisima, J.
(The Supreme Court: En Banc and Division Cases)
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Par. 2-3:
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
FACTS:
99 hectares of land presumptively owned by the Republic of the
Philippines was adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to
be without jurisdiction. Petitioners submitted these consolidated cases
to the SC Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc.
Under Supreme Court Circular No.2- 89, dated Feb. 7, 1989,
amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
Xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:
1.....Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2.....Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3.....Cases raising novel questions of law;
4.....Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5.....Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on
Audit;
6.....Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one
(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
29
7.....Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
8.....Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc
and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the
court en banc; and
9.....All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit
its attention.
When the Motions were first brought to the attention of the Court on
March 7, 2000, it opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted
on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was premature for
the Court to resolve the motion.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4 -1 to deny petitioners
motion to transfer the cases to the Banc. On March 14, 2000, the Court
deliberated on the motion and voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the
banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.
This action of the Court is a legitimate and valid exercise of its
RESIDUAL POWER within within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of
the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the nine justices who voted to treat the consolidated
cases as En Banc cases did not have any cogent or compelling
reason for such action. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling
enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En banc has to act
upon and decide petitioners motions for reconsideration.
It has to be stressed that where the Court En Banc entertains a case
for resolution, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the
Court simple means that the nature of the cases calls for an en banc
attention and consideration.
It should also not be concluded that the Court took undue advantage
of sheer voting strength.
It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable
opinion of the majority that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient
importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is
claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
16 September 1998
Regalado, J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
30
FACTS:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in a
business transaction with Nestor Agustin, the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and respondent, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, persuaded the petitioner into
having an amorous relationship with him. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for the corporation’s problems.
Because of some misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents, Fabian
wanted to terminate their relationship but Agustin threatened her not
to.
Fabian then filed an administrative case against Agustin with the
Ombudsman, but Agustin was eventually exonerated.
Fabian argues that Sec 27, of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
allows that all decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten days from
receipt of the written notice. She also argues that the Ombudsman
cannot restrict the right to appeal and cannot limit the power of review
of the SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Sec. 27 of RA 6670 is unconstitutional. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Sec. 30, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
The constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
The very provision cited by the petitioner does not include quasi-
judicial agencies such as the OMB. Under the present Rule 45,
appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but
only from judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required
to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Furthermore, the legislative background of RA 6770 shows that the
Conference Committee Report was aware of the provisions of Section
30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo
Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of the bill admitted
that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court
on the matter.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
7 October 2008
Puno, C.J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
31
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Procedural
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein
respondents to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Respondents filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed, among others, that:
(1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) they be granted the interim reliefs
allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule;
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
Circumstances
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to
as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion
that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army
(NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on 13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond
and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty
and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the
Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead,
and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and
Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion
to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the
aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently
filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition
as amparo petition. On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved
to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo
Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and
remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary
hearing and decide the petition. On 26 December 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of
Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official
and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and
Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records
of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody. Thus the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
32
 (2) Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for
the right to security of a person may be invoked.
HELD/RATIO:
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS Effect of the
nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of
evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence
of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity
of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated
by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO
PETITION Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the
right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom
from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is
not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the
word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person. xxx Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of
the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion
of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities,
and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are
an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. xxx Third, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights
by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person
(as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees
full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from
fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,
“freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well- founded as people
react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the
amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is
actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened
with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule
is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier
part of the provision. Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the
right to security may be invoked – While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right
33
to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In
other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for
the right to security of person to be invoked.
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF AMPARO:
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition
in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The
Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective
on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
hence representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system
participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light
of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It
was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to
the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings
are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 217126-27
10 November 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Third Level Courts: Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation
report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six Administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for
violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds and
Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati
for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The
TRO was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by
Binay against the Ombudsman and various other officials for
deliberately refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to
course to the petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to
file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the case
was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
ISSUE/S:
34
(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance , is the Ombudsman
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (No)
(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition for certiorari. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (No)
(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and illegal. (Premature
Issue)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general
rule a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court
prior to resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can
still be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
a) Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo
has no jurisdiction.
b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable.
d) Where under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration
would be useless.
e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief.
f) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of
due process.
h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object.
i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involves both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort
to certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is
based on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same
states:
Section 14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the
Ombudsman by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or
finding of the Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the
same except for decisions or findings taken to the Supreme Court on
35
pure questions of law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45
appeal can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
courts and not against “findings” of quasi judicial agencies including
the Office of the Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides
that increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice
and concurrence is in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Section 14 of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase
the Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, therefore it is concluded that the second paragraph of
Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65
petition is the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared
unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoin in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices
independence under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office
from judicial intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman
as an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses, of the bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman
independence covers three things:
1. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot
be abolished nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges be removed, altered or modified by law unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made
2. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its
funds for purposes germane to its function.
3. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means
that those within the ranks of the Office can only be disciplined by
internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. This is because the courts are
apolitical bodies which may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman
is not exempt from judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislative and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An
example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs
of preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’
power to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’
constitutional rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a
court to exercise its full functions.
36
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus pending deliberation
on whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of
procedure without the consent of the Court, the CA had the authority
to issue the injunctive writs.
FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned
thus the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The
purpose of a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who
is being suspended from using the powers of his office to influence
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution
of the case against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to
nullify the preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr
re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the
Makati Parking Building Project. The CA found it sufficient that the
application of the condonation doctrine was enough to enjoin the
implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual
v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
1. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct, also offenses committed or acts done during the previous
term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
2. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of
previous Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for these
aforesaid acts.
3. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to
know the life and character of their candidates of their right to elect
officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the
legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is
a public trust. The LGC provides that an elective official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in
office etc. The LGC also provides that those officials removed from
office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from
running for any elective local office.
Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including
the ones cited above, the Çourt concluded that the doctrine of
condonation is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local officials administrative liability for a
Misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term or another elective post. There
is no support to the statement in the case of Pascual that the courts
would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if
condonation were not to be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal
basis that election implied condonation. There is also no presumption
in any rule of law that the electorate upon re- election an official, have
disregarded or forgave the officials faults. The electorate rarely has full
knowledge of a officials misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are
shrouded in secrecy. Condonation cannot be subscribed to because it
implied forgiveness, which requires knowledge of the acts being
forgiven for and in the absence of knowledge of these acts there can
be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases
after this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also
37
done for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office.
However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings in the
resolution, makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr
contempt petition. Thus in this comment, the Ombudsman may raise
her objections to the contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt
to not give due course to the same contempt proceedings. Absent any
indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the
CA it would then be premature for the Court to rule on the issue.
Republic Act No. 9282
(Third Level Courts: Court of Tax Appeals)
Under R.A. No. 9282:
The Court of Tax Appeals was elevated to the same level as the Court
of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice.
It shall now consist of one (1) Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate
Justices. They shall have the same qualifications, ranks, category,
salary, emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements and
other benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. It
shall sit en banc, or in two (2) divisions with three (3) Justices each. A
decision of a division of the CTA may further be appealed by verified
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
(Due to the enactment of RA 9503 on 12 June 2008 and took effect
on 5 July 2008, the organizational structure of the CTA is further
enlarged by the creation of a Third Division which has three (3)
additional Justices. Therefore, CTA is now composed of one (1)
Presiding Justice and eight (8) Associate Justices. The CTA may sit
en banc or in three (3) divisions with each division consisting of three
(3) Justices.)
The CTA’s original appellate jurisdiction was expanded to include the
following:
1. Criminal cases involving violations of the NIRC and the Tariff
and Customs Code;
2. Decisions of the RTC in local tax cases;
3. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(CBAA) in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property; and
4. Collection of internal revenue taxes and customs duties the
assessment of which have already become final.
Republic Act No. 8249
(Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan)
Under R.A. No. 8249:
Sandiganbayan is a special court, of the same level as the Court of
Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
It shall consist of one (1) presiding justice and (14) fourteen associate
justices who shall be appointed by the President.
Before RA 8249 was enacted, the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was
determined based on the penalty imposable on the offense or offenses
charged on the accused. Under RA 8249 Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction regardless of the penalty, so long as the offense charged
was committed by a public officer.
To determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, two (2)
criteria must be taken into consideration, namely: (1) The nature of the
offense and (2) The salary grade of the public official.
38

Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:
A.) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, (Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act),
B.) Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads;
b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other department heads;
c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval
captains and all officers of higher rank;
e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of
Provincial Director and those holding the rank of Senior
Superintendent or higher;
f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants;
officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
g) President, directors or trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
2. Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Classification
Act of 1989;
3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision
of the Constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
C.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and
employees mentioned above;
D.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986
Sandiganbayan has Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court in:
Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of
the Supreme Court
The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction in:
Final judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil
cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but which were committed by public officers below
Salary Grade 27.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in govemment -owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Therefore,
private individuals can be sued in cases before the
39
Sandiganbayan if they are alleged to be in conspiracy with the public
officer.
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894
15 July 2015
Peralta, J.
(Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan)
Art. XI, Sec. 4:
Section. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case Danilo A. Duncano is the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade
26 as classified under RA No. 6758. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case
against him for the violation of Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.
Duncano allegedly willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN)
for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in
Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and
his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan
Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT
LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under
Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear a case because
he is an official of the executive branch occupying the
position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is
classified as below Salary Grade 27.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials
of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those
specifically enumerated. This is so since the term “Regional Director”
and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies
that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are
conjoined together “relating one to the other” to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies
the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding that
the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary
Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249
unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over
officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the
position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary
Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who
are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of
the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Inding and Binay v.
Sandiganbayan were cited.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4
(A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade
of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27
or higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated
40
in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in
fact, on all fours with Cuyco.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)
and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though
petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary
Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious
error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office,
entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26. There is no merit in the OSP’s
allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(Second Level Courts: Regional Trial Courts)
Under BP Blg. 129:
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch.
– The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or
claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (200,000.00);
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
7. In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as
now provided by law; and
41
 8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
1. In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
2. In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the
Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for
review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when
the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the
decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations
cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under
the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial
Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or
agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under
present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless
subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
Republic Act No. 7691
(First Level Courts: Municipal Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities)
Under R.A. No. 7691:
Section 2. Section 32 od the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties including the civil liability arising
42
 from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount
of the demand does not exceed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,00.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be
included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided,
further, That where there are several claims or causes of
actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
traansactions;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
19 January 1999
Puno, J.
(Jurisdiction)
FACTS:
The Secretary of Justice filed for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining Echegaray’s execution and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The Secretary of Justice claims that the decision of the case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit
of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may
be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority. It
further included in its position a copy of the House of Representatives’
resolution which advised the branches of government to immediately
implement the re-imposition of the death penalty.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Has the Court lost jurisdiction of the case at bar and hence can
no longer restrain the execution of Echegaray? (No)
(2) After a decision has become final and executory, does the
execution enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department? (No)
43
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court does not lose jurisdiction of case after a decision has
become final and executory. The important part of a litigation is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene
and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because
of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution
of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in
light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The
Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the
effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment.
But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the
court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event
are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
SECOND ISSUE:
After a decision has become final and executory, the execution does
not enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department.
The Secretary of Justice uses Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
The above provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The
suspension of the death sentence is an exercise of judicial power. It is
not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects
is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114323
23 July 1998
Martinez, J.
(Basis of Decisions)
Art. VIII, Sec. 14:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall
be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Oil and Natural Gas Comm. (ONGC) is a foreign
corporation controlled and owned by the Indian government.
Respondent, Pacific Cement Company Inc. (PCCI), is a private
corporation organized under Philippine Law.
On February 26, 1983 respondent agreed to supply the petitioner
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the
petitioner paid $477,300.00 through a letter of credit.
44

The oil well cement was loaded on MV SURUTANA NAVA ship at the
port of Surigao City for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. Due to
a dispute between the ship owner and the respondent, the cargo
remained in Bangkok and failed to reach its destination. Respondent
failed to give the 4,300 metric tons of cement despite petitioner’s
demands. They agreed that the respondent will replace the entire
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement cost free at
the petitioner’s designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class
“G” cement did not conform to the petitioner’s specifications.
On July 23, 1988, arbitrator, Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute
in petitioner’s favor amounting to $899,603.07, Foreign court issued
notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition.
The private respondent complied and sent its objections dated
January 16, 1989. Foreign court refused to admit the private
respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and
thereafter issued an Order on February 7, 1990Private respondent
refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to
the petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30
of Surigao City RTC for the enforcement of the of the foreign court’s
judgment.
CLAUSE 15 “All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out
of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court , within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated.”
CLAUSE 16 "All questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification, designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship of the items ordered
or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but
qualified to "in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract,
design, drawing, specification, etc.,"
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
under Clause 16 of the contract. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a
dispute within Clause 16’s purview. (No)
(3) Whether or not the memorandum decisions by inferior tribunals
can be considered as facts and conclusions of law. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not due process was given to the respondent even if
there was no hearing. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute clause under Clause
16 of their contract.
ART. 1373 provides: If some stipulation of any contract should admit
of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
ART. 1374 provides: The various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly.
This canon of construction states in interpreting a contract as in this
case, care should be taken that every part must be given effect, as it
was enacted by an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of
conflicting provisions. The correct interpretation is to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims
or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract,
and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
The petitioner states that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not
a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement
to conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling
within the ambit of Clause 16. What was referred to arbitration was the
failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the
45
specifications of the contract (Class “G” cement), a matter clearly
within the coverage of Clause 16.
Hence, arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute due to
“specification” in Clause 16 which is supposed to be Class G cement
SECOND ISSUE:
Non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by
the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their
contract.
Doctrine of noscitur a sociis, provides that the supply order/contract in
Clause 16 must be construed within its associated words, limited only
to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract. Clause 16 should pertain only
to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract. Non- delivery
of the oil well cement does not fall here but under Clause 15 “All
questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in
connection with this supply order”.
THIRD ISSUE:
Memorandum decisions of inferior tribunals can be considered as
facts and conclusions of law.
Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
In Francisco v. Permskul , this Court held that the Makati RTC’s
memorandum decision is within the ambit of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. In this case, the foreign court adopted the arbitrator’s
findings of facts and law in Award Paper No. 3/B -1. It contains an
exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties, and the arbitrator’s evaluation of the same.
Procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, state that a
valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings,
and the same must be respected. If the foreign court mandates that
an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay
the necessary docket fees, then Philippine courts cannot invalidate
foreign court’s order because our rules provide otherwise. Even if
Philippine courts cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise, (Award Paper No. 3/B-1) can be
considered as facts and conclusions of law.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Due process was given to respondent even if the foreign court did not
answer their concerns.
Due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence in support of one’s defense. Denial of opportunity to be heard
is contrary to due process. There is no violation of due process even
if a hearing did not occur, for the party was given a chance to explain
his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.
Respondent does not deny that foreign court informed them to file its
objections and to pay its corresponding legal fees. Instead of paying,
respondent asked the foreign court about the correct amount of fees.
Foreign court rejected the private respondent’s objection and
proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner’s claims. Respondent’s
claim that the foreign court violated its right to due process when it
failed to reply to its queries. Also when the foreign court rejected its
objections on clearly meritorious grounds does not violate due
process. Due process was not denied for respondent was afforded
sufficient opportunity to be heard.
De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002
17 March 2010
Bersamin, J.
(The Judicial and Bar Council)
Art. VIII, Sec. 8:
46
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative
of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio
of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
FACTS:
Chief Justice Puno’s compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010 will
occur eight days after the presidential election. The JBC began the
process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice.
On February 8 2010, the JBC announced the names of the following
nominees to the public for any complaint or opposition to their
nomination who were namely: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice
Leonardo- De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice
Sandoval.
Although the process for filing the position of Chief Justice had begun,
the JBC had not yet submitted to the President its list so that the latter
may appoint the next Chief Justice due to the controversy
in this case being unresolved. Because of these acts of the JBC, seven
different petitions were filed in the Supreme Court which prayed either
for: (1) the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the
list of at least 3 nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice
because the President has to appoint the next CJ within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy in accordance with Section 4(1), Article
8 of the Constitution; or (2) prevent the JBC from conducting its
search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief
Justice in accordance with the prohibition provided in Section 15,
Article 7
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi or legal standing.
(Yes)
(2) Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next
Chief Justice. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the submission of
the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Each of the petitioners in the seven different petitions have locus
standi. Each have demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of
the controversy. The issues before us are of transcendental
importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in
particular. The issue is determinative of the authority of the President
to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief
Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary. Nevertheless,
to dispel any doubt on locus standi, it should be noted that it is within
the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirements for legal
standing so that it could address and resolve the serious constitutional
questions raised.
SECOND ISSUE:
47
The controversy is ripe for judicial determination. The JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees for the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because
the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the
preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of
constitutional experts, as may be needed.
THIRD ISSUE:
The prohibition under Article 7, Section 15 does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Article 7 refers to the Executive Department while Article 8 refers to
the Judiciary. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend
the prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They could have easily explicitly
written that the prohibition to be equally applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court. Since this specification was not
done, it reveals that the prohibition against the President making
appointments within 2 months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s term does not refer to the
Supreme Court.
Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Article 7 are of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Sections
14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
implies that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department
as well. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Furthermore, the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because the establishment of the JBC
and the process of nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the
Judiciary.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the
Supreme Court within the 90-day period as provided by Article 8,
Section 4(1) was a true mandate for the President due to the usage of
the word shall - an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be
enforced. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.
Furthermore, there cannot be an Acting Chief Justice and the Court
because the framers of the Constitution intended the position to be
permanent.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. For mandamus to lie,
the following requisites must be present: (a) the plaintiff has a clear
legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant
to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d)
the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within their discretion. The object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit
to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary,
because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For
48
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
Thus, there is no sufficient grounds to grant the mandamus against
the JBC. It is premature because the JBC still has until May 17, 2010,
at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President.
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Marbury v. Madison
1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137
(Origins of Judicial Review)
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court first declared an act of Congress
unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review.
FACTS:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President
Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by
creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees.
Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams,
under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42
new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the
Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the
commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President
Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State
James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury
sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to
deliver his commission.
ISSUE/S:
Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation,
the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the
commission.
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to
deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power
to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of
the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of
the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus
is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an
original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits
of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
10 November 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Origins of Judicial Review)
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complain (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on
49
Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Thus arose
the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
th
12 Congress, posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint
against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate
has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA- Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation, prays in his petition for
50
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition
for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to
the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of
the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to
protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
emanating there from be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance
of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint,
and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles
of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as
a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation
Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they
claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House
of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this
Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering
with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
51
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest
in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and
Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint,
were absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector
L. Hofilena, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding
interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they are trying
to inculcate in the minds of their students, pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from
trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that
the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and
all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate
be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution
of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited
from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. (No)
(2) Whether or not the case is already ripe for adjudication. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction. (No)
(4) Whether or not the Court should exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
not upset the system of checks and balances. The Supreme Court
Ruled that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
52
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government (Art. VIII, Sec 1). Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Thus, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
the system of checks and balances.
SECOND ISSUE:
The case is already ripe for adjudication. In Tan v. Macapagal, it was
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. Here,
the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit. In conclusion, the case is already ripe for adjudication.
THIRD ISSUE:
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The Supreme Court ruled
that political question refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure. Here, the procedure is mostly about the
wisdom of the congress and not by court. Thus, the Court has no
jurisdiction over this case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court should not exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. The Supreme Court ruled that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Thus, the court should not
restrain from deciding in cases of impeachment since judicial review
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
Tanada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520
28 February 1957
Concepcion, J.
(Political Question)
FACTS:
Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and
President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for
the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which
several others, were proclaimed elected in the Senate. Subsequently,
the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their
respective seats in the Senate -was contested by petitioner
Macapagal et. al, in the said election. The protest is now pending
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the
Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party,
and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-
belonging to the Citizens Party. The contend that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or
color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
53
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of
appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal”. It the petitioner’s stand that
the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and
Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators
Cuenco and Delgado who caused said appointments to be made as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and
that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to
take cognizance of the electoral case pending before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Electoral Case no. 4) , in nullification of the rights
of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the
Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional
rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co- protestants to
have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal
composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the
Party having the second largest number of votes and to be designated
by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with
five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival
party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal
and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5)
Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the
manner described above.
Among others, petitioners pray that judgment be rendered ousting
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the court is without jurisdiction to direct or control
the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral
Tribunal. (No)
(2) Whether or not the current case is a political question. (No)
(3) Whether or not the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens
Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate
three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal- could validly
choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination
by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate OR W/N
whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may
validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said
Citizens Party. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The courts have jurisdiction. This case is not an action against the
Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or
indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members
of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET), SET is neither part of Congress nor of the Senate.
Moreover, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the
exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised. The courts are called
upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be
exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers
possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter
function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch
of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is
not the same, thing as the performance of the act. The Legislative
power is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet,
this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In fact, whenever the conflicting
claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House
thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue,
but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded
54
without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its
eventual destruction.
SECOND ISSUE:
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in
the present case. Currently, the court is called upon to decide whether
the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen upon nomination of the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and
hence, is null and void.
THIRD ISSUE:
The main question is whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid
and lawful.
No, it is not valid in accordance with the intention and principle
provided by the constitution. The main argument in support of the
mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the
number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word
“shall” in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution. The flaw in the
position is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word
"shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals,
it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method
prescribed for their election. Respondents have not even tried to show
why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of
members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered
directory as regards the procedure for their selection.The
intention behind the provision was to prevent the abuse of the majority
against the minority in Congress. The main objective of the framers of
our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of
Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking
body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely:
(a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having
the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in
each House of Congress, were given the same number of
representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they
may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in thesame body
the same number of representatives as each one of said political
parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow
said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. The most vital
feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the
parties. The spirit of the law prevails over its letter. Partisan
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the
majority party and either one (1) or two
(2) members nominated by the party having the second largest
number of votes in the House concerned.
The defenses of waiver and estoppel by respondents set up against
petitioner Tañada are unmeritorious. Although an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit, particularly those
meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those
tending to secure his personal liberty, the power to waive does not
exist when public policy or public morals are involved. In addition, the
rule estoppel is that whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or
omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it. In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada
55
did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could
nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political
parties specified in the Constitution and that the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right
to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in
the Electoral Tribunal. Neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of
them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative. Lastly, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election
of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are
null and void ab initio.
Paras, dissenting:
It is the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six
members from the National Assembly that shall be part of the Electoral
Commission.There is clearly no intention for the fluctuations in the
total membership of the Commission. The number of seats then in
such Commission must be fixed since the Constitution must have
consistent application.
As such, when there is a lack of a minority representation in the
Assembly to nominate three minority members, it follows that the only
part in the Assembly may nominate (the other members) to fulfil the
mandate of the Constitution.
LABRADOR, dissenting:
The petition violates Section 2, Article 6 of the Constitution on multiple
grounds. First, it does not fulfil the mandatory provision which fixes the
membership of the SET to nine (9) members. Second, it denies the
Senate the power granted to it by the
Constitution of electing its members to the Electoral Tribunal,
specifically due to the refusal of the minority member (Senator
Tanada) to nominate. Third, the petition holds superior a procedural
provision over a substantive one, thus violating the fixed membership
of Electoral Tribunal. Fourth, the majority decision has likewise
inserted a provision that has no justification in law or in reason - where
the failure or refusal from the minority to nominate all three members
would result in the corresponding reduction of membership in the
tribunal.
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation
G.R. Nos. 203754-204418
16 June 2015
Velasco, J.
(Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, passed City Ordinance
No. LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance
of the City of Cebu". Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and
43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators
of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of
the City Treasurer of Cebu City.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall
be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount
due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.
Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167,
creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and
abolishing the Film Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc.
and the Film Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for
the tax treatment of certain graded films as follows:
56

Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained
an “A” or “B” grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12
of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:
Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its
producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed
and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro
Manila and other highly urbanized and independent component cities
in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No.
7160 at the following rates:
For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such
film; and
For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such
films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the
Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise
accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period
the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted
within thirty (30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the
Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the
producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the
present, all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as
urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole
exception of Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
The proprietors and cinema operators, including private respondent
Colon Heritage Realty Corp. (Colon Heritage), operator of the
Oriente theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to pay
the aforestated amounts to FDCP. The demand, however, fell on
deaf ears. Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a
letter from Regal Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the status of its
receivables for tax rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate
films along with those which it co-produced with GMA films. This
was followed by a letter from Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film
Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate remittance of its
amusement tax rewards for its graded films for the years 2004-2008.
Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema
operators to remit the said amounts as FDCP demanded, on one hand,
and Cebu City’s assertion of a claim on the amounts in question, the
city finally filed on May 18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition
for declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529 (City of Cebu v. FDCP). In said
petition, Cebu City sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA
9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC (Branches 5 and 14) gravely erred in
declaring Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid for being
unconstitutional. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
Local fiscal autonomy and the constitutionally-delegated power
to tax
The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of
sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of right, to every independent
government, and needs no express conferment by the people before
it can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be
delegated to the executive and judicial branches of government
without running afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It,
however, can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with
the principle that legislative powers may be delegated to local
19
governments in respect of matters of local concern. The authority
57
of provinces, cities, and municipalities to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, therefore, is not inherent and may be
exercised only to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by statute.
RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress,
broad as they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of
37
the Constitution. Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going
beyond the parameters wrought by the organic law. In the case at bar,
through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the
income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not
and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially,
despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore,
clearly overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment
being violative of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local autonomy,
Grant of amusement tax reward incentive: not a tax exemption
Both the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are borne by the
proprietors, lessors, and operators, not by the producers of the graded
films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is actually a
monetary reward given to them for having produced a graded film,
the funding for which was taken by the national government from the
coffers of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an exemption
from payment of tax.
Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entire RA 9167 as
unconstitutional
43
It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case,
which the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167
unconstitutional. This being the case, and in view of the elementary
44
rule that every statute is presumed valid, the declaration by the RTC,
Branch 5 of the entirety of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is improper.
Amounts paid by Colon Heritage need not be returned
Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, the
RTC, Branch 5, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ordered the return of all
amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of
amusement tax.
Ocampo v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 225973
8 November 2016
(Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On 7 August 2016, National Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:
Subject: Interment of the late Former President
Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB
Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo
Duterte on July 11, 2016.
In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President
to implement his election campaign promise to have
the remains of the late former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
kindly undertake all the necessary planning and
preparations to facilitate the coordination of all
agencies concerned specially the provisions for
ceremonial and security requirements. Coordinate
closely with the Marcos family regarding the date of
interment and the transport of the late former
President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to LNMB.
58
 The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO
since the LNMB is under its supervision and
administration. PVAO shall designate the focal
person for this activity who shall be the overall
overseer of the event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon
as possible.
On 9 August 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued
directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General commanding
it to provide services, honors and other courtesies for the late
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
(1) Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. (No)
(2) Whether petitioners have locus standi. (No)
(3) Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. (Yes)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) Whether the National Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte
to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains
of Marcos interred at the LNMB. (No)
(2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws. (No)
(3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth
from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of
the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB. (No)
(4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of
the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedure by which his
remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
For a question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act to be heard and decided by the Court, the following
requisites for judicial inquiry must be present:
a. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
b. person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
c. question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
d. issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
In this case, the absence of the first 2 requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last 2 superfluous.
President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and
the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on
his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion,
as discussed below, President Duterte’s decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
59
SECOND ISSUE:
Locus Standi is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question which requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a
person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.
The Petitioners have no legal standing to file such petitions because
they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national
shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life.
THIRD ISSUE:
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available.
While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of
any of those exceptions. Petitioners should be faulted for failing to
seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive
before the Secretary of National Defense. If petitioners would still be
dismissed with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the
matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense.
Petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is
not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and
override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. At bar,
President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the
bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. None
is present in this case.
SECOND ISSUE:
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as people,
its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as
the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human
rights law cited by petitioners.
To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the “decent
and the brave” or “hero” would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remain
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
60

The enforcement of the HRVV’s rights under RA 10368 will surely not
be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The assailed act
has no casual connection and legal relation to the law.
THIRD ISSUE:
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not.
They are governed by PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
AFP Regulations G 161-375: Who may be interred
1. Medal of Valor awardee
2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief of AFP
3. Secretary of National Defense
4. Chief of Staff of AFP
5. General or Flag Officers of AFP
6. Active and retired military personnel
7. Government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists and
others as long as approved by the C-i-C, Congress or
Secretary of National Defense
8. Widows of former presidents
Those who are not qualified:
1. Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
2. Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution nor its exercise be limited by
legislature. As the incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the
1992 Agreement between Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte. He is free to amend, revoke
or rescind political agreement entered into by his predecessors, and
to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment
and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his
mandate.
J. Brion (Separate Concurring)
First, judicial review, even under our Court's expanded jurisdiction,
does not empower the Court to directly pass upon allegations
involving violations of statutes:
The Court's direct authority to exercise its expanded jurisdiction is
limited to the determination of the constitutionality of a governmental
act. Grave abuse of discretion arising from mere violations of statutes
cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of its
expanded jurisdiction. The petitioner’s recourse in this situation lies
with other judicial remedies or proceedings, allowed under the Rules
of Court that may arrive in due course at the Court's portals for review
For these statutory violations, recourse may be made before the
courts through an appeal of the administrative body's ruling, or by filing
for a petition for declaratory relief before the lower court with
jurisdiction over the matter. Only when these lower courts have
rendered their decisions should these matters be elevated to this
Court by appeal or certiorari; even then, the issues the petitioners may
present are limited to questions of law, not to questions of fact.
Second, the Constitution's "faithful execution" clause cannot be made
the basis to question the Executive's manner of implementing our
laws:
In the first place, it places the Court in the position to pass upon the
scope and parameters of the vague and not- easily determinable
"faithfulness" standard. Putting the Court in this position (especially
when considered with the Court's expanded jurisdiction) amounts to
placing it in a higher plane from where it can dictate how laws should
be implemented. In fact, it is hard to discern how the Court can apply
a standard for the faithful execution of the laws, without determining
how the law should be implemented in the first place.
Additionally, characterizing the failure to ensure faithful execution of
the laws as a constitutional violation can prove to be an
61
unreasonably restricting interpretation. It could possibly paralyze
executive discretion, and expose the Executive to constant lawsuits
based on acts of grave abuse of discretion he or she allegedly
committed.
Third, the petitioners failed to specify any treaty obligation prohibiting
Marcos' burial at the LNMB;
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of The Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for instance,
does not create new international or domestic legal obligations
Without any specific and legally binding prohibition limiting the
President's actions, no basis exists to nullify his order and to disregard
the presumption of regularity that exists in the performance of his
duties.
While critical of the Marcos regime hardly amount to a prohibition
barring the interment of his remains in a resting place duly reserved
by law for soldiers; former President Marcos indisputably was a soldier
during his lifetime and was one long before the human rights violations
attributed to him took place. To deny him now, despite the law entitling
him to a LNMB resting place, may only lay the petitioners to the charge
that they are now doing to another what they have accused former
President Marcos of doing -denying another of the rule of law.
Fourth, the Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos regime,
should not be interpreted in a way that would prevent reconciliation
and the country's move towards national unity;
Finally, the necessity of Marcos' burial at the LNMB is a political
question that the President has decided, and is not without support
from the Filipino electorate.
Bersamin, J., separate concurring:
1. The interment of the remains of President Marcos in the LMNB is a
matter that exclusively pertains to the discretion of President Duterte
as the Chief Executive.
The character of the LMNB as the resting place for the war dead and
other military personnel under the care and control of the APP has
placed the LMNB under the control of the President. Plainly enough,
the President thereby exercised such control through the APP Chief
of Staff
2. In the context of the LNMB being a military facility, the AFP has
issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 to prescribe guidelines that
enumerate the persons whose remains may be interred therein:
 The exercise by President Duterte of his discretion upon a
matter under his control like the interment of the remains of
President Marcos in the LNMB is beyond review by the Court.
He has not thereby transgressed any legal boundaries.
President Marcos -being a former President of the Philippines,
a Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former
Senator and Senate President, and a former Congressman -
is one of those whose remains are entitled to be interred in the
LNMB under the terms of AFP Regulations G 161-375.
 President Duterte was far from whimsical or arbitrary in his
exercise of discretion. I believe that interment of any remains
in the LNMB is a political question within the exclusive domain
of the Chief Executive
Carpio, J., dissenting:
1. Marcos is disqualified from being interred at the LNMB:
 AFPR G 161-375, which respondents rely on to justify the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, specifically provides that
"personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" are not
qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Marcos, who was
62
 forcibly ousted from the Presidency by the sovereign act of
the Filipino people, falls under this disqualification.
 Marcos was focrcibly ousted from Presidency by the Filipino
People (People Power Revolution) which is the strongest form
of dishonorable discharge
 TAKE NOTE: Respondents argue that because Marcos was
not dishonorably discharged in accordance with the
procedures and guidelines prescribed in Administrative
Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment (Circular
17, dated 2 October 1987, Series of 1987, of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines), Marcos was honorably separated
from service. ( J. Carpio disagree)
 Marcos was separated from service with finality, having been
forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986.
Circular 17, issued more than one year after such separation
from office, cannot be made to apply retroactively to Marcos.
 When Circular 17 was issued, Marcos had already been finally
discharged, terminated, and ousted -as President and
Commander-in-Chief -by the Filipino people. Circular 17
requires certain administrative procedures and guidelines in
the discharge of incumbent or serving military personnel.
There is a physical and legal impossibility to apply to Marcos
Circular 17 since it was issued long after Marcos had been
separated from office.
2. There is no substantial distinction between the military and civilian
personnel, for purposes of interment at the LNMB that would warrant
applying the disqualifications to military personnel and not to civilian
personnel.
 To submit to respondents' view that the disqualifications under
AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military personnel, and that the
President, even as Commander-in-Chief, is not a military
personnel subject to such disqualifications, 10 negates the
purpose for which the LNMB was originally established, which
is to honor Filipino soldiers who fought for freedom and
democracy for our country. Indeed, Marcos is
the very anti-thesis of freedom and democracy because he
was a dictator as declared by this Court.
 Applying only to military personnel the disqualifications will
unduly favor non-military personnel who will always be
eligible, regardless of crimes committed against the State or
humanity, to be interred at the LNMB as long as they are
included in the list of those qualified.
 Under the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are in like
circumstances and conditions must be treated alike both as to
the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case,
as those enumerated in the AFPR G 161-375 are all granted
the privilege of being interred at the LNMB, consequently, the
disqualifications must also be made applicable to all of them
3. Marcos is the "very antithesis of freedom and democracy because
he was a dictator as declared by the Supreme Court."
4. Burying Marcos at the national shrine is also contrary to public
policy, based on Republic Act 10368 or the Human Rights Victims
Reparations Act.
Leonen, J., dissenting:
Based on the Constitution, only the Filipino people "can determine a
President's place in history"
Marcos is not a hero or "an exemplary public officer" because of the
human rights atrocities committed under his regime
The orders to bury him at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violate Republic
Act 289, which created the National Pantheon. Section 1 of the law
says that only those "who have led lives worthy of emulation" can be
buried at the heroes' shrine.
Duterte's order to allow the burial contradicts his oath of office
"because they encourage impunity, which is the result of rewarding
63
the person who presided over human rights violations and who
personally participated in the plunder of public treasury."
The government failed to show factual basis to prove that Marcos'
burial would not violate RA 289 in relation to the findings of the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). The NHCP
earlier released a study disputing the claims that Marcos was a soldier
and war veteran.
Serreno, C.J., dissenting:
1. The court has the authority to resolve this controversy under the
expanded concept of judicial review in the 1987 Constitution.
 With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no
longer utilize the traditional political question doctrine to
impede the power of judicial review.
 In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has
decided issues that were traditionally considered political
questions.
 The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an
election renders the matter non-justiciable.
2. The president acted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation
of his duty to faithfully execute the laws when he ordered the burial of
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
 Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy tocondemn
the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively
prohibits the incumbent President from honoring him through
a burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
 The AFP does not have the power to determine which
persons are qualified for interment in the Libingan.
 The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the
President's residual powers; it is not unfettered, and such
power can only be exercised in conformity with the entire
Constitution.
3. To allow Marcos to be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani would
violate international human rights law ad an independent source of
state obligations, and would negate the remedies provided by
Republic Act 10368.
 Under international law, the Philippines is obligated toprovide
effective remedies, including holistic reparations, to human
rights victims.
 The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to
provide reparations to victims of human rights violations
during the Marcos regime.
 The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to
combat impunity.
4. Public funds and property cannot be used for the burial as it
serves no legitimate public purpose.
 The burial would contravene the purpose of the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
 Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve
the avowed policy of national unity and healing.
 The burial would promote only the private interest of the
Marcos family
Caguioa, J., dissenting:
The burial of former President Marcos does not raise a political
question beyond the ambit of judicial review.
For the same reasons that the interment serves no legitimate public
purpose, no use of public property or public funds can be made to
support it.
The President may validly order the interment of former President
Marcos in the LNMB pursuant to his power of control and his duty to
faithfully execute laws, provided that no contravention of the
Constitution, laws, executive issuances, public policy, customs and
international obligations arises therefrom or is committed.
The Solicitor General failed to show any contingency for the valid
exercise of the President's residual powers, and likewise failed to
64
demonstrate sufficient factual basis to justify the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB.
The interment of former President Marcos constitutes a violation of the
physical, historical and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
and the Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 220598
19 July 2016
Bersamin, J.
(Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); PCSO Budgets
and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and
Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriate; PCSO Chairman of the Board of
Directors Sergio O. Valencia; and Members of the PCSO Board of
Directors, etc. with plunder.
They were able to unlawfully acquire a total amount of
P365,997,915.00. They were able to amass this amount by:
 Diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget
of PCSO to its Confidential/ Intelligence Fund
 Raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in
several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts.
 Taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influences to unjustly enrich
themselves.
Several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for
bail. On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for
bail of Valenica, Morato, and Roquero upon finding that the evidence
of guilt is not so strong against them. However, in the case of
petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on
the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. Motion
for reconsideration was denied. GMA assailed the denial of her
petition for bail, which is unresolved to date.
Funds were withdrawn by several members of the board from the CIF
and were approved by President GMA in several occasions each with
different amounts. GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero
and Villar separatelyled their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to
evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the
charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of
the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any
PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by
conveying and transferring into their possession and control any
money or funds from PCSO account. However, the Sandiganbayan
denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there
was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit
plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case
of malversation against Valencia, pertinently saying: Demurrer to
evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.
The party demurring challenges, the sufficiency of the whole evidence
to sustain a verdict. The court then ascertains whether there is a
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support
a verdict of guilt. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence
must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree
of participation therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD
743,312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
Hence, these consolidated petitions of certiorari brought to assail and
annul the resolutions April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015,
65
whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to
evidence, and their motions for reconsideration, asserting such
denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Procedural Issue:
(1) Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence. (Yes)
Substantive Issues:
(1) Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
(2) Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements
of the crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00?
(No)
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to correct grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for
certiorari because the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The special civil action for
certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion
for leave of court to le demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not
an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order
that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in
case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and
assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue
should not be limited.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other
courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII. The exercise of this
power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary
or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the
Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse
of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence
of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this
jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to
commit a crime. As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law
considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is
exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit
treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat,
rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit
sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to
commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the
crime among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal design
must be alleged and competently shown. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her
having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional
66
CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act
of plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to
plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its
conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information
did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her
handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely
unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid
practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , the Court recognized two nuances of
appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel
conspiracy and the chain conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs
when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually
with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the
event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a
single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple
conspiracies. The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of
Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any
design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate
and acquire ill -gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the
information to that effect, and competent proof
thereon, GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests, even if unqualified,
could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder
or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any means
irregular or illegal. The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine
of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers
to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for
incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and
signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not release any
money because there was then no budget available for the additional
CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount
to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
(2a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict the petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution
established all the elements of plunder. After a review of the records,
we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against
the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State
must allege and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in
connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts:
a. through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
b. by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
67
 share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer;
c. by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
d. by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
e. by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
f. by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill- gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that
either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was
also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the
PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(2b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury,
the key is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis,
by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may
be made by considering the company of the words in which the word
or phrase is found or with which it is associated.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;"
and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The
common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public
officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public
treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use
of the property taken, the
68
phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the
property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use
the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money
went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally bene
ted from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate
act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
JUDGES
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 177721
3 July 2007
Azcuna, J.
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Gregory S. Ong was appointed as associate justice of the Supreme
Court by the Executive Secretary. However, Petitioner, contested this
appointment by saying that Ong is not a Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines that he is a Chinese citizen, and that his own birth
certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship, thus he is not qualified to
be a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioners cited Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which provided that "No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines."
On the other hand, Respondent contended that Ong was appointed
from a list of candidates given by the JBC and that Respondent has
referred back to the JBC to determine the issue of Ong’s citizenship.
They cited SEC. 9 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, “The
Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation”.
Ong maintains that he is a natural born citizen, following a series of
changes of nationalities with respect to his ancestors which ended with
his mother being a Filipino citizen at birth and his father eventually
becoming naturalized along with him and his siblings. He also
maintained that the petitioners have no standing to file their claim.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the Petitioners have standing. (Yes)
(2) W/N Ong is a natural-born Filipino. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost
importance, the qualification and the citizenship of a person to be
appointed as a member of the Supreme Court.
SECOND ISSUE:
Ong is only a naturalized Filipino citizen. The court took judicial notice
of Ong’s petition to take the Bar. In the petition he alleged that that he
is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino
citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father was a
naturalized Filipino citizen thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As
part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the
naturalization papers of his father. It was on the basis of these
allegations under oath and the submitted evidence that the Court
allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from
the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
69
However, according to the case of Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, no
substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial change. Thus the factual assertions
detailing the events and changes of Ong’s ancestors would have to be
proven in a proper action, especially the fact that Respondent Ong’s
mother was a Filipino citizen contrary to what still appears in the
records of the court. Until this fact is proven, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
8 August 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.
(Role and Standards: Independence)
FACTS:
The case stemmed from four (4) articles that appeared in the
“Business Circuit” column of Amado Macasaet in the Malaya, a
newspaper of general circulation. The articles contained statements
and innuendos about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme
Court, which came out in 4 issues of the newspaper on September 18,
19, 20 and 21, 2007.
September 18, 2007 Article:
 Talked about a lady Justice (did not confirm whether from the SC
or the CA) who did not report for a day the week prior to the article.
 Stated that the Justice’s secretary received a gift-wrapped box
the size of two-dozen milk cans.
 As she thought the contents were perishable, the secretary
opened the box and indeed it was full of cash estimated at P10M.
 Said secretary informed the Justice. For doing so, the Justice
fired her.
 The writer criticized how the “bribe-giver” should have made sure
that the recipient was at least in the office or that he/she should
have delivered the cash instead to the recipient’s home.
 Also criticized how the justice system is dirty.
 The identity of the Justice was not disclosed to the writer of the
article.
September 19, 2007 Article:
 Revealed that the bribe money was given by a Fil-Chinese
businessman who has been criminally charged.
 That the said bribe-giver was acquitted as the lady Justice
subject of the previous article was the ponente of the case.
 That apparently, the secretary who was fired made five trips tothe
guard house to pick up the boxes. The writer of the article now
corrected his previous statement that there was only 1 box.
 Dropped that the name of the justice’s secretary is Cecilia.
September 20, 2007 Article:
 Called for Cecilia to reveal the truth as to the bribery – “to save
the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.”
September 21, 2007 Article:
 The writer now corrected his previous statement as to the time of
the occurrence of the event – The secretary was fired in March
2007, not the week prior to the first article.
 Also disclosed the identity of the Justice’s secretary – Cecilia
Munoz-Delis.
 The writer also declared that the whereabouts of the said
secretary is unknown and that the Supreme Court should
investigate such case.
Since the first article was published, the attention of Assistant Court
Administrator was already caught. As the information was still vague
as to which court was being referred to, he opted to just note the
article. Cecila Munoz-Delis apparently was part of the staff of Justice
Ynares-Santiago, but as Judicial Staff Officer, not Secretary, as
respondent Macasaet wrote.
70

An online article was likewise published in Newsbreak containing the
same allegations against Justice Ynares-Santiago. Justice Ynares-
Santiago requested the Chief Justice to have the articles included in
the agenda of the Court En Banc.
The Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution ordering Amado
Macasaet to explain why he should not be cited in Contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Macasaet’s explanations
were included in the case records and an Investigation Committee was
formed.
The Investigating Committee found that the articles were groundless
and were declared to be hearsay, and so concluded that there are
sufficient grounds to cite respondent Macasaet for indirect contempt
as his articles tend to indirectly impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice. Respondent Macasaet poses that citing him
in contempt for his published articles would be tantamount to violating
the right to freedom of the press. Respondent Macasaet likewise
claims that his right to due process has been violated as no formal
charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3, Rule
71 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the articles writing and publishing by the
respondent are to be considered as valid exercise of the rights to
freedom of expression (which includes freedom of the press).
(NO).
(2) Whether or not the failure to file a formal charge against
respondent as required by Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
is a violation of his right to due process. (NO).
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Macasaet’s diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the
administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting
respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate the avowal of the
highest Court of the land. Nowhere in his columns can there be found
a single word of respect for the Court on the integrity and honor of the
Court.
To allow respondent to use freedom of the press as an excuse to
damage the Court would be to make a mockery of such liberty. Without
bases for his publications (he admitted that the articles were products
of his conclusions), he has committed acts that degrade and impede
the orderly administration of justice.
SECOND ISSUE:
Under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated by the Court on its own volition. In the dissenting
opinion of Justice Carpio, he mentioned that the proceedings of the
Investigating Committee were fatally defective for patent denial of due
process because when the witnesses of the Committee testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the
witnesses, denying Macasaet of such right. This is not the case based
on 3 reasons:
o First, that the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to
be regular. The burden to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet.
o Second, assuming that Macasaet was not able to cross- examine
his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due
process of law was violated.
 The right of the accused to cross-examine the witness
against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional
right to meet “face-to-face,” can be waived if not
asserted timely.
o Third, the Court cannot invoke the right to cross-examine on
behalf of Macasaet. Otherwise, the Court would be acting as his
counsel, which is absurd.
Criticism at every level of Government is certainly welcome – as it is
part of the checks and balances in our republican system of
government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an
integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its
constitutionally-mandated duties.
71

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
31 March 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(Role and Standards: Integrity)
FACTS:
In 1995, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation by the Supreme Court Clinic
Services (SC Clinic) revealed "evidence of ego disintegration" and
"developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew
his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self- esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998
reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background the Judicial Bar
Council (JBC) allowed him to get a second opinion from a private
practitioner. The second opinion appeared, hence, Atty. Floro’s
appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73,
Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
An audit was conducted on Judge Floro’s sala, which the audit team
reported the following to the OCA:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court
during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of
Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that
he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which
he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct
when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to perform the duties and functions
of a judge. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The court held that Judge Floro is unfit to perform the duties and
functions of a judge.
72

The court, however, would like to point out that among the 13 charges
against the respondent judge, the court has not found him guilty of
gross misconduct or acts of corruption. But nonetheless, the findings
of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case
indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
For charge “a”: the court found him guilty of simple misconduct in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition.
For charge “b”: the court found nothing improper in having allowing
another person to rest in his chambers for short periods of time during
office hours.
For charges “c” and “g”: the court three fundamental errors in Judge
Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor
thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release.
Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on
recognizance was not reduced into writing.
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his
failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
For charge “d”: the court found respondent guilty of unbecoming
conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt,
necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge
whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only
be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well.
For charges “h” and “j”: The court pointed out that it was well within
the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus
ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an
amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty under
paragraph "j" of the complaint.
Regarding the charge in “h” that Judge Floro used his moral
ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385- MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil
aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis.
For charge “i”: the court found that it was within the powers of Judge
Floro to order the assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial.
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an
accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it
is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by
reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention
until his faculties are recovered.
For charges “e” and “f”: “private practice" is more than an isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one’s self to the public as a lawyer. In this case, the court found that
Judge Floro did not file other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases, except for a
“Motion for Entry of Judgment”. Hence, Judge Floro’s act of filing the
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in
any wise constitute private practice of law.
73

As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge
Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without
filing for leave of absence.
For charges “k” and “l”: the court stated that although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said,
nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior
as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go
his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules
of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming
conduct.
For charge “m”: Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of
Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the
course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Circular No. 13 does not define or punish an offense. It is merely a
guideline to be followed in administering justice.
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118882
26 September 1996
Melo, J.
(Role and Standards: Impartiality)
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review with urgent
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
31733 in so far as it denied People’s prayer for the inhibition of Judge
Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, and
enjoining the judge from conducting further proceedings in such
criminal cases, before the Supreme Court.
On 3 April 1995, the Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and
Roger Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to
comment within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro S. Espina from
taking further action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until
further orders from the Court.
Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and Go failed to file their respective
comments within the reglementary period, nor within the second
deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that sanction
relating to delay in the submission of the comments may not amount
to much, and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases
93-01-38 and 93-01 -39, the Court resolved to dispense with the
latter's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to render the Judge to be
partial or bias in the present criminal case. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. Due process is intended to insure confidence
in the judiciary by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play.
There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. The Judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Herein, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered
74
to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to
fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and
the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action 92-
11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the principal
accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's
decision in favor of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis
for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. It would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September
26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
23 September 2014
Villarama, J.
(Role and Standards: Propriety)
FACTS:
In the course of the investigations conducted by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee with regard to the PDAF scams, certain names of
government officials where mentioned by “whistle-blowers” who were
former employees of Napoles. One of the officials mentioned was
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong, the respondent in this
case. The whistle blowers were Benhur Luy, a cousin of Napoles who
worked for her for several years, Marina Sula, an employee of
Napoles, and Aries Rufo, a reporter from Rappler. The SC ordered an
investigation to be conducted by Justice Sandoval Gutierrez regarding
the possible transgressions committed by Respondent.
It was found by the investigation that, two criminal cases were filed
with the Sandiganbayan in 20001 for Falsification of Public documents
and AntiGraft Law against officers of the military and
civilian employees including Napoles. These cases were referred to
as Kevlar cases since the subject matter were Kevlar helmets
supposedly for the military purchased from companies owned by
Napoles. Napoles was acquitted in the Kevlar cases since she was
found by the court not one of the dealers/suppliers in the transaction
in question.
Benhur Testimony
During the investigation, Benhur Luy testified that Napoles mentioned
to him the Kevlar case and that she had a “connect” in the
Sandiganbayan. When asked who the connect was, Benhur said that
it was Respondent. He further testified that Napoles told him that she
“fixed” the case because of her connect in the Sandiganbayan. Probed
further as to the meaning of “fixed”, Benhur testified that PHP100
million pesos was listed as an expense in the ledger of the company
owned by Napoles and that such were given to different people during
the pendency of the case and that she also gave money to respondent
but the amount was not mentioned to Benhur. Further, Benhur testified
that respondent went to the office of Napoles twice in Ortigas and
gave a check to Napoles amounting
25.5 million to be placed as a loan to the AFPSLAI and which would
receive a very high interest rate and that respondent received 11
checks in return each amounting to PHP 282K as advanced interest
earned from the loan of his money to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association (AFPSLAI)
which Napoles had a personal account paying 13% interest annually.
Sula Testimony
Sula, the long- time employee, corroborated the testimony of Benhur,
by stating that Napoles told her and other employees that she has a
contact with the Sandiganbayan which was Respondent and that they
should not be worried in case a suit was filed against Napoles
regarding the PDAF funds. She also testified that Napoles told them
that Justice Ong will help Napoles in the Kevlar case.
75
Rufo, the Rappler reporter, procured a picture showing Respondent
beside Napoles and Jinggoy Estrada and he testified that when he
saw the picture, he knew that Respondent was one of the members of
the division that handled the Kevlar case and that he knew that the
Justice should not be seen or be going to a party with Napoles who
was a party in a case under his Division.
Respondent in his defense denied all the imputations against him. He
asserted that he did not meet Napoles during the pendency of the
Kevlar case, that the Kevlar case was denied based on the merits of
the case, and that the testimonies had no evident proof of what was
asserted. Respondent alleges that the picture was taken at the
birthday party of Jinggoy Estrada in 2012 and that Respondent and
Napoles talked about the Black Nazarene and that Napoles arranged
for the Black Nazarene robe to be put over respondent as he was
suffering from cancer. Then, the arrangement was indeed fulfilled and
that he thanked Napoles for such an opportunity and personally went
to her office twice to thank her.
The investigating Justice, Sandoval -Gutierrez found credence in the
testimonies of Benhur and Sala and that the picture showed
respondent’s disregard of the dictum of propriety essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
ISSUE/S:
WON respondent can be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and impropriety. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
The SC adopted the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice.
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the
Kevlar case
2. Respondent fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money form
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the Kevlar case
4. Respondent visited Napoles where he received 11 checks
amounting to PHP 282k each as advanced interest
5. Respondent attended Napoles’ parties and was photographed
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and
corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal in the said case. He is also charged for dishonesty
for failing to disclose with Chief Justice Serreno that he had actually
visited Napoles in her office as he denied having attended any social
event hosted by her.
In administrative proceedings like this one, the amount of evidence
needed is only of substantial evidence, that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act or
bribery committed by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case. The testimonies establish that Napoles had been in
contact with Respondent during the pendency of the Kevlar case.
Napoles revealed to the witnesses that she has a contact with the
Sandiganbayan and that person will help her “fix” the case. The
revelation was further confirmed when she was acquitted in 2010 and
that Respondent was seen visiting her office in 2012. Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez rejected the claim of Respondent that he went
twice to the office of Napoles was merely to say thank you for the Black
Nazarene robe. Justice believed that the meeting was because of the
financial transaction between the two parties with regard to the money
loaned to the AFPSLAI. This financial transaction is supported by the
testimony of Benhur that 100M pesos were used to “fix” the Kevlar
case.
76
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on
two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4
(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on
June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Previous cases have enjoined judges to avoid association or
socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. It
does not mean that judges should live in retirement or seclusion, it but
advised that they be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that the relations or friendship
constitute an element in determining his judicial course.
In the report of Justice Sandoval- Gutierrez the testimonies of the
witnesses were more plausible and believable and corroborate each
other compared to the denials and excuses of Respondent. It is a
settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally
given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
Thus the SC concurred with Justice Sandoval- Gutierrez's
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagreed with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about
his association with Napoles.
Respondent’s conduct of visiting the office and being in social events
with Napoles gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and
undermined the integrity of the courts of justice.
The SC also found that Respondent was guilty of dishonesty for not
being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative
complaint was filed against him in violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The SC found respondent guilty of a serious charge and adjudged him
a penalty of dismissal form service and forfeiture of all benefits.
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
23 April 2010
Per Curiam
(Role and Standards: Competence and Diligence)
Notes by Digest Author: This is a long case since it is composed of
numerous cases, all targeted at respondent judge Arcaya-Chua,
and 1 case at her and her accomplice.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases stemmed from the administrative
complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
Francisco P. Ocampo (Ocampo) charged respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of
the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo (Milan), filed a petition claiming
the sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P.
Ocampo (Francesca), and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima).
77
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge
issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their
daughters outside the country without the court's permission and
directing him to allow, Milan visitation rights over their daughters in
their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered
voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Ocampo then served interrogatories
to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.
In an Order, respondent Judge denied the MTD. Ocampo questioned
the dismissal of his MTD since Milan never presented any evidence to
controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to
dismiss. Ocampo thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration (MR),
which was likewise denied by respondent Judge.
Respondent judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),
requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence (1211
West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City), to refrain
from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and
create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their
minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of
P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of
expenses for medication and education.
Ocampo faulted the judge in issuing the TPO since the former’s period
to file an answer hasn’t expired yet. Moreover, he was directed to give
financial support to his wife and 2 daughters even if the wife herself
alleged that the kids were not his and without considering his financial
resources/capacity. Ocampo further stated that the judge, in issuing
the TPO, did not take into account the wife’s infidelity. Ocampo also
stated that the sheriff responsible for the TPO’s implementation, was
disrespectful and insensitive. It was
a Maundy Thursday, when the sheriff arrived in Ocampo’s house,
woke everyone up while they slept and demanded that Ocampo pay
the P50k amount for support right then and there.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang/RCBC” Case
In this case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the
Chief Justice in a Memorandum of the reports about the rampant
selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua.
These reports were confirmed by judges Winlove M. Dumayas,
Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind
Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373,
entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child
custody case.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent judge issued a TPO,
granting among others the custody of the subject minor Rafi Pulliam
(Rafi), to therein petitioner Albert Chang Tan (Albert), and
prohibiting Stephanie Pulliam (Stephanie) to stay away from the home
and office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of Rafi. As per the
sheriff’s return, said TPO was not properly implemented insofar as
Rafi’s custody was concerned. This irked Albert which led to a heated
argument between him and the OIC of Branch 144. On the same day,
respondent judge issued an Order authorizing the sheriff to enter the
premises where Rafi may be found for the purpose of turning over
custody to Albert.
According to the OCA, although it was not shown that respondent
judge received money from Albert in exchange for TPO’s issuance,
the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing said TPO. The
OCA also stated that this was not the only case where the judge
displayed unusual interest. The judge also displayed the same
unusual interest in another case, RCBC v. Moreno, where she ordered
a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According
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the OCA, what was highly suspicious was the judge’s actuation where
there was no real urgency in the application of said writ.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141: The “Judicial Audit” Case
A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC
Makati Branch 144, which is the sala of respondent judge, following
reports of alleged irregularities committed by her. In a memorandum
by the OCA to CJ Reynato Puno, the Court Administrator Christopher
Lock submitted the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing
the Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in respondent
judge’s sala.
This initial report stated that as early as May 12, 2007 (Saturday), the
Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards
thereat on a 24 -hour basis. The members of the audit team made it
clear to OIC Victoria Jamora and court personnel that actions on the
records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no
records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
On May 17, guards Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap noticed
Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic
bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a
trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was
surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain copies of
marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua
numbering to hundreds.
When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents
upon respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could
not offer any explanation why he chose to dispose of the documents
that morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed
that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where
the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office.
The other bags when retrieved, contained more copies of marriage
certificates.
In this case, respondent judge was charged in connection with the
1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized
from January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly
ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., to dispose of the said copies of marriage
certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of 1,809
marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office
of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati
City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of
P542,700.00 at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos P300.00 per
marriage; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly
Report of Cases.
A.M. No, RTJ-07-2093
Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge
Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty.
Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband, alleged that in
the first week of September 2002, she asked respondents help
regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the
Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of
the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee
of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections
with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which
she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution
of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave
respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s chamber. When
complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told
her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10
million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the
P100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.
The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to
Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
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During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007,
complainant manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her
complaint against respondent. In a Verified Manifestation,
complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and
respondent had a long and serious discussion about the dispute and
bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it
dawned on complainant that her accusation against respondent was
brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension
of facts concerning the incident subject of the present administrative
case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in their family,
the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly
relations with each other; and that in view of the foregoing,
complainant was no longer interested in pursuing her administrative
case against respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of the charges
against her.
HELD/RATIO:
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
The investigating Justice in this case was Justice Salazar-Fernando
(JSF, for brevity). Regarding the denial of the MTD, JSF believed that
respondent judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion
vested upon her as a judge. Assuming the same was erroneous, no
administrative liability could attach to the judge in the absence of
sufficient evidence that she ruled in a corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent or
malicious manner.
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing,
JSF found respondent judge’s explanation acceptable. The order
setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on
December 8, 2006, and there was an interim of at least five days from
the issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled
hearing. It did not appear that respondent Judge had any hand in the
belated service of the notice to the complainant. JSF held that
respondent judge could not be faulted as to the alleged
suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO
requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-
doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed
to respondent Judge. The actions of respondent judge is in accord with
Sec. 15 of RA 9262: “ x x x The court shall order the immediate
personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. x x x x”. Hence, the issuance of said TPO was neither
irregular nor improper.
As to the complaint by Ocampo on the insensitive implementation of
the TPO on a Maundy Thursday, JSF found nothing improper or
wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case.
There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the
issuance of the TPO during Holy Week, as it was Ocampo's counsel
himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date.
Considering the urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper
or illegal that respondent Judge caused its immediate implementation.
JSF also believed that respondent Judge could not have been privy to
the brazen manner in which the TPO was served by the designated
sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco, who was administratively charged by
Ocampo for the allegedly offensive manner the TPO was served. As
correctly argued by respondent Judge, such was the personal
accountability of Sheriff Tangangco only.
Lastly, JSF found that campo's allegation of bribery against
respondent Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by
JSF on October 24, 2007, Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal
knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
JSF recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07- 2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case) should be dismissed. JSF stated that in the absence
80
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts
are erroneous.
Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang Tan/RCBC” Case
JSF stated that the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by
respondent Judge could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262,
because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a
woman. The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on
that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to
"women and their children," not to men. Under R.A. No. 9262, a
TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife.
Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, JSF found
respondent Judge’s error in this regard to be gross ignorance of the
law.
With respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
respondent Judge’s reasons for granting custody over Rafi to Albert
Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the
evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor
of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie
determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and
would serve her paramount interest. JSF found nothing improper in
respondent Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of
Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the
subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie
has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the
latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the
ideal person to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise,
respondent Judge’s award of temporary custody to the father could be
justified.
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent
Judge allegedly displayed in the said case, JSF found no substantial
evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself
admitted that there was no proof that respondent
Judge received money from Albert. Moreover, not one of the
witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the alleged
heated argument between Albert Chang Tan and the OIC of
respondent judge’s sala except only for secondhand accounts that
they heard that such incident actually transpired. JSF stated that
respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual
participation in that incident, because the "heated argument" was
allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria Jamora.
As regards respondent Judge’s issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in the RCBC Case, JSF found no evidence against
respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case.
Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding
her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the
manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the writ.
JSF was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed
speedily issued, the ex parte hearing on the application having been
held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on
the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing
impossible or irregular in such feat. Per respondent’s account, she had
been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and
she did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose
of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering
respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before
her court, JSF found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance
to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. JSF also
found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment to be apt.
JSF held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by
any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge
is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties.
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case Re: Marriage Certificates and
Monthly Reports
81
JSF found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in
respondent Judge’s solemnization of marriages in her court and failure
to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports. JSF
stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage
certificates, which were said to have been contained in four
(4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the
time the judicial audit was being conducted.
Respondent Judge admitted the fact that she ordered Indicio, her
utility worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic
bags. However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that
she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of
May, days before the judicial audit.
JSF stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose
of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why
such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic
bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could
tarry for several days. The logical implication is that the order to
dispose could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely
later when the judicial audit was already being conducted.
JSF also did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why
the plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the
stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage
which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge
theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff,
who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to
borrow money from her, could have been responsible in transferring
the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her
chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was
padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the
impending administrative investigation on her. Hence, to expose the
big number of weddings she had been
solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s machinations had
not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out
the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her
chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's room, so that
once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the
corridor, the documents would be discovered by the audit team.
JSF did not believe the reasons of respondent judge. According to
JSF, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much
cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the
acts being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big
number of weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have
to go the difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he
would have to do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had
been wont to do, per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.
As regards to the non-payment marriage solemnization fees and the
certifications issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of
Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge, only 166 marriages were paid
the corresponding solemnization fees. JSF was convinced and found
no reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of said certifications, the
contents of which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila
Ticman, the same persons who personally verified from their records
whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge were paid.
JSF disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge that the anomaly
attributed to her was the work of Umipig. JSF found it incredible that
since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three
years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme.
In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, JSF
found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her
82
signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to
the correct number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge.
Jamoras’ justification that “she could not have questioned respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua” even if there were erroneous entries in the
monthly reports is in itself pregnant with admission that
something anomalous could have indeed been taking place.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Justice Buzon, the investigating justice in this case, recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence
upon which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the
withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to
prove the allegations in her Complaint.
The Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed
the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in
the same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded
verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent. The Court
then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a
more severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a
repetition of the same offense.
FINALLY, the Supreme Court’s Ruling:
The SC agrees with the findings of JSF, the investigating justice.
Settled is that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable
doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the solemnization of Marriage case), there
is substantial evidence that respondent Judge did not report in
her Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she solemnized
during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were
paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were
solemnized by her. The monthly reports of cases on record showed
that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of
marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates
that were seized from her office. Various court personnel testified that
there were indeed numerous marriages solemnized by respondent
judge, but only few had their payments/fees properly remitted to the
court. In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot
shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he
forged her signature in the Monthly Reports.
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of
Branch 144 from July 2005 to April 2007. It is incredible that Victoria
Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings
solemnized by respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007,
which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated marriage
certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said
period that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the
Investigating Justice JSF, correctly stated that she knew that the
figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect, but she
condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she
was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of JSF in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that
respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of
gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court
upholds the finding of JSF that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of
petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A.
No. 9292.
83
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court
sustains the recommendation of JSF that the case be dismissed in
the absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua is liable for the charge of harassment, grave abuse of authority,
gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita
Muoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during the
proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims
against her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the
present case. The Court is not persuaded.
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00,
and her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to
prove the administrative liability of respondent.
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the
findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be
based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, while
disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based
on the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Section
8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
o Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or; A fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished with
dismissal for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that
respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141 (The Judicial Audit Case).
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Chang/RCBC case)
and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judges motion
for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
To Conclude the Supreme Court’s Rulings:
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn
S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144
is DISMISSED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from
office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits.
84
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge
Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of
SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without salary
and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is
found GUILTY of grave misconduct and punished
with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality.
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code
(Liabilities of a Judge: Civil Liability)
Article 27
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant
or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that
may be taken.
Article 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) Right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
(7) Right to just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) Right to equal protection of the laws;
(9) Right to be secure in one’s, person, house, paper and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) Liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) Privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) Right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) Right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances;
(14) Right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) Right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) Right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witness face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance
with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
85
 and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution,
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code
(Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability)
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence.
Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to
him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary
special disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutor order.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order
or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or
decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
Santiago III v. Enriquez
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J
13 February 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability)
FACTS:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon
City a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate
of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and
Blas Fajardo.
Quezon City RTC granted the petition. The Republic of the to the Court
of Appeals and was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison.
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report
however the respondent expressed his dissent to the Report
Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested
Justice Gonzales-Sison to take a second look at respondents
Dissenting Opinion, as the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are
strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality.
Respondent requested the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals
to designate two associate justices to complete the composition of a
Special Division of five. The Raffle Committee designated Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Lucas P. Bersaminas additional members of the
Special Division.
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondents
Dissenting Opinion. Justice Bersamin expressed his concurrence with
the Report of Justice Gonzales-Sison, while Justice Cruz expressed
his concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of
the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-
Sison with which Justice Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting
Opinion.
86

The Decision of the Special Division reversed the decision of the
Quezon City RTC.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges that Associate Justice
Enriquez deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to
grant the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant. For this
reason, this administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against
respondent.
Respondent contends that the administrative complaint was filed
prematurely considering that complainants motion for reconsideration
of the Decision was pending.
Respondent also contends that the administrative complaint is not the
proper forum for the determination of whether the Decision is
erroneous or contrary to law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Associate Justice Enriquez is Guilty of ignorance
of the law or gross incompetence. (NO)
(2) Whether or not Filing of charges against a single member of
a division of the appellate court is appropriate. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices
of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.To
hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice could be infallible in his judgment.
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in support of
the Decision, since there is no showing that the Decision is tainted with
fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or
order to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative
complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition
for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud,
malice, or dishonesty.
In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, it is a general principle
of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free
to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the
integrity and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of
universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from
the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a
court.
SECOND ISSUE:
According to Bautista v. Abdulwahid:
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004
was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual
capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is inappropriate.
87

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
22 November 2016
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Discipline of Members of the
Bench)
FACTS:
1st complaint:
CJ Corono issued A.O. No. 19-2011 assigning night courts in the city
of Pasay and Manila. Judge Yu was assigned to be the judge every
Friday to which she opposed and sent multiple letters demanding the
establishment of night courts be abolished for lack of research,
compensation, security, and its alleged illegality due to the violation of
the Rules on Summary Procedure.
OCA submitted a memorandum recommending the Judge Yu’s
insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct be docketed as an administrative complaint against
her.
Judge Yu argued that there was no insubordination because she was
merely expressing her opinion to the matter and that she has a
constitutional right to freedom of speech.
2nd complaint:
Lopez’ appointment
Judge Yu requested for the position of Clerk of Court III in her sala to
be filled. There were three applicants, Serrano, Lopez, and Bernardo.
Judge Yu wanted Bernardo to be her clerk but the Selection and
Promotion board assigned Lopez to be the clerk. Judge Yu still
requested for Bernardo to be temporarily assigned and she claims that
Lopez is not qualified because Lopez does not have the needed
indorsement from the court where she will be assigned.
Still, Lopez was eventually appointed Clerk of Court III. Because of
this, Judge Yu filed her formal protest to the Supreme Court, but the
court dismissed the case.
Lagman’s appointment
Judge Yu filed a complaint against Lagman, the legal researcher of
MTC-Pasay branch 47, for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation
of judicial functions and dishonesty.
Lagman requested to be transferred to another court pending the
hearing of her case. Later on, Lagman was appointed as the Clerk III
of RTC-Pasay branch 108.
Lagman’s appointment was assailed by Judge Yu claiming that it was
a “fast appointment”, hence, Judge Yu threatened to file formal
charges against the members of the OCA-SPBLC.
The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing Judge Yu’s conduct.
The court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she
should not be disciplined for her actions.
Judge Yu claims that she was merely expressing herself and that her
letters are privileged communication and could not be used against
her, pursuant to her constitutional right against self-incrimination.
3rd complaint:
4 MeTC judges and 70 MeTC personnel filed 2 affidavit- complaints
accusing Judge Yu with: (1) gross insubordination; (2) refusal to
perform official duty; (3) gross ignorance of the law or procedure; (4)
serious and grave misconduct constituting violations of Canon 3,
Rules 3.0 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to Canon
6 of The New Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary;
Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and
Sections 1 and 2, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (5)
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars; (6) violation
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (7) violation of
the Lawyer's Oath and her oath of
88
office as judge; (8) oppressive conduct; and (9) violation of Article
231 of the Revised Penal Code
1) The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct
of Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers
of the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances,
and her manner of disposing cases.
2) Judge Yu issued a show cause order against the judges and
personnel, requiring them to explain why they should not be cited
in contempt for using court documents as attachments in their
complaint.
4th complaint:
Judge Emily San Gaspar filed a complaint against Judge Yu for
sending her lewd messaged on facebook and her yahoo account. In
their correspondence, Judge Yu kept on referring to a MEAL STUB
and that it entailed to a “69” meal. A few months later, Judge Yu
discovered that the meal stub message she received from Judge
Emily was just a facebook scam. Judge Yu then apologized and
requested that her emails and messages be deleted. Judge Emily then
deactivated her account, to which Judge Yu was relieved. When
Judge Emily reactivated her account, Judge Yu was alarmed by her
reactivation and kept messaging Judge Emily about her previous
emails. Judge Emily finally filed the complaint when she discovered
that Judge Yu created a fake facebook account of Judge Emily and
when Judge Yu messaged Judge Emily’s bestfriend.
The OCA recommended for the court to find Judge Yu guilty of
GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW, REFUSAL TO PERFORM OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, GROSS
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
OPPRESSION, and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, and
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any Public office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The OCA agreed with the recommendation and findings of Justice
Abdulwahid to consider Judge Yu's actuations towards Judge San
Gaspar- Gito as conduct unbecoming of a judge, but clarified that
Judge Yu's use of the official letterhead of her court in summoning the
brother of Judge San Gaspar-Gito to a conference demonstrated her
abuse of power, and constituted a violation of Section 8, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her.
Non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
The court ruled that Judge Yu resisted the implementation of A.O. No.
19-2011 because of her unresolved protest against the issuance. Her
unresolved protest was not a sufficient justification for her to resist the
implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011. She was quite aware that A.O.
No. 19-2011 was issued pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers to the Court the power of administrative
supervision over all courts, and was for that reason an issuance to be
immediately implemented and unquestioningly obeyed by the affected
Judges.
According to Himalin v. Balderian, the refusal of a Judge to comply
with any resolution or directive of the Court constituted insubordination
and gross misconduct, viz.:
A judge who deliberately and continuously failed and refused to
comply with a resolution of this Court was held guilty of gross
misconduct and insubordination, the Supreme Court being the agency
exclusively vested by our Constitution with administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. The Court
can hardly discharge such constitutional mandate of overseeing
judges and court personnel and taking proper
89
administrative sanction against them if the judge or personnel
concerned does not even recognize its administrative authority.
Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnels The
court ruled that Judge Yu’s opposition was unwarranted.
First, the Selection and Promotion Board explained to Judge Yu the
selection process that had resulted in the appointment of Ms. Lopez.
She could not impose her recommendee on the SPB which was
legally mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its
assessment of the applicants based on performance, eligibility,
education and training, experience and outstanding
accomplishments, psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and
potentials.
Also, Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just
as unwarranted.
Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, a pending administrative complaint shall
not disqualify an employee from promotion.
Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court
personnel
The court said that respondent Judge Yu acted as if she was the
investigating authority instead of being the respondent. She took
undue advantage of her position as a judge and used the judicial
process for her own benefit. Such action clearly depicts an abusive
character which has no place in the judiciary.
By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for
contempt of court, Judge Yu wielded a power that she did not hold.
Hence, she was guilty of gross misconduct.
Sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of
a judicial officer
Judge Yu denied sending the messages to Judge San Gaspar -Gito,
and countered that it was the latter who first sent the "meal stub"
message. She maintained that the messages were confidential and
inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Judge Yu's reliance on the exclusionary rule fails.
The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents of the
Govemment, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation
of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly
defined under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution
refers to the prohibition against the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Moreover, the barrage of messages, most of which were sent within
the same day, makes us believe that they had all come from Judge
Yu. Although she insisted that Judge San Gaspar-Gito had sent the
"meal stub," Judge Yu did not offer any plausible explanation on the
other messages containing sexual innuendos.
The court ruled that Judge Yu is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer for sending inappropriate messages with sexual
undertones to a fellow female Judge, and for using the official
letterhead of her judicial office in summoning a lawyer to a conference.
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17
8 February 2011
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
90
FACTS:
Members of the Malaya Lolas Organization sought reconsideration of
the decision of the Court that dismissed the charges of plagiarism,
twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano
Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote in Vinuya v.
Romulo (GR 162230, April 28, 2010).
To be precise, Justice Del Castillo was charged of copying without
acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent , Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark
Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005)
Petitioners claimed that the Court has, by its decision, legalized or
approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.” The presentation of another person’s
ideas as one’s own must be deliberate or premeditated – a taking with
ill intent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by
the Supreme Court. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
While the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the
writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare
decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
procedures, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The
strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance
of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
In contrast to academic or scholarly writing, decisions of courts are not
written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of work or
art. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted, but that they are fair and correct in the context of the
particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is
the object of every decision of a court of law.
Joyce C. George observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
 A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate,
is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words,
or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published
in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used
without giving attribution. Judges are free to use whatever
sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to
judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: (1)
The judge is not writing a literary work and, (2) The purpose
of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges
adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.
Although Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors
materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision
for the Court in the Vinuya case, the evidence, as found by the Court’s
Ethics Committee, showed that the attribution to these authors
appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision.
Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced
court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the
time she was cleaning up the final draft.
The passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed
on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo,
but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
91

Carpio, dissenting:
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to decide in an administrative
case whether a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct
in office as this power belongs exclusively to Congress.
Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all
impeachable officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. In
writing judicial decisions, a judge must comply with the Law on
Copyright, as the judge has no power to exempt himself from the
mandatory requirements of the law.
Sereno, dissenting:
Judges need not strain themselves to meet inapplicable standards of
research and attribution of sources in their judicial opinions, not seek
to achieve the scholarly rigidity or thoroughness observed in academic
work. They need to answer to only two standards - diligence and
honesty.
On the use of the excerpt from Joyce C. George’s Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook quoted in the majority Resolution: In no wise does
George imply that the judicial function confers upon judges the implicit
right to use the writing of others without attribution. Neither does
George conflate the possible lack of sanctions for plagiarism with the
issue of whether a determination of judicial plagiarism can be made.
Rather, George is careful to make the distinction between the issue of
whether judicial plagiarism was committed and the issue of whether a
sanction can be imposed for an act of judicial plagiarism. In George’s
terminology, the latter issue may also be framed as a question of
whether judicial plagiarism is “subject to a claim of legal (that is,
sanctionable) plagiarism”, and it has no bearing whatsoever on the
former issue.
Carpio Morales, separate dissenting:
Justice Carpio Morales joins Justice Carpio’s thesis in his Dissenting
Opinion on the commission of plagiarism or violation of intellectual
property rights in the Vinuya decision, as well as with his other thesis
that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide an administrative case
where a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in
office, with qualification.
The Court may wield its administrative power against its incumbent
members on grounds other than culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust, and provided the offense or misbehavior does not carry
with it a penalty, the service of which would amount to removal from
office either on a permanent or temporary basis such as suspension.
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
30 June 2008
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and beratingǁ him
during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan,
et al. where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the
proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When
Mane answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University
(MLQU), Belen told him: ―Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot
equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not
all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created
equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme
Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.
92
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person,
seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA,
upon evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were
unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of
Belen.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen
during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations
which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing
of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to
discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the
counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being
―assaulted,ǁ he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of
bounds, however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and
personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of
boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct
themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.
LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
3 September 1991
Paras, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural- born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such
93
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in
or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer -negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In
the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic
B.M. No. 553
17 June 1993
Regalado, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
The petitioner complained the 2 advertisements made by the Legal
Clinic. The respondent entity is staffed purely by paralegals.
One advertisement shows P 560 for a valid marriage and info on
Divorce, Absence, Annulment and VISA.
The other advertisement shows Guam Divorce, an Attorney in Guam,
is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic.
Services include info on Guam divorce, annulment, immigration
problem, VISA extension and among others.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the services advertised by the respondent
constitutes practice of law. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the services advertised can properly be subject
of the advertisement. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. In our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. The canon of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct.
There are two exceptions of advertising or solicitation. One is the
publication or reputable law list and the second is the ordinary
professional card.
94
 In Re: Cunanan
18 March 1954
Diokno, J.
(Admission to the Practice of Law)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
FACTS:
The case is related to the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
To pass the Bar, a candidate must obtain a general average of 75%
in all subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject.
Due to varying degrees of difficulties of the exams, the court adjusted
the passing average per year, with 74% being the passing average
needed in 1949.
In 1950-53, the passing average needed was 75%. Bar candidates
who failed sought the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which will reduce
the passing grade needed to 70%, to be effective since 1946. Senate
Bill No. 12 was eventually vetoed by the President. Nevertheless,
Senate Bill No. 371, which embodied substantially the provisions of
Senate Bill No. 12, passed into law due to the President’s inaction and
became Republic Act No. 972 (RA 972).
RA 972 adjusted the passing rate as follows:
 1946-51: 70%
 1952: 71%
 1953: 72%
 1954: 73%
 1955: 74%

Several postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking RA 972, some of them claiming that they suffered from
“insufficiency of reading materials” and of “inadequacy of preparation.”
(Note: The years affected is right after World War 2)
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
RA 972 is unconstitutional.
The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates
who had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
reflected by the results of their exams.
 Public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult.
 Insufficiency of legal reading materials is exaggerated, citing
mimeographed copies of Supreme Court decisions,
continuous publication of the Official Gazette, unrestricted
entry of imported books and magazines since 1945, law
books being printed locally during the affected time period,
and a new set of Philippine Reports that started publication
on 1946.
The law has no precedent in its favor.
 Similar laws in other countries have been immediately
declared without force or effect by the judiciary.
The case of Cooper cited is inapplicable.
 The law of New York does not require a candidate who
failed the exams to be admitted to the bar.
 The law of New York does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
 Constitution of New York at that time and of the Philippines are
different regarding matters of admission to the practice of law.
Admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers, as
well as their supervision, are judicial functions and responsibilities.
 The function requires (1) previously established rules, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, and (3) decision as
95
 to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles, in effect making it a judicial function of the highest
degree.
US Cases:
 Admission to practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court.
The disputed law is not a legislation, it is a judgment revoking those
promulgated by the Supreme Court during the affected time period.
Only this court may revoke such judgment, not the legislative nor
executive department.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of judicial functions, as in the case of the law in question.
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the Supreme
Court equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice
of law, it continues to reside solely in the Supreme Court.
The law in question has also been found to suffer from the fatal defect
of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
If there is no motive given of the nature indicated for the classification,
then it is fatally defective. The law is not curative, its purpose being to
attempt to amend and correct the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(1) They are not within the legislative powers of Congress to
enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers.
(2) They create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that
infringe constitutional principles.
(3) Their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles.
The contested law suffers from the above stated fatal defects.
Part of the law referring to exams from 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2
are unconstitutional.
Part of the law referring to subsequent examinations after its approval,
from 1953 to 1955 is valid.
Labrador, J., concurring and dissenting:
Right to admit members to the Bar is exclusive privilege of the
Supreme Court.
Power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its
exercise.
Rules on the holding of exams, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power, but
the power to determine has or has not made the required grade is
judicial.
Votes to declare the whole law as unconstitutional for not being
embraced within the rule making power of Congress, for being an
undue interference with the power of the Supreme Court to admit
members thereof, and for discriminating against those who failed in
the time periods not embraced by the law.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:
Under Art. VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, the Congress has the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court concerning the admission of attorneys to the practice
of law.
96
 Sebastian v. Calis
A.C. No. 5118
9 September 1999
Per Curiam
(Nature of the Lawyer’s Oath)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sebastian alleged that sometime in November 1992, she
was referred to the respondent who promised to process all the
necessary documents for Sebastian's trip to the USA for a fee of 150k
Php. A partial payment was done on December 1, 1992 in the amount
of 20k Php which was given to the wife of Calis, Ester, for which a
receipt was issued.
On June 20, 1994, too expedite the processing of her travel
documents complainant issued Planters Development Check No
12026524 in the amount of 65k Php in favor of Calis who issued a
receipt. However it turns out that the documents that Calis planned to
give Sebastian were spurious. The complainant demanded the return
of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was
nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for
quite sometime; with promise that her money will be refunded if
something goes wrong.
Complainant was given a passport and visa issued in the name of
Lizette R. Ferrer. Upon arrival at the Singaporean International Airport
though, she was apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for
carrying spurious travel documents: Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by
her predicament. Complainant was deported back to the Philippines
where respondent fetcher her from the airport. The respondent took
Sebastian's documents with a promise that he will secure new
documents for her. Complainant opted not to pursue with her travel
and demanded for the return of her money in the amount of 150k Php.
Partial refunds were given by Attorney Calis but in the end the
petitioner found out that respondent had transferred to an unknown
residence in order to evade responsibility.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Calis is guilty of committing gross misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule
101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived
the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents: that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would
happen: that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised
to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something
went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness, and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires the he should be a person of good moral character. This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of
a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant
when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are
respondents acts illegal, they are detestable from a moral point of
view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the
Bar and the administration of justice.
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The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We
must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior .He can be deprived of his license for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the
opportunity to be heard.
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to
comply with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the
summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of
unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical,
unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma
A.C. No. 2474
15 September 2004
Per Curiam
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Eduard Cojuanco, Jr (complainant) was a client for Angara
Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and Atty. Leo J.
Palma (respondent) was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
Atty. Palma developed a close relationship with the complainant’s
family. Travelling and dining with them abroad. He frequented their
house and even tutored complainant’s 22 year old daughter Maria
Luisa Cojuanco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, Atty Palma would marry Lisa in hongkong.
Respondent would only inform the family the following day adding that
everything was legal.
Complainant came to know that respondent represent himself as a
bachelor to the Hong Kong authorities and that respondent was
married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
The complaint filed a petition for the declarion of nullity of the marriage
with the CFI. CFI declared the marriage void ab initio. Complainant
would subsequently file a case for disbarment.
The CFI decision was set aside and remanded to the CFI and has not
reached an outcome at this point.
Respondent motions to dismiss the disbarment proceeding to lack of
cause of action. He likewise would argue a suspension of the
proceeding since the final outcome of the Civil case has not reached
a final outcome posing a prejudicial question.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the respondent’s actions constitute grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the pending decision in the Civil Case concerning
the validity of the marriage poses a prejudicial question. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
There is no distinction as to whether a transgression is committed in
the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because
a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, even the private life of a lawyer may reflect upon his good name
and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry.
Complainant admits that respondent is a good lawyer, however,
professional competency does not make a lawyer a worthy member of
the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable
requirement.
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Undoubtedly, his actions constitute grossly immoral conduct under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He contracted a
marriage while his marriage with Elizabeth was still valid. He made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His actions in contracting the second marriage are
contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Immorality as defined by the court is that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
Respondent’s action is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
He used his complainants trust in him to initiate a relationship with
Lisa. Instead of his legal affairs, he would court Lisa behind his back.
He even used complainant’s resources to get a plane ticket.
He justifies the marriage since he really loves Lisa. This shows a
distorted mind with disregard to the sanctity of marriage. How could
he observe mutual respect and fidelity when he was still married to
Elizabeth.
SECOND ISSUE
The judgement of annulment of marriage has no bearing on the instant
disbarment proceeding. In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The result of
the case would not affect current proceedings as long as there is a
clear preponderance of evidence.
Castaneda v. Ago
G.R. No. L-28546
30 July 1975
Castro, J.
(The Lawyer and Society)
FACTS:
In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed
a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their
petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes
Yu Ago, as his co -plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed
of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing
new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of
possession.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date
of May 26, 1966.
The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court
of Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court.
The Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8,
1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
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Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose
M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in
the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The
respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen
(14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold
tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme
Court). The Court condemn the attitude of the respondents and their
counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
In Re: Edillon
A.M. No. 1928
03 August 1978
Castro, C.J.
(The Lawyer and the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-
65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B.
Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-
Laws of the IBP.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
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rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not compelling him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the court may compel him to pay the
corresponding dues to be a member of the IBP. (YES)
(3) Whether or not enforcement of the penalty provisions amounts
to a deprivation of his right to property. (NO)
(4) Whether or not the court has the power/ jurisdiction to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.
 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State.
SECOND ISSUE:
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes
of integration.
THIRD ISSUE:
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
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(1) But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-
A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Atty. Edillion is hereby disbarred.
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled
“Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
8 March 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
(The Lawyer and the Courts)
FACTS:
The Ponencia of Justice Mariano Del Castillo in the case of Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated April 28, 2010. On May
31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al filed a motion for
reconsideration on the said decision raising two issues:
(2) Jurisprudence and the Constitution reject the Court’s decision that
the executive’s foreign policy are unlimited, and
that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of citizens.
Thereafter, Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, counsel for Vinuya, et al.
filed a supplemental MR alleging that the decision on the said case
plagiarised 3 sources namely:
(3) an article by Evan Criddle and Even Fox-Decent entitled “A
fiduciary theory of jus cogens,”
(4) a book by Christian Tam entitled “Enforcing erga omnes
obligations in international law,” and
(5) an article by Mark Ellis entitled “Breaking the silence: on
rape as an international crime.”
On August 9 2010, Atty. Marivic Leonen and 36 other lawyers, all
members of the UP College of Law, published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism relative to the Court’s decision in the Vinuya,
et al. v. Exec. Sec case. Essentially, they call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo in the face of the allegations of plagiarism in his
work.
The Court then directed Atty. Leonen and the 36 other lawyers to show
cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violating Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny
respondents their freedom of expression. (NO)
2. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors. (NO)
3. Whether or not the submissions of respondents satisfactorily
explain why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar
under the Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
CPR. (YES and NO)
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4. Whether or not the separate compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the bar under canon 10, rules 10.01, 10.02, and
10.03. (NO)
5. Whether or not respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, whether
respondents are entitled to require the production or presentation
of evidence bearing on the plagiarism issues in the Vinuya case
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo and to have
access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and
evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Misconception that the Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize
as a "legitimate public issue.”
It was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression
of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" when it
was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such allegations." The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but
only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said
Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered
as fair or constructive.
SECOND ISSUE
There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers.
The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the
Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give
due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do
not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the
ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as
the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers.
THIRD ISSUE:
Only the Compliance of Professor Lynch, as a visiting professor, and
Professor Vasquez, for his candor and honesty and conceding to the
wisdom of the Court were satisfactory.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court said that they were surprised that someone like Dean
Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated
as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal
communication of an intent to sign.
The Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in
judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
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intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
as required under Canon 10.
FIFTH ISSUE
Disciplinary proceedings are neither criminal nor civil but
administrative, and the essence of administrative due process is only
the right to be heard, not a full trial.
The Court said that it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. As
respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do
not require a trial type hearing. We have held that: The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy.
Burbe v. Magulta
A.C. No. 99-634
10 June 2002
Panganiban, J:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client
Relationship)
FACTS:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover
a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand
letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so
the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the
filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any
feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-
ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the
case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him
to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made
to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly
went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went
back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent
that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the
office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with
the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel,
and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at
all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing
fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he
offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000
deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the
filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the
part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The
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failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his
part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.”
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez
A.C. No. 8243
24 July 2009
Per Curiam
(The Lawyer and the Client: Conflict of Interest)
FACTS:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) for the violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after
becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee deposited at Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of the Respondent and a lawyer- client
relationship was established.
Complainant found out that the respondent have clients in Multitel
after receiving a demand letter from the latter.
Respondent continued to help the complainant with the latter paying
an amount and transferring properties to the former to settle liabilities
when he went to the US.
Upon returning, complainant was informed by the respondent that he
has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent also said that
she was willing to return the amount given after all the legal fees has
been deducted. Complainant accepted.
However, Complainant noticed that respondent has been avoiding
him. He sent a letter to the latter asking for a full accounting of all the
money, documents and properties given but the respondent failed to
provide a clear audited financial report.
Complainant filed a complaint against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking the disbarment of the respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility representing conflict of interest. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Respondent is DISBARRED for representing conflicting interest
and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.”
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste
and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer- client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s
case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge
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must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship
by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services
was ever forged. However, the absence of a written contract will not
preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between
the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938
20 September 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client Privilege)
FACTS:
Members of ACCRA law firm acting attorneys delivered to their client
documents representing financial transactions regarding shares,
dealings and deeds of trusts, assignments and information relative to
their clients personal and business circumstances
On July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations, He was
one of the clients of ACCRA law firm mentioned above
The PCGG’s case included ACCRA law firm however they wanted to
cut a deal that they would be excluded from the corruption case if they
just revealed the identity of their client
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the PCGG Is allowed to violate attorney-client privilege
In pursuit of their mandate to crack down on ill-gotten wealth by
revealing the identity of their client. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
The Rules of Court provide that the attorney-client privilege is defined
as
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The following is the General rule and exception regarding Attorney
client privilege
1) The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2) The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
4) Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however
qualified by some important exceptions.
106
 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the clients name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice.
2) Client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege
if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal assistant.
3) Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential
Disclosure would therefore reveal client confidences ,revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link
that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the client of a crime.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent
PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in
PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui
G.R. No. 152072
31 January 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney’s Fees)
FACTS:
The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land
belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area
of 1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less.
Eventually, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H.
Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as
"partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of
1,790,570. 36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal." On even date,
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De
Zuzuarregui in the amount of P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986,
the amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by
the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On
14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt for receiving the
amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00
given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986,
the Zuzuarreguis, through Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued
another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds. The total
amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of
the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount,
the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by
Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new
counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding
that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to
bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under
pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September
1987 explaining their side of the story. They stated therein, among
other things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the
surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go
to them.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the lawyer's fee is excessive and unconscionable. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk
107
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the
same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable
fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees
if the same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.
– An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of
justice, decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore,
that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable
character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling
within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which
was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or
an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation
case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is,
undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances.
Its reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling
in the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo, where we reduced the
amount of attorney’s fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent
(15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield
that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor
108
 MODULE 3
III. The Executive and Legislative Branches
in Relation to the Judicial Branch
THE EXECUTIVE
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
15 September 1989
(Express, Implied/Residual Power)
FACTS:
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
“within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation
to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of
Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
o Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state.
o (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
o Article 12
o 1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence.
o 2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
o 3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
o 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. Respondents also point out that the
decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has
international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic,
Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua were among the deposed
dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their
governments.
109
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed. (No)
(2) Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the issue constitutes a political question
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right
to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a
totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave
a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights.
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from
the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." [Art. 13(2).]
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own," [Art. 12(2)]
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to
protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the
separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished
from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be
"arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining
to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right
to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Further, the Court holds the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American
Presidency.] The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times
110
of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence.
The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has
acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion
in deciding to bar their return.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be
contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it
could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the
catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
Lagman v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 231658
4 July 2017
Del Castillo, J:
(Executive’s Calling Out Power, Power to Declare
Martial Law, Power to Suspend the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus)
FACTS:
Starting May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days,
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
(Proclamation) declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The
President then submitted a Report which was required by the
constitution based on the factual basis of the Proclamation which
stated that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued by rebellious
groups and lawless violence. The Proclamation came into being
because of the siege of Marawi by the Maute group, one of the
aforesaid rebellious groups. The Report then highlighted the strategic
location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report
pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls
under the control of the lawless groups. Later on, both the Senate and
the House of Representatives both declared their full support for the
declaration of Martial Law. There are three main petitions in this case:
1. Lagman Petition
a) Declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in
any part of Mindanao.
b) Declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because the President's Report contained"false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic accounts.
111
 c) The declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because of the inclusion of events in the Report which had
long been resolved.
d) No sufficient factual basis considering that the President
acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or
any ranking official
e) No sufficient factual basis because it was shown that military
was able to pre-empt the Maute group in their plan to take
over Marawi
2. Cullamat Petition
a) Seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 fo being
unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that
there i rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants
its declaration.
3. Mohamad Petition
a) Claims that Martial law is a solution of last resort and should
be resorted to only after the exhaustion of other remedies.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the calling out power of the President was
validly exercised. (YES)
(2) Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis and the
requirements for public safety were sufficient for the
declaration of Martial Law. (YES)
(3) Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis and the
requirements for public safety were sufficient for the
declaration for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas Corpus. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the
extraordinary powers of:
a) Calling out the armed forces;
b) Suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
c) Declaring martial law. These powers may be resorted to
only under specified conditions.
The president may resort to the power of the calling out of the armed
forces whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion. Prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the
declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017, the President had already
issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. It was
then stated in the case that from the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, both Congress and the Court do not have the power to
interfere with the decision-making power of the President. In other
words, they have no power to force the President to choose which of
the three extraordinary powers to wield when responding to a crisis.
Thus, it was deemed that the exercise of this power by the President
was indeed valid.
SECOND AND THIRD ISSUE:
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely
(1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power. For rebellion to exist, the following elements
must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking
arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the
Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogatives. Examples of the factual details which
occurred in Marawi which led the President to declare Martial Law and
suspend the writ are as follows:
1) Burning of government and private property.
2) Establishment of checkpoints.
3) Hoisting of the ISIS flag.
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 4) Takeover of a hospital.
5) Attacks on various facilities.
6) Taking of hostages.
7) Links and potential alliances with other terrorist groups.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude
that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual basis tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of
the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a consideration of the facts.
In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. The
declaration of Martial Law over the whole of Mindanao is allowed
since The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or
application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. This is both an acknowledgement and a
recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the
President as Commander -in-Chief, who is the repository of vital,
classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in
calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession
that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a
more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground.
Although the President is not required to impose martial law only
within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public
uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit.
At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the
coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all,
rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Petition denied. The Court upholds the validity of all the exercised
powers of the President.
U.S. v. Nixon
418 US 683
24 July 1974
Burger, J.
(The Concept of Executive Privilege)
FACTS:
In light of the watergate scandal, upon motion of the Special
Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tucem was issued pursuant to the rules
of court where it required the production of certain tapes between
Nixon and his advisers.
The President released them but later filed a motion to quash where
such was accompanied by a claim of executive privilege.
The President also challenged the jurisdiction of the court based on a
contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable because it was between
the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-
executive" in character.
Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that
a President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be
used in a given criminal case. (Note: The president was the one who
appointed the Special Prosecutor to investigate the case)
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the President's right to safeguard certain
information, using his "executive privilege", entirely immune from
judicial review. (No)
(2) Whether or not the Judiciary have jurisdiction over the case.
(Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
113
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor
the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive
privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference
to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the
subpoena and produce the tapes and documents.
SECOND ISSUE
The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without
more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability
does not depend on such a surface inquiry. The issue is the production
or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special
Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case.
It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of
his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the
ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the
communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the
merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable."
In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the
fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be
viewed as a barrier to justiciability.
Neri v. Senate
G.R. No. 180643
25 March 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
(The Concept of Executive Privilege)
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner, Romulo Neri, appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for 11 hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a
project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(President Arroyo) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege on whether
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, whether she directed
him to prioritize it, and whether she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to
these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more
on November 20, 2007.
On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote
to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with
petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. On
November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees
issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply
to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention
to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations
unsatisfactory. They issued an order citing petitioner in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration insisting that he had not
shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and granted by
the Court on the ground that, first, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second,
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order.
11
4

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri
are covered by the executive privilege and therefore should not be
disclosed to them. (Yes)
(2) Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system. (Yes)
(3) Whether the respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to
the exercise of their functions. (No)
(4) Whether the respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri are covered
by the executive privilege and therefore should not be disclosed to the
Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that the executive privilege which
is the Presidential communication privilege pertains to
communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential. Presidential communications privilege
applies to decision-making of the President. The elements of the
Presidential Communication Privilege are, to wit:
a.) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.”
b.) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
c.) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In this case, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect
to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right
to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency and there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Thus, the three questions posed by Congress to Romulo Neri are
covered by the executive privilege and therefore should not be
disclosed to the Congress since it did not entail the right to information
of the public or diminish the public accountability and transparency’s
significance and there is no showing of compelling need for disclosure
of the information covered by executive privilege.
SECOND ISSUE:
There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system. The Supreme Court ruled that there are
certain types of information which the government may withhold from
the public, that there is a governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters; and that the right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under
the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. Here, it was the President herself, through
Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a
specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees
investigation. Hence, there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system since there are only
certain types of information which the government may withhold from
the public with respect to military, diplomatic and other national
security matters.
THIRD ISSUE:
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The respondent Committees failed to show that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions. The Supreme Court ruled that the presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating
their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to
the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the
information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear
what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without
the said information sought by the three (3) questions. Therefore, the
respondent Committees failed to show that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions since there is only a generalized assertion that the
information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Therespondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order. The Supreme Court held that accused
should have been adequately informed what matters are to be covered
by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent
information and documents. Another thing, while it is true that this
Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress,
as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional
requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress
compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible
violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this case, the
petitioners request a copy of questions the committee did not grant it
and Subpoena Ad Testificandum made no specific reference to any
pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to
be asked. As it were, the subpoena merely commanded him to testify
on what he knows relative to the subject matter under inquiry. Hence,
the respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order since there
was no copy of questions before the inquiry and the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum was generally issued.
Soliven v. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585
14 November 1988
Per Curiam
(Immunity of the President from Suit)
FACTS:
Luis Beltran (Beltran), along with the others (as petitioners), were
charged with libel by the then President Corazon Aquino (Cory). Cory
filed a complaint-affidavit against Beltran and others. Makasair
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint because this would defeat
the presidential immunity from suit.
Makasiar contends that the president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue, then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be
consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a
president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE/S:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
(1) Whether the presidential immunity from suit be waived. (YES)
(2) Whether the presidential immunity from suit can be invoked by
Beltran (an individual other than the President. (NO)
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(1) Whether Beltran was denied due process. (NO)
(2) Whether Beltran’s constitutional rights were violated when RTC
judge issued a warrant of arrest w/o personally examining the
complaint and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
(NO)
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HELD/RATIO:
SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES FIRST ISSUE:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
There is nothing in our present laws which prevents the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, the choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.
SECOND ISSUE:
This privilege of immunity from suit only pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only be the holder of the office,
and not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Consequently, Beltran, in this criminal case, in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against the accused.
PROCEDURAL
ISSUES FIRST ISSUE:
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal
case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he
is so minded.
This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect,
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter- affidavits.
SECOND ISSUE:
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge
to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests.
However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Guitierrez, Jr., J, separate concurring:
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the
three principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case
would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, Gutierrez believes
that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved
now rather than later.
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of
the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow
the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press
freedom.
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Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis
at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (majority decision)
David v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396
3 May 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(Immunity of the President from Suit)
FACTS:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017)
and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling
upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.
Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary
of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in- Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
"The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction ; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left
represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of
the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance
and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad
front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May
2004;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly
magnified by certain segments of the national media;
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
4
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier
by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that
political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for
purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
11
8
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented.”
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies
would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang
Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro
Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who
were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge
clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used
truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to
stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed
participants. The same police action was used against the protesters
marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan
Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen
broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and
Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested
was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP,
on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside
the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen
from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. A
few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices,
the police surrounded the premises of another pro- opposition paper,
Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin
Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police
showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained
that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion
filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran,
however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit
Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the
rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the
police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon
City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into
custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine
Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur
Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna
Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza
Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the
PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the
custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5"
decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights
of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised
in these petitions.
11
9
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not it is proper to implead President Arroyo as a
respondent. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance
or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office
only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. Nos. 146710-15
2 March 2001
Puno, J.
(Impeachment of the President)
FACTS:
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming
inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House.
Service. Sacrifice. Excellence.
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as
President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175. On the same date, the
House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176.
On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying
to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the
COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
th
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 ) highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.
Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.Despite the lapse of time and still
without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner
continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Estrada is only temporarily disabled to act as
the President. (No)
(2) Whether or not Estrada’s actions were considered as an
effective resignation. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Congress have recognized Arroyo as the President. Impliedly, such
recognition presupposes the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly Estrada’s claim of temporary
incapacity. The question at bar is purely political which cannot be
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decided by the Supreme Court without violating the principle of
separation of powers. As such, the SC cannot exercise its judicial
power for full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative branch.
SECOND ISSUE:
A resignation is not governed by any formal requirements, what is
required merely is that there is an intent to resign and acts of
relinquishment. Resignation canbe oral, written, expressed or
implied.
Petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2000.
However, using totality test (via his acts and omissions) as to
determine whether or not he resigned has it can be shown that clearly,
on his part, President Estrada INTENDED TO RESIGN.
Acts which showed his intention to resign:
1. leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order;
2. expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them;
3. called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
4. Recognition of the oath-taking of PGMA;
THIRD ISSUE:
What is the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President?
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule
is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity
will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially
when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. A public office is a public trust.
THE LEGISLATURE
Araneta v. Gatmaitan
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191
30 April 1957
Felix, J.
(Law-making of the Legislature as Distinguished
from Rule-Making Authority of the Executive or Law
Execution)
FACTS:
In 1950, trawl operators from Malabon and Navotas migrated to the
Bicol region in order to fish in the San Miguel Bay, located between
the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, which is
considered the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the
Bicol region.
Subsistence fisherman, in the belief that such practices caused the
depletion of the marine resources in the area, clamored to prohibit the
operation of trawls within the bay.
The Municipal Mayor’s League condemned the trawl operations as the
cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolved to
petition the President to ban or regulate the operations of trawls to
certain periods of the year. Two resolutions were issued to this effect.
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President Magsaysay issued Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the
use of trawls in San Miguel Bay; it was amended by E.O. No. 66
allowing trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently,
E.O. No. 80 was issued which effectively revived EO No. 22.
Trawl Operators filled a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory
relief with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Manila restrain the
respondents and declare the EOs void.
The Governor of Camarines Sur called the attention of the Court that
the Solicitor General had not been notified of the proceeding. The
Court ordered that the trial could go on and the SolGencould be
notified before judgement was entered. The SolGen was allowed to
file his memorandum after the evidence for both parties was
submitted.
Ruling of the CFI: Congress may define the conditions which the
power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters may be
exercised. It is primarily within the fields of legislation not of execution.
Congress had not intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on
matters of national importance. To accept respondents' view would be
to sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees.
Until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be
banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation. The remedy
for respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur
is to go to the Legislature.
Petitioners filed for a writ of injunction and respondent were ordered
to file a bond of P30,000 for the non-issuance of the injunction,
pending appeal. Respondents raised this matter to SC contending that
by requiring the bond the Republic of the Philippines was made a party
defendant which transformed the suit into one against the Government
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the Respondents, acting in their capacity as
Government officials, could be required to post bond in an action
against them. (No)
(2) Whether or not the E.O.s was validly issued by the President.
(Yes)
(3) Whether or not the above E.O.s were a valid delegation of
powers of the Congress. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The SC held that the present action being one against petitioners,
acting in their capacity as Government officials, is essentially one
against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond
would be indirectly a requirement against the Government. (Note: If
they ask why the republic cannot be a party defendant it’s because
the State cannot be sued without its consent.)
However, as the records show that respondents failed to put up the
bond allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor
General's Office but since they failed to issue bond for reasons beyond
their control the issue becomes moot and academic.
SECOND ISSUE:
First, the SolGen avers that the constitutionality of an executive order
cannot be assailed in petition for declaratory relief. However, in Hilado
vs. De la Costa, the Court in effect accepted the propriety of such
action.
The SC cited various provisions of the Fisheries law. Pertinently, the
law declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking, destroying
or killing of any fish fry or fish eggs. It authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate regulations
restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device (includes the net
used by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well
as to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and
sanctuaries to be administered in the manner prescribed by him.
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Section 75 mentions certain streams, ponds and waters within the
game refuges, . . . communal forest, etc., which the law itself declares
fish refuges and sanctuaries, but this enumeration of places does not
curtail the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which
naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel Bay in Camarines.
From both the law and the preceding manifestations, the Court held
that even without the EO, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing
come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the
criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions,
regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine
waters.
Since the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl, the President by virtue
of the Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 10(1)) and the Administrative Code
(Sections 63, 74, 79) may also exercise that same power and
authority. The EOs are therefore valid.
THIRD ISSUE:
The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and
the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law
consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what
the law shall be, while in the latter, the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
In US v. Ang Tang Ho, the Legislature cannot delegate legislative
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor- General to make rules
and regulations to carry it into effect. There is no delegation of power
and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains
to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in
the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
In this case, Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) it authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the
regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be
imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the
protection of fish fry or fish eggs ; (c) authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery
reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the
manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any
person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places, or, in any manner
disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs; and
(d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in
violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not
more than P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both,
in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83).
As the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned from the foregoing,
the Fisheries Act is complete in itself. Leaving to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA
G.R. No. 76633
18 October 1988
Cruz, J.
(Law-making of the Legislature as Distinguished
from Rule-Making Authority of the Executive or Law
Execution)
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FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985.
His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum
circular as violative of the principle of non -delegation of legislative
power issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial
for the family of overseas workers.
It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or Not POEA violated the principle of non-delegation of
powers. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797:
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA)."
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
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 Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566
19 November 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Undue Delegation of Legislative Power)
FACTS:
Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.
Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling
out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would
cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their
hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master. This practice was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.
While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel
obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. In a more technical
sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily
to bring money to a representative's district. Some scholars on the
subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,
although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in
reference to certain funds of the Executive.
History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines
The Congressional Pork Barrel dates back from 1922 (Pre Martial Law
Era) in the form of Act 3044 or the Public Works Act of 1922, it is
considered as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the
Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were
subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. During the
Martial Law Era, the Pork Barrel System was discontinued due to the
era of one -man controlled legislature. But in 1982, the Batasang
Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". At this moment, the Congressional Pork Barrel
projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects", or non-
public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration
of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in
the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations
of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It
has been documented that the clamor raised by the Senators and the
Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAA with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
The administrations after the EDSA revolution have been consistent in
adopting the Pork Barrel System. It was in the year 200046 that the
"Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly
released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated
in the 2000 PDAF Article.
In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles (Aquino Administration), it is
stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement)."
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However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who
would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.
History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that
the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the
President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on March 22, 1976, issued PD 910.
In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a
special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government
efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
Controversies in the Philippines
It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge
sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks." He said that "the kickbacks were
‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged
from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project,
which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, asphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings."
"The publication of the stories, including those about congressional
initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."
2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF
as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately,
for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle--
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for
an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle--blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti--Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three--year audit
investigation covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009,
or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The
purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of
funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local
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Projects (VILP) by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies
and several government--owned--and--controlled corporations
(GOCCs). The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374
Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were
found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.
Accordingly, the CoA‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012--03
(CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public. As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-- blowers
alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian
reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." According to
incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing
"one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
are matters of policy not subject to judicial review. (NO)
(3) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue. (YES)
(4) Whether or not the Court‘s Decision in "Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez" (Philconsa) and in "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"
(LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis. (NO)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the "Congressional Pork Barrel"
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
(1) separation of powers (YES)
(2) non--delegability of legislative power (YES)
(3) checks and balances (YES)
(4) accountability (YES)
(5) political dynasties (NO)
(6) local autonomy (NO)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the "Presidential Pork Barrel"
(1) Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Res Judicata and Stare Decisis
Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges
against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the
cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on
the merits.
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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Definition of Terms
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump--sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump--sum
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump--sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular,
petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump--sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,
the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1. Separation of Powers
a. Statement of Principle
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much
more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is
properly the domain of the Executive.
Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law --making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern
it self with details for implementation by the Executive."
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows.
But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to
mere oversight.
b. Application
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post--enactment phases of project
implementation.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
identify projects post--GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second 2 paragraph of Special
Provision 4.
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted
that legislators have been accorded post--enactment authority to
identify PDAF projects.
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Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been
accorded post--enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states
that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be".
Clearly, these post--enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form
or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have,
whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its
own.
2. Non--delegability of Legislative Power
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post--enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of
a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump--sum fund from which they are able to dictate
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
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Thus, keeping with the principle of non--delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as
all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through
a process known as "bill presentment."
As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law--making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved,
it takes effect as law after the required publication.”
For the President to exercise his item--veto power, it necessarily
follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill."
In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,
the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in
itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision
of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to
ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item
veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only
"general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
b. Application
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump--sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily
means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration.
This kind of lump--sum/post--enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the above--described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
Moreover, even without its post--enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed
since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump--sum
appropriation above--characterized.
In particular, the lump--sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated
as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending,
i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
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indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may
be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump--sum budgeting
scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."
That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility
to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what
the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable
ends.
c. Accountability.
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in
some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in
the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post--
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation – a matter before another office of government
– renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
4. Political Dynasties
The Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court
observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic
indicators have been taken into consideration.
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As a result, a district representative of a highly--urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far--
flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former.
To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
-List Representatives –and in some years, even the Vice--President
– who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for
its execution.
Indeed, this type of personality--driven project identification has not
only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has
even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in
purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork
Barrel 1. Validity of Appropriation
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of
PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific"
purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury.
Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law
since the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation
of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created
a Special Fund incidental thereto.
In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is
neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the
Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise
and Powers of PAGCOR.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being
used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in
violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law
(a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from
the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence,
if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation
by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be
the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
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appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates
a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the
same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to
appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under
contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy
resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President.
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from
this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General
Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
Analyzing the legal text vis--à--vis the above--mentioned principles, it
may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a
Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable
amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a
specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if
the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot
be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains
post--enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations.
These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations
meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law.
As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under
the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire
PDAF, but rather the post--enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the
law.
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2. Undue Delegation
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used."
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD
1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.
Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily
examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court
proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates
that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines."
The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately
curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the
first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to
use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine
as a "priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure
development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article;
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene,
assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of
the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project
identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund
release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red
personal, lump--sum allocations to legislators from which they are able
to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all
informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly
deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10,
2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the
year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced
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from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The
remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not
be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking
that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on
Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of
public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be
prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable
regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial
is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the
Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the
funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of
Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government.
and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under
the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
MODULE 4
IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW
MUNICIPAL LAW V. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory
Construction, 2003 ed.)
What is a Law?
In its jural and generic sense, it refers to the whole body or system of
law.
In its jural and concrete sense, it means a rule of conduct formulated
and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state.
Are executive issuances of the President and the rulings of the
Supreme Court be considered laws?
Yes. Laws includes statues enacted by the legislature, presidential
decrees and executive orders issued by the President in the exercise
of his legislative power, other presidential issuances in the exercise of
his ordinance power, rulings of the Supreme Court construing the law.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the

government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate

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Are rules and regulations promulgated by administrative officers
included?
Yes. Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or
executive officers pursuant to a delegated power are considered laws.
Same applies to ordinances passed by sanggunians of local
government units.
What is a Statute?
It is an act of the legislature as an organized body, expressed in the
form, and passed according to the procedure, required to constitute it
as part of the law of the land.
Who enacted statutes by the legislature?
1. Philippine Commission
2. Philippine Legislature
3. Batasang Pambansa
4. Congress of the Philippines
What are the executive issuances made during the (1) martial law
and (2) the revolutionary period under the Freedom
Constitution?
(1) Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power
(2) Executive Orders issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power
What is a public statute?
It is one which affects the public at large or the whole community.
What is a private statute?
It is one which applies only to a specific person or subject.
What is a general law?
It is one which applies to the whole state and operates throughout
the state alike upon all the people or all of a class.
It is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not
omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.
What is a special law?
It is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to
a particular community, individual or thing.
What is a local law?
It is one whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality.
What is a permanent statute?
It is one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until
repealed. It does not terminate by the lapse of a fixed period or by the
occurrence of an event.
What is a temporary statute?
It is a statute whose duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the
statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event.
What are Public Acts?
Statues passed by the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Legislature from 1901 to 1935.
What are Commonwealth Acts?
Laws enacted during the Commonwealth from 1936 to 1946.
What are Republic Acts?
Laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines from 1946 to 1972
and from 1987 under the 1987 Constitution.
What is a Batas Pambansa?
Laws promulgated by the Batasang Pambansa.
What is Legislative Power and to whom is this power vested?
Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws. It is
vested in the Congress.
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Do sanggunians of local government units have legislative
power?
Yes. Sangguniang barangay, sangguniang bayan, sangguniang
panlungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan have legislative powers,
within their respective jurisdictions, to enact ordinances enforceable
within the local government units concerned.
Is the legislative power of Congress plenary in character?
Yes. The legislative power is plenary for all purposes of civil
government, subject only to such limitations as are found in the
Constitution.
Is there a procedure that must be followed for a bill to be passed
as a law?
Yes. A bill may be enacted into law only in the manner the Constitution
requires and in accordance with the procedure therein provided.
Congress also provides in detail the procedure by which a bill may be
enacted into law. Detailed procedures are embodied in the Rules of
both Houses of Congress.
What is a bill?
It is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of
Congress for enactment into law.
Can a bill embrace more than one subject?
No. A bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
Can a private bill originate from the Senate?
No. It must originate from the House of Representatives.
Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives.
May a bill be approved in 2 readings?
No. The Constitution provides that no bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days.
What happens in the (1) First Reading, (2) Second Reading, and
(3) Third Reading?
First reading consists of reading the number and title of the bill,
followed by it referral to the appropriate Committee for study and
recommendation.
On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments
proposed by the Committee, if any, unless copies thereof are
distributed and such reading is dispensed with. The bill is subject to
debates, pertinent motions, and amendments.
On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be
submitted for final vote by yeas and nays.
What happens if the other House approves the bill without
amendment?
The bill is passed by Congress and the same will be transmitted to the
President for appropriate action.
What is the function of the Conference Committee?
It settled the differences if the other House introduces amendments
and the House from which it originated does not agree with said
amendments.
When may a bill passed by Congress becomes a law?
(1) When the President signs it;
(2) When the President does not sign nor communicate his veto
of the bill within thirty days after his receipt thereof;
(3) When the vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by two-thirds
vote of all its Members, each House voting separately.
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How is the Bill authenticated?
The system of authentication devised is the signing by the Speaker
and the Senate President of the printed copy of the approved bill.
What is the purpose of the authentication?
It is to signify to the President that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by the legislature and is ready for his approval or
rejection.
What is the value of a Journal?
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect.
What is an Enrolled Bill?
It is the bill passed by Congress, authenticated by the Speaker and
the Senate President and approved by the President.
What is the Enrolled Bill Doctrine?
It provides that the act as passed and approved is deemed importing
absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Why is the enrolled bill accorded with conclusive verity?
It is because of the fact that the enrolled bill carries on its face a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged respectively with the duty of enacting and
executing laws, that it was passed by the assembly.
In case of a discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled
bill, which will prevail?
The enrolled bill prevails, particularly with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered into the legislative journal.
When may there be withdrawal of authentication?
The Speaker and the Senate President may withdraw their
signatures from the signed bull where there is serious and
substantial discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated in
the legislature and shown by the journal and that of the enrolled bill.
What is the effect of the withdrawal of authentication?
Such withdrawal renders the bill without attestation and nullifies its
status as an enrolled bill. In such a case, the bill is no longer accorded
absolute verity as regards its text.
What are the two constitutional limitations upon the legislature
with regard title of statute?
(1) The legislature is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
(2) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject thereof.
What are the purposes of the constitutional requirement that a
bill shall embrace only one subject?
(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation;
(2) To prevent or surprise fraud upon the legislature, by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gave no information, and
which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted;
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
the legislation that are being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire; and
(4) The title of a statute is used as a guide in ascertaining
legislative intent when the language of the act does not
clearly expresses its purpose.
How is the constitutional requirement as to title of a bill
construed?
It shall be construed liberally. It should not be given a technical
interpretation.
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It is necessary that the Legislature employ precise language in
the title of an enactment?
No. The language used will suffice if the title should meet the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed measure and its operation.
For amendatory acts, is it needed to state the precise nature of
the amendatory act?
No. A title which states that it is an act to amend a specific statute is
a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
Does the constitutional requirement that a bill shall embrace only
one subject have a retroactive effect?
No. The requirement only applies to bill which may thereafter be
enacted into law. It does not apply to laws in force and existing at the
time the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The constitutional requirement has also no application to municipal or
city ordinances.
What is the effect of non-compliance by a statute to the
constitutional requirement on title?
A statute whose title does not conform to the constitutional
requirement or is not related in any manner to its subject is null and
void.
Is the effect the same if the subject matter of a statute is not
sufficiently expressed in its title?
No. Where the subject matter of the statute is not sufficiently
expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not
expressed therein is void, leaving the rest in force. UNLESS the invalid
provisions are inseparable from the others, in which case the nullity of
the former vitiates the latter.
What is an Enacting Clause?
It is that part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof
which states the authority by which the act is enacted.
What is a Preamble?
It is a prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting
the purpose, reason, or occasion of remaking the law to which it is
prefixed.
What is the Purview of Statute?
The purview or body of a statute is that part which tells what the law
is all about. It should embrace only one subject matter.
What is a Separability Clause?
It is that part of a statute which states that if any provision of the act
is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby.
It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision
shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act.
What are Presidential Issuances? What do they include?
Presidential issuances are those which the President issues in the
exercise of his ordinance power.
They include executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special
orders.
What are Executive Orders?
Executive Orders are acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers.
What are Administrative Orders?
Administrative Orders are acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head.
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What are Proclamations?
Proclamations are acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
statute or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence
of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend.
What is a Memorandum Order?
It is the act of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concerns a particular
officer or office of the Government.
What are Memorandum Circulars?
They are acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration which the President desires to bring to the attention of
all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance.
What are General or Specific Orders?
They are acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
May the Supreme Court promulgate rules which are substantive
in nature?
No. Unlike legislature which may enact laws which are substantive
and procedural, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule- making
power, does not have the power to promulgate rules which are
substantive in nature.
Is a rule or regulation which restricts or enlarges a statute valid?
No. The rule-making power of a public administrative agency is a
delegated legislative power. It may not issue rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of the
statute which created it.
Service. Sacrifice. Excellence.
What are the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power?
(1) It must be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate; and
(2) It must fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
What are examples of adequate standards?
(1) Simplicity and dignity;
(2) Public interest;
(3) Public welfare;
(4) Interests of law and order;
(5) Justice and equity and substantial merit of the case;
(6) Adequate and efficient instruction.
Can there be a rule promulgated to amend an Act of Congress?
No. The power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute
is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative agency
cannot amend an Act of Congress.
In case of a discrepancy between the law and an implementing
rule and regulation, which will prevail?
The law prevails.
What is the difference between the (1) promulgation of rules and
regulations by the administrative agency, and (2) rendition of an
opinion by an administrative agency?
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. On the other
hand, when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law.
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What is the value of an administrative interpretation of the law?
It is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.
What is the smallest legislative body?
Sangguniang barangay.
Which bodies review a barangay ordinance?
A barangay ordinance is subject to review by the sangguniang bayan
or sangguniang panlungsod, as the case may be, to determine
whetherit is consistent with the law or with municipal or city ordinance.
To whom is the power to enact municipal ordinance given?
The power to enact municipal ordinance is lodged with the
sangguniang bayan.
What is the require vote for the passage of an ordinance?
Majority vote of the members of the sangguniang bayan present and
voting, there being a quorum.
Can the veto of the mayor be overridden?
Yes. The sangguniang bayan may, by two-thirds vote of all members,
override the veto of the mayor. In which case, it shall become effective
for all legal intents and purposes.
Who reviews the approved municipal ordinance?
The sangguninang panlalawigan.
To whom is the power to pass city ordinance given?
The power to pass city ordinance is vested in the sangguniang
panlungsod. The required vote to pass an ordinance is the same as
that of the municipal ordinance.
To whom is the power to pass provincial ordinance given?
The power to pass provincial ordinance is vested to the
sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the province.
Can the sangguniang panlalawigan override a vetoed
ordinance?
Yes. A vetoed ordinance may be repassed by the sangguniang
panlalwigan by a two-thirds vote of all its members.
Discussion by Joaquin G. Bernas (An Introduction to
Public International Law, 2002 ed.)
What is the traditional definition of international law?
It is a body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon
civilized sstaes in their relations to one another.
What is the (modern) defition of international law according to
the Third Restatement?
It is the law which deals with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some
of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.
What is the Command Theory?
In this view, international law is not law because it does not come
from a command of a sovereign.
What is the Consensual Theory?
Under this theory, international law derives its binding force form
the consent of the states.
What is the Natural Law Theory?
This theory posits that law is derived by reason form the nature of man.
International law is said to be an application of natural reason to the
nature of the state-person.
What is Public International Law?
This governs the relationships between and among states and also
their relations with intenational organizations and individual persons.
What is Private International Law?
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It is really domestic law which deals with cases where foreign law
intrudes in the domestic sphere where there are questions of the
applicability of foreign law or the role of foreign courts.
How are sources of international law classified?
(1) Formal and (2) Material
What are formal sources?
It refer to the various processes by which rules come into existence.
What are material sources?
It is concerned with the substance and content of the obligation.
Sometimes referred to as the evidence if international law.
What are the sources of international law?
(1) International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states;
(2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(4) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
What is Custom or Customary International Law?
It means a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation.
What are the 2 basis elements of Custom?
(1) Material Factor (usus) – how the states behave
(2) Subjective Factor – why they behave the way they do
What are the elements of usus?
(1) duration,
(2) consistency, and
(3) generality of practice of states.
What is Opinio Juris?
It is the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory.
Would dissenting states be bound by custom?
Yes, unless they had consistently objected to it while the custom
was merely in the process of formation.
Who has the burden of prooving the existence of opinio juris?
The existence of opinio juris is a matter of proof. The burden of
proving its existence falls on the state claiming it.
What is Instant Custom?
It comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number of states
supporting a specific line of action.
If a treaty comes later than a particular custom, as between the
parties to the treaty, which should prevail?
The treaty.
If a later treaty is contrary to a customary rule that has the
status of jus cogens, which will prevail?
Custom will prevail.
Is Equity a source of law?
Yes. The Permanent Court of Justice had occasion to use equity as a
source of law in one case. Equity, when accepted, is an instrument
whereby convetional or customary law may be supplemented or
modified in order achieve justice.
What is a Soft Law?
It is an international agreement no concluded as treaty and threfore
not covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
What is the dualist or pluralist theory?
It holds that international law and mnicpal law are essentially
different from each other.
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How does municipal and international law differ with regard to
what they regulate?
Municipal law regulates relations between individual persons under
the state whereas international law regulates relations between
states.
For dualists, when international law and municipal law conflict,
which must prevail?
Municipal Law must prevail.
What is the monistic theory or monism?
Under this theory, international law and domestic law belong to only
one system of law.
How does international law become part of domestic law for
dualists?
(1) Doctrine of transformation. – for international law to become
part of domestic law, it must be expressly and specifically
transformed into domestic law through the appropriate
constitutional machinery.
(2) Doctrine of incorporation, - the law of natons, wherever any
question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction,
is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and it is
held to be part of the law of the land.
Which law prevails in a domestic court?
Municipal Law for the domestic courts are bound to apply the local
law.
Which law prevails in an international tribunal.
International Law. It is an established principle that, before an
international tribunal, a state may not plead its own law as an excuse
for failure to comply with international law.
Should a conflict arise between an international agreement and
the Philippine Constitution, which should prevail?
Philippine Constitution. The treaty would not be valid and operative
as domestic law.
COMMON LAW V. CIVIL LAW
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A
LAND WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina
DeFabritiis
How is the focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction
designed?
The focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction is designed to allow
the judges in that system to be the primary lawmakers with previously
decided cases as their source of law.
Professors direct students to read series of cases to provide
them with the data they are to use to deduce the governing legal
norms. How does this teaching method affect students?
This method of teaching affects how students develop their advocacy
skills in law school and how they ultimately argue before appellate
bodies as practitioners.
What are the 2 main central concepts in the common law legal
system?
1. Statutory interpretation; and
2. Precedent.
What comprises the core of the civil law legal system?
It is the language of the Code and the writings of scholars.
What are the social objectives similar to common-law and civil
law legal system?
1. Individualism.
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 2. Liberalism, and
3. Personal rights.
Is a traditional common law oral advocacy style suitable for a
civil law argument?
No.
What is common law?
Common law, in its most basic form, is a body of law comprised of
precedent.
What does “precedent” mean?
It means a prior decision, or a consistent group of decisions which
represent a model to be followed by subsequent decisions.
More precisely, it refers to the binding decisions of higher courts of
the same jurisdiction.
It may also mean the law created and molded by judges with
legislation serving a supplementary function.
What binds a common law court in the United States?
It is formally bound by prior reported rulings on specific disputes,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court or higher courts within the state
or federal jurisdiction.
What is the “Doctrine of stare decisis et quieta non movere” or
Stare Decisis?
It means “to stand by things decided and not disturb settled law”.
How does Stare Decisis work?
It commands judges to apply the law as it has been set out in a prior
case when a higher, or sometimes equal, court made the prior
decision.
It is necessary that the new case be the same as the precedent?
Yes. It is required that the new case be the same OR substantially
the same as the precedent.
Must the question of the case be the same too?
Yes. A decision has a stare decisis effect with regard to a later case
only if the question on which the decision in both cases rests is the
same, or substantially the same.
In general, will the doctrine apply if the facts between the cases
are essentially different?
No.
What is the role of stare decisis in maintaining consistency?
Present day common law systems rely on stare decisis to maintain
consistency when judges are filling in gaps in the law.
How is ambiguity cleared in one court’s decision?
It may be cleared up when that same court or another court within that
jurisdiction decides another case on different facts while addressing
the similar issues.
In common law systems, what is the judge’s role?
It is to make laws.
What is the proper construction where some statutory provisions
appear to be in conflict with a deeply rooted rule of the common
law?
The provision must be interpreted in such a way as to evade the
conflict for statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed.
What is the effect when a court interprets or applies a statute to
a dispute?
The court’s decision becomes part of the body of law on the topic the
statute addresses.
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Where did civil law originate from? Such method is resorted in cases where a gap in the Code exists
Civil law is a legal tradition originating in Roman Law, as codified in because statutory concepts or rules are contradictory or entirely
the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and subsequently developing on lacking.
continental Europe.
How does a judge render decision in this kind of method?
What are the exclusive sources of law in civil law jurisdiction? He renders decision by using his assessment of social, economic, and
(1) Written constitutions moral factors and following the guiding ideas or values pervading the
(2) Codes Code and the legal system as a whole.
(3) Specific statutes or decrees, and
(4) International treaties. What is the extent of the law “created” by the judge?
A civil judge creates a law only to the extent that the judge makes
What are the 5 basic codes found in a civil law jurisdiction? concrete what was a general and abstract rule in the code.
(1) Civil code
(2) Commercial code In this kind of method, are other judges required to follow the
(3) Code of civil procedure decision?
(4) Penal code, and No. The judge’s decision does not become a source of law, nor do
(5) Code of criminal procedure. other judges have to follow the decision.

Do civil law statutes provide specific definitions? Are judicial decisions a source of law in a civil law
No. Instead, they state principles in broad, general phrases. system? No.

Are code principles explained precisely?
No. rather, they are stated concisely so that they may be exhaustive.
Does a civil law judge create laws?
No. The judge applies the law due to his function of a civil law judge
as a civil servant.
What is the value of scholarly texts in civil law?
Scholarly texts are not a primary source of law. They are doctrinally
definitive and indispensible to the systematic and comprehensive
understanding of the code.
When do usually judge resort to the rulemaking method in
deciding a case?
Does this mean that if a case has been decided already by a
higher court, a lower court may decide differently?
Yes. In theory, even if the highest court has already spoken on a
question and indicated a clear view of its proper resolution, the lowest
court in the jurisdiction can decide differently.
What is the Doctrine of jurisprudence constant?
It refers to a series of decisions forming a constant stream of uniform
and homogeneous rulings that have the same reason. This doctrine
affords the cases considerable persuasive authority and justifies,
without requiring, the court in abstaining from new inquiry because of
its faith in the prior decisions.
What is Advocacy?
It is the process of trying to convince your audience through the
technique of persuasion.

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What should be the mantra of advocates in both common law
and civil law jurisdictions?
They should have a mantra that reduces their case to the bare
essence. That is, to advocate should have a central theme that she
will approach from different angles: facts, law, intent, and policy.
What are the components of the traditional structure of an oral
argument?
(1) Opening Statement,
(2) Road Map,
(3) Body of the Argument, and
(4) Conclusion.
What must the advocate do in his opening statement?
He should cordially greet the judges, and introduce himself as counsel
as well as co-counsel where appropriate.
What must the advocate do at the conclusion of the
introduction?
An advocate should ask if the court would like a brief statement of the
facts.
What does an advocate do in the presentation of the Road Map?
The advocate gives the court a concise outline or road map of the
issues he will argue to support his position.
What is the purpose of the Road Map?
The Road Map lets the judges know the order in which the advocate
has organized the issues.
What does an advocate do in a rebuttal? How long should it be?
The advocate should use rebuttal time to make two or three concise
points in response to the most injurious points of the opponent’s
argument. He must not raise points that the he neglected to make in
his main argument.
An advocate should not reserve more than two or three minutes for
rebuttal.
What should the advocate do in the conclusion?
He should briefly summarize the important points of the advocate’s
argument in light of the theme he set forth at the beginning of the
argument.
What is the dominant style of reasoning in the common law
jurisdiction?
Inductive style of reasoning.
What is the Inductive style of reasoning?
Courts interpret and synthesize earlier court decision to create general
legal principles and then apply those principles to the facts of the case
before them.
How must a common law advocate present the body of his
argument?
He must analyze cases presenting similar but not identical facts. He
must, form those cases, extract the specific rules, and then through
deduction, determine the often narrow scope of each rule, and
sometime proposes new rules to cover facts that have not yet
presented themselves.
How must a common law advocate fashion the body of the
argument to make a connection between two cases?
It is enough for an advocate referencing a particular case to make a
general statement of what the case holds and why the court should
apply its reasoning to the present case, or in the alternative decline to
do so.
What is a Precedent?
It is prior decisions functioning as model for later decisions.
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In the judge’s endeavour to fit a case into the body of
precedent, what are the three steps in judicial reasoning?
(1) Recognition of a similarity between cases;
(2) Interpretation of a rule fashioned from the material facts of
the first case;
(3) Application of the rule to the second case.
Is it the precedent itself which tells the Court which line to
follow?
No. It is the advocate’s arguments that must persuade the court to
select one line over the other.
What does an argument from precedent seek to happen?
That the court give weight to a particular prior result regardless of
whether that court believes it to be correct or believes it to be valuable
in any way to rely on that prior result.
Generally, when does a court overrule its precedent?
Only for good reasons that outweigh the policies of certainty,
predictability, and fairness underlying stare decisis.
To which does the success of an advocate depend?
It will depend on persuading the court of the accuracy of the analogies
the advocates suggests between his client’s situation and that of the
precedent he cites.
What is the core of an advocate’s argument?
It is not merely by drawing the court’s attention to favorable precedent.
It is equally important to demonstrate why unfavourable precedent is
not relevant
What is the dominant style of reasoning in the civil law
jurisdiction?
Deductive style of reasoning.
What is the Deductive style of reasoning?
It is when the courts apply general legal principals to specific
situations by reasoning with guidance from scholars.
How must a civil law advocate build the body of his argument?
He must build it around legal principles tracing their history, identify
their function, determining their domain of application, and explaining
their effects in terms of rights and obligations.
How does a civil law judge decide a case?
In deciding a case, civil law requires a judge to search for legal
concepts in the Civil Code delineating a pattern of competing interests
closely resembling the interests pressing for recognition in the instant
case.
What is the primary goal of an advocate?
It is to convince the court that his client should prevail.
What must the advocate do to achieve this goal?
The advocate must understand and appreciate the main goals of an
oral argument – persuasion and education.
What are required to create an effective civil law argument by
transferring common law advocacy skills?
(1) An understanding of the purpose of the oral argument, as well
as the governing rules of the court or tribunal hearing the argument;
(2) An appreciation for the role of the judge hearing the
argument;
(3) A broader grasp of what the common law considers
secondary authority; and
(4) An awareness of the applicability of non-binding precedent.
To which must an advocate familiarize himself in order to
achieve the main objectives of oral argument?
He must familiarize himself with the governing rules of the court or
tribunal before which he is appearing.
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What binds a common law court?
A common-law court is formally bound by prior reported rulings on
specific disputes, decided by the Supreme Court or higher courts
within the state or federal jurisdiction.
Does the doctrine of stare decisis apply in the civil law system?
No. Lower courts are not bound to follow decisions of higher courts in
the same jurisdiction.
What must be the focus of the body of argument of a civil law
advocate?
The focus must be to make the applicable code and treaty provisions
the central of the body.
Should his body of argument rely solely on making reference to
decisions of other courts?
No. His arguments must also find support in scholarly doctrines and
notions of customary international law, consisting of rules of law
derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief
that the law required them to act that way.
How must this advocate respond to a judge’s question?
He must respond in a way that allows the court to adhere to existing
jurisprudence, legal science, and scholarly developed doctrine and in
so doing apply the relevant Code provisions to the case before it.
How does a civil law judge decide a case?
By applying general legal principles to specific situations by
reasoning with guidance from scholars.
Are secondary sources binding in a common law
jurisdiction? No.
Are scholarly texts considered a primary source of law in civil
law jurisdiction?
No. But they are doctrinally definite and indispensable to the
systematic and comprehensive understanding of the code.
What is the “trifecta” that an advocate must achieve?
(1) An advocate must be clear so that the court understands her
argument.
(2) An advocate must be interesting so that the court pays
attention to her argument.
(3) An advocate must be persuasive so that the court rules in
favor of her argument.
MIXED JURISDICTIONS: COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW
(CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED) by William Tetley
What is the classic definition of a mixed jurisdiction?
Mixed jurisdiction are legal systems in which the Romano-Germanic
tradition has become suffused to some degree by Anglo-American
law. (Maurice Tancelin, Introduction, in F.P.Walton, The Scope and
Interpretation of the Civil Code I)
Mixed jurisdictions are really political units (countries or their political
subdivisions) which have mixed legal systems. Common law/civil law
mixed jurisdictions include Louisiana, Quebec, St. Lucia, Puerto Rico,
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Scotland.
What is the modern definition of a mixed legal system?
“…a legal system which, to an extensive degree, exhibits
characteristics of both the civilian and the English common law
traditions.” (Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal
Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q.R.
228, 228, 1998)
What are the two different forms of civil law traditions that Walton
and Evans-Jones refer to?
Walton is concerned with codified systems, such as Quebec and
Louisiana, while Evans-Jones is dealing with jurisdictions such as
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Scotland and South Africa, which received Roman law over a
considerable period of time without ever adopting a code.
The distinction is important when one analyzes such new branches
of the common law as “restitution.”
What is a legal system?
A legal system, as that term is here used, is an operation set of legal
institutions, procedures, and rules. In this sense there are one federal
and fifty state legal systems in the United States, separate legal
systems in each of the other nations, and still other distinct legal
systems in such organizations as the European Economic Community
and the United Nations.
Each law in fact constitutes a system: it has a vocabulary used to
express concepts, its rules are arranged into categories, it has
techniques for expressing rules and interpreting them, it is linked to a
view of the social order itself which determines the way in which the
law is applied and shapes the very function of the law in that society.
What is a legal order?
It is a body of rules and institutions regulating a given society.
Synonyms: juridical system, legal system, system of law
What is a legal tradition?
A legal tradition is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society
and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal
system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected and taught. The legal tradition relates the the legal system
to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system
into cultural perspective. It is thus the general culture underlying a
family of similar legal systems.
What are the three highly influential legal traditions in the
contemporary world?
Civil law, Common law, and Socialist law
What is Civil Law?
Civil Law may be defined as that legal tradition which has its origin in
Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and as
subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the world.
It is highly systemized and structured and relies on declarations of
broad, general principles, often ignoring the details. Civil Law
eventually divided into two streams: the codified Roman law (as seen
in the French Civil Code of 1804 and its progeny and imitators-
Continental Europe, Quebec, Louisiana being examples); and
uncodified Roman law (as seen in Scotland and South Africa)
What is Common Law? Common law is the legal tradition which
evolved in England from the eleventh century onwards. Its principles
appear for the most part in reported judgments, usually of the higher
courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising in disputes which
courts have adjudicated. The common law is usually much more
detailed in its prescriptions than the civil law. Common law is the
foundation of private law, not only for England, Wales and Ireland,
but also in forty-nine U.S. states, nine Canadian provinces and in
most countries which first received that law as colonies of the British
Empire and which, in many cases, have preserved it as independent
States of the British Commonwealth.
What is Statutory Law?
Statutory law, or law found in legislation other than civil codes, is basic
to both the civil and common law. In common law jurisdictions, most
rules are found in the jurisprudence and statutes complete them. In
civil law jurisdictions, the important principles are stated in the code,
while the statutes complete them.
What is a Mixed Legal System? Give an example
A mixed legal system is one in which the law in force is derived from
more than one legal tradition or legal family. For example, in the
Quebec legal system, the basic private law is derived partly from the
civil law tradition and partly from the common law tradition. Another
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example is the Egyptian legal system, in which the basic private law is
derived partly from the civil law tradition and partly from Moslem or
other religiously-based legal traditions.
What is a Mixed Jurisdiction? Give an example
A mixed jurisdiction is a country or a political subdivision of a country
in which a mixed legal system prevails. For example, Scotland may
be said to be a mixed jurisdiction, because it has a mixed legal system,
derived in part from the civil law tradition and in part from the common
law tradition.
This definition of "mixed jurisdiction" is very similar to those of Walton
and Evans-Jones cited above, except that the term as used here
describes only the territory in which a mixed legal system exists, rather
than the mixed legal system itself.
What is Maritime Law?
Maritime law is a mixed legal system in its own right, found in all
jurisdictions, including those belonging to only one major legal
tradition. Maritime law is civilian in its origin and has benefited greatly,
in the last two centuries at least, from the infusion of certain English
common law principles and innovations.
Maritime law also consists of modern international Conventions,
including Conventions on collision, salvage, the carriage of goods by
sea, maritime liens and mortgages, and ship owners’ limitation, for
example.
What are the forms of Civil Law Jurisdictions and how did they
develop?
To understand civil law one must realize that Scotland and South
Africa, for example, received Roman law and have retained it without
benefit of codification. Continental Europe received civil law from
ancient Rome and then retained it by codification, imposed for the
most part by victories of Napoleon and later on by the example and
great influence of the French Civil Code of 1804.32 Other jurisdictions,
particularly the countries of Latin America, as well as
Service. Sacrifice. Excellence.
Egypt, imitated the French Code (or other codes based upon it) in
enacting their own codifications. Quebec and Louisiana, for their part,
received civil law and retained it by codifications developed internally,
while also incorporating into their codes certain elements of common
law origin.
Civil law jurisdictions often have a statute law that is heavily
influenced by the common law.
What did the French Civil Code of 1804 reflect?
It reflected the achievements of the French Revolution. The French
Civil Code of 1804 was no mere consolidation or systematization of
existing law, but rather was intended to be a "revolutionary code." In
fact, however, the revolutionary content of the Code (e.g. principles
such as freedom and equality of all citizens and the inviolability of
property) was balanced with more conservative notions, reflected
especially in the pre-existing customary law of France's northern
provinces, which earlier scholars such as R.J. Pothier (1699-1772)
had striven to harmonize before the Revolution.
How did the French Civil Code influence other areas?
Napoleon's victorious armies imposed the French Civil Code on
various territories, notably the French-occupied German-speaking
areas on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as the Netherlands,
Belgium, Italy and the Hanseatic cities. Political suasion led to its
introduction into various other German principalities, as well as
Danzig, Warsaw and the Swiss cantons. After the downfall of the
Emperor, the Code's prestige caused the adoption of similar
codifications, in the form of either direct translation of the French
Code or national codes based on the French model but with local
modifications. These codes include those of Parma (1820), Sardinia
(1837), the Netherlands (1838), Modena (1852), unified Italy (1865),
Romania (1864), Portugal (1867) and Spain (1889).11
In Latin America, the French Code was introduced into Haiti in 1825,
while the codes of Bolivia (1830) and Chile (1855) follow the
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arrangement and copy much of the substance of the Code Napoléon.
The movement towards codification which the French Civil Code set
in motion also gave birth to the German Civil Code of 1896 (in force in
1900), although its terminology is more academic and technical and
its rules more precise than those of the French Code. The Swiss Civil
Code of 1912, by comparison, is simple and non-technical, relying
heavily on general principles. The combined French, German and
Swiss influence influenced the codifications of Brazil (1916), Mexico
(1928), pre-Communist China(1931) and Peru(1936). Japan adopted
the German Civil Code in 1898 and Turkey, a translation of the Swiss
Code in 1926.)
What are the four periods which reflected the Scots Law?
Scots Law has been divided into four periods:
a. the feudal period, extending from the Battle of Carham
establishing Scotland's present boundaries in 1018 to the
death of King Robert the Bruce in 1329;
b. the "dark age" until 1532, when the Court of Session was
established;
c. the Roman period from 1532 until the Napoleonic Wars,
when the great reception of Roman Law occurred;
d. the modern period saw influence of English law which had
been given authority by the Union of the Parliaments in 1707
and the establishment of the House of Lords as the final court
of appeal of Scotland in civil matters.
Is Scottish Law a mixed legal system?
Yes. Scottish law is truly a "mixed legal system" because of the
diversity of its main sources: feudal law, Roman law, Canon law,
English common law (in part) and statutes." In the words of Enid
Marshall:
While, however, Scots law is a distinct legal system, it is far
from being an original legal system in the sense of having
developed independently of outside influences: there is little
in Scots law which is purely native to the country; most of the
Scots law has been contributed to Scotland by other legal
systems, and the distinctiveness of the Scottish legal system
springs from the original way in which the law-makers of
Scotland have over past centuries formed a coherent body of
law out of these diverse contributions.
A similar conclusion has been reached by Robin Evans-Jones in his
more recent study of Scots private law.' Evans-Jones points out,
however, that the civil law tradition in Scotland is in constant danger
of being overwhelmed by English common law, because the process
of reception of that law is ongoing, the common law continuing to
exercise a strong influence on Scots lawyers and judges.
What kind of mixed jurisdiction is the Republic of South Africa?
The Republic of South Africa is a mixed jurisdiction whose legal
system reflects elements of both civil and common law, as well as
African tribal customary law. The civilian heritage is "Roman-Dutch
law," brought to the Cape of Good Hope by the first Dutch settlers
about 1652 when the colony, then under the administration of the
Dutch East India Company, served primarily as a "refreshment
station" for Dutch merchants and seafarers on the long journey
between the Netherlands and the East Indies. In the new Republic of
South Africa, where South African legislation and precedents are
lacking, Roman-Dutch and English sources are given approximately
equal weight, in a kind of pragmatism. There is a considerable respect
for both the institutional writers and more recent authors on Roman-
Dutch law (a civilian trait), mixed with a view of judicial precedent as
of very great importance (a common law characteristic)."' There is also
are cognition of African customary law ("indigenous law") which under
the present Constitution must be applied where applicable, subject to
the Constitution and any relevant legislation.
Describe the new Civil Code of Québec.
The new Civil Code gives full recognition to the human person and
human rights as the central focus of all private law, while also
consolidating the position of the Code as the iuscommune of
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Québec. Its specific rules give expression, in more contemporary
language, to the social changes in Quebec society since the "Quiet
Revolution." The new Code continues to reflect the impact of certain
English principles and institutions (e.g. freedom of testation, trusts
(now called "foundations"-and "moveable hypothecs"--an adaptation
of the English chattel mortgage), while still respecting the basic
structure and terminology of civilian codification. It takes account of
contemporary technological developments (e.g. computerization of
registers of civil status and registers of personal and moveable real
rights). It also includes a very important Book X on private international
law, which is marked by recent developments in the conflict of laws in
Europe (e.g. the Rome Convention 1980" and the Swiss Statute on
Private International Law 1987'9), and which also incorporates a
number of common law concepts, such as forum non conveniens, into
what is essentially a civilian codal regime. The French and English
versions of the new Code are official, and may be used to assist in
interpreting ambiguous provisions.
What is the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808?
The Digest of 1808, known as the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, was
largely inspired by the revolutionary ideas of France, gleaned from the
French Civil Code of 1804 and its preparatory works, approximately
70% of its 2,156 articles being based on those sources. The remainder
of the text was derived from Spanish law and institutions, which rules
were retained in the event of conflict with French-inspired provisions.
How did the Digest of 1808 came about?
Louisiana was first subjected to French Edicts, Ordinances and the
Custom of Paris by charters issued to companies of merchant
adventurers in 1712 and 1717, which laws remained in force when the
territory became a royal colony in 1731. After Louisiana's cession to
Spain in 1763, French laws remained in force until 1769, when they
were officially replaced by Spanish laws and institutions.
Following the territory's retrocession to France in 1800, Spanish law
continued in force, because France assumed sovereignty for only
twenty days in 1803 before the United States took
possession of Louisiana on December 20 of that
year.
After the transfer to the U.S., pressure came from the incoming
Americans to impose the common law in Louisiana, particularly
because six different compilations of Spanish laws existed and it was
unclear which of over 20,000 individual laws of Spain applied in the
territory. Thanks, however, to the leadership of Edward Livingston, a
New York common lawyer who had become a convert to the
superiority of the civil law after moving to New Orleans, and following
a political crisis surrounding the matter, a two-man committee was
mandated by the Louisiana legislature to prepare a compilation of the
civil law applicable in the "Territory of Orleans."" The product was a
digest,9 3 known as the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, which was
approved even by Governor Claiborne, who had formerly been a major
advocate of the common law.
Why is there a Louisiana Civil Code of 1825?
Despite the Digest, confusion persisted as to which specific laws
applied in Louisiana.' Another committee was therefore instructed by
the legislature to revise the civil code and add to it any missing laws
still found to be in force. The result was the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825, which was modelled very closely on the French Civil Code, most
of its 3,522 articles having an exact equivalent in that Code.' It was
designed to replace all pre-existing law, although the courts refused to
give it quite the sweeping effect that had been intended.
The 1808 and 1825 Codes were both drafted in French and translated
into English, after which they were published in both languages, both
versions being official. The enabling statute of the 1808 Code"
required consultation of both language versions in the event of
ambiguity of any provision. The 1825 Code, on the other hand, was
merely published in both French and English, without any provision in
its enabling statute for resolving conflicts.
What law prevailed over Egypt after the Roman law?
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Islamic law. Prior to the arrival of Islam in 641 A.D., Roman law
prevailed in Egypt. The Islamic conquest led, however, to the
imposition of Islamic Sharialaw, consisting of a compilation of Islamic
jurisprudence, rooted in the Koran (the Islamic Holy Book), the Sunna
(the Prophet's traditions),the ijma (the consensus of opinion of Moslem
jurists) and other sources. This law was administered by Shariacourts,
empowered to hear civil, criminal and family matters within their
assigned territories."e Sharialaw prevailed for approximately eleven
hundred years, but, interestingly, permitted non-Moslems to apply
their own religiously-based family law systems, so that, in that domain,
Egypt may be said to have been a mixed legal system for centuries.
What kind of legal system did Egypt have after the accession to
power of Mohammed Ali as ruler of Egypt in 1805?
“Mixed codes”. The accession to power of Mohammed Ali as ruler of
Egypt in 1805 resulted in the increasing influence of European law,
and particularly of French law, in the country. Beginning in 1856, a
system of fourteen judicial councils was created to administer non-
Moslem family law in Egypt (especially for the benefit of foreign
residents). In 1875, a system of "mixed courts" was established, to
administer the so-called "mixed codes," being different civil,
commercial, penal and procedural codes governing the relations
between foreigners or between foreigners and Egyptians. These
codes, notably the Civil Code of 1875, were modelled on the
corresponding codes in force in France. In fact, the Egyptian
government would only adopt them after their approval by those
foreign countries (principally Britain and France) which enjoyed a
privileged status in Egypt."
Did it prevail?
No. Not surprisingly, considerable confusion and jurisdictional conflict
arose out of this complex legal and judicial structure, leading to
demands for simplification and rationalization. The mixed courts were
abolished in 1949 and the Sharia courts and religious judicial councils
in 1955, their jurisdiction being transferred to the national courts, which
came to be known as "ordinary courts."' The old "mixed
codes" were replaced by national codes of universal application to
Egyptians and foreigners alike, notably the new Egyptian Civil Code
of 1948 and the Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure of 1968, which
continued to reflect French influence. Significantly, however, family
law, although now administered in a unified judiciary, continued to be
subject to the "personal law" of each of the principal religious
groupings within the population, in accordance with the "Personal
Status Law" of 1929
What is the principal source of legislation in Egypt?
Today, under Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, as
amended in 1980, Islamic Sharia law is the principal source of
legislation in Egypt. Both Moslem and civilian legal systems coexist,
however, as illustrated in a decision of the Supreme Constitutional
Court in 1985, "1 holding that Article 226 of the Civil Code, permitting
interest to be charged on overdue debts, was not, as alleged,
unconstitutional under Article 2 of the Constitution, because that
provision was not retroactive, and because its implementation in
specific fields of private law was not automatic, but required express
amending legislation.
Is the Modern Egyptian law a mixed legal system?
Yes. Modern Egyptian law is therefore an intriguing mixed legal
system, blending civilian rules fashioned, in style, structure and
content, on the model of the French Civil Code of 1804, with the law
of Islam and, in family law areas (such as marriage, divorce, filiation
and, alimentary obligations), with a variety of religiously-founded
personal laws.
Civil Law and Common Law: Differences in Sources, Concepts,
and Style
A. Order of Priority: Jurisprudence and Doctrine
Priority in Civil Law is given to doctrine (including the codifier’s reports)
over jurisprudence.
Priority in Common Law is given to jurisprudence over doctrine
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This difference in priority can be explained by the role of the legislator
in both traditions. French civil law adopts Montesquieu's theory of
separation of powers, whereby the function of the legislator is to
legislate, and the function of the courts is to apply the law. Common
law, on the other hand, finds in judge-made precedent the core of its
law.
B. Doctrine: Functions
The civil law doctrine's function is "to draw from this disorganized mass
[cases, books and legal dictionaries] the rules and the principles which
will clarify and purge the subject of impure elements, and thus provide
both the practice and the courts with a guide for the solution of
particular cases in the future."
The common law doctrine's function is more modest: authors are
encouraged to distinguish cases that would appear incompatible to a
civilist, and to extract from these specific rules.
C. Doctrine: Style
The civilist focuses rather on legal principles. He or she traces
their history, identifies their function, determines their domain of
application, and explains their effects in terms of rights and
obligations. At this stage, general and exceptional effects are
deduced. Apart from requiring some statutory analysis,
determining the area of application of a principle involves some
induction from the existing case law, while delimiting exceptions
involves some deduction.
The common law author focuses on fact patterns. He or she
analyzes cases presenting similar but not identical facts,
extracting from the specific rules, and then, through deduction,
determines the often very narrow scope of each rule, and
sometimes proposes new rules to cover facts that have not yet
presented themselves.
D. Jurisprudence: Function
Civil law jurisprudence applies general principles, and that is
only a secondary source of law of explanation
Common law jurisprudence sets out a new specific rule to a new
specific set of facts and provides the principal source of law
E. Stare Decisis
The English doctrine of stare decisis compels lower courts to
follow decisions rendered in higher courts, hence establishing an
order of priority of sources by “reason of authority." Stare decisis
is unknown to civil law, where judgments rendered by judges only
enjoy the "authority of reason.
F. Jurisprudence: Style
Civil law judgments are written in a more formalistic style than
common law judgments.
Civil law decisions are indeed shorter than common law decisions, and
are separated into two parts- the motifs (reasons) and the
dispositif(order). This is because civil law judges are specially trained
in special schools created for the purpose, while common law judges
are appointed from amongst practicing lawyers, without special
training.
The method of writing judgments is also different.
Common law judgments extensively expose the facts, compare or
distinguish them from the facts of previous cases, and decide (if not
create) the specific legal rule relevant to the present facts.
Civil law decisions first identify the legal principles that might be
relevant, then verify if the facts support their application (only the facts
relevant to the advanced principle thus need be stated). (In Québec,
the common law methodology is followed.)
G. Statues: Functions
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Civil law codes provide the core of the law-general principles are
systematically and exhaustively exposed in codes" 6 and particular
statutes complete them. Finally follows the jurisprudence.
Common law statutes, on the other hand, complete the case law,
which latter contains the core of the law expressed through
specific rules applying to specific facts.
H. Style of Drafting of Laws
Civil law codes and statutes are concise Common law statutes are
precise.
Civil law statutes provide no definitions, and state principles in broad,
general phrases
Common law statutes provide detailed definitions, and each specific
rule sets out lengthy enumerations of specific applications or
exceptions,preceded by a catch-all phrase and followed by a
demurrer such as "notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing.”
This difference in style is linked to the function of statutes.
Civilian statutory general principles need not be explained, precisely
because they are not read restrictively (not being exceptions), but
need to be stated concisely if the code is to be exhaustive.
Common law statutory provisions need not be concise, because they
cover only the specific part of the law to be reformed, but must be
precise, because the common law courts restrict rules to the specific
facts they are intended to cover.
Those styles can be found in international conventions.
The Hamburg Rules were drafted in a civilian style with the rule of
responsibility in-one sweeping article The Hague Rules, by
comparison, were drafted in a common law fashion, with
responsibility in three very long and detailed articles.
I. Interpretation of Laws
In civil law jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous law,
according to Mazeaud, is to discover the intention of the legislator by
examining the legislation as a whole as well as the provisions more
immediately surrounding the obscure text.
In common law jurisdictions, by comparison, statutes are to be
objectively construed according to certain rules standing by
themselves,' such as that an enactment must be read as whole, and
that special provisions will control general provisions, so as to meet
the subjects' reasonable understandings and expectations.
Two reasons can be advanced to explain this difference in
interpretation.
Firstly, common law statutes have to be read against a case law
background, while civil law codes and statutes are the primary source
of law under Montesquieu's theory.
Secondly, civil law judges are influenced by Rousseau's theory that
the State is the source of all rights under the social contract, while
English judges favour Hobbes' theory that the individual agreed to
forfeit to the State only certain rights.
J. The Appointment of Judges
Common law judges, who are called to play an important role in
deciding what the law is, are appointed from among experienced
practicing lawyers.
Civil law judges, whose main function is adjudicating, are
appointed fresh from specialized schools. (Québec judges, in the
common law tradition, however, are all appointed from practicing
lawyers, this being another example of the common law tradition
in Québec.)
K. Consequences – Evolution of the Law
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Civil law principles are frozen into codes and often rigid doctrine
and are imposed on courts
Most common law rules can be changed from time to time, subject
to the doctrine of stare decisis.
On one hand, the realities of modern life can be addressed in a
timelier fashion through the common law, e.g. the salvage lien and
repairer's lien.
On the other hand, common law judges are sometimes hesitant to
change a rule, where the consequences of doing so in relation to
the whole of the law are not clear."
Less timid to reform, civil law jurisdictions have sometimes hired
learned authors to assist in effecting major legal changes.
L. Concept of the Legal Rule
Civil law systems are "closed," in the sense that every possible
situation is governed by a limited number of general principles,'
while common law system are "open," in the sense that new rules
may be created or imported for new facts.
Civil law allows for wider rules than does the common law in
private law matters (those rules that can be avoided by contract),
in that civil law rules are suppletive (the parties are deemed to
know the law and hence to be aware of those rules), while
common law rules are presumptive of the intention of the parties
when relevant facts are present
M. Categories of Laws
Civil law categories are based on the rules themselves, e.g. private
law and public law,"' while common law categories were founded on
the law that was administered by different courts, e.g. common law
courts and the court of Equity.
Adjectival law (which includes the rules of procedure and evidence)
was traditionally given considerable attention in common law
jurisdictions, while substantive law habitually received more attention
in civil law jurisdictions.
N. Rights versus Remedies
Civil law focuses on rights and obligations, while common law is
oriented toward the jurisdiction of particular courts to grant the sought-
after remedy ("remedies precede rights")."
It follows that the civil law does not have a clearly defined system of
remedies, but relies rather on the courts to choose or even create the
appropriate remedy. Conversely, the common law does not have a
unitary system of rights and obligations.
Civil law and Common law: Resulting Differences in
Law A. Economic Loss
Civil law's unitary system of obligations provides for the same
means of enforcement whatever the obligation (patrimonial or not,
contractual or not), including performance by equivalence,
i.e. damages, which include losses of profits."
Common law, while allowing consequential damages in contract,
used to be unwilling to award pure economic loss (i.e. damages
in tort when there is no physical damage).
B. Pre-judgment Interests
Pre-judgment interests are recoverable as of right in civil law,
because they are understood as part of the lucrum cessans.
On the contrary, pre-judgment interest has been awarded only in
relatively recent times in common law systems, except in maritime
law.
C. Lex Mercatoria
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The modem lex mercatoria finds its strength in civilian
jurisdictions, as was pointed out by Thomas Carbonneau:
It is not surprising that the strongest advocates of the new law
merchant are from civil law jurisdictions where general legal
principles constitute the primary source of law and specialized
courts have long handled commercial disputes at an intermediary
level of the legal system. Nor is it astonishing that the most virulent
critics of lex mercatoria and delocalization are steeped in the
common law tradition of narrow rules and holdings, where
decisional law is the foremost source of law and courts are its
oracles.
D. Conflict of Laws
Terminology-In common law, "conflict of laws" includes choice of law,
choice of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments. In civil law,
the appropriate translation is "private international law" because
conflict of laws merely governs choice of law rules.
History-While private international law dates back to the Roman times,
common law conflict of laws rules are relatively new, because the
procedural requirement of service used to be sufficient to limit the
jurisdiction of the court to domestic conflicts.
Emphasis- Civil law, being essentially substantive instead of
adjectival, puts more emphasis on its choice of law rules, while
common law, being essentially procedural, focuses on the rules of
jurisdiction
Traditional method -The civil law traditional method (imported into
many common law systems) consists in characterizing the dispute as
belonging a defined category, and then identifying the applicable
internal law in relation to points of attachment of the category
concerned. Even with similar categories (e.g. procedural versus
substantive issues), the characterization of issues is always influenced
(if not mandatorily governed) by the lex fori; hence a delay
to sue issue would be characterized as substantive in civil law (relating
to prescription) and procedural in common law (relating to limitation
periods). The same is true of maritime liens, which are procedures in
England, and substantive rights in civil law, as in certain common law
jurisdictions.
Special methods--Civil law and common law developed similar rules
to limit the scope of the traditional method when its strict application
led to undesirable results. The civil law notions of fraude à la loi and
fraude au jugement” are similar to the common law rule of "no evasion
of the law"; the same is true of civil law's international public order and
common law's public policy. The civil law concept of Ioi d'application
immédiate(mandatory rules) is also making its way outside the civil
law jurisdictions.
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court,
which has jurisdiction to hear a claim, refuses to do so, because it
believes another court of another state also has jurisdiction to hear the
claim and can better render justice in the circumstances.' This principle
was unknown to civil law courts, which are often required by the
constitutions of their respective countries to hear an action, although
they may suspend it. Scotland was first to develop the concept of
forum non conveniens and now Quebec and Louisiana'" have adopted
the principle.
F. Forum Conveniens
Forum conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court,
which does not have jurisdiction over a claim, nevertheless accepts
jurisdiction, because there is no other appropriate jurisdiction to hear
the claim and justice would not otherwise be done.
The principle is not known in civil law.
G. Arbitration
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A common law equity clause in an arbitration agreement "purports
expressly to dispense the arbitrator from applying the law either wholly
or in part."
In civil law, these are called amiable compositeur clauses. While strict
equity clauses (also known as ex equo et bono clauses) are suspect
in England, amiable compositeur clauses are generally permitted in
civil law jurisdictions and are found in civilian codes.
H. Arbitration and Interpretation/Construction of Contracts
The common law objective contract theory dictates that contractual
promises be interpreted according to the reasonable expectation of
the promisee (an objective standard).
Civil law, which is based on the autonomy of free will, requires actual
consent (a subjective standard), but presumptions of fact are available
to the trial judge.
Some Civilian Principles Now in the Common Law
A. Restitution
Terminology- While the principle of unjust enrichment now unites
restitutionary claims at common law, unjust enrichment at civil law is
but one of the quasi-contracts (others being negotiorum gestio and
solution indebitii) which triggers restitution.
It is interesting that today the three basic requirements of unjustified
enrichment under both civil law and common law are: 1) an enrichment
by the receipt of a benefit, 2) that this benefit be gained at the plaintiff's
expense, and 3) a lack of legal cause.
B. Negligence: Delict – The General Tort of Negligence
Civil law, on the contrary, always recognized the general
obligation not to act unreasonably in situations not governed by
contract.
Donohue v. Stevenson created, amongst the special duties of care
already sanctioned by the action in negligence, a general duty of
care similar to that of civil law: "you must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would
be likely to injure your neighbor," neighbors being "persons who
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are
called in question."'' Since then, "obligations" are now taught in
common law schools and books are written on the subject.
C. Foreseeable Contractual Damages
In civil law, it is not sufficient that contractual damages be the
immediate and direct consequence of the non-performance; they
must have been foreseen or foreseeable at the time that the
obligation was contracted unless there is intentional or gross fault.
D. Pre-Judgment Interests
Civil law, the general principle of restitutio in integrum entails that
pre- judgment interests be granted as a loss of profit. Interest is
even payable as of right when the debtor has delayed in
performing an obligation to pay a sum of money, and are
calculated from the date the obligation was due.
Pre-judgment interests were gradually awarded in common law.
E. Proof of Foreign Law
Common law is more adversarial, while civil law is more inquisitorial,
when it comes to proving the substance of a foreign law, a question of
fact arising in a choice of law or recognition of foreign law situation.
15
8
At common law, foreign law was proven by the testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, who were summoned to court, and subject to
examination as to both their qualifications as experts and their
knowledge and interpretation of the foreign law in question.
In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, foreign laws needed
usually be proven only by the production of a certificate, prepared by
a diplomat of the relevant state or an expert in the foreign law
concerned, who, however, was not called to testify as a witness at
trial. Moreover, judicial notice was possible and is now compulsory.
Other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and the United
States of America have taken an even more civilian route in adopting
less formalistic means of proof and permitting judicial notice as a
general rule.
F. Contributory Negligence and Last Opportunity Rule
While at common law, contributory negligence has always been a
complete bar to an action in tort, civil law has always dealt with this
issue as a mere question of causation, thereby apportioning liability
according to the gravity of the concurrent faults.
By way of statute, most common law jurisdictions have now limited, if
not abolished, the contributory negligence rule, and adopted the more
equitable "proportionate fault" (comparative fault) rule.' The Supreme
Court of Canada even took the matter of reform in its own hands and
eliminated the contributory negligence bar in respect of torts aboard a
single ship under Canadian maritime law."'
Moreover, the common law developed the "last opportunity rule"
(known as the "the last clear chance rule" in the U.S.) in order to avoid
triggering the contributory negligence rule against an otherwise faulty
claimant.
As to the "last opportunity rule," it was held to be incompatible with
the new proportionate fault system and hence fell obsolete.
G. Marine Insurance
Common law speaks of an undertaking to indemnify "marine losses,
that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure."
Civil law is concerned instead with the guarantee of "risks in respect
of a maritime operation."'
Despite this different wording, however, common law marine policies
cover risk interests as well as property rights.
The Lex Mercatoria
A. The Influence of the Lex Mercatoria
In medieval Europe, beginning as early as the ninth century and-
continuing up until the sixteenth century, there existed a remarkably
uniform body of customary mercantile law which was applied by
merchant courts in commercial disputes. This transnational custom
was known as the lex mercatoria, or in English, the "Law Merchant."'
' The lex mercatoria incorporated a body of customary private
maritime law, the lex maritima, or "Ley Maryne" as it was called in
French. The two were interrelated because of the importance of
seafaring commerce in medieval Europe.
The Law Merchant, including maritime law, thus constituted a legal
system, with rules and institutions of its own, which relied upon
codified principles in the civilian manner, and which was burdened
with little conflict of laws because of its Europe-wide character.
But in addition there is what has been called the "new" Law Merchant,
the modem lex mercatoria, which many scholars believe is gradually
beginning to take shape in international commerce. The 1993 Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP
500) published by the International Chamber of Commerce is one
example, being a compilation of modern banking practices which
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enjoy near universal acceptance and "will readily be treated by the
court as impliedly incorporated into the various documentary credit
contracts as established usage." The 1990 Incoterms of the
International Chamber of Commerce also provide a transnational set
of conditions on price and delivery applied uniformly in international
sale of goods contracts.
Another significant development is the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention
which "seeks to maintain a delicate balance between the contrasting
attitudes and concepts of the civil law and of the common law...”in
harmonizing law on the sale of goods between States party to the
Convention. It is noteworthy that the Convention has been applied as
part of the modem lex mercatoria by the Iran- United States Claims
Tribunal.
In shipping, the influence of the contemporary Law Merchant may be
seen in the use by shippers and ship-owners and their respective
agents of a multitude of standard-form contracts, particularly
standard-form bills of lading and charter parties, as well as in certain
normative documents frequently incorporated by reference into
carriage of goods by sea contracts.
One of the areas in which growth of a modem lex mercatoria is most
visible is in international commercial arbitration. With each passing
year, there is an ever-increasing volume of reported arbitral awards
(particularly in civil law jurisdictions, as well as in the United States),
and arbitrators are tending more and more to refer to previous awards
rendered in similar cases, thus gradually developing a system of
arbitral precedent."
B. The 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts
A major step forward in the development of a modern lex mercatoria
was taken in 1994 when the Governing Council of the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome, Italy
adopted the "Principles of International Commercial Contracts."' This
document was the fruit of some fourteen years of
Service. Sacrifice. Excellence.
labour by a working group comprising some of the most respected
specialists in contract law and international trade law from the civil
law, common law and Socialist legal systems in different countries of
the world. Its drafters took account of both common law and civilian
compilations and codifications. Together with the Comments, the
UNIDROIT Principles set forth some of the fundamental concepts
underlying international commercial contracts in the modem world.
Accordingly, the Principles constitute more than just a checklist or
guide to negotiators in concluding transborder trade agreements.
They are autonomous in character, in that they permit issues which
are not addressed specifically to be resolved in harmony with their
basic tenets. Most importantly, the Principles may be applied as
constituting the lex mercatoria when the parties to the contract have
agreed that it should be applicable, thus giving added credibility to
the existence of the new Law Merchant itself.
Finally, it is immensely significant that the Principles can be, and are
being, applied as models for national and international lawmakers in
drafting new legislation on commercial contracts.
Among the reasons for the rapid acceptance of the UNIDROIT
Principles is their accessibility in many languages. “They have also
found a place in the curricula and teaching materials of literally dozens
of law faculties in Europe. North America, South America, Africa and
Asia." Another is the fact that they represent a consensus of over
seventy specialists from all major legal systems. Finally, as one
experienced American lawyer has commented:238 "The great
importance of the (UNIDROITJ Principles is that the volume exists. It
can be taken to court, it can be referred to page and article number,
and persons who are referred to its provisions can locate and review
them without difficulty. This alone is a great contribution towards
making lex mercatoria definitive and provable."
The UNIDROIT Principles, in the few years since their approval,
have achieved an impressive synthesis of the law of international
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trade, reconciling different legal traditions in a creative and beneficial
fashion, to the benefit of the international business community.
Statutes to Unify or Reconcile the Two Systems
A unique initiative in the reconciliation of the common law with the civil
law by statute is underway in Canada. In June 1998, the federal
Minister of Justice introduced in the Canadian House of Commons,
Bill C-50, entitled Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1.
In Canada, where nine provinces and three territories are common
law jurisdictions, and only one province (Quebec) is a civil law
jurisdiction, there has been a regrettable tendency in the past for
federal statutes to be drafted using the vocabulary and style of the
common law alone.
Bill C-S0 seeks to correct such distortions in present federal law and
to prevent their repetition in the future. The major purpose of the Bill
is to "ensure that all existing federal legislation that deals with private
law integrates the terminology, concepts and institutions of Quebec
civil law."
Since 1993, the Department of Justice of Canada has reviewed
approximately 700 federal laws to identify those whose content or
format would be most affected by changes in the Quebec Civil Code,
and has identified approximately 300 such statutes which will require
further review over the next nine years. The challenge of effective
harmonization is therefore one of considerable magnitude. It remains
to be seen to what extent the high hopes underlying Bill C-50 will be
realized.
Nevertheless, harmonizing two legal systems by statute, in a manner
designed to respect the essence and genius of each system, is a
creative undertaking, and a development which, if successful in the
Canadian/Québec context, might well be of interest to other mixed
jurisdictions around the world.
What did the author experience in Practicing in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“As lawyers, we understood we had been trained as civilians, but in
corporate, tax, criminal and administrative matters, the law was
common law in both its nature and its drafting. The judges and lawyers
had no difficulty in adapting to both systems, so that imperceptibly one
legal tradition impinged on the other.
In consequence, in our day-to-day work, we found no major problem
in practising civil law in Québec and then moving over to the common
law of another province or of the Federal courts. In other words,
lawyers and judges are not concerned with practising and adjudging
law in the mixed jurisdiction of Québec. Rather, if they aware of the
dual legal systems, they rejoice in them.”
What did the author experience in Legislating in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“Today, one of the purposes of the nationalist movement and of
separatist politicians in Quebec is the protection of the civil law of
Quebec, along with the French language and culture. It is my view that
they can be protected as well, or perhaps better, in a federal system.”
What did the author experience in Teaching in a Mixed
Jurisdiction?
“Professors in mixed jurisdictions are much more concerned with the
distinction between the civil law and the common law than are
practitioners. The latter consider the other tradition merely as a
different law, or a foreign law, with which they must contend.
In Quebec, the civil law is very important as a major part of Quebec's
distinctive nature. The civil law, like the French language, must be
protected from the intrusions of the common law. Professors lead the
charge in this regard, whether or not they are separatists politically.”
What is the view of the author in the creation of Mixed
Jurisdictions?
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“It is my view that mixed jurisdictions are created when one culture,
with its law, language and style of courts, imposes upon another
culture, usually by conquest. The imposition on Quebec of the English
common law, together with England's administrative, judicial and
legislative system, leaving the French civil law to continue
unchanged, is an example Mixed jurisdictions may also be created
by the voluntary "reception" of foreign law.' The classic example of
this process may be found in Scotland.”
Survival of Mixed Jurisdictions
“It is my very strong view that it is very difficult for a mixed
jurisdiction to survive if it has only one language, one
legislature and one court system. The two legal systems in
such a mixed jurisdiction are soon melded together as one.”
A. Language
1. Québec
Under Canada's Constitution Act, 1867, all provincial laws and
regulations of Quebec, as well as all federal laws and regulations,
must be adopted in both French and English, so that Canada and
Québec have, in fact, two languages of legislation. Both languages
may be used in the debates and must be used in the records of both
the federal Parliament and the Quebec National Assembly. Either of
those languages may be used in any court of Canada (i.e. the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada), as well
as in the courts of Quebec. French, of course, is a major language of
the civil law, Quebec's system of private law. English, on the other
hand, is traditionally the language of the common law, which forms
the basis of Québec's public law, as well as of many spheres of
federal law (e.g. criminal law, maritime law, etc.).
Both the historic languages of the civil law and the common law in fact
continue to be read, understood, spoken and written by Quebec's
legislators, judges, lawyers and scholars. The decisions of
Quebec judges frequently contain quotations from both civil law
sources (generally in French) and from common law sources
(generally in English).
A clear commitment to the preservation of the civilian legal tradition of
Quebec law, even in the context of Canadian federal legislation, is
seen in the draft Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. I
discussed above.
This "bijuralism" and bilingualism also cause Quebec lawyers
(especially graduates of the "National Programme" offered by the
Faculty of Law of McGill University) to be in great demand in
international law firms and international organizations, as well as in
the Canadian federal civil service, where both their language skills and
their knowledge of the two principal legal systems of the Western
world are highly prized.
2. South Africa
South Africa's mixed legal system also thrives largely because both
Afrikaans and English are recognized as official languages of the
Republic, together with a number of indigenous languages."
Historically, the fact that Dutch and German were languages
accessible to so many Afrikaners also contributed, particularly in the
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the survival of
Roman-Dutch law, at a time when it risked being totally undermined
by the common law and the English language.
This practice brought much modern civilian learning into South
African law, a process greatly facilitated by virtue of the fact that the
Afrikaans - speaking academics enjoyed a linguistic affinity to at least
two of the most influential European countries.
The laws of the Republic are enacted in both Afrikaans and English,
which languages are also official in the courts. Law students require
a knowledge of both those tongues to pursue their studies and to
practise effectively afterwards. Judgments are written in both
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languages, and both civil law and common law authorities are cited
in them. Legal publishing is also done in both Afrikaans and English,
with much of the writing on Roman-Dutch law appearing in Afrikaans.
There is also a recognition of customary law in the new Constitution
of 1996.
3. Louisiana
The state's first Constitution in 1812 was actually drafted in French,
and only a duly authenticated English translation was sent to
Washington, to comply with the requirements of the Enabling Act of
the U.S. Congress, which permitted Louisiana to accede to
statehood.
Under Louisiana's 1845 Constitution, the Constitution and laws of
Louisiana were required to be promulgated in the English and French
languages (Article 132), The Constitutions of 1845 (Article
104) and 1852 (Article 101) also obliged the Secretary of the State
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives to be
"conversant" with both French and English, and permitted members to
address either House in French or in English.
The State Constitutions of 1879 (Article 154), 1898 (Article 165) and
1913 (Article 165), however, all contained provisions requiring the
laws, public records and judicial and legislative written proceedings to
be promulgated reserved and conducted in English. Eventually under
the 1921 Constitution, the English language alone came to prevail in
the legislature and the courts of Louisiana, as it did also in public
education.
Under Louisiana's present Constitution of 1974, there is no provision
on the official language or the language of the legislature or the courts,
but in fact English alone is the official tongue.
4. Scotland
A similar situation prevails in Scotland, where language, and culture
generally, played a role in the "reception" of Roman law into Scots law
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and more recently, in
the reception of much English common law, thus making Scotlanda
"mixed jurisdiction."
Robin Evans- Jones attributes the first reception largely to the
influence of Scottish lawyers who received their legal education in
continental European universities and then went home with "an
intellectual and cultural preference for the Civil law in which they had
been trained."
At that time, such studies were undertaken in Latin, French and/or
Dutch. In the nineteenth century, however, as a result of a "cultural
shift in Scotland from continental Europe towards England,"
Scottish lawyers ceased being trained on the Continent and began
to see themselves as part of a worldwide community of English-
speaking lawyers sharing with English and American jurists a legal
heritage associated with justice and freedom. The result of this
cultural transformation has been a slow erosion of the civilian
heritage of Scots law, in favor of its English common law
component.
Evans-Jones cites the example of the concept of condictio
indebiti, or unjustified enrichment, which Scottish judges have
increasingly refined and interpreted in accordance with English,
rather than modern civil law.
He observes that the general principle of unjustified enrichment,
as a source of obligations, is really the creation of the later civilian
tradition (not generally taught in Scottish law schools), rather than
of Roman law, and notes:
The fact that English is the only official language in Scotland
obviously makes it much harder to secure the kind of widespread
knowledge of the modern European civil law among Scots lawyers
which Evans-Jones sees as vital to shoring up the foundation of
Scots law. Nor does it appear likely that any traditional civil law
language (e.g. Latin or French) will be made
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official by Scotland's new Parliament, which assumed its
legislative powers on July 1, 1999.
It is therefore clear that the presence of two (or more) official and
"living" languages in a mixed jurisdiction makes a major contribution
to the flourishing of the two (or more) legal systems of that jurisdiction,
as well as to the preservation of the genius and tradition underlying
each system.
Conversely, the existence of only one official language in a mixed
jurisdiction tends to foster the erosion of any legal system other than
the one of which that language is the principal medium of expression.
5. Other Jurisdictions
It would be interesting to study the effect on the law of Israel of the
presence in that country of two languages (Hebrew and English),
and the effect on Egypt of the presence of two legal systems (Sharia
law and French civil law) in that country, which has only one official
language (Arabic).
B. Separate Legislatures
Where a mixed jurisdiction has its own legislature separate from the
legislature of the federation (if any) of which it forms part, and
separate from the legislature of any other country, it is easier to
secure the future of the divergent legal traditions of the jurisdiction
than it is where only one assembly exercises legislative power.
Quebec has had its own legislature, separate from the federal
Parliament in Ottawa, from the beginning of Canadian Confederation
in 1867. This feature of Canadian federalism has not only helped
maintain Québec's distinct cultural identity as the one jurisdiction in
North America where the language and culture of the majority of the
people is French; it has also served to safeguard and to foster the
development of the civil law tradition of the province, as a mixed
jurisdiction, within Canada.
Louisiana too possesses its own legislature, but the less extensive
legislative authority of the states of the American Union compared to
the provinces of the Canadian federation, coupled with the power of
the federal common law of the United States, makes it more difficult
for Louisiana than for Quebec to preserve and enhance its civilian
tradition.
South Africa, with its own national and provincial legislatures, is also able
to protect and stimulate the growth of its mixed legal system.
Scotland has its own Parliament again after nearly two hundred years
during which its legislation has been enacted by the United Kingdom
Parliament sitting at West minister. It should therefore be able to take
action to develop both the civilian and common law components of
Scots law by legislation. With respect to the civilian heritage, it is to
be hoped that Scots legislators, now that the new Parliament has
assumed its functions, will set in motion a planned process for the
codification of Scottish civil law, entrusting this task to a carefully-
selected group of experts, who will have the general civilian
background and language skills necessary to permit them to draw
inspiration from contemporary codifications in the States of the
European Union, as well as from Louisiana, Québec, Japan, and the
Latin American countries, in drafting a code responding to the needs
of contemporary Scotland.
It should be noted, however, that where a mixed jurisdiction lacks its
own legislature, the protection and promotion of its different legal
traditions can nevertheless be supported beneficially by the
involvement of an active law commission or other specialized legal
agency. Separate legislative structures, or at least separate law
enforcement and law reform agencies, are vital to the survival of
mixed jurisdictions.
C. Separate Courts
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Apart from distinct languages and separate legislatures, another
major support for a mixed jurisdiction is a separate court system.
In Canada , the administration of justice in the provinces generally falls
under the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. The federal
Government nevertheless has the power to appoint judges of the
superior courts of the provinces (including the provincial courts of
appeal), with the appointment of judges of inferior courts being the
responsibility of the provincial governments. The provincial courts
(superior and inferior) adjudicate all claims within their respective
monetary jurisdiction, whether those claims arise under federal or
provincial law. For this reason, Canada is said to have a "co-
operative" court system (sometimes called a "unitary" court system,
not to be confused with a unitary State).
There are also two federal courts established by Parliament for the
"better administration of the laws of Canada": the Supreme Court of
Canada(the final court of appeal for Canada since 1949 in all cases
decided by the provincial courts of appeal) and the Federal Court of
Canada (which has both a Trial Division and an Appeal Division and
is a statutory tribunal deciding disputes in a limited number of fields of
federal law, such as industrial property, admiralty matters and
immigration appeals).
As a Canadian province, Quebec has the Court of Quebec (an inferior
court with provincially-appointed judges), as well as the Quebec
Superior Court (a superior court of general jurisdiction) and the Court
of Appeal of Quebec (a superior court of appeal), both of which have
federally appointed judges. These judges decide civil cases arising
under both federal and provincial law, and therefore under both of
Quebec's legal systems. The judges are appointed from among
practising lawyers trained in Quebec civil law, and who are also
familiar with common law, at least to the extent that it underlies much
statutory law, both federal and provincial, which they are called upon
to apply.
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest
court of appeal in both civil and criminal cases, ordinarily has three
justices from Quebec who are jurists trained and experienced in the
civil law of the province. They sit with six judges drawn from the
common law provinces. The Quebec justices normally write the
leading decisions in all appeals in cases involving Quebec civil law.
The common law justices are in most cases well versed in the civil
law, however, as are the Quebec judges in the common law. The
two legal traditions therefore continue to be living realities in the
highest court of the land, and they interact with one another without
compromising the integrity of either system.
Louisiana, like other American states, has both federal and state
courts of first instance and appeal. Most of the civil litigation involving
the Louisiana Civil Code is tried in the state courts, whose elected
judges are former lawyers with at least five years of practice in the
state."' As former lawyers, they must have passed Bar examinations
testing their knowledge of civil law before being admitted to legal
practice, as well as those aspects of common law which apply in
Louisiana. Appeals to that Court from decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in disputes governed by the civil law of the state are
usually heard and decided by justices schooled and experienced
only in the common law.
In South Africa , under the 1996 Constitution, the judicial structure
of the Republic consists of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Court of Appeal, the High Courts, including any high court of appeal
that may be established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from
High Courts, the Magistrates' Courts and any other court established
or recognized in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of
a status similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates' Courts.
The judges of these courts are trained ex- practitioners of both
Roman-Dutch and common law, as are those of the Supreme Court
of Appeal, the Republic's final court of appeal, and of its
Constitutional Court. The legal profession consists of "advocates"
(similar to English barristers) and
165
"attorneys" (similar to English solicitors). The advocates are
organized into Bar associations or societies (one each at the seat of
the various divisions of the Supreme Court), with the General
Council of the Bar of South Africa acting as the coordinating body of
those associations. The attorneys are organized into one law society
for each province, with the Association of Law Societies playing the
coordinating role. Advocates must pass the National Bar
Examination of the General Council of the Bar, and attorneys must
meet certain degree requirements.
The key part which the South African courts play in maintaining the
country's distinct legal heritage is recognized officially in the 1996
Constitution, which provides at Section 173: "The Constitutional Court,
Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common
law, taking into account the interests of justice." (italics added for
emphasis). "Common law" is taken to mean the full South African law,
including both its English and Dutch legacies, as they have evolved in
the Republic.
Scotland too has long had a separate court system, including sheriffs'
courts and the Court of Session, with its Outer and Inner Houses. The
fact that the House of Lords is the final court of appeal for Scotland in
civil cases has sometimes been invoked by authors concerned over
the maintenance of the civilian heritage of Scots law. It is significant
that the Scotland Act 1998 provides that judicial appointments are a
devolved matter, in the sense that although the Lord President of the
Court of Session and the Lord Justice Clerk shall continue to be
recommended by the Prime Minister to the Queen for appointment,
such recommendations must be based upon a nomination by the
Scottish Executive. The other judges of the Court of Session, sheriff’s
principal and sheriffs shall be recommended for appointment to the
Queen by the First Minister (of Scotland), after consulting the Lord
President."
Egypt no longer has its Sharia courts administering Sharia law,
separate from the national courts administering its codes.
Nonetheless, the judges of the unified, national courts possess
expertise in both Sharia and codal law, so that Egypt's mixed legal
heritage appears to be safeguarded for the future.
The survival of mixed jurisdictions is immensely aided by the
existence of separate judicial structures, staffed by judges
possessing a thoroughgoing understanding of the different legal
traditions concerned. Such separate court structures exist in virtually
all mixed jurisdictions today. It is desirable to ensure as well the
representation, in the highest court of the State in which a mixed
jurisdiction exists, of a certain number of judges trained in the two
legal systems, especially where one of the systems applies to a
minority population and/or to only one particular region (e.g. Quebec,
Louisiana and Scotland).
Conclusion
This paper has identified some of the principal mixed jurisdictions in
the contemporary world and has sketched (very briefly) the historical
development of their respective mixed legal systems. Special attention
has been devoted to systems combining elements of the common law
tradition with elements of the civilian tradition in either uncodified form
(e.g. Scotland and South Africa) or in codifications (Louisiana and
Quebec).
Some major differences in content, structure and style as between
these two traditions have been explored, and some examples of
differences between the substantive law rules of each have been
presented.
The contribution of the lex mercatoria (both ancient and modem) to
reconciling differences between legal traditions has been surveyed.
In this domain, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts 1994, that remarkable synthesis of fundamental values and
ideas on international- trade law achieved by specialists from different
legal systems, is of particular importance, because it is
166
increasingly accepted as a guideline and applied as a substantive
restatement of supranational commercial norms.
The paper has also noted the recent Canadian project of harmonizing
federal legislation (reflecting common law) with Quebec civil law by
statute. I have also made personal observations on mixed legal
systems, from the viewpoint of a practitioner, a legislator and a law
teacher.
Finally, I have warned that mixed jurisdictions can best survive if each
legal system has its own language, courts and legislature.
The preservation of different languages, cultures and institutions
(legislative and judicial) within a mixed jurisdiction, high quality legal
education and the enactment of codes and statutes, can all be of
significant assistance in the continuance and evolution of a mixed
legal system, in the face of globalization and pressure for
standardization.
Equally important to the survival and development of any mixed legal
system, however, is the awareness of judges, lawyers, legislators and
academics of the distinctiveness of the legal traditions underlying the
system. This must be coupled with a profound commitment to defend,
and indeed to celebrate, the integrity of each of those traditions, so
that they may make their particular contributions to the system as a
whole.
For those of us living and practising in mixed jurisdictions, the fate of
our mixed legal systems at the turn of the millennium depends, in the
final analysis, not on our stars, but on ourselves.
MODULE 5
V. ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS
STARE DECISIS
Fermin v. People
G.R. No. 157643
28 March 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo
Gutierrez, 2 criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli
Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
Fermin was charged being the publisher of “Gossip Tabloid” while
Tugas was editor-in-chief.
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it
is improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true
that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case here in the
Philippines for she and husband Eddie Gutierrez have more
problems/cases to confront there. This was said to be due to their,
especially Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to remit
proceeds to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were
selling and not being on good terms with the latter.
The Court of Appeals acquitted Tugas on account of non- participation
but Fermin's conviction was affirmed.
Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
She argues that she had no knowledge and participation in the
publication of the article, that the article is not libelous and is covered
by the freedom of the press.
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ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cristy Fermin is guilty of libel. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is not
required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author,
editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication.
Petitioner was not only the “publisher,” but also the “president” and
“chairperson.” Petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether
or not she had actual knowledge and participation. The elements of
libel were present.
1) Evident imputation of the crime of malversation (converting
money for personal use), of vices or defects for being fugitives
from the law (evading prosecution in America) and of being a
wastrel
2) Attribution made publicly. Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
circulation.
3) The victims were identified and identifiable.
4) The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
5) Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself; the
imputations were false.
6) Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill against
complainants during the electoral campaign as Fermin is a
close friend of Eddie's opponent in the Congressional race.
While complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people do not have
the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in
broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
Note: CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But
the SC cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs
Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA as that would run afoul of
his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation
G.R. No. 159422
28 March 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Remington steel leased units 963, 964 and 966 of a building owned
by the Manila Downtown YMCA in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila.
Units 964 and 966 were on the ground floor which also served as
passageway to the second floor unit 963.
The lease contract over unit 963 was terminated by YMCA on
February 27, 1997.
On March 24, 1997, Remington filed with the MeTC a case for Fixing
of Lease Period over unit 963.
On April 8, 1997, YMCA filed in the same court an action for Unlawful
Detainer involving unit 963 against Remington.
On June 23, 1998, Remington filed a Formal Surrender of the Leased
Premises, opting to surrender possession of units 964 and 966.
Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966
as passageway to second floor unit 963. It kept the premises
padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises.
On August 11, 1998, MeTC rendered a decision extending the lease
for three years from finality of the decision the lease period on second
floor unit 963 and dismissed YMCA’s complaint for ejectment.
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On August 21, 1998, Remington filed in the MeTC a Motion to
Continue Passageway alleging that it had no means of ingress or
egress to second floor unit 963.
As reported by a Commissioner who conducted an ocular inspection,
Remington was still in possession of the keys to units 964 and 966
because YMCA failed to provide adequate passageway to unit 963.
The records of the case were forwarded to the RTC in connection with
the appeals taken by the parties.
RTC granted a longer extension period of five years for unit 963 and
ordered YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between unit 964
and 966.
YMCA appealed to the CA, which held that the lower courts had
authority to fix an extension of the lease period.
However, CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, as the
continuation of the lease was no longer tenable after the lapse of six
years, since the parties’ formal contract had already expired.
In the meantime, that the case in the CA was pending, YMCA filed in
MeTC-Manila two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to evict
Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966. The cases were
initially consolidated but eventually, they were tried separately.
Both MeTC-Manila branches which tried the two cases ordered
Remington to vacate the premises.
Remington appealed both decisions to the RTC-Manila, who both held
to reverse the respective decision of the lower court and dismissed the
two complaints for unlawful detainer.
YMCA filed separate motions for reconsiderations, which were denied.
YMCA then filed separate petitions for review in the CA.
CA dismissed outright the petition involving unit 964 on the ground that
William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and Certification on
Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of authority to file the
petition for review.
YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration, appending thereto a
Secretary’s Certificate executed by YMCA’s Corporate Secretary
attesting to a Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William
Golangco to prepare and file the petition for review.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Citing Spouses Melo v. CA,
the CA underscored the mandatory nature of the requirement that the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should be annexed to, or
simultaneously filed with the petition and that subsequent compliance
therewith cannot excuse a party’s failure to comply in the first instance.
Thus, YMCA appealed to SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in dismissing YMCA’s
petition for failure to attach a proof of authority of the signatory to the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court require that a petition
for review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a
certificate of non-forum shopping.
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These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is
sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that
the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct, not merely speculative.
The rule against forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial
procedure.
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirements for Verification vis-a-vis Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.
Non-compliance with the Verification does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective, hence, the court may order its correction, or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be better served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
petition.
However, jurisprudence instructs that the rule on certification against
forum shopping may be relaxed on the grounds of “substantial
compliance” or “special circumstance or compelling reasons.”
As with previous jurisprudence, YMCA rectified its failure to submit
proof of Golangco’s authority to sign the Verification and Certification
on Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its Motion
for Reconsideration a Secretary’s Certificate issued by its Corporate
Secretary stating that Golangco had been authorized by YMCA’s
Board of Directors.
CA’s reliance on Melo was misplaced because in Melo there no
rectification made as compared with this case.
Due to a favorable decision obtained by YMCA in the case involving
unit 966, the present case is also ruled in YMCA’s favor due to stare
decisis et non quieta movere which means “to adhere to precedents,
and not to unsettle things which are established.”
Under the doctrine, when the SC has once laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same.
Stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved, as
compared with res judicata which is based upon the judgment.
Since the facts of the case at hand are substantially the same with the
facts of the case involving unit 966, the petition is granted.
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v. Pagdanganan
G.R. No. 167866
12 October 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) approved and supervised under-the-crown
promotional campaign entitled Number Fever sometime in 1992. It
undertook to give away cash prizes to holders of specially marked
crowns and resealable caps of PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e.,
Pepsi, 7-Up, Mirinda and Mountain Dew.
On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the
notorious three-digit combination 349 as the winning number for the
next day, 26 May 1992. On the same night of the announcement,
however, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO learned of reports that
numerous people were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns and/or
resealable caps with incorrect security codes L- 2560-FQ and L- 3560-
FQ. Upon verification from the list of the 25 pre-selected winning three-
digit numbers, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI learned
that the three-digit combination 349 was indeed the
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winning combination for 26 May 1992 but the security codes L-2560-
FQ and L-3560-FQ do not correspond to that assigned to the winning
number 349.
Respondent Pagdanganan demanded from petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO and the DTI the payment of the corresponding cash prize of
each of his 349 bearing crown, specifically, four 7- Up crowns and two
Mirinda crowns, each displaying the cash prize of P1,000,000.00 in
addition to one 7-Up crown showing the cash prize of P100,000.00.
Respondent filed Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of
Pasig City but the case was dismissed. Their Motion for
Reconsideration is also denied and they appeal to the Court of
Appeals that reversed and set aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from raising STARE
DECISIS. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and
De Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts
concerning the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI
and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan
and Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning 349
Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable
caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or
allowed to be cashed in by petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing
to contain the correct security code assigned to such winning
combination. As a result, the rejected crown and/or resealable cap
holders filed separate complaints for specific performance/ sum of
money/ breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners
PCPPI and PEPSICO.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is well
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit;
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial
pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed
reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory
decisions those decisions considered to have attained the status of
judicial precedents in so far as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned.
For it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. In the case at bar, therefore, we have no
alternative but to uphold the ruling that the correct security code is an
essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to become entitled to the
amount printed on a 349 bearing crown and/or resealable cap.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle
or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.
This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code.
It is even said that such decisions assume the same authority as the
statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become,
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control
the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also
of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
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RES JUDICATA
Antonio v. Sayman
G.R. No. 149624
29 September 2010
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon were the original
owners of the subject parcel of coconut land, consisting of 15,903
square meters.
Andrea Pansaon who survived her husband Catalino Manguiob,
together with some other heirs, sold to Macedonio Monje Seven
Thousand Five Hundred (7,500) square meters only of the aforesaid
property.
Macedonio Monje immediately took possession thereof and
constructed a house worth P30,000.00.
The heirs of spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon who
also died, sold the subject property which was already sold to
Macedonio Monje in 1962, in favor of Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina
V. Manguiob.
Immediately thereafter, spouses Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V.
Manguiob had executed an absolute deed of sale in favor of the
formers sister- in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, the entire Lot consisting of
15,903 square meters.
Macedonio Monje received a letter from Avelyn B. Antonio, informing
him that she is now the registered owner of the subject property.
Aggrieved, Macedonio Monje filed before the CFI-Baganga, Davao
Oriental, a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale between
the heirs of Catalino Manguiob and Carolina Balanay/Nicanor
Manguiob, as well as the subsequent deed of absolute sale by the
latter in favor [of] Avelyn Antonio and the cancellation of TCT No. T-
9643, docketed as Civil Case No. 007-125.
The lower court declared the deeds of sale as null and void.
The appellants appealed the case up to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the decision but raised the fact that the lower court erred in
delivering Monje an area larger than what he bought from the heirs
of Manguiob.
Because of what the Supreme court said, petitioners filed a case for a
sum of money, accounting of the proceeds of the copra, damages and
attorneys fees with regard to the excess portion of the subject property
granted to Monje.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is res judicata. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
There is no res judicata.
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. According to
the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
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causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the
judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and
not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any
right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.
The court said that there is identity of parties but there is no identity of
issues because the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is whether
the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1
being contested by respondents is valid, while in Civil Case No. 506,
the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the
remaining 8,403 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly
sold to them and whether they are entitled to an accounting of the
proceeds of the copra harvested from their property which was
supposedly appropriated by respondents.
The court also ruled that the causes of action are not identical because
there is no identity of subject matter between the two cases. The
subject matter of the first case being the 7,500 square meter portion
of the lot, while the second case’s subject matter is the 8,403 square
meter portion.
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu
G.R. No. 157557
10 March 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
This case is the result of two previous cases. In the first case of
Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), it was ruled that therein petitioners,
Francisca Valdehueza, et al ., were not entitled to recover possession
of lot 939 in Cebu City but only to demand its fair market value. In the
second case of Yu v. Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals annulled
the subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, et al., to
herein respondents, Ramon Yu, et al., and held that the latter were
not purchasers in good faith.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata
and remanded the case to the trial court. Now the case is before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the action barred by res judicata. (YES)
(2) W/N the respondents entitled to reversion of the
expropriated property. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint
on the ground of res judicata and maintains that respondents are
bereft of any right to assert ownership as the sale in their favor was
invalidated in Yu v. Republic.
Petitioner further asserts that the expropriation of Lot No. 939 was
absolute and unconditional. Thus, no reversion could be legally
claimed despite the subsequent sale or reversion of the other nearby
lots.
Respondents counter that the action is not barred by res judicata
because the abandonment of the government of the public purpose
constitutes a new cause of action. Further, respondents
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contend that the determination of their right to reacquire or repossess
the lot necessitates a full blown trial.
Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Only the first three elements are present in this case. The identity of
the causes of action is at issue here.
Res judicata has two concepts:
1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c)
Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case,
because respondents again seek to enforce a right based on a sale
which has been nullified by a final and executory judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to
reversion has been nullified, they no right over the property and thus,
have no legal personality for the action of reversion of
expropriated property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the
respondents are not the real parties-in -interest. This is a ground for
the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint
evidently states no cause of action.
PETITION GRANTED. DECISION OF CA SET ASIDE.
LIS PENDENS
Lim v. Cruz
G.R. No. 143646
4 April 2001
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by
respondent against spouses Henry and Rosario Lim (herein
petitioners) before the RTC.
Respondent was allegedly in possession of a portion of land sold to
him by Rosary Aldaba.
An Ejectment complaint was filed against him by one of the
petitioners, claiming to be the owner of the property occupied by him.
Judgment was rendered against respondent, which he elevated to the
appellate court.
Upon investigation, respondent discovered that the title in the name of
petitioners was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever
machination.
Respondent then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at
the back of the petitioners’ title.
Petitioners contend that the lis pendens was registered for the sole
purpose of molesting them and that it is not necessary to protect their
rights.
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The lis pendens was eventually cancelled by the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis
pendens. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens practically covers his
entire land and thus molests his right as an owner.
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the
party causing the registration thereof.
Such notice serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
encumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation.
Only the particular property subject of litigation is covered by the
notice of lis pendens.
In causing the annotation of the lis pendens, respondent’s aim is to
protect his rights as an owner of the specific area he claims to own,
not of the whole.
Courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two grounds:
(1) After a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party.
(2) It is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in
the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the
land belongs to him, hence, even on the basis of an unregistered deed
of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title.
Such an annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack
against the certificate of title, based on the principle that the
registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect
similar to a lien.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy
and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated,
and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.
Tan vs. Lantin:
The law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis
pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient
bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated.
Petition DENIED.
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty
Corporation
G.R. No. 148568
20 March 2003
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
On June 20, 1996, Herbal Cove Realty (HCR) and Atlantic Erectors
Inc (AEI) entered into a Construction Contract whereby the former
agreed to construct four (4) units of townhouses] designated as 16- A,
16-B, 17-A and 17-B and one (1) single detached unit for an original
contract price of P15,726,745.19 which was later adjusted to
P16,726,745. 19 as a result of additional works. The contract period
is 180 days commencing on July 7, 1996 and to terminate on January
7, 1997. AEI claimed that the said period was not followed due to
reasons attributable to HCR namely: suspension orders, additional
works, force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or delay on
their part. HCR, however, denied such claims and instead pointed to
AEI as having exceeded the 180 day contract period aggravated by
defective workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in
compliance with specifications.
175

On November 21. 1997, AEI filed a case against HCR for relief
through various sums of money.
On the same day, AEI filed a notice of Lis Pendens for annotation of
the pendency of Civil Case No. 97-707 on certain Transfer Certificates
of Titles. On April 24. 1998, HCR filed a Motion to cancel notice of Lis
Pendens, arguing that AEI’s action is a purely personal one to collect
a sum of money. The trial court allowed the notice of Lis Pendens to
push through, saying it only served as a warning that litigation was
occurring over the properties. HCR then filed to the CA.
The Court of Appeals, granted HCR’s motion to cancel the notice of
Lis Pendens. The failure to allege and claim the contractor’s lien did
not warrant the continued annotation on the property titles of HCR
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials for
and labor on the houses constructed on a property are a proper
lien for annotation of lis pendens on the property title. (No)
(2) Whether or not the trial court after having declared itself without
jurisdiction to try the case, may still decide on the substantial
issue of the case. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The money claims are not a proper basis for a notice of Lis Pendens.
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens
may be availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession
of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court
proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building
thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. The money claim cannot
be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement of a lien
or an encumberance. Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real
rights of the debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens shall be
preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or
real right:
(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as
well as of architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other
works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;
(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction,
reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said
buildings, canals or other works.
Therefore, the enforcement of the lien thereunder is not applicable
here, because petitioner's Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. Nowhere does it show that respondent's property was
subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all
concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did not pertain to
insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the adjudication
of claims of preferred creditors could be ascertained. Such notice is
rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action
which in this case it is.
SECOND ISSUE:
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which governs appeals
from regional trial courts, expressly provides that RTCs lose
jurisdiction over a case when an appeal is filed. The rule reads:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. -- A party's appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties”.
176
On the basis of the foregoing rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over
the case only on August 31, 1998, when petitioner filed its Notice of
Appeal. Thus, any order issued by the RTC prior to that date should
be considered valid, because the court still had jurisdiction over the
case. Accordingly, it still had the authority or jurisdiction to issue the
July 30, 1998 Order canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens. On the other
hand, the November 4, 1998Order that set aside the July 30, 1998
Order and reinstated that Notice should be considered without force
and effect, because it was issued by the trial court after it had already
lost jurisdiction.
LAW OF THE CASE
Villa v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 87186
24 April 1992
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Questionable payments were made by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) Mactan to Rocen Enterprises and Spraway
Corp., dealers in paper products and printed matter, for the purchase
of electrical items and the cost of their installation, in the total amount
of P299,175.
Dario, Centeno and Robles represented the firms in the transaction.
The Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City rendered a decision that the 3
were liable for violating R.A. 3019.
Included in said decision was a finding that Arturo Jimenez, Rodolfo
Montayre, Camilo Villa, Josefina Sucalit, Leonor, and Bustamante
were equally liable for conspiring with the convicted accused.
Investigation was conducted on alleged conspirators and led to a filing
of information with the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3
R.A. 3019.
Bustamante was acquitted for lack of evidence.
On July 28, 1988, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan found all
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating R.A.3019.
The Sandiganbayan ovserved that here was an overcharge in the four
vouchers between the prices quoted and amounts actually paid. The
overcharge of 27,100 could not be justified.
While the Sandiganbayan case was pending, The CA reversed the
decision of the Circuit Criminal Court for insufficient evidence. (the
case against Dario Centeno and Robles).
Petitioners invoked the CA decision on their motions of
reconsideration. Leonor did not appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the doctrine of “the law of the case” bars the conviction.
(NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Law of the case- “that principle under which determinations of
questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all
its subsequent stages where such determination has already been
made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of
procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be
adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision. It
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case.”
Law of the case is on a former appeal… what is irrevocably
established as controlling legal rule of decision between the SAME
parties in the SAME case continues to be law of the case.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly
brought before it and its decision in any given case constitutes the law
of that particular case.
The CA decision was not a determination of a question of law.
177
The present Sandiganbayan decision is not a stage or subsequent
proceeding of said CA decision.
There is no identity of parties between the two cases. (different
accused)
Even if the CA decision became the “law of the case”. It is limited to
that case solely.
Padillo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119707
29 November 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Pardillo filed the instnat petition, Civil Case No.. 9114, which is a
petittion for declaratory relief and damages against Respondent
Averia andd Casilang.
Pardillo claims that she is the asolute owner of a 251 square meter
lamd, which she bought form Marina de Vera Quicho and that there
was an unlawful refusal to turn over said property to her.
Avera filed his answer with counterclaim contendig that there is litis
pendentia and res judicata because there is already a decision in a
previous case, Civil case No. 1620-G, that he filed pertaining to the
same subject property.
The decision in 1620-G ordered Marina de-vera-Quicho to transfer
and register said property to Averia. The said decision became finsl
and executory as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was
instituted therefrom.
Paddilo filed another case, M.C 374-82, to compel the register of
deeds of Lucena to register the deed of sale made by De-Vera
Quicho in her favor. Averia then instituted Civil Case 1690-G to
rescind the 2 deeds of sale made in favor of Padillo.
Civil case 1690-G was dismissed for improper venue.
RTC-Lucena then decided on M.C 374-82 wherein it ordered the
Register of Deeds to register Padillo’s deed of sale. There was an
argument on whether the RTC has jurisdiction over cadastral
cases, to which the SC declared that there is now no distinction to
the jurisdiction of the lowercourts with regard to cadastral cases.
However, the SC ordered a new trial be made where all parties are
given an opportunity to be heard.
In the new trail of M.C 37482, the court declared Padillo as the sole
owner of the subject property.
This decision was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
While the foregoing proceedings ensued in M.C. No. 374- 82, the
trial court in Civil Case No. 9114, issued an Order dated wherein it
deferred the resolution of Averia's motion to dismiss and ordered the
case temporarily archived in view of the pendency in the CA of the
appeal of Averia in Civil Case No. 1690-G.
When the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed, in a decision dated
September 16, 1987, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1690-G for
improper venue, the hearing in Civil Case No. 9114 was resumed on
November 19, 1987 but resolution of Averia's Motion to Dismiss was
deferred due to the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82.
The trial court’s decision in MC 374-82 in proceeded to deny
respondent Averia's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suspend Further
Proceeding in Civil Case No. 9114.
Thereafter, Averia assailed the denial of his motion to dismiss in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
15356, before the CA, which rendered a decision therein ordering
178
the suspension of Civil Case No. 9114 to await the final termination of
M.C. No. 37482 then pending appeal with the CA No appeal was filed
therefrom, hence, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 15356 became final.
The SC affirmed the MC 347-82 decision.
The TC then decided on cicil case 9114, wherein it ruled that Padillo
is the rightful owner of the property and ordered damages and fees to
be paid by Averia.
The CA then reversed the decision on the ground of res judicata. The
CA held that MC 374- 82 resolved the case on the merits and that
Padillo did not claim any damages in the new trial, which resulted to a
waiver of her claims.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is res judicata. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
There is no res judicata.
The court said that under ordinary circumstances, this Court would
have subscribed to the appellate court's conclusion that M.C. No.
37482 barred petitioner's claim for damages in Civil Case No. 9114
since all four (4) essential requisites in order for res judicata as a "bar
by prior judgment" to attach are present in the instant case, to wit:
1) The former judgment must be final;
2) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
3) It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
4) There must be between the first and second action identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of cause of
action.
However, a different conclusion is warranted under the principle of law
of the case. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
of the case before the court.
As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is
held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong,
the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing.
The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of this
principle called the law of the case which is totally different from the
concept of res judicata. Law of the case does not have the finality of
the doctrine of res judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereas
res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been
done in another case.
Significantly in the instant case, the law of the case on the matter of
the pendency of M.C. No. 37482 to bar Civil Case No. 9114 has been
settled in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356.
It is worthwhile to consider that at the time this Court in G.R. No.
65129 ordered the new trial of M.C. No. 374-82, Civil Case No. 9114
was already existent. When the issue of the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 9114 on the ground of pendency of M.C. No. 374-82 was
raised before the trial court wherein the said Civil Case No. 9114
was docketed, the trial court chose to merely defer resolution
thereof. And when the said issue of litis pendentia was raised before
the Court of Appeals via a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 15356, the Court of Appeals, while agreeing with respondent
Averia's arguments on the existence of litis pendentia, which would
ultimately result in res judicata, incorrectly ordered the mere
suspension of Civil Case No. 9114 to await the final termination of
179
M.C. No. 374- 82, instead of dismissing the case and/or ordering that
the claim for damages be filed in M.C. No. 374-82.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on December
21, 1989 and by then, M.C. No. 374 82 had long been resolved by the
trial court and pending appeal with the Court of Appeals. Since no
appeal was filed from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 15356, the resolution therein of the appellate court which
ordered the suspension instead of dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114,
became final. Thus, even if erroneous, the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA -G.R. SP No. 15356 has become the law of the case
as between herein petitioner Padillo and respondent Averia, and may
no longer be disturbed or modified. It is not subject to review or
reversal in any court.
Petitioner, therefore, should not be faulted for yielding in good faith to
the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 15356 and continuing to pursue her claim for damages in Civil
Case No. 9114. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.
R. SP No. 15356 on the matter of the issue of existence of M.C. No.
37442 as a bar to Civil Case No. 9114 should dictate all further
proceedings.
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
People of the Philippines v. Derilo
G.R. No. 117818
18 April 1997
REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Roman Derilo and others were charged with the crime of murder
committed by a band. They killed one Perpetua Adalim with guns and
bolos. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo
was apprehended.
Perpetua C. Adalim went to the house of Crescencio Lupido at Sitio
Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early
evening of January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring
to work in her ricefields. While Perpetua was waiting and standing in
the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and confronted
Perpetua. One of them then shot her and the others took turns
stabbing her.
Appellant (Isidoro) did not deny his participation in the commission of
the crime. He asked only for the modification of the death penalty to
life imprisonment.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not there was evident premeditation in the crime.
(NO)
2) Whether or not a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but
also its attendant circumstances. (NO)
3) Whether or not RA 7659 applied to the crime committed.
(NO)
4) Whether or not the death penalty can be applied. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime of murder on the bases of its
findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant and the
existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. Evident premeditation
must be based on external acts and must be evident, not merely
suspected, indicating deliberate planning. There must be a
demonstration by outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and
manifest. There is no proof, direct or circumstantial, to show when
appellant and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their
decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that elapsed before
this plan was carried out, the circumstance of evident premeditation
cannot be presumed against appellant.
SECOND ISSUE
The court must still conduct a searching inquiry when a plea of guilty
is made.
180

Three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to
a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court
must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.
THIRD ISSUE
RA 7659 imposed the death penalty on certain heinous offenses
including murder. However, being a penal law, Republic Act No. 7659
may not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by
appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. This is
because at this time, the controlling provision was merely Article 248
of the RPC which did not impose the death penalty. Further, the
presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
necessarily.implied. Prospectivity is embodied in Article 21 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
FOURTH ISSUE
Capital punishment cannot be validly imposed on the appellant. The
Constitution mentions: Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua . Appellant, it will be recalled, was
sentenced in 1986 to suffer the death penalty as then provided under
the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of the Constitution in
1987, that sentence should have been reduced to reclusion perpetua
under such constitutional fiat.
Petition modified. Accused sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify victim’s family.
Co v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100776
28 October 1993
NARVASA, C.J.
FACTS:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken
vessel, petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens'
Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1
The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two
days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was
filed by the salvage company against Albino Co, the latter eventually
being convicted by the RTC.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for
its verdict of conviction, on the ruling in Que v. People — i.e., that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of
the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four
(4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v.
Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry
of Justice.
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another
issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1)
year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the
complainant on September 1, 1983.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the law may be applied retroactively. (NO)
181

HELD/RATIO:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to
Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code,
a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal..."
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has
been applied in many cases. It applies as well to administrative rulings
and circulars, and it has also been applied to judicial decisions which,
"although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system. Many cases have
been decided which apply said principle.
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of
the proposition that the Court's decision in Que v. People that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to
familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.
LANDMARK CASE
Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019
4 January 1995
FACTS:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before a MTC judge, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents in Iloilo City. They eventually gave birth to a boy, named
Leouel Santos, Jr.
However, the marriage did not last, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses' family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Julia
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
but he failed.
Returning to the Philippines without Julia, Leouel filed with the RTC, a
complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code".
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,
that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
182
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Julia was psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
Although, the Family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity," the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee provides an insight on the import of the provision.
Indeed, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application.
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
Thus, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If such psychoses should occur only during the
183
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano
G.R. No. 167459
26 January 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J:
FACTS:
Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the
AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-
out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual
intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the
Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan.
The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any
debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they
found an abandoned and neglected one-year -old baby girl whom they
later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit
with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan.
Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one
(1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation
in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of
their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country,
she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change
her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of
their living quarters.
When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass
from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with
Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose
drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona
and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who
is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97 -2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
who testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to
the petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at
bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required
to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and nullified the parties’ marriage on the finding that the
evidence presented Gravity, Antecedence, and Incurability.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to
the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSG’s contention that the
trial court erred in granting the petition despite Jose’s abject failure to
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discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity
of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2000.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated
March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in
the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
 A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time ofthe
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outburst" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
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 incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9
(Citations omitted.)
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and
not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by
judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present
case.
Petition Denied.
LEADING CASE AND ABANDONMENT OF DOCTRINE
Ting v. Velez-Ting
G.R. No. 166562
31 March 2009
Nachura, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-
Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu
City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. The
couple begot six (6) children.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.
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In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally
with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to
drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in
the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront
and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex
with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and
shot the gate of their house. Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s
job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to
refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to
other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for
his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable.
Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give
financial support to their family. In his answer, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active
member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only
for social reasons and for leisure.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The
RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made
by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive
drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-
curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies,
which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even
before his marriage to Carmen.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered
a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s
finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the
time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since
the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.
She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.
Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having
been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed
a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period
but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition
and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45
On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision reversing its first
ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused
to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina
cases. (YES)
(2) Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized. (NO)
187
(3) Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with law
and jurisprudence. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by
the thing and do not disturb the calm."
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings;
(3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4)
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively
for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
SECOND ISSUE:
The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must
always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
of the proceedings.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of
the stringent requirements set forth therein.
The parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
18
8
incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by
the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
THIRD ISSUE:
We find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to
prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered
from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and
the appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were
present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely
cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner
would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre -existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the
totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate
to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case,
the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce,
prevail.
Petition granted.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals G.R.
Nos. 217126-27 10 November 2015 PERLAS-
BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation
report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six Administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for
violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds and
Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati
for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The
TRO was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by
Binay against the Ombudsman and various other officials for
deliberately refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to
course to the petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to
file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the case
was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
ISSUE/S:
189
(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance , is the Ombudsman
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition for certiorari. (YES)
(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. (YES)
(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (NO)
(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and illegal.
(Premature Issue)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general
rule a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court
prior to resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can
still be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
j) Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo
has no jurisdiction.
k) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
l) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable.
m) Where under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration
would be useless.
n) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief.
o) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
p) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of
due process.
q) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object.
r) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involves both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort
to certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is
based on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same
states:
Section 14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the
Ombudsman by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or
finding of the Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the
same except for decisions or findings taken to the Supreme Court on
pure questions of law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45
appeal can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
courts and not against “findings” of quasi judicial agencies including
the Office of the Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides
that increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice
and concurrence is in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Section 14 of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase
the Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, therefore it is concluded that the second paragraph of
Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65
petition is the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared
unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoin in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices
independence under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office
from judicial intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman
as an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses, of the bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman
independence covers three things:
4. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot
be abolished nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges be removed, altered or modified by law unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made
5. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its
funds for purposes germane to its function.
6. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means
that those within the ranks of the Office can only be disciplined by
internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. This is because the courts are
apolitical bodies which may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman
is not exempt from judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislative and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An
example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs
of preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’
power to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’
constitutional rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a
court to exercise its full functions.
191
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus pending deliberation
on whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of
procedure without the consent of the Court, the CA had the authority
to issue the injunctive writs.
FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned
thus the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The
purpose of a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who
is being suspended from using the powers of his office to influence
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution
of the case against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to
nullify the preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr
re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the
Makati Parking Building Project. The CA found it sufficient that the
application of the condonation doctrine was enough to enjoin the
implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual
v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
4. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct, also offenses committed or acts done during the previous
term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
5. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of
previous Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for these
aforesaid acts.
6. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to
know the life and character of their candidates of their right to elect
officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the
legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is
a public trust. The LGC provides that an elective official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in
office etc. The LGC also provides that those officials removed from
office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from
running for any elective local office.
Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including
the ones cited above, the Çourt concluded that the doctrine of
condonation is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local officials administrative liability for a
Misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term or another elective post. There
is no support to the statement in the case of Pascual that the courts
would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if
condonation were not to be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal
basis that election implied condonation. There is also no presumption
in any rule of law that the electorate upon re- election an official, have
disregarded or forgave the officials faults. The electorate rarely has full
knowledge of a officials misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are
shrouded in secrecy. Condonation cannot be subscribed to because it
implied forgiveness, which requires knowledge of the acts being
forgiven for and in the absence of knowledge of these acts there can
be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases
after this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also
192
done for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office.
However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings in the
resolution, makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr
contempt petition. Thus in this comment, the Ombudsman may raise
her objections to the contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt
to not give due course to the same contempt proceedings. Absent any
indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the
CA it would then be premature for the Court to rule on the issue.
DURA LEX, SED LEX / CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 180016
29 April 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lito Corpuz met with complainant Danilo Tangcoy at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olangapo City. Corpuz approached
Tangcoy and offered for him to sell his jewelry on a commission basis.
Tangcoy agreed.
Tangcoy gave Corpuz a diamond ring, 2 bracelets and a necklace,
collectively amounting to P98,000.00 for the latter to sell. It was agreed
that Corpuz would have to return the items if unsold within 60 days.
The period expired, however Corpuz neither paid Tangcoy nor
returned to jewelry.
Tangcoy then filed a case for estafa against Corpuz.
The RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt; the CA
affirmed such decision. The case was thus elevated to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when they accepted as evidence
mere machine copies, as violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
(NO)
(2) Whether or not CA erred in accepting the information even though
the date of occurrence written was different from the date of
occurrence testified. (NO)
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in finding the demand for the return
of the jewelry was proved. (NO)
(4) Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the accused was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and applying the penalty stated by the
RTC. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The petitioner is right in stating that the receipt presented as
evidence of the transfer of the jewelry was not the best evidence as
such were merely photocopies. However, the petitioner was not able
to timely object to the admissibility of the photocopied receipt during
both the marking of the evidence as well as the formal offer of such
evidence. Such non-objection renders the evidence admissible.
SECOND ISSUE:
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner
and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of
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the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective. Moreover, the said date (July 5, 1991)
is also near the due date within which petitioner should have delivered
the proceeds or returned the said jewelry as testified upon by
Tangcoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
The elements of estafa are as follows: The elements of estafa with
abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender. Such elements do not render the date of occurrence/time as
material to the consummation of the crime.
THIRD ISSUE:
During the testimony of Tangcoy, the court inferred that Tangcoy was
able to demand from Corpuz twice the jewelry albeit orally. This is
allowed since there is no need for a written demand for the return of
the objects in question.
When the law does not qualify, we should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The issue in question relates more to the penalty to be adjudged to
Corpuz than the finding of guilt. The penalty was discussed as it was
raised that the values stated in the law under the crime of estafa was
pegged based on the values during the creation of the law in 1930.
Thus, there is a difference in the application due to the change in the
purchasing of the power since then. Some justices would not want to
dwell in the issue as they justified that such may be tantamount to
judicial legislation and would therefore violate the separation of
powers in the government.
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a
way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and
that in the course of such application or construction, it should not
make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the
law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should
apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly
put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would
lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers
by means of judicial legislation.
It was further discussed that any acceptable solution could not be
solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the
present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There
are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said
values could be accurately and properly adjusted. It is up to the
legislative branch to correct the values indicated in the laws but for
now, the courts would only interpret and provide the penalty as
indicated in the current writing of the law.
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