Eminent Domain
1) ​Manapat v Court of Appeals
RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park
property on condition that they would vacate the premises should
the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the
area. The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants
offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they
could not afford RCAM’s proposed price, the occupantpetitioned
the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its
subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to
them at a low price.
Later on, Marcos issued PD 1072 appropriating P1.2M out of the
President’s Special Operations Funds to cover the additional
amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. NHA filed 16
expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement
Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and
resale at a low cost to the residents of the area
2) ​Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano
4 parcels of agricultural land owned by Manzano were to be taken
for public use under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Manzano considered the land valuations by Landbank
(the duly designated financial intermediary of CARP) as too low
and they prayed for 2M at least for each property. Commissioners
of the Special Agrarian Court were then appointed to investigate
the values of the lands which recommended 2M plus for each
property. The RTC and CA adopted the Commissioners’ final
report favoring Manzano. The main issue between the parties was
the land valuation of said properties.
3) National Power Corporation v. Posada
NPC filed a notice to take possession for right of way easements
over respondent’s parcels of land, as NPC was later to build a
Substation Island Grid Project. It offered to pay Php500/ sqm. as
just compensation, but respondents opposed, claiming the value
is Php 2,000/ sqm.
All the requirements for valid exercise of the power of eminent domain have been complied with.
(1)​ the property taken must be private property​ - subject parcels of land are private property
(2) ​there must be genuine necessity to take the private property​ - determination of whether there is genuine
necessity for the exercise of eminent domain is a justiciable question. But when the power is exercised by
Legislature, the question of necessity is a political question. The authority to expropriate came from PD 1072,
issued by Marcos. As explicitly recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had legislative
powers. The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of a political question
(3) ​the taking must be for public use​ - NHA intended to improve and upgrade the area by constructing roads
and installing facilities under the Government’s ZIP and subdividing them into much smaller lots for distribution
and sale at a low cost to qualified beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace Park.
Around 510 families will benefit from this. ZIP is an integral part of the Government’s Socialized Housing
Program which, the SC has already deemed compliant with the public use requirement, being a program
devoted to a public purpose
(4)​ there must be payment of just compensation​ - The subject cases were remanded to the RTC for the
determination of the amount of just compensation.
(5) ​the taking must comply with due process of law​ - In the expropriation proceedings, all the parties have
been given their day in court. That they are now before the SC is proof enough that they weren’t denied due
process of law
The land valuations of the Commissioners of the Special Agrarian Court (RTC) are considered to be just
compensation b/c the RTC has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the
properties.​ ​RA 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts (the RTC) the​ "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." ​ ​Furthermore, the
Commissioners are the ones with the specialized skills and knowledge in this case and such factual findings
should be respected.
The amount of just compensation must be determined based on the fair market value of the property at the time
of the taking. The measure of just compensation is not the taker's gain, but ​the owner's loss.​ Market value is
"that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."
Payment of the provisional value is not sufficient for just compensation, because it is merely the value
of the structures and improvements based on the current zonal valuation by the BIR.
Just compensation on the other hand takes into account the prevailing fair market value of the property or the
value of the land.
The valuation of the NPC should be followed, as RA 8974 mandates that the Implementing Agency shall
determine the valuation of the improvements and/ or structures on the land to be acquired, using the
replacement cost method.
4) Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation
The Municipality of Paranaque entered into a negotiation with VM
Realty Corporation to acquire two parcels of land for a socialized
housing project, pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution.
VM counterclaims that the Municipality’s complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and
not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code.
5) ​Rebadulla v. RP
The DPWH took parcels of land belonging to Rebadullas for its
project. The Rebadullas rejected the price offered by the DPWH
(Php2.50/sqm), and asked for a reappraisal of their property
stating that (Php200/sqm) was its fair value. The PAC (Provincial
Appraisal Committee) declined to change its initial valuation, and
the RTC held that the Republic should pay the fair market value
based on the BIR zonal valuation (Php7/sqm).
6)​ Apo Fruits Corporation v Land Bank of the Philippines
Apo sold its land to the government for purposes of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform. The initial valuation of the Land
Bank was Php16.5484 per sqm. Finding the valuation too low,
Apo rejected the offer. Meanwhile, the land was transferred in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Apo filed a complaint
before the RTC for determination of the just compensation. RTC
rendered judgment finding a valuation of Php130.00 per sqm in
consideration of the assessment done by Apo. The CA modified
the judgment at a lower price.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislature, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs,
other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to Congress’ controls and restraints, ​imposed through
the law conferring the power or in other legislations. ​Therefore, the following requisites must first concur
before and LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The CA and RTC erred in relying on the BIR’s zonal valuation as the sole basis for determining just
compensation, as zonal valuation is simply one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate.
Just compensation is “the​ sum equivalent of the market value of the property,​ broadly described as the price
fixed in open market by the seller in the usual + ordinary course of legal action or competition, or the fair value of
the property as between one who receives and who desires to sell it, fixed at the ​time of actual taking​ by the
gov’t”.
The nature and character of the land at the time of taking is the principal criterion in determining just
compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property, its surrounding, and its improvements must be
considered. Among other factors that must be considered in determining the fair market value of the property are
the cost acquisition, current value of similar properties, its actual or potential uses, and in cases of land, its size,
shape, location, and tax declaration. ​The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. To be “just”,
the compensation must be fair not only to the owner, but also to the taker.
The just compensation for the subject property taking into account the distance of the subject property to
different landmarks in Tagum City, the fact that it is planted with commercial bamboos, the Average of Sales
Data used by the commissioners, the Deeds of Sale of properties found near and adjacent to the subject
property, is hereby fixed at Php 130.00 per sq m.
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors' shall be considered.
7) ​American Print Works v. Lawrence
Mayor Lawrence of New York was sued for damages by APW for
ordering the destruction of its buildings through gunpowder
explosion for the purpose of stopping the great conflagration
raging the city. APW contended that the action is one of
expropriation for which he was entitled to payment of just
compensation.
8) Manosca v. Court of Appeals
Petitioners inherited a parcel of land in Taguig. This parcel of land
was declared as a historical landmark by National Historical
Institute for being the birthplace of Felix Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the Constitution.
9) ​City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
The City of Manila expropriated certain land for the extension of
Rizal Avenue, but the defendants allege that there was no
necessity for such expropriation and that the land in question was
cemetery which should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.
10) ​Republic of the Philippines v. La Orden de PP
Benedictinos de Filipinas
To carry out its plan of easing the daily traffic congestion, the
Government offered to buy a portion​ ​of a bigger parcel of land
belonging to La Orden situated in Mendiola in order to extend
Azcarraga Street. They did not reach an agreement so the
Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. La Orden
argued that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already
dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to
APW cannot claim just compensation because the destruction of the property in question does not
come under the right of eminent domain, but under the right of necessity, or self-preservation. ​Lawrence
is absolved from personal responsibility for the damages because in case of actual necessity (such as to prevent
the spreading of a fire), one may lawfully destroy the private property of any one for the safety or protection of
the many. The destruction had become necessary to prevent the spread of a conflagration in the city, and to
save other buildings and property therein from taking fire.
The ​right of eminent domain​ is a public right; it arises from the laws of society and is vested in the state or its
grantee, acting under the right and power of the state, or benefit of the state, those acting under it. The​ right of
necessity​ arises under the laws of the society or society itself. It is the right of self-defense, of self-preservation,
whether applied to persons or to property. It is a private right vested in the individual, and with which the right of
the state or state necessity has nothing to do.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of
eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. ​But
each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and
directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficie
The courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation because xx
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation. Before it can exercise the right, a
law that confers power upon it must first exist. Further, the land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of such expropriation public.
Art. 349 of the CC provides that no one may be deprived of his property, unless it be by competent authority, for
some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment of proper compensation. In this case, the records do
not show that the City has definitely decided that there exists a necessity for the appropriation of the land.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings because the parties should have been
given an opportunity to present their respective evidence​ that might be of help in determining the vital
question of fact ​involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the
traffic congestion on Legarda street.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just
compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently,​ the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine
necessity therefor.
expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed
expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of
a property dedicated to education. The trial court held that the
expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence, the petition
and the question on whether or not there is a genuine necessity
for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain.
11)​ Republic v Vda. De Castelvi
In 1947, the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in
Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi
gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused
because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000 that were erected and already established on
the property. She, then, instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the Republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question. The issue in
this case is whether or not the compensation should be
determined as of 1947 or 1959.
12)​ RP v. Gingoyon
Some time after the nullification of the build-operate-and-transfer
agreement of NAIA 3 between the RP and the PH Int’l air
terminals co. (PIATCO), the NAIA 3 facilities were already nearly
completed. The NAIA 3 facilities remained in the possession of
PIATCO, while the gov’t sought for the issuance of a writ of
possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities. As it already deposited Php4B to
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes
of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the
just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent
domain was filed.
It is RA 8974, and not Rule 67 that should govern the present expropriation proceeding, as it provides a
procedure more favorable to the property owner, being applied instances when the nat’l gov’t
expropriates property “for nat’l gov’t infrastructure projects”.
It is the 2004 resolution in the Agan case that must be followed (as it is the “law of the case”), which provided
that it is PIATCO that should be paid for reimbursement, and not a mere initial deposit to an authorized gov’t
depositary.
Further, in cases (such as this one) where there is currently no way to immediately ascertain the value of the
the Land Bank (NAIA 3’s assessed value), RP contends that it is
Rule 67, not RA 8974 that should be applied to the case.
13) ​Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections
In 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which
requires newspaper publishers to free print space of not less than
½ page for the “COMELEC Space.” This “space” will be allocated
among candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government, as well as to enable COMELEC to
disseminate vital election information.
Philippine Press Institute opposed such resolution contending that
it is unconstitutional as it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies,
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
14) ​De Knecht v. CA
The Knechts were owners of a land sold at a public auction upon
their failure to pay real estate taxes. Spouses Babieras and
Spouses Sangalangs were the highest bidders who then sold the
property to Salem Investment Corporation. The Knechts prayed
for reconveyance but was dismissed. The property eventually
became part of those expropriated under BP 340 authorizing the
national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay
City for the EDSA Extension. The RP filed Civil Case 7327 for
determination of just compensation for expropriated properties.
The Knechts sought to be compensated by the government for
expropriated property. The Knechts insisted that although they
were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time
Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and
therefore should have been joined as defendants in the
expropriation proceedings and entitled to a share in the just
compensation.
15) ​Alfonso v. Land Bank of the PH
Palomar owns two parcels of land in Sorsogon. Upon the
improvements and structures, RA 8974 provides that in cases wherein the completion of the gov’t infrastructure
project is of utmost importance and there is no existing valuation, the implementing agency must pay the owner
of the property its “proferred value”.
For there to be a valid exercise of eminent domain, there must be a ​necessity for the taking​ and the ​legal
authority of the government agency to effect the taking​.
De Knechts are NOT entitled to just compensation because 4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327,
a case for reconveyance was dismissed with finality which resulted to the Knechts’ loss of whatever
right or colorable title they had to the property. ​The fact that the Knechts remained in physical possession
was based on their claim of ownership, not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since
the issue of ownership was put to rest in the civil case of reconveyance, they had no legal interest in the property
by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did
not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties.”
NOTE: ​Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation, reference must be
made to the provisions on eminent domain in the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1.​ The complaint.​-- The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint
which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be condemned, ​and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, ​showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each
defendant separately.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned.
"Owner"​ when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be
made parties to the proceeding, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to ​all
those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned​. If a person claiming an interest in the
land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the
compensation.
The courts are not obliged to apply the DAR formula in cases where they are asked to determine just
compensation of property covered by RA 6657 or the CARP
effectivity of RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Program
(CARP), the DAR sought to acquire Palomar’s properties (valued
at 36,066.27 and 792,869.06). Palomar rejected both valuation.
While land valuation cases were filed before the DARAB, Palomar
sold her rights over the two properties to Alfonso. The provincial
adjudicator applied DAR Admin Order No.5 to valued the
properties. Later, Chua of Cuervo Appraisers was appointed as
Commissioner. He used two approaches in valuing the properties:
the Market Data Approach (MDA) and Capitalized Income
Approach (CIA) due to their different actual land use. LBP tried to
contest this, saying that capitalized income of a property cannot
be used as a basis in determining just compensation.
16) ​EPZA v. Dulay
Judge Dulay issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation for 4 parcels
of land (owned by San Antonio) where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu is to be constructed. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San
Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to
by the latter contending that under ​PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
17) ​Department of Agrarian Reform v. Galle
There was a back and forth between Galle and the DAR with
regards to respondents land. LBP and DAR proposed to pay for
the land of Galle in the amount of P7M and then P20M. Galle did
not accept the offer. After being denied her need with the DAR
Adjudication Board, she went to the Special Agrarian Court then
eventually Court of Appeals where both sided with her. Thus this
petition
18) ​Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation v. RP
Evergreen owns a parcel of land, a portion of which the
RP-DPWH sought to expropriate to construct Package 3, Marikina
Bridge and Access Road, and the Metro Manila Urban Transport
Integration project. Evergreen declined the offer (It alleged the
conditions for filing a complaint for expropriation have not been
RA 6657 Sec. 17’s factors, as well as it’s resulting formulas, provide for a uniform structure for the computation
of just compensation. It ensures the amounts to be paid to affected landowners are NOT contradictory to the
objectives of agrarian reform.
Unless declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas partake the nature of statutes, which (under the
2009 amendment) become law itself. When faced with situations which do not warrant the DAR formula’s strict
application, the courts (in their discretion) may relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before
them.
The mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional b/c the determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. ​The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determination but no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the justness of the decreed compensation.
With regards to just compensation, it has to be both timely and just. The owner is made to suffer from
the deprivation of his land while waiting for years to be paid for it. The judiciary cannot exercise
unlimited power with regards to the determination of the value of land. The courts must still follow
regulations and law provided.
The SAC and CA forgot to take into consideration RA6557 and AOs 6 and 11 when computing for the value of
the land. Yes just compensation must be timely, but the courts must still abide with rules and regulations when
determining the value of the land. In the case at bar, the determination for the value of the land was remanded
back to the lower court for further investigation taking into consideration RA6557 and AOs 6 and 11 with regards
to calculating for just compensation.
Evergreen is entitled to the payment of interest for the subject premises expropriated, since the delay in
the payment of compensation is a forbearance of money.
The payment of 100% of the value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation by itself does not
constitute just compensation, as it is only one of two payments the government must make. Under RA 8974, the
other payment to be made is the difference between the amount already paid, and the just compensation as
determined by the court.
met and there is no need for expropriation), and the two parties
agree that the issue to be resolved was the amount of just
compensation.

19)​ Land Bank of the Philippines v. Alcantara
A portion of land owned by Alacantara was to be taken by the
government. In evaluating the land the LBP value was
P1,210,252.96. The respondent did not agree and thus went to
court to fight for the value. The Special Agrarian Court and Court
of Appeals agreed that based on the foregoing evidence
presented by respondent the value should be P2.2676M.
Aggrieved petitioner raised it to the SC
When DAR used AO 6 and 11 using the formula provided therein, it had the force of law as it is an actual
law in determining the value of the land taken and the amount to be payed.
The SAC and CA did not provide a proper explanation why a deviation from AOs 6 and 11 was necessary. They
mostly based their evaluation from testimonials rather than actual presented evaluations. Thus the case must be
remanded back to the SAC for further evaluation as despite LBP’s proper use of the formula, the values taken
from such formula has no legitimate backing.

20) ​The Manila Banking Corporation v. Bases Conversion Just compensation​ "as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
and Development Authority The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to intensify the meaning of
the word 'compensation' and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
Respondent Bases Conversion and Development Authority to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
("BCDA") is tasked mainly to manage the Clark and Subic military
reservations/camps and their extensions and to adopt and
That "[t]he determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the
implement a comprehensive development plan for their
discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. This
conversion into productive uses, with a view to promoting the
economic and social development of the country (Section 4, RA
judicial function has constitutional ​raison d'etre;​ Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private
7227). Among the powers expressly granted to it is the power to property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation." Legislative enactments, as
exercise the right of eminent domain. well as executive issuances, fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are
tantamount to impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. They are not binding on courts and, at
BCDA filed a complaint against herein petitioner The Manila best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just compensation.
Banking Corporation ("TMBC"), seeking to expropriate a parcel of
land in Pampanga. The subject property was being expropriated
to pave the way for the implementation of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEX) Project of the national government, which
will significantly alleviate the worsening traffic condition of the
North Luzon Expressway.

21) ​RP v. Macabagdal
Petitioner, represented by the DPWH, filed a complaint for the
expropriation of a lot in Valenzuela City for the construction of the
NLEX Segment 8.1. RP was granted a writ of possession and
was ordered to deposit an amount representing the zonal value
as provisional deposit. The RTC found the recommendation of the
board commissioners to be favorablel and petitioner was directed
to pay the same, as well as the legal interest computed from the
time of taking of the subject lot until full payment.
Legal interest shall run not from the date of filing of the complaint, but from the date of issuance of the
Writ of Possession (since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be
established).
The owner’s loss is not only his property, but also its income-generating potential. When property is taken, full
compensation of its value must be immediately paid. The 12%/ annum rate of legal interest is applicable only
until June 30, 2013, after which the interest will be set to 6% (pursuant to BSP-MB Circular 799).

22) ​NPC v. Marasigan, et al. The amount of P47M for just compensation is correct since the value at the time of the filing of the
For purposes of constructing and maintaining its steel complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property
transmission lines and wooden electric poles, NPC filed, on involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. ​The affected land
January 23 2006, an expropriation complaint against Marasigan areas were classified as industrial, commercial and residential since the year 1993. NPC insists that it took the
as registered owners of the following 4 parcels of land in Pili, subject property in the 1970s (when it was still agricultural) despite having initiated the expropriation complaint
Camarines Sur. The total area over which NPC sought an only on January 23 2006. But there being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the subject properties at a
easement of right of way covers 49,173 square meters. NPC date preceding the filing of the expropriation complaint, the time of the taking should be taken to mean as
offered to pay P299k basing the valuation on the tax declarations coinciding with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings on January 23, 2006.
allegedly classifying the properties as agricultural land and the
corresponding zoning valuation of BIR. While Marasigan had no
objection regarding the expropriation, they nevertheless opposed
the classification of the properties as agricultural on the ground
that the same were classified as “industrial, commercial and
residential” since the year 1993. Marasigan thus claimed P47M
for the affected lands. RTC affirmed the recommendation of the
appraisal committee for the payment of just compensation at the
fixed amount of P47M based on the BIR zonal valuation of the
properties classified as “residential, commercial, and industrial” as
of the time of the filing of the complaint in January 2006.

23) ​National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville The computation of just compensation for the expropriated property should be based on its value at the
time of taking of the property.
National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) suddenly built a
transmission line while Oroville purchased a lot of land from Just compensation is therefore fixed at ₱78.65 per square meter, which is the fair market value of the property at
certain individuals. Then TransCo again asked to buy the land but the time of taking.
during negotiations asked for payment of the built transmission
line.

24) ​Land Bank of the PH v. Dalauta Valuation of properties in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies.
Eugenio Dalauta was the registered owner of an agricultural land
in Butuan. It was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a
under compulsory acquisition of the CARP. The LBP offered violation of the Bill of Rights (private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation), then
Php192,782.59 as compensation which Dalauta rejected. The the court’s findings shall prevail over whatever statute, decree, or executive order.
DARAB affirmed the valuation, but Dalauta filed a petition for just
compensation with the RTC sitting as SAC. He alleges the LBP’s
valuation was inconsistent with the rules and regulations
prescribed in the DAR Administrative Order No. 6, for determining
the just compensation of lands covered by CARP’s compulsory
acquisition scheme.

25)​ Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rural Bank of Hermosa Settled is the fact that just compensation is valued from the day the land was taken from the owner.

2 parcels of land are involved in this case in which respondent In this case, the court cannot appreciate the contentions of the petitioner with regards to the value. The RTC and
offered it to the government which was then acquired and placed CA failed to appreciate the use of the DAR AOs when calculating for the value. As for the LBP, the court
under CARP. LBP initially offered P28k but the respondent found remands the case back to the RTC for further investigation as LBP used DAR AO 17 when DAR AO 6 and 11
it undervalued thus filing a petition to the RTC and CA. are in effect. Additionally, the evaluation of the LBP has no sufficient backing.
26) ​Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Tapulado
In this case, the Tapulados are the owners of two land properties
placed under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer
Program pursuant to PD 27, and in 1978 awarded them to
farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado did not receive any compensation
from the government initially, and it was only two years later when
the subject lands were assessed of its value, which the Tapulados
filed a contention against in the RTC, acting as SAC
27) ​Heirs of Pidacan v. Air Transportation Office
Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired parcel of land in San
Jose Mindoro Occidental. However, in 1948, respondent Air
Transportation Office used a portion of the property as an airport.
In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new
terminal building on the property. The ATO also lengthened,
widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners
demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as
well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused.
28) ​Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Tecson
In 1940, the DPWH took Tecon’s property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. In 1994, Tecson demanded the payment of the FMV of
the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm.
Unsatisfied, Tecson demanded the return of their property, or the
payment of compensation at the current FMV. RTC and CA ruled
in favor of Tecson, valuing the property at P1.5k per sqm. The
SC, however, did not agree with both courts and ruled instead
that just compensation should be based on the value of the
property at the time of taking in 1940, which is P0.70 per sqm.
The case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
29) ​Yared v. LBP
Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the names of
the farmer-beneficiaries.
When private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the
taking is deemed complete. Taking occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the
property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of his property.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' private property was converted into an airport by respondent ATO.
As a consequence, petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and enjoyment of their property.
Clearly, there was taking in the concept of expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed on
petitioners' private land.
As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking.
In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been
using petitioners' property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings.
To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value
considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to conveniently
invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of
taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.
The compensation should be based on the market value of the property at the time of taking which is
P0.70 per sqm. ​While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the
long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but
at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the
property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he
actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.
Also, the government’s failure to observe the proper/necessary expropriation proceedings prior to
actual taking would not nullify the actual expropriation​ given that the property subject of expropriation is
indubitably devoted for public use. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to
the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
It has been established that the payment of interest is needed when there is delay in the payment of just
compensation.
A land was taken from petitioner under CARP. The initial value
was P7M immediately deposited but aggrieved the petitioner
asked for a reevaluation of the said property (1996). However
only in 2011 was the value increased to P11M. Problem now is
whether to get the interest from the P7M value or the P11M value.
LBP waited almost 15 years to reevaluate the property thus depriving the petitioner of possible income. LBP
cannot assume the value of the initial P7M as it wasn’t the appropriate value. Thus including interest the proper
payment should be P18M.

30) ​Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI)
offered to the government to sell their lands. Initially they were
offered P86M (AFC) and P164M (HPI). The companies denied
thus filing a petition for the actual value. The land was taken from
them but was never fully paid thus the government accrued
interest (12%) for the value of the land. The estimated value was
P1,383,179,000.00 according to the RTC.
It has been established that as long as full payment hasn’t been give to the owner of the land, the
government shall pay for interest in accordance to law.
AFC and HPI were not yet fully payed when the land was taken from them. For 10 years they weren’t justly
compensated and thus were deprived of possible income from the land. LBP and DAR contend that they need
not pay the interest but the Supreme Court argue that just compensation isn’t just about paying for the full
amount but the interest accrued as well.

31)​ Republic of the Philippines v. Lim While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay
The case deals with the issue of whether or not the Republic of just compensation ​within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings​,
the Philippines is the owner of the land it expropriated and failed the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
to pay 50 years ago. Sometime in 1938, the Republic
expropriated two lots from the Denzons to establish a military Just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also
reservation for the Philippine Army. 50 years have passed and the the payment of the property within a ​reasonable time​. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
heirs of the Denzons never received payment despite court considered "just."
orders. While the case was ongoing, Valdehueza and Panerio
mortgaged the said property to Vicente Lim and because of their
failure to pay the loan, Vicente Lim acquired ownership of the lots.
He applied for a quieting of title (a remedy to remove any doubt
on the real property) against AFP officials and was declared the
exclusive and absolute owner of the said property.

The Republic assailed the decision and insisted that Lim cannot
recover possession of the lot but can only demand payment of its
fair market value, pursuant to the ruling in ​Republic v. CA et al
and ​Reyes v. National Housing Authority.​ The Court ruled that the
ownership was never fully vested on the Republic, considering
that it never paid just compensation and has deprived the original
owners of their property for 50 years. This unjust exercise of
eminent domain gives the right to the private owners to recover
full ownership of their property

32) ​Republic of the Philippines v. Limbonhani and Sons
In 1964, RP through the exercise of its power of eminent domain
acquired the Godinez’ lot in an expropriation case and took
possession of it, depositing the sum of P32k as partial payment.
Limbonhai is the rightful owner of the property as there was no valid expropriation since no payment of
just compensation has been made. ​MCIAA failed to present any evidence of full payment of the just
compensation for the property. In an expropriation case, an essential element of due process is that there must
be just compensation whenever private property is to be taken for public use. Without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. The authority to condemn
In 1967, Godinez sold the lot to Limbonhai. In 1996, RP then
sought a petition of complaint claiming for its ownership stating
that the subject lot was expropriated by the government for airport
purposes. RTC & CA ruled in favor of Limbonhai. RP argued that
Limbonhai and Sons’ claim over the property has no basis
because the lot has already been expropriated as early as 1967.
Respondent countered that there was no valid expropriation since
no payment of just compensation has been made even after 29
years from the court order.
33) ​National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay
NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant project
in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project
included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants. The respondents, as owners of the land,
sued NPC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with
the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They
alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the
underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the
Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus
V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land.
34) ​NPC v. CA
NPC filed an expropriation case on Pobre’s resort-subdivision
containing thermal water in order to conduct geothermal activities.
This was approved but NPC inflicted permanent damage on the
property due to industrial waste done on property to the extent
that the lands are not useful and viable anymore for Pobre. The
RTC ordered NPC to pay for the market value of the WHOLE
is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. The government has the burden of
proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain, such as the payment of just compensation.
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. On the other hand,
the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based
on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former
arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but
the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner, rather than the expropriator, brings
the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based
on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. It would
very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for
private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the
Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In
either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the land.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint. Compensation that is
reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel,
as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by
NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and
consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.
Payment for the whole property is considered as just compensation as it is no longer possible and
practical to restore the possession of the property to Pobre. ​The property is no longer habitable as a
resort-subdivision and has become worthless to Pobre. “when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an
entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus
compensable.”
property. NPC questions this.