Ae Ref: 97-F-1045 2C MAR 1993 Mr. Jerrold Lanes Ee ee Dear Mr. Lanes: This responds to your June 1, 1997, Freedom of Information Act request. Your request was processed by the Joint Staff which has provided the enclosed document as responsive. There are no assessable fees for this response. Sincerely, "SIGNED A.H, Passarella Director Enclosure: As stated ui Prepared by campbell:7£10451:3/20/98:DFOI:1183 :gr__pk__yl__wh.hide Sea Ree hewes paar nimteak sees Poa scsi 30S 1887/7212 26 June 1967 Pages 2 ~ 9), 31 REPORT BY THE 35 to tne JOINT CHIEPS OF STAFF BOUNDARTES, Tey At their meeting on 28 June 1Y67, tne Joint chiefs or stare, after making anendzents, approves the recommendations An paragraph 8 of this report. 2. This Decision replaces pare 2. Holders are resuested to substitute the additional attacned revises paces 6 and 7-2 incorporating the anendnents, and to gestroy the superseded pages tm accorgance with security requin 3. The memorandua in the Josure, together with Its Appendix and Annex, was forwarded as 73-67, anted 29 June 1967, to the Secretary .f Defense. Copies of thio paper are being formarsed ‘to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, and CIUCCTRIKE/USCINCHEAPSA. 4, Im that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Coge 18 (e), applied and were followed.MioLe East wouucars 7 ‘THE. PROBLEM 1, To provide the Secretary of Defense with tne views of the Joint chiefs of starr concerninn nininur secuptnd trritary wnich Tarael mtent require in order to molntain allitart ty @efensibie borders. " FACTS GEARINT On THE PEOKLEM 2, Erfective with the cease-fire in the Arab-Inraelt cone . Fliet, Israel now occupte Arab territory ensentiaiie follows: : S J Joréan (tne West bank). * “a A strip of the Syrian Highland, northeast of Late ° a: Moerta, approsinately 12 alien wide. 1 a fc. Te aazn Strip. n 4, Te Sinal Pentsinua, we 3. On 19 June 1967, the Seeretary oF Defarsn, noting that B the question of future borders between Tevael and the nttque a g ous Arab States would be & key problen in anv fleur East setties 26 Bt By nent, requestes# the views of the Joint chiefs of Starr 6 concerning minimum territory, in addition 19 that Reid on ” 4 gune 1967, which Tarael isnt be Justified in retaintne in 18 ~order to permit amore effective defense against yosiitie none 19 ventional Arab attack and terrorist raids. Defense a2so requested that the Joint chiefs of Staff disres a “the political iactors in arriving at thelr views. 2 bet. Discussron “W, Prom’a strictly military point -* view, Israel would 23 ‘beriertt by redesignating its borders to attain better security. 28 Such redesignation would probably be based on widely accepted 75 WHEERCHRERE ES TEN 1867/72 eee : Jes Te87/721-1 DECLASSIFIED . BY_ uy Spec DATE_Zteteeaes #£ shaban Fy i soheunbiade MRR cht tactical principles auch ar control of conmanding terrain, ‘elimination of saliente, effective use of natura? obstacles, and provision of sufficient territory under friendly control to insure defense inesepth for important factiities and instal dations. 5. For further discussion, see the Enclosure and its ‘Appendix. conctustous 6. Based solely on military considerations, Israel would require the following minimum territory t” permit a more effece tive defense inst possitie conventional Arab attack and terroriat raids: ‘a. The high ground which runs northesouth through the center of West Jordan to include the Latrun area and, pos~ atbly, Jerusalem and that portion of West Jordan south of Jerusniem and west of the Dead Sea. b. The Syrtan heten eh overtook Lake Thberdas and tthe Taraeli-Syrian horder to where It Intersects with Lebancn. ce, The Caza st 4, ‘That portion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of ‘the Wadi e1 Gerafi, then east to an intersection with the Guif of Aqaba at approximately 29°20" nortn latitude and the demilitarized zone around Al Anja. es Key terrain in the Sinai controlling the Strait of ‘Aran, provided international guarantees for free passare of the Gulf of Aqaba are not forthcoming. 7. A decision on the proper defensible t wndaries for & country whieh is based solely on military consideratias would Agnore the Snescapabie political, econonic, soctological, and peychological considerations which help deternine any state's defensive posture. DECLASSIFIED J BY_ Zar ale DATE_2Z:20 4iosrbsaey eid RECOMMENDATION 8, Tt is recommended that: "ay Te memorandum tn the Enclosure, torether with tt: forwarded to the Secretary of butons b. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, and CINCSTAIKE/USCINCREAFSA. NATO activities. @, ‘Tis paper NOT be Forwarded to the Chairman, U: Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Comittee. Aetion Officers: Lt Col M, E Key, USA Le turnhy, ust sR? ini to -20nbOCa egpenie Sit » Appendix ang Annex, which reflects tne ao7y cone sus le . This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assizned to =) L DECLASSIFIED BY 4 Sn DATE_2 20705ENCLOSUR acsi-372-67 49 June 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CECPETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Middle East Boundaries (W) 1. (S) Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 June 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without regard to olitical factors, on the wmininun territory, in addition te that held on « June 1967; Israel might De justified in retaining in order to permit a more effec tive defense against possible conventional Arab attack and ter= foriet raids. 2. (8) Troma strictly military poin: of view, Israe} would require the retention cf sone captured territory in crger to provide militarily defensible borders. Determination sf territory fo be retained shuld be based on acccpted tactical principles Such ab control of connanding terrain, use of natural obstacles @linination of enenycheld. safientes and provicion of defense in: Septh for important facilities and installations. More detailea Giecuseions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto. In suamary, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding these areas are as follows a. The Jordanian West Bank. Control of the prominent high ground running north-south through the widdle of Wes" Jordan Benerally east of the main north-south hiphway along the axis Jeninciabioa-Bira-Jerusalem and then southeass to a junction With the Dead See at the Wadi el Daraja would provide Terael With amilivarily defanaible border. ‘The envisioned defensive Line would run just east of Jerusalem; however, provision could be nade for internationalization of the city without significant detriment to leraei's defensive posture. >, Syrian Territory Contiguous to leraei. Israel is portichtariy sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied ee ite Woperacnnent eo TOS 1887/721, jn Yee THe7/701-1 6 Evelenurs E (Revised by Deetaten = 9 dune 196) DECLASSIFIED H. BY_ Zen Srp Se DATE_Ligpos“Deore ~omeonrincinat territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Onaitra about 18 miles inside the Syrian border, Mould give Taree] control of the terrain which syria has used effectively in harassing the border area. ec. The Jerusalen-Latrun Area. See subparagraph 2a, above. 4, Te Gaze strip. By occupying the Gaze Strip, Israel would Hace approsinately si milee of hostile border. for eight Configured as it ie, the strip serves as a salient for intro- Suction of Arab subversion and terrorism, ang its retention Would be to Tsreei's military advantage: fe. The Negev-Sinai Border. Except for retention of the dentittarised one around AT Awja and some territory for the protection of the port of Eilat, discussed below, continued Decupation of the Sinai would present Ierael with problems ‘Outweighing any military gains- £. Toe Negevedordan-Aqaba-Strait of Tinan Area. Israel's opjectiver Rere-wouse Be innocent passage through the Gulf of Agaba and protection of ite port at filat.. Terael could occupy Sharm ash-Sheykh with considerable inconvenience but coulé rely fon sone form of internationalization to secure free access to She gulf. Failing this, Israel vould require key terrain in the Sinai xo protect its use of the Strait of Tiran. Eilat, Situated at the apex of Israel's narrow southern tip, is A: Vulnerable to direct ground action fron Egyptian territory. Yerael would lessen the threat by retention of a portion of the Sinal Penineuie south and east of the Wadi el Gerafi then sn intersection vith the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 28°20! noren latitude: 3. (S) It ie emphasized that the aborr conclusions. in accordance with your tere of reference, are nascd ole! on Bilitery considerations from the israel! point of view ee ea ai For the Joint chiefs of staff: Chairman Joint chisfs of Staff Attachments eHWaHoacan Downgrader tomOnRRMEt Ses Tee7/721-1 18 (Revises by Doetaton = 29 June 19 Enclosure =] DECLASSIFIED BY or Sega DATE_Z77ep[APPENDIX (4 pases) Ses T87/721-1 o Appendix 4 : DECLASSIFIED rf BY Snr Sree DATE_2723 706°Dew mceicaiertte APPENDIX DISCUSSION OF KEY ISRAELI BORDEK AREAS 2, (5) The Jordansan west a. Threat. the Jerdan-Israeli border is 204 ailen 1H length extending from the Gulf of Agabs nortimard te the pew! Sea, thence following the armistice demarcation !ines ant ine Jordan River northward to the Yarmuk River, thence elena the Yarmuk River to the Syrian frontier. ‘This border aren nas traditionally been Lightly neld by military forces ant uctense consisted mainly of small, videly separated catpe: and, therefore, afforded an area where Iaunctins sf ganoieur and terrorists into Israel was relatively easy. purinw period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of $1 incidents Of sabotage and mining activity took place alony tai Worden These activities resulted in Unree killed, 1% wuunied, ant @anage to houses, roads, bridges, railraads, ami water ant electric power installations in Israel. Instances 9: er uane of small arms fire occurred quite trequentiy. ‘tne masnesty of these events took place from the Mount Hohn ail Aravan areas where the Jordanian authorities div not take sufficien: ures to protect against line crosses ami saboteurs. tT © niah ground running north-south through the auddle of west Jordan overlooks Israel's narrow midsection and offers a ruste for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in te gar B. Requirement. A boundary along the commanding terrain overlooking the Jordan River from th vest could provide a anorter defense line. However, as a minimum, Israel would need a defense Line generaily along the axis Bardala-Tebas- Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then to the northerr yart ef tne Dead Sea. This Line would widen the narrow portior cf Israel Dente SCONE, e see DECLASSIFIED BY. ; DATE_27° 726 (Revined = 27 aeun 1465and provide additional + woulé provide additional buffer for the » base at Beersheba, 2 Im addition, this line would give a portion of the foothills to 3 7 Hurael and avoid interdiction by artillery in the Israeli vilh 4 Auges in the loviands. This line would also provide » shorter 5 @efense Line than the border of 4 June 1967 and would reduce « the Jordanian salient into toe 1. 18 also provides adequate 7 Lines of comunications for lateral movement. « 2. (S) Syrian Territory contiquous to Israei ’ Theest. The border between Syria and Inraci extends 10 ‘approximately 43 miles. Tt extends from a point on the n Lebanese-Syrian border east to the vicinity of Yaniyas, south to Lake Tiberias, then south along the eastern shore of the b lake to the Syrian-Jerdantan border. urine the period January 14 1965 to February 1967, a total of 26 santa and terrorist 1s acts occurred along this border. In addition, there ware “ umerous shellings of villaacs trom the hiah ground ower looking 17 the area southeast of Lake Tabersas, Cesuattien were seven killed and 18 wounded, Control of the dominant terrain afte 1 Syria a military route of approach into northern israel: howe 29 fever, the greatest threat in this sector 15 from terroriam and 21 sabotage. 2 D. Requirement. Israel must hol the commanding terrain east 23 of the boundary of 4 June 1967 which overicoks the Galilee area. 24 To provide a defense in-depth, Israel would need a strip about 25 AS miles wide extending from the border of Lebanon to the border 26 of Jordan, This line would provide prots-tion for the Israeli 27 villages on the east bank of Lake Tiberias but would make ze defending forces east of the lake vulnerable to a severing 2 thrust from Jordan to the southern tip of the lake. The 30 Israelis would probably decide to accept ‘this risk. Asa side 31 effect, this Line would give the taraelis control of approxi- 32 mately 25 miles of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline: a Downgsededete-GOHROEHINEE 2 vpenax DECLASSIFIED =. BY sare DATE_J72 705(S) The Jerusalen-Latrun Area Threat. These areas have been the scene of intermittent trouble over the years as both Jordanians ard Israeli nave been Allegalty cultivating lands in the ares between the Lanes. Only fone serious incident occurred in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. b. Requirement, To defend the Jerusalon srea vould cequire that the boundary of Terael be positioned to the cast of the city to provide for the organization of an adequate defensive position. on the other hand, if Jerusalem were to be inter nationalized under the United Nations, 9 boundary established west of the city could be defended in accurdance with the con cept in paragraph 1, above 4. (S) The Gaze strip a Threat. during ene period 1949-1956, prior to tne Suez war, numerous infiltrations and terrorist raids were mounted by Egypt from the Gaza Strip. However. with the estaLiishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957, bared sn the Gaza Strip and along the Sinsi Loruer, the situation nas been quiet Only three events of sabotage occurred in thir area during the period January 1965 to February 1967, The Strip, under Egyptian control, provides a salient into Israel « iittic less than 30 nies long and from four to eight miles wide. It has served as a training area for the Palestine Liberation Army and, despite the few incidents arising in this area of late, it is signifi- cant to note that one of the first actions by the Ieraelis in the recent conflict was to seal off the area from the Sinai. b. Requirenent. Occupation of the Strip by Israel would reduce the hostile border by a factor of five and eliminate a source for raids and training of the Palestine Liberation Army Bong AOE, : ww 2 23 Fy 2s 26 2 20 29 20 4 DECLASSIFIED BY_Z DATE_?797.5. (5) The Negev-Sinai porder ‘This area has not presented any-border probions ‘since entablishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957, The demilitarized zone around Al Avia, containing she main north-south, east-west road junction in eastsrn Sinai and the major water source in the area, is the princiva! teature Providing military advantage. >. Requizenent. Except for an adjustment of » portion of the boundary tied to the defense of Eilat, discussed Lelow, and Fetention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja, ce nant is Seen for Israeli retention »f occupied territory in the Sinai. 6. (S) The Negevesorden-Agaba-Strait of Titan Arca threat. There were only five incidents of saberade an this area during the period January 1965 to February 1467 Terael's chief concern in this area is fies avenge threuh the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of aqaba ant protection wi witats Terael's chicf of1 port ané trade Link with the Kost African countries. Filat, being at the apex of Israci's southern tip, 4p vulnerable to interdiction from Eeyptian territory D. Requirement. To provide Israel with sufficient depth to Protect the port, the boundary should be esta Aishod approx mately 20 miles to the west along the Wad: el-Gorafs, south to Ate headwaters, then tte a point on the Gulf of Agaha at ‘approximately 39° 20° north latitude. In the event an inter ational guarantee for free ps jage of he Strait uf varan and the Gulf of Agaba is not provides, Isriel would feel competed to occuoy key terrain in order to control the ontrance to the strat 7. (W) See attached nap. (mevises ~ 27 June 1967) 26 2 2Samp anNex NEAR EAST Mar Tana AIR Matinee! i ial cathe eneme mntentaMEDITERRANEAN SEA He cope ev igeace Ton Derenaive Punroses DECLASSIFIED BY Nene Sie aac DATE_2 72 20g peer} : E22 2gcory no, DistarpuTiON w NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the HOLDERS OP Jes 1887/721-2 A Revort by the 3-5 MIDDLE EAST BOUNDARTES (Uv) PIRST CORRIGENDUM At the request of the originator, holders are requests to substitute the attached revised white pages 1 ani & and tz iestroy the superseded pages in accordance with security ri Le R. Vasey HJ. HALLENBECK Joint secretariat UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachments ve Fovt Stage DATEPZ272.