7. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES V.
CA o Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) assigned and transferred to
Topic: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Petitioners: INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC
Respondents: THE HON CA, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, THE HON GERONIMO VELASCO, in his capacity as
Minister of Energy, and PNB
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies "where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (US v. Western
Pacific Railroad Co.).
FACTS:
● This petition seeks the reversal of the CA decision w/c ruled against the
petitioner
● Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract
for the operation of 2 coal blocks in Eastern Samar by the gov’t thru
Bureau of Energy Development (BED)
● Then Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) applied again for exploration of
additional 3 coal blocks called Giporlos Area
● Later on Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) was advised that the logical
coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corp (MMIC) w/c was already developing the coal deposit in Bagacay
Area and that Bagacay and Giporlos should be awarded to MMIC. (this is
in line w/ the objective of rationalizing the country’s over-all coal supply-
demand balance)
MMIC all its rights and interests in the 2 coal blocks
● Subsequently, Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) filed for rescission of
Memorandum of Agreement w/ damages against MMIC & then Minister
of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC, alleging
 that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even
before the MoA was finalized and approved by BED;
 that MMIC discontinued work;
 that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the
adjacent coal blocks and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the
reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI’s loan as
provided in the MoA.
 IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve
the return of the coal contract from MMIC to petitioner, w/ a
written contract saying that it’s valid and effective & to convert
such contract to a development/production or exploitation in IEI’s
favor.
● PNB was later impleaded in an amended complaint when the latter w/
the DBP effected extrajudicial foreclosures on mortgages (Mortgage
Trust Agreement) constituted in its favor by MMIC after the latter
defaulted in its obli for P22M. The CA eventually dismissed the case
against PNB.
● Strangely enough, Jesus Cabarrus if the president of both MMIC and
Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI)
● RTC: ordered rescission, declared the continued efficacy of the coal
contract in favor or IEI, ordered the reversion of 2 coal block covered by
the contract, ordered BED to give due course to IEI’s application for coal
contract & for the 3 more coal blocks
● CA: reversed RTC, held that the rendition of the summary judgment was
not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the
 parties, and that RTC had no jurisdiction over the action considering that
under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of coal blocks.
● Hence, this petition
ISSUE: W/N the civil court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for
rescission of the MoA concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks –
NO. BED has jurisdiction.
RULING:
1. While the action filed by IEI was for rescission, its cause of action
was not merely the rescission but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks.
2. BED, as successor to the Energy Development Board, is tasked w/
the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national
program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and
extraction of fossil fuels
3. Accdg to PD 972 and PD 1206, the jurisdiction of the BED, to pass
upon any question involving the MoA between EIE and MMIC,
should be sustained.
4. It’s been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies.
5. if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
6. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in
this case since the question of what coal areas should be
exploited and developed and which entity should be granted
coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter.
7. The trial court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,
development and extraction of mineral resources like coal.
8. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does
not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED
are threshed out and determined.
With the foregoing conclusion arrived at, the question as to the propriety of
the summary judgment rendered by the Trial Court becomes unnecessary to
resolve. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES: PD 972 & PD 1206 (up to you guys if gusto nyo pa print)
The pertinent sections of P.D. No. 1206 provide:
"Sec. 6. Bureau of Energy Development. There is created in the Department
a Bureau of Energy Development, hereinafter referred to in this Section as
the Bureau, which shall have the following powers and functions, among
others:
"a. Administer a national program for the encouragement, guidance, and
whenever necessary, regulation of such business activity relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of fossil fuels such as
petroleum, coal, . .
"The decisions, orders, resolutions or actions of the Bureau may be appealed
to the Secretary whose decisions are final and executory unless appealed to
the President. (Emphasis upplied.)

That law further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct Energy
Development Board relative to the implementation of P.D. No. 972 on coal
exploration and development have been transferred to the BED, provided
that coal operating contracts including the transfer or assignment of interest
in said contracts, shall require the approval of the Secretary (Minister) of
Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).

"Sec. 12. . . . the powers and functions transferred to the Bureau of Energy
Development are:

xxx xxx xxx

"ii. The following powers and functions of the Energy Development Board
under PD No. 910 . . .=

"(1) Undertake by itself or through other arrangements, such as service

contracts, the active exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of
energy resources . . .

(2) Regulate all activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,

development, and extraction of fossil and nuclear fuels . . . (P.D. No. 1206)
(Emphasis supplied.)

P.D. No. 972 also provides:

"Sec. 8. Each coal operating contract herein authorized shall . . . be executed

by the Energy Development Board.

ROXAS v. CA
Topic: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Petitioner: ROXAS & CO., INC.
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving
applications for conversion of lands is the DAR.
FACTS:
● Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and the registered owner of three
haciendas in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.
 Haciendas Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway
● Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
● Before the law's effectivity, Roxas & Co with DAR a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway
● Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL.
 DAR Regional Director requested LBP Land Valuation
Manager to open a trust account in favor of Roxas, representing
the valuation of Hacienda Palico
 LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and
P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as
compensation for Roxas' land in Hacienda Banilad
● Roxas applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and
Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands
● However, DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas
 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’S) were
distributed to farmer beneficiaries
● Roxas sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR, withdrawing its Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) of Hacienda Caylaway.
 informed DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses
● DAR Secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of the VOS
● Roxas instituted Case with DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), praying
for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by DAR
 alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu had been declared a
tourist zone, thus, not suitable for agricultural production
 alleged that Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the
lands to non-agricultural
● DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether
the property was subject to agrarian reform.
 Hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.
● Roxas filed with the Court of Appeals
 questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL
and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its
landholdings.
● Roxas’ petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
 Found that Roxas failed to exhaust administrative remedies
● Roxas moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
● Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
1. W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite Roxas’ failure
to exhaust administrative remedies – YES.
2. Assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-
agricultural, W/N this Court has the power to rule on this issue – NO.
RULING:
1. Roxas rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a
violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies
before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
● There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptions are: (5) when the respondent acted in disregard
of due process
 DAR's opening of trust account deposits in Roxas’ name with the
LBP does not constitute payment under the law.
 Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to
farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on
the part of Roxas.
1. DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of Roxas'
landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate
over his application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to
non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or
disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.
● At the time Roxas filed its application for conversion, the Rules of
Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land
use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2
 Under this A.O., applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares
are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
 The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The
Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be
appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals
● doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
 DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter.
 The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage
of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nulli ed for respondent DAR's
failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set
forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and
determination of petitioner's application for conversion.
 ● Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706

 directing the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate

the conduct of Senate President Villar for using his position of
power to influence public officials in relocating the C-5 road
extension project to deliberately pass thru his properties, and to
negotiate the overpriced purchase of road rights of way thru
several properties also owned by his corporations redounding in
PIMENTEL JR. v. SENATE COMMITTEE huge personal financial benefits for him to the detriment of the

Topic: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction; Inapplicability of the doctrine Filipino people.

Petitioners: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P.  Members of the Committee: Pia Cayetano (Chairperson), Loren

ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN Legarda, Joker Arroyo, Alan Peter Cayetano, Miriam Defensor-

PETER S. CAYETANO Santiago, Gregorio Honasan, Panfilo Lacson (members)

Respondents: SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by ● Nov 17, 2008: Juan Ponce Enrile was elected Senate President.

SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE  The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of

FACTS: Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon,

Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members
● Senator Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng
for the Majority.
Bayan, Bantayan!”
● Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member
 Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion
from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.
in the 2008 General Appropriations Act particularly the P200
million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos ● Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with

P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to fairness on Senator Villar's case, Senator Lacson moved that the

Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate,

and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 acting as a Committee of the Whole.

road including ROW. ● Petitioner Senators (Pimentel, Villar, Arroyo, Pangilinan, Pia & Alan

 Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Cayetano) objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics

Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole and questioned the

account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further determination of the quorum.

stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the  Petitioners proposed 11 amendments; 3 were adopted.
double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
  Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed
amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
● Respondent Senate Committee proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry
on P.S. Resolution 706 and subsequently declared that there was
substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing.
MAIN ISSUE: W/N the petition is premature for failure to observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort.
RULING: No. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in this case.
1. The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which
means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
2. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of the court.
3. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of respondent for their resolution.
o The issues here are purely legal questions which are within the
competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an
administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.
4. Doctrine: "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is
a duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would
be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look
behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."
o The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal
issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the
doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution
of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint
by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the
Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
SO ORDERED.
Other issues (if she asks):
1. Indispensable party
● An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in
the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the
other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between them.
● Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before
the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the
outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues
in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of
the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without
affecting Senator Madrigal's interest. The nature of Senator
Madrigal's interest in this case is not of the nature that this case
could not be resolved without her participation.
2. Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee on the Whole
 ● The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating
to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and
reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges." However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name
its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation.
● In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the
Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings
involve the Senate's exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
are internal to the Senate.

3. Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate

Committee of the Whole

● the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the

Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that
does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. In the same
manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right
to due process.

● The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of

proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court.

● The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own

rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when
required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court
will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

4. Prior Publication

● The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of

the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that
affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for
their publication before the rules can take effect.