Macailing v.
Andrada Macailing, proportionately in the new application to be filed by
Topic: Judicial Review – Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial
review does not necessarily imply that it is unavailable
Petitioners: Rafael Macailing, Silvestre Macailing, Dominico Necesito And
Rafael Necesito
Respondents: Tomas Andrada, Maria Andrada, Federico Andrada,
Florencia Vda. De Andrada, Jesus Andrada, Andrea R. Gaurana (Heirs Of
Salvador Andrada) And Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema (In
Behalf Of The President),
DOCTRINE: In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some
statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere
silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is
unavailable. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the
extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available
FACTS:
1. A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose
between parties:
- Petitioner Macailang who were settlers thereon occupying four
hectares each; and
- Respondent Andrada (later substituted by his heirs), the sales
applicant of a bigger parcel, which includes the lands occupied by
petitioner Macailang.
2. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in Petitioner Macailang
favor, and excluded the four parcels that they were claiming.
3. The Director of Lands, however, reversed and declared that the
portions adjudged to Petitioner Macailang shall be restored to the
heirs Respondent Andrada who should then include plaintiffs
1
Respondent Andrada.
4. On Appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
reversed the Director of Lands by awarding to Petitioner Macailang
the lands they claimed.
5. Respondent Andrada moved to reconsider twice, but denied twice
also by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
6. Still not satisfied Respondent Andrada appealed to the Office of the
President.
7. In a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema,
"[b]y authority of the President", reversed the decision of the
Secretary and declared that the lands involved "should be restored to the
heirs of Andrada to be included in their individual applications."
8. Petitioner Macailang, started the present suit in the Cotabato court.
 They raised the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary.
9. The CFI affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources
10. Thus, Respondent Andrada appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUES:
1. (Issue in the syllabus) W/N certiorari is the proper remedy - YES
2. W/N the Court has the power to nullify the decisions of administrative
agencies - YES
 solemn decision" of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

HELD: Resources "that had already become final and executory

1. YES  No necessity there was for plaintiffs to aver that there was no
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions , some
This can be clearly read from the factual narration in the complaint.
statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are
silent.  After all, the case has already reached the administrative peak —
the Office of the President has already acted thereon.
 Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial
review is unavailable  The fact that the petition was not verified may be excused. The case
presented was one which shaped out a question of law. There were
 Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the
no facts that really needed confirmation under oath. In fact, no trial
extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available
was conducted by the court below. Absence of verification here is not
 Deducible from the foregoing is that where administrative agencies
fatally defective
have original jurisdiction in the premises, the court's interference with
 This is a special civil action for certiorari.
administrative action is necessarily limited
2. YES
 The remedies that can be availed of where the statute is silent,
as in the present case, are the special civil actions for  The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are
inapplicable, in that those cases involved petitions for writs of
 certiorari,
injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside
 prohibition and/or m
the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved
 andamus specified in the Rules of Court.
 In this case, therefore, we have no alternative but to hold that  The ruling in Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary:
the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an  has not varied the rule, at least in so far as prohibitory writs are
ordinary civil action. concerned.

 Certiorari appears to be the real course of action here taken by  The Gayacao case conceded the power of the provincial Court of

Petitioner Macailang. First Instance to take cognizance of cases involving judicial

review of administrative decisions, where the sole issue before
 While the petition by itself does not conform to the formal
the Court, is whether the decision of respondent public officials
requirements, the allegations thereof show that plaintiffs charge
was legally correct or not'; but it clearly reaffirmed the non-
defendant Assistant Executive Secretary with grave abuse of
jurisdiction rulings previously cited where writs of injunction are
discretion in upholding defendants' appeal "in desecration of a
issued or sought in order to control acts of non-resident officials
2
  Indeed, numerous are the cases where courts of First instance of
provinces have rightly assumed jurisdiction over petitions solely to
review acts of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, both of whom may be found in Manila. For
instance, in the 1949 case of Alejo vs. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924,
928, this Court impliedly upheld the power of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija to review land decisions of the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
 We hold that the Cotabato court has jurisdiction
We, accordingly, hold that the August 20, 1959 letter-decision of the
Assistant Executive Secretary "by authority of the President" reversing the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in this case is
null and void and of no force and effect.
For the reasons given, the lower court's decision (labeled Order) of January
31,
1963 appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
3
Office of the Court Administrator v Lopez
Topic: Quantum required is substantial evidence
Petitioners: Office of the Court Administrator
Respondents: Claudio M. Lopez
FACTS:
1. Claudio Lopez (Process Server for the MTC, Supiden, La Union) was
charged with a violation of SEC 11 of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), after a search of his house yielded the seizure of 790.6 grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops.
2. Consonant with the En Banc Resolution dated 12 March 1981 –
authorizing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to initiate motu
proprio the filing of administrative complaint against judges and/or
employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or
charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts – the OCA
recommended the filing of an administrative complaint against
Claudio Lopez for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a
Government Employee.
3. The Court approved the OCAs recommendation and required
Claudio Lopez to comment on the complaint.
4. Claudio Lopez submitted a one page answer/comment alleging that:
 a criminal case was pending before the RTC La Union; and
 that from the evidence presented, it was clear that the
prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case might
be dismissed.
  Lopez therefore prayed that this instant complaint be dismissed.  This is a flagrant violation of the law and is considered a

ISSUE: W/N Lopez should be administratively liable? YES grave misconduct.

RULING: YES.

● As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding

of administrative culpability, ONLY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS ● The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some
REQUIRED. established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful

 The present case is an administrative case, NOT a criminal behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.

case, against respondent.  The misconduct is considered grave IF it involves any of the

 Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the

evidence which is defined as that amount of relevant law, or to disregard established rules, which must be

evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as established by substantial evidence.

adequate to support a conclusion.  As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of

 Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of

necessary, and established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave

misconduct.
 The dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent is
not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case.  Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the
act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
 We emphasize the well settled rule that a criminal case is
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit
different from an administrative case and each must be
for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to
of others.
each case.
 An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered
● The evidence showed that Claudio Lopez is the occupant of the
as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral turpitude
place where the 790.6 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops were
are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the
recovered.
Administrative Code.
● Claudio Lopez did not have the necessary permit or authority from
 We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the
the appropriate government agency to possess the same.
Investigating Judge and the OCA that Lopez committed grave
misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the
4
 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.
● Once again, we stress that court employees, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice,
should always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility.
 Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but must also be in accordance with the law and
court regulations.
 No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary.
 Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and
honesty to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary.
 They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public
trust and confidence in the courts.
 Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy
burden of responsibility.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server
of the Municipal Trial Court of Sudipen, La Union, from the service with
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
5
government including government owned or controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
Gonzales v. CA
DOCTRINE: Rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the
courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence.
It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to
pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum.
Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts
from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the
cause of action of the petitioner.
Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners: Lilia Gonzales
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO S. MARAYA, as
Regional Director, DAR, Region VI, Iloilo City, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Iloilo City, RAMON PERUEL, MARCELINO BOLIVAR,
ALFONSO CARMELO, ESPERIDION PELEGRINO and WILFREDO
CARMELO
FACTS :
● Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales

 received two Orders dated November 27, 1990 and April 22, ISSUE:
 From the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), ● W/N the CA erred in dismissing the case for failing to exhaust
 Signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director Antonio S. administrative remedies? – NO
Maraya, and
 issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the
government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27.

● Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales was directed to surrender the titles to

her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent HELD: Contention of Petitioner Gonzales to the Supreme Court

Land Bank of the Philippines, ● The Petitioner Gonzales contends that the petition for certiorari and

 While the said Respondent Land Bank of the Philippines was prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals comes within the

ordered to pay the Petitioner Gonzales an aggregate amount of exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit :

P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land. (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity;

● Petitioner Gonzales filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's
with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to fundamental right to due process; and
restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the (3) where the question involved is a purely legal one.
DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of
● The Petitioner Gonzales further contends that certiorari, not appeal,
jurisdiction,
is the proper remedy as a question of jurisdiction prescinding from the
 Alleging that the Petitioner Gonzales NEVER filed a land alleged denial of due process is raised in the petition; and that the
transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the questioned Orders are merely interlocutory and hence unappealable.
execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her
● Moreover, the Orders issued by the Regional Office of the DAR are
land.
VOID for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction based on
● Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying and dismissing the the following:
petition for failure of the Petitioner Gonzales to exhaust administrative
o (1) the orders are baseless as the petitioner never filed any
remedies.
land transfer claim with the DAR;
● Court of Appeals also held that Certiorari cannot be used by the
o (2) they were issued in violation of the Petitioner Gonzales
petitioners as a substitute for appeal of the assailed issuances.
right to due process as the latter was never notified of the
● Hence this petition
approved final survey plan, the land valuation summary and
6
 the farmer's undertaking; and (3) the orders fixed just
compensation based on the provisions of P.D. 27 which is
inconsistent with, and therefore has already been repealed by,
Republic Act No. 6657.
RULING:
Petitioner Gonzales should have sought redress in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), and the DARAB’s
officials should have been given an opportunity to review the matter
and resolve the controversy.
The Supreme Court are not convinced that any of the exceptions were
satisfied
 As above stated, the Orders issued by the Regional Director
pursuant to law are not patent nullities, and
 the alleged denial of the petitioner's right to due process is
intertwined with the question of notice upon the petitioner which
raises basically a factual matter, i.e., whether three notices were
properly served upon petitioner.
 The issue is not to be resolved by the Court of Appeals in the first
instance on certiorari. We do not see how the controversy raises a
purely legal question
● The proper procedure which Petitioner Gonzales should have taken is:
7
 to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional
Director, or
 to go directly to the DARAB, or
 to go to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD).
● PRIOR RESORT TO THESE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WILL NOT
ONLY SATISFY THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as
the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited
by the technical rules of procedure and evidence.
● From there, Petitioner Gonzales has yet another forum available, the
Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases
involving land valuation or determination of just compensation
● The procedural short-cut taken by the Petitioner Gonzales which
ends no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered
fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.
● Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
NOTE: Background FUNCTIONS of DAR
● A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under
the Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for "supporting the field
units and supervising program implementation of the Department within
the region".
● The function of the DAR Regional Office includes " [implementing] laws,
policies, plans, rules and regulations of the Department in the regional
area".
● A similar function is delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under 4. Only 166,798 bags were unloaded at the Port of Manila.
Executive Order No. 129-A 13 . 5. After the discharging was completed, NFA paid Hongfil Shipping

o It may be reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed Corporation the amount of P1,006,972.11 covering the shipment of

orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and tenant corn grains.

emancipation program of the government is within the authority 6. Thereafter, Hongfil Shipping Corporation sent its billing to NFA

and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional Director. claiming payment for

 freight covering the shut-out load or deadfreight
 demurrage (failure to load/discharge the ship on time agreed
upon), allegedly sustained during the loading and unloading of
subject shipment of corn grains.
7. When NFA refused to pay the amount reflected in the billing, Hongfil
Shipping Corporation brought the present action against NFA.

NFA v. CA

FACTS:
Issues:
1. National Food Authority (NFA), thru its officers, Emil Ong, Roselinda
Geraldez, Ramon Sargan and Adelina A. Yap, entered into a “Letter of 1) W/N petitioners be held liable for deadfreight? – YES
Agreement for Vessel/Barge Hire” with Hongfil Shipping 2) W/N petitioners be held liable for demurrage? – NO
Corporation for the shipment of 200,000 bags of corn grains from
Cagayan de Oro City to Manila.
Held:
2. The loading of bags of corn grains in the vessel commenced but it
1) Yes. It bears stressing that subject Letter of Agreement is considered
took a longer period (21 days, 15 hours, and 18 minutes) to finish
a Charter Party.
than as was certified by the Arrastre firm as there was a strike
staged by the Arrastre workers in view of the refusal of the striking A Charter Party is classified into:

stevedores to attend to their work. (1) “bareboat” or “demise” charter and

3. The vessel was allowed to depart for the port of Manila and arrived (2) contract of affreightment.
there, but unfortunately, it took another 20 days, 14 hours and 33
Subject contract is one of affreightment, whereby the owner of the
minutes to finish the unloading due to the unavailability of a
vessel leases part or all of its space to haul goods for others.
berthing space for the vessel M/V CHARLIE/DIANE certified by the
Port of Manila.
8
It is a contract for special service to be rendered by the owner of the
vessel. Under such contract, the ship retains:
 possession, command, and navigation of the ship,
 the charterer or freighter merely having use of the space in the
vessel in return for his payment of the charter hire.
Under the law, the cargo not loaded is considered a dead freight . It is the
amount paid by or recoverable from a charterer of a ship for the portion
of the ship’s capacity the latter contracted for but failed to occupy.
Explicit in the law that the liability for dead freight is on the charterer .
(Article 680 of the Code of Commerce).
2) No. Demurrage is the sum fixed in a charter party as a remuneration
to the owner of the ships for the detention of his vessel beyond the
number of days allowed by the charter party for loading or unloading or
for sailing.
Liability for demurrage, exists only when expressly stipulated in the
contract.
Shipper or charterer is liable for the payment of demurrage claims
when he exceeds the period for loading and unloading as agreed
upon or the agreed “laydays”.
The period for such may or may not be stipulated in the contract.
 A charter party may either provide for a fixed laydays or
 Contain general or indefinite words such as “customary quick
dispatch” or “as fast as the streamer can load”.
In the case at bar, the charter party provides merely for a general or
indefinite words of “customary quick dispatch”.
Such stipulation implies that loading and unloading of the cargo
should be within a reasonable time.
9
The charterer NFA could not be held liable for demurrage for it
appears that cause of delay was not imputable to either of the
parties.
The cause of delay during the loading was the strike staged by the
crew of the arrastre operator, and the unavailability of a berthing
space for the vessel during the unloading.
Here, the Court holds that the delay sued upon was still within the
“reasonable time” embraced in the stipulation of “Customary Quick
Dispatch”. Furthermore, considering the subject contract of affreightment
contains an express provision “Demurrage/Dispatch: NONE”, the same
left the parties with no recourse but to apply the literal meaning of such
stipulation.
Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro
Topic: DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES
Petitioners: The Commissioner of Customs & The Collector of Customs
Respondents: Hon Pedro C. Navarro (Judge CFI Rizal) & Juanito Flores
(JSF Enterprises, ASIATIC Inc)
DOCTRINE: It is the settled law and jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the
customs authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be
imported into the Philippines, for the purpose of enforcement of Philippine
customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually under their
possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or detention thereof
has previously been issued by the port collector of customs.
FACTS:
● Respondent judge Navarro GRANTED the prayer of private RULING: NO -- CUSTOMS HAS JURISDICTION
respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated (importers of ● Government v. Gale (1913 decision):
1,350 cartons of fresh fruits) for a writ of preliminary injunction to
a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings
restrain Petitioners (The Commissioner of Customs & The Collector
constitutes a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers
of Customs) from proceeding with the auction sale of such
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the
perishable goods
forfeiture and further disposition of the subject matter of such
 The goods were classified as non-essential consumer proceedings.
commodities – banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294
● The prevailing doctrine is that the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION in
and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law
seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs,
and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner
which bars a Court of First instance from assuming cognizance over
Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the
such a matter.
Tariff and Customs Code.
● It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
● Petitioners pointed out that respondent Judge Navarro is in
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION over:
violation for ASSUMING JURISDICTION over an incident of a
 imported goods,
pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which was a matter
 for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws,
falling within the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION of the customs
 from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
authorities.
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
● The Court issued a resolution:
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with
 requiring Respondents Flores to file an answer and at the same seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in
petitioners
question and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
 to prevent the challenged order of Respondent Judge
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
Navarro from being implemented.
tariff and customs laws, it is to the EXCLUSION of the regular courts.
 Instead of preparing an answer, Respondents Flores just
The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first
submitted a manifestation stating that "after an intensive and
instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the
serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have
doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken
decided to abandon its interest in the case."
to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of
ISSUE: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction? competence to act on the matter.

10

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent
Judge of January 4, 1971 nullified and set aside. The preliminary injunction
issued by this Court in its resolution of February 15, 1971 against the
enforcement of the above order is made permanent. Respondent Judge, or
whoever is acting in his place and in his stead, is ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 14178 of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled
Juanito S. Flores, doing business under the name and style of J.S.F.
Enterprises and Asiatic Incorporated v. the Commissioner of Customs and
the Collector of Customs. Costs against private respondents.
Vda. De Tan v Veterans Backpay Commission
Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies - Exceptions
Petitioners: Maria Natividad Vda De Tan
Respondents: Veterans Backpay Commission
DOCTRINE: Administrative Remedies; Rule Of Exhaustion Not To Be
Invoked If Party Is In Estoppel. — The respondent Commission is in estoppel
to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering
that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
were "advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the
office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for
11
recourse", thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial
ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission
FACTS :
● On March 5, 1957, petitioner-appellee, Maria Natividad vda. de Tan,
filed with Court of First Instance of Manila a verified petition for
mandamus seeking an order to compel the respondent-appellant
Veterans Back Pay Commission:
(1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese
national, entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives under
Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, and
(2) to give due course to the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said
veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding backpay certificate of
indebtedness.
● Respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission filed its answer in due
time asserting certain special and affirmative defenses, on the basis
of which, the Commission unsuccessful moved to dismiss the petition
● Parties submitted stipulation of facts:
1. That the petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan is of legal age,
a widow and a resident of the Philippines
2. That the Respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission is a
government instrumentality or agency, duly vested with authority
to implement the provisions of Backpay Law, otherwise known
as Republic Act No. 897, further amending Republic Act No. 304;
3. That the petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan is the widow
of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese
national, and bonafide member the 1st Regiment, United State-
Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines; died in a battle at Rizal
Province; and certified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
 having rendered arteriosus military services during the Japanese exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of
occupation; the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court.

4. That petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan as widow of the ISSUE:

said recognized deceased veteran, filed an application for back ● W/N petitioner’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies bars
pay subsequent action in courts - NO
5. The Secretary and Chief of Office Staff the Veterans Back
Pay Commission sent a letter to General Vicente Lopez of the
HELD:
United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines apprising
The respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission contented that the Maria
the latter that the Commission has reaffirmed its solution
Natividad vda. de Tan should have first exhausted her administrative
granting the back pay to alien members;
remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her
6. The Armed Forces of the Philippines certified that deceased
failure to do so is a bar to her action in court
veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerrilla
● The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule,
7. That after due deliberation Respondent Veterans Back Pay
considering that in its resolution (Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts)
Commission revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens
reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of
are not entitled to back pay;
Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the
8. That on February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission declared that —
Commission, through its Secretary & Chief of Office Staff, made
o "The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are
a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein petitioner
advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by
denying her request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to
the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the
backpay;
court for recourse," (Annex F)
9. That upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the
● Thereby leading Maria Natividad vda. de Tan to conclude that only a
petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan brought the case direct
final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Veterans Back
to this Honorable Court by way of mandamus
Pay Commission.
● RTC: ordered respondent Commission to give due course to the
● Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is, in effect,
claim of herein petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan.
a suit against the government without its consent.
● Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal and it further
● The relief prayed for is simply "the recognition of the rights of the
contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first
petitioner-appellee" under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Republic

12
 Act No, 897, and consists in "directing an agency of the government to ● On February 24, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A 8544,
perform an act . . . it is bound to perform." entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of the Merchant Marine

● Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 necessarily embody state consent to an Profession in the Philippines, otherwise known as the Philippine

action against the officers entrusted with the implementation of said Acts Merchant Marine Officers Act of 1998. It took effect Mar. 25, 1998.

in case of unjustified refusal to recognize the rights of proper applicants. ● RA 8544 provides for, and governs, among others, the examination,
registration and issuance of Certificate of Competency to Merchant
Marine Officers.

 Sec. 2 declares it the policy of the State to institutionalize radical

changes as required by international and national standards to
ensure that only qualified, competent and globally competitive
Marine Deck/Engineer Officers as determined through licensure
examinations shall be allowed entry to the practice of the
Merchant Marine profession

 Sec. 17 provides that to be considered as having passed the

board exam, an average of 70%, with no grade lower than 60%
in any subject must be obtained.

● The law also created the Board of Marine Desk Officers (herein
respondents), which is tasked to administer and enforce rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of the said act.

● On April 25-27, 1998 respondent Board of Marine Deck Officers

BORDALLO v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION conducted the examination for deck officers. 

Topic: Exceptions to the Doctrine of Administrative Remedies ● Petitioner Juan Lorenzo Bordallo took the examination for Chief Mate,

Petitioners: JUAN BORDALLO, RESTITUTO G. DE CASTRO and NOEL G. ● Petitioner Restituto de Castro for Second Mate, and
OLARTE ● Petitioner Noel Olarte for Third Mate. 
Respondents: THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION and ● At that time, the respondent Board of Marine Deck Officers had not
THE BOARD OF MARINE DECK OFFICERS yet issued the syllabi and the rules and regulations pursuant to Republic
FACTS: Act.

13
● The 3 Petitioners received notices from respondent Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC) that they failed in their respective
examinations.
 None obtained a general average of 75% but none of them had a
grade below 60% in any subject as well.
● The 3 Petitioners filed a petition before the Board of Marine Deck
Officers claiming that,
 in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 8544, they should be
considered as having passed the April 1998 Examination for
Deck Officers.
● The Board of Marine Deck Officers denied the petition on the ground
that it is guided by PRC Resolution No. 569, which was issued after the
examinations:
 Admitting that the resolution was issued for the examinations in
July 1998, it applies to the previous examination given in April
which the petitioners took.
 The denial was also premised on the fact that the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Board was not yet
effective during the licensure examinations given in April 1998
and July 1998. The new rating system under the new law was
only implemented in the licensure examinations given in October
1998
● Petitioners filed before the CA a petition for mandamus which the CA
denied because the court said that petitioners should have appealed to
the PRC and not to them.
ISSUE: W/N the resort to mandamus in the CA is proper?
RULING: YES.
14
As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after
exhausting all remedies provided.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but
admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the question is
purely legal, such as the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of
petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners’ cause.
Second, the Court of Appeals held that even if it disregarded the
inappropriateness of Petitioners recourse, the ratings provided for in [Section
17 of] Republic Act 8544 cannot be applied.
According to said court, [t]he approval of the Rules and Regulations
implementing Republic Act 8544 [pursuant to Section 10 (l)] and the requisite
syllabi are conditions sine qua non for the application of Section 17.
As these conditions were not satisfied at the time petitioners took the
examination, they cannot be deemed to have passed the same. The flaw in
both the rulings of the Board of Marine Deck Officers and the Court of
Appeals is that they apply the passing rating decreed by P.D. No. 97 even
when the latter had already lost its effectivity, having been expressly
repealed by Section 38 of R.A. No. 8544, thus:
SEC. 38. Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 97, as amended, and
all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other
administrative issuances and parts thereof which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Upon the effectivity of the repealing statute, R.A. No. 8544, the repealed
statute, P.D. No. 97, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as if it had
never existed. Courts, or administrative agencies for that matter, have no
power to perpetuate a rule of law that the legislature has repealed.[7] The
Board rationalized its application of the 75% passing rating under P.D. No.
97 on the ground that the syllabi[8] of the subjects had not yet been WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and
prepared, adopted and issued and the implementing rules and regulations is GRANTED. Petitioners are held to be qualified as having passed the
had not been promulgated. Board Examination for Marine Deck Officers conducted on April 25-27, 1998.

The Boards predicament is understandable, considering that the law had just SO ORDERED.
taken effect on March 25, 1998 and the examination was scheduled to take
place on April 25, 26 and 27, 1998.

It would appear to us, however, that the solution was to postpone the
examination rather than to apply a law that had already been rendered non-
existent.

Neither is there anything in Section 33 (2), R.A. No. 8544 that justifies the
Boards action.

Said provision simply reads:

SEC. 33. Transitory Provision. The present Boards shall continue to function
in the interim until such time as the new Board shall be duly constituted
pursuant to this Act.

It does not provide for the continued application of Section 9, P.D. No. 97
pending the Boards adoption of the new syllabi and the rules and regulations.
It may be true that R.A. No. 8544, in its intent to raise the standards of the
marine profession, prescribes a scope of examination different from that
provided for under P.D. No. 97 and its implementing rules.

It may also be true that the syllabi and the subsequent examination on April
25-27, 1998 do not conform to the standards laid down by the new law and
its own implementing rules. The examinees, however, had a right to assume
that respondents had performed their functions in accordance with the
applicable law and they should not be prejudiced by the agencies mistakes in
KILUSANG BAYAN VS. DOMINGUEZ
its implementation.
Topic: ADMIN; Exhaustion of Admin Remedies; Exception

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
15
 Petitioners: KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and
MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC., the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract.
(KBMBPM), TERESITA A. FAJARDO, NADYESDA B. PONSONES, MA. FE ● Petitioner Ignacio Bunye sought opinions from both the Commission on
V. BOMBASE, LOIDA D. LUCES, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, AMADO V. Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the
MANUEL, AND ROLANDO G. GARCIA, INCUMBENT MEMBERS OF THE instrument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal
BOARD; AMADO G. PEREZ AND MA. FE V. BOMBASE, INCUMBENT steps be taken towards its rescission.
GENERAL MANAGER AND SECRETARY-TREASURER, RESPECTIVELY
● The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC granted the Municipality authority
Respondents: HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, SECRETARY OF "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation/rescission of the
AGRICULTURE, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION IV OF THE above cited contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO immediate transfer/takeover of the possession, management and operation
CORONADO AND MUNICIPAL MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, BOTH IN HIS of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa."
CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA
● Consequently, upon representations made by Petitioner Ignacio Bunye
AND AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF SANGGUNIANG BAYAN NG
with the Municipal Council, the latter approved a Resolution evading the
MUNTINLUPA AND JOHN DOES
contract.

FACTS:
● The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (Municipality), Metro Manila,
thru its then Mayor, entered into a contract with KBMBPM represented by
its General Manager, for the latter's management and operation of the new
Muntinlupa public market.
● The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of
vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 175 and
Letter of Implementation No. 23.
● Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago
Carlos, Jr., Petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly
scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the
● To implement this resolution, Petitioner Ignacio Bunye together with his co-
petitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine
Constabulary
 proceeded to the public market and announced to the general
public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking
over the management and operation of the facility, and that the
stallholders should thenceforth pay their market fees to the
Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the
KBMBPM.
● The KBMBPM filed with the RTC a complaint for breach of contract,
specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Municipality and its officers.
 The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the
public market effected "in excess of his (Bunye's) alleged

16
 authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a unverified petition; the disbandment of the Board of Directors was
public official." done without authority of law since under Letter of Implementation

● The writ applied for having been denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted No. 23, removal of officers, directors or committee members could

the attempts of Ignacio Bunye and company to complete the take-over; be done only by the majority of the members entitled to vote at an

they continued holding office in the KBS building, under their respective annual or special general assembly and only after an opportunity to

official capacities. The matter having been elevated to this Court by way of be heard at said assembly.

certiorari. We remanded the same to the CA. (b) Respondent Secretary acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and
despotic manner, so patent and gross that it amounted to a grave
● Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
abuse of discretion.
charging herein Petitioner Ignacio Bunye and his co-petitioners with
(c) The Order is a clear violation of the By-Laws of KBMBPM and is
oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-
likewise illegal and unlawful for it allows or tolerates the violation of
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management and
the penal provisions under paragraph (c), Section 9 of P.D. No. 175.
operation of the public market from KBMBPM.
(d) The Order is a clear violation of the constitutional right of the
● In a subpoena, prosecutor Mothalib C. Onos of the Office of the Special
individual petitioners to be heard.
Prosecutor directed Petitioner Ignacio Bunye and his co-petitioners to
● Petitioner Ignacio Bunye pray that upon the filing of the petition,
submit counter-affidavits, affidavits of their witnesses and other supporting
documents.  respondents, their agents, representatives or persons acting on
their behalf be ordered to refrain,
● Two (2) days before the expiration of the period granted to file said
 cease and desist from enforcing and
documents, Petitioner Ignacio Bunye, et al. filed by mail an urgent
 implementing the questioned Order or from excluding the
motion for extension of "at least fifteen (15) days from October 22,
individual petitioners from the exercise of their rights as such
1988" within which to comply with the subpoena.
officers and, in the event that said acts sought to be restrained
● Thereafter, the following transpired which subsequently gave rise to these
were already partially or wholly done,
petitions. (I only included G.R. 85439 kase yun lang nag talk about
 to immediately restore the management and operation of the
exhaustion)
public market to petitioners, order respondents
● Petitioner Ignacio Bunye and co-petitioners filed the petition in this case  to vacate the premises and, thereafter,
alleging, inter alia, that:  preserve the status quo; and that, finally, the challenged Order be
(a) Respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declared null and void.
issuing the Order for he arrogated unto himself a judicial function by
determining the alleged guilt of petitioners on the strength of a mere

17
● Ignacio Bunye, by himself, filed his Comment on 23 January 1989. He
denies the factual allegations in the petition and claims that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  Agriculture; but denying, for having become moot and academic, the prayer
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies can
be disregarded. YES.
RULING:
● As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that
this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
● This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the
courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision
to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had
immediately.
● Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields
to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as
in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary
or oppressive.
● Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Bunye’s takeover of the market was patently beyond the scope of his
authority, thereby illegal.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
18
1. GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 85439; declaring null and void the
challenged Order of 28 October 1988 of the respondent Secretary of
of petitioners that they be restored to their positions in the KBMBPM.
2. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G.R. No. 91927.
7. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES V. CA
Topic: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Petitioners: INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC
Respondents: THE HON CA, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, THE HON GERONIMO VELASCO, in his capacity as
Minister of Energy, and PNB
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies "where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (US v. Western
Pacific Railroad Co.).
FACTS:
● This petition seeks the reversal of the CA decision w/c ruled against the
petitioner
● Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract
for the operation of 2 coal blocks in Eastern Samar by the gov’t thru
Bureau of Energy Development (BED)
● Then Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) applied again for exploration of
additional 3 coal blocks called Giporlos Area
● Later on Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) was advised that the logical
coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corp (MMIC) w/c was already developing the coal deposit in Bagacay
Area and that Bagacay and Giporlos should be awarded to MMIC. (this is
in line w/ the objective of rationalizing the country’s over-all coal supply-
demand balance)
o Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) assigned and transferred to
MMIC all its rights and interests in the 2 coal blocks
● Subsequently, Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI) filed for rescission of
Memorandum of Agreement w/ damages against MMIC & then Minister
of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC, alleging
 that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even
before the MoA was finalized and approved by BED;
 that MMIC discontinued work;
 that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the
adjacent coal blocks and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the
reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI’s loan as
provided in the MoA.
 IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve
the return of the coal contract from MMIC to petitioner, w/ a
written contract saying that it’s valid and effective & to convert
such contract to a development/production or exploitation in IEI’s
favor.
● PNB was later impleaded in an amended complaint when the latter w/
the DBP effected extrajudicial foreclosures on mortgages (Mortgage
Trust Agreement) constituted in its favor by MMIC after the latter
19
defaulted in its obli for P22M. The CA eventually dismissed the case
against PNB.
● Strangely enough, Jesus Cabarrus if the president of both MMIC and
Industrial Enterprises Inc (IEI)
● RTC: ordered rescission, declared the continued efficacy of the coal
contract in favor or IEI, ordered the reversion of 2 coal block covered by
the contract, ordered BED to give due course to IEI’s application for coal
contract & for the 3 more coal blocks
● CA: reversed RTC, held that the rendition of the summary judgment was
not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the
parties, and that RTC had no jurisdiction over the action considering that
under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of coal blocks.
● Hence, this petition
ISSUE: W/N the civil court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for
rescission of the MoA concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks
– NO. BED has jurisdiction.
RULING:
1. While the action filed by IEI was for rescission, its cause of action
was not merely the rescission but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks.
2. BED, as successor to the Energy Development Board, is tasked w/
the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national
program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and
extraction of fossil fuels
3. Accdg to PD 972 and PD 1206, the jurisdiction of the BED, to pass
upon any question involving the MoA between EIE and MMIC,
should be sustained.
 4. It’s been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary \\\
jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies.

5. if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,

specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.

6. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in NOTES: PD 972 & PD 1206 (up to you guys if gusto nyo pa print)
this case since the question of what coal areas should be
The pertinent sections of P.D. No. 1206 provide:
exploited and developed and which entity should be granted
"Sec. 6. Bureau of Energy Development. There is created in the Department
coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
a Bureau of Energy Development, hereinafter referred to in this Section as
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in
the Bureau, which shall have the following powers and functions, among
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter.
others:
7. The trial court does not have the competence to decide matters
"a. Administer a national program for the encouragement, guidance, and
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,
whenever necessary, regulation of such business activity relative to the
development and extraction of mineral resources like coal.
exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of fossil fuels such as
8. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does
petroleum, coal, . .
not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be
"The decisions, orders, resolutions or actions of the Bureau may be appealed
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED
to the Secretary whose decisions are final and executory unless appealed to
are threshed out and determined.
the President. (Emphasis upplied.)

That law further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct Energy
With the foregoing conclusion arrived at, the question as to the propriety of
Development Board relative to the implementation of P.D. No. 972 on coal
the summary judgment rendered by the Trial Court becomes unnecessary to
exploration and development have been transferred to the BED, provided
resolve. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition. No costs.
that coal operating contracts including the transfer or assignment of interest
SO ORDERED.
in said contracts, shall require the approval of the Secretary (Minister) of
Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).

20
"Sec. 12. . . . the powers and functions transferred to the Bureau of Energy
Development are:

xxx xxx xxx

"ii. The following powers and functions of the Energy Development Board
under PD No. 910 . . .=

"(1) Undertake by itself or through other arrangements, such as service

contracts, the active exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of
energy resources . . .

(2) Regulate all activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,

development, and extraction of fossil and nuclear fuels . . . (P.D. No. 1206) ROXAS v. CA

(Emphasis supplied.) Topic: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

P.D. No. 972 also provides: Petitioner: ROXAS & CO., INC.

"Sec. 8. Each coal operating contract herein authorized shall . . . be executed
by the Energy Development Board.
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to

arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving
applications for conversion of lands is the DAR.

FACTS:

● Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and the registered owner of three
haciendas in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.

 Haciendas Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway

● Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian

21
 Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. ● DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether

● Before the law's effectivity, Roxas & Co with DAR a voluntary offer to the property was subject to agrarian reform.

sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway  Hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the

● Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.

acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. ● Roxas filed with the Court of Appeals

 DAR Regional Director requested LBP Land Valuation  questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL
Manager to open a trust account in favor of Roxas, representing and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its
the valuation of Hacienda Palico landholdings.

 LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and ● Roxas’ petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as  Found that Roxas failed to exhaust administrative remedies
compensation for Roxas' land in Hacienda Banilad
● Roxas moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
● Roxas applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and
● Hence, this recourse.
Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands
ISSUE:
● However, DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas
1. W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite Roxas’ failure
 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’S) were
to exhaust administrative remedies – YES.
distributed to farmer beneficiaries
2. Assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-
● Roxas sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR, withdrawing its Voluntary
agricultural, W/N this Court has the power to rule on this issue – NO.
Offer to Sell (VOS) of Hacienda Caylaway.
RULING:
 informed DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
1. Roxas rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses
violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies
● DAR Secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of the VOS
before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
● Roxas instituted Case with DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), praying
● There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to immediately.
for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by DAR
Among these exceptions are: (5) when the respondent acted in disregard
 alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu had been declared a of due process
tourist zone, thus, not suitable for agricultural production
 DAR's opening of trust account deposits in Roxas’ name with the
 alleged that Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the LBP does not constitute payment under the law.
lands to non-agricultural
22
  Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to
farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on
the part of Roxas.
3. DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of Roxas'
landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate
over his application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to
non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or
disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.
● At the time Roxas filed its application for conversion, the Rules of
Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land
use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2
 Under this A.O., applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares
are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
 The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The
Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be
appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals
● doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
 DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter.
 The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage
of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
23
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nulli ed for respondent DAR's
failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set
forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and
determination of petitioner's application for conversion.
PIMENTEL JR. v. SENATE COMMITTEE
Topic: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction; Inapplicability of the doctrine
Petitioners: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P.
ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN
PETER S. CAYETANO
Respondents: SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by
SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FACTS:
● Senator Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng
Bayan, Bantayan!”
 Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion
in the 2008 General Appropriations Act particularly the P200
million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos
P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to
Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW),
 and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5
road including ROW.
 Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya,
Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on
account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further
stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the
double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
● Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706
 directing the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate
the conduct of Senate President Villar for using his position of
power to influence public officials in relocating the C-5 road
extension project to deliberately pass thru his properties, and to
negotiate the overpriced purchase of road rights of way thru
several properties also owned by his corporations redounding in
huge personal financial benefits for him to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
 Members of the Committee: Pia Cayetano (Chairperson), Loren
Legarda, Joker Arroyo, Alan Peter Cayetano, Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, Gregorio Honasan, Panfilo Lacson (members)
● Nov 17, 2008: Juan Ponce Enrile was elected Senate President.
 The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of
Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon,
Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members
for the Majority.
● Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member
from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.
● Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
fairness on Senator Villar's case, Senator Lacson moved that the
24
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate,
acting as a Committee of the Whole.
● Petitioner Senators (Pimentel, Villar, Arroyo, Pangilinan, Pia & Alan
Cayetano) objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole and questioned the
determination of the quorum.
 Petitioners proposed 11 amendments; 3 were adopted.
 Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed
amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
● Respondent Senate Committee proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry
on P.S. Resolution 706 and subsequently declared that there was
substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing.
MAIN ISSUE: W/N the petition is premature for failure to observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort.
RULING: No. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in this case.
1. The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which
means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
2. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of the court.
3. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of respondent for their resolution.
 o The issues here are purely legal questions which are within the
competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an
administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.
4. Doctrine: "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is
a duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would
be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look
behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."
o The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal
issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the
doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution
of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint
by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the
Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
SO ORDERED.
Other issues (if she asks):
1. Indispensable party
● An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest
in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of
the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
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injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between
them.
● Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before
the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the
outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues
in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of
the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without
affecting Senator Madrigal's interest. The nature of Senator
Madrigal's interest in this case is not of the nature that this case
could not be resolved without her participation.
2. Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee on the Whole
● The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating
to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and
reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges." However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name
its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation.
3. Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate
Committee of the Whole
● the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that
does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. In the same
manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right
to due process.
 ● The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of
proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court.

● The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own

rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when
required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court
will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

4. Prior Publication

● The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of

the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that
affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for
their publication before the rules can take effect.

● In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the

Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings
involve the Senate's exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
are internal to the Senate.

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